ML20024J320

LER 94-022-00:on 940907,TS Violation Occurred Due to Inadequate Fire Watch.Retrained Personnel Associated W/ Painting activities.W/941007 Ltr

ML20024J320
Person / Time
Site:	River Bend
Issue date:	10/07/1994
From:	Fisiciaro J, Gates T ENTERGY OPERATIONS, INC.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
LER-94-022, LER-94-22, RBG-40936, NUDOCS 9410130265
Download: ML20024J320 (4)

Text

Entargy Opsrations, Inc.

River Bend Station 8

5485 U S. H;ghway 61 S F a cis 10. LA 70775 (504) 336-622.5 FAX (504) 635-5068 JAMES J. FISICARO Director Nuclear Safety 7

October 7, .1994 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555

Subject:

River Bend Station - Unit 1 Docket No. 50-458 License No. NPF-47 Licensee Event Report 50-458/94-022-00 File No.: G9.5, G9.25.1.3 RBG-40936

. RBF1-94-0068 i

Gentlemen:

In accordance with 10CFR50.73, enclosed is a Licensee Event Report. ,

Sincerely, d're k%

JJF/jr enclosure xc: U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region IV NRC Sr. Resident Inspector INPO Records Center Mr. C. R. Oberg Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality, Radiation Protection Division toe ^ , ,

9410130265 941007 PDR ADOCK 05000458 p' S PDR , J.

NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OM8 NO. 3150-0104 (se2) EXPIRES 6/31/95 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) EEST7" EGARSNS EDENE Eiu"AS 'TO"E TH INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCe4 (MN88 7714). U S NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION. WASHINGTON.

DC 20555 0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (31504)104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, W ASHINGTON, DC 20503 F ACIUTY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) PAGE p)

River Bend Station 05000-458 1 of 3 llTLE (4)

VIOLATION OF TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS DUE TO INADEQUATE FIRE WATCH EVENT DATE (5) LER NUMBER (6) REPORT DATE (7) OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)

MONTH CAY YEAR YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION MONTH DAY YEAR F ACluTY NAME DOCKET NUMBER NUMBER NUMBER N/A 05000 F ACIUTY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 09 07 94 94 022 00 10 07 94 N/A 05000 OPERATING THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT To THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR $ (check one or more (11)

MODE (9) 1 20.402(b) 20.405(c) 50.73(a)(2)(iv) l 73.71(b)

POWER 20.405(a)(1)(i) 50.36(c)(1) 50.73(a)(2)(v) l 73.71(c)

LEVEL (10) 100 20.405(a)(1)(ii) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(vii) OTHER X ow m m 20.405(a)(1)(ill) 50.73(a)(2)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) j,sp.c e7yy.

20.405(a)(1)(iv) 50.73(a)(2)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 20.405(a)(1)(v) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(x)

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12) _

NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)

T.W. Gates, Supervisor - Nuclear Licensing 504-381-4866 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE Sf 5 TEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER R RA E CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER R TABLE M "T" DAY YE^R SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14) EXPECTED YES X NO SUBMISSION (If ye., complete EXPECTED SUDMISSION DATE)

DATE (15)

ABSTRACT (umno 14oo p.c , . . .oprommm.ey is .me.-.p.c.a typ.*ntre im..)(in At 1732 hours0.02 days <br />0.481 hours <br />0.00286 weeks <br />6.59026e-4 months <br /> on September 7,1994 with the reactor in Operational Condition 1 (Power Operation), during restoration of a portion of the fire protection system, opemtions personnel ide.ntified that a continuous fire watch was not properly implemented in accordance with RBS Technical Specifications Section 3.7.6.2.c.

The subsequent investigation revealed that the responsible individual left the assigned area approximately twenty-one (21) minutes prior to the sprinkler system being returned to an operable status. The system was returned to service at approximately 1730 hours0.02 days <br />0.481 hours <br />0.00286 weeks <br />6.58265e-4 months <br />.

~

The f66rcause of this event was attributed to a failure to ensure that the fire watcli v7iis mainiairied'diiring system inoperability. Contract personnel failed to comply with requirements that the fire watch be maintained until the system had been properly restored. Corrective actions included disciplinary actions for the responsible individuals and retmining of personnel associated with painting activities.

The area was without coverage for approximately 21 minutes. During this time, automatic sprinkler system AS-12 was opemble for fire suppression. The area in the vicinity of the water curtain does not contain equipment which requires the storage of combustible materials for maintenance. Therefore, there was a low probability of a fire occurring in that area during the time of inadequate coverage. Due to other fire protection deficiencies, the Auxiliary Building was also being patrolled by hourly roving fire watch personnel. The health and safety of the public was not compromised as a result of this condition.

