ML20028A414
| ML20028A414 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Brunswick  |
| Issue date: | 11/16/1982 |
| From: | Zimmerman S CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| To: | Vassallo D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| REF-GTECI-A-36, REF-GTECI-SF, RTR-NUREG-0612, RTR-NUREG-612, TASK-A-36, TASK-OR NUDOCS 8211220101 | |
| Download: ML20028A414 (50) | |
Text
I s
~. ,
l CD&L Carolina Power & Light Campany NOV 161982 Of fice of Nuclear Reactor Regulation ATTN: Mr. D. B. Vassallo, 011ef Operating Reactora Branch No. 2 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT, UNIT NOS.1 AND 2 DOCKER NOS. 50-325 AND 50-324 LICENSE NOS. DPR-71 AND DPR-62 CONTROL OF HEAVY IDADS
Dear Mr. Vassallo:
By letter dated December 22, 1980, NRC requested that Carolina Power
& Light Company (CP&L) provide information regarding control of heavy loads at nuclear power plants. Our June 22, 1981 letter provided the Part I report which addresses the general requirements for overhead-handling systems. The attached information is provided to supplenent that response f or the Brunswick Steam Electric Plant Unit Nos. I and 2.
You will find enclosed a copy of the Part II report f or Brunswick Units 1 and 2. The Part II report addresses the specific requirements for overhead-handling systems identified in Sections 2.2 and 2.3 of Enclosure 3 to your December 22, 1980 letter. Also enclosed is Revision 1 to the Part I report which supersedes the Part I report previously submitted by our letter of June 22, 1981.
If you have any questions regarding this information, please contact my staff.
Yours very truly,
-h
! S. R. Zimmerman Manager Licensing & Permits SRZ/pgp (402C5T1) q l
Enclosure 3 cc: Mr. T. Hof kin (Westec Services , Inc. )
Mr. D. O. Myers ( NRC-BSEP) l i Mr. J. P. O' Reilly (NRC-RII)
Mr. I. H. Sargent (Franklin Lesearch)
Mr. J. A. Van Vliet (NRC) 8211220101 821116 PDR ADOCK 05000324 P PDR l 411 Fayetteville Street
- P. O Box 1551 e Raleigh. N. C. 27602 l p , :rn n.m,mn c =ga . :re:~2- .
- Q
I s
CAROLINA POWER & LIGHI COMPANY BRUNSWICK
^
STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT UNITS 1 & 2
) CONTROL OF HEAVY LOADS RESPONSE TO REQUEST BY j NRC FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 1
PART I i
k Revision 1 i
i I
e I
l J
]
9 4
l i
y-3p m-. --t--.-. w-mmw.e-p_-m-y&-y-gi9,e-.m,.w-w-yreg, -- ._y9p .
w
_a,, -%... ,emesee--- ' - - -*
~
PART I RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON
" CONTROL OF HEAVY LOADS" The following report constitutes CP&L's response to the NRC regarding their request for additional information on " Control of Heavy Loads",
As requested in the December 22, 1980 NRC letter; Part I, answers those questions identified in Section 2.1, " General Requirements for Overhead Handling Systems" of Enclosure 3.
2.1 General Requirements for Overhead Handling Systems Request 2.1 (1)
" Report the results of your review of plant arrangements to identify all overhead-handling systems from which a load drop may result in damage to any system required for plant shutdown or decay heat removal (taking no credit for any interlocks, technical specifications, operating procedures, or detailed structural analysis)."
Response to 2.1 (1)
The overhead-handling systems identified during our plant review are listed by building below.
Reactor Building Cranes '
Reactor Building Crane - 125-ton whiting overhead traveling bridge with 5-ton Auxiliary Hook Refueling Platform - Stearns-Rogers Refueling Jib Crane 1,000 lbs. @ 15'r Monorails / Hoists MR-2 10-ton Hand-Operated Chain Hoist MR-4 10-ton Hand-Operated Chain Hoist MR-7 10-ton Monorail 12-ton Electric Hoist and Trolley for HPCI Pump and Turbine (Hoist is down-graded to monorail capacity.)
MR-10 5-ton Hand-Operated Chain Hoist MR-11 5-ton Hand-0perated Chain Hoist MR-12 5-ton Hand-Operated Chain Hoist MR-13 5-ton Hand-Operated Chain Hoist MR-20 20-ton Hand-Operated Chain Hoist MR-21 20-ton Hand-Operated Chain Hoist NOTE: The Hand-Operated hoists are removed during plant operation -
only installed during required maintenance periods.
Diesel Generator Building Cranes 5-ton Single Bridge Crane Hand-Operated D/G (1) 5-ton Single Bridge Crane Hand-Operated D/G (2) 5-ton Single Bridge Crane Hand-Operated D/G (3) 5-ton Single Bridge Crane Hand-Operated D/G (4)
Intake Structure Intake Structure Crane ton P&H traveling gantry Request 2.1 (2)
" Justify the exclusion of any overhead-handling system from the above category by verifying that there is sufficient physical separation from any load-impact point and any safety-related component to permit a determination by inepection that no heavy load drop can result in damage to any system or component required for plant shutdown or decay heat removal."
Response 2.1 (2)
Reactor Building Channel-Handling Boom 80-lb. Capacity Hand-Operated Chain Hoist and Trolley The channel-handling boom has been excluded since it is not capable of handling a heavy load.
Monorails / Hoists
- MR-1 2-ton Hand-Operated Chain Hoist for Vacuum Breakers MR-3 2-ton Hand-Operated Chain Hoist for RCIC Pump & Turbine MR-5 5-ton Hand-Operated Chain Hoist for CRD Pump A MR-6 5-ton Hand-Operated Chain Hoist for CRD Pump B MR-8 10-ton Hand-Operated Chain Hoist for Valve Removal MR-9 10-ton Electric Motor Hoist & Trolley for Steam & F. W. Valves MR-14 1.0-ton Electric Motor Hoist & Trolley for Contaminated Equipment Room MR-15 2-ton Hand-Operated Chain Hoist for Gamma Scan Lead Plug MR-16 5-ton Electric Motor Hoist & Trolley for Access Covers MR-17 2-to n Hand-Operated Chain Hoist for Removable Platform MR-18 1-ton Hand-Operated Chain Hoist for Neutron Monitoring Equipment MR-19 10-ton Hand-Operated Hoist for Hatch Covers
( 3) ST-4 2-ton Hand Operated Chain H0ist & Davit for Relief Valves (Unit 2 Only)
CRD 1-1/2-ton Electric Motor Hoist & Trolley Rebuild Hoist
The above Soists are either removed, physically secured during nonuse periods, ce do not carry heavy loads.
A physical inspection confirmed that no safe shutdown or decay heat removal components are adjacent to the monorails or davit arm-load paths; therefore, no safe shutdown or decay heat removal component could be damaged by a heavy load drop.
Turbine Building Cranes Turbine Building Crane - 188-ton Whiting Overhead Traveling Bridge with 25-ton box Auxiliary Hook Auxiliary Bay Crane - 100-ton Whiting Semi Gantry with 5-ton Auxiliary Hook Mon arails/ Hoists d-ton Hand-Operated Chain Hoist for Recirculation Pump M. G/ Set "A" 8-ton Hand-Operated Chain Hoist for Recirculation Pump M. G. Set "B" 5-ton Hand Operated Chain Hoist for Condensate Booster Pumps 1-ton Hand-Operated Chain Hoist for Air Compressor The above cranes and hoists have been excluded from Item 2.1 (1) since no system or component required for plant shutdown or decay removal is located in the Turbine Building.
Diesel Generator Building Cranes Monorail / Hoist ton hand-operated chain hoist for switchgear has been excluded since it does not handle heavy loads.
Stackhouse Filter Monorail Hoist The five-ton electric hoist used at the stackhouse filter is over 200 feet from any safety-related system or component and, therefore, has been excluded from consideration as a hazard with regard to handling loads near safety-related systems and components.
Intake Structure Monorails / Hoists
- 2-2-ten Monorails for Se rvice Water Strainers & Miscellaneous Equipment Servicing
- 2-2-ton Monorails for Miscellaneous Equipment Servicing
- (Hoists removed during plant operations - only installed during required maintenance periods.)
These hoists have been excluded since they do not carry heavy loads.
J Radwaste Building Monorails / Hoists MR-1 4-to n Deleted MR-2 12-ton Electric Motor Hoist & Trolley for Filter Demineralizer )
Tank i MR-3 8-ton Electric Motor Hoist & Trolley for Fuel Pool Filter and Waste Collector Filter MR-4 12-ton Electric Motor Hoist & Trolley for filter Demineralizer Tank MR-5 8-ton Electric Motor Hoist & Trolley for Filter Demineralizer Tank MR-6 1-1/2-ton Hand-Operated Chain Hoist for Centrifuge MR-7 2-ton Hand-Operated Chain Hoist for Centrifuge MR-8 3/4-ton Hand-Operated Chain Hoist for HVAC Equipment The radwaste monorails / hoists are not included in Item 2.1 (1), above, since they are completely separate from the area of safe shutdown or decay heat removal systems and/or components. The separation is established by concrete walls as well as distance.
Shop Cranes and Miscellaneous Hoists Cranes 5-ton Hot Machine Shop Crane 5-ton Clean Machine Shop Crane Monorails / Hoists 2-ton Hand-Operated Chain Holst for Pumps and Valves 1-ton Hand-Operated Chain Hoist for HVAC Equipment 5-ton Hand-Operated Chain Hoist for A0G Equipment The above cranes and hoists have been excluded from Item 2.1 (1), above, since no system or component required for plant shutdown or decay heat removal is located in the shop or other areas where the hoists are located.
Request: 2.1 (3)
"With respect to the design and operation of heavy load-handling systems in the containment and the spent fuel pool area and those load-bearing systems identified in 2.1-1 above, provide your evaluation concerning compliance with the guidelines of NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.1.
The following specific information should be included in your reply".
Reponse to 2.1 (3) Summary Our review of NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.1, indicates that BSEP is substantially in compliance. There are several minor points of exception or deviation. These points are commented on below:
- 1. Section 5.1.1 (1) of NUREG-0612, Safe Load Paths, requires that load paths should be " clearly marked on the floor in the area where the load is to be handled".
.i
Comment Safe load paths have been defined on the drawings referenced in Response 2.1 (3)a. Loads are moved by the safest and shortest paths in accordance with the above drawings and written procedures. Due to the number of paths and their configurations, it is felt that marked load paths could possibly cause confusion and therefore not contribute to assuring the safe handling of loads.
