ML18354A757

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NRC-2018-000251 - Resp 1 - Final, Agency Records Subject to the Request Are Enclosed. (Part 1 of 2)
ML18354A757
Person / Time
Issue date: 11/27/2018
From:
NRC/OCIO
To:
Shared Package
ML18354A758 List:
References
FOIA, NRC-2018-000251
Download: ML18354A757 (377)


Text

From: Guzman, Richard Sent: 22 Jun 2017 09:09:45 -0400 To: Helton, Shana;Cylkowski, David;Setzer, Thomas;Banic, Merrilee Cc: Rudland, David;Greives, Jonathan;Haagensen, Brian;Siwy, Andrew;Rich, Sarah;Broaddus, Doug;Danna, James;Kim, James;Benner, Eric;Mikula, Olivia

Subject:

ACTION: 2.206 Immediate Action Request re: Indian Point Unit 3 Rx Head 0-rings and Restart (LTR-17-0235)

Attachments: SR1-3118K5017061606420.pdf, FW: Quick Turnaround Request for OGC Review, RE: Ticket LTR-17-0235 All, Good morning. We've received a 2.206 petition from Tom Gurdziel concerning the reactor vessel head o-rings at Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 3 (IP3). He requests that NRC prevent restart of IP3 until they essentially determine a root cause. Because of the timing of their startup, we are treating the petitioner's request to keep IP3 shutdown as a request for immediate action. While the licensee has already synchronized to the grid (completed ahead of schedule earlier this a.m.), we intend to follow the process per MD 8.11 , to the extent possible and 'promptly' notify the petitioner of the pending staff action (i.e., per MD 8.11, when the staff plans to take an action contrary to the requested action in the petition (i.e., permitting restart of a facility when the petitioner has requested that restart not be permitted).

To expedite this step in the process, I would like to forego a PRB F2F meeting and get your concurrence and/or comments via e-mail today by 12 pm, if possible.

ACTION by 1200 6/22: Please review the petition request (1-page email attached) and let me know if you have any objections or concerns with the proposed path to reject the petitioner's request for immediate action (i.e., to prevent the restart of IP3), based on the PRB determination that there are no immediate safety significant concerns which would adversely impact the public's health and safety. Also, provide comments/mark-ups, if any on the proposed e-mail response to the petitioner (draft e-mail below). Also, note that as stated in today's 0800 RI call , the Region does not have any immediate safety concerns with licensee's decision to startup as the reactor vessel head outer o-ring is currently holding RCS pressure.

Forthcoming steps for addressing petitioner's request for immediate action:

1. 1. PRB members to concur on determination to deny petitioner's immediate action request -

respond to PM via email today by 1200

2. 2. Obtain NRR concurrence on the PRB recommendation for addressing the petitioner's requests for immediate action
3. Inform petitioner of staff's decision or pending actions regarding the petitioner's immediate action requests (NOTE: per MD 8.11 , if the staff plans to take an action that is contrary to an immediate action requested in the petition (permitting restart of a facility when the petitioner has requested that restart not be permitted), the petitioner must promptly be notified of the pending staff action).

3.

4. Follow-on steps:
5. 1. A follow-on PRB meeting will be scheduled on a later date to make an initial recommendation as to whether or not the petition meets the criteria for review under 10 CFR 2.206
6. 2. Inform petitioner of staffs initial recommendation (whether to accept or reject the petition for review).
7. 3. Offer a meeting or teleconference for the petitioner to address the PRB in light of its initial recommendation.
4. Issue an acknowledgement (or closure) letter to the petitioner Proposed PRB/Contacts:

Chair: Shana Helton Petition Manager: Rich Guzman 2.206 Coordinator: Lee Banic / Jim Kim DE: Dave Rudland RI : Tom Setzer OE: TBD OGC: David Cylkowski / Olivia Mikula Other key points (from Region I)

1. The outer o-ring is currently holding RCS pressure. The system was designed to operate on just the outer o-ring. There is no engineering or licensing basis for not performing a plant startup.
2. There was no root cause completed as a result of the double o-ring leak. The apparent cause determination may not bound the problem (i.e. there may be another cause).
3. Corrective actions that could be taken to fix o-ring leakage problems beyond what was done during the last outage require a minimum of 2-3 months lead time.
4. The unidentified leak rate was just determined to be 0.1 gpm which is lower than the UIL of 1.4 gpm at the time of the shutdown.

Current IP3 startup status (0800 6/22)

  • Reactor went critical at 4:34 pm on 6/21
  • Mode 1 at 11 :36 pm on 6/21
  • Synched to the grid at 2:26 am on 6/22
  • 100% expected -1 :30 on 6/23 I appreciate your help on this short-fuse request. Standing by for any questions/concerns.

Thanks, Rich Rich Guzman Sr. PM , Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office: 0-9C07 I Phone: 301-415-1030


0 RAFT-----------------------------------------------

Good Afternoon, I have been assigned as a Petition Manager for the 10 CFR 2.206 petition you submitted to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) on June 11 , 2017, regard ing your concerns with the reactor vessel head o-rings at Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 3.

Section 2.206 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations describes the petition process -

the primary mechanism for tlhe public to request enforcement action by the NRC in a public process. This process permits anyone to petition NRC to take enforcement-type action related to NRC licensees or licensed activities. Depending on the results of its evaluation, NRC could modify, suspend or revoke an NRG-issued license or take any other appropriate enforcement action to resolve a problem. The NRC staff's guidance for the disposition of 2.206 petition requests is in Management Directive 8.11 , which is publicly available.

The 2.206 process provides a mechanism for any member of the public to request enforcement action against NRC licensees. The 2.206 process is separate from the allegations process which affords individuals who raise safety concerns a degree of protection of their identity. In the 2.206 process, all of the information in your letter will lbe made public, including your identity.

You specifically requested in your letter for the NRC to keep Indian Point, Unit 3 (IP3) in cold shutdown until the condition of the reactor vessel head upper and lower surfaces are "proved to be identical to the as-purchased condition". The NRC considers your request as a short-term, immediate action given that IP3 is in the process of restarting from its refueling outage. On June 22, 2017, your request for immediate action was reviewed by members of the Petition Review Board (PRB), which includes staff from the NRC's Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) and Region I. After its review and discussion, the PRB determined that there were no immediate safety significant concerns which would adversely impact the public's health and safety; therefore, the PRB denied your request for immediate action in the restart of IP3.

In accordance with NRC Management Directive 8.11, you have the opportunity to address the PRB, either in person at the NRC Headquarters in Rockville, MD, or by telephone conference.

The purpose of this interaction is so that the petitioner can discuss the petition and verbally supplement the petition with any new information. During the meeting, the PRB is in listening mode and will not make any decisions regarding your petiition.

I would appreciate if you could advise me by Friday, June 30, 2017, if you agree to the NRC's processing your request under the 2.206 process. In addition, please advise me if you would like to address the PRB. If you would like to meet in person, I will need to schedule a formal public meeting at the NRC Headquarters. If you would prefer to address the PRB via phone, I will also work with you to coordinate a date/time during the upcoming weeks.

If you have other questions on the 2.206 process, or regarding the role as petition manager, please contact me at 301-415-1030.

Thank you,


DRAFT-----------------------------------------------

  • '\ Ticket: LTR-17-0235-1

(~U.S.NRC United Sta!tS _Nud,*1r Rrguln, <>ry C'.,mtnl., , l(,n Protecting People and the Envinmment

, .General lnfonnation . . -_

Assigned Offices: RI 01!:DO Due Date:

Other Parties: SECY Due Date:

OEDO Original Due Date:

Date Response Requested by Originator:

Subject:

Tom Gurdzie\, E-mail re: A Serious and Repetitive Matter

Description:

CC Routing:

Incoming ADAMS Accession:

Incoming ADAMS Package:

Response Accession:

  • Ot:her Information ** .' *, .... *:
  • _*_:
  • Cross Reference No: SRM: No Process Information " ** i'; : ; "*
  • Action Type: Appropriate Action OEDO Concurrence: No Slgnatu ..e Level: OCM Concurrence: No Special Instructions: OCA Concurrence: No For Appropriate Action. Office/Region to determine ifa response is needed. If response is appropriate, please be sure to include your response to the ADAMS Package and process accordingly. Copies should be sent to RidsEdoMailCenter and RidsSecyMailCenter. (If appropriate).

Originator Name: Tom Gurdziel Date of Incoming:

Originator Org.: Citizens Document Received by OEDO Date:

Addressee Name: Svinicki K L OEDO POC: Bowen, Jeremy (jsb3)

Addressee Affiliation: NRC/OCM Incoming Task: E-mail

From: Broaddus, Doug Sent: 20 Jun 2017 18:34:44 -0400 To: Guzman, Richard;Kim, James Cc: Banic, Merrilee;Danna, James;Broaddus, Doug;Benner, Eric

Subject:

FW: Quick Turnaround Request for OGC Review Importance: High Jim/Rich, (b)(5)

Doug From: Lemoncelli, Mauri Sent: Tuesday, June 20, 2017 6:21 PM To: Broaddus, Doug <Doug.Broaddus@nrc.gov>

Subject:

RE: Quick Turnaround Request for OGC Review Hi Doug, (b)(5)

Thanks for the opportunity to discuss.

Mauri Mauri T. Lemoncelli Deputy Assistant General Counsel, Materials Litigation & Enforcement Division U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission OWFN-15(07 Washington, D.C. 20555-0001 New Telephone Number: 301.287.9242 Mauri.Lemoncelli@nrc.gov U.S. RC u....s.-. ........ a.p1- , c . -

From : Broaddus, Doug Sent: Tuesday, June 20, 2017 5:35 PM To: Lemoncelli, Mauri <Mauri.Lemoncelli@nrc.gov>

Subject:

Quick Turnaround Request for OGC Review

Mauri, Lee Banic is out and I have to apologize but I am not sure of her normal process for requesting OGG support for 2.206 actions, so I asked Jim (her backup) to make the request that he sent you earlier. We are asking for a quick answer on whether OGG agrees that this does not meet the minimum criteria for review as a 2.206 because the licensee is in the process of restarting, and the incoming request is to keep the licensee in cold shutdown. As such, we are essentially treating the request to keep them shutdown as a request for immediate action. We would like to contact the individual by phone before the licensee restarts to inform him that the action does not meet the criteria for review, as well as that we do not have a safety basis to prevent restart.

Please let me know ASAP if we need to follow a different process to request OGG review for this action.

Thanks, Doug From : Kim, James Se nt: Tuesday, June 20, 2017 2:18 PM To: Lemoncelli, Mauri <Mauri.Lemoncelli@nrc.gov>

Cc: Danna, James <James.Danna@nrc.gov>; Banic, Merrilee

<Merri lee.Banic@nrc.gov>; Broaddus, Doug <Doug.Broaddus@nrc.gov>; Guzman, Richard <Richard.Guzman@nrc.gov>

Subject:

RE: Ticket LTR-17-0235 Please review the attached whether it meets 2.206 petition criteria.

Thanks, Jim Kim NRR/DORL Backup 2.206 Coordinator 301 -415-4125 From : Broaddus, Doug Sent: Tuesday, June 20, 2017 1:26 PM To: Guzman, Richard <Richard.Guzman@nrc.gov>; Kim, James <James.Kim@nrc.gov>

Cc: Jordan, Natreon <Natreon.Jordan@nrc.gov>; Tobin, Jennifer

<Jennifer.Tobin@nrc.gov>; Danna, James <James.Danna@nrc.gov>; Banic, M errilee

<Merrilee.Banic@nrc.gov>; Walker, Sandra <Sandra.Walker@nrc.gov>; Setzer, Thomas

<Thomas.Setzer@nrc.gov>; Benner, Eric <Eric .Benner@nrc.gov>

Subject:

RE: Ticket LTR-17-0235 Importance: High

Rich, Thanks for the assessment and recommendation. I will ask Jim Kim (backing up Lee Banic as the 2.206 coordinator) to send your assessment and recommendation to OGC to ensure they are in agreement that this does not meet the basis criteria to be considered under the 2.206 process. Please do not convey your preliminary determination to Mr. Gurdziel, until we get a response from OGC.

Jim (Kim),

Please coordinate with OGC to get a quick read on Rich's assessment and recommendation. I understand that the licensee is in the process of restarting, so we need an answer from OGC quickly so we can (ideally) get back to Mr.

Gurdziel prior to the plant going back on line. Although his request to keep the plant in cold shutdown is not indicated as an immediate action, it essentially has become an immediate action due to the ongoing plant restart.

Thanks Doug From: Guzman, Richard Sent: Tuesday, June 20, 2017 12:34 PM To: Broaddus, Doug <Doug.Broaddus@nrc.gov>; Setzer, Thomas

<Thom as.Setzer@nrc.gov>

Cc: Jor dan, Natreon <Natreon.Jordan@nrc.gov>; Tobin, Jennifer

<Jennifer.Tobin@nrc.gov>; Danna, James <James.Danna@nrc.gov>; Banic, Merrilee <Merrilee.Banic@nrc.gov>; Walker, Sandra

<Sand ra.Walker@nrc.gov>

Subject:

RE: Ticket LTR-17-0235 Doug, I've completed my initial review of the incoming e-mail from Mr. Gurdziel and recommend that we treat it as routine correspondence on the basis that the request does not meet the screening criteria for review under 2.206. Specifically, while Mr. Gurdziel cites 10 CFR 2.206 and requests an enforcement-related action, he fails to provide sufficient facts to support the petition and simply asserts that Indian Point, Unit 3 is unsafe.

Per the MD 8.11 criteria for rejection, the NRC will not treat a general assertion of a safety problem, without supporting facts, as a formal petition under 2.206. In such cases, the staff handles these general requests as routine correspondence.

Therefore, I recommend we provide the above input as our 2.206 rejection basis to Region/Br-2; Tom Setzer will respond to Mr. Gurdziel as appropriate via e-mail, routine/general correspondence. I've spoken to Theresa Clark and she is ok with this approach. Once the transferred "for

appropriate action" ticket comes down from NRR, we can close it withe e-mail reply sent to Mr. Gurdziel.

Tom S. - as we discussed, please use the underlined 2.206 rejection basis above in your reply to Gurdziel and cc: or forward me a copy so that we can close the associated ticket.

Thanks, Rich Rich Guzman Sr. PM , Division Operator Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office: 0-9C7 I Phone: (301) 415-1030 Richard.Guzman@nrc.gov From: Broaddus, Doug Sent: Monday, June 19, 2017 7:19 AM To: Banic, Merrilee <Merrilee.Banic@nrc.gov>; Guzman, Richard

<Richard .Guzman@nrc.gov>; Kim, James <James.Kim@nrc.gov>; Danna, James

<James.Danna@nrc.gov>

Subject:

Re: Ticket LTR-17-0235 Jim/Rich, Please advise if this meets the minimum screening criteria for review as a petition request. I am not sure that Lee had a chance to assess this before she left, bl.It this determination needs to be made before we assemble a PRB. Rich's indication that it is not an allegation provides a portion of the screening assessment.

Thanks Doug On: 16 June 2017 09:47, "Banic, Merrilee" <Merrilee.Banic@nrc.gov> wrote:

As discussed in line for a chair: Shana Helton, Louise Lund; Mar. Gavrilas From: Guzman, Richard Sent: Friday, June 16, 2017 9:21 AM To: Kim, James <James.Kim@nrc.gov>; Danna, James <James.Danna@nrc.gov>

Cc: Banic, Merrilee <Merrilee.Banic@nrc.gov>; Broaddus, Doug

<Doug.Broaddus@nrc.gov>

Subject:

RE: Ticket LTR-17-0235

Thanks, Jim.

Lee - I'll take for action as petition manager; the petition (email) does not appear to contain allegation or sensitive information. Please let me know once we have a chair and OGC rep and I'll start arranging for our initial PRB discussion (i.e., recommendation on immediate action aspects).

Rich From: Kim, James Sent: Friday, June 16, 2017 8:55 AM To: Guzman, Richard <Richard.Guzman@nrc.gov>; Danna, James

<James.Danna@nrc.gov>

Cc: Banic, Merrilee <Merrilee.Banic@nrc.gov>; Broaddus, Doug

<Doug.Broaddus@nrc.gov>

Subject:

FW: Ticket LTR-17-0235 This is a heads-up.

Tom Gurdziel has requested 2.206 petition to cold shutdown Indian Point 3.

From: Banic, Merrilee Sent: Friday, June 16, 2017 8:29 AM To: Br oaddus, Doug <Doug.Broaddus@nrc.gov>

Cc: Kim, James <James.Kim@nrc.gov>

Subject:

FW: Ticket LTR-17-0235 Head up.

From: Clark, Theresa Sent: Friday, June 16, 2017 8:13 AM To: Greives, Jonat han <Jonathan.Greives@nrc.gov>; Inverso, Tara

<Tara.lnverso@nrc.gov>

Cc: Bowen, Jeremy <Jeremy.Bowen@nrc.gov>; Setzer, Thomas

<Thomas.Setzer@nrc.gov>; Banic, M errilee <Merrilee.Banic@nrc.gov>

Subject:

Re: Ticket LTR-17-0235 Yes, this one should go to NRR to see *if* it meets the 2.206 process requirements. Please request a transfer in STAR.

Lee, heads up for you.

Thanks!

On: 16 June 2017 08:02, "Greives, Jonathan" <Jonathan.Greives@nrc.gov>

wrote:

Theresa and/or Tara, Forwarding the below email since Jeremy is out of office through Monday.

Thanks, Jon Jonathan Greives Regional State Liaison Officer U.S. Nuclear Regu latory Commission- Region 1 610-337-5337 {W)

Hb)(6) l{Cl jonathan.greives@nrc.gov From: Greives, Jonathan Sent: Friday, June 16, 2017 7:59 AM To: Bowen, Jeremy <Jeremy.Bowen@nrc.gov>

Cc: Thomas Setzer (Thomas.Setzer@ruc.gov) <Thomas.Setzer@nrc.gov>

Subject:

Ticket LTR-17-0235

Jeremy, We were assigned ticket LTR-17-0235 this week which requests us to determine if a response is required to an email from a concerned citizen to Chairman Svinicki. The email requests the NRC to prevent a restart of Indian Point 3 due to the repetitive nature of reactor vessel head o-ring leaks and states that it constitutes a 2.206 petition. Given that the requester has specified his preference to enter the petition process, should the ticket be assigned to NRR instead of R1?

Let me know if you have any questions.

Thanks, Jonathan Greives Regional State Liaison Officer U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission- Region 1 610-337-5337 (W) l(b )(6)  !(C) jonathan.greives@nrc.gov

From: Rudland, David Sent: 22 Jun 2017 13:24:25 +0000 To: Lubinski, John;Ross-Lee, MaryJane Cc: Coyne, Kevin

Subject:

FW: ACTION: 2.206 Immediate Action Request re: Indian Point Unit 3 Rx Head 0-rings and Restart (LTR-17-0235)

Attachments: SR1-3118K5017061606420.pdf, FW: Quick Turnaround Request for OGC Review, RE: Ticket LTR-17-0235 FYI David L. Rudland, Ph.D.

Chief, Vessels and Internals Integrity Branch Division of Engineering Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulat ion U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mail Stop: OWFN-llFOl 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852-2738 Office: (301) 415-1896 Cell: !(b)(6) I Email : david.rud land@nrc.gov From: Guzman, Richard Sent: Thursday, June 22, 2017 9:10 AM To: Helton, Shana <Shana.Helton@nrc.gov>; Cylkowski, David <David.Cylkowski@nrc.gov>; Setzer, Thomas <Thomas.Setzer@nrc.gov>; Banic, Merrilee <Merrilee.Banic@nrc.gov>

Cc: Rudland, David <David.Rudland@nrc.gov>; Greives, Jonathan <Jonathan.Greives@nrc.gov>;

Haagensen, Brian <Brian.Haagensen@nrc.gov>; Siwy, Andrew <Andrew.Siwy@nrc.gov>; Rich, Sarah

<Sara h.Rich@nrc.gov>; Broaddus, Doug <Doug.Broaddus@nrc.gov>; Danna, James

<James.Danna@nrc.gov>; Kim, James <James.Kim@nrc.gov>; Benner, Eric <Eric.Benner@nrc.gov>;

M ikula, Olivia <Olivia.Mikula@nrc.gov>

Subject:

ACTION : 2.206 Immediate Action Request re: Indian Point Unit 3 Rx Head 0 -rings and Resta rt (LTR-17-0235)

All ,

Good morning. We've received a 2.206 petition from Tom Gurdziel concerning the reactor vessel head o-rings at Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 3 (IP3). He requests that NRC prevent restart of IP3 until they essentially determine a root cause. Because of the timing of their startup, we are treating the petitioner's request to ke,ep IP3 shutdown as a request for immediate action. While the licensee has already synchronized to the grid (completed ahead of schedule earlier this a.m.), we intend to follow the process per MD 8.11, to the extent possible and 'promptly' notify the petitioner of the pending staff action (i.e., per MD 8.11 , when the staff plans to take an action contrary to the requested action in the petition (i.e., permitting restart of a facility when the petitioner has requested that restart not be permitted).

To expedite this step in the process, I would like to forego a PRB F2F meeting and get your concurrence and/or comments via e-mail today by 12 pm, if possible.

ACTION by 1200 6/22: Please review the petition request (1 -page email attached) and let me know if you have any objections or concerns with the proposed path to reject the petitioner's request for immediate action (i.e., to prevent the restart of IP3), based on the PRB determination that there are no immediate safety significant concerns which would adversely impact the public's health and safety. Also, provide comments/mark-ups, if any on the proposed e-mail response to the petitioner (draft e-mail below). Also, note that as stated in today's 0800 RI call, the Region does not have any immediate safety concerns with licensee's decision to startup as the reactor vessel head outer o-ring is currently holding RCS pressure.

Forthcoming steps for addressing petitioner's request for immediate action:

1. 1. PRB members to concur on determination to deny petitioner's immediate action request -

respond to PM via email today by 1200

2. 2. Obtain NRR concurrence on the PRB recommendation for addressing the petitioner's requests for immediate action
3. Inform petitioner of staffs decision or pending actions regarding the petitioner's immediate action requests (NOTE: per MD 8.11, if the staff plans to take an action that is contrary to an immediate action requested in the petition (permitting restart of a facility when the petitioner has requested that restart not be permitted), the petitioner must promptly be notified of the pending staff action).

3.

4. Follow-on steps:
5. 1. A follow-on PRB meeting will be scheduled on a later date to make an initial recommendation as to whether or not the petition meets the criteria for review under 10 CFR 2.206
6. 2. Inform petitioner of staff's initial recommendation (whether to accept or reject the petition for review).
7. 3. Offer a meeting or teleconference for the petitioner to address the PRB in light of its initial recommendation.
4. Issue an acknowledgement (or closure) letter to the petitioner Proposed PRB/Contacts:

Chair: Shana Helton Petition Manager: Rich Guzman 2.206 Coordinator: Lee Banic / Jim Kim DE: Dave Rudland RI: Tom Setzer OE: TBD OGC: David Cylkowski / Olivia Mikula Other key points (from Region I)

1. The outer o-ring is currently holding RCS pressure. The system was designed to operate on just the outer o-ring. There is no engineering or licensing basis for not performing a plant startup.
2. There was no root cause completed as a result of the double o-ring leak. The apparent cause determination may not bound the problem (i.e. there may be another cause).
3. Corrective actions that could be taken to fix o-ring leakage problems beyond what was done during the last outage require a minimum of 2-3 months lead time.

