ML20011E119

LER 90-001-00:on 900103,isolation of RCIC Steam Supply Inboard Isolation Valve Occurred During Surveillance Testing of RCIC Sys.Caused by Technician Lifting Wrong Lead,Causing ESF Actuation.Lead Relanded on terminal.W/900130 Ltr

ML20011E119
Person / Time
Site:	River Bend
Issue date:	01/30/1990
From:	Booker J, England L GULF STATES UTILITIES CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
LER-90-001, LER-90-1, RBG-32220, NUDOCS 9002080021
Download: ML20011E119 (4)

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a January 30, 1990 1 RBG- 32220 - i File Nos. G9.5, G9,25.1.3 -

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission"

- Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555.

~ ~ , e Gentlemen: ,

River Bend Station - Unit 1:

Docket No. 50-458 Please. find enclosed Licensee,. Event Report No.90-001 for River Bend Station - Unit 1. This: report is being submitted pursuant-to 10CFR50.73.

- Sincerely,

. $- Y**7 J. E. Booker  ;

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- Manager-River Bend Oversight i

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-k River Bend Nuclear Group 4 h'e k. es t i '

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l' - cc: -U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission-611 Ryan Plaza' Drive, Suite 1000 Arlington, TX 76011  !

l NRC Resident' Inspector i P.O. Box 1051 St. Francisville, LA 70775-1 1 INP0 Records Center 1100 Circle 75 Parkway p Atlanta, GA 30339-3064

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TITLE tel Isolation of Reactor Core Isolation-Coolino Isolation Valve due to Human Erro:

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p At- 2122 hours on January 3, 1990, with the unit in Operational Condition 1 at 100 percent power, an isolation of the reactor core l

isolation cooling (RCIC) steam supply inboard isolation valve (IE51*MOVF063) occurred. This was caused by an instrumentation and controls- (I&C) technician lifting an incorrect lead during the performance of a surveillance test procedure (STP). This event was a l- Division II RCIC system (*BN*) isolation and thus an engineered safety feature (ESF) actuation. Therefore, this report is hereby submitted pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv).

This event occurred during surveillance testing of the RCIC system.

Thus, the system was inoperative and the plant was in a limiting condition for operation (LCO). The RCIC isolation occurred as

. designed. No other safety systems were involved or affected. The RCIC system was restored to operable status following completion of surveillance testing. Therefore, there was no adverse impact on the health and safety of the public as a result of this event.

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At 2122 hours0.0246 days <br />0.589 hours <br />0.00351 weeks <br />8.07421e-4 months <br /> on January 3, 1990, with the unit in Operational Condition 1 at 100 percent power, an isolation of the reactor core (RCIC) steam supply inboard isolation valve isolation cooling (IE51*MOVF063) occurred. This was caused by an instrumentation. and controls (180) technician lifting an incorrect lead during the performance of a surveillance test procedure (STP). This event was a Division II RCIC system (*BN*) isolation and thus an engineered safety feature (ESF) actuation. Therefore, this report is hereby submitted pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv).

INVESiljAllpN 4 At the time of the event, surveillance test procedure (STP) 207-4295, I rev 4 "RCIC-RCIC Steam Line Flow High Timer Quarterly Ch. Cal.

(E51-K84)" was being performed. During the performance of the STP, technicians were required to lift the lead on relay lE51*K84 terminal M1 to prevent the RCIC steam supply inboard isolation valve 1E51*MOVF063 (*ISV*) from stroking closed. However, the technician lifted the lead on relay 1E12A-K129C terminal M1 in error. This contact is for the residual heat removal (RHR) pump IE12-C002C stop control automatic trip indication only and would not have affected the operation of the RHR pump automatic trip function. The STP was continued and an isolation signal was generated causing IE51*MOVF063 to stroke closed.

The shift supervisor was notified of the event. The trip signal was removed, the lead was relanded on IE12A-K129C terminal M1 and the isolation signal was reset. The STP was completed with no further occurrences. ,

A similar event was reported in LER 88-019. In this case, leads were inadvertently lifted from a control cabinet instead of the junction box for a radiation monitor. This event resulted in an initiation of the fuel building charcoal filtration system. Corrective action for this event included, counseling for the individuals involved in the event as well as training for all IAC technicians.

CORRECTIVE ACTION The lead was relanded on IE12A-K129C terminal M1 and the Division II isolation was reset. The STP was completed with no further occurrences. Maintenance guidelines, which include the procedure for lifting leads in the control room pc els, have been added-to ADM-0023

" Conduct of Maintenance."

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Training will be conducted on the event for all  !&C foremen and technicians. Training will also be conducted on A0M-0023 for all IAC and electrical maintenance personnel. The required training will be completed by March 3, 1990. The individuals involved in the event have received counseling.

l SAFETY ASSESSMENT This event occurred during surveillance testing of the RCIC system.

Thus, the system was inoperative end the plant was in a limiting

. condition- for operation (LCO). The RCIC isolation occurred as designed. No other safety systems were involved or affected. The RCIC system was restored to operable status following completion of surveillance testing. Therefore, there was no adverse impact on the health and safety of the public as a result of this event. -

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NOTE: Energy Industr Identification System Codes are identified in the text as (*XX*).

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