- 2. Section 5.1.1 (4) requires that "special lifting devices ,
should satisfy the guidelines of ANSI N14.6-1978 ' Standard for Special Devices for Shipping Containers Weighing 10,000 Pounds (4,500 kg) or More for Nuclear Materials'.
This standard should apply to all special lif ting devices which carry heavy loads in areas as defined above".
Comment The lifting devices identified in Table 3-1 are designed t
in accordance with accepted industry standards and good engineering practices. ANSI N14.6-1978 was not in existence during Brunswick Steam Electric Plant design. Further discussion regarding adequacy of design is located in Response 2.1 (3)d.
- 3. Section 5.1.1 (5) requires that "lif ting devices not, specially designed should be installed and used in accordance with the guidelines of ANSI B30.9-1971 ' Slings'" and that "in selecting the pr'oper sling the load used should be the sum of the static and maximum dynamic load".
Comment Non "Special" lif ting devices such as slings, shackles and fittings are in compliance to ANSI B30.9-1971 or other applicable standards such as Federal Specification RR-C-271 for shackles; however, components were sized using only static load. Additional comments regarding design adequacy are located in Response 2.1 (3)d.
Request: 2.1 (3)a
" Drawings or sketches suf ficient to clearly identify the location of safe load paths, spent fuel and safety-related equipment".
Response to 2.1 (3)a The following drawings identify safe load paths for loads identified i in Response 2.1 (1) above. A copy of each drawing is attached to
- this report.
l 81020-M-001 Safe Load Paths SH.1, SH.2, & SH.3 Reactor Building Elevation 117'-4" I 81020-M-002 Safe Load Paths SH. 1 & SH 2 Diesel Generator Building 81020-M-003 Safe Load Paths
. Intake Structure
81020-M-004 Safe Load Pathe Reactor Building Elevation 50'-0" 81020-M-005 Safe Load Paths ,
Reactor Building Elevation 20'-0" 81020-M-006 Safe Load Paths Reactor tailding Elevation 17'-0" Request: 2.1 (3)b "A discussion of measures taken to ensure that load-handling operations remain within safe load paths, including procedures, if any, for deviation from these paths".
Response to 2.1 (3)b The safe load paths indicated on the drawings listed in Response 2.1 (3)a above are referenced in various plant operating procedures. These procedures are identified in the tabulation of heavy loads which is Table 3-1. The procedures refer maintenance and operations personnel to the applicable load path dr. awing. The load paths follow the safest and shortest routes with consideration given to going around fuel and safety-related equipment. In addition, reference to safe load paths is made in Procedure MP-6 " Operation and Inspection of Cranes and Material-Handling Equipment". During crane operator training and requalification, crane operators are instructed regarding these load paths. The work is performed in accordance with the written approved procedures by experienced personnel and supervised by competent foremen. Prior to initiating the work activities in the procedure, the foreman critiques the procedure with his men to assure each one knows the correct methods to be followed. Electrical interlocks, as well as written instructions in the plant procedures, prevent loads from being handled over the spent fuel and reactor except during specific operations.
To summarize, loads are handled along established safe load paths under the control of qualified and experienced personnel in accordance with written and approved procedures.
Request 2.1 (3) e "A tabulation of heavy loads to be handled by each crane which includes the load identification, load weight, its designated lifting device, and verification that the handling of such a load is governed by a written procedure containing as a minimum the information identified in NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.1 (2) ."
Response to 2.1 (3) c Revised Table 3-1 provides a tabulation by crane / load-handling system of the heavy loads normally handled. Included in the table are load weights, designated lif ting devices, and reference to procedures which govern the activities being performed. The procedures generally include sections for purpose, responsibility, precautions, special equipment and descrip-tions, references, and step-by-s tep ins tructions. The procec'ures in use at Brunswick Units L and 2 meet the intent of NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.1 (2).
Request: 2.1 (3)d
Verification that lif ting devices identified in 2.1.3-C above comply with the requirements of ANSI N14.6-1978 or ANSI B30.9-1971 as appropriate. For lif ting devices where these standards as supplemented by NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.1 (4) or 5.1.1 (5) are not met, describe any proposed alternatives, and demonstrate their equivalency in terms of load-handling reliability' .
Response to 2.1 (3)d The " cask redundant lifting yoke" and the work basket redundant lifting rig are of redundant design, and the crane on which they are used is single - failure-proof. Therefore, a load drop with regard to equipment handled by the above systems is not considered credible.
Load-handling devices at BSEP , identified in Table 3-1 (other than those discussed above) were designed in accordance with accepted industry standards and good engineering practices.
Our preliminary review indicated that "Special" lif ting devices were designed for a minimum safety factor of 3 based on yield strength, considering only static load. Dynamic loading that could be imparted on the handling devices is considered to be negligible.
The two (2) cranes which handle the special lifting devices have hook speeds of 3 FPM for Reactor Building Crane and 13 FPM for the Intake Structure Crane. If a dynamic load factor of .5% of static load for each foot per minute of hook speed is considered (per CMAA - Spec. 70) the percentage of static load for dynamic loading is 1.5% for the Reactor Building Crane and 6.5% for the Intake Structure Crane. Design criteria has been confirmed for the special lifting devices and is included below:
Special Lifting Devices Adapter Link
- Head Strongback
- Dryer Separator Sling
- Stud Tensioner Frame Spent Fuel Cask Yoke (Redundant)
Shielded Personnel Work Basket Lif ting Apparatus (Redundant)
Stud Handling Tool General Purpose Grapple
!
- Invessel Service Platform Strongback l
Circulating Water Traveling Screen Strongback The special lif ting devices listed above have been designed with a minimum safety factor of 4.5 based on yield strength or 6 based on ultimate strength. A single failure analysis for each of the special lif ting devices marked with an asterisk determined that a failure of a single lif ting attachment would not result in a load drop. Failure of a single lif ting attachment would result in an approximate 35% reduction of the safety factor which CP&L considers to be acceptable. Should a f ailure occur, the af fected equipment would be safely set down and repaired and reinspected prior to continuing the work effort. Table 3-2 provides the results of our analyses regarding safety factors. The other special lif ting devices (excluding the ones that are redundant) do not handle heavy loads near irradiated fuel or safe shutdown equipment or do not handle heavy loads. Since the special lifting devices are considered to be adequate, nodifications to accommodate increased re-quirements of current standards are not planned.
"Non-special" lifting apparatus such as slings, shackles, and fittings are sized to maintain a minimum safety factor of 5, based on ultimate strength and considering only static load.
Slings and Standard Lifting Equipment All slings, shackles, and standard lif ting apparatus, such as eye bolts and turnbuckles, conform to the requirements of ANSI B30.9 and/or other federal standards as may be appropriate. A safety factor of 5 is the minimum allowed; and in many circumstances, a greater safety factor is maintained to provide additional safety margins. Section 2.2 of our Part II report identifies these increased factors.
In addition, as a result of our review of load configurations, several rigging arrangements have been modified to provide greater reliability and to allow for the possibility of a single attachment point failure without a resultant load drop.
Lif ting devices are inspecthd and maintained in accordance with the requirements of ANSI B30.9, B30.10, and N14.6. The existing BSEP inspection, testing and maintenance procedures are considered an extremely important segment for assuring safe load-handling operations.
Request: 2.1 (3)e
" Verification that ANSI B30.2-1976, Chapter 2-2, has been invoked with respect to crane inspection, testing, and maintenance. Where any exception is taken to this standard, sufficient information should be provided to demonstrate the equivalency of proposed alte'rnatives".
Response to 2.1 (3)e The crane inspection, testing, and maintenance program at BSEP is in conformance with ANSI B.30.2-1976, Chapter 2-2 and the Occupational Safety and Health Standards, Section 179,29CFR, Part 1910. Various '
written procedures are in ef fect which implement the requirements of the above standard and regulation. These procedures are reviewed during crane operator training to familiarize the operators with these requirements. Maintenance personnel responsible for performing inspection, testing and maintenance are qualified and experienced with regard to the above standards.
a i
,,.-m_- +-w <w- .-y-
l
)
Request: 2.1 (3)f Verify that crane design complies with the guidelines of CMAA Specifica-tion 70 and Chapter 2-1 of ANSI B30.2-1976, including the demonstration of equivalency of actual design requirements for instances where specific compliance with these standards is not provided.
Response to 2.1 (3)f All of the cranes and hoists used at the BSEP except the refueling
, bridge were purchased in accordance with UE&C specifications as discussed below:
- l. The Reactor Building crane is of single-failure-proof design. Details of the crane were provided to the NRC by letter on June 18, 1976 and July 26, 1976.
The Reactor Building overhead cranes were purchased in accordance with United Engineers and Constructors, Inc.,
Specification No. 9527-01-257-2. The Specification requires that these " cranes shall conform to the latest editions of CMAA, Specification No. 70 for Electric Overhead Traveling Cranes and ANSI B30.2 for Overhead and Gantry Cranes unless otherwise specified or noted".
- 2. The Intake Structure crane was purchased in accordance with United Engineers and Constructors, Inc., Specification No. 9527-01-257-10. The Specification requires that
" cranes furnished under this specification shall conform to the requirements of American National Standard Safety Code for Overhead Gantry Cranes, ANSI B30.2 and the Crane -
Manufacturers Association of America, Inc., Specifications for Electric Overhead Traveling Cranes, CMAA Specification No. 70".
- 3. The Refueling Jib Crane was purchased in accordance with United Engineers & Constructors, Inc., Specification No. 9527-01-257-6. The Specification required that the
" jib crane shall conform to applicable portions of the following codes" AISC, NFPA, NEMA, ASA-Safety Codes for i
Cranes, Derricks and Hoists, AWS, SSPC, ASTM, and ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code.Section VIII, Division 1, and that the hoist shall be designed to the requirements of NEMA and NEC as they apply to a hoist. The jib crane and its components were designed to withstand seismic events (while fully loaded) to the extent that a static
. loading of 1.0g applied in the direction of least resistance l to that loading will not cause any part of the unit to be overstressed and also will not result in a loss of control of load.
4
- 4. The remainder of cranes and hoists identified in Response 2.1 (1) above except the refueling bridge were purchased in accordance with United Engineers & Constructors, Inc.,
Specification No. 9527-01-257-5. The Specification requires that the hoists and cranes "shall be furnished and designed in accordance with the Occupational Safety and Health Administration Standard 29CFR which includes ANSI B30.2-1967. Overhead and Gantry Cranes and electrical equipment shall conform with the National Electric Code". Welding procedures and personnel qualification are required to be in conformance with AWS D14.1.
