ML20043B330

LER 90-017-00:on 900419,inadequate Fire Barrier in Shake Space Occurred Contrary to Tech Spec.Caused by Oversight. Roving Fire Watch Scheduled.Maint Will Rework Voids & Install Seismic Gap seal.W/900521 Ltr

ML20043B330
Person / Time
Site:	River Bend
Issue date:	05/21/1990
From:	England L, Odell W GULF STATES UTILITIES CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
LER-90-017, LER-90-17, RBG-32873, NUDOCS 9005290108
Download: ML20043B330 (4)

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'. GULF STATES UTILITIES COMPAN1' wvte u u,snuou uw ounct wu m s, ruumut u>nwmn ARE A CODt bD4 fdh M M 34f Pf41 May 21,1990 i RBG- 32873 File Nos. G9.5, G9.25.1.3 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission '

Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555 Gentlemen:

1 River Bend Station - Unit 1 Docket No. 50-458 Please find enclosed Licensee Event Report No.90-017 for River Bend Station - Unit 1. This report is being submitted pursuant to 10CFR50.73.

Sincerely, W. H. Odell i Manager-Oversight j f River Bend Nuclear Group AT R)& jff'" l TFP/PDG/ JHM pg cc: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  ;

611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000  :

Arlington, TX 76011 NRC Resident Inspector .

P.O. Box 1051 St. Francisville, LA 70775 INPO Rscords Center 1100 Circle 75 Parkway Atlanta, GA 30339-3064 90052901os 900523 4_

, [M ADOCK 05000458 V PDC i .

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.: LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) ' ' a ' * ' ' 81

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"' Inadequate Fire Barrier in Shake Space / Contrary to TS Caused by <

Human Oversight During Construction Evthf OATE ISI Lim Nuestin (St RIPORT Daf t (71 OTMtn F ACILITit$ INv0Lvtp t06

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YES lif ren cometere Ex9tCTED SVOMISSr0k OATil no l l L881R ACT tsem*r to F400 sonens a e . eneroneere'v h9 teen eing.e weto troewerrten sness noi on 02/01/90 with the unit at 100 percent power (operational Condition

1) , during the performance of surveillance test procedure, STP-000-3602, two voids in a fire barrier were discovered in the shake space between the auxiliary building and the containment shield wall.

.These voids were determined on 4/19/90 to constitute a breach in the 3-hour fire barrior requirement as defined by 10CFR 50 Appendix R.

The installation oversight occurred during construction. The root cause was determined to be human error.

The two areas involved were added to the roving fire watch schedule.

Maintenance will rework the voids and install a seismic gap seal in accordance with specification 229.180, A change will be made to STP-000-3602 so that future inspections by OA/0C personnel will include instructions to inspect for seismic gap seals.

The combination of structural design, location of the discovered voids and separation of redundant safe shutdown equipment provides assurance that the plant safety and health and safety of the public has not been compromised.

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e v.s aucumi vuTo , commissio LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT C5NTINUATION u.aovio ove o mo-oio.

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0l0 01 2 0F 0l3 vent . . w.ac ,.- min u nn REPORTED CONDITION l

On 02/01/90 during the performance of surveillance test procedure  !

STP-000-3602, with the plant in Operational condition 1 (100 percent  !

power), two voids in a fire barrier were discovered in the shake space  !

between the auxiliary building (*NF*) and the containment shield wall.  !

These volds are above the main steam tunnel walls (at the junction of l the containment shield wall and steam tunnel wall as shown on (

attachment) and extend through the thickness of the elevation 141 ft. l slab. The gap in the sealant material in the shake space is a breach '

in the 3-hour fire barrier, as specified in 10CFR 50 Appendix R.

Condition Report 90-0082 was initiated to identify the problem.

However, it was not until during the investigation of the problem on ,

04/19/90 that it was determined to be a condition different from the  !

situation currently being documented by revisions to LER 89-010.  !

Condition Report 90-0339 was written to document the unique condition ,

and is reportable pursuant 10CFR50. 73 (a) (2) (1) (B) as a condition. i prohibited by Technical Specification, j INVESTIGATION Field investigation of the voids identified at the junction of the shield building wall and the steam tunnel wall at elevation 139 ft. in j the auxiliary building revealed that the fire barrier was not installed in the shake space above the wall during construction. The slab at elevation 141 ft. is approximately 1 ft.3 in, thick at this  ;

particular junction; the top of the wall is approximately 139 ft. 91n. 3 Therefore, for the thickness of the slab, no fire barrier existed.

Engineering and Design Coordination Report (E&DCR) P-2989A provides details to drawing EC-68H for the fire seals around the main steam  !

tunnel and E&DCR P-2952A provides details for the fire sea]s for the shake spaces in the auxiliary building. Apparently, during construction, confusion as to which detail should be used to seal this i transition space led to no action being taken. Personnel error-is l

considered the root cause of this event. No other LERs have been j submitted involving failure to provide a seal in shake spaces.

The intersection of the main steam tunnel walls and the containment shield wall are labyrinthed together to avoid the possible streaming of radiation. The intricate passage way created is three inches wide and four feet long. The location of the voids is in an isolated corner of the auxiliary building. Should a fire occur, smoke, gas or flame would have to travel a tortuous path to escape through the void. ,

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UCENSEE EVENT REP!RT (LER) TEXT CENTINUATl!N u.aovio ove no sino-oio.

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0 l0 0l 3 or 0l3 vent n- . . e w an.nm 1 CORRECTIVE ACTION The two areas were added to the roving fire watch schedule to provide for immediate corrective action.

In order to maintain the integrity of the fire. barriers, the voids will be reworked to coinply with E&DCR P-2989A, details 41-41 and 42-42. On the inside face, a seismic gap seal will be_ installed in accordance with Specification 229.180 and Detail GK of the E&DCR. A change will be made to STP-000-3602 so that future inspections by OA/0C personnel will include instructions to inspect for seismic gap seals.

SAFETY ASSESSMENT Three. valves (*V*) (1B21*F019, 1E12*F008, and IE51*F064) needed for safe shutdown are. located in the main steam tunnel. These valves are needed for safe shutdown in the event of loss of Division II power.

.The cables and associated wiring for the functionally redundant train (Division II) are located outside the steam tunnel at a distance

. greater than twenty (20) feet. Furthermore, smoke detectors are

. installed in the auxiliary building near the main steam tunnel walls.-

The combination of 1) structural geometry of the shield wall / main steam tunnel. wall, 2) remote location. of the voids, and 3) separation of redundant safe shutdown systems provides assurance that plant safety and de health and safety of the public were not compromised.

i NOTE: Energy Industry Identification System Codes are identified in the text as (*XX*).

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