ML20011D620

LER 89-040-00:on 891117,surveillance Test of Div II Penetration Valve Leakage Control Sys Air Supply Header Pressure Not Performed within Allowable Tolerance.Addl Training of Scheduling Group Will Be provided.W/891218 Ltr

ML20011D620
Person / Time
Site:	River Bend
Issue date:	12/18/1989
From:	Booker J, England L GULF STATES UTILITIES CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
LER-89-040, RBG-31961, NUDOCS 8912280114
Download: ML20011D620 (4)

Text

i 4

• +

t GULF STATES UTILITIES COMPANY i'

Ruta Bf A3 6TA1!ON ' PDSt OFF!CE flOX 220 51 FR ANCISvitti. LOUlstAhA 70775

- AM A CODE 604 C35 60M 346 8661 December la 1989 .

R B G 31961 = '8 File Nos. G9.5, G9.25.1.3 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555 Gentlemen:

River BendsStat'ioni- Unit 1 Docket-No'. 50-458

.Please find enclosed Licensee Event Report _No.89-040'for River Bend Station -' Unit 1. 'This report is being submitted pursuant.to 10CFR50.73.

l S_.i n c e r e l y ,

, h J. EP Booker Manager-River Bend Oversight g River Bend Nuclear;-Group W W <W JEB/TFP/RGW/DC /TGM/pg a

cc: U.S. Nuc ear Regulatory Commissioni 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite L1000 Arlington, TX 76011 ,

NRC' Resident Inspector P.O. Box 1051 St. Francisville LA 70775 INP0 Records Center 1100 Circle ~75 Parkway Atlanta, GA'30339-3064' 8912280114 891218 PDR ADOCK 05000458 S PDC N? b -

i Ih

i

• RC Feem att u S. NUCLEA/. 650uLATORv COMMIWtoes

. CJPR;Vf D oms D3 31elkeite LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) ' ""' 8 8 '80 "

FiceLif y NAME Its DOCEttNUMSER() ragt m RIVER BEND STATION o l5 l 0 lo 10 l4 15 ;8 i joplo ;3 T1148 448 Surveillance Tolerance on Penetretion Velve Leekage Control System Exceeded EVENT DATE tll LE R NUMSER ($1 REPORT Daf t (Fi OTMER F ACILITit$ INVOLVED its MONYM DAY VIAR VtAR 5"LiU '"e "'j,N MONTM DAY vtAR * *C' Liv v names DOCKET NUMetaisp 0151010101 I i q9

- ~

1l1 1l 7 8 9 8l 9 0l 4 l0 0 l0 1l2 1l8 o i s ,o g o , o , , ,

THis RiponT 18 $UDMITTED PuntuANT TO THE m60uentMENTS OF 1. CF n g (checa one e, more av <*e sonen,a,11111 OPE R ATING

" " '

• I so m ai no .oem so ni.H:H i n vimi to o.wmni sowmm so ni.n:H.i Ts.fi m noi o i gi 7 ao .o.mmm nmi.Hei so ni.imius gTHt

_ _ _ ,, R r,s,ug,,; ,a;;,,=,, , , , ,

to do6te H1Hao X so TateHalos so.73i.): HvinilAl J664J 20 do64aH1H6vi RT3isH Hul to T3teit:H,uu tti J aceiteH1Hvi to T3teH21bhi to.73<elt2Hn)

LKf 48EE CONT ACT FOR THl$ LER 113)

NAME TELEPMONE NUM8pm

^*"'

L. A. England - Director, Nuclear Licensing 510 14 3l8 il t- 14 11 l4 15 COMPLETE ONt LINE FOR E ACH COMPONENT F Af tumE OtsCRitED IN TH18 REP 0mf (13 CAv.E iv m o Coo o m i ~*~x; ^ c- ";;altgp CAv.. . m. Co oNE~1 MA~g;Ac aty;;;p i i l I i l l l t i I I I I I I I l l l I I l l l l l l sue, tim NTAL areoni imCTio n .

juoNTM oAy veAn SL,SMis$lON Yt$ ti,,en com,ie,e Ex*ECTED SyewSSION DA TEI NO l l l t..u ACT + -,,,,m ... ,..-,,..,A,,.- ... .,,,._ , m ,n.,

At 1330 on 11/17/89 with the unit in Operational Condition 1 (Power Operation) it was determined that the surveillance test performed on l the Division II Penetration Valve Leakage Control System (PVLCS) air l

supply header pressure functional had not been performed within the allowable surveillance tolerance. This discrepancy was discovered after the successful completion of the surveillance test procedure (STP) on 11/17/89 at 1120.

l During the investigation that followed completion of the STP, it was discovered that the calculated tolerance was incorrect. The investigation revealed that instead of the reported allowable tolerance ending on 11/17/89 at 1105 the actual tolerance ended at 0905. At the time of discovery the STP had been completed and both Divisions of PVLCS were operable.

l During the period in which Division II of PVLCS was inoperable (2 hrs 15 min) Division I of PVLCS remained operable. Since operation with I one train of PVLCS inoperable is permitted by the Technical Specifications, and the seven day TS action statement was not exceeded, there was no impact on the health and safety of the public or the safe operation of the plant.

1 NoC Form 306 19 8J e

Nec peraismaa u8 NucLt12 atIUL1ToaY CCmannessose

' 4 UCENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION - amoveo ove No mo-oio.

imnes. eae.

)

9 ACluty asaass su 00cetti Nuesta 13 Ltm Nuesten les Pact 431 3 naa "t=t' -

'h*3 RIVER BEND STATION 0 l5 l0 lo l 0 l 4] 518 8l9 -

0 l4 l0 -

0 l0 0l2 OF 0 [3  ;

rexi n . s.s -anc , mim REPORTED CONDITION At 1330 on 11/17/89 with the unit in Operational Condition 1 (Power Operation) it was determined the surveillance test performed on the  !