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P!RC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB No. 3150-0104 Tw1) EXPIRES 5/31/95 N oRMATION LE RE E $0 R RW LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE

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SSs'oe'3 7 o^r?cE 'o"r'" U NAGEME ET WA$HINGTON. DC 20503 F ACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) l PAGE (3)

Rivsr Bend Station 05000-458 94-022-00 l2 OF 3 i TEXT (M trvxe space ts requwed, use addthonalcopoos of NRC Forrrt 306A)(17)

REPORTED CONDITION Plant personnel had removed a ponion of the fire protection system from service. Water sprinkler WS-20 had been isolated to prevent inadvenent actuation due to paint vapors in the area of the fire detectors. As a result of the inoperability of WS-20, TS action 3.7.6.2.c was appropriately implemented within the times specified by TS. However, prior to the system being returned to the operable status, fire watch personnel exited the area. This resulted in the affected area being without fire watch coverage for approximately 21 minutes. Even though the appropriate actions were taken, they were not properly maintained to ensure full compliance with RBS TS. This repon is submitted pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)2(i)(b) as an operation prohibited by the Technical Specincations.

INVESTIGATION RBS TS Section 3.7.6.2.c requires Auxiliary Building fire protection sprinkler system (*KP*) WS-20 to be operable whenever the protected equipment is required to be operable. In the event of inoperability, the TS requires personnel to establish a continuous fire watch with backup fire suppression equipment for those areas in which redundant systems or components could be damaged. Sprinkler WS-20 provides a three hour protective fire barrier (water curtain) for redundant unit coolers (*VF*). Therefore, a continuous fire watch was necessary.

On September 7,1994 at 0700 hours0.0081 days <br />0.194 hours <br />0.00116 weeks <br />2.6635e-4 months <br />, contract personnel were assigned to spray paint piping and structures in the Auxiliary Building on elevation 141'. As a precautionary measure, plant operations personnel isolated WS-20 in accordance with plant tagout procedures to prevent inadvertent actuation of the system due to airborne paint vapors in the vicinity of area fire detectors. At the time of system impairment, a fire watch was established under the direction of the contract foreman. The painting activities were concluded at approximately 1709 hours0.0198 days <br />0.475 hours <br />0.00283 weeks <br />6.502745e-4 months <br />. Prior to restoration of WS-20, the contract foreman released fire watch personnel from the continuous Gre watch assignment.

Subsequent interviews with involved personnel revealed that the contract foreman released the fire watch following notification to the plant operations control operating foreman that painting had been completed and the system tagout could be released. However, involved contract personnel did not recognize that the Gre watch would be required in the area until the system was restored. The interviews revealed that the contract foreman was aware of this requirement; however, at the time of occurrence, there was a lack of concentration on the requirements for the fire watch assignment by the contract foreman.

When operations personnel arrived to restore the system at 1730 hours0.02 days <br />0.481 hours <br />0.00286 weeks <br />6.58265e-4 months <br />, it was recognized that the fire watch was not at the assigned kration. The Shift Superintendent was notified at 1732 hours0.02 days <br />0.481 hours <br />0.00286 weeks <br />6.59026e-4 months <br /> of the non-compliance.

ROOT CAUSE A task analysis and interviews with the responsible personnel revealed that the failure to comply with the Hre watch duty requirements was caused by inattention to responsibility and details. The fire watch personnel are specifically tmined and qualiGed at RBS by classroom participation and exam.

b f,lRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 6 92) EXPIRES 5/31/95 MA Le RE O H ORW LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) couueNTs neoAnoiNo sunoeN esriurre to TNs TEXT CONTINUATlON E![^s?hulteSn"n'eofATO OMMS ON JGTN

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Rivsr Bend Station 05000-458 94-022-00 3OF3 TLK1 (W mars space sa requaed, use e%tanelcopses d NRC hwm 306A)(11)

The contract foreman and fire watch were qualified and should have been cognizant of the requirements to remain at the assigned location until verification by operations personnel that the system had been restored.

This is included in the classroom instruction. The decision by the foreman to release the fire watch at the time of notification to operations personnel was considered to be the primary causal factor for this event.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS The contract foreman was terminated for failure to comply with established requirements and the responsible individual assigned as fire watch received disciplinary action.

All appropriate personnel working for the painting contractor, including the responsible fire watch, were trained at the weekly safety meeting on fire watch duties and responsibilities.

SAFETY ASSESSMENT The fire protection system is designed to detect and suppress fires which may occur in plant areas. WS-20 supplies a water curtain to separate redundant safety related equipment located on elevation 141' of the Auxiliary Building. The purpose for having a continuous fire watch is to ensure that an immediate backup means for fire detection, protection and notification is established in safety related areas of the plant when permanent fire protection systems are unavailable.

The area was without coverage for approximately 21 minutes. During this time, automatic sprinkler system AS-12 was operable for fire suppression. The area in the vicinity of the water curtain does not contain equipment which requires the storage of combustible materials for maintenance. Therefore, there was a low probability of a fire occurring in that area during the time of inadequate coverage. Due to other fire protection deficiencies, the Auxiliary Building was also being patrolled by hourly roving fire watch personnel. The inoperability of WS-20 did not adversely affect the operation of the fire detection system in this area. Consequently, control room annunciation was available during the time of this condition. In the event of a fire in the area, the fire brigade was available and would have been activated. No fires occurred during the time of the non-compliance. Therefore, the health and safety of the public were not adversely

affected as a result of this incident.

l l ADDITIONAL INFORMATION A review of previous LERs which were associated with fire watches was performed to identify any similar events. None were found.

Note: Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) Codes are identified in the text as (*XX*). l i

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