ML19324B622

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
LER 89-034-00:on 890930,determined That 10 H Run of Standby Gas Treatment Sys Train B Not Performed within Allowable Surveillance Tolerance Which Had Ended on 890904.Caused by Human Error.Operations Personnel trained.W/891027 Ltr
ML19324B622
Person / Time
Site: River Bend Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 10/27/1989
From: Booker J, England L
GULF STATES UTILITIES CO.
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
LER-89-034, LER-89-34, RBG-31699, NUDOCS 8911070196
Download: ML19324B622 (6)
v • d • e


Text

,_ _ _ _ _ . __

o GULF STATES UTELET1ES COMPANY  ;

nu u. a nen* ,ono...ai.a m, n euwas muu mm i tat. tnia as e:r ti n*,4 a at4 f.:w h

October 27, 1989 l RBG- 31699 l File Nos. G9.5, G9.25.1.3 I ,

l U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555 i Gentlemen:

i River Bend Station - Unit 1 Docket No. 50-458 i Please find enclosed Licensee Event Report No.89-034 for  :

l River Bend Station - Unit 1. This report is being submitted pursuant to 10CFR50.73.  !

Sincerely,

'Ch

. E. Booker  !

Manager-River Bend Oversight l

n. River Bend Nuclear Group 4'3) @

JEB/TFP/RGW/JIiM/HJH/ch i

cet U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  !

611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000 Arlington, TX 76011 NRC Resident Inspector '

P.O. Box 1051 St. Francisville, LA 70775 INPO Records Center 1100 Circle 75 Parkway i Atlanta, GA 30339-3064 i

~

8911070196 PDR 891027 6 ADOCK 05000458 ' ;t h

l h g,a-.. -

u. ......vu.
    • oveo o.e no eie

. i LEE %SEE EVENT CEPORT (LER) s***u *sto

. .c.a.,, . o. noc . i t . :,, . . , +

RIVER BEND STATION o 15 ! o 10 l o f 4! $18 1 loFl 015 m6'

  • F e.Ilure to Per f orm lechnical Specif icat ion Surveil t ence Due to Personne' Error e ve , o.is + 6en =v. sea e me ,o ve in n,. . e nennin nvo6 vee ei ,

most. o., ,s.. vi.= "t :',,;; ' 0'@ wows. o, vi a *

  • c+ ' , *
  • u occ . e t =swn a +  !

t cilloIc10 l

- ~

0 [9 3l0 8 9 8l 9 0l3h 0 l0 1l0 2l 7 8l9 oisto eo,oi l l t e .e.one s eve. rves cu.eu.=, to t e . ov... m o, ie ce s i ,c . . . . m.

"8*8 8' 3 m enemi n assi.i es tsion:Hi.i is tim m .i.m un _

esamm _

es vs.nsn.i is tiw

,,e, , i 0 . ..m n., . . i., . i

. , i. n .

_ gg,;.,.p,,,

. ..in n.,i . , ... . , s. n .. n ., .,

n . m nio miswan i es tawan,wei to .cwn n.i w towenn m ,swa n.i 6 ce=ese co=v.c, een t .: 6 n nei we se6ee one =sweia

.ac.cogi

=

L. A. England. Director-Nuclear Licensing 5 l0 14 318 i li- #411! 415 cow 6e vi o.: 6n.: een s.ca cowo=s=, e.nvas esecaeco n. *** escoat nai

"'o$,'n'fg' C.vot Cow *o=thf " '

Civli e,$1 w Cou*o40%f " %$C' , 8,stlw

" "d$E  %'o .e 8 I i l i i l l I I I I I l i I I I I I i 1 l l I I I I I I

.v 6 e ., .6 .. , . ..e. e,. o n.i

,,,,,,,, looi. e., vi..

~] ves ,,,, . enecree ve <u,o= oct, 7 =o l l l

,e nct n.~e ,. ..= .. .. , n, . -.n = o ei ,

At 1535 on 9/30/89 with the unit in operational condition 3 (flot Shutdown), it was determined that the 10 hour1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> run of the "B" standby gas treatment system (SGTS) train required by Technical Specification (TS) 4.6.5.4.a had not been performed within the allowable surveillance tolerance which had ended 9/4/89. This caused the "B" SGTS train to be inoperable (per TS) for a period of 26 days, which exceeded the 7 day limit of the Action Statement. Also during this time period, the "A" SGTS train was inoperable during short periods.

The immediate action taken by the shift supervisor was to complete the 10 hour1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> run of the "B" SGTS train, restoring the "B" SGTS to operable status.

The root cause of this event has been determined to be human error in the scheduling of surveillance test procedure (STP)-257-0201, " Standby Gas Treatment System Operability Test." Corrective action will consist of: 1) splitting the STP to provide better tracking for l

individual trains, 2) training to be given to Operations personnel, 3) training of STP scheduling group, and 4) an additional weekly review

( will be performed on the previous weeks performances, i

Evaluation of this event has concluded that the filter train could have performed its designed safety function in the event of an accident. Therefore, there was no impact on the safety and health of I the public as a result of this event.

l nec e-. ame k.Ii

e.- sua v auc6u novao., co . l UCENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION awaovio ove *o me-o*

twssen ,

passmt eMst ni Dotati mutStt tai tem esutete eti ,aN isi u.. "ttut- TMn i RIVER BEND STATION o is lc le ts l 4l$ lB 8l 9 -

0l3l4 -

0l0 0 l2 of 015  !