In addition, the equipment was specified to be designed such that "all equipment shall be secured in such a manner as not to fall durinr. a seismic reaction while in an unloaded condition", and that 90% of the yield stress shall not be exceeded. Seismic coefficients for vertical and horizontal were specified in the equipment list ranging from .24g to .50g.
Request: 2.1 (3)g Exceptions, if any, taken to ANSI B30.2-1976 with respect to operator training, qualification and conduct.
Response to 2.1 (3)g All crane operators are trained in accordance with the requirements of ANSI B30.2-1976. No exceptions are taken.
Crane operators are required to receive classroom instruction and gain practical operating experience under the direction of other qualified operators for each crane on which they are to become qualified. In addition to a physical examination by a medical doctor, each operator trainee must pass a written examination.
Crane operators are required to requalify annually. The crane operator training program plays an important par.t in assuring safe handling of loads at BSEP and therefore is carefully administered by th,e maintenance supervisor or his designee.
i i
i -
2 .
CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY 1
4 i
BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT UNITS 1 & 2 ,
i t
i l
i
! CONTROL OF HEAVY IDADS l PART II i
1 i
i 1
Response to NRC Request for Additional Information i
l s
I; I
I I
i i
4 I
l a
i i
p.
PART II
SUMMARY
A thorough review of loads and load configurations has been performed for Brunswick Units 1 and 2 and the results included in this report. It is the opinion of CP&L that BSEP Units 1 and 2 meet the intent of NUREG-0612.
The ultimate safety factor for assuring the safe handling of heavy loads (regardless of additional safety factors that may be imposed on lif ting equipment) remains with our efforts to employ competent, careful, and well-trained personnel. The crane operator training program at BSEP has been designed to provide the crane operators and personnel responsible for handling heavy loads with a thorough understanding of proper crane operation and rigging techniques. Additionally, the inspection testing and maintenance of load-handling systems and rigging apparatus combines with the proper training of personnel to assure the continued safe handling of heavy loads.
Although the lif ting devices that have been identified do not meet every criteria within NUREG-0612, we believe the intent has been met.
CP&L takes exception to the application of increased standards that have been imposed on special lif ting equipment. As discussed previously, the special lif ting equipment was designed with minimum safety factors of 4.5 or 6 based on yield or ultimate strength when considering static and dynamic loading. When considering a single failure condition, the minimum safety factor is 2.5 for yield and 3.8 for ultimate. Since we have placed emphasis on inspection of our lif ting equipment annually and prior to each use, we feel these reduced safety factors when considering dynamic loading, provide an acceptable margin of safety. For equipment that is handled by standard lif ting equipment, safety factors will be increased when it is considered necessary to maintain a greater margin of safety to ensure maximum load-handling reliability as described herein.
SECTION 2.2 " SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS FOR OVERHEAD HANDLING SYSTEMS OPERATING IN THE REACTOR BUILDING" NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.4, provides guidelines concerning the design and operation of load-handling systems in the vicinity of spent fuel in the reactor vessel or in storage. Information provided in response to this section should demonstrate that adequate measures have been taken to ensure that, in this area, either the likelihood of a load drop which might damage spent fuel is extremely small or that the estimated consequences of such a drop will not exceed the limits set by the evaluation criteria of NUREG-0612, Section 5.1, Criteria I through III.
Request 2.2 (1)
" Identify by name, type, capacity, and equipment designator, any cranes physically capable (f.e. , ignoring interlocks, movable mechanical stops, or operating procedures) of carrying loads over spent fuel in the storage pool or in the reactor vessel."
Request 2.2 (2)
" Justify the exclusion of any cranes in this area from the above category by verifying that they are incapable of carrying heavy loads or are permanently prevented from movement of heavy loads over stored fuel or into any location where, following any failure, such load may drop into the reactor vessel or spent fuel storage pool."
Request 2.2 (3)
" Identify any cranes listed in 2.2 (1), above, which you have evaluated as having sufficient delign features to make the likelihood of a load drop extremely small for all loads to be carried and the basis for this -
evaluation (i.e. , complete compliance with NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.6, or partial compliance supplemented by suitable alternative or additional design features) . For each crane so evaluated, provide the load-handling system (i.e. , crane load combination) information specified in Attach-ment 1".
Response to 2.2 (1), (2), and (3)
Exclusion Crane Manufacturer Type Capacity Basis Reactor Building Crane Whiting Overhead Bridge 125 tons 3,4 Refueling Jib Crane Yale Eaton Jib 1,000 lbs. 1
@ 15' R Channel-Handling Boom N/A Davit Arm 80 lbs. 1 Refueling Platform Stearns- Bridge 1,700 lbs. 1 Rodgers MR-16 N/A Monorail (E) 10 tons 1,2 MR-17 N/A Monorail (H.O.) 2 tons 1,2 Exclusion Basis:
- 1. load-handling system does not carry heavy loads
- 2. physical separation
- 3. single failure proof
- 4. interlocks prevent crane from carrying heavy loads over spent fuel storage pool (E) electric (H.O.) hand-operated
Response to 2.2 (1), (2), and (3), Continued The reactor building crane, identified above as being single failure proof, has been discussed with the NRC previously in the following correspondence:
g July 26, 1976 to Mr. Bernard C. Rusche from Mr. J. A. Jones
Subject:
Brunswick Steam Electric Plant Units 1 & 2 Dockets 50-324 and 50-325 - Reactor Building June 18, 1976 to Mr. Bernard C. Rusche from Mr. J. A. Jones Subj ect: Brunswick Steam Electric Plant Units 1 & 2 Dockets 50-324 and 50-325 - Reactor Building Crane Table 3-1, " Tabulation of Heavy Loads" identifies the crane-load com-binations and lif ting devices associated with the Reactor Building Crane. During investigation of load-handling operations at BSEP Units 1 &
2, several load-handling configurations were noted that required im-provement of sling sizing and configuration. The following discussion provideo the evaluation for each lif ting device and identifies the lif ting devices that will be upgraded to provide greater safety factors and/or single attachnent point failure protection. Revisions to the lif ting devices will be completed as described below:
Adapter Link - When the Reactor Building Crane was upgraded to be a single failure crane it was necessary to design an adapter link to fit between the redundant crane hook and the following special lifting devices:
(2) head strongback, (b) moisture separator and steam tryer sling, and (c) in-vessel service platform strongback to accommodate attachment. The adapter link has a minimum safety factor of 6.0 based on yield strength and 10.1 based on ultimate when considering a maximum load di 141,000 lbs.
(R.V., head and adapter link) and a 1.5% impact load.
Access Plugs / Shielding - The current lifting apparatus, consisting c: -
2-8 parts, 7/8" diameter, IWRC wire rope slings, provides a safety f actor of 5 and utilizes a generally accepted rigging configuration.
However, the method of attachment does not allow for a failure of one lifting attachment; therefore, a four- (4) leg, matched sling assembly consisting of four (4) minimum 2-1/4" diameter, 6 x 37 extra improved plow steel IWRC slings will replace the existing lifting apparatus. This provides a safety factor of 8.7 and allows for the unlikely failure of one (1) attachment point. A single lif t point failure will result in a shifting of the load to two (2) points and a reduction of the sling safety factor to 4.3. The new sling assembly should be in service by July,1933.
Stud Tensioners - The stud tensioners are handled by a structural frame and slings. The frame has a minimum safety factor of 5.3 based on yield and 9.6 based on ultimate and connects to the Reactor Building Crane Sister Hook with 2-3" diameter pins. Each of the four tensioners are connected to the frame with a 1/2" diameter IWRC sling. Considering the 1300 lb tensioner weight when compared to the rated capacity of a 1/2" diameter sling, the safety factor becomes 14.7. The 1/2" diameter sling is currently connected to the tensioner frame and spreader assembly with a 1/2" diameter 316SS bolt at each end. However, to improve the safety factor (SF) and eliminate bolt thread cutting action on the sling the 1/2" diameter 316SS bolts are being replaced with 1/2" diameter "round pin" shackle pins and locking pin. The shackle pins provide a SF of 10.9 based on ultimate strength. (Refer to Table 3-2, page 3 of 3).
Spent Fuel Cask Redundant Yoke - The spent fuel cask redundant yoke complies with the requirements of NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.6, and ANSI N14.6-1978.
Shielded Personnel Work Basket - This lif ting apparatus is redundant. I Failure of a single load path would result in transfer to the redundant path and not in a load drop.
Head Strongback - The head strongback is utilized to carry the R.V.
Head, Drywell Head and the R.V. Insulation. The connection of the strongback to the Reactor Building Crane is accomplished with 2 pins.
Connection to the lif ted equipment is made with 4 turnbuckle and clevis pin assemblies. Should a failure of a single attachment point occur, the load would be transfarred to either the remaining pin or to two (2) turnbuckles and reduce the design safety factor by 50%, which is con-sidered to be adequate. See Table 3.2.
Debris Cask Lif ting Apparatus - Currently utilizes a redundant sling arrangement consisting of 4 legs. Each leg is comprised of 3/4" dia-meter, 6 x 19 IWRC improved plow s teel wire rope. In order to provide greater reliability in the event of a single lift point failure, the sling sizing will be upgraded to 1-1/8", which will provide a safety factor greater than 5 for two lif t points. This upgrade should be completed by July, 1983.
Head Stud Rack Sling Assembly - Is a four- (4) leg sling assembly with .
each leg consisting of 3/8" diameter, 6 x 19 IWRC wire rope. The safety f actor is greater than 10, and a single attachment point failure will not result in a load drop.
Cattle Chute Lif ting Apparatus - Utilizes a four- (4) point lif ting arrangement consisting of 4 slings and a spreader frame and four (4) slings suspended from the spreader frame. The sling arrangement con-sists of 3/4" diameter, 6 x 19 IWRC wire rope. The arrangement provides j a safety factor of 7. Failure of a single attachment point would not result in a load drop. The safety factor of 7 would be reduced to 3.5 since the load would be transferred to two (2) points.
Fuel Rack Sling Assembly - Presently utilizes a four-(4) leg matched, " dia-meter, 6 x 19 IWRC wire rope sling assembly which provides a safety factor of 7.6. Failure of one (1) attachment point would result in a load shift to two (2) points and a reduction of the safety factor to 3.8. The load would not drop. However, after July, 1983, this will be handled with special lif ting devices (Mfg. by Lambco Supply Corporation) that will provide a safety factor of 10, and will allow for the possibility of a single liftpoint failure.
