ML20005E138

LER 89-041-00:on 891125,unplanned ESF Actuation Occurred as Result of Two Leads Shorted Together During Testing of Control Circuitry,Causing Valve Isolation from Suppression Pool.Sys Lineup Restored to Normal position.W/891226 Ltr

ML20005E138
Person / Time
Site:	River Bend
Issue date:	12/26/1989
From:	Booker J, England L GULF STATES UTILITIES CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
LER-89-041, LER-89-41, RBG-32016, NUDOCS 9001030378
Download: ML20005E138 (4)

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December 26, 1989 RBG-32016 i p File Nos. G9.5, G9.25.1.3  ;

i U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission L Document Control Desk j Washington, D.C. 20555,  !

! Gentlemen:

River Bend Station - Unit 1

? ' Docket No. 50-458 l

[ Please find enclosed Licensee Event' Report No.'89-041 for River Bend Station - Unit 1. 'This report is being submitted pursuant E to 10CFR50.73.

I -Sincerely, f/ mY ,

[r*1. E. Booker Manager-River Benc Oversight River-Bend Nuclear Group JEB/TFP/ / ' /ch >

cc: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000 Arlington, TX 76011 NRC Resident Inspector P.O. Box 1051  !

St. Francisville, LA 70775 INP0 Records Center

-1100 Circle 75 Parkway  :

Atlanta, GA 30339-3064

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Condition 1 (Power Operation) an unplanned Engineered Safety Feature (ESP) actuation occurred as a result of two leads being shorted together during surveillance testing of associated control circuitry.

This caused the valvo isolating the suppression pool from the high pressure core spray (IIPCS) system suction path (1E22*MOVF015) to stroke open. When this valve was fully open, the llPCS suction path

! from the condensato storage tank was isolated bv the closure of valve l 1E22*MOVF001, 1

l l The high presnure core sprav (IIPCS) suction path automatic transfer i function performed as designed. No other safety systems were affected. Therefore, there was no adverse impact on the health and - '

safety of the public as a result of this event.

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At 1450 on 11/25/89 with the unit at 97.5 percent power in Operational ,

Condition 1 (Power Operation) an unplanned Engineered Safety Feature

! (ESP) actuation occurred as a result of two leads being shorted together during surveillance testing of associated control circuitry.

This caused the valve (*20*) isolating the suppression pool from the high pressure core spray (HPCS) system (*BG*) suction path (lE22*MOVF015) to stroke open. When this valve was fully open, the c

HPCS suction path from the condensate storage tank (*KA*) was automatically isolated by the closure of valve IE22*MOVF001 (*20*).

The actuation of the HPCS suction path automatic transfer constitutes t an ESF actuation. Therefore, this report is hereby submitted pursuant to 10CFR50.73 (a) (2) (iv) . The HPCS suction path automatic transfer '

function performed as designed and the reactor core isolation cooling '

(RCIC) system was operable throughout the event.

INVESTIGATION At the time of the actuation described above, surveillance test procedure (STP) 203-4207, Rev. 8, ECCS/HPCS-Suppression Pool Water Level-High Monthly Channel Functional, 18 month channel calibration, 18 month LSFT 1E22*N055C, 1E22*N655C, was being performed. As a part of this surveillance test, the leads are lifted on terminals

• TB-0007-01 and TB-0007-02 in panel 1H13*P625. Lifting these leads removes the normally open contacts, M1 and T1 from control relay 1E22A-K31 and thus will prevent 1E22*MOVF015 from stroking.

The functional portion of the STP had been completed and restoration was in progress when terminals TB-0007-01 and TB-0007-02 were accidentally shorted together. This action energized the valve operator for IE22*MOVF015 which caused the valve to stroke open and was thus responsible for the ESF actuation described above.

This surveillance procedure has been performed a total of eleven times and it's corresponding procedure (STP 203-4208 Rev. 7) a total of sixteen times with no similar problems noted.

A review of previously submitted LERs found that similar events were reported in LERs88-004 and 89-029. Two RCIC isolations due to shorting of leads were reported in LER 88-04. Shorted leads led to multiple ESF actuations including a Division II Diesel Generator (DG) auto-start, Division I and II standby gas treatment system, annulus mixi n'g , and fuel building filter train auto-starts, and closure of various containment isolation valves as reported in LER 89-029.

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The shorted connection was opened, the system line-up was restored to normal and a control board line-up was performed per procedure. The surveillance test procedure restoration was continued after the short was removed with no repeated occurrences. The surveillance test procedures, STP 203-4207 Rev. 8 and 203-4208 Rev. 7 have been revised to delete lifting the lead on TB-0007-02 in panel IH13*P625. This will achieve the same results as lifting leads on both TB-0007-01 and TB-0007-02 and decrease the potential for a recurrence of this event.

The technician involved has received counseling, and training will be conducted on the event for all I&C foremen and technicians by February 25, 1990.

SAFETY ASSESSMENT The IIPCS suction path automatic transfer function performed as designed and the RCIC system was operable throughout the event.

Therefore, there was no adverse impact on the health and safety of the public or the safe operation of the plant as a result of this event.

NOTE: Energy Industry Identification System Codes are identified in the text as (*XX*).

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