4 . The unidentified leak rate was just determined to be 0.1 gpm wh ich is lower than the UIL of 1.4 gpm at the time of the shutdown.

Current IP3 startup status (0800 6/22)

  • Reactor went critical at 4:34 pm on 6/21
  • Mode 1 at 11 :36 pm on 6/21
  • Synched to the grid at 2:26 am on 6/22
  • 100% expected -1 :30 on 6/23 I appreciate your help on this short-fuse request. Standing by for any questions/concerns.
Thanks, Rich Rich Guzman Sr. PM , Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office: 0-9C07 I Phone: 301-415-1030

DRAFT-----------------------------------------------

Good Afternoon, I have been assigned as a Petition Manager for the 10 CFR 2.206 petition you submitted to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) on June 11, 2017, regarding your concerns with the reactor vessel head o-rings at Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 3.

Section 2.206 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations describes the petition process -

the primary mechanism for the public to request enforcement action by the NRC in a public process. This process permits anyone to petition NRC to take enforcement-type action related to NRC licensees or licensed activities. Depending on the results of its evaluation, NRC could modify, suspend or revoke an NRG-issued license or take any other appropriate enforcement action to resolve a problem. The NRC staffs guidance for the disposition of 2.206 petition requests is in Management Directive 8.11 , which is publicly available.

The 2.206 process provides a mechanism for any member of the public to request enforcement action against NRC licensees. The 2.206 process is separate from the allegations process which affords individuals who raise safety concerns a degree of protection of their identity. In the 2.206 process, all of the information in your letter will lbe made public, including your identity.

You specifically requested in your letter for the NRC to keep Indian Point, Unit 3 (IP3) in cold shutdown until the condition of the reactor vessel head upper and lower surfaces are "proved to be identical to the as-purchased condition". The NRC considers your request as a short-term, immediate action given that IP3 is in the process of restarting from its refueling outage. On June 22, 2017, your request for immediate action was reviewed by members of the Petition Review Board (PRB}, which includes staff from the NRC's Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) and Region I. After its review and discussion, the PRB determined that there were no immediate safety significant concerns which would adversely impact the public's health and safety; therefore, the PRB denied your request for immediate action in the restart of IP3.

In accordance with NRC Management Directive 8.11, you have the opportunity to address the PRB, either in person at the NRC Headquarters in Rockville, MD, or by telephone conference.

The purpose of this interaction is so that the petitioner can discuss the petition and verbally supplement the petition with any new information. During the meeting , the PRB is in listening mode and will not make any decisions regarding your petition.

I would appreciate if you could advise me by Friday, June 30 , 2017 , if you agree to the NRC's processing your request under the 2.206 process. In addition, please advise me if you would like to address the PRB. If you wou ld like to meet in person, I will need to schedule a formal public meeting at the NRG Headquarters. If you would prefer to address the PRB via phone, I will also work with you to coordinate a date/time during the upcoming weeks .

If you have other questions on the 2.206 process, or regarding the role as petition manager, please contact me at 301-415-1030.

Thank you,


DRAFT-----------------------------------------------

From: Rudland, David Sent: 22 Jun 2017 19:10:44 +0000 To: Lubinski, John;Ross-Lee, MaryJane

Subject:

FW: ACTION: 2.206 Immediate Action Request re: Indian Point Unit 3 Rx Head 0-rings and Restart (LTR-17-0235)

Attachments: RE: ACTION : 2.206 Immediate Action Request re: Indian Point Unit 3 Rx Head 0-rings and Restart (LTR-17-0235)

Another FYI ... the group decided that there is no immediate safety concern for plant restart, and NRR (Michelle) concurred .

David L. Rudland, Ph.D.

Chief, Vessels and Internals Integrity Branch Division of Engineering Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mail Stop: OWFN-llFOl 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852-2738 Office: (301) 415-1896 Cell: !(b)(6) I Email: david.rudland@nrc.gov From: Guzman, Richard Sent: Thursday, June 22, 2017 2:35 PM To: Setzer, Thomas <Thomas.Setzer@nrc.gov>; Mikula, Olivia <Olivia.Mikula@nrc.gov>; Rudland, David

<David.Rudland@nrc.gov>; Helton, Shana <Shana.Helton@nrc.gov>; Cylkowski, David

<David.Cyl kowski@nrc.gov>; Banic, Merrilee <Merrilee.Banic@nrc.gov>

Cc: Greives, Jonathan <Jonathan.Greives@nrc.gov>; Haagensen, Brian <Brian.Haagensen@nrc.gov>;

Siwy, Andrew <Andrew.Siwy@nrc.gov>; Rich, Sarah <Sarah.Rich@nrc.gov>; Broaddus, Doug

<Doug.Broaddus@nrc.gov>; Danna, James <James. Danna@nr c.gov>; Kim, James

<James.Kim@nrc.gov>; Benner, Eric <Eric.Benner@nrc.gov>; Arrighi, Russell

<Russell.Arrighi@nrc.gov>; Jordan, Natreon <Natreon.Jordan@nrc.gov>

Subject:

RE: ACTION : 2.206 Immediate Action Request re: Indian Point Unit 3 Rx Head 0 -rings and Restart (LTR-17-0235)

All, Keeping everyone in the loop .. .we've got NRR concurrence. I will proceed with contacting Mr.

Gurdziel by telephone and follow it up with an e-mail. Per MD 8.1 1, I will also offer him the opportunity to address the PRB (via meeting or teleconference) and provide additional explanation and support for his petition request before we formally review the petition. Our next PRB action is to make an "initial determination" on whether his request meets the criteria for review under 2.206 as outlined below. Will keep you posted.

4. Follow-on steps:
5. 1. A follow-on PRB meeting will be scheduled on a later date to make an initial recommendation as to whether or not the petition meets the criteria for review under 10 CFR 2.206
6. 2. Inform petitioner of staffs initial recommendation {whether to accept or reject the petition for review).
7. 3. Offer a meeting or teleconference for the petitioner to address the PRB in light of its initial recommendation.
4. Issue an acknowledgement (or closure) letter to the petitioner Thanks again, Rich Rich Guzman Sr. PM , Division Operator Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office: 0-9C7 I Phone: (301) 415-1030 Richard .Guzman@nrc.gov From: Helton, Shana Sent: Thursday, June 22, 2017 12:09 PM To: Guzman, Richard <Richard.Guzman@nrc.gov>

Subject:

Re: ACTION: 2.206 Immediate Action Request re: Indian Point Unit 3 Rx Head 0-rings and Restart (LTR-17-0235)

I concur on denying immediate action request, Shana On : 22 June 201711:52, "Guzman, Richard" <Richard.Guzman@nrc.gov> wrote:

I believe we have a consensus (step 1 complete) and can move forward with getting Michele Evan's concurrence on our recommendation. I will update the response appropriately to include the additional technical basis provided by EVIB and the Region (Tom and Jon - I will run these by you as well).

Forthcoming steps for addressing petitioner's request for immediate action:

1. 1. PRB members to concur on determination to deny petitioner's immediate action request -

respond to PM via email today by 1200

2. 2. Obtain NRR concurrence on the PRB recommendation for addressing the petitioner's requests for immediate action
3. Inform petitioner of staff's decision or pending actions regarding the petitioner's immediate action requests (NOTE : per MD 8.11, if the staff plans to take an action that is contrary to an immediate action requested in the petition (permitting restart of a facility when the petitioner has requested that restart not be permitted), the petitioner must promptly be notified of the pending staff action).

Shana - please let me know if you need anything additional to get Michele's okay. I'd like to respond to Mr. Gurdziel by 3p today (so I can get to my son's baseball game ©) Thanks to all for the quick-turn!

Rich Rich Guzman Sr. PM , Division Operator Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office: 0-9C7 I Phone: (301) 415-1030 Richard.Guzman@nrc.gov From: Helton, Shana Sent: Thursday, June 22, 2017 11:33 AM To: Guzman, Richard <Richard.Guzman@nrc.gov>; Greives, Jonathan <Jonathan.Greives@nrc.gov>;

Setzer, Thomas <Thomas.Setzer@nrc.gov>; Cylkowski, David < David.Cylkowski@nrc.gov>; Banic, Merri lee <Merri lee. Ban ic@nrc.gov>

Cc: Rudland, David <David .Rudland@nrc.gov>; Haagensen, Brian <Brian.Haagensen@nrc.gov>; Siwy, Andrew <Andrew.Siwy@nrc.gov>; Rich, Sarah <Sarah .Rich@nrc.gov>; Broaddus, Doug

<Doug.Broaddus@nrc.gov>; Danna, James <James.Danna@nrc.gov>; Kim, James <James.Kim@nrc.gov>;

Benner, Eric <Eric.Benner@nrc.gov>; Mikula, Olivia <Olivia.Mikula@nrc.gov>; Jordan, Natreon

<Natreon.Jordan@nrc.gov>; Tobin, Jennifer <Jennifer.Tobin@nrc.gov>

Subject:

Re: ACTION: 2.206 Immediate Action Request re: Indian Point Unit 3 Rx Head 0-rings and Restart (LTR-17-0235)

I'm ok as long as safety is assured and the discussion below is very helpful with that. I see no need to stop IP from starting back up.

On: 22 June 201711:10, "Guzman, Richard" <Richard.Guzman@nrc.gov> wrote:

Shana - I will defer to you as our PRB chair, if you would like to have a conference call before making a determination, I can set up a bridgeline and get a conference room for 1200 today.

From: Greives, Jonathan Sent: Thursday, June 22, 2017 10:36 AM To: Guzman, Richard <Richard.Guzman@nrc.gov>; Setzer, Thomas <Thomas.Setzer@nrc.gov>; Helton, Shana <Shana.Helton@nrc.gov>; Cylkowski, David <David.Cylkowski@nrc.gov>; Banic, Merrilee

<Merrilee.Banic@nrc.gov>

Cc: Rudland, David <David.Rudland@nrc.gov>; Haagensen, Brian <Brian.Haagensen@nrc.gov>; Siwy, Andrew <Andrew.Siwy@nrc.gov>; Rich, Sarah <Sarah.Rich@nrc.gov>; Broaddus, Doug

<Doug.Broaddus@nrc.gov>; Danna, James <James.Danna@nrc.gov>; Kim, James <James.Kim@nrc.gov>;

Benner, Eric <Eric.Benner@nrc .gov>; Mikula, Olivia <Olivia.Mikula@nrc.gov>

Subject:

RE: ACTION: 2.206 Immediate Action Request re: Indian Point Unit 3 Rx Head 0-rings and Restart (LTR-17-0235)

Rich,

Should be put together a quick call this morning to get everyone on the page? This important action/communication appears difficult via email.

I agree with all that the licensee needs to understand the cause of the repeat leaks and then we need to follow-up on their assessment. However, I don't believe a small amount of leakage from this joint (even if both o-rings were to leak) presents a safety concern that would jeopardize the ability of the plant to safely shut down or respond to any accident. Their TSs dictate requirements for monitoring unidentified leakage in containment and have limits that ensure they shut down the plant with adequate margin to safety. Historically, they have identified the leakage at a very low level (as Rich said, less than 10% of the TS limit) and have taken prudent, conservative action to shut down the plant to repair.

Thanks, Jon From: Guzman, Richard Sent: Thursday, June 22, 2017 10:29 AM To: Setzer, Thomas <Thomas.Setzer@nrc.gov>; Helton, Shana <Shana .Helton@nrc.gov>; Cylkowski, David <David .Cylkowski@nrc.gov>; Banic, Merrilee <Merrilee.Banic@nrc.gov>

Cc: Rudland, David <David.Rudland@nrc.gov>; Greives, Jonathan <Jonathan.Greives@nrc.gov>;

Haagensen, Brian <Brian.Haagensen@nrc.gov>; Siwy, Andrew <Andrew.Siwy@nrc.gov>; Rich, Sarah

<Sarah.Rich@nrc.gov>; Broaddus, Doug <Doug.Broaddus@nrc.gov>; Danna, James

<James.Danna@nrc.gov>; Kim, James <James.Kim@nrc.gov>; Benner, Eric <Eric.Benner@nrc.gov>;

Mikula, Olivia <Olivia.Mikula@nrc.gov>

Subject:

RE: ACTION: 2.206 Immediate Action Request re: Indian Point Unit 3 Rx Head 0-rings and Restart (LTR-17-0235)

Also please note the highlighted error in my original message. The unidentified leakage at time of shutdown was 0.14 (vice 1.4 gpm). The current 0.1 O gpm UIL rate is 1/10 the TS limit for UIL.

Thanks, Rich From: Setzer, Thomas Sent: Thursday, June 22, 2017 10:17 AM To: Helton, Shana <Shana.Helton@nrc.gov>; Guzman, Richard <Richard.Guzman@nrc.gov>; Cylkowski, David <David.Cylkowski@nrc.gov>; Banic, Merrilee <Merrilee.Banic@nrc.gov>

Cc: Rudland, David <David.Rudland@nrc.gov>; Greives, Jonathan <Jonathan.Greives@nrc.gov>;

Haagensen, Brian <Brian.Haagensen@nrc.gov>; Siwy, Andrew <Andrew.Siwy@nrc.gov>; Rich, Sarah

<Sarah .Rich@nrc.gov>; Broaddus, Doug <Doug.Broaddus@nrc.gov>; Danna, James

<James.Danna@nrc.gov>; Kim, James <James.Kim@nrc.gov>; Ben ner, Eric <Eric. Benner@nrc.gov>;

Mikula, Olivia <Olivia.Mikula@nrc.gov>

Subject:

Re: ACTION: 2.206 Immediate Action Request re: Indian Point Unit 3 Rx Head 0 -rings and Restart (LTR-17-0235)

Thats a great point Shana. l guess l would need the definition of "adequate protection" to understand this better. The fact is that Indian Point has had numerous oring leaks, and h as yet to identify the smoking gun or root cause as to why this plagues Unit 3. Incidentally, Unit 2 has I

of its 2 orings leaking at this moment.

We do not have a safety concern with the current condition at Unit 3 (the inner oring isleakong but theouter is holding). Theouter ring is a fully qualified I 00% pressure seal, so it is designed to provide adequate sealing on its own.

I would not fee l an enforcement action to prevent startup would be warranted. The situation begs more inspection and review but both the NRC and licensee, but it is not a safety concern at this point.

VR, Tom


Original Message --------

From: "Helton, Shana" <Shana.Helton@nrc.gov>

Date: Thu, June 22, 2017 9:38 AM-0400 To: "Guzman, Richard" <Richard.Guzman@nrc.gov>, "Cylkowski, David"

<David.Cylkowski@nrc.gov>, "Setzer, Thomas" <Thomas.Setzer@nrc.gov>, "Banic, Merrilee"

<Merrilee.Banic@nrc.gov>

CC: "Rudland, David" < David.Rudland@ nrc.gov>, "Greives, Jonathan"

<Jonathan.Gre ives@nrc.gov>, "Haagensen, Brian" <Brian.Haagensen@nrc.gov>, "Siwy, Andrew" <Andrew.Siwy@ nrc.gov>, "Rich, Sarah" <Sarah.Rich@nrc.gov>, "Broaddus, Doug"

<Doug.Broaddus@nrc.gov>, "Danna, James" <James.Danna@nrc.gov>, "Kim, James"

<Jamcs.Kim@nrc.gov>, "Benner, Eric" <Eric.Bcnncr@nrc.gov>, "Mikula, Olivia"

<01 ivia. Miku la@nrc.gov>

Subject:

Re: ACTION: 2.206 Immediate Action Request re: Indian Point Unit 3 Rx Head 0-rings and Restart (LTR-17-0235)

I would like to understand why we have confidence that this o-ring repair provides adequate protection, given it's a repair that allegedly (per the petitio ner) had been made repeatedly. I need this before concurring - thanks.

From : Setzer, Thomas Se nt: Thursday, June 22, 2017 10:51 AM To: Mikula, Olivia <Olivia.M ikula@nrc.gov>; Rudland, David <David.Rudland@n rc.gov>; Helton, Shana

<Shana.Helton@nrc.gov>; Guzman, Richard <Richard.Guzman@nrc.gov>; Cylkowski, David

<David.Cylkowski@nrc.gov>; Banic, Merrilee <Merrilee.Banic@nrc.gov>

Cc: Greives, Jonathan <Jonathan .Greives@nrc.gov>; Haagensen, Brian <Brian. Haagensen@nrc.gov>;

Siwy, Andrew <Andrew.Siwy@nrc.gov>; Rich, Sarah <Sarah.Rich@nrc.gov>; Broaddus, Doug

<Doug.Broaddus@nrc.gov>; Danna, James <James.Danna@nrc.gov>; Kim, James

<James.Kim @nrc.gov>; Benner, Eric <Eric.Benner @nrc.gov>

Subje ct: RE: ACTION : 2.206 Immediate Action Request re: Indian Point Unit 3 Rx Head 0 -rings and Restart (LTR-17-0235)

There is no requirement for the oring functionality. If they leak by, unidentified leakage is the tech requirement that comes into play. The tech spec limit on that is l gpm.

If the outer oring holds, they wont leak and would not challenge that tech spec requirement. In this most recent event at Unit 3 where both orings leaked, the unidentified leakage was approx 0.15 gpm.


Original Message --------

From: "Mikula, Olivia" <Olivia.Mikula@nrc.gov>

Date: Thu, June 22, 20 l 7 10:28 AM -0400 To: "Rudland, David" <David.Rudland@nrc.gov>, "Setzer, Thomas"

<Thomas.Setzer@nrc.gov>, "Helton, Shana" <Shana.Helton@nrc.gov>, "Guzman, Richard"

<Richard.Guzrnan@nrc.gov>, "Cylkowski, David" <David.Cylkowski@nrc.gov>, "Banic, Merrilee" < Merrilee.Banic@ nrc.gov>

CC: "Greives, Jonathan" <Jonathan.Greives@nrc.gov>, "Haagensen, Brian"

<Brian.Haagensen@ nrc.gov>, "Siwy, Andrew" <Andrew.Siwy@nrc.gov>, "Rich, Sarah"

<Sarah.Rich@nrc.gov>, "Broaddus, Doug" <Doug.Broaddus@nrc.gov>, "Danna, James"

<Jamcs.Danna@ nrc.gov>, "Kim, James" <James.Kim@ nrc.gov>, "Benner, Eric"

<Eric.Benner@nrc.gov>

Subject:

RE: ACTION: 2.206 Immediate Action Request re: Indian Point Unit 3 Rx Head 0-rings and Restart (LTR-17-0235)

Good morning, Thank you for that additional information. Is there a binding requirement for this inner oring to be fully functional? In other words, is there something in their technical specifications or in our regulations that makes this issue they are facing problematic? Or does the functionality of the outer ring leave them in full compliance with requirements?

Thank you, Olivia From : Rudland, David Sent: Thursday, June 22, 2017 10:26 AM To: Setzer, Thomas <Thomas.Setzer@nrc.gov>; Helton, Shana <Shana.Helton@nrc.gov>; Guzman, Richard <Richard.Guzman@nr,c.gov>; Cylkowski, David <David.Cylkowski@nrc.gov>; Banic, Merrilee

<Merrilee.Banic@nrc.gov>

Cc: Greives, Jonathan <Jonathan.Greives@nrc.gov>; Haagensen, Brian <Brian.Haagensen@nrc.gov>;

Siwy, Andrew <Andrew.Siwy@nrc.gov>; Rich, Sarah <Sarah.Rich@nrc.gov>; Broaddus, Doug

<Doug.Broaddus@nrc.gov>; Danna, James <James.Danna@nrc.gov>; Kim, James

<James.Kim@nrc.gov>; Benner, Eric <Eric.Benner@nrc.gov>; M ikula, Olivia <Olivia.Mikula@nrc.gov>

Subject:

RE: ACTION: 2.206 Im mediate Action Request re: Indian Point Unit 3 Rx Head 0-rings and Restart (LTR-17-0235)

Tom and Shana

I see Tom's point. The safety concern comes from both o-rings leaking, but it is worrisome that this keeps happening and moving forward we need to take a very close look at the root cause.

Since the one o-ring is holding at pressure, there does not appear to be an immediate safety concern that requires enforcement action. In fact, the leak detection and tech spec limits were sufficient to catch the issue before it caused a large concern.

Did they replace both o-rings during this outage, or just one? If they replaced both and now one is leaking, that may be a different story Thanks Dave David L. Rudland, Ph.D.

Chief, Vessels and Internals Integrity Branch Division of Engineering Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mail Stop: OWFN-llFOl 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852-2738 Office: (301) 415-1896 Cell: !(b)(6) I Email: david.rud land@nrc.gov From : Setzer, Thomas Sent: Thursday, June 22, 2017 10:17 AM To: Helton, Shana <Shana.Helton@nrc.gov>; Guzman, Richard <Richard.Guzman@nrc.gov>; Cylkowski, David <David.Cylkowski@nrc.gov>; Banic, Merrilee <Merrilee.Ban ic@nrc.gov>

Cc: Rudland, David <David .Rudland@nrc.gov>; Greives, Jonathan <Jonathan.Greives@nrc.gov>;

Haagensen, Brian <Brian .Haagensen@nrc.gov>; Siwy, Andrew <Andrew.Siwy@nrc.gov>; Rich, Sarah

<Sarah.Rich@nrc.gov>; Broaddus, Doug <Doug.Broaddus@nrc.gov>; Danna, James

<James.Danna@nrc.gov>; Kim, James <James.Kim@nrc.gov>; Benner, Eric <Eric.Benner@nrc.gov>;

M ikula, Olivia <0livia.Mikula@nrc.gov>

Subje ct: Re: ACTION: 2.206 Immediate Action Request re: Indian Point Unit 3 Rx Head 0 -rings and Restart (LTR-17-0235)

Thats a great point Shana. 1 guess l would need the definition of "adequate protection" to understand this better. T he fact is that Ind ian Point has had numerous oring leaks, and has yet to identify the smoking gun or root cause as to why this plagues Unit 3. Incidentally, Unit 2 has I of its 2 orings leaking at this moment.

We do not have a safety concern with the current condition at Unit 3 (the inner oring isleakong but theouter is holding). Theouter ring is a fu lly qualified 100% pressure seal, so it is designed

to provide adequate sealing on its own.

I would not feel an enforcement action to prevent startup would be warranted. The situation begs more inspection and review but both the NRC and licensee, but it is not a safety concern at this point.