HEPA Filter Sling Assembly - The current two (2) h" diameter siings used to make a four point lif t will be upgraded to utilize a four- (4) leg sling assembly consisting of 1/2" diame ter, 6 x 19 IWRC wire rope which pro-vides a safety factor of 10 and which allows for a single attachment point failure without a load drop. This should be completed by July,1983.
RPV Service Platform Lif ting Sling - Initial design was a three- (3) leg sling assembly consisting of 5/8" diameter, 6 x 19 IWRC wire rope, a turnbuckle on one (1) leg and safety hooks on each leg. The three (3) slings were joined together with an oval ring and was load rated at 7.2 tons with a safety factor of 5. Since the three- (3) leg assembly would not allow for a single lif t point failure without a load drop, the following recommendations should be implemented by July,1983; this will increase the safety factor to 10.
Recommended Arrangement - A three- (3) leg sling assembly similar to the original assembly (see GE Drawing Ll7C4530, Service Platform Sling) with slings and fittings sized as follows or engineer approved:
Slings - 7/8" diameter, 6 x 25 IWRC extra improved plow steel preformed right regular lay Safety Hooks - rated at 7.5 tons, with safety latch Turnbuckle - 1 " diameter x 24" takeup jaw and jaw Oblong Link - Crosby, Figure A342, lh" diameter alloy oblong link (39,900 SWL) or equal The above sling assembly will provide a safety factor of approximately 10.
The three (3) lif ting lugs are to be upgraded to provide an approximate safety factor of 6, based on yield, or 10 based on ultimate strength.
Moisture Separator and Steam Dryer Sling - Attaches to the RB crane hook with two (2) pins and the separator or dryer at four (4) points. Failure of any one (1) attachment point would not result in a load drop. The sling's heaviest lift is approximately 83% of the 60-ton rated capacity.
See Table 3.2.
Invessel Service Platform Strongback - Attached to the RB crane hook with two (2) pins and the in-vessel service platform at four (4) points by means of special bolts. A single failure of one (1) attachment point would not result in a load drop. See Table 3.2.
Spent Fuel Pool Gate Slings - The two (2) 1-1/4", 6 x 37 IWRC slings used to handle the fuel pool gates provide a safety factor greater than
- 10. See Table 3.2.
Flux Monitor & Shipping Crate Slings - The two (2) 1/2" diameter, 6 x 19 IWRC wire rope slings provide a safety factor greater than 10.
Request 2.2 (4)
For cranes identified in 2.2-1 above, not categorized according to 2.2-3, demonstrate that the criteria of NUREG-0612, Section 5.1, are satisfied. Compliance with Criterion IV will be demonstrated in re-sponse to Section 2.4 of this request. With respect to Criteria I through III, provide a discussion of your evaluation of crane operation in the Reactor Building and your determination of compliance. This response should include the following information for each crane:
Response to 2.2 (4)
With exception of the RB crane, which is single failure proof, all other cranes identified in 2.2.1 above have been excluded since they do not carry heavy loads or are physically separated from the area of the spent fuel pool or reactor vessel. Therefore, no reply to this request is required.
~5- l 1
=
. -l SECTION 2.3 " SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS FOR OVERHEAD HANDLING SYSTEMS OPERATING IN PLANT AREAS CONTAINING EQUIPMENT FOR REACTOR SHUTDOWN, DECAY HEAT REMOVAL, OR SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING."
NUREC-0612, Section 5.1.5, provides guidelines concerning the design and l operation of load-handling systems in the vicinity of equipment or j components required for safe reactor shutdown and decay heat removal.
Information provided in response to this section should be sufficient to )
demonstrate that adequate measures have been taken to ensure that in these areas either the likelihood of a load drop, which might prevent safe reactor shutdown or prohibit continued decay heat removal, is extremely small or that damage to such equipment from load drops will be limited in order not to result in the loss of these safety-related functions. Cranes which must be evaluated in this section have been previously identified in your response to 2.1-1 and their loads in your response to 2.1-3c.
Request 2.3 (1)
" Identify any cranes listed in 2.1 (1) above which you have evaluated as having suf ficient design features to make the likelihood of a load drop extremely small for all loads to be carried and the basis for this evaluation (i.e. , complete compliance with NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.6, or partial compliance supplemented by suitable alternative or additional design features). For each crane so evaluated, provide the load-handling system (i.e. , crar.e-load combination) information specified in Attachment 1."
l i
1 t
Response to 2.3 (1)
The only single failure proof cranes are the Reactor Building Cranes on Units 1 & 2, which have been previously discussed in our response to Section 2.2.
Request 2.3 (2)
"For any cranes identified in 2.1 (1) not designated as a single failure proof in 2.3 (1), a comprehensive hazard evaluation should be provided which includes the following information."
Request 2.3 (2)a "The presentation in a matrix format of all heavy loads and potential impact areas where damage might occur to safety-related equipment.
Heavy loads identification should include designation and weight or 4 cross-reference to information provided in 2.1 (3)c. Impact areas should be identified by construction zones and elevations or by some other method such that the impact area can be located on the plant general arrangement drawings. Figure 1 provides a typical matrix.
Response to 2.3 (2)a Table 2.3 (2) provides our hazard evaluation for each of the cranes, identified in 2.1 (1), not designated as single failure proof. Equipment weight and other pertinent information regarding crane / load combinations can be found in revised Table 3-1, " Tabulation of Heavy Loads," resubmitted with this report.
Request 2.3 (2)b "For each interaction identified, indicate which of the load and impact area combinations can be eliminated because of separation and redundancy of safety-related equipment, mechanical stops and/or electrical interlocks, or other site-specific considerations. Elimination on the basis of the aforementioned consideration should be supplemented by the following specific info rmation." (See Paragraphs 1 through 3; 2.3 (2)b.)
Response to 2.3 (2)b l Load target combinations eliminated because of separation and/or redundancy of safety-related equipment are as follows:
RHR Pumps B & D - The hoist for monorail (MR-2), which services RHR pumps B & D, is not installed during plant operating periods. Puring maintenance periods when the hoist is required and in the event of a load drop, RHR Pumps A & C provide an alternate source for decay heat removal. The B & D pumps located on elevation -17'-0" are physicallly separated by two (2) 2' thick concrete walls and approximately 75'.
There is no hazard below the pumps.
RHR Pumps A & C - Same as RHR Pumps B & D above.
HPCI Pump and Turbine - The hoist for monorail (MR-7), which services the HPCL pump and turbine, is mounted on the elevation above the HPCI pump and turbine and is separated by concrete floor plugs. The hoist is designed to withstand seismic loads unloaded. Since this hoist is used only to service the pump and turbine during maintenance periods, the reactor system would be depressurized and backup provided by the low pressure injection system. No other safety-related equipment would be affected.
RHR Service Water Booster Pumps A, B, C, & D - Each of the four (4) RHR Service Water Booster Pumps are serviced by a separate monorail and hoist directly over the pump and motor. The hoist is not installed during plant operating periods. Each pump is a minimum of 14'-3" from the next pump and pumps A & C are also separated by a missile shield from pumps B & D. A hand-operated chain hoist is caly installed on a monorail when a pump is to be serviced. Use of the monorail does not affect other safety-related equipment.
Recirculating Pump Motor "A" - The hoist for Recirculating Pump "A" is not installed on the monorail during plant operating periods. During recirculating pump maintenance periods, a hand-operated chain hoist is installed. The rigging apparatus used provides a minimum safety factor of 6.2. The recirculating pumps.are not required for safe shutdown or decay heat removal.
Recirculating Pump Motor "B" - See Recirculating Pump Motor "A" above. ,
Service Water Pumps and Motors - The service water pumps and motors have been eliminated because of system redundancy. In the event of a load drop during handling of a nuclear service water pump or adjacent conventional service water pump, it is possible that one or both of the adjacent service water pumps could be damaged. However, should this unlikely event occur, a minimum of two (2) other service water pumps would iremain operable to supply service water to equipment required for safe shutdown and decay heat removal.
Although the intake structure crane is not single failure proof, a more than adequate margin of safety exists since each service water; pump (heaviest load) is only approximately 1/5 the crane's 30 ton capacity.
Administrative controls prohibit the crane operator from handling the pumps or motors over other equipment required for safe shutdown or decay heat removal. The lif ting apparatus has been sized to provide at least a safety factor of 9 for the service water pumps and motors.
Circulating Water Pumps and Motors - The circulating water pumps and motors have been eliminated as a potential hazard since they are: not located near any equipment required for safe shutdown or decay heat removal. Although there are no electrical interlocks or mechanical stops to prevent the crane operator from carrying a heavy loat ever the service water pump structure, administrative procedures do prohibit the operators from doing so. The crane operators, as part of the crane operator training and qualification programs, are instructed about safe load paths.
~
- s.
1 Circulating Water Traveling Water Screens - The circulating water traveling water screens have been eliminated as a potential hazard since they are not located near any equipment required for safe shutdown or decay heat removal. (See Circulating Water Pump discussion above for additional information.
Servf ee Water Traveling Water Screens - This equipment has been elimi-nated as a potential hazard since it is not handled near equipment required for safe shutdown or decay heat removal. The screens are not handled over the service water structure building which houses the service water pumps. (See Circulating Water Pump discussion above for additional information.)
Diesel Generators 1 through 4 Components - Each of the four (4) diesel generators are serviced by a separate hand-operated bridge crane. Each crane is physically secured during nonuse periods at ,the west'end of the D/G. The diesel generators are separated from each other by concrete walls. Since the cranes are only used to service a diesel generator that is not in service and the other provides system redundancy, these
, crane / load combinations have been eliminated as potential hazards.
Request 2.3 (2)c "For interactions not eliminated by the analysis of 2.3 (2)b above, identify any handling systems for specific loads which you have eval-uated as having suf ficient design features to make the likelihood of a load drop extremely small and the basis for this evaluation (i.e.,
complete compliance with NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.6 or. partial compliance supplemental by suitable alternative or additional design features).
For each so evaluated, provide the load handling system (i.e., crane / load combination) information specified in Attachment 1."
Response to 2.3 (2hc No cranes or crane / load combinations fit into this category.