"" AEF6Nff5"d5NSTS1i3T""*" 1 At 1535 on 9/30/89 with the unit in Operational Condition 3 (hot shutdown), a review of the surveillance test status and tracking system (STSTS) for the allowable tolerance of the Surveillance Test Procedure (STP)-257-0201, " Standby Gas Treatment System Monthly '.

Operability Test" revealed that the 10 hour1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> run of the "B" train of the standby gas treatment system (SGTS) (*BH*) required by Technical Specification (TS) 4.6.5.4.a had not been performed within the ,

allowable surveillance tolerance per TS 4.0.2. This condition rendered "B" train of SGTS inoperable per TS; however, the SGTS train ,

was still capable of performing its safety function. The seven day TS '

Action Statement to be in hot shutdown within twelve hours and cold shutdown within twenty-four hours had been exceeded as of 9/11/89.

  • The reactor was in full power operation until a reactor scram occurred at 0340 on 9/30/89 (see LER 89-035). This condition is reportable pursuant to 10CFR50.73 (a) (2) (1) (B) as operation prohibited by the Technical Specifications.

INVESTICATION Each train of the SGTS is required to be run for ten hours with the heaters energized every 31 days while in operational Conditions 1, 2 and 3 per TS 4.6.5.4.a. On 8/26/89, the ten hour run for "A" SGTS train was completed satisfactorily. Electrical preventive maintenance was then performed on the "B" SGTS panel. When the "B" SGTS train was started to verify operability, a blown fuse was discovered. The fuse was replaced and the "B" train of SGTS was run for three minutes using STP-257-0201, " Standby Gas Treatment System Monthly operability Test" to verify operability. However, a ten hour run of the "B" SGTS train was still needed in order to satisfy the monthly surveillance requirements.

On 8/28/89, the STP group of Operational Planning and Scheduling received the STP completion / exception form that was to designate tho' performance of STP-257-0201 as a partial performance for the ten hour run of the "A" SGTS train only. The operations Department supervisor had lined out and initialed the complete performance check mark and marked the partial performance space with an "X". Section 5.8.3.3 of Administrative Procedure (ADM)-0015 requires notation of the unacceptable subsystem as an exception to the STP. When data entry was made to the STSTS system, the STP completion / exception form was misinterpreted and updated as a full performance of STP-257-0201.

l This input was proofed and misread again, and independently but incorrectly verified two days later on 8/30/89.

l On 9/4/89 the allowable tolerance limit of STP-257-0201 was exceeded, rendering "B" SGTS train inoperable. Although the heater circuits of the train were operable and the system was capable of operating, the tet. hour run had not been completed. NRC Regulatory Guide 1.52, g,....-.. .u. . 4 n. u. s.

(

- .-- m.*

v . wn s . ...m.,o. no .. ,

UCENSit EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUAT6ON **novio on no w-oice si.m . si e u .. e o, s**i. = m e. + . . . . . . . , noi +

'ua "t LR. 56*Ji RIVER FIEND STATION O15101018lAl518 819 -

Ol3i 4 -

0 10 013 0' 0b ,

"feTI'on7.YI"rYeYnEeEls performing the ten hour rurs in order to reduce the moisture butidup on the charcoal absorbers and HEPA filters. It should be noted that on several occasions during the period between 8/26/89 and 9/30/89, "B" SGTS train was successfully run with the heaters energized: twice on 8/26/89 for a total of fifteen minutes, twice on 9/16/a3 for a total of 23 secondc; and once on 9/26/89 for one hour and fifteen minutes. On 9/11/89, the seven '

day Action Statement of TS 3.6.5.4 was exceeded. Also during the time period between 9/4/89 and 9/30/84, several events occurred which required "B" SGTS train to be operable. Division I diesel generator

(*EK*) was inoperable due to maintenance, the "A" SGTS fan 1A was out i of service for preventive maintenance and the "A" SGTS heater was inoperable due to a blown fuse, on 9/30/89 a tolerance check for STP-257-0201 was requested by the '

Operations Department. The STP coordinator performed the tolerance check and noted that the $TP completion / exception form for the 8/26/89 performance was not a full performance as the STSTS computer indicated. The shift supervisor was notified that a verification of the STP documentation would be required. The STP coordinator recommended that the ten hour run of "B" SGTS be started. The reactor -

was in hot shutdown (Operational Condition 3) at the time. At 1326 on 9/30/89 the ten hour run was started. At 1535, the verification of the STP documentation was completed and the conclusion made that the 8/26/89 performance of STP-257-0201 was for the SGTS "A" train only.

At 2330 on 9/30/89 the ten hour run of "B" SGTS was completed satisfactorily from the as found condition. The "B" SGTS was declared ,

operable prior to the reactor (*RCT*) startup.