VR, Tom


Original Message --------

From: "Helton, Shana" <Shana.Helton@nrc.gov>

Date: Thu, June 22, 2017 9:38 AM -0400 To: "Guzman, Richard" <Richard.Guzman@nrc.gov>, "Cylkowski, David"

<David.Cylkowski@nrc.gov>, "Setzer, Thomas" <Thomas.Setzer@nrc.gov>, "Banic, Merrilee"

<Merrilee.Banic@nrc.gov>

CC: "Rudland, David" <David.Rudland@nrc.gov>, "Greives, Jonathan"

<Jonathan.Grcivcs@nrc.gov>, "Haagensen, Brian" <Brian.Haagcnscn@nrc.gov>, "Siwy, Andrew" <Andrew.Siwy@nrc.gov>, "Rich, Sarah" <Sarah.Rich@nrc.gov>, "Broaddus, Doug"

<Doug.Broaddus@nrc.gov>, "Danna, James" <James.Danna@nrc.gov>, "Kim, James"

<Jamcs.Kim@nrc.gov>, "Benner, Eric" <Eric.Bcnncr@nrc.gov>, "Mikula, Olivia"

<OJ ivia.Miku la@nrc.gov>

Subject:

Re: ACTION: 2.206 Immediate Action Request re: Indian Point Unit 3 Rx Head 0 -

rings and Restart (LTR-17-0235)

I would like to understand why we have confidence that this o-ring repair provides adequate protection, given it's a repair that allegedly (per the petitioner) had been made repeatedly. I need this before concurring - thanks.

On: 22 June 2017 09:09, "Guzman, Richard" <Richard.Guzman@nrc.gov> wrote:

All, Good morning. We've received a 2.206 petition from Tom Gurdziel concerning the reactor vessel head o-rings at Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 3 (IP3). He requests that NRC prevent restart of IP3 until they essentially determine a root cause. Because of the timing of their startup, we are treating the petitioner's request to ke,ep IP3 shutdown as a request for immediate action. While the licensee has already synchronized to the grid (completed ahead of schedule earlier this a.m.), we intend to follow the process per MD 8.11, to the extent possible and 'promptly' notify the petitioner of the pending staff action (i.e., per MD 8.11, when the staff plans to take an action contrary to the requested action in the petition (i.e., permitting restart of a facility when the petitioner has requested that restart not be permitted).

To expedite this step in the process, I would like to forego a PRB F2F meeting and get your concurrence and/or comments via e-mail today by 12 pm, if possible.

ACTION by 1200 6/22: Please review the petition request (1-page email attached) and let me know if you have any objections or concerns with the proposed path to reject the petitioner's req uest for immediate action (i.e., to prevent the restart of IP3), based on the PRB

determination that there are no immediate safety significant concerns which would adversely impact the public's health and safety. Also, provide comments/mark-ups, if any on the proposed e-mail response to the petitioner (draft e-mail below). Also, note that as stated in today's 0800 RI call , the Region does not have any immediate safety concerns with licensee's decision to startup as the reactor vessel head outer o-ring is currently holding RCS pressure.

Forthcoming steps for addressing petitioner's request for immediate action:

1. 1. PRB members to concur on determination to deny petitioner's immediate action request -

respond to PM via email today by 1200

2. 2. Obtain NRR concurrence on the PRB recommendation for addressing the petitioner's requests for immediate action
3. Inform petitioner of staff's decision or pending actions regarding the petitioner's immediate action requests (NOTE: per MD 8.11, if the staff plans to take an action that is contrary to an immediate action requested in the petition (permitting restart of a facility when the petitioner has requested that restart not be permitted), the petitioner must promptly be notified of the pending staff action).

3.

4. Follow-on steps:
5. 1. A follow-on PRB meeting will be scheduled on a later date to make an initial recommendation as to whether or not the petition meets the criteria for review under 10 CFR 2.206
6. 2. Inform petitioner of staff's initial recommendation (whether to accept or reject the petition for review).
7. 3. Offer a meeting or teleconference for the petitioner to address the PRB in light of its initial recommendation.
4. Issue an acknowledgement (or closure) letter to the petitioner Proposed PRB/Contacts:

Chair: Shana Helton Petition Manager: Rich Guzman 2.206 Coordinator: Lee Banic / Jim Kim DE: Dave Rudland RI: Tom Setzer OE: TBD OGC: David Cylkowski / Olivia Mikula Other key points (from Region I)

1. The outer o-ring is currently holding RCS pressure. The system was designed to operate on just the outer o-ring. There is no engineering or licensing basis for not performing a plant startup.
2. There was no root cause completed as a result of the double o-ring leak. The apparent cause determination may not bound the problem (i.e. there may be another cause).
3. Corrective actions that could be taken to fix o-ring leakage problems beyond what was done during the last outage require a minimum of 2-3 months lead time.
4. The unidentified leak rate was just determined to be 0.1 gpm which is lower than the UIL of 1.4 gpm at the time of the shutdown.

Current IP3 startup status (0800 6/22)

  • Reactor went critical at 4:34 pm on 6/21
  • Mode 1 at 11 :36 pm on 6/21
  • Synched to the grid at 2:26 am on 6/22
  • 100% expected -1 :30 on 6/23 I appreciate your help on this short-fuse request. Standing by for any questions/concerns.
Thanks, Rich Rich Guzman Sr. PM , Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office: 0 -9C07 I Phone: 301-415-1030

*------------------------DRAFT-----------------------------------------------

Good Afternoon, I have been assigned as a Petition Manager for the 10 CFR 2.206 petition you submitted to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) on June 11 , 2017, regarding your concerns with the reactor vessel head o-rings at Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 3.

Section 2.206 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations describes the petition process -

the primary mechanism for tile public to request enforcement action by the NRC in a public process. This process permits anyone to petition NRC to take enforcement-type action related to NRC licensees or licensed activities. Depending on the results of its evaluation, NRC could modify, suspend or revoke an NRC-issued license or take any other appropriate enforcement action to resolve a problem. The NRC staffs guidance for the disposition of 2.206 petition requests is in Management Directive 8.11 , which is publicly available.

The 2.206 process provides a mechanism for any member of the public to request enforcement action against NRC licensees. The 2.206 process is separate from the allegations process which affords individuals who raise safety concerns a degree of protection of their identity. In the 2.206 process, all of the information in your letter will be made public, including your identity.

You specifically requested in your letter for the NRC to keep Indian Point, Unit 3 (IP3) in cold shutdown until the condition of the reactor vessel head upper and lower surfaces are "proved to be identical to the as-purchased condition". The NRC considers your request as a short-term, immediate action given that IP3 is in the process of restarting from its refueling outage. On June 22, 2017, your request for immediate action was reviewed by members of the Petition Review Board (PRB), which includes staff from the NRC's Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) and Region I. After its review and discussion, the PRB determined that there were no immediate safety significant concerns which would adversely impact the public's health and safety; therefore, the PRB denied your request for immediate action in the restart of IP3.

In accordance with NRC Management Directive 8.11, you have the opportunity to address the PRB, either in person at the NRC Headquarters in Rockville, MD, or by telephone conference.

The purpose of this interaction is so that the petitioner can discuss the petition and verbally supplement the petition with any new information. During the meeting, the PRB is in listening mode and will not make any decisions regarding your petiition.

I would appreciate if you could advise me by Friday, June 30 , 2017 , if you agree to the NRC's processing your request under the 2.206 process . In addition , please advise me if you would like to address the PRB . If you would like to meet in person, I will need to schedule a formal public meeting at the NRC Headquarters. If you would prefer to address the PRB via phone, I will also work with you to coordinate a date/time during the upcoming weeks.

If you have other questions on the 2.206 process, or regarding the role as petition manager, please contact me at 301-415-1030 .

Thank you,


0 RAFT-----------------------------------------------

From: Evans, Michele Sent: 22 Jun 2017 14:21:36 -0400 To: Guzman, Richard;Helton, Shana

Subject:

RE: ACTION: 2.206 Immediate Action Request re: Indian Point Unit 3 Rx Head 0 -rings and Restart (LTR-17-0235)

Rich, I agree with the recommended approach to deny the immediate actions.

Thanks Michele


Original Message --------

From: "Guzman, Richard" <Richard.Guzman@nrc.gov>

Date: Thu, June 22, 2017 1:59 PM -0400 To: "Helton, Shana" <Shana.Helton@nrc.gov>

CC: "Evans, Michele" <Michele.Evans@nrc.gov>

Subject:

RE: ACTION: 2.206 Immediate Action Request re: Indian Point Unit 3 Rx Head 0-rings and Restart (LTR-17-0235)

Shana, As we discussed, please* obtain Michele's concurrence on the PRB's determination to deny the immediate action requested by the petitioner as summarized below. I understand you have concurred on this PRB determination. I would like to contact the petitioner by 3pm today, if possible. Looping in Michele to expedite this request and for your convenience.

SUMMARY

We've received a 2.206 petition from Tom Gurdziel concerning the reactor vessel head o-rings at Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 3 (IP3). He requests that NRC prevent restart of IP3 until they essentially determine a root cause. Because of the timing of their startup, we are treating the petitioner's request to keep IP3 shutdown as a request for immediate action. While the licensee has already synchronized to the grid (completed ahead of schedule earlier this a.m.), we intend to follow the process per MD 8.11, to the extent possible and 'promptly' notify the petitioner of the pending staff action (i.e., per MD 8.11 , when the staff plans to take an action contrary to the requested action in the petition (i.e., permitting restart of a facility when the petitioner has requested that restart not be permitted).

ACTION:

Per MD 8.11 , NRR concurrence is needed prior to communicating the PRB's determination regarding the petitioner's requested action for immediate action.

JUSTIFICATION:

After its review and discussion, the PRB determined that there were no immediate safety significant concerns which would adversely impact the public's health and safety;

therefore, the PRB recommends the petitioner's request to keep IP3 shutdown be denied.

Additional technical justification:

1. The licensee is meeting their TSs (1.0 gpm unidentified leakage). The TS requirements for leakage provide reasonable assurance of adequate protection. The IP3 TSs dictate requirements for monitoring unidentified leakage in containment and have limits that ensure they shut down the plant with adequate margin to safety. The unidentified leak rate is 0. 1 gpm which is 10% the limit of the TS and lower than the UIL of 0.14 gpm at time of shutdown.
2. The outer o-ring is currently holding RCS pressure. The system was designed to operate on j ust the outer o-ring. There is no engineering, licensing , of sufficient regulatory basis for preventing the plant startup.
3. The staff has determined there is no safety concern with the current condition at Unit 3 (i.e., the inner o-ring is leaking, but the outer is holding). The outer o-ring is a fully qualified 100% pressure seal, so it is designed to provide adequate seal ing on its own. An enforcement action to prevent startup would not be warranted.
4. The licensee's leak monitoring systems and TS limits are sufficient to identify the issue before it causes a larger concern.
5. Historically, the licensee has identified the leakage at a very low level and have taken prudent, conservative action to shut down the plant to repair.

If you or Michele have any questions, I can be reached at 301-415-1030.

Thanks, Rich Rich Guzman Sr. PM, Division Operator Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office: 0 -9C7 I Phone: (301) 415-1030 Richard.Guzman@nrc.gov From: Helton, Shana Sent: Thursday, June 22, 2017 12:09 PM To: Guzman, Richard <Richard.Guzman@nrc.gov>

concerns which would adversely impact the public's health and safety; therefore , the PRB denied your request for immediate action in the restart of IP3.

In accordance with NRG Management Directive 8.11 , you have the opportunity to address the PRB , either in person at the NRG Headquarters in Rockville , MD, or by telephone conference. The purpose of this interaction is so that the petitioner can discuss the petition and verbally supplement the petition with any new information.

During the meeting , the PRB is in listening mode and will not make any decisions regarding your petition .

I would appreciate if you could advise me by Friday, June 30 , 2017 , if you agree to the NRG's processing your request under the 2.206 process. In addition , please advise me if you would like to address the PRB. If you would like to meet in person , I will need to schedule a formal public meeting at the NRG Headquarters. If you wou ld prefer to address the PRB via phone, I will also work with you to coordinate a date/time during the upcom ing weeks .

If you have other questions on the 2.206 process, or regarding the role as petition manager, please contact me at 301-415- 1030 .

Thank you ,


DRA FT-----------------------------------------------

From: Floyd, Niklas Sent: 8 Sep 2015 09:00:25 -0400 To: Tsao, John;Alley, David Cc: Gray, Mel

Subject:

FW: Brief t imeline of RV head flange o-rings John and Dave, This is FYI regarding Indian Point Unit 3 reactor vessel head flange leakage. The licensee plans to shut down on September 14th to replace both 0-rings. The current unidentified leak rate (assumed to all be through the flange) is approximately 0.20 GPM.

We do not need support at this time, but I wanted to inform you all.

Nik From: Floyd, Niklas Sent: Friday, September 04, 2015 10:22 AM To: Gray, Mel <Mel.Gray@nrc.gov>; Lally, Christ opher <Christopher.Lally@nrc.gov>; Burritt, Arthur

<Arthur.Burritt@nrc.gov>; Scott, Michael <Michael.Scott@nrc.gov>; Colaccino, Joseph

<Joseph.Colaccino@nrc.gov>; Lorson, Raymond <Raymond.Lorson@nrc.gov>; Suber, Gregory

<Gregory.Su ber@nre.gov>

Cc: Kulp, Jeffrey <Jeffrey.Kulp@nrc.gov>; Gray, Harold <Harold.Gray@nrc.gov>; Pinson, Brandon

<Brandon .Pinson@nrc.gov>; Newman, Garrett <Garrett.Newman@nrc.gov>; Rich, Sarah

<Sarah.Rich@nrc.gov>

Subject:

RE: Brief timeline of RV head flange o-rings

All, We have no concerns with Indian Point's plan to operate until September 14th. Their preliminary calculation estimates 2.5 months of boric acid corrosion before any substantial impact to the reactor vessel bolts would occur. There was no indication of flange leakage prior to September 1st until the licensee staff placed the outer 0-ring back into service. Looking forward, this means the total exposure time of the boric acid to impact the bolts would be approximately 13 days, and that is too short for any significant degradation. Also, we observed pictures of the reactor vessel flange area taken on September 2nd that showed white boric deposits, which indicates there is no iron corrosion products. The licensee revised their ODMI to increase the visual inspections of the flange area to every two days in order to detect evidence of change in the boric acid accumulation or color.

Indian Point staff are currently working on a detailed evaluation to provide an actual wastage calculation, and it will be available early next week. We plan to review this evaluation once it is available.

Niklas Floyd Reactor Inspector Division of Reactor Safety

USNRC Region I (610) 337-5282 From : Gray, Mel Se nt: Friday, September 04, 2015 7:54 AM To: Floyd, Niklas <Niklas.Floyd@nrc.gov>; Gray, Harold <Harold.Gray@nrc.gov>

Cc: Kulp, Jeffrey <Jeffrey.Kulp@nrc.gov>

Subject:

FW: Brief timeline of RV head flange o-rings Can you guys circle back on this this morning with me?

From: Scott, Michael Sent: Friday, September 04, 2015 7:52 AM To: Burritt, Arthur <Arthur.Burritt@nrc.gov>; Colaccino, Joseph <Joseph.Colaccino@nrc.gov>

Cc: Lally, Christopher <Christopher.Lally@nrc.gov>; Lorson, Raymond <Raymond.Lorson@nrc.gov>;

Gray, Mel <Mel.Gray@nrc.gov>; Suber, Gregory <Gregory.Suber@nrc.gov>; Colaccino, Joseph

<Joseph.Colaccino@nrc.gov>

Subject:

RE: Brief timeline of RV head flange o-rings Larry Coyle informed me yesterday that they plan to shut down no later than Monday Sep 14 to repair. I assume we have no concerns with them operating until that time, unless situation dramatically worsens. If that is a bad assumption, would appreciate if staff would circle back with division management ASAP.

Thanks From : Burritt, Arthur Se nt: Thursday, September 03, 2015 11:22 AM To: Scott, M ichael <Michael.Scott@nrc.gov>; Colaccino, Joseph <Joseph.Colaccino@nrc.gov>

Cc: Lally, Christopher <Christopher.Lally@nrc.gov>

Subject:

FW: Brief timeline of RV head fla nge o-rings FYI From : Pinson, Brandon Se nt: Thursday, September 03, 2015 10:40 AM To: Lally, Christopher; Gray, Mel Cc: Rich, Sarah; New man, Garrett; Setzer, Thomas; Schussler, Jason; Pickett, Douglas; Burritt, Arthur

Subject:

Brief timeline of RV head flange o-rings Most of the history of the RV flange leakage is captured in the cover pages of the ODMI (attached for anyone who doesn't have it), but here's a quick rundown:

3/23/15 - A CR was written to document increased flange leak-off line temperature, indicating leakage across the inner a-ring. The inner leak off isolation was closed, and the outer leak off isolation was opened, putting the outer o-ring in service.

7/14/15 -Another CR was written to document an increase in flange leak-off line temperature, indicating leakage across the outer o-ring . As a result, the inner leak off isolation was opened on 8/4/15, putting both the inner and outer seals in service .

9/1 /15 - Inner o-ring was taken out of service due to ongoing challenges with keeping the RCDT temperature in check. Outer o-ring remained in service 9/2/15 - Inner o-ring was placed back in service , and they are currently in this configuration (both inner and outer o-rings in service).

As of this morning , the unidentified leak rate was 0.16gpm (total leak rate was 0.39gpm). Larry Coyle (SVP) ind icated a target date of 9/11/15 for shutdown and repair, however there are further discussions ongoing today related to timing.

Brandon

From: Santos, Cayetano Sent: 11 Sep 2015 08:47:17 -0400 To: Pickett, Douglas;Beasley, Benjamin Cc: Dudek, Michael;Jessie, Janelle

Subject:

FW: Daily note for IP shutdown Attachments: Indian Point Unit 3 Reactor Vessel Head Oring Key msg.docx Doug/Ben, Region I sent OEDO a one-pager about the Indian Point 3 0-ring seal leakage (see attached).

plan to forward this to the reactor CAs today. Region I also plans to submit a daily note about this.

Just wanted to share for your awareness.

Thanks, Tanny From: Tifft, Doug Sent: Thursday, September 10, 2015 5:06 PM To: Santos,Cayetano Cc: Lew, David; Scott, Michael

Subject:

Daily note for IP shutdown

Tanny, I understand that you are covering for Janelle Jessie while she is out of the office. Entergy is planning to shut down Indian Point Unit 3 on Monday, September 14 to replace the seals on the reactor vessel.

We haven't prepared an EDO daily note for this, but we think it could be of interest to the Commission since it is Indian Point and will likely receive press coverage. Given that the outage start date is proprietary and we can only fit a limited amount of information on a daily note, we were thinking a walk round to the Commission may be best. I've attached a short summary of the issue and key messages that was developed by the Region that you could use for a walk around. That said, if you think a daily note is more appropriate, we will generate one tomorrow.

Please let me know how you want to handle this. The best way to get a hold of me is on cell -

610-574-9796.

Thanks,

-Doug

~!Yi#

Regional State liaison Officer Office: 610-337-6918 Cell: !(b)(6)

INTERNAL USE ONLY Not all for public disclosure Indian Point Unit 3 Reactor Vessel Head 0-ring Leak

Background

There are two o-ring seals on the Indian Point Unit 3 reactor vessel - an inner and outer o-ring. The inner and outer o-ring arrangement seals the reactor coolant system (RCS) pressure between the vessel head and the vessel flange. Concentric grooves are machined into the vessel head flange where two hollow o-ring gaskets are mounted by clips and screws. The two hollow o-rings form pressure-tight seals by permitting RCS pressure to self-energize (activate) these o-rings against the groove surfaces of the vessel head and vessel flange-sealing surface. Theo-rings are made of lnconel and plated with 6-9 mils thick polished silver for malleability.

The Reactor Vessel Flange (RVF) Leakage Monitoring System detects leakage from the o-rings. This system consists of a tapped pipe in the outboard side of the inner a-ring annulus. This pipe has a temperature indicator (Tl-401 ) and any leakage is directed to the Reactor Coolant Drain Tank (RCDT). If the inner o-ring fails to seal, leakage of RCS fluid will give a high temperature indication and alarm in the Control Room. A second tap is. provided in the outboard side of the outer a-ring annulus, and is utilized if the first tap is isolated due to failure of the inner o-ring and there is no indication of leakage on the outer a-ring. If both o-rings show indication of leakage, the recommended configuration is with both leak-off lines open.

On 3/23/15, Indian Point Unit 3 Operations wrote a condition report documenting an increase in Reactor RVF leak-off line temperature. This indicates leak-by on the RVF in-service o-ring (in this case the inner a-ring). In accordance with station procedures, operators closed the leak off valve and placed the outer o-ring in service.

On 7/14/15, Operations wrote another condition report documenting an increase in RVF leak-off line temperature, as well as an oscillating trend between approximately 115°F and 125°F. On 7/1 5/15, the temperature increased from 123°F to 177°F to 201 °F in the coL1rse of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. A containment entry was made to verify the temperatures indicated, and results support t he indications.

After the RCDT in-leakage trended upward from 0.03 to 0.06 GPM, the decision was made to open the inner o-ring leak-off line isolation valve, leaving both valves open. This was the recommended operating configuration from Westinghouse to minimize potential leakage that could affect the vessel flange studs.

A containment entry on 8/4/15 performed this evolution. Following this, the RCDT in-leakage rate increased to about 0.2 GPM, leak-off line temperature initially dropped to 150°F, then increased to 228°F where it has remained, and RCDT temperature increased from 90°F to approximately 140°F.

Current Condition as of September 10, 2015:

Due to the burden of maintaining the RCDT in the operating limits, the decision was made to close the inner o-ring leak-off line to reduce the amount of leakage to the RCDT. This valve was closed on 9/1/15.

Following this, the leakrate decreased to approximately 0.07 gpm and the leak-off line and RCDT temperatures all decreased. About four hours later, radiation monitor R-11 showed an increase in containment particulate radiation level. An entry into containment was made on 9/2/15 to open the inner o-ring leak-off line valve, and to inspect the flange for leakage. Evidence of leakage to the studs was found in two separate areas on the RVF, in the form of accumulated boric acid. [PROPRIEI4R¥: A planned maintenance outage will begin on or around Monday, September 14 to replace the o-rings.]

Key Messages:

  • Entergy has performed a bounding calculation for the leakage past the o-rings and the extent of damage (wastage) it would cause to the reactor vessel head studs. This calculation showed that it would take 2.5 months operating in the current condition before the studs would reach their stress limits as allowed by the ASME Code. This is a conservative calculation.

INTERNAL USE ONLY Not all for public disclosure

  • NRC experts completed an independent confirmatory analysis and found that both the assumed corrosion rates and the methodologies used in the calculation were reasonable. As a result, given the current plant conditions , we do not have a safety concern with the plant operating in the current condition , and a [PROPP\IET;P;Fr.<. planned outage of Monday September 14] is well within the timeframe of the bounding calculation .
  • Resident Inspectors are monitoring leakage trends (total, unidentified , and identified leakages) and plant conditions on a daily basis.
  • NRC inspectors will perform inspections of the vessel (DRS Harold Gray) and the o-rings. We will also inspect condition reports and the licensee's use of the corrective action program to evaluate and correct this condition . Results of the inspections will be documented in publically available reports.

From: Issa, Alfred Sent: 12 May 2015 11:33:47 +0000 To: Harmon, David

Subject:

FW: EN 51047 - FARLEY UNIT 1 - TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SHUTDOWN DUE TO REACTOR COOLANT PUMP TRIP - FYI FYI. Please disseminate as you see fit.