Request 2.3 (2)d "For interactions not eliminated in 2.3 (2)b or 2.3 (2)c above, demon-strate using appropriate analysis that damage would not preclude opera-tien of suf ficient equipment to allow the system to perform its safety function following a load drop (NUREG-0612), Section 5.1, Criterion IV).
For each analysis so conducted, the following information should be provided."
Response to 2.3 (2)d All interactions have been eliminated in Response to 2.3 (2)b.
3
TABLE 3-I Sheet 1 of 5 l
TABULATION OF HEAVY LOADS FOR BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT CRANES LOAD IDENTIFICATION WElGHT LIFTING DEVICE PROCEDURE '
REACTOR BLDC. CRANE Whiting - Overhead Shielding /Acess Plugs 7-110 Tons Slings (2 braided 7/8"x8 MP-0, HP-6 Bridge parts)y 125 Ton Main Drywell llead 43 Tons llead Strongback MP-8 +
5 Ton Aux.
Reactor Vessel llead 70 Tons llead Strongback Fil-3, MP-7 Steam Dryers 75,000 Lbs. Dryer & Separator Sling Fil-3, MP-9 Moisture Separators 102,000 lbs. Dryer & Separator Sling MP-9 ,
R.P.V. Service Platform 14,000 Lbs. Service Platform Sling Fil-3, PT 18.2, Fil-5 i
i R.V. Ilead Insulation 4,000 lbs, llead Strongback MP-7 Ilead Strongback 5 Tons Main llook - 2 pins Fil-3, MP-7 Frame & 1'800 Lbs Stud Tensioner assy, (4) Ten-5,200 Lbs. Tensioner Frame MP-7, MP-8 stoners I li.E.P. A. Filter 4,000 Lbs. 2 Slings 1/2" dia. 6x19 IWRC MP-6 Spent Fuel Pool Cates 4,500 Lbs. '
2-1 1/4" dia.x6' 6x37 IWRC MP-9 7,500 Slings !
Spent Fuel Shipping Cask 80 Tons Redundant Lifting Yoke MP-27, HP-29 Fuel Racks PWR 8'720 lbs.
liWR 7 200 Lbs. 4 Leg Sling 1/2" dia. MP-6 6x19 IWRC 4-12'x3/4" dia. Sling)Spr'der .
Cattle Chute 12 Tons 4-20'x3/4" dia. Sling) Frame MP-9 ;
Shielded Personnel Work 8,500 Lbs. Redundant Lifting Rig '
- l Basket Dryer / Separator Sling & '
j llook i Replacement Fuel Storage Later Later Later Racks
, R.V. Ilead Stud 600 Lbs. Stud Handling Tool Fl!-3, HP-7 I l llead Nut & Washer Rack 600 Lbs, llandling Sling - 3,800 Lbs. FH-3, MP-7 6
4 Leg 1/4" Spreader l
TABLE 3-I Sheet 2 of 5 .
~
TABULATION OF HEAVY LOADS FOR BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT CRANES LOAD IDENTIFICATION WEIGHT LIFTING DEVICE PROCEDURE Reactor Building Crane - Continued llead Stud Rack 3,000 Lbs. 4 Leg Sling 3/8" dia. Fil-3, Fil-5, HP-7 6x19 IWRC Refueling and Service Tools .4 Tons Various Fil-10, Fil-11, Fil-llA, Fil-15 New Fuel 745 lbs. General Purpose Grapple Fil-9 Debris Cask 11 Tons Redundant Lifting Apparatus MP-6 Invessel Service Platform 85,629 Lbs. Strongback MP-6 & Special Work Procedures 2 PCS) 5(,000 Lbs.
Fluz Monitor & Shipping Crate Slings 1/2" dia. MP-6 6x19 IWRC HEFUELING PLATFORM Reactor Vessel Servicing & PT-18.1, HP-6, Fil-llA Refueling Traveling Bridge BWR Dummy Fuel Assembly 600.Lbs. Fuel Grapple Fil-4 Trolley & Aux. Iloist EWR New Fuel Assembly 745 Lbs. Fuel Grapple Fil-5, Fil-9, Fil-10, Fil-11 On Separate Monorail BWR Spent Fuel Assembly 745 Lbs. Fuel Grapple Fil-5, Fil-ll, Fil-15 Refueling & Service Tools .4, Ton Various Fil-10, Fil-ll, Fil-llA, Fil-15 PWR Fuel 1,439 Lbs. Fuel Grapple Fil-13 REFUELING JIB CRANE Capacity 1,000 Lbs. @ Refueling Tools 15'R Electric floist with Reactor Components Various
,5 Ton MP-6, Fil-4, Fil-5 l Motorized Trolley &
11oom REACTOR RUILDING 110ISTt lleaviest Load MR-2 Chain Holst 2 RilR Pumps B&D 8,400 Lbs. Slings 2 Leg 5/8" dia., HP-6 6x19 IWRC MR-4 Chain iloist Ri!R Pumps A&C 8,400 Lbs. Slings 2 Leg 5/84dia. MP-6 6x19 IWRC
-h e
TABLE 3-I Sbeet 3 or 5 TABULATION OF HEAVY LOADS FOR BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT CRANES LOAD IDENTIFICATION WElGHT LIFTING DEVICE PROCEDURE Reactor Building floiste Continued MR-7 Elect. Motor ilPCI Pump & Turbine 8,400 Lbs. Slings 2 Leg 5/8" dia. MP-6 Iloist & Trolley 6x19 IWRC MR-10 Chain iloist RilR Serv. Water Booster PumpA 6,465 Lbs. Slings 2 Leg 3/4" dia. MP-6 6x19 IWRC MR -11 Chain iloist 2 RIIR Serv. Water Booster Pumpli 6,465 Lbs. Slings 2 Leg 3/4" dia. MP-6 6x19 IWRC MR-12 Chain !!oist RilR Service Water & Booster 6,465 Lbs. Slings 2 Leg 3/4" dia. MP-6 Pump C 6x19 IWRC MR-13 Chain !!oist RilR Service Water & Booster 6 g465 Lbs. Slings 2 Leg 3/4" dia. MP-6 Pump D 6x19 IWRC
!!R-20 Chain iloist Recirc. Pump Motor A 34,000 Lbs. Slings 2 or 3 Leg 1 1/4" dia. MP-6 6x37 IWRC MR-21 Chain lloist Recire. Pump Motor B 34,000 Lbs. Slings 2 or 3 Leg 1 1/4" dia. MP-6 6x37 IWRC INTAKE STRUCTURE CRANE P & 11 Traveling Cantry Service Water Motors 3,600 Lbs. Sling 2 Leg 1/2" dia. MP-6 6x19 IWRC 30 Ton Capacity Circ. Water Pumps 56,000 Lbs. Sling 2 Leg 1 1/2" dia. MP-6 6x37 IWRC OR 34,000 Lbs. Sling 3 Leg 1 3/8" dia.
6x37 IWRC og Cire. Water Motors 45,000 lbs. Sling 4 Leg 1 1/8" dia. MP-6 6x37 IWRC Traveling Screens .
Circ. Water 54,000 Lbs. Strongback (28 tons) MP-6 Service Water 21,100 Lbs. Slings 2 Leg 1" dia. MP-6 i 6x19 IWRC or 4 Leg ;
) 3/4" dia. 6x19 IWRC ._
TABLE 3-l Sheet 4 of 5 .
TABULATION OF HEAVY LOADS FOR '
BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT CRANES LOAD IDENTIFICATION WEIGHT LIFTING DEVICE PROCEDURE Intake Structure Crane Continued Service flater Pumps 6.284 Lbs. Sling 2 Leg 5/8 dia. MP-6 6x19 IWRC DIESEL BUILDING CRANES Single Bridge D/G 1 Components 3,300 Lbs. Sling 1/2" dia. 6x19 IWRC MP-6 Iland Operated D/G 2 Components 3,300 Lbs. Sling 1/2" dia. 6x19 IWRC MP-6 Chain lloist & Trolley D/G 3 Components 3,300 Lbs. Sling 1/2" dia. 6x19 IWRC' MP-6 3 D/G 4 Components 3,300 Lbs. Sling 1/2" dia. 6x19 IWRC MP-6 Notes:
- 1. Access Plug / Shielding- the load to two (2) point The current use of 2-8 and a reduction of the part braided slings con- safety factor to 2.5 sisting of 7/8" dia. IURC wire rope provides a 2, IIo4st' pemoved.dur$3 plani i safety factor of 5; how- operation - only installes l ever the method of con- during required mainte-nection does not allow nance periods, for a failure of one lifting attachment. A Iloists are physically se-3 four (4) leg matched cured during nonuse sling assembly has been periods.
recommended consisting of 2" dia. 6x37 improved 4. Sling sizes given are plow steel IWRC slings. considered minimum to be This will provide a used for given configu '
safety factor of 5.0 and ration, i.e., vertical or allow for a failure of basket hitch. Site per-one (1) attachment point sonnel are permitted to without resulting in a ,
use larger size slings or load drop. Failure of a can vary rigging configu-single attachment point ration.
will result in shifting
TABLE 3-I sheet s of 5 TABULATION OF HEAVY LOADS FOR i BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT CRANES LOAD IDENTIFICATION WEIGHT LIFTING DEVICE PROCEDURE S. Sling capacities are based on ANSI B30.9 tables; however, recom-mended capacities f rom I sling / wire rope mfg. may l 3
be used provided a mini-
- mum safety factor of 5
! is maintained.
- 6. All slings used are of l IWRC improved plow steel construction or equal.
- 7. Unless specifically noted all slings have swagged fittings.
O
,,,. . . < r ey o a. 9 : ,
Page 1 of 3 TABLE 3-2 SAFETY FACTORS FOR LIFTING DEVICES USED ,
FOR HEAVY LOADS LIFTED BY REACTOR BUILDING MAIN CRANE Load Lifting Critical I2} Critical Computed Safet:r Factor II) Remarks ,
Identification Device Components Stress Normal Operating Single Failure dnd Weight Considered Type Condition Condition 1 (kips)
SF SF SF I SF, u Head Main Hook Pin Bending 103.5 200.0 37.7 72.1 (3) l strongback hook wt = 10.0 Reactor Head Turnbuckle Tension ---
9.3 ---
5.9 vessel head strongback Main beam Bending 7.2 14.7 4.7 9.5 (3) wt = 140.0 Hook pin Bending 6.9 13.2 2.5 4.8 Drywell Head Turnbuckle Tension ---
15.4 ---
9.7 head strongback Main beam Bending 11.4 23.2 7.5 15.2 (3) wt = 85.0 Hook pin Bending 10.9 20.9 4.0 7.6 Spent fuel 2-Ik" x 6' Lifting lug Shear 13.8 34.4 > 7.0 >11.7 pool gate 6 x 37 IWRC Fillet we!d Shear 11.1 18.5 7.0 11.7 (3) wt = 4.5 slings Sling Tension ---
33.4 ---
14.1 NOTES: 1. Safety Factor SF strength (or ultYma(or SF ) is defined as the ratio of the capacity of the components at yield testYength)overtheloadappliedtothecomponents. ,
- 2. Components of the lifting device not considered are less critical.