The root cause of this event has been determined to ho human error.

Even though the verification process for the data input to the STSTS system is a proven process, as indicated by the small number of errors l made compared to the number of STP performances completed (20,219) since the system's inception, two individuals erred in verifying the input as correct. Contributing to the error was a lack of completc

  • information on the STP completion form.

There have been three LERs previously submitted by River Bond Station involving regularly scheduled STPs where the surveillance interval was exceeded due to scheduling errors LER 85-050 described quarterly STPs for the residual heat removal (RHR) system which were improperly rescheduled following post maintenance testing of a RHR valve; LER 86-048 described a daily STP for the control rod pattern controller high and low power setpoint functional testa that were missed by two days due to poor scheduling within the maintenance department; and LER 89-017 which involved a manual change to the STSTS which caused the intermediate range neutron monitor weekly functional STPs to exceed their 3.25 allowable tolerance by nine hours and forty-five minutes while the unit was shutdown.

. m.o , ... . .u o. .i.

.g.... .

m f

L w .. . ~m.. . a.a . c- w

    • UCENSit EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION maoito ov =o swo.

mm e si e

. un m o m ii a m en ai 6,. . ., ....,,,

n** " t ' n." t "22, i

RIVER DEND STATION e p ;o je l,l 4l$lg gl 9 _ oj 3l4 _ ojo oja or o j$

ven g g=gac an..,mi At 1326 or. 9/30/89, upon notification that the "B" SGTS STP may not have been performed within the required tolerance, the shift supervisor began the required ten hour SGTS run. When verification was made that the "B" SGTS train ten hour run had not been performed L

within the required tolerance, the shift supervisor reviewed the TS Action Statement 3.0.5.4 and noted that the plant was already in hot shutdown and until the ten hour run was completed satisfactorily, the impending reactor startup would not commence. At 2330 on 9/30/89, the i ten hour STP run of the "B" SGTS train was completed satisfactorily.

To prevent a similar error in the future, STP-257-0201 will be split into 2 separate procedures to allow better traceability of the required ten hour run for each SGTS train. Also, the Ooerations Department personnel who are involved in the completion of a STP completion / exception form will undergo training by the STP scheduling ,

group on the proper methods to be used. Additionally, the STP group of Operational Planning and Scheduling will conduct training by the STP scheduling group on the STSTS data entry verification process and will conduct an additional weekly review of the STP scheduling log to verify STP performances.

, SAFETY ASSESSMENT According to the maintenance guidanco of NRC Regulatory Guide 1.5, Revision 2, each engineered safety feature (ESP) atmosphere cleanup train should be operated ten hours per month in order to reduce the buildup of moisture on the charcoal absorbers and HEPA filters. P SGTS train "B" was run only fifteen minutes on 8/26/89 and exceeded the ten hour run STP allowable tolerance on 9/4/89. Subsequently, t train "B" was run twenty-three seconds on 9/16/89, one hour and '

thirty-four minutes on 9/26/09, and had an official ten hour run on '

9/30/89. The heater was operable except during the first twelve minutes of the run on 8/26/89.

The technical justification for the periodic ventilation runs is i better explained in ERDA 76-21, " Nuclear Air Cleaning Handbook",

Section 2.2.3. Briefly, it states that common sources for sensible moisture are saturated air or gas stream, carry-over from air washers and scrubbers, sprinklers if activated in the event of a fire, and large volumes of steam and moisture during a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) or heat-exchanger failure. Condensation can take place when filters are installed in underground pits, in housings located outdoors, or in unheated spaces of buildings, or when groundwater can evaporate into the filter housing salts that leak from wood filter casings. The conclusion is to perform periodic ventilation on a monthly or weekly basis.

...... . . v i m.. o .,. m .i.

e

>> . *[v .*

I 1, v. =un ne o w uvom u o . .a "l UCENSEE EVENT REFORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION .movsp ow =o sino-e*

i,........

  1. Agl4tTV h4M5 66 Def44% NJtSSR 486 gga segugge igi ,600 tai
o. " h !.1' . "'J1!?

l' RIVER BEND STATION o p jolclel4[5l8 8 l9 -

0 l3 [4 -

0 l0 0l5 of 0j5

""'Xt"ftT0 ewe'n?"IEaTITA"the scTs system is not susceptible to condensation concerns like those mentioned above. The system has experienced no sensible moisture (i.e., saturated air, carry-over from washers, sprinkler actuations, LOCA or heat-exchanger failure). Based on the fact that the SGTS train "B" had been run four times throughout the time frame, any small amount of moisture that had existed in the filter housing would have been removed. The filter would have been able to perform its design function in the event of an accident.

During this period, there were no events which required the filter to perform its safety function. Therefore, it is concluded that there was no impact on the health and safety of the public as a result of this event.

NOTE: Energy Industry Identification System Codes are identified in the text as (*XX*).

t I

i l

g,, o.. m. .u s s o isse oesa sn ais

Retrieved from "https://kanterella.com/w/index.php?title=ML19324B622&oldid=2488167"