Thanks

~ed 1444. 'P.&.

'US1tRe

~eaa'aii t ) ~ &~

atfied.i444@~.94V-(301J 415-5342 From: King, Mark Sent: Monday, May 11, 2015 3:47 PM To: Mathew, Roy; Keefe, Molly; Pasquale, Daniel; Kendzia, Thomas; Armstrong, Aaron; Prescott, Paul; Issa, Alfred; Thompson, John; Sigmon, Rebecca

Subject:

EN 51047 - FARLEY UNIT 1 - TECHNICAL SPECIFICATI ON SHUTDOWN DUE TO REACTOR COOLANT PUMP TRIP - FYI EN 51047

  • FARLEY UNIT 1
  • TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SHUTDOWN DUE TO REACTOR COOLANT PUMP TRIP UPDATE 5/11/20 15: 1B UAT current transformers were left with the factory jumpers (grounds) installed. Following jumper removal and extensive transformer testing, the 1B Station Aux Transformer (SAT) was reenergized on 5/8. Reactor startup occurred on 5/8 and the generator tied to the grid late on 5/9. The 1B UAT was loaded with the 1A, 1B and 1C 4kV busses (RCPs) on 5/9.

Licensee perform ing a causal evaluation to investigate, but it appears the work order instructions that implemented the design change to install the 1B UAT did not require jumper removal. Note: The drawings associated with the design change package (PCPJ show tha~

these jumpers should be removed in the field.

Send to TRG for Electrical (Roy Mathew), Human Performance (Molly Keefe), QA/Vendor (Dan Pasquale , Tom Kendzia, Aaron Armstrong, Paul Prescott), NRO (Al Issa) and IOEB POCs (John Thompson, Rebecca Sigmon), assigned to Mark King.


EN entry from 5/8/2015-----------

This notification is being made as required by 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i) due to a Farley Nuclear Plant Unit 1 shutdown required by Technical Specifications.

At 0509 CDT on 5/7/2015, 18 Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) tripped during transfer of 18 4160V bus to 18 unit auxiliary transformer. Technical Specification LCO 3.4.4 Condition A was entered for loss of a Reactor Coolant System (RCS) loop. Unit 1 reactor was shut down per operating procedures and entered Mode 3 at 0740 CDT. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

Send EN info to TRG for Electrical (Roy Mathew), assigned to Mark King.

FYI

From: Tsao, John Sent: 17 Ju l 2015 07:10:49 -0400 To: Alley, David

Subject:

FW: Indian Point 3--RPV head flange 0-ring leak fyi John From: Fairbanks, Carolyn Sent: Thursday, July 16, 2015 10:06 AM To: Ross-Lee, MaryJane; Tsao, John; Lubinski, John Cc: McHale, John; Alley, David

Subject:

RE : Indian Point 3--RPV head flange 0 -ring leak I spoke to the PM this morning, here's the latest information:

Last night, a high humidity alarm in containment and a high level fan cooler condenser level alarm went off very briefly. The Region is following up on the cause(s) - whether those were due to an outdoor temperature effect, steaming and condensation from the 0-rings, etc. The licensee will provide an operability determination to the Region today. The current status is that the plant is within Tech Specs for leakage and the licensee has indicated they plan to continue operating (not replace the 0-rings before the next outage in Feb. 2017). We'll get some feedback from the Region via the PM after the operability determination, and remain available for any support needed by the Region.

From: Ross- Lee, MaryJane Sent: Thursday, July 16, 2015 9:22 AM To: Tsao, John; Lubinski, John Cc: Fairbanks, Carolyn; McHale, John; Alley, David

Subject:

RE: Indian Point 3--RPV head flange 0-ring leak Any new news on this?

Mary Jone Ross-Lee (MJ)

Deputy Director, Division of Engineering Off ice of Nuclear Reactor Regulation OWFN 9H1 US Nuclear Regulatory Commission

~

Q)

Office: 301-415-3298 Mobile: !(b)(6) I

':I e-mail: mary1ane.ross- ee@nrc.gov From : Tsao, John Sent: Wednesday, July 15, 2015 11:32 AM To: Lubinski, John; Ross-Lee, MaryJane

Cc: Fairbanks, Carolyn; McHale, John; Alley, David

Subject:

Indian Point 3-- RPV head flange 0 -ring leak John/MJ Last night Indian Point Unit 3 detected a leakage (0.035 gpm) off the outer 0-ring. The unit started up in March 2015. During the startup evolution, the inner 0-ring was damaged.

This morning , Carolyn Fairbanks, Doug Pickett and I talked with Arthur Burritt who is the branch chief in Region I responsible for Indian Point. Right now Region I is gathering information. We in NRR are on a stand-by mode ready to help Region I.

John

From: Coyne, Kevin Sent: 30 May 2017 11:00:37 -0400 To: Alley, David;Rudland, David

Subject:

FW: IP3 leak Attachments: FW: IP3 in AL3 for UIL increase, FW: Here is the trend for IP3 unidentified leakage today From: Benner, Eric Sent: Tuesday, May 30, 2017 ].0:53 AM To: Lubinski, John <John.Lubinski@nrc.gov>; Coyne, Kevin <Kevin.Coyne@nrc.gov>; Evans, Michele

<Michele.Evans@nrc.gov>; McDermott, Brian <Brian.McDermott@nrc.gov>

Cc: Ross-Lee, MaryJane <MaryJane.Ross-Lee@nrc.gov>; Brock, Kathryn <Kathryn.Brock@nrc.gov>

Subject:

FW: IP3 leak FYI From: Guzman, Richard Sent: Tuesday, May 30, 2017 9:46 AM To: Danna, James <James.Danna@nrc.gov>

Cc: Ross-Lee, MaryJane <MaryJane.Ross-Lee@nrc.gov>; Benner, Eric <Eric.Benner@nrc.gov>

Subject:

FW: IP3 leak

Jim, One additional awareness item in terms of timing - based on the current leak rate, IP3 would reach the 0.5 gpm trigger point (forced shutdown and repair) on 6/12. Note that G2G and annual assessment meetings are scheduled for 6/13 and 6/14, respectively. Residents anticipate the licensee will look to shutdown and repair the leak sooner than the 6/12 projection.

Rich From: Guzman, Richard Sent: Tuesday, May 30, 2017 9:30 AM To: Danna, James <James.Danna@nrc.gov>

Subject:

RE: IP3 leak Jim -

The IP3 leak was initially identified on the RPV inner a-ring shortly after startup on 5/26, at which time they shifted to the outer seal and leakage rate appeared to return to normal values.

Since 5/26, RCS leak has been slowly increasing. They a re currently at 0.12 gpm (increased from 0.01 to 0.10 gpm over one week) Total RCS leakage is 0.18 gpm. The licensee is in Action Level Ill and taking the required actions.

They had a fleet management call yesterday and are preparing for a Unit 3 outage to identify the source of the leak and repair the problem.

They suspect that the source of the leakage is the RPV o-ring leakoff line. As indicated above, on 5/26 they experienced some leakage through the inner RPV o-ring seal and shifted to the outer seal. This pressurizes the inner seal leakoff line. If boric acid from the earlier seal leak is causing the seal leakoff valve not to go fully shut, then thi s could be the cause of the increased leakage - steam cutting of the valve surface.

The tech spec limit for unidentified leakage is 1.0 gpm.

The licensee has established trigger points such that if RCS UIL continues to increase:

  • at 0.25 gpm - they will staff the OCC
  • at 0.40 gpm they will downpower and conduct inspections inside the cranewall
  • at 0.50 gpm they will shutdown Trend Analysis from the SRI Today's (5/30) measurement shows a slow but steady trend toward the first ODMI [Operational Decision Making Issue] trigger point of 0.25 gpm. The unidentified leak rate has increased from 0.01 gpm on 5/26 (after shifting to the outer RPV seal) to 0.12 gpm today, 5/30.

If the leak continues to increase at almost -0.0333 gpm/day, the first ODMI trigger point will be reached by - June 2 or June 3.

This will cause them to downpower Unit 3 to reduce radiation levels inside containment so they can conduct more detailed inspections inside the crane. If the leak rate continues to linearly increase, they will be taking the unit offline by -June 7th.

More to follow. Residents continue to monitor the situation.

Rich Guzman Sr. PM , Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office: 0-8E10 I Phone: 301-415-1030 From: Danna, James Sent: Tuesday, May 30, 2017 8:36 AM To: Guzman, Richard <Richard.Guzman@nrc.gov>

Subject:

IP3 lea k Importance: High

Rich, Can you give me any brief background/status on the leakage at IP3 that I can mention at this morning's 1O am DORL meeting? I heard on the call this morning there is an o-ring leak.

Jim

From: Danna, James Sent: Tuesday, May 30, 2017 8:21 AM To: NRR_DORL_LPLl Distribution <NRR DORL LPL1Distribution@nrc.gov>

Subject:

any items I should mention at DORL 10am meeting?

Importance: High

From: Haagensen, Brian Sent: 30 May 2017 09:04:46 -0400 To: Guzman, Richard

Subject:

FW: IP3 in Al3 for Ull increase Attachments: CR l og Entry on Ull 2017 01_01_45.pdf, CR log Entry on Ull 2017 11_46_45.pdf, Ull Trend Graph.docx Note: The three attachments are withheld in their entirety under exemption 4.

From: Haagensen, Brian Sent: Sunday, May 28, 2017 1:47 PM To: Setzer, Thomas Cc: Rich, Sarah ; Siwy, Andrew

Subject:

IP3 in Al3 for Ull increase

Tom, It appears that IP3 may have a leak inside containment. The total RCS leak rate has steadily increased from 0.09 gpm to 0.18 gpm over the past week since startup. RCS UIL has increased from 0.01 to 0.10 gpm in the same time period. They are now officially in AL 3 and are taking the required actions.
  • Chemistry samples show a slight increase in particu late activity
  • They are performing a containment entry to try to identify the source of the leak
  • I have attached several files which contain control room log entries and the PEO log trends.
  • Informing management
  • CR drafted As you may reca ll, IP3 experienced a leak on the RPV inner o-ring short ly after startup.

They shifted to the outer o-ring and the leakage returned to normal values. In addition, the leak detector thermocouples did not show continued leakage after shifting to the outer o-ring.

We will continue to monitor the trends conditions over the weekend. The leakage is still far away from tech spec limits (1.0 gpm UIL) but the t rends have me concerned . This is a problem for next week unless the trends degrade f urther or unless the conta inment entry team finds pressure boundary leakage.

Call if you have any questions.

Brian C. Haagensen Senior Resident Inspector Indian Point Energy Center

914-739-9630/1 (office)

D (cell )

(home)

From: Haagensen, Brian Sent: 30 May 2017 08 :53:20 -0400 To: Setzer, Thomas;Safouri, Christopher;Patel, Jigar Cc: Siwy, Andrew;Rich, Sarah;Guzman, Richard

Subject:

FW: Here is the trend for IP3 unidentif ied leakage today Below is the trend graph for RCS leakage.

Projected trigger points:

0.25 gpm = 3 June 0.4 gpm = 9 June 0.5 gpm = 12 June (b)(4)

From : Haagensen, Brian Sent: Tuesday, May 30, 2017 8:50 AM To: Guzman, Richard

Senior Resident Inspector Indian Point Energy Center 914 739-9360 (Office)

(b)(6) (Cell)

From: Tsao, John Sent: 17 Jul 2015 08:19:47 -0400 To: Ross-Lee, MaryJane Cc: Lubinsk i, John;Fairbanks, Carolyn;McHale, John;Alley, David

Subject:

FW: IP3 Vessel Flange 0 -ring leakage Update Fyi John From: Burritt, Arthur Sent: Friday, July 17, 2015 8:15 AM To: Tsao, John; Pickett, Douglas; Floyd, Niklas Cc: Scott, Michael

Subject:

FW: IP3 Vessel Flange 0-ring Update FYI From: Rich, Sarah Sent: Thursday, July 16, 2015 4 :09 PM To: Burritt, Arthur; Floyd, Niklas Cc: Stewart, Scott; Newman, Garrett; Setzer, Thomas; Pinson, Brandon

Subject:

IP3 Vessel Flange 0 -ring Update

All, This afternoon, the alarm came in again for high temperature on the vessel flange leakoff line.

The temperature has remained just above the set point, at about 140 degrees F. All other containment parameters are normal.

I attended the condition report review group meeting this morning that reviewed the ODMI for the o-ring leakage. The ODMI was handed out at the meeting and participants were asked to give feedback. There was a great deal of discussion on what to do for monitoring and how often. The ODMI is not yet approved, but based on the discussion it seems that monitoring will include frequent parameter monitoring and weekly inspections and containment air sampling.

The ODMI is expected to be completed tomorrow.

Sarah

From: Pickett, Douglas Sent: 17 Jul 2015 09:15:05 -0400 To: Dudek, Michael;Tsao, John;Fairbanks, Carolyn;Alley, David

Subject:

FW: IP3 Vessel Flange 0-ring Update The email below is from one of the Indian Point resident inspectors. ODMI stands for Operational Decision Making Issue and is separate from an operability determination. ODMls provide management direction to the staff to handle ongoing issues.

It is the regional understanding that, absent any significant changes, the licensee plans to continue operation with 0-ring leakage for the duration of the operating cycle which ends in February 2017.

From: Burritt, Arthur Sent: Friday, July 17, 2015 8:15 AM To: Tsao, John; Pickett, Douglas; Floyd, Niklas Cc: Scott, Michael

Subject:

FW: IP3 Vessel Flange 0-ring Update FYI From: Rich, Sarah Sent: Thursday, July 16, 2015 4:09 PM To: Burritt, Arthur; Floyd, Niklas Cc: Stewart, Scott; Newman, Garrett; Setzer, Thomas; Pinson, Brandon

Subject:

IP3 Vessel Flange 0 -ring Update

All, This afternoon, the alarm came in again for high temperature on the vessel flange leakoff line.

The temperature has remained just above the set point, at about 140 degrees F. All other containment parameters are normal.

I attended the condition report review group meeting this morning that reviewed the ODMI for the a-ring leakage. The ODMI was handed out at the meeting and participants were asked to give feedback. There was a great deal of discussion on what to do for monitoring and how often. The ODMI is not yet approved, but based on the discussion it seems that monitoring will include frequent parameter monitoring and weekly inspections and containment air sampling.

The ODMI is expected to be completed tomorrow.

Sarah

From: King, Michael Sent: 8 Jan 2018 18:49:55 +0000 To: Jones, Heather

Subject:

FW: Tomorrow's News Tonight (cc'ing Brian and M ike)

Hi Heather .. .this is all I could find on the IP o-ring FOIA.

Thanks, Mike From: Miller, Chris Sent: Friday, November 03, 2017 5:22 PM To: Thomas, Eric <Eric.Thomas@nrc.gov>; Elliott, Robert <Robert.Elliott@nrc.gov>; McDermott, Brian

<Brian.McDermott@nrc.gov>; King, Michael <Michael.King2@nrc.gov>

Cc: King, Ma rk <Mark.King@nrc.gov>

Subject:

RE: Tomorrow's News Tonight (cc'ing Brian and Mike)

Thanks Eric.

chris From: Thomas, Eric Sent: Friday, November 03, 2017 12:36 PM To: Miller, Chris <Chris.Miller@nrc.gov>; Elliott, Robert <Robert.Elliott@nrc.gov>; McDermott, Brian

<Brian.McDermott@nrc.gov>; King, Michael <Michael.King2@nrc.gov>

Cc: King, Ma rk <Mark.King@nrc.gov>

Subje ct: RE: Tomorrow's News Tonight (cc'ing Brian and Mike)

Chris, Looks like it's the 10/27/17 integrated report. ML17303A977, related to RVH o-rings.

We were following this in 2015 when they had some RVH o-ring leakage on Unit 3 due to crimping of the rings and problems with clip installations. They did an outage in Sep 2015 and replaced the o-rings.

In the 10/27 insp report, inspectors did a sample of issues related Rx Vessel Head 0-rings going back to 2003. No Findings, but some inspector insights on the licensee's corrective actions. Here's an excerpt from the beginning of that section.

"The inspectors performed an in-depth review of Entergy' s evaluation and corrective actions associated with repeated reactor coolant system (RCS) leakage through the reactor vessel head 0-rings. The inspectors reviewed CRs and corrective actions associated with the eight reactor vessel head 0-rings leaks that had occurred at Indian Point since 2003. Specifically, the inspectors reviewed the corrective actions to verify they were addressing the identified conditions adverse to quality. The inspectors reviewed Entergy's maintenance history records and causal analyses."

Eric

From : Miller, Chris Sent: Friday, November 03, 2017 10:56 AM To: Elliott, Robert <Robert. Elliott@nrc.gov>

Cc: Thomas, Eric <Eric.Thomas@nrc.gov>

Subject:

Fwd : Tomorrow's News Tonight Can you or your staff answer? Thanks chris Begin Forwarded Message:

From: "McDermott, Brian" <Brian.McDermott@nrc.gov>

Subject:

Fwd: Tomorrow's News Tonight Date: 03 November 2017 09:47 To: "Miller, Chris" <Chris.Miller@nrc.gov>, "King, M ichael" <Michae1.King2@nrc.gov>

Just curious, is the o ring the Rx vessel head or something smaller, perhaps EQ relat ed?

Begin Forwarded Message:

From: "Castelveter, David" <David.Castelveter@nrc.gov>

Subject:

Tomorrow's News Tonight Date: 02 November 2017 16:57 To: "Castelveter, David" <David.Castelveter@nrc.gov>

Nov.2,2017 Traditional Media SEABROOK - NextEra, the plant's owner, has appealed an ASLB ruling granting a hearing on a watchdog group on the company's license amendment request regarding concrete degradation at the facility. The Newburyport Daily News (Mass.) spoke with OPA Region I about next steps.

INDIAN POINT -A reporter for S&P Global Platts asked for additional information regarding the 0-ring leakage at both units addressed in our latest quarterly inspection report for the plant. OPA Region I responded .

URANIUM ONE - OPA HQ received follow-up inquiries from The Hill, The Washington Post and Fox News (Sean Hannity) regarding the recent Uranium One export news

coverage. We clarified facts with the Washington Post and The Hill and provided a general response to Fox News.

Press Releases None

~ i s ~ ;

e ary ma David A. Castelveter Office Di rector U.S. Nuclear Regu latory Commission Office of Public Affairs (Mail Stop 0-16D3) 11555 Rockville Pike, MD 20852 301-415-8200 (O)

!(b)(6)  !(Cl david.castelveter@nrc .gov www .nrc.gov

From: Tsao, John Sent: 17 Jul 2015 14:35 :06 -0400 To: Alley, David;McHale, John;Fairbanks, Ca rolyn;Ross-Lee, MaryJane;Lubinski, John

Subject:

FYI FW: IP3 Reactor Vessel Head Flange 0 -ring Leak ODM I Attachments: CR-IP3-2015-03845 U3 RVF 0 -ring Leakage Rev O 7-15-15.pdf fyi Note: The attached 8-page Nuclear Management Manual is withheld in its entirety under FO IA John exemption 4.

From: Burritt, Arthur Sent: Friday, July 17, 2015 2:31 PM To: Tsao, John Cc: Pickett, Douglas

Subject:

FW: IP3 Reactor Vessel Head Flange 0 -ring Leak ODMI For review, Sara Rich and Nick Floyd are the Resident Office and Regional points of contact.

Please review the attached and share any concerns From: Rich, Sarah Sent: Friday, July 17, 2015 10:57 AM To: Burritt, Arthur; Floyd, Niklas Cc: Setzer, Thomas; Newman, Garrett; Pinson, Brandon; Stewart, Scott

Subject:

IP3 Reactor Vessel Head Flange 0-ring Leak ODMI

All, I have attached the operational decision-making issue (ODMI) document on the reactor vessel head flange o-ring leakage. It was approved this morning.

Sarah

From: Giantelli, Joseph Sent: 27 Jun 2014 08:09 :00 -0400 To: Mathew, Roy;lssa, Alfred

Subject:

FYI - LER - DAVIS-BESSE: REACTOR TRIP DUE TO REACTOR COOLANT PUMP MOTOR FAULTY ELECTRICAL CONNECTION LER 3462013001ROO - DAVIS-BESSE: REACTOR TRIP DUE TO REACTOR COOLANT PUMP MOTOR FAULTY ELECTRICAL CONNECTION (EN 49159)

On June 29, 2013, with Davis-Besse operating at approximately 100 percent power, the Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) Motor 1-2 tripped due to actuation of a differential trip relay in the motor source breaker. This resulted in a reactor trip from the Reactor Protection System on Flux/Delta-Flux/Flow. Licensees determined the cause of the RCP motor trip to be a failure in the current transformer (CT) circuit. A screw on the RCP Motor 1-2 CT terminal block had a stress/fatigue related failure which caused the wire to detach in the CT circuitry causing an open circuit and actuation of the differential trip . The investigation also found degraded wiring in the CT circuit because it was touching the high voltage buss bar insulation in the RCP motor termination box and experienced degradation caused by corona discharge. The CT wiring and terminal block including all screws were replaced. The screws were replaced with a different type of material.

Procurement documents will be revised to ensure replacement hardware is of appropriate quality to meet ANSI standards. The CT wiring , terminal blocks and screws in all four RCPs will be inspected during the next scheduled outage. Forward to TRG Lead for Electrical Power Systems (Roy Mathew) and NRO (Al Issa): assigned to Joe Giantelli Joe Giantelli Operating Experience Branch 301-415-0504 joseph.giantelli@nrc.gov If you want to go quickly go alone.

If you want to go far go together.

From: Pickett, Douglas Sent: 3 Sep 2015 07:20:35 -0400 To: Beasley, Benjamin

Subject:

Indian Po int 3 Flange Leakage Updates Attachments: RE : U3 Flange Leak Update, FW: U3 Flange Leak Update Two separate email updates from the IP residents.

Fan cooler weir level increases, containment rad monitor indications. It seems the situation has stabilized to the point that the licensee wants to defer any immediate shutdown.

Douglas V. Pickett, Senior Project Manager Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit Nos. 2 & 3 James A FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant Douglas .Pickett@nrc.gov 301-415-1364

From: Rich, Sarah Sent: 3 Sep 2015 01 :38 :20 -0400 To: Newman, Garrett;Burritt, Arthur;Lally, Christopher;P inson, Brandon;Schussler, Jason;Setzer, Thomas;Floyd, Niklas;Pickett, Douglas

Subject:

RE : U3 Flange Leak Update The control room has been calculating identified and unidentified leak rates every hour since putting the inner leak off line back in service. Identified leakage has been steady at 0.23 GPM.

Unidentified leakage has been about 0.2 GPM , plus or minus 0.03 GPM. They have also had fewer FCU weir high water level alarms this shift.

