ML20005G164

LER 89-044-00:on 891211,unplanned ESF Actuation Occurred, Resulting in Isolation of Rcic.Caused by Technician Failing to Perform Steps of Surveillance Test Procedure in Sequence.Div II Isolation Signal reset.W/900110 Ltr

ML20005G164
Person / Time
Site:	River Bend
Issue date:	01/10/1990
From:	Booker J, England L GULF STATES UTILITIES CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
LER-89-044, RBG-32077, NUDOCS 9001180221
Download: ML20005G164 (4)

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GULF STATES UTILITIES COMPANY WtRELAJL'AflON PD1'T DFW( BOX 220 51 FP ANQ!NtLLE. L OL)t$1AN A 74776 AOf. A CDDI MM 636 (*094 346 6061 January 10, 1990 RBG- 32077 File Nos. G9.5, G9.25.1.3 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory CommissionL Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555 Gentlemen:

River Bend Station - Unit 1 Docket No. 50-458 Please find enclosed Licensee Event Report No.89-044 for River Bend Station - Unit'1. This report is being submitted pursuant to 10CFR50.73.

Sincerely, 071 g '

R#- J. E. Booker Manager-River Bend Oversight River Bend Nuclear Group JEB/TFP/RGW/DCH/ELG/pg cc: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commissioil 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000 Arlington, TX 76011 NRC Resident Inspector P.O. Box 1051 St. Francisville, LA 70775 INPO Records Center 1100 Circle 75 Parkway Atlanta, GA 30339-3064

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At 0148 on December 11, 1989 with the unit in Operational Condition 1 at 100 percent power, an unplanned Engineered Safety Feature actuation occurred. The actuation was a result of an Instrumentation and Control technician failing to perform the steps of a surveillance test procedure in sequence. The actuation caused an isolation of the reactor core isolation cooling system (RCIC). The isolation signal was reset and the RCIC system was restored to standby in accordance with system operating procedure SOP-0035. This event is hereby reported as an ESF actuation pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv).

The RCIC isolation occurred as designed. No other safety systems were affected. Therefore, there was no adverse impact on the health and safety of the public as a result of this event.

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O !O O l2 0' O13 v.c . . anc a.-am w on REPORTED CONDITION At 0148 on December 11, 1989 with the unit in Operational Condition 1 at 100 percent power, an Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) actuation occurred. The actuation was a result of an Instrumentation and Controls (I&C) technician failing to perform the steps of a surveillance test procedure in sequence. As a result of the actuation, a Division II reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) system

(*BN*) isolation occurred. This event is hereby reported as an <

Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) actuation pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv).

INVESTIGATION At the time of the event, Surveillance Test Procedure (STP) 207-4539 Rev 0A, "RCIC Isolation - RCIC Steam Supply Pressure Low Monthly Channel Functional", (E31-N6858, E31-N085B) was being performed. The functional portion of the STP had been completed and restoration was in progress. The lead technician instructed the performer to " pull out the center knob and restore removed fuses and lifted leads." This was incorrect and was the direct contributor to the event. These actions were performed prior to requesting the Nuclear Controls Operator (NCO) to turn the "RCIC Div. II Isolation Reset" switch

. E51A-S25, located on Panel H13-P601, Insert 2.B. to feset and then back to normal to reset the trip logic.

When the performer re-landed the leads without the logic being reset, the steam supply line isolation to the RCIC turb'ine and residual heat removal (RHR) condensing heat exchanger valve 1E51*MOVF063 (*20*)

stroked closed. The Shift Supervisor was notified, the Division II isolation signal was reset, and the RCIC system was restored to standby in accordance with system operating procedure SOP-0035. The technicians completed the STP with no further occurrences.

Similar events due to personnel performing the steps of surveillance tests out of sequence have been reported in LERs85-045, 86-051,88-016 and 89-032. A. Division III ECCS initiation and injection was reported in LER 85-045 due to improperly valving a transmitter into service during the performance of an STP. A reactor water cleanup (RWCU) system isolation occurred as reported in LER 86-051 due to personnel not using the RWCU isolation bypass switch. Another RWCU isolation occurred when technicians working on one logic channel  !

proceeded to another logic channel before completing steps on the i previous channel, as reported in LER 88-016. An isolation of the reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) system, as reported in LER  !89-032, occurred due to a technician not lifting a pair of leads in ~

the proper sequence with the next step, which was to initiate the RCIC trip signal. l l

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= - . - .msn mar a an.w on CORRECTIVE ACTION The Division II isolation signal was reset and the RCIC System was restored to standby in accordance with 50P-0035. The STP was completed with no further occurrences. i Training will be conducted on this event for I&C maintenance foremen and technicians with emphasis on the ADM-0015 requirement to perform steps in sequence unless directed otherwise by the STP. This training will be completed by February 28, 1990. The individuals involved in this event were counseled on their failure to correctly follow '

procedure.

SA[,[Il_ ASSESSMENT The RCIC system isolation occurred as designed. No other safety systems were involved or affected. Therefore, there was no adverse impact on the health and safety of the public as a result of this event.

NOTE: Energy Industry identification System Codes are identified in the text as (*XX*).

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