ML19329F967

Final Deficiency Rept Re Mod to Dragon Valves,Inc,Valve Manifolds.Failure of Valve Would Not Cause Malfunction During Emergency Operation of Standby Liquid Control Sys & Not Considered Reportable Per 10CFR50.55(e)

ML19329F967
Person / Time
Site:	Grand Gulf
Issue date:	07/02/1980
From:	MISSISSIPPI POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML19329F962	List: ML19329F961 ML19329F967
References
AECM-80-148, NUDOCS 8007110417
Download: ML19329F967 (2)

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• Attachment A to-AECM-80/148 Page 1 of 2 FINAL REPORT FOR PRD-80/06

1. Description of Deficiency In March of 1977, Dragon Valves, Inc., requested that certain valve manifolds, supplied by that firm, be returned for modifications and changing certain internal springs. Reports by various buyers to Dragon Valves had indicated that some of the 2 and 5 valve packless manifolds did not always open when the upper stem of the inlet valves were retracted. These problems were' revealed by functional testing.

i The affected valve manifolds at Grand Gui# were returned to the supplier and underwent the required modifications to prevent the above stated malfunctions. The modified manifolds were returned to the Grand Gulf construction site; the modifications were evaluated and the manifolds were accepted, i

An investigation was initiated in May of 1977 under Bechtel MCAR-GGNS No. 26 to evaluate the manifold deficiency and the procedures associated with modifications initiated by the supplier after re-ceipt and acceptance at the construction site. That investir,ation concluded that the matter was not reportable under 10CFR50.55(e).

That conclusion was, in part, based on the ar,sumption that func-tional testing of the system would have revealed the deficiency

... had the valve remained unmodified.

During a site inspection by Mr. M. Gouge of the NRC on March 6, 1980, a review of the above referenced MCAR was conducted. Mr.

Gauge concluded that this deficiency had been improperly evaluated.

II ., Safety Implications The valve manifolds involved in this matter are designated with Mark Nos. J-21-2N and J-21-5N, two and five valve manifolds, re-s' .ctively. These valves are used in instrumentation installa-tions. Our findings indicate that- none of thu five valve manifolds are employed in safety-related systems. The only safety-related. system in which the two valve manifolds are used is in the Standby-Liquid Control System (C41).

The Standby Liquid Control System employs these valves with two instruments, C41-N004 (Pressura Transmitter) and C41-N-R003 (Pressure Indicato r) . These instruments are used only during the testing mode of operation of-the system and are not required during the emergency operation of the system. 1 It is conclu'ded, from the above, that.the failure'of the valve to ~

function properly would not cause a malfunction during the emer-l gency operation of_the Standby Liquid Control System. Therefore, it'is not considered to be a reportabic deficiency within the meaning of 10CFR50.55(e).

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c-Attachment A to AECM-80/148 Page 2 of 2 9

III.- Corrective Action Taken The Supplier Deviation Disposition Request (SDDR) submitted by the supplier was approved by Project Engineering. The Project QA Pro-gram Policy has-been refined to provide for the proper return of

- materials / equipment to suppliers.

. Details-of corrective actions taken are documented by Management Currective Action Report (MCAR) GCNS No. 26 and is available for your review at the Grand Gulf construction site.

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