From: Rich, Sarah Sent: Wednesday, September 02, 2015 4:17 PM To: Newman, Garrett <Garrett.Newman@nrc.gov>; Burritt, Arthur <Arthur.Burritt@nrc.gov>; Lally, Christopher <Christopher.Lally@nrc.gov>; Pinson, Brandon <Brandon.Pinson@nrc.gov>; Schussler, Jason <Jason.Schussler@nrc.gov>; Setzer, Thomas <Thomas.Setzer@nrc.gov>; Floyd, Niklas

<Niklas.Floyd@nrc.gov>; Pickett, Douglas <Douglas.Pickett@nrc.gov>

Subject:

RE: U3 Flange Leak Update When I was in the unit 3 control room just now they continued to have indications of leakage past the flange, in the form of increasing fan cooler unit weir levels on multiple FCUs and no reduction in containment particulate rad monitor readings. In addition, there is also indication of some leakage into the RCDT now that the inner o-ring leakoff line valve is open , in the form of a steady high temperature on the vessel flange leakoff line and slowly increasing level in the RCDT. They are putting together another trip into containment to take more pictures of the flange , possibly to see if the dry boric acid spots look any different.

For those following along in IMC 2515, App D, we have completed actions 1-3 for Action Level Ill. We will follow step 4 if the leakage continues to increase from now until mid-day Friday, although I am aware that Doug has been reaching out all along to certain members of NRR.

From: Burritt, Arthur Sent: 2 Sep 2015 17:36:51 -0400 To: Scott, Michael;Colaccino, Joseph Cc: Pickett, Douglas;Gray, Mel;Gray, Harold

Subject:

FW: U3 Flange Leak Update From : Newman, Garrett Se nt: Wednesday, September 02, 2015 2:11 PM To: Rich, Sarah; Burritt, Arthur; Lally, Christopher; Pinson, Bran don; Schussler, Jason; Setzer, Thomas; Floyd, Niklas

Subject:

U3 Flange Leak Updat e Operations performed a containment entry at 1O: 15 hrs with the outer 0-ring in service and leaking at about 0.25 gpm. They observed and photographed two areas of boric acid along the circumference but did not see steaming. I just saw the pictures and observed two seemingly dry, white, thin deposits a few feet around each.

Operations placed the inner 0-ring leak detection back in service at 10:35 hrs in an attempt to reduce total and unidentified leakage, reverting to the prior condition of leakage going to the RCDT. The flange detection line temperature immediately increased to -230 degrees indicating that there is now some flow to the RCDT.

Operations continues to make hourly leak rate evaluations. The 14:00 hr evaluation reported 0.36 gpm unidentified leakage. This number may not fully account for the identified leakage going to the RCDT (ballpark 0.18 gpm at 11 :00) but I think it is safe to say there is still leakage past the flange. The gaseous and particulate radiation monitors have remained steady since the increase last night. It's uncertain when they will make another containment entry.

Entergy continues their decision-making with consideration of moving up the forced outage.

have not been able to get a timeline but I think they would like to wait a few weeks until temperature drops (for heat stress considerations) if conditions permit. I reminded Operations management about our request for wastage timelines.

I don't have an immediate concern for continued operation within their ODMI and TS limits. I do think we need to see at least a preliminary evaluation of wastage rates this week.

From : Newman, Garrett Sent: Wednesday, September 02, 2015 7:08 AM To: Rich, Sarah; Burritt, Arthur; Lally, Christopher; Pinson, Brandon; Schussler, Jason; Setzer, Thomas; Floyd, Niklas

Subject:

Re: IP Status and Flange Leak Update I t alked to the shift manager. Unidentified leakage is 0.29gpm. They are making preparations to shutdown in the near futu re, as soon as today. I w ill call in at 7:30.

From: Rich, Sara h Sent: Wednesday, September 2, 2015 3:19 AM To: Burritt, Arthur; Newman, Garrett; Lally, Christopher; Pinson, Brandon; Schussler, Jason; Setzer, Thomas; Floyd, Niklas

Subject:

IP Status and Flange Leak Update Unit 2:

100% power Risk is Green Unidentified leakrate is 0.03 GPM No significant work going on at Unit 2 Dry Fuel Storage inspection exit on Wednesday at 12:30, no findings.

Unit 3:

100% power Risk is Green Unidentified leakrate is 0.23 GPM Unit 3 closed the valve on the reactor vessel flange inner o-ring leakoff line at 1:30 pm on Tuesday due to ongoing challenges with keeping the RCDT temperature in check. At the time the leakrate into the RCDT was approximately 0.4 GPM. Now the outer o-ring is in service, and there is almost no leakage into the RCDT (<0.01 gpm), which is confirmed by the low temperature reading on the reactor vessel flange leakoff line temperature indicator (110 degrees, down from 255 degrees). However, two mass-balance RCS leakrate measurements have confirmed that the unidentified leakrate is 0.23 GPM, and it is extremely likely that almost all of that is leakage through the reactor vessel flange metal-to-metal surface. At about 1630 on Tuesday there was a corresponding increase in radiation measured on the containment particulate radiation monitor (see attachment). This is the same rad monitor that showed a small step increase when the leak was first identified back in July.

As of this writing, the shift manager had not yet notified station management. The ODMI does not contain actions to address increases in unidentified leakage. Their procedure for monitoring unidentified leakage, O-SOP-LEAKRATE-001, directs them to identify the source of the leakage by making a containment entry. Their regularly scheduled containment entry is planned for Thursday.

Their tech spec limit for unidentified leakage is 1 GPM.

I was here tonight for the first of two force-on-force drills. It went well. I will not be in on Wednesday until after lunch.

From: Pickett, Douglas Sent: 11 Sep 2015 10:43:27 -0400 To: Tsao, John;Elliott, Robert;Chernoff, Margaret;Jackson, Christopher;Alley, David

Subject:

Indian Point 3 to Shut Down to Replace Reactor Vessel 0 -Rings Attachments: Indian Point Unit 3 Reactor Vessel Head Oring Key msg.docx FYI-Attached is a very nice writeup describing the current Indian Point 3 reactor vessel flange 0-ring degradation. The licensee plans to shut down next Monday (9/14) for an approximate two week outage to replace the damaged 0-rings.

Doug Douglas V. Pickett, Senior Project Manager Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit Nos. 2 & 3 James A FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant Douglas.Pickett@nrc.gov 301-415-1364 From: Santos, Cayetano Sent: Friday, September 11, 2015 8:47 AM To: Pickett, Douglas; Beasley, Benjamin Cc: Dudek, Michael; Jessie, Janelle

Subject:

FW: Daily note for IP shutdown Doug/Ben, Region I sent OEDO a one-pager about the Indian Point 3 0-ring seal leakage (see attached).

plan to forward this to the reactor CAs today. Region I also plans to submit a daily note about this.

Just wanted to share for your awareness.

Thanks, Tanny From: Tifft, Doug Sent: Thursday, September 10, 2015 5:06 PM To: Santos,Cayetano Cc: Lew, David; Scott, M ichael

Subject:

Daily note for IP shutdown

Tanny,

I understand that you are covering for Janelle Jessie while she is out of the office. Entergy is planning to shut down Indian Point Unit 3 on Monday, September 14 to replace the seals on the reactor vessel.

We haven't prepared an EDO daily note for this, but we think it could be of interest to the Commission since it is Indian Point and will likely receive press coverage. Given that the outage start date is proprietary and we can only fit a limited amount of information on a daily note, we were thinking a walk round to the Commission may be best. I've attached a short summary of the issue and key messages that was developed by the Region that you could use for a walk around. That said, if you think a daily note is more appropriate, we will generate one tomorrow.

Please let me know how you want to handle this. The best way to get a hold of me is on cell -

!(b)(6) 1 Thanks,

-Doug

~Si#

Regional State Liaison Officer Office : 610-337-6918 Cell: !(b )(6)

From: King, Mark Sent: 13 Jun 2017 14:58:53 +0000 To: Miller, Chris;King, Michael Cc: Chernoff, Harold

Subject:

Indian Point Unit 3 Reactor Shut Down To Allow For Leak Repair (for 0 -ring leakage on RV) - 11 day outage is expected - FYI News story: Indian Point Unit 3 Reactor Shut Down To Allow For Leak Repair.

On its website, 12-TV Westchester, NY (6/12) reported that Indian Point's Unit 3 reactor was shut down Monday morning as crews worked to fix a leak. Entergy said in a news release that operators "have been monitoring what they call slight water leakage during the last few weeks" and plant workers "will replace two water seals that sit between the lid of the reactor and the reactor vessel." The article goes on to ask residents if they are worried by the news of the leak and the repair. Gemma Dunne of Continental Village, said, "Any kind of leakage of that kind of reactor, makes you wonder cancer wise."

FYI - See typical RV 0-ring setup shown on page 38 from Westinghouse training course info, if interested.

My understanding based on the Region-1 morning call is that Indian Point site has had repeated issues with these RV o-rings leaking and that the Resident Inspector staff will perform a detailed corrective action review under the Pl&R inspection module to try and better understand why and will process the issues related to these repeat issues as well as a detailed review of the licensee root cause reports.

The outage on Indian Point Unit 3 is expected to last -11 days.

FYI, Mark Mark King Senior Reactor Systems Engineer NRC/NRR/DIRS/IOEB - Operating Experience Branch 0-7E08 301-415-1150 NRC- One Mission - One Team

From: Rudland, David Sent: 1 Sep 2017 12:41:45 +0000 To: Guzman, Richard

Subject:

RE: ACTION: 2.206 Immediate Action Request re: Indian Point Unit 3 Rx Head 0-rings and Restart (LTR-17-0235)

I'm ok with it. ... Just was not sure if a BC needed to concur David L. Rud land, Ph.D.

Chief, Vessels and Internals Integrity Branch Division of Engineering Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mail Stop: OWFN-llFOl 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852-2738 Office: 301 415-1896 Cell: ....,___,,_.,..,.....~

(b)(6)

Email: david.rudland@nrc.gov From : Guzman, Richard Se nt: Friday, September 01, 2017 8:41 AM To: Rudland, David <David.Rudland@nrc.gov>

Subject:

RE: ACTION: 2.206 Immediate Act ion Request re: Indian Point Unit 3 Rx Head 0-rings and Restart (LTR-17-0235)

That is great news. Congrats!!! I was thinking that you can still concur as PRB member from EVIB (not as BC) - are you okay w/concurring on the letter for completion and continuity purposes?

From : Rud land, David Se nt: Friday, September 01, 2017 8:38 AM To: Guzman, Richard <Richard.Guzman@nrc.gov>

Subject:

RE: ACTION : 2.206 Im mediate Action Request re: Indian Point Unit 3 Rx Head 0 -rings and Restart (LTR-17-0235)

Today is my last day as BC of EVIB ... Steve Ruffing will be acting come Tuesday.

I was promoted to SL yesterday Dave David L. Rudland, Ph .D.

Chief, Vessels and Internals Integrity Branch

Division of Engineering Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mail Stop: OWFN-llFOl 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852-2738 Office: 301 415-1896 Cell: ._ (b)(6) _,

Email: david.rudland@nrc.gov From: Guzman, Richard Sent: Friday, September 01, 2017 8:32 AM To: Rudland, David <David.Rudland@nrc.gov>

Subject:

Re: ACTION: 2.206 Immediate Action Request re: Indian Point Unit 3 Rx Head 0 -rings and Restart (LTR-17-0235)

Thanks Dave. I really appreciate the quick turnaround. As a heads up, I expect to send you another 2.206 closeout letter by next week - that one concerns the IP baffle former bolts (Friends of the Earth).

Rich Guzman Sr Project Manager NRR/DORL US NRC Phone: (301) 415-1030 On: 01 September 2017 08:20, "Rudland, David" <David .Rudland@nrc.gov> wrote:

Rich Here are a couple of comments and a few nits for your consideration. I concur on the document.

Thanks Dave David L. Rudland, Ph.D.

Chief, Vessels and Internals Integrity Branch Division of Engineering Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mail Stop: OWFN-llFOl 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852-2738 Office : (301) 415-1896

Cell: l._

(b_)(_B)_ __.,

Email: david.rudland@nrc.gov From : Guzman, Richard Sent: Thursday, August 31, 2017 11:58 AM To: Rudland, David <David.Rudland@nrc.gov>

Subject:

RE : ACTION: 2.206 Im mediate Action Request re: Indian Point Unit 3 Rx Head 0 -rings and Restart (LTR-17-0235)

Dave, Good Morning. Attached for your review and concurrence is the subject closure letter. Would appreciate if you can complete your 'sanity check' and provide concurrence by Tuesday (9/5) next week, if possible (sorry for the short turn-around request). Please reach out to me if you have any questions.

View ADAMS Properties Mll 7243A186 Open ADAMS Document (LTR-17-0235 Response/Closure Letter to Thomas Gurdziel re: 2.206 Petition, Indian Point Reactor Vessel Head 0-rings)

Thanks, Rich From : Rud land, David Sent: Thursday, June 22, 2017 10:26 AM To: Setzer, Thomas <Thomas.Setzer@nrc.gov>; Helton, Shana <Shana.Helton@nrc.gov>; Guzman, Richard <Richard.Guzman@nrc.gov>; Cylkowski, David <David.Cylkowski@nrc.gov>; Banic, Merrilee

<Merrilee.Banic@nrc.gov>

Cc: Greives, Jonathan <Jonathan.Greives@nrc.gov>; Haagensen, Brian <Brian.Haagensen@nrc.gov>;

Siwy, Andrew <Andrew.Siwy@nrc.gov>; Rich, Sarah <Sarah.Rich@nrc.gov>; Broaddus, Doug

<Doug.Broaddus@nrc.gov>; Danna, James <James.Danna@nrc.gov>; Kim, James

<James.Kim@nrc.gov>; Benner, Eric <Eric.Benner@nrc.gov>; Mikula, Olivia <Olivia.Mikula@nrc.gov>

Subject:

RE: ACTION: 2.206 Immediate Action Request re: Indian Point Unit 3 Rx Head 0-rings and Restart (LTR-17-0235)

Tom and Shana I see Tom's point. The safety concern comes from both a-rings leaking, but it is worrisome that this keeps happening and moving forward we need to take a very close look at the root cause.

Since the one a-ring is holding at pressure, there does not appear to be an immediate safety concern that requires enforcement action. In fact, the leak detection and tech spec limits were sufficient to catch the issue before it caused a large concern.

Did they replace both a-rings during this outage, or just one? If they replaced both and now one is leaking, that may be a different story Thanks

Dave David L. Rudland, Ph.D.

Chief, Vessels and Internals Integrity Branch Division of Engineering Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mail Stop: OWFN-11F01 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852-2738 Office: (301) 415-1896 Cell: !(b)(6) I Email: david.rudland@nrc.gov From : Setzer, Thomas Sent: Thursday, June 22, 2017 10:17 AM To: Helton, Shana <Shana.Helton@nrc.gov>; Guzman, Richard <Richard.Guzman@nrc.gov>; Cylkowski, David <David.Cylkowski@nrc.gov>; Banic, Merrilee <Merrilee.Ban ic@nrc.gov>

Cc: Rudland, David <David .Rudland@nrc.gov>; Greives, Jonathan <Jonathan.Greives@nrc.gov>;

Haagensen, Brian <Brian. Haagensen@nrc.gov>; Siwy, Andrew <Andrew.Siwy@nrc.gov>; Rich, Sarah

<Sarah.Rich@nrc.gov>; Broaddus, Doug <Doug.Broaddus@nrc.gov>; Danna, James

<James.Danna@nrc.gov>; Kim, James <James.Kim@nrc.gov>; Benner, Eric <Eric.Benner@nrc.gov>;

M ikula, Olivia <0livia.Mikula@nrc.gov>

Subject:

Re: ACTION: 2.206 Immediate Action Request re: Indian Point Unit 3 Rx Head 0 -rings and Restart (LTR-17-0235)

Thats a great point Shana. I guess I wou ld need the definition of "adequate protection" to understand this better. The fact is that Indian Point has had numerous oring leaks, and has yet to identify the smoking gun or root cause as to why this plagues Unit 3. Incidentally, Unit 2 has 1 of its 2 orings leaking at this moment.

We do not have a safety concern with the current condition at Unit 3 (the inner oring isleakong but theouter is holding). Theouter ring is a fu lly qualified 100% pressure seal, so it is designed to provide adequate sealing on its own.

I would not feel an enforcement action to prevent startup would be warranted. The situation begs more inspection and review but both the NRC and licensee, but it is not a safety concern at this point.

VR, Tom


Original Message --------

From: "Helton, Shana" <Sha na.Helton@nrc.gov>

Date: Thu, June 22, 2017 9:38 AM -0400 To: "Guzman, Richard" <Richard.Guzman@nrc.gov>, "Cylkowski, David"

<David.Cylkowski@nrc.gov>, "Setzer, Thomas" <Thomas.Setzcr@nrc.gov>, "Banic, MeITilee"

<Merrilee.Banic@ nrc.gov>

CC: "Rudland, David" <Dav id.Rudland@ nrc.gov>, "Greives, Jonathan"

<Jonathan.Greives@nrc.gov>, "Haagensen, Brian" <Brian.Haagensen@nrc.gov>, "Siwy, Andrew" <Andrew.Siwy@nrc.gov>, "Rich, Sarah" <Sarah.Rich@nrc.gov>, "Broaddus, Doug"

<Doug.Broaddus@nrc.gov>, "Danna, James" <Jamcs.Danna@nrc.gov>, "Kim, James"

<James.Kim@nrc.gov>, "Benner, E ric" <Eric.Benner@ nrc.gov>, "Mikula, Olivia"

<Olivia.Mikula@nrc.gov>

Subject:

Re: ACTION: 2.206 Immediate Action Request re: Indian Point Unit 3 Rx Head 0-rings and Restart (LTR- 17-0235)

I would like to understand why we have confidence that this o-ring repair provides adequate protection, given it's a repair that allegedly (per the petitioner) had been made repeatedly. I need this before concurring - thanks.

On: 22 June 2017 09:09, "Guzman, Richard" < Richard.Guzman@nrc.gov> wrote:

All, Good morning. We've received a 2.206 petition from Tom Gurdziel concerning the reactor vessel head a-rings at Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 3 (IP3). He requests that NRC prevent restart of IP3 until they essentially determine a root cause. Because of the timing of their startup, we are treating the petitioner's request to ke,ep IP3 shutdown as a request for immediate action. While the licensee has already synchronized to the grid (completed ahead of schedule earlier this a.m.), we intend to follow the process per MD 8.11, to the extent possible and 'promptly' notify the petitioner of the pending staff action (i.e., per MD 8.11, when the staff plans to take an action contrary to the requested action in the petition (i.e., permitting restart of a facility when the petitioner has requested that restart not be permitted).

To expedite this step in the process, I would like to forego a PRB F2F meeting and get your concurrence and/or comments via e-mail today by 12 pm, if possible.

ACTION by 1200 6/22: Please review the petition request (1-page email attached) and let me know if you have any objections or concerns with the proposed path to reject the petitioner's request for immediate action (i.e., to prevent the restart of IP3), based on the PRB determination that there are no immediate safety significant concerns which would adversely impact the public's health and safety. Also, provide comments/mark-ups, if any on the proposed e-mail response to the petitioner (draft e-mail below). Also, note that as stated in today's 0800 RI call, the Region does not have any immediate safety concerns with licensee's decision to startup as the reactor vessel head outer o-ring is currently holding RCS pressure.

Forthcoming steps for addressing petitioner's request for immediate action:

1. 1. PRB members to concur on determination to deny petitioner's immediate action request -

respond to PM via email today by 1200

2. 2. Obtain NRR concurrence on the PRB recommendation for addressing the petitioner's requests for immediate action
3. Inform petitioner of staffs decision or pending actions regarding the petitioner's immediate action requests (NOTE: per MD 8.11, if the staff plans to take an action that is contrary to an immediate action requested in the petition (permitting restart of a facility when the petitioner has requested that restart not be permitted), the petitioner must promptly be notified of the pending staff action).

3.

4. Follow-on steps:
5. 1. A follow-on PRB meeting will be scheduled on a later date to make an initial recommendation as to whether or not the petition meets the criteria for review under 10 CFR 2.206
6. 2. Inform petitioner of staffs initial recommendation (whether to accept or reject the petition for review).
7. 3. Offer a meeting or teleconference for the petitioner to address the PRB in light of its initial recommendation.
4. Issue an acknowledgement (or closure) letter to the petitioner Proposed PRB/Contacts:

Chair: Shana Helton Petition Manager: Rich Guzman 2.206 Coordinator: Lee Banic / Jim Kim DE: Dave Rudland RI: Tom Setzer OE: TBD OGC: David Cylkowski / Olivia Mikula Other key points (from Region I)

1. The outer o-ring is currently holding RCS pressure. The system was designed to operate on just the outer o-ring. There is no engineering or licensing basis for not performing a plant startup.
2. There was no root cause completed as a result of the double o-ring leak. The apparent cause determination may not bound the problem (i.e. there may be another cause).
3. Corrective actions that could be taken to fix o-ring leakage problems beyond what was done during the last outage require a minimum of 2-3 months lead time.
4. The unidentified leak rate was just determined to be 0.1 gpm which is lower than the UIL of 1.4 gpm at the time of the shutdown.

Current IP3 startup status (0800 6/22)

  • Reactor went critical at 4:34 pm on 6/21
  • Mode 1 at 11 :36 pm on 6/21
  • Synched to the grid at 2:26 am on 6/22
  • 100% expected -1 :30 on 6/23 I appreciate your help on this short-fuse request. Standing by for any questions/concerns.

Thanks, Rich Rich Guzman Sr. PM , Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Office: 0 -9C07 I Phone: 301-415-1030


*------------------------DRAFT-----------------------------------------------

Good Afternoon, I have been assigned as a Petition Manager for the 10 CFR 2.206 petition you submitted to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) on June 11 , 2017, regarding your concerns with the reactor vessel head o-rings at Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 3.

Section 2.206 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations describes the petition process -

the primary mechanism for the public to request enforcement action by the NRC in a public process. This process permits anyone to petition NRC to take enforcement-type action related to NRC licensees or licensed activities. Depending on the results of its evaluation, NRC could modify, suspend or revoke an NRG-issued license or take any other appropriate enforcement action to resolve a problem. The NRC staffs guidance for the disposition of 2.206 petition requests is in Management Directive 8.11 , which is publicly available.

The 2.206 process provides a mechanism for any member of the public to request enforcement action against NRC licensees. The 2.206 process is separate from the allegations process which affords individuals who raise safety concerns a degree of protection of their identity. In the 2.206 process, all of the information in your letter will be made public, including your identity.

You specifically requested in your letter for the NRC to keep Indian Point, Unit 3 (IP3) in cold shutdown until the condition of the reactor vessel head upper and lower surfaces are "proved to be identical to the as-purchased condition". The NRC considers your request as a short-term, immediate action given that IP3 is in the process of restarting from its refueling outage. On June 22, 2017, your request for immediate action was reviewed by members of the Petition Review Board (PRB), which includes staff from the NRC's Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) and Region I. After its review and discussion, the PRB determined that there were no immediate safety significant concerns which would adversely impact the public's health and safety; therefore, the PRB denied your request for immediate action in the restart of IP3.

In accordance with NRC Management Directive 8.11, you have the opportunity to address the PRB, either in person at the NRC Headquarters in Rockville, MD, or by telephone conference.