- 3. Loadings considered in the computation include weights of load to be lifted and lif ting device used plus their dynamic effect.
9
.., e- o; a:.
ry n s a, Page 2 of 3 TABLE 3-2 SAFETY FACTORS FOR LIFTING DEVICES USED FOR llEAVY LOADS LIFTED BY REACTOR BUILDING MAIN CRANE (continued)
Load Lifting Critical (2) Critical Computed Safety Factor (II Remarks identification Device Components Stress and Weight Considered Type Normal Operating Single Failure (kips) Condition Condition SF SF SF SF
. y u y u l Moisture Dryer & 11ook Box Shear 6.7 10.9 --- ---
separator separator Socket pin Bending 4.5 10.1 2.9 6.4 (3) wt = 102.0 sling Sling Tension ---
6.0 ---
3.8 i
Steam Dryer & Socket pin Bending 6.1 13.8 3.9 8.7
, dryer separator Sling Tension ---
8.0 ---
5.0 (3)
' wt = 75.0 sling In-vessel Platform Stud Tension 11.7 18.9 7.4 11.9 service lifting Main beam Bending 5.4 8.8 3.5 5.6 platform tool 3/4" hook Shear 15.6 25.2 --- ---
(3) wt = 85.63 plate (2 parts) llook pin Bending 34.7 57.6 --- ---
NOTES: 1. Safety Factor SF strength (or ultYma(or SF ) is defined te stEength) over theasload the applied ratio of tothe capacity the of the components at yield components.
- 2. Components of the lifting device not considered are less critical.
- 3. Loadings considered in the computation include weights of load to be lifted and lif ting device used plus their dynamic effect.
8
,, , , r. g. go n e, n -s n Page 3 of 3 TABLE 3-2 SAFETY FACTORS FOR LIFTING DEVICES USED ,
FOR HEAVY LOADS LIFTED BY REACTOR BUILDING MAIN CRANE (continued)
Load Lifting Criticel( Critical Computed Safety Factor (I) Remarks identification Device Components Stress dnd Weight Considered Type Nonnal Operating Single Failure (kips) Condition Condition SF SF SF SF y u y u Stud Stud 1/2" wire rope Tension ---
14.7 ---
10.7 tensioner tensioner wt = S200 lb handling 3"x4" plate Shear 9.9 18.1 --- ---
(3) frame Main beam Bending 5.3 9.6 4.1 7.3 Hook pin Bending 14.5 39.7 --- ---
3/8" dia. wire Tension ---
16.9 --- ---
rope assembly (Incl. hook, stud, & rope)
Eyebolts (2) Tension ---
20.0 --- ---
ea, bolt 1/2" Round Bending ---
10.9 --- ---
Pin NOTES: 1. Safety Factor SF strength (or ultYma(or SF ) is defined te stYength) asload over the the applied ratio of to thethe capacity of the components at yield components.
- 2. Components of the lifting device not considered are less critical.
- 3. Loadings considered in the computation include weights of load to be lifted and lifting device used plus their dynamic effect.
TABLE 2.3-2 -
CONTROL OF llEAVY LOADS IIAZARD EVALUATION ,
CAROLINA POWER & LICllT COMPANY BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT UNITS 1&2 Page 1 of 2 SAFETY RELATED llAZARD ELIMINA-CRANE LOCATION ELEVATION LOAD IIAZARD AREA EQUIPMENT TION CATEGORY HR-2 Cols. S-T -17'0" RilR Pumps B&D Elev. 17'-0" RilR Pumps B 6R-7R Col. S-T 6R-7R MR-4 Cols. S-T -17'0" RilR Pumps A&C Elev. -17'0" RIIR Pumps B 3R-4R MR-7 Cols. S-T -17'0" IIPCI Pump & Elev. -17'0" IIPCI Pump & Tur- C, B 4R-6R Turbine Elev. 20' bine' Motor Control Cols. S-T Center No. 1XC 4R-6R 480V AC MR-10 Cols. P-S 50'0" RHR Service Water Elev. 50'0" RilR Service Water B 4R-SR Booster Pump A Cols. 4R-5R Booster Pump A P-S MR-11 Cols. P-S 50'0" RilR Service Water Elev. 50'0" RHR Service Water B SR Booster Pump B Cols. P-S, SR Booster Pump B MR-12 Cols. P-S 50'0" RilR Service Water Elev. 50'0" RilR Service Water B 6R , Booster Pump C Cols. P-S, 6R Booster Pump C MR-13 Cols. N-P 50'0" THR' Service Uatec Elev. 50'0" RilR Service Water B 6R-711 ,
Booster Pump D Co!s. P-S, 6R-7R Booster Pump D MR-20 Cols. N-P , -17'0" Recire. Pump Elev. -17'0" Recirc. Pump A B 4R-6R ~~
Motor A MR-21 Cols. M-N -17'0" Recirc. Pump Elev. -17'0" Recirc. Pump B B SR-6R Motor B h
TABLE 2.3-2 .
CONTROL OF llEAVY LOADS IIAZARD EVALUATION CAROLINA POWER & LICIIT COMPANY -
BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLAhT UNITJ 1&2 Page 2 of 2 SAFETY RELATED llAZARD ELIMINA-l CRANE LOCATION ELEVATION LOAD IIAZARD AREA EQUIPMENT TION CATECORY Intake Structure Service Water Service Water Elev. 20 Service Service Water B Crane Intake Structur( 20'0" Pumps & Motor; Water Structure Pumps & Motors &
Related Equipment Circ. Water 6'7" Circ. Water Pumps N/A None C Structure & Motors Circ. Water 20' C. W. Traveling 'N/A None C Structura Water Screens Service Water 20' S. W. TraveliEg N/A None C Structure Water Screens Olesel Generator Building Cranes D/g Bldg. 23'0" Misc. D/g #1 Elev. 23'0" D/g #1 & Excita- B I)fg CR. #1 Components Cols. 9D-LOD t io n Cub ica l Ge n.
V-X Control Panel MCC Cabinets 0/g CR. #2 D/g Bldg. 23'0" Misc. D/g #2 Elev. 23'0" D/g #2 & Excita- B Components Cols. 10D-11D tion Cubical Cen.
V-X Control Panel MCC Cabinets 0/g CR. #3 D/g Bldg. 23'0" Misc. D/g #2 Elev. 23'0" D/g #3 & Excita- B Components Cols. IlD-12D tion Cubical Gen.
V-X Control Panel MCC MCC Cabinets D/g CR. #4 D/g Bldg. 23'0" Misc. D/g #2 Elev. 23'0" D/g #4 & Excita- B Co npo su nts Cois. 12D-L3D tion Cahiril n.
V-t ab ot co t Pea !
'IT 'I th i.o ir a O
- 1 2 a o ,,
f.
H l e "
. A l l NN M H
I- wy' , g'*9g I 1 j
".l snitt.p _ _
I i
~P_u,4GS _.
6 ti O
, I,
= ,
=.
=
h "
F l i ..
g' "
l = -
. i ,,
l -
u
&R H l '
- -6. - - - - _ - = =
8 .
I(=nrusaw&d - A
% % 1
- I 9
n
= ~4, r f;; ; oc I ,- si g H g ;
g 21R
'l I t e
. .r;.
y ,_, ::e l
o I-~ c -
Q l N l
h c-4 1 l
_ SHIELD PLUC-J
.I "1
l j
4
~
l l c "M j t j l l
- l I
h 5 i _ru s
_ P. i i
4 !,
I $ I
( ) !
/
L - - - .....
~ ~'
- O24R H- I I l'N ::
. L II
. @ Q @ @ 6
- = ..a n % --
if;?ih i a+,' . O-g
O 7 8 9 10 W w ==
N ItEDucsp Size OF KEPRouc4GLE Ig g ANoiucacA*40 ttAarry ce m. n 8 H
-T i H -
~
G 9
/ -
F
\
H SAFE LOAD PATHS 4 -
. Kio SYMBOL , LOAD E
$ -- ...--- SHIELD PLUGS 1,2.5.46
- SHIELD PujGS 3.7,0.54 piiT.
wouco 2 $ --------
_ _ , , .I._ _// ... _H $ .
- SHIELD Pt. LGS 9,10, hll -
7 g i $ - --
GHLElD PL1JGS 12.13,h 14
~ SHIELD PL1Ks M*G- I i $ .. .. _ cmEu.vmT cuers o un snan P111G I w eto PLUG 2 r' s ,, n n , n n - vatve Leovereoutesses F5 ;
> @ O .I H -
NOTES
~
f I. FUEL. LOCATED IM SHADED AREAS I 1. LOAD PATHS APPUCA6LE. TO UMf514')- C l S.Hol5T6 HUST BE KEMOVED Olt PROPEitLY
{ SE:CuKED WHEM NOT IN USE l -
l H
I
?
_ _ . . _ _ _.. gg a Illllllli _
I N CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY _
tevCLE AR PL ANT ENG80eEEmeesG StP ARTMENT = A alt 4st, M. C.
SRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT R .
S -
CONTROL OF' HEAVY LOADS SAFE LOAD PATHS A
. REACTOR BUILDINS ELEV. l17'- 0"
., , A,.4 _ , , - = NINO i . uni en GrEM h sJ /4pa % g.eq.g5 l . l 7 e = =
~
aA
- g. ; ~ 1 2 3 4 0 H .
I I l_
E lllll1111 M G
_m_ i mm O O m m o- o
~_ C3
~
=H-- zg/ u
=H+
=
u I N 4/-h /
~
.I~
0-
- -H ,
~~ -~
/ , ,
1..