Division II Penetration Valve Leakage Control System (PVLCS) air 3 l supply header pressure functional had not been performed within the  !

L allowable surveillance tolerance. This discrepancy was discovered )

l after the successful completion of the surveillance test procedure (STP) on 11/17/89 at 1120.

During the investigation that followed completion of the STP, it was discovered that the calculated tolerance was incorrect. The investigation revealed that instead of the reported allowable tolerance ending on 11/17/89 at 1105 the actual tolerance ended at  !

0905. At the time of discovery the STP had been completed and both ,

Divisions of PVLCS were operable. t Division II of PVLCS was inoperable from 11/17/89 at 0905 to 1120 (this includes the 56 minutes taken to perform the procedure). The  ;

action statement of Technical Specification (TS) 3.6.1.10 allows seven t days of inoperability of one division of PVLCS. This event is considered to be a violation of Technical Specification 4.0.2 and thus <

is reportable under 10CFR50.73 (a) (2) (1) (B) . l INVESTIGATION ,

The surveillance test procedure (STP), STP-255-4212, " Division II I Penetration Valve Leakage Control System (PVLCS) Air Supply Header i Pressure Low Channel Functional Test", is required to be performed  !

monthly in Operational Modes 1, 2, and 3 per TS 4.6.1.10.d. Due to  ;

plant conditions from 11/14/89 at 1004 to 11/17/89 at 0245 fin which the Division I Diesel Generator (DG) was inoperable per' limiting l condition for operation (LCO) LCO 89-0577. Therefore,-the procedure could not be performed without causing Division II of PVLCS to be inoperable at the same time. On 11/15/89 a surveillance tolerance ,

check was. requested by the Instrumentation and Controls (I&C) f Department due to these conditions. The tolerance was checked'by the  ;

Surveillance Test Procedure Scheduling Group which indicated that the '

surveillance would expire on 11/17/89 at 1105. The Division I DG was 1 declared operable on 11/17/89 at 0245 and LCO 89-0577 was cleared. j The I&C Department signed into STP-255-4212 at 1024 and completed the '

procedure at 1120. The STP Coordinator noted that the completion time

' ( 112 0') was past the allowable tolerance time of 1105 and proceeded to

, investigate this discrepancy. In the course of this investigation a recheck was performed of the tolerance's calculation. It was i discovered that the original calculation was not verified by a different member of the STP Group, which is not normal practice.

i i

g.o- . .u . a.,oi... + m . w i.

enc feed Esta U $ t.UCLE AA ESIUL1 TORY C0esattsSION I UCENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION - *na0veo ous ~o mo-oio.

• emnes.sv m F ACitsTy esaast tip DOCK 41 NutSth (21 Lf R NM8R los P&OE @

n.a " W.F. ':%*3: ,

t 0l4l0 0l0 0F RIVER BEND STATION 0 l5 lo l0 l014l5 l8 8l 9 - -

0l 3 0 l3 !

mn ,m. . m= =- mww m The computer generated STP tolerance check will only compute full (24 i hr.) days. Therefore, the .75 day or 18 hours2.083333e-4 days <br />0.005 hours <br />2.97619e-5 weeks <br />6.849e-6 months <br /> allowed for a monthly surveillance per TS 4.0.2 must be manually calculated. During this calculation a mathematical error was made which gave an incorrect time of_1105 while the correct time was actually 0905. Due to this error y the component (ILSV*E5128) was inoperable per Technical Specification 4.0.2 on 11/17/89 at 0905. When the STP was started at 1024 the 1 component then became functionally inoperable. At 1120 upon l completion of STP-255-4212 operability was restored. The STP was j completed satisfactorily and no adjustments were required. During the i time between 0905 and 1024 (1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> 19 min.) the Shift Supervisor was  ;

not aware that the component was inoperable per Technical J Specification 4.0.2. The action statement for TS 3.6.1.10 states that with one PVLCS division inoperable, restore the inoperable division to j operable status within 7 days or be in at least Hot Shutdown within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. Throughout the time in which Division II of PVLCS was inoperable (0905 to 1120), Division I of PVLCS remained operable. Upon discovery of the missed Division II PVLCS surveillance  !

at approximately 1330, both Divisions were operable and no immediate action was required by the Technical Specifications.

A review of previously submitted LERs found that similar events were i reported in LERs85-050, 86-048, and 89-017. Scheduling errors were j the reason that quarterly surveillances were not being performed on  !

the residual heat removal (RHR) system (LER 85-050) and an STP on the intermediate range monitor (IRM) was not performed within the 3.25' allowable tolerance specified by Technical Specification 4.0.2 (LER J 89-017). In LER 86-048 an STP on the rod pattern control system (RPCS) was missed due to poor scheduling by the responsible  ;

organization.  ;

CORRECTIVE ACTION The STP scheduling group calculated an erroneous expiration time for the STP. While this event led to exceeding the correct expiration g time, such events are infrequent occurrences. Furthermore, one train d of the affected system remained operable throughout the event and the Technical Specification action time was not exceeded. GSU will provide additional training to the STP scheduling group by January 6, 1990 to address this event.

SAFETY ASSESSMENT During the period in which Division II of PVLCS was inoperable (2 hrs 15 min) Division I of PVLCS remained operable. Since operation with one train of PVLCS inoperable is permitted by the Technical Specifications, and the seven day TS action statement was not exceeded, there was no impact on the health and-safety of the public or the safe operation of the plant.

gtg.o= m. .u s o o i.e -o.easauis

_. .