The purpose of this interaction is so that the petitioner can discuss the petition and verbally supplement the petition with any new information. During the meeting, the PRB is in listening mode and will not make any decisions regarding your pet1ition.

I would appreciate if you could advise me by Friday, June 30, 2017, if you agree to the NRC's processing your request under the 2.206 process. In addition, please advise me if you would like to address the PRB. If you would like to meet in person, I will need to schedule a formal public meeting at the NRC Headquarters. If you would prefer to address the PRB via phone, I will also work with you to coordinate a date/time during the upcoming weeks.

If you have other questions on the 2.206 process, or regarding the role as petition manager, please contact me at 301-415-1030.

Thank you,


*------------------------DRAFT-----------------------------------------------

From: Rudland, David Sent: 1 Sep 2017 12:20:49 +0000 To: Guzman, Richard

Subject:

RE: ACTION: 2.206 Immediate Action Request re: Indian Point Unit 3 Rx Head 0-rings and Restart (LTR-17-0235)

Attachments: Draft Gurdziel Closure letter (Indian Point 0-Rings) V4-dr.docx Rich Here are a couple of comments and a few nits for your consideration. I concur on the document.

Thanks Dave David L. Rudland, Ph.D.

Chief, Vessels and Internals Integrity Branch Division of Engineering Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mail Stop: OWFN-llFOl 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852-2738 Office: (301) 415-1896 Cell: j(b)(6) j Email: david.rudland@nrc.gov From : Guzman, Richard Sent: Thursday, August 31, 2017 11:58 AM To: Rudland, David <David.Rudland@nrc.gov>

Subject:

RE: ACTION : 2.206 Im mediate Action Request re: Indian Point Unit 3 Rx Head 0 -rings and Restart (LTR-17-0235)

Dave, Good Morning. Attached for your review and concurrence is the subject closure letter. Would appreciate if you can complete your 'sanity check' and provide concurrence by Tuesday (9/5) next week, if possible (sorry for the short turn-around request). Please reach out to me if you have any questions.

View ADAMS Properties Mll 7243A186 Open ADAM S Document (LTR-17-0235 Response/Closure Letter to Thomas Gurdziel re: 2.206 Petition, Indian Point Reactor Vessel Head 0 -rings)

Thanks, Rich

From : Rud land, David Sent: Thursday, June 22, 2017 10:26 AM To: Setzer, Thomas <Thomas.Setzer@nrc.gov>; Helton, Shana <Shana .Helton@nrc.gov>; Guzman, Richard <Richard.Guzman@nrc.gov>; Cylkowski, David <David.Cylkowski@nrc.gov>; Banic, Merrilee

<Merrilee.Banic@nrc.gov>

Cc: Greives, Jonathan <Jonathan.Greives@nrc.gov>; Haagensen, Brian <Brian.Haagensen@nrc.gov>;

Siwy, Andrew <Andrew.Siwy@nrc.gov>; Rich, Sarah <Sarah.Rich@nrc.gov>; Broaddus, Doug

<Doug.Broaddus@nrc.gov>; Danna, James <James.Danna@nrc.gov>; Kim, James

<James.Kim@nrc.gov>; Benner, Eric <Eric.Benner@nrc.gov>; Mikula, Olivia <Olivia.Mikula@nrc.gov>

Subject:

RE: ACTION : 2.206 Immediate Action Request re: Indian Point Unit 3 Rx Head 0 -rings and Restart (LTR-17-0235)

Tom and Shana I see Tom's point. The safety concern comes from both o-rings leaking, but it is worrisome that this keeps happening and moving forward we need to take a very close look at the root cause.

Since the one o-ring is holding at pressure, there does not appear to be an immediate safety concern that requires enforcement action. In fact, the leak detection and tech spec limits were sufficient to catch the issue before it caused a large concern.

Did they replace both o-rings during this outage, or just one? If they replaced both and now one is leaking, that may be a different story Thanks Dave David L. Rudland, Ph.D.

Chief, Vessels and Internals Integrity Branch Division of Engineering Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mail Stop: OWFN-llFOl 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852-2738 Office: (301) 415-1896 Cell: !(b)(6) I Email: david.rudland@nrc.gov From : Setzer, Thomas Sent: Thursday, June 22, 2017 10:17 AM To: Helton, Shana <Shana.Helton@nrc.gov>; Guzman, Richard <Richard.Guzman@nrc.gov>; Cylkowski, David <David.Cylkowski@nrc.gov>; Banic, Merrilee <Merrilee.Banic@nrc.gov>

Cc: Rudland, David <David.Rudland@nrc.gov>; Greives, Jonathan <Jonathan.Greives@nrc.gov>;

Haagensen, Brian <Brian.Haagensen@nrc.gov>; Siwy, Andrew <Andrew.Siwy@nrc.gov>; Rich, Sarah

<Sarah.Rich@nrc.gov>; Broaddus, Doug <Doug.Broaddus@nrc.gov>; Danna, James

<James.Danna@nrc.gov>; Kim, James <James.Kim@n rc.gov>; Benner, Eric <Eric.Benner@nrc.gov>;

M ikula, Olivia <Olivia.Mikula@nrc.gov>

Subject:

Re: ACTION: 2.206 Immediate Action Request re: Indian Point Unit 3 Rx Head 0-rings and Restart (LTR-17-0235)

Thats a great point Shana. I guess I wou ld need the definition of "adequate protection" to understand this better. The fact is that Indian Point has had numerous oring leaks, and has yet to identify the smoking gun or root cause as to why this plagues Unit 3. Incidentally, Unit 2 has l of its 2 orings leaking at this moment.

We do not have a safety concern with the current condition at Unit 3 (the inner oring isleakong but theouter is holding). Theouter ring is a fully qualified 100% pressure seal, so it is designed to provide adequate sealing on its own.

I would not fee l an enforcement action to prevent startup would be warranted. The situation begs more inspection and review but both the NRC and licensee, but it is not a safety concern at this point.

YR, Tom


Original Message --------

From: "Helton, Shana" <Shana.Helton@nrc.gov>

Date: Thu, June 22, 2017 9:38 AM-0400 To: "Guzman, Richard" <Richard.Guzman@nrc.gov>, "Cylkowski, David"

<David.Cylkowski@nrc.gov>, "Setzer, Thomas" <Thomas.Setzer@nrc.gov>, "Banic, Merrilee"

<Merrilee.Banic@nrc.gov>

CC: "Rudland, David" < David.Rudland@nrc.gov>, "Greives, Jonathan"

<Jonathan.Grcives@nrc.gov>, "Haagensen, Brian" <Brian.Haagensen@nrc.gov>, "Siwy, Andrew" <Andrew.Siwy@ nrc.gov>, "Rich, Sarah" <Sarah.Rich@nrc.gov>, "Broaddus, Doug"

<Doug.Broaddus@nrc.gov>, "Danna, James" <James.Danna@nrc.gov>, "Kim, James"

<James.Kim@nrc.gov>, "Benner, Eric" <Eric.Benner@nrc.gov>, "Mikula, Olivia"

<Oliv ia.M ikula@nrc.gov>

Subject:

Re: ACTION: 2.206 Immed iate Action Request re: Indian Point Un it 3 Rx Head 0 -

rings and Restait (LTR-17-0235)

I would like to understand why we have confidence that th is o-ring repair provides adequate protection, given it's a repair that allegedly (per the petitioner) had been made repeatedly. I need this before concurring - thanks.

On: 22 June 2017 09:09, "Guzman, Richard" <Richard.Guzman@nrc.gov> wrote:

All,

Good morning. We've received a 2.206 petition from Tom Gurdziel concerning the reactor vessel head o-rings at Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 3 (IP3). He requests that NRC prevent restart of IP3 until they essentially determine a root cause. Because of the timing of their startup, we are treating the petitioner's request to keep IP3 shutdown as a request for immediate action. While the licensee has already synchronized to the grid (completed ahead of schedule earlier this a.m.), we intend to follow the process per MD 8.11, to the extent possible and 'promptly' notify the petitioner of the pending staff action (i.e., per MD 8.11 , when the staff plans to take an action contrary to the requested action in the petition (i.e., permitting restart of a facility when the petitioner has requested that restart not be permitted).

To expedite this step in the process, I would like to forego a PRB F2F meeting and get your concurrence and/or comments via e-mail today by 12 pm, if possible.

ACTION by 1200 6/22: Please review the petition request (1 -page email attached) and let me know if you have any objections or concerns with the proposed path to reject the petitioner's request for immediate action (i.e., to prevent the restart of IP3), based on the PRB determination that there are no immediate safety significant concerns which would adversely impact the public's health and safety. Also, provide comments/mark-ups, if any on the proposed e-mail response to the petitioner (draft e-mail below). Also, note that as stated in today's 0800 RI call, the Region does not have any immediate safety concerns with licensee's decision to startup as the reactor vessel head outer o-ring is currently holding RCS pressure.

Forthcoming steps for addressing petitioner's request for immediate action:

1. 1. PRB members to concur on determination to deny petitioner's immediate action request -

respond to PM via email today by 1200

2. 2. Obtain NRR concurrence on the PRB recommendation for addressing the petitioner's requests for immediate action
3. Inform petitioner of staffs decision or pending actions regarding the petitioner's immediate action requests (NOTE: per MD 8.11, if the staff plans to take an action that is contrary to an immediate action requested in the petition (permitting restart of a facility when the petitioner has requested that restart not be permitted), the petitioner must promptly be notified of the pending staff action).

3.

4. Follow-on steps:
5. 1. A follow-on PRB meeting will be scheduled on a later date to make an initial recommendation as to whether or not the petition meets the criteria for review under 10 CFR 2.206
6. 2. Inform petitioner of staffs initial recommendation (whether to accept or reject the petition for review).
7. 3. Offer a meeting or teleconference for the petitioner to address the PRB in light of its initial recommendation.
4. Issue an acknowledgement (or closure) letter to the petitioner Proposed PRB/Contacts:

Chair: Shana Helton Petition Manager: Rich Guzman 2.206 Coordinator: Lee Banic / Jim Kim DE: Dave Rudland RI: Tom Setzer OE: TBD OGC: David Cylkowski / Olivia Mikula

Other key points (from Region I)

1. The outer o-ring is currently holding RCS pressure. The system was designed to operate on just the outer o-ring. There is no engineering or licensing basis for not performing a plant startup.
2. There was no root cause completed as a result of the double o-ring leak. The apparent cause determination may not bound the problem (i.e. there may be another cause).
3. Corrective actions that could be taken to fix o-ring leakage problems beyond what was done during the last outage require a minimum of 2-3 months lead time.
4. The unidentified leak rate was just determined to be 0.1 gpm which is lower than the UIL of 1.4 gpm at the time of the shutdown.

Current IP3 startup status (0800 6/22)

  • Reactor went critical at 4:34 pm on 6/21
  • Mode 1 at 11 :36 pm on 6/21
  • Synched to the grid at 2:26 am on 6/22
  • 100% expected -1 :30 on 6/23 I appreciate your help on this short-fuse request. Standing by for any questions/concerns.
Thanks, Rich Rich Guzman Sr. PM , Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office: 0 -9C07 J Phone: 301 -415-1030

DRAFT-----------------------------------------------

Good Afternoon, I have been assigned as a Petition Manager for the 10 CFR 2.206 petition you submitted to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) on June 11, 2017, regarding your concerns with the reactor vessel head o-rings at Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 3.

Section 2.206 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations describes the petition process -

the primary mechanism for the public to request enforcement action by the NRC in a p,ublic process. This process permits anyone to petition NRC to take enforcement-type action related to NRC licensees or licensed activities. Depending on the results of its evaluation, NRC could modify, suspend or revoke an NRG-issued license or take any other appropriate enforcement action to resolve a problem. The NRC staffs guidance for the disposition of 2.206 petition requests is in Management Directive 8.11 , which is publicly available.

The 2.206 process provides a mechanism for any member of the public to request enforcement action against NRC licensees. The 2.206 process is separate from the allegations process which affords individuals who raise safety concerns a degree of protection of their identity. In the 2.206 process, all of the information in your letter will be made public, including your identity.

You specifically requested in your letter for the NRC to keep Indian Point, Unit 3 (IP3) in cold shutdown until the condition of the reactor vessel head upper and lower surfaces are "proved to be identical to the as-purchased condition ". The NRC considers your request as a short-term ,

immediate action given that IP3 is in the process of restarting from its refueling outage. On June 22, 2017, your request for immediate action was reviewed by members of the Petition Review Board (PRB), which includes staff from the NRC's Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) and Region I. After its review and discussion, the PRB determined that there were no immediate safety significant concerns which would adversely im pact the public's health and safety; therefore, the PRB denied your request for immediate action in the restart of IP3.

In accordance with NRC Management Directive 8.11 , you have the opportunity to address the PRB, either in person at the NRC Headquarters in Rockville, MD, or by telephone conference.

The purpose of this interaction is so that the petitioner can discuss the petition and verbally supplement the petition with any new information. During the meeting , the PRB is in listening mode and will not make any decisions regarding your petition.

I would appreciate if you could advise me by Friday, June 30, 2017 , if you agree to the NRC's processing your request under the 2.206 process . In addition, please advise me if you would like to address the PRB . If you wou ld like to meet in person , I will need to schedule a formal public meeting at the NRC Headquarters. If you would prefer to address the PRB via phone, I will also work with you to coordinate a date/time during the upcoming weeks.

If you have other questions on the 2.206 process, or regarding the role as petition manager, please contact me at 301-415-1030 .

Thank you,


D RAFT-----------------------------------------------

Mr. Thomas Gurdziel 9 Twin Orchard Drive Oswego, NY 13126

Dear Mr. Gurdziel:

This letter is in response to your petition via e-mail dated June 11, 2017, 1 addressed to the Chairman of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), regarding the reactor vessel head 0-rings at Indian Point, Unit No. 3 (IP3). Your petition was referred to the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation for review in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), Section 2.206, "Requests for action under this subpart." The process for reviewing 2.206 petitions is contained in NRC Management Directive (MD) 8.11 , "Review Process for 10 CFR 2.206 Petitions."2 Your petition concerned the 0-ring leakage from the reactor vessel head at IP3. In your petition, you requested the NRC tG-keep IP3 in cold shutdown until the condition of the reactor vessel head upper and lower surface, including the "0-ring grooves be proved to be identical to the as purchased condition."

As the basis for this request, the petition stated that IP3 is unsafe to return the plant to operation with just the installation of new reactor vessel head 0-rings. The petition also questioned the licensee's (Entergy) maintenance practices and the repetitive nature of the leakage condition, stating that the IP3 operated 5-1/2 months before having to shutdown to repair the reactor vessel head 0-rings, while in the latest occurrence, IP3 operated less than a month before the subsequent repair.

The NRC considered your requested enforcement action as a short-term , immediate action request given that IP3 was in the process of restarting from its maintenance outage. On June 22, 2017, your request for immediate action was reviewed by members of the Petition Review Board (PRB) and advisors, which included staff from the NRC's Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR), Office of the General Counsel, NRC Region I office, and NRC resident inspectors at Indian Point. After its review and discussion, the PRB determined that there were no immediate safety concerns which would adversely impact the public's health and safety; therefore, the PRB denied your request for immediate action in the restart of IP3. In an e-mail dated June 22, 2017,3 the petition manager informed you of this decision, described the 10 CFR 2.206 process, and offered you an opportunity to address the PRB via meeting or teleconference prior to making its initial recommendation. You declined the opportunity to address the PRB in a follow-on telephone call with the petition manager on June 22, 2017.

1 Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession Nos. ML16088A374 and ML17163A254.

2 ADAMS Accession No. ML041770328.

3 ADAMS Accession No. ML17174AOOO

T. Gurdziel In an e-mail to the NRC dated June 24, 2017,4 you expressed concern with the Entergy/Indian Point Unit 3 reactor vessel upper head leak, not only iA--that it occurred following the completion of consecutive refueling outages, but "because it makes clear that the level of skill, knowledge, communication, supervision/management, and initiative in the industry today, (after Fukushima),

is not sufficient."

In a subsequent e-mail to the NRC on June 28, 2017, 5 you requested the PRB to consider as an example of Entergy's level of maintenance, the cited Event No. 52829, which was a 10 CFR 50.72 report submitted by Entergy providing notification to the NRC that Indian Point Unit No. 2 was manually shutdown on June 26, 2017, due to a loss of one of the main boiler feed pumps.

The PRB met on July 25, 2017, and reviewed your petition in accordance with NRC MD 8.11 ,

which specifies the criteria that are used to determine whether to accept or reject petitions for review. In making its recommendation, the PRB considered the information provided in your petition and the supplemental information provided in your June 24 and 28, 2017, e-mails.

The PRB's initial recommendation was that your request does not meet the criteria for review under 10 CFR 2.206 because your petition and e-mails did not provide sufficient facts to support the petition , and the issues identified in the petition have been previously reviewed and evaluated, for which a resolution had been achieved. On August 1, 2017, the Petition Manager contacted you via telephone to inform you of the PRB's initial recommendation and to offer you the opportunity to address the PRB in light of its recommendation. During that conversation, you indicated that you did not desire to address the PRB or provide any additional information supporting your request. As such, the PRB's final determination is to not accept your petition for review under the 10 CFR 2.206 process because your petition meets the criteria for rejection in accordance with NRC MD 8.11 , Part Ill, C.1 and C.2, as discussed below.

In support of its recommendation to reject the petition under 10 CFR 2.206, the PRB noted that compliance with the plant Technical Specification (TS) requirements for leakage and leak detection monitoring provide reasonable assurance of adequate protection. Specifically, the IP3 reactor coolant system (RCS) operational leakage limits are specified in Section 3.4.13, "RCS Operational Leakage," of the IP3 TSs. Additionally, an early warning of unidentified leakage is provided by the automatic systems that monitor the containment atmosphere radioactivity and the containment sump level. The leakage detection system requirements are specified in TS section 3.4.15, "RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation. " These TS requirements dictate the required actions for monitoring unidentified leakage into containment and specify the limits to ensure that the licensee shuts down the plant with adequate margin to safety.

During plant life, the joint and valve interfaces can produce varying amounts of reactor coolant leakage, through either normal operational wear or mechanical deterioration. The purpose of the RCS operational leakage TS limiting condition for operation (LCO) is to limit system operation in the presence of leakage from these sources to amounts that do not compromise safety. While no pressure boundary leakage is allowed in TSs, leakage past seals and gaskets (which is not considered pressure boundary leakage) is acceptable to a specified limit. One gallon per minute (gpm) for unidentified leakage is the applicable TS limit for joint interfaces such as the reactor vessel head 0-ring.

4 ADAMS Accession No. ML17204A883 5 ADAMS Accession No. ML17204A884

T. Gurdziel This +S-limiHf\---unidentified leakage, per the TS limit. is allowed as a reasonable minimum , Comment (RD(: Kinda confusing ...

detectable amount that the containment air monitoring and containment sump level monitoring / can you reword. Why do you specify equipment can detect within a reasonable time period. / NRC inspection here? The point of

/ the sentence and those that follow are The PRB also considered the operating experience at IP3 when making its recommendation. / to describe the ooerator actions.

Specifically, the licensee historically has identified the leakage at a very low level and have Comment (RD(: This is the first time taken prudent, conservative action to shut down the plant to make the appropriate repairs. In i , you mention the "outer" ring. You may the case of the June 2017 0-ring leak, the unidentified leakage was less than 10% of the TS / / need a bit of discussion above to limit. In ~he NRC's latest inspection period, IP3 began the period p uring refuelin.9_outage {RFOJj / suooort vour claim here 3RF017 which lasted 65 days. Upon completion of the outage, the operators restarted IP3 on ,/,! Comment (RD(: Very long sentence May 17, 2017, and increased power slowly to approximately 100 percent power on May 23, ,:,i 2017. On June 12, 2017, operators at I P3 shutdown the reactor to replace the reactor vessel "

head 0-rings. Operators returned IP3 to approximately 100 percent power on June 23, 2017; ,/,/

and IP3 has remained at or near 100 percent power to date. In support of its recommendation, the PRB noted that that unidentified leakage at IP3 has remained within the limits specified by ii 1 1 the TSs during this entire period. ff Additionally, the NRC inspectors conducted an inspection of the IP3 planned outage to replace  ::

the 0 -rings on the reactor vessel flange from June 12 to 22, 2017. Prior to the outage, the ,,f,f inspectors reviewed the outage work schedule and outage risk assessment to verify that risk, industry operating experience, previous site-specific problems, and defense-in-depth were 1°,f considered. The inspectors observed portions of the shutdown and startup to verify the unit was operating in accordance with established procedures and the TSs. During the outage, the NRC 1010110101 resident inspectors reviewed various maintenance activities and verified that Entergy complied 0 with the TSs. The NRC inspectors did not identify any performance issues associated w ith ,i,i::

actions of the licensee personnel during the maintenance outage. The integrated inspection ,*' ,

report was issued August 7, 2017 with no findings of significance. 6 1100100

~ egarding your concerns of the licensee's maintenance practices and the repetitive nature of the ii leakage condition, while the NRC recognizes that Indian Point has had numerous 0-ring //

leakage occurrences in the past, the NRC does not have an immediate safety concern with the ii current condition at IP3 as the p uter ring l s designed to_provide adeq uate_p!essure sealin.9 on its i!

own, and as discussed above, the licensee is meeting the applicable NRC requirements with i respect to RCS plant leakage. [ he condition does not_present a_safety concern that would_______ J warrant a forced shutdown or the enforcement action requested in the petition request. The PRB also noted that there are no violations of NRC requirements or any immediate public health and safety risk that would warrant a plant shutdown or the prevention of a restart.

Therefore, the NRC considers that adequate protection is reasonably assured based on the licensee's compliance with the specific requirements related to leakage of the 0-rings. The licensee is in compliance with the TS requirements for leakage and leak detection monitoring.

The NRC continues to monitor plant RCS leakage at Indian Point and will ensure that Entergy is meeting the NRC applicable requirements for RCS operational leakage and leak detection.

6 Indian Point Nuclear Generating - Integrated Inspection Report 05000247/2017002 AND 05000286/2017002, ADAMS Accession No. ML17220A074

T. Gurdziel In conclusion, and in accordance with the criteria in MD 8.11 , the PRB's final determination is that your petition does not meet the criteria for consideration under 10 CFR 2.206, because it does not provide sufficient facts to support the petition and raises issues that have already been reviewed, evaluated, and resolved by the NRC. Therefore, the PRB has concluded that your petition meets the criteria for rejection in accordance with MD 8.11 , Part Ill, C.1 and C.2.

This letter closes all NRC actions associated with your 2.206 petition. If you have any questions, please feel free to contact Richard Guzman at (301) 415-1030 or by e-mail at Richa rd.Guzman@nrc.gov.

Sincerely, Shana R. Helton, Deputy Director Division of Safety Systems Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket No. 50-286 cc: Mr. Anthony Vitale (w/copy of petition)

Site Vice President Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.