D A ,
eg l, 4 1
- I ^ V g- =~ /
/
,/, ,
y y c ,,
/ % $ b B lllllll[j e ll1111ll1 b. E : .._
h I:
H- I lI 1 I I
. @ Q @ d @
1 2 3 4 5 l
' N- b' O 7 O' O
=
'" semm-Ass se em ,'"", -
troutro sescwr renexxasts a s O mo mcass,sp c4.Aam e m. "M N H T H _
NOTEG
- 1. 91ADED AREA SMOWS FUCL LCCATICMS G
- 2. LOAD PATHS APPLICABLE TD UMITS I $ '/.
S HotSTS MUST l$E REMovEDOR PROPE"RLY H _
SECURED LJHEN NOT IM USE.
F GAFE LOAD PATHS H NO SYMBOL LOAD L #. 74 ,,/,7 ( Q v/ ///uun/ i ' KVP SERVitE PLATFCKM $ GUPFCRT g re ee e eee unei IMvEs4EL SHIE.LDED PLATFOKM l h ,. $ " " DRYElt I GEFN:ATOK, SLING ,
E
~
f STUD TEMGICNElt I_ .__ '
H $ s' STEAM SE9a#ATOR _
+,
+7'f
/ \
g ' ' ' '
STEAM DitYER 4V -
$ . .- RPV HEAD o f//
j Y
/
% 4 inuuuuui DRYWELL HE~AD
.. ..y 4 _ _ _ _ __ _ s E4 0 STRONdBACK _
I h s 4, 1
- _ _l [s g ru nu//u nl n'.rT RACKS Q's l"^'s f s'
- $ ru /// u u n i STUD KACKS C
[*_g_] p g r:un/uua HEAD IMSULADOM
/ i VESSEL PIPIM6 SPOOLS j
4 4 vunu/u _
(
@/ / 8 111111111 dlEIRRI I H i
CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY __.
' NUCLE AR PL AN T thelhEERING DEP ARTMENT - A ALES 0M, N. C.
BRUNSWICK STE AM ELECTRIC PLANT
- R - S -
CONTROLOF HEAVY LOADS SAFE LOAD PATHS A REACTOR BUILDING ELEY. ITT*- O" n 7 *
- E .'. ! T O '"'
i
===v 2 -3
% 4* v Dv Wh4 5Ha a- 81020 - M - OOI B 6 7 8 9 10
.-Y
.9 1 2 3 o 3
'y agoto-MMX>l H
Q ..
1 l
1.'M m I
2 m. L M'
G V Si3 IllIIIIIII
" l H' l OlSR -
l"
==
[a_/
F - _. y
}'
g
_ y : : 2B y
=H
/ ;
u n---- ---
u
-- l/
E G f///// WlS bh 8
)
I /
) (~W x '
g.
, g ,
Xe N,//f -
" r ,- _
%f -
3.< > ! > l. e-, >y
.I O j l
! ex ta i
L_a _m
, H llllllll%
l l ..
H- - I 1: :I
@2 I I E A
1 2
Q 3
@ 6 4 5
%. DUNCAN PARNELL, ONC., RALEIGN 981 e
O l 7 0 0 20 ,
E enemmenes or em ,'","
O AND RE ucs SEE W ftEmmo utaf at iufJtEA$ep (LAarff 0F D640.
g 66 H T w C
.g
/ ,
i NOTE
- l. FUEL LOCATED IM GHADED AKEAS -
- 2. LOAD PATHS APPLICABLE To UNITS i H I l{1 1
4 3.Hols75 MUST 6E REMOVED OR E PROPEltL'i GEcurtED LJHEM AJOT' IM LISE ik~ (/
ss / H D
CATTLC CHuTtr
/s L4TATioM puCIMCr ftEFU EUMo SAFE LOAD PATWG
/\ M SYMSOL LOAD -
ss
$ - - - - - - SHIPPIMO CA0K 2
/s q h - * * * * - SPE4JT FUEL Ptet. CATE5 C
CATTLE c.54uTE
( $ > ', ; HEPA FILTER N $
re-eeeeeeeeiNEta FUEL t
rte cuore
' Tion A OURi40 EMAL OPEfCAT m H g CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY
,k 11glllll}lljl vet .. n>=, s o.=in ame o s a r = = =, - nata #. .. c.
l} j j ^^"
BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT J . .y
~
CONTROL OF' HEAVY LOADS SAFE LOADPATHS A
- REACTOR BUILDING ELEY.117'-0" 4" T ' t'i ' ""l"" O " '""3".,
m w du wa6 s%w siomo- u - ooi a 6 7 8 9 l 10 a
IIl
- ~
- 1 s ,:. o c e
- y boto-M- oo t.
H -
G csg y 2 i z
~
~
} '
E j
@ [] I I ['.]~- l l
l :
~
W,., -
f
- _ . . P .
I _ _
i
.a - _
i G i i
q - -
i e .
Q .
=-
,.h D -
o O O c OH .g: ll.
Ob h-- :
llllllllllllll lllll!llllllll n n c g , , o EOtllPMEMT REdD FOR CAFE CHUTDOWU = O
_ O C.ENERATOR = ,
@ C.EMERATOR CCMTKOL
= 5 i
PAMEL ( EM6tME. CONTROL Q } q ]
B
@460 V. sWGR. =
@Mc.c. CAstuETS 5
@ DIESEL OIL TRAM 5FEF. ]
=
PUMPS
=
=
%O %O G
^ 5 L1 HEN EQLil GAFE SHUT (
EXTREME CA 1 2 3 4 5 DUNCAN.PARNELL. INC.. RALElGM 189
7
.U Id sv<
Wh),<
O 7 8 O SO '= = , jiCQx essassium se as ,", ",,,
Pu W W RTH O **'""m. -
^488 ' '** 'TT C' ***
E g .
y H
&N
, booto sHGGT 1 M M MOTE:
g g CK4JE l Call UT.ATIONS Q SHOWM IU THIS BAY TYP.
g a
FOR ALLENGlWE l'AYS
) < > c >
b O , ,
CE c s ,, b -
iniuu4 SAFE LCAP F
7 / I L_
i ,
) E]
El c- 4A
.V [:]
y :
I
. .I g u.,
~ ,
.O .
~
h a sui )
EQulR ED90W*L-
_ _ -c
,. El . []
u El -
. . > / .. -
OF i:l C d[
)
G
(
^
)
n
&A t -cCAs4 th L.5 J 4 4
'* g c lllllllllllll u .a i i e i i b
^ hil
] ] NOTE.
I, DWIMG APPLICABLE TO 3 3 UMITS I(1 E 2. Hoists MUST BE REMOVED E OR PROPERLY $EcuREO CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY _
7 { mucLE AR Plan? ENGehttRING DEP ARTWENT
- el ALSDSM. E. C.
kM V R E 3.HolsT$ ARE L4X~.KED WM CK STEM EEMC M CCNTROL OF HEAVY LOADS L
8 WEM END SAFE LOA 0 PATHS A FMEW 15 MAMDLED OVEC 4 SHADED ECulPMENT oltsEL GENERATOR BUILDING
>OW N CCMFCNENT5 Rect.liREP FOR SAf E 7 7 .,.,.,. 7 = _- i - i .Pz b MusT BE TAKEM SMUTCCt.JM. gn apyy % s- a .= W 81020 M-002 e 6 7 8 9 10 e
.S , .
C
~ ,_ 1 2 3 l 0 5l
- ?aioto ,M o o a
H EQUIM4Ehtr KEQUIED PCIC CNrE SHUTDOW4 '
@ Alf,0 c; W o K
@ SUPPLY Allt FANS
@ s w avre m G
, 8 8 8 8 E a i
MONOllLAlb
"~[ d / ',_s ts m u 6 U L. . J h . _WPPLY AIC Pt.EMuM i r - _
/ n N ,
m i I
'""' i "
i
]
iammmmmme, imummumm6 . inumus 4gb dca ,
C' S- .
D w
{ }IImuI "A
[ }l IumI p'
Y.
A 1 2 3 4 5
~
- DUNCAN-PARMSLL, $NC., RALSIS9$ 181 i .
- i,., .
Y O 7 s l 8 l 30 h a 5 NorE: 8 amoucso sans oramuosts.mo im uAany or m a k 2.1 g
L DRAWIMG APPt lCABLS EUMITS I f 9.
- 2. HotST5 MUST BE REMOVED OE PitCfERLV 4ECUltED L4 HEN MOT IM UGE. _
5.SHADEO EDuePMEbri REOUIREDFOR 9FE GHUTDOWM.
4 MO ECtJIPMEMT IS To SE. LIFTED OVER "
54:E SHUTDOMM EQUIPMENT UhlLESS MECESSARY AND THEM LJ/ EXTREME caution.
8 8 8 F l C @ U 8 N/ .
7\
h wwcas O
w O
u . .a c
y
. _ _ l1 Y O h. O _
- l .-. inst .
O" O !
- c yismi.
(_ jim.
i v v Illllllllllll 3
CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY _
.,.u..s................,...r...u..
=
sRUNSWICK STsAal ELECTalC PLANT
~
CONTROL OF HEAVY LO408 SAFE LOAD MATpg A cesst stnenATon suluxue
'"L"" ':"J "" '*"**
T 't".1 _
m .m aw am 5.+,, w sloso-M-oos s 6 7 8 9 l 10 h
1 2 C 4 5 l
- ll ssor.o-m _oos H
G
//
KAIL FOK SoTON C=ANTKY c.KANE ,_____.. _____ _, , . _ _._______
L_____ _____ ________
4_-,c j j u __ _
__________)_.___I_____ __._i___
I
; [
E - . :- _ _ _ _ _ _ , ,
fl [Ul[UliO I
l l i e. i, iI e
1[U1 Ii ie l
i D l...] _ _ _ _ _.1 t
r---- ,iee-- - - i r- - - - - 7 i i
- l i 1 l 88 1
( _ _ _ _ .I, L _ __ _ _ lIi , . ___d b_____)
M OG'L li 8 ;
i / / i l r----+ r---' r -- 7 P----i
. 1 I a !
i I
i I t I
- ~
l i ;/
[ ie i C -
Q-- _
v_
] c l i
' I f '
cpNE stAL l
l EOuePMEM REQUIEED Ftyst SAf E. SNUTDoh3M 3. hcl 51 SEC.u f a g Oi MUCLEAR SEICVICE MTER PUMPS 4OTC McfTE 6 MUTE l 1. DKAMIMG APPLICABLE TO UNITS II 2 . SHOW1
- e. MO EQulPMEMT 85 TO BE UFTED OVEt SAFE. SHUTt%)WN EQUIPMENT UNLESS MEC.E554Cf AUDTHEN N/EXTEEME '
A CAUTIC4.-
, - ' ~
1 3 3 4 5
.ca m.[. . , . - . ..