Indian Point Energy Center 450 Broadway, GSB P.O. Box 249 Buchanan, NY 10511-0249 Additional distribution via ListServ

PKG ML17163A255 LTR ML17243A186 Incomma: ML17163A254 *b*v e-ma1*1 OFFICE DORL/LPL1/PM DORL/LPL 1/LA DORL/LSBP/PM DORL/LPL1/BC NAME RGuzman LRonewicz MBani:c JDanna DATE 08/31/2017 OFFICE DE/EVIB/BC RI/DRP/BR2/BC OCG DSS/DD NAME DRudland JGreives OMikula SHelton DATE From: Guzman, Richard Sent: 31 Aug 2017 11:58:04 -0400 To: Rudland, David

Subject:

RE: ACTION: 2.206 Immediate Action Request re: Indian Point Unit 3 Rx Head 0-rings and Restart (LTR-17-0235)

Attachments: Draft Gurdziel Closure letter (Indian Point 0-Rings) V4.docx

Dave, Good Morning. Attached for your review and concurrence is the subject closure letter. Would appreciate if you can complete your 'sanity check' and provide concurrence by Tuesday (9/5) next week, if possible (sorry for the short turn-around request). Please reach out to me if you have any questions.

View ADAMS Properties ML17243A186 Open ADAM S Document (LTR-17-0235 Response/Closure Letter to Thomas Gurdziel re: 2.206 Petit ion, Indian Point React or Vessel Head 0-rings)

Thanks, Rich From : Rud land, David Sent: Thursday, June 22, 2017 10:26 AM To: Setzer, Thomas <Thomas.Setzer@nrc.gov>; Helton, Shana <Shana.Helton@nrc.gov>; Guzman, Richard <Richard.Guzman@nrc.gov>; Cylkowski, David <David.Cylkowski@nrc.gov>; Banic, Merrilee

<Merrilee. Banic@nrc.gov>

Cc: Greives, Jonathan <Jonat han.Greives@nrc.gov>; Haagensen, Brian <Brian.Haagensen@ nrc.gov>;

Siwy, Andrew <Andrew.Siwy@nrc.gov>; Rich, Sarah <Sarah.Rich @nrc.gov>; Broaddus, Doug

<Doug.Broaddus@nrc.gov>; Danna, James <James. Danna@nrc.gov>; Kim, James

<James.Kim@nrc.gov>; Benner, Eric <Eric.Benner@nrc.gov>; Mikula, Olivia <Olivia. M ikula@nrc.gov>

Subject:

RE : ACTION : 2.206 Im mediate Action Request re: Indian Point Unit 3 Rx Head 0-rings and Restart (LTR-17-0235)

Tom and Shana I see Tom's point. The safety concern comes from both a-rings leaking, but it is worrisome that this keeps happening and moving forward we need to take a very close look at the root cause.

Since the one o-ring is holding at pressure, there does not appear to be an immediate safety concern that requires enforcement action. In fact, the leak detection and tech spec limits were sufficient to catch the issue before it caused a large concern.

Did they replace both o-rings during this outage, or just one? If they replaced both and now one is leaking, that may be a different story Thanks Dave

David L. Rudland, Ph.D.

Chief, Vessels and Internals Int egrity Branch Division of Engineering Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mail Stop: OWFN-llFOl 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, M D 20852-2738 Office: (301) 415-1896 Cell : !(b)(6) I Email: david.rudland@nrc.gov From : Setzer, Thomas Sent: Thursday, Ju ne 22, 2017 10:17 AM To: Helton, Shana <Shana.Helton@nrc.gov>; Guzman, Richard <Richard.Guzman@nrc.gov>; Cylkowski, David <David.Cylkowski@nrc.gov>; Banic, Merrilee <Merrilee.Banic@nrc.gov>

Cc: Rudland, David <David .Rudland@nrc.gov>; Greives, Jonathan <Jonathan.Greives@nrc.gov>;

Haagensen, Brian <Brian.Haagensen@nrc.gov>; Siwy, Andrew <Andrew.Siwy@nrc.gov>; Rich, Sarah

<Sarah.Rich@nrc.gov>; Broaddus, Doug <Doug.Broaddus@nrc.gov>; Danna, James

<James.Danna@nrc.gov>; Kim , James <James.Kim@nrc.gov>; Benner, Eric <Eric.Benner@nrc.gov>;

Mikula, Olivia <Olivia.Mikula@nrc.gov>

Subject:

Re: ACTION: 2.206 Immediate Action Request re: Indian Point Unit 3 Rx Head 0 -rings and Restart (LTR-17-0235)

Thats a great point Shana. I guess I would need the definition of "adequate protection" to understand this better. The fact is that Indian Point has had numerous oring leaks, and has yet to identify the smoking gun or root cause as to why this plagues Unit 3. Incidentally, Unit 2 has I of its 2 orings leaking at this moment.

We do not have a safety concern with the current condition at Unit 3 (the inner oring isleakong but theouter is hold ing). Theouter ring is a fu lly qualifi ed 100% pressure seal, so it is designed to provide adequate sealing on its own.

l would not feel an enforcement action to prevent startup would be warranted. The situation begs more inspection and review but both the NRC and licensee, but it is not a safety concern at this point.

YR, Tom


Original Message --------

From: "Helton, Shana" <Shana. Hclton@nrc.gov>

Date: Thu, June 22, 2017 9:38 AM -0400

To: "Guzman, Richard" <Richard.Guzman@nrc.gov>, "Cylkowski, David"

<David.Cylkowski@nrc.gov>, "Setzer, Thomas" <Thomas.Setzer@nrc.gov>, "Banic, Merrilee"

<Merrilee.Banic@nrc.gov>

CC: "Rudland, David" <David.Rudland@nrc.gov>, "Greives, Jonathan"

<Jonathan.Greives@nrc.gov>, "Haagensen, Brian" <Brian.Haagensen@nrc.gov>, "Siwy, Andrew" <Andrew.Siwy@ nrc.gov>, "Rich, Sarah" <Sarah.Rich@nrc.gov>, "Broaddus, Doug"

<Doug.Broaddus@nrc.gov>, "Danna, James" <James.Danna@nrc.gov>, "Kim, James"

<James.Kim@nrc.gov>, "Benner, Eric" <Eric.Benner@nrc.gov>, "Mikula, Olivia"

<Olivia.M ikula@nrc.gov>

Subject:

Re: ACTION: 2.206 Immediate Action Request re: Indian Point Unit 3 Rx Head 0-rings and Resta1t (LTR-17-0235) 1 would like to understand why we have confidence that this o-ring repair provides adequate protection, given it's a repair that allegedly (per the petitioner) had been made repeatedly. I need this before concurring - thanks.

On: 22 June 2017 09:09, "Guzman, Richard" <Richard.Guzman@nrc.gov> wrote:

All, Good morning. We've received a 2.206 petition from Tom Gurdziel concerning the reactor vessel head a-rings at Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 3 (IP3). He requests that NRC prevent restart of IP3 until they essentially determine a root cause. Because of the timing of their startup, we are treating the petitioner's request to ke,ep IP3 shutdown as a request for immediate action. While the licensee has already synchronized to the grid (completed ahead of schedule earlier this a.m.), we intend to follow the process per MD 8.11, to the extent possible and 'promptly' notify the petitioner of the pending staff action (i.e., per MD 8.11, when the staff plans to take an action contrary to the requested action in the petition (i.e., permitting restart of a facility when the petitioner has requested that restart not be permitted).

To expedite this step in the process, I would like to forego a PRB F2F meeting and get your concurrence and/or comments via e-mail today by 12 pm, if possible.

ACTION by 1200 6/22: Please review the petition request (1-page email attached) and let me know if you have any objections or concerns with the proposed path to reject the petitioner's request for immediate action (i.e., to prevent the restart of IP3), based on the PRB determination that there are no immediate safety significant concerns which would adversely impact the public's health and safety. Also, provide comments/mark-ups, if any on the proposed e-mail response to the petitioner (draft e-mail below). Also, note that as stated in today's 0800 RI call, the Region does not have any immediate safety concerns with licensee's decision to startup as the reactor vessel head outer a-ring is currently holding RCS pressure.

Forthcoming steps for addressing petitioner's request for immediate action:

1. 1. PRB members to concur on determination to deny petitioner's immediate action request -

respond to PM via email today by 1200

2. 2. Obtain NRR concurrence on the PRB recommendation for addressing the petitioner's requests for immediate action
3. Inform petitioner of staffs decision or pending actions regarding the petitioner's immediate action requests (NOTE: per MD 8.11, if the staff plans to take an action that is contrary to an

immediate action requested in the petition (permitting restart of a facility when the petitioner has requested that restart not be permitted), the petitioner must promptly be notified of the pending staff action).

3.

4. Follow-on steps:
5. 1. A follow-on PRB meeting will be scheduled on a later date to make an initial recommendation as to whether or not the petition meets the criteria for review under 10 CFR 2.206
6. 2. Inform petitioner of staffs initial recommendation (whether to accept or reject the petition for review).
7. 3. Offer a meeting or teleconference for the petitioner to address the PRB in light of its initial recommendation.
4. Issue an acknowledgement (or closure) letter to the petitioner Proposed PRB/Contacts:

Chair: Shana Helton Petition Manager: Rich Guzman 2.206 Coordinator: Lee Banic / Jim Kim DE: Dave Rudland RI: Tom Setzer OE: TBD OGC: David Cylkowski / Olivia Mikula Other key points (from Region I)

1. The outer o-ring is currently holding RCS pressure. The system was designed to operate on just the outer o-ring. There is no engineering or licensing basis for not performing a plant startup.
2. There was no root cause completed as a result of the double o-ring leak. The apparent cause determination may not bound the problem (i.e. there may be another cause).
3. Corrective actions that could be taken to fix o-ring leakage problems beyond what was done during the last outage require a minimum of 2-3 months lead time.

4 . The unidentified leak rate was just determined to be 0.1 gpm which is lower than the UIL of 1.4 gpm at the time of the shutdown.

Current IP3 startup status (0800 6/22)

  • Reactor went critical at 4:34 pm on 6/21
  • Mode 1 at 11 :36 pm on 6/21
  • Synched to the grid at 2:26 am on 6/22
  • 100% expected -1 :30 on 6/23 I appreciate your help on this short-fuse request. Standing by for any questions/concerns.

Thanks, Rich Rich Guzman Sr. PM , Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office: 0 -9C07 I Phone: 301 -415-1030


DRAFT-----------------------------------------------

Good Afternoon ,

I have been assigned as a Petition Manager for the 10 CFR 2.206 petition you submitted to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) on June 11 , 2017, regarding your concerns with the reactor vessel head o-rings at Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 3.

Section 2.206 of Title 1O of the Code of Federal Regulations describes the petition process -

the primary mechanism for the public to request enforcement action by the NRC in a public process. This process permits anyone to petition NRC to take enforcement-type action related to NRC licensees or licensed activities. Depending on the results of its evaluation, NRC could modify, suspend or revoke an NRG-issued license or take any other appropriate enforcement action to resolve a problem. The NRC staffs guidance for the disposition of 2.206 petition requests is in Management Directive 8.11 , which is publicly available.

The 2.206 process provides a mechanism for any member of the public to request enforcement action against NRC licensees. The 2.206 process is separate from the allegations process which affords individuals who raise safety concerns a degree of protection of their identity. In the 2.206 process, all of the information in your letter will lbe made public, including your identity.

You specifically requested in your letter for the NRC to keep Indian Point, Unit 3 (IP3) in cold shutdown until the condition of the reactor vessel head upper and lower surfaces are "proved to be identical to the as-purchased condition". The NRC considers your request as a short-term, immediate action given that IP3 is in the process of restarting from its refueling outage. On June 22, 2017, your request for immediate action was reviewed by members of the Petition Review Board (PRB), which includes staff from the NRC's Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) and Region I. After its review and discussion, the PRB determined that there were no immediate safety significant concerns which would adversely impact the public's health and safety; therefore, the PRB denied your request for immediate action in the restart of IP3.

In accordance with NRC Management Directive 8.11 , you have the opportunity to address the PRB, either in person at the NRC Headquarters in Rockville, MD, or by telephone conference.

The purpose of this interaction is so that the petitioner can discuss the petition and verbally supplement the petition with any new information. During the meeting, the PRB is in listening mode and will not make any decisions regarding your petition.

I would appreciate if you could advise me by Friday, June 30, 2017, if you agree to the NRC's processing your request under the 2.206 process. In addition, please advise me if you would like to address the PRB. If you would like to meet in person, I will need to schedule a formal public meeting at the NRC Headquarters. If you would prefer to address the PRB via phone, I will also work with you to coordinate a date/time during the upcoming weeks.

If you have other questions on the 2.206 process, or regarding the role as petition manager, please contact me at 301-415-1030.

Thank you,


DRAFT-----------------------------------------------

Mr. Thomas Gurdziel 9 Twin Orchard Drive Oswego, NY 13126

Dear Mr. Gurdziel:

This letter is in response to your petition via e-mail dated June 11, 2017, 1 addressed to the Chairman of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), regarding the reactor vessel head 0-rings at Indian Point, Unit No. 3 (IP3). Your petition was referred to the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation for review in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), Section 2.206, "Requests for action under this subpart." The process for reviewing 2.206 petitions is contained in NRC Management Directive (MD) 8.11 , "Review Process for 10 CFR 2.206 Petitions."2 Your petition concerned the 0-ring leakage from the reactor vessel head at IP3. In your petition, you requested the NRC to keep IP3 in cold shutdown until the condition of the reactor vessel head upper and lower surface, including the "0-ring grooves be proved to be identical to the as purchased condition."

As the basis for this request, the petition stated that IP3 is unsafe to return the plant to operation with just the installation of new reactor vessel head 0-rings. The petition also questioned the licensee's (Entergy) maintenance practices and the repetitive nature of the leakage condition, stating that the IP3 operated 5-1/2 months before having to shutdown to repair the reactor vessel head 0-rings, while in the latest occurrence, IP3 operated less than a month before the subsequent repair.

The NRC considered your requested enforcement action as a short-term , immediate action request given that IP3 was in the process of restarting from its maintenance outage. On June 22, 2017, your request for immediate action was reviewed by members of the Petition Review Board (PRB) and advisors, which included staff from the NRC's Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR), Office of the General Counsel, NRC Region I office, and NRC resident inspectors at Indian Point. After its review and discussion, the PRB determined that there were no immediate safety concerns which would adversely impact the public's health and safety; therefore, the PRB denied your request for immediate action in the restart of IP3. In an e-mail dated June 22, 2017,3 the petition manager informed you of this decision, described the 10 CFR 2.206 process, and offered you an opportunity to address the PRB via meeting or teleconference prior to making its initial recommendation. You declined the opportunity to address the PRB in a follow-on telephone call with the petition manager on June 22, 2017.

1 Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession Nos. ML16088A374 and ML17163A254.

2 ADAMS Accession No. ML041770328.

3 ADAMS Accession No. ML17174AOOO

T. Gurdziel In an e-mail to the NRC dated June 24, 2017,4 you expressed concern with the Entergy/Indian Point Unit 3 reactor vessel upper head leak, not only in that it occurred following the completion of consecutive refueling outages, but "because it makes clear that the level of skill, knowledge, communication, supervision/management, and initiative in the industry today, (after Fukushima),

is not sufficient."

In a subsequent e-mail to the NRC on June 28, 2017, 5 you requested the PRB to consider as an example of Entergy's level of maintenance, the cited Event No. 52829, which was a 10 CFR 50.72 report submitted by Entergy providing notification to the NRC that Indian Point Unit No. 2 was manually shutdown on June 26, 2017, due to a loss of one of the main boiler feed pumps.

The PRB met on July 25, 2017, and reviewed your petition in accordance with NRC MD 8.11 ,

which specifies the criteria that are used to determine whether to accept or reject petitions for review. In making its recommendation, the PRB considered the information provided in your petition and the supplemental information provided in your June 24 and 28, 2017, e-mails.

The PRB's initial recommendation was that your request does not meet the criteria for review under 10 CFR 2.206 because your petition and e-mails did not provide sufficient facts to support the petition , and the issues identified in the petition have been previously reviewed and evaluated, for which a resolution had been achieved. On August 1, 2017, the Petition Manager contacted you via telephone to inform you of the PRB's initial recommendation and to offer you the opportunity to address the PRB in light of its recommendation. During that conversation, you indicated that you did not desire to address the PRB or provide any additional information supporting your request. As such, the PRB's final determination is to not accept your petition for review under the 10 CFR 2.206 process because your petition meets the criteria for rejection in accordance with NRC MD 8.11 , Part Ill, C.1 and C.2, as discussed below.

In support of its recommendation to reject the petition under 10 CFR 2.206, the PRB noted that compliance with the plant Technical Specification (TS) requirements for leakage and leak detection monitoring provide reasonable assurance of adequate protection. Specifically, the IP3 reactor coolant system (RCS) operational leakage limits are specified in Section 3.4.13, "RCS Operational Leakage," of the IP3 TSs. Additionally, an early warning of unidentified leakage is provided by the automatic systems that monitor the containment atmosphere radioactivity and the containment sump level. The leakage detection system requirements are specified in TS section 3.4.15, "RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation. " These TS requirements dictate the required actions for monitoring unidentified leakage into containment and specify the limits to ensure that the licensee shuts down the plant with adequate margin to safety.

During plant life, the joint and valve interfaces can produce varying amounts of reactor coolant leakage, through either normal operational wear or mechanical deterioration. The purpose of the RCS operational leakage TS limiting condition for operation (LCO) is to limit system operation in the presence of leakage from these sources to amounts that do not compromise safety. While no pressure boundary leakage is allowed in TSs, leakage past seals and gaskets (which is not considered pressure boundary leakage) is acceptable to a specified limit. One gallon per minute (gpm) for unidentified leakage is the applicable TS limit for joint interfaces such as the reactor vessel head 0-ring.

4 ADAMS Accession No. ML17204A883 5 ADAMS Accession No. ML17204A884

T. Gurdziel This TS limit in unidentified leakage is allowed as a reasonable minimum detectable amount that the containment air monitoring and containment sump level monitoring equipment can detect within a reasonable time period.

The PRB also considered the operating experience at IP3 when making its recommendation.

Specifically, the licensee historically has identified the leakage at a very low level and have taken prudent, conservative action to shut down the plant to make the appropriate repairs. In the case of the June 2017 0 -ring leak, the unidentified leakage was less than 10% of the TS limit. In the NRC's latest inspection period, IP3 began the period during refueling outage (RFO) 3RF017 which lasted 65 days. Upon completion of the outage, the operators restarted IP3 on May 17, 2017, and increased power slowly to approximately 100 percent power on May 23, 2017. On June 12, 2017, operators at IP3 shutdown the reactor to replace the reactor vessel head 0-rings. Operators returned IP3 to approximately 100 percent power on June 23, 2017; and IP3 has remained at or near 100 percent power to date. In support of its recommendation, the PRB noted that that unidentified leakage at IP3 has remained within the limits specified by the TSs during this entire period.

Additionally, the inspectors conducted an inspection of the IP3 planned outage to replace the 0 -

rings on the reactor vessel flange from June 12 to 22, 2017. Prior to the outage, the inspectors reviewed the outage work schedule and outage risk assessment to verify that risk, industry operating experience, previous site-specific problems, and defense-in-depth were considered.

The inspectors observed portions of the shutdown and startup to verify the unit was operating in accordance with established procedures and the TSs. During the outage, the NRC resident inspectors reviewed various maintenance activities and verified that Entergy complied with the TSs. The NRC inspectors did not identify any performance issues associated with actions of the licensee personnel during the maintenance outage. The in tegrated inspection report was issued August 7, 2017 with no findings of significance.6 Regarding your concerns of the licensee's maintenance practices and the repetitive nature of the leakage condition, while the NRC recognizes that Indian Point has had numerous 0 -ring leakage occurrences in the past, the NRC does not have an immediate safety concern with the current condition at IP3 as the outer ring is designed to provide adequate pressure sealing on its own , and as discussed above, the licensee is meeting the applicable NRC requirements with respect to RCS plant leakage. The condition does not present a safety concern that would warrant a forced shutdown or the enforcement action requested in the petition request. The PRB also noted that there are no violations of NRC requirements or any immediate public health and safety risk that would warrant a plant shutdown or the prevention of a restart.

Therefore, the NRC considers that adequate protection is reasonably assured based on the licensee's compliance with the specific requirements related to leakage of the 0-rings. The licensee is in compliance with the TS requirements for leakage and leak detection monitoring.

The NRC continues to monitor plant RCS leakage at Indian Point and will ensure that Entergy is meeting the NRC applicable requirements for RCS operational leakage and leak detection.

6 Indian Point Nuclear Generating - Integrated Inspection Report 05000247/2017002 AND 05000286/2017002, ADAMS Accession No. ML17220A074

T. Gurdziel In conclusion, and in accordance with the criteria in MD 8.11 , the PRB's final determination is that your petition does not meet the criteria for consideration under 10 CFR 2.206, because it does not provide sufficient facts to support the petition and raises issues that have already been reviewed, evaluated, and resolved by the NRC. Therefore, the PRB has concluded that your petition meets the criteria for rejection in accordance with MD 8.11 , Part Ill, C.1 and C.2.

This letter closes all NRC actions associated with your 2.206 petition. If you have any questions, please feel free to contact Richard Guzman at (301) 415-1030 or by e-mail at Richa rd.Guzman@nrc.gov.

Sincerely, Shana R. Helton, Deputy Director Division of Safety Systems Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket No. 50-286 cc: Mr. Anthony Vitale (w/copy of petition)

Site Vice President Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.

Indian Point Energy Center 450 Broadway, GSB P.O. Box 249 Buchanan, NY 10511-0249 Additional distribution via ListServ

PKG ML17163A255 LTR ML17243A186 Incomma: ML17163A254 *b*v e-ma1*1 OFFICE DORL/LPL1/PM DORL/LPL 1/LA DORL/LSBP/PM DORL/LPL1/BC NAME RGuzman LRonewicz MBani:c JDanna DATE 08/31/2017 OFFICE DE/EVIB/BC RI/DRP/BR2/BC OCG DSS/DD NAME DRudland JGreives OMikula SHelton DATE From: Guzman, Richard Sent: 22 Jun 2017 14:34:57 -0400 To: Setzer, Thomas;Mikula, Olivia;Rudland, David;Helton, Shana;Cylkowski, David;Banic, M errilee Cc: Greives, Jonathan;Haagensen, Brian;Siwy, Andrew;Rich, Sarah;Broaddus, Doug;Danna, James;Kim, James;Benner, Eric;Arrighi, Russell;Jordan, Natreon

Subject:

RE: ACTION: 2.206 Immediate Action Request re: Indian Point Unit 3 Rx Head 0 -

rings and Restart (LTR-17-0235)

Attachments: RE: ACTION: 2.206 Immediate Action Request re: Indian Point Unit 3 Rx Head 0 -

rings and Restart (LTR-17-0235)

All, Keeping everyone in the loop .. .we've got NRR concurrence. I will proceed with contacting Mr.

Gurdziel by telephone and follow it up with an e-mail. Per MD 8.11, I will also offer him the opportunity to address the PRB (via meeting or teleconference) and provide additional explanation and support for his petition request before we formally review the petition. Our next PRB action is to make an "initial determination" on whether his request meets the criteria for review under 2.206 as outlined below. Will keep you posted.