, l .
i,_.;], g_ $
hik I .
0 7 0 0 10 ~'
agn M .- ST DE 37 mete ssoucsp car or anocurssaw Jts 5 0 iuCKEAr.ED C1.ACITY or pin 6 ,E A A 11 H r_we ocmiuc.To iwcwoe wwoes e,Teucrum n y 7 at twc.woso Meus
)
O I
)
l I m - --g --
g-s-- - - m i-mumm - _--
L U
_,_ J _ _ _ nummeO-
__f________, g i i I
$ l l_ 8 . I
______.' - . E E.
r- ' '
r-- ---
o - 1,r- I l OI l x- swc u>so Paw j l l i i.
1 QO n\ n n n n GA . .
' "~#
,_. a- - - - - - -
. D 7_____.,
7......., _ _ _ ,
i i e ., i a i
\_ _ _ _ _ _ .! ( _ _ _ _ } I l l,
, L _ _ _ y L __ _ , I l
- i. e. i i
i.
J i ii e, i t
.i ,, ..
i
'i i,i i i i iii e ii ie i
'Ic e!
]
e' l !I !i i i
1 < 2 L _ _ _ _ al ! t_ _ J -
I!
= c _ .1 = !'_..!.<i
,L 1l____-
i C
L1 1 _
3 MUST BE REMOVED OC PROPERLY kp wsEu war iu us 8
i ECulPMEwT NC7T AFFECTIMC:r SAFE cNM EOulPMEkfr WY Mci SE
$ IM THis DK444tMGr CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ,__
teUCLE AR PLauf EmGeseggmeest DEPARTestNT = RALEtGM, go, g.
'u"
BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT CONTR01. OF HEAVY LOADS SAFE L. DAD PATHS A INTAKE SERVICE WATER STRUCTURE .
1
= = _- l-I San gew,gging Omi$ s-w.a w 81020-M.OO3 g l 8 7 8 9 2 r^~"
l -- ----
f
-- 1 2 O G *5 o,= = oto?.o-M-oo4 H
_ l l
, , I _. _ _ l IX1 Q o
I I
-g-
- I T 1 2
' 1 F
i i
- g e- ,
l - g - M st- 9 IQ UC h4 '
O O E
VAINE REMOVAL I "" 1 u
O O i-s c _ _ $ @
E
]
g -
i i r ._
5 5
! n i
.g IX l 11 I I 2
l' 1 F 1 I l
A 1 2 3 4 5
'" % ;; _-- nammu, ame.. nammen see
O 7 O O to _m
. mmmen.
E .- . == ."
8 " # " " #40 0 3 5 suctrAuncuarry es mo #si H
% 7 i L d i
<$ i G
l NOTE:
i i g 1. GHADED EOulPMEMT REOutRED FCE SAFE
] s-M .
- 2. DRAWING APPLICAEL.E TO UulTG I I 2.
3.HOIS'13 MijST BE REMOVED CC PROPERLY SEECUR,ED WHEN NOT IM USE p 4.CTHEK EQUIPME")JT" IM REACT. oK BulLDiM6 NOT AFFEc.TINC2 THE
~ ~
] ^ 0.OMTROL OF HEAVY LOADS OR SAFE SHUTDoWM EcuiPMEMT MAY NOT BE
$'"]g,;< e f eeg g SHOWN lu TH6 PRAWlMG
//$1: ,/7A -
E 3
SAFE. LOAD PATH 5 ECutWM KECD W M SMDOWM_
/ h RS.CLW PUMP j[
m --
h,,, // @ K.s.c.CM. HEAT EXchWMGERS s ..i _i e,a @R.H R 5. SERVCENAER SCOSTEK PUMP 5MTR. D Tow sec-.t _.[
1 /A ', ' ' ' ' '(/,
7/// A 3
g.-- 5AFE LOAD Fwn45
- /.-
l . % ;f ~ ' 'f7 . C
/)S h,- ) '
~
b-Mt-is - 1 scu 1
I E MW "
M _1 '
l , r- -T 1 CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY _
NWCLE AR PL ANT Steset BSING DEP A Af tstMT - R ALGtGM. N. 4.
3RUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT inu .
CONTROL OF MEAWY LOADS
- SAFE LOAD PADS A nsacTom suitoeNeauty so'-o"
= ? ' -
- arm nuv.asa W mm g alono-e-oo4 e ,
s 7 a e a -
r
'[ f 9*" r=
P 9-e- m 1 2 3 4 .
5
- 8
,, BIO 2C M-OO6 H
t 1 y
i l g. , tLL .
l
/ lWWilitli O o O
,' g 3
, o .
wa F
39 s',i i
/
l c2
/
i ,/ ;s %
/
f V i- M = - se 80 ton
/j l- He- se
" f
~ '
i /
m l:'
t...
~
[",- ' "w #
,p -
- my %
o i::'.
m og- -
_ \
- /
\ /
C \\ / /
- /
\\
\\ /
j
\\
\s -'
_s s
) ,' s > .
m
. ss ,( N D D
's
!EIMil 0 0
- 1 i n 's y m
- O I
A i 1 2 3 4 s
- ve.
~- -
l 0 7 O O 10 1 -
_ e sies ,',"",",,
HEpuctosizs or crProouc;ur o M 5 6 gg ,ye,ggggp et,,,g o, g3g, g ( g J ,j H l
1 NOTE-u g _ ] 1. SHADED EOulPMEMT REOutRED FOR SAFE 4 's i _ _ suurDoMu L 2.DRAWIMC3 APPLICAG.E "TO uMITS I f. 7.
M s\ s U
@ S.HolSTS MUST BE REMOVED OR PgoPERLY NN =
SEC.URED WHEN Nor IN uSE.
g p -
.i l
sN r- 4 OTHER EQUIPMEMT IM THE REAcTolq
\
s -
7 .
BUILDIMG MOT AFFECTING THE
, \\ '
C.O hET K O L. OF" HEAW LooCf2 og F ,
[" D ' ., ~~ l ./
f,'m'[-
EQUIPMEMT REQ'D FOR c,AFE. l 1 -
'a*\ --
sHuToowM wu Mar se secuM iM s\
/-
/
THIG DE"AWlMQ I I E f5 5 x
] /g; EOulPMEMT REdD Foli' SAFE GMLTTDOklM O C.HI, HEAT EXCNER E o
/k 7 @MoToe courrot ccwrEK M2 lxc 480V AL
-4 @leroR COMTR*OL cEWER MQ IXD @V A(
p , ;
] @McTec ccurcot cEMTEg y2 IXA 480V AL
@MorcR COMTTOL CEMTER. MS ;XB 4LOVA.C. D
@MoTot couTxoL CEMTER MQ IXDA 15cvDC.
T @MoTot C.ouTKoL tEMTEK NQ IXD6 tsoyDf,. -
, @ h //, !
}' @ MOTOR cokrTROL C.EUTER M2 'IXA1 j' ,' i.m=.7 io Tou @MoroR courrot CENTER M9. IXB1 C f #/ i
@HRC.I. LEAK DETECroR IMTE EACK' S
//
/l _
- 4. . m . . {,- n c _
<[} ,
- 3
/ =
+HMiI,/j/
,/
11ll1111 5
g v ', [
r l {lll r CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY
==****a'taaa*""'**"'"'a'-aa"'*""*-
BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT
] CONTROL OF HEAVY LOADS SAFE LOADPATHS A )
i REACTOR BUILDING ELEV. 30'-C
- - v.2 = _- .- .
_ t
- -ana .. . .
S 7 8 9 10 o I-7 C .- O
..p._,
, 1 2 3 4 5 c,:
moso_m-coca H
4
- m I L o /
[Y
. I 1
' l
' i
- N #
- /
g \ ._
p , ,
\ /
E O
I i
l l D -
< \
m j
l
\
i y
i B !
l l -
i i
A
, l 1 2 3 4 5
. w sw O. ov- -- =r_t see.. maa.meen see
- g. ,
s .
0 7 O O 10
=
T .- w as '""","
5 e, cc uct erzt emo ucists j j 2 AND luCREASED CLARITY OF Dkte p) v gi H N OTE.*
l.GHADEO EQulPMEkTT REQ'O FOR 8,AFE.
SHUTDOWW 2DRAWIMG APPLICABLE TD UNITS I & ?
- ;; i i , ,
3 HotSTS MuST BC EEMcNED OR PROPERLY FMc + " --
" " ~
5E T T ._@ SECURED L1HEkl MOT ILI USC bh _ 4OTHER EOutPMENT IM THE REACJOR
- 5 BuiLDsMc ucrr AFFEC. tim 6 THE c.cMTROL C OF HEAVY LCM OR EOulPMENT FCit
./
SAFE GHUTDOWM MAY MOT BE SHOWN gygg ,, ,_ F pggg ,o yog iN THIS DNIMG
. o O EculPMEMT REcutRED FCK 4AFE 4.HUTOOWM
@ FAN coct Ib.1Cs UMIT
@ E.KK.S. HEAT EXCHAMOEK E
g @ R.HK. PUMP o @ HRC.l.$. PUMP d TL.!K51NE IMSTEUMEMT EACK
~ '
= . - -
c @ aec.i.s. TunsiuE C : l r MK-7
[ 6E
@ H.P.CLS. PUMP
[# ,, fg @HPC.l Gl.AupExkauST PUMPW/ 5ARO, c.c METKlC .
@aec.i. leu oErEcroc iusT r4Ct A
- M c '2. -
IOTON @Lt.PC.I. LEVEL. StarTC.H I-X-LGHH-4136
-3 /M N
,=
$ Q
@lt.C.lC. TUESIME C l
@R.C.I.C PUMP i
gs o
- j;'--h g- v e e < / / //i DEPICTS SAFE LOAD AREA C : ~:: !- -
B QAROLINA POWER 8: LIGHT COMPANY _
mucteam P6 ant emeimane.no capaniment - nate.e.e. m. c. 1 3RUNSWICK STEARI ELECTRIC PLANT
~
cowTnot or HEAvvLoans SAFE I.DAc PATHS A naAcTon eviLome stav.eit'-o- l
. ' m.
- "
- l ""l"" l = _"__"'
esa tisw j.ty wee kmqw esoa0-u-cos e l s 7 e o to _
1
_ ! }.
Q
- __ _ .- _ ., ._ ,