4 . Follow-on steps:

5. 1. A follow-on PRB meeting will be scheduled on a later date to make an initial recommendation as to whether or not the petition meets the criteria for review under 10 CFR 2.206
6. 2. Inform petitioner of staffs initial recommendation (whether to accept or rej ect the petition for review).
7. 3. Offer a meeting or teleconference for the petitioner to address the PRB in light of its initial recommendation.
4. Issue an acknowledgement (or closure) letter to the petitioner Thanks again, Rich Rich Guzman Sr. PM , Division Operator Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office: 0-9C7 I Phone: (301) 415-1030 Richard.Guzman@nrc.gov From: Helton, Shana Sent: Thursday, June 22, 2017 12:09 PM To: Guzman, Richard <Richard.Guzman@nrc.gov>

Subject:

Re: ACTION: 2.206 Im mediate Action Request re: Indian Point Unit 3 Rx Head 0-rings and Restart (LTR-17-0235)

I concur on denying immediat e action request, Shana On: 22 June 201711:52, "Guzman, Richard" <Richard.Guzman@nrc.gov> wrote:

I believe we have a consensus (step 1 complete) and cari move forward with getting Michele Evan's concurrence on our recommendation . I will update the response appropriately to include the additional technical basis provided by EVIB and the Region (Tom and Jon - I will run these by you as well).

Forthcoming steps for addressing petitioner's request for immediate action:

1. 1. PRB members to concur on determination to deny petitioner's immediate action request -

respond to PM via email today by 1200

2. 2. Obtain NRR concurrence on the PRB recommendation for addressing the petitioner's requests for immediate action
3. Inform petitioner of staff's decision or pending actions regarding the petitioner's immediate action requests (NOTE: per MD 8.11, if the staff plans to take an action that is contrary to an immediate action requested in the petition (permitting restart of a facility when the petitioner has requested that restart not be permitted), the petitioner must promptly be notified of the pending staff action).

Shana - please let me know if you need anything additional to get Michele's okay. I'd like to respond to Mr. Gurdziel by 3p today j(b)(6) I Thanks to all for the quick-turn!

Rich Rich Guzman Sr. PM , Division Operator Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office: 0-9C7 I Phone: (301) 415-1030 Richard.Guzman@nrc.gov From: Helton, Shana Sent: Thursday, June 22, 2017 11:33 AM To: Guzman, Richard <Richard.Guzman@nrc.gov>; Greives, Jonathan <Jonathan.Greives@nrc.gov>;

Setzer, Thomas <Thomas.Setzer@nrc.gov>; Cylkowski, David < David.Cylkowski@nrc.gov>; Banic, Merrilee <Merrilee.Banic@nrc.gov>

Cc: Rudland, David <David .Rudland@nrc.gov>; Haagensen, Brian <Brian.Haagensen@nrc.gov>; Siwy, Andrew <Andrew.Siwy@nrc.gov>; Rich, Sarah <Sarah .Rich@nr c.gov>; Broaddus, Doug

<Doug.Broaddus@nrc.gov>; Danna, James <James.Danna@nrc.gov>; Kim, James <James.Kim@nrc.gov>;

Benner, Eric <Eric.Benner@nrc.gov>; Mikula, Olivia <Olivia.Mikula@nrc.gov>; Jordan, Natreo111

<Natreon.Jordan@nrc.gov>; Tobin, Jennifer <Jennifer.Tobin@nrc.gov>

Subject:

Re: ACTION: 2.206 Immediate Action Request re: Indian Point Unit 3 Rx Head 0-rings and Restart (LTR-17-0235)

I'm ok as long as safety is assured and the discussion below is very helpful with that. I see no need to stop IP from starting back up.

On : 22 June 201711:10, "Guzman, Richard" <Richard.Guzman@nrc.gov> wrote:

Shana - I will defer to you as our PRB chair, if you would like to have a conference call before making a determination, I can set up a bridgeline and get a conference room for 1200 today.

From: Greives, Jonathan Sent: Thursday, June 22, 2017 10:36 AM To: Guzman, Richard <Richard.Guzman@nrc.gov>; Setzer, Thomas <Thomas.Setzer@nrc.gov>; Helton, Shana <Shana.Helton@nrc.gov>; Cylkowski, David <David.Cylkowski@nrc.gov>; Banic, Merrilee

<Merrilee.Banic@nrc.gov>

Cc: Rudland, David <David.Rudland@nrc.gov>; Haagensen, Brian <Brian. Haagensen@nrc.gov>; Siwy, Andrew <Andrew.Siwy@nrc.gov>; Rich, Sarah <Sarah.Rich@nrc.gov>; Broaddus, Doug

<Doug.Broaddus@nrc.gov>; Danna, James <James.Danna@nrc.gov>; Kim, James <James.Kim@nrc.gov>;

Benner, Eric <Eric.Benner@nrc.gov>; Mikula, Olivia <0 livia.Mikula@nrc.gov>

Subject:

RE: ACTION: 2.206 Immediate Action Request re: Indian Point Unit 3 Rx Head 0-rings and Restart (LTR-17-0235)

Rich, Should be put together a quick call this morning to get everyone on the page? This important action/communication appears difficult via email.

I agree with all that the licensee needs to understand the cause of the repeat leaks and then we need to follow-up on their assessment. However, I don't believe a small amount of leakage from this joint (even if both o-rings were to leak) presents a safety concern that would jeopardize the ability of the plant to safely shut down or respond to any accident. Their TSs dictate requirements for monitoring unidentified leakage in containment and have limits that ensure they shut down the plant with adequate margin to safety. Historically, they have identified the leakage at a very low level (as Rich said, less than 10% of the TS limit) and have taken prudent, conservative action to shut down the plant to repair.

Thanks, Jon From: Guzman, Richard Sent: Thursday, June 22, 2017 10:29 AM To: Setzer, Thomas <Thomas.Setzer@nrc.gov>; Helton, Shana <Shana.Helton@nrc.gov>; Cylkowski, David <David.Cylkowski@nrc.gov>; Banic, Merrilee <Merrilee.Banic@nrc.gov>

Cc: Rudland, David <David .Rudland@nrc.gov>; Greives, Jonathan <Jonathan.Greives@nrc.gov>;

Haagensen, Brian <Brian.Haagensen@nrc.gov>; Siwy, Andrew <Andrew.Siwy@nrc.gov>; Rich, Sarah

<Sarah.Rich@nrc.gov>; Broaddus, Doug <Doug.Broaddus@nrc.gov>; Danna, James

<James.Danna@nrc.gov>; Kim, James <James.Kim@nrc.gov>; Benner, Eric <Eric.Benner@nrc.gov>;

Mikula, Olivia <0 livia.Mikula@nrc.gov>

Subject:

RE: ACTION: 2.206 Immediate Action Request re: Indian Point Unit 3 Rx Head 0-rings and Restart (LTR-17-0235)

Also please note the highlighted error in my original message. The unidentified leakage at time of shutdown was 0.14 (vice 1.4 gpm). The current 0.10 gpm UIL rate is 1/10 the TS limit for UIL.

Thanks, Rich From: Setzer, Thomas Sent: Thursday, June 22, 201710:17 AM To: Helton, Shana <Shana.Helton@nrc.gov>; Guzman, Richard <Richard .Guzman@nrc.gov>; Cylkowski, David <David .Cylkowski@nrc.gov>; Banic, Merrilee <Merrilee.Banic@nrc.gov>

Cc: Rudland, David <David.Rudland@nrc.gov>; Greives, Jonathan <Jonat han.Greives@nrc.gov>;

Haagensen, Brian <Brian.Haagensen@nrc.gov>; Siwy, Andrew <Andrew.Siwy@nrc.gov>; Rich, Sarah

<Sarah.Rich@nrc.gov>; Broaddus, Doug <Doug.Broaddus@nrc.gov>; Danna, James

<James.Danna@nrc.gov>; Kim, James <James.Kim@nrc.gov>; Benner, Eric <Eric.Benner@nrc.gov>;

Mikula, Olivia <Olivia.Mikula@ nrc.gov>

Subject:

Re: ACTION: 2.206 Immediate Action Request re: Indian Point Unit 3 Rx Head 0 -rings and Restart (LTR-17-0235)

Thats a great point Shana. l guess l would need the definition of "adequate protection" to understand this better. The fact is that Indian Point has had numerous oring leaks, and has yet to identify the smoking gun or root cause as to why this plag ues Unit 3. Incidentally, Unit 2 has I of its 2 orings leaking at this moment.

We do not have a safety concern with the current cond ition at Unit 3 (the inner oring isleakong but theouter is holding). Theouter ring is a fully qualified 100% pressure seal, so it is designed to provide adequate sealing on its own.

I would not feel an enforcement action to prevent startup would be warranted. The situation begs more inspection and review but both the NRC and licensee, but it is not a safety concern at this point.

VR, Tom


Original Message --------

From: "Helton, Shana" <Shana.Helton@nrc.gov>

Date: Thu, June 22, 2017 9:38 AM-0400 To: "Guzman, Richard" <Richard.Guzman@nrc.gov>, "Cylkowski, David"

<David.Cylkowski@nrc.gov>, "Setzer, Thomas" <Thomas.Setzer@nrc.gov>, "Banic, Merrilee"

<Mcrrilee.Ban ic@nrc.gov>

CC: "Rudland, David" <David.Rudland@nrc.gov>, "Greives, Jonathan"

<Jonathan.Greives@nrc.gov>, "Haagensen, Brian" <Brian.Haagensen@nrc.gov>, "Siwy, Andrew" <Andrew.Siwy@nrc.gov>, "Rich, Sarah" <Sarah.Rich@nrc.gov>, "Broaddus, Doug"

<Doug.Broaddus@nrc.gov>, "Danna, James" <Jamcs.Danna@nrc.gov>, "Kim, James"

<James.Kim@nrc.gov>, "Benner, Eric" <Eric.Benner@nrc.gov>, "Mikula, Oli via"

<O livia.Mikula@nrc.gov>

Subject:

Re: ACTION: 2.206 Immediate Action Request re: Indian Point Unit 3 Rx Head 0-rings and Restart (LTR-17-0235)

I would like to understand why we have confidence that this o-ring repair provides adequate protection, given it's a repair that allegedly (per the petitioner) had been made repeatedly. I need this before concurring - thanks.

From: Setzer, Thomas Sent: Thursday, June 22, 2017 10:51 AM To: Mikula, Olivia <Olivia.Mikula@nrc.gov>; Rudland, David <David.Rudland@nrc.gov>; Helton, Shana

<Shana.Helton@nrc.gov>; Guzman, Richard <Richard.Guzman@nrc.gov>; Cylkowski, David

<David.Cyl kowski@nrc.gov>; Banic, Merrilee <Merrilee.Banic@nrc.gov>

Cc: Greives, Jonathan <Jonathan.Greives@nrc.gov>; Haagensen, Brian <Brian.Haagensen@ nrc.gov>;

Siwy, Andrew <Andrew.Siwy@nrc.gov>; Rich, Sarah <Sarah.Rich @nrc.gov>; Broaddus, Doug

<Doug.Broaddus@nrc.gov>; Danna, James <James.Danna@nrc.gov>; Kim, James

<James.Kim@nrc.gov>; Benner, Eric <Eric.Benner@nrc.gov>

Subject:

RE: ACTION: 2.206 Im mediate Action Request re: Indian Poi nt Unit 3 Rx Head 0-rings and Restart (LTR-17-0235)

There is no requirement for the oring fu nctional ity. If they leak by, unidentified leakage is the tech requirement that comes into play. The tech spec limit on that is 1 gpm.

If the outer oring holds, they wont leak and would not cha llenge that tech spec requirement. In this most recent event at Unit 3 where both orings leaked, the unidentified leakage was approx 0.15 gpm.


Original Message --------

From: "Mikula, Olivia" <Olivia.Mikula@nrc.gov>

Date: Thu, June 22, 201 7 10:28 AM -0400 To: "Rudland, David" <David.Rudland@nrc.gov>, "Setzer, Thomas"

<Thomas.Setzer@nrc.gov>, "Helton, Shana" <Shana.Hellon@nrc.gov>, "Guzman, Richard"

<Richard.Guzman@nrc.gov>, "Cylkowski, David" <David.Cylkowski@nrc.gov>, "Banic, Merrilee" <Mcrrilcc.Banic@ nrc.gov>

CC: "Greives, Jonathan" <Jonathan.Greives@nrc.gov>, "Haagensen, Brian"

<Brian.Haagensen@nrc.gov>, "Siwy, Andrew" <Andrew.Siwy@nrc.gov>, "Rich, Sarah"

<Sarah.Rich@ nrc.gov>, "Broaddus, Doug" <Doug.Broaddus@nrc.gov>, "Danna, James"

<James. Danna@nrc.gov>, "Kim, James" <James.Kim@nrc.gov>, "Benner, Eric"

<Eric.Benner@nrc.gov>

Subject:

RE: ACTION: 2.206 Immediate Action Request re: Indian Point Unit 3 Rx Head 0-rings and Restart (LTR-17-0235)

Good morning, Thank you for that additional information. Is there a binding requirement for this inner oring to be fully functional? In other words, is there something in their technical specifications or in our

regulations that makes this issue they are facing problematic? Or does the functionality of the outer ring leave them in full compliance with requirements?

Thank you, Olivia From: Rud land, David Sent: Thursday, June 22, 2017 10:26 AM To: Setzer, Thomas <Thomas.Setzer@nrc.gov>; Helton, Shana <Shana .Helton@nrc.gov>; Guzman, Richard <Richard.Guzman@nrc.gov>; Cylkowski, David <David.Cylkowski@nrc.gov>; Banic, Merrilee

<Merrilee.Ban ic@nrc.gov>

Cc: Greives, Jonathan <Jonathan.Greives@n rc.gov>; Haagensen, Brian <Brian.Haagensen@nrc.gov>;

Siwy, Andrew <Andrew.Siwy@n rc.gov>; Rich, Sarah <Sarah.Rich@nrc.gov>; Broaddus, Doug

<Doug.Broaddus@nrc.gov>; Danna, James <James.Danna@nrc.gov>; Kim, James

<James.Kim@nrc.gov>; Benner, Eric <Eric.Benner@nrc.gov>; Mikula, Olivia <Olivia.Mikula@nrc.gov>

Subject:

RE : ACTION : 2.206 Im mediate Action Request re: Indian Point Unit 3 Rx Head 0 -rings and Restart (LTR-17-0235)

Tom and Shana I see Tom's point. The safety concern comes from both o-rings leaking, but it is worrisome that this keeps happening and moving forward we need to take a very close look at the root cause.

Since the one o-ring is holding at pressure, there does not appear to be an immediate safety concern that requires enforcement action. In fact, the leak detection and tech spec limits were sufficient to catch the issue before it caused a large concern.

Did they replace both o-rings during this outage, or just one? If they replaced both and now one is leaking, that may be a different story Thanks Dave David L. Rudland, Ph.D.

Chief, Vessels and Internals Integrity Branch Division of Engineering Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mail Stop: OWFN-llFOl 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852-2738 Office: (301) 415-1896 Cell: !(b)(6) I Email: david.rudland@nrc.gov

From : Setzer, Thomas Sent: Thursday, June 22, 2017 10:17 AM To: Helton, Shana <Shana.Helton@nrc.gov>; Guzman, Richard <Richard.Guzman@nrc.gov>; Cylkowski, David <David.Cylkowski@nrc.gov>; Banic, Merrilee <Merrilee.Ban ic@nrc.gov>

Cc: Rudland, David <David.Rudland@nrc.gov>; Greives, Jonathan <Jonathan.Greives@nrc.gov>;

Haagensen, Brian <Brian .Haagensen@nrc.gov>; Siwy, Andrew <Andrew.Siwy@nrc.gov>; Rich, Sarah

<Sarah.Rich@nrc.gov>; Broaddus, Doug <Doug.Broaddus@nrc.gov>; Danna, James

<James.Danna@nrc.gov>; Kim, James <James.Kim@nrc.gov>; Benner, Eric <Eric.Benner@nrc.gov>;

Mikula, Olivia <Olivia.Miku la@nrc.gov>

Subject:

Re: ACTION: 2.206 Immediate Action Request re: Indian Point Unit 3 Rx Head 0-rings and Restart (LTR-17-0235)

Thats a great point Shana. I guess I would need the definition of "adequate protection" to understand this better. The fact is that Indian Point has had numerous oring leaks, and has yet to identify the smoking gun or root cause as to why this plagues Unit 3. Incidentally, Unit 2 has 1 of its 2 orings leaking at this moment.

We do not have a safety concern with the current condition at Unit 3 (the inner oring isleakong but theouter is holding). Theouter ring is a fu lly qualified 100% pressure seal, so it is designed to provide adequate sealing on its own.

l wou ld not fee l an enforcement action to prevent startup would be warranted. The situation begs more inspection and review but both the NRC and licensee, but it is not a safety concern at this point.

VR, Tom


Original Message --------

From: "He lton, Shana" <Shana.Helton@nrc.gov>

Date: Thu, June 22, 2017 9:38 AM-0400 To: "Guzman, Richard" <Richard.Guzman@nrc.gov>, "Cylkowski, David"

<David.Cylkowski@nrc.gov>, "Setzer, Thomas" <Thomas.Setzer@nrc.gov>, "Banic, Merrilee"

<Merrilee.Banic@ nrc.gov>

CC: "Rudland, David" <David.Rudland@nrc.gov>, "Greives, Jonathan"

<Jonathan.Greives@nrc.gov>, "Haagensen, Brian" <Brian.Haagensen@nrc.gov>, "Siwy, Andrew" <Andrew.Siwy@ nrc.gov>, "Rich, Sarah" <Sarah.Rich@nrc.gov>, "Broaddus, Doug"

<Doug.Broaddus@nrc.gov>, "Danna, James" <James.Danna@nrc.gov>, "Kim, James"

<James.Kim@nrc.gov>, "Benner, Eric" <Eric.Benner@nrc.gov>, "Mikula, Olivia"

<Olivia.Mikula@nrc.gov>

Subject:

Re: ACTION: 2.206 lmmediate Action Request re: Indian Point Unit 3 Rx Head 0-rings and Restart (LTR- 17-0235)

I would like to understand why we have confidence that this o-ring repair provides adequate protection, given it's a repair that allegedly (per the petitioner) had been made repeatedly. I need this before concurring - thanks.

On: 22 June 2017 09:09, "Guzman, Richard" <Richard.Guzman@nrc.gov> wrote:

All, Good morning. We've received a 2.206 petition from Tom Gurdziel concerning the reactor vessel head o-rings at Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 3 (IP3). He requests that NRC prevent restart of IP3 until they essentially determine a root cause. Because of the timing of their startup, we are treating the petitioner's request to keep IP3 shutdown as a request for immediate action. While the licensee has already synchronized to the grid (completed ahead of schedule earlier this a.m.), we intend to follow the process per MD 8.11, to the extent possible and 'promptly' notify the petitioner of the pending staff action (i.e., per MD 8.11, when the staff plans to take an action contrary to the requested action in the petition (i.e., permitting restart of a facility when the petitioner has requested that restart not be permitted).

To expedite this step in the process, I would like to forego a PRB F2F meeting and get your concurrence and/or comments via e-mail today by 12 pm, if possible.

ACTION by 1200 6/22: Please review the petition request (1-page email attached) and let me know if you have any objections or concerns with the proposed path to reject the petitioner's request for immediate action (i.e., to prevent the restart of IP3), based on the PRB determination that there are no immediate safety significant concerns which would adversely impact the public's health and safety. Also, provide comments/mark-ups, if any on the proposed e-mail response to the petitioner (draft e-mail below). Also, note that as stated in today's 0800 RI call, the Region does not have any immediate safety concerns with licensee's decision to startup as the reactor vessel head outer o-ring is currently holding RCS pressure.

Forthcoming steps for addressing petitioner's request for immediate action:

1. 1. PRB members to concur on determination to deny petitioner's immediate action request -

respond to PM via email today by 1200

2. 2. Obtain NRR concurrence on the PRB recommendation for addressing the petitioner's requests for immediate action
3. Inform petitioner of staffs decision or pending actions regarding the petitioner's immediate action requests (NOTE: per MD 8.11, if the staff plans to take an action that is contrary to an immediate action requested in the petition (permitting restart of a facility when the petitioner has requested that restart not be permitted), the petitioner must promptly be notified of the pending staff action).

3.

4. Follow-on steps:
5. 1. A follow-on PRB meeting will be scheduled on a later date to make an initial recommendation as to whether or not the petition meets the criteria for review under 10 CFR 2.206
6. 2. Inform petitioner of staffs initial recommendation (whether to accept or reject the petition for review).
7. 3. Offer a meeting or teleconference for the petitioner to address the PRB in light of its initial recommendation.
4. Issue an acknowledgement (or closure) letter to the petitioner Proposed PRB/Contacts:

Chair: Shana Helton Petition Manager: Rich Guzman 2.206 Coordinator: Lee Banic / Jim Kim

DE: Dave Rudland RI: Tom Setzer OE: TBD OGC: David Cylkowski / Olivia Mikula Other key points (from Region I)

1. The outer o-ring is currently holding RCS pressure. The system was designed to operate on just the outer o-ring. There is no engineering or licensing basis for not performing a plant startup.
2. There was no root cause completed as a result of thle double o-ring leak. The apparent cause determination may not bound the problem (i.e. there may be another cause).
3. Corrective actions that could be taken to fix o-ring leakage problems beyond what was done during the last outage require a minimum of 2-3 months lead time.

4 . The unidentified leak rate was just determined to be 0.1 gpm which is lower than the UIL of 1.4 gpm at the time of the shutdown.

Current IP3 startup status (0800 6/22)

  • Reactor went critical at 4:34 pm on 6/21
  • Mode 1 at 11 :36 pm on 6/21
  • Synched to the grid at 2:26 am on 6/22
  • 100% expected -1 :30 on 6/23 I appreciate your help on this short-fuse request. Standing by for any questions/concerns.
Thanks, Rich Rich Guzman Sr. PM , Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office: 0-9C07 I Phone: 301-415-1030

*------------------------DRAFT-----------------------------------------------

Good Afternoon, I have been assigned as a Petition Manager for the 10 CFR 2.206 petition you submitted to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) on June 11 , 2017, regarding your concerns with the reactor vessel head o-rings at Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 3.

Section 2.206 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations describes the petition process -

the primary mechanism for the public to request enforcement action by the NRC in a public process. This process permits anyone to petition NRC to take enforcement-type action related to NRC licensees or licensed activities. Depending on the results of its evaluation, NRC could modify, suspend or revoke an NRC-issued license or take any other appropriate enforcement action to resolve a problem. The NRC staff's guidance for the disposition of 2.206 petition requests is in Management Directive 8.11 , which is publicly available.

The 2.206 process provides a mechanism for any member of the public to request enforcement action against NRC licensees. The 2.206 process is separate from the allegations process

which affords individuals who raise safety concerns a degree of protection of their identity. In the 2.206 process , all of the information in your letter will be made public, including your identity.

You specifically requested in your letter for the NRC to keep Indian Point, Unit 3 (IP3) in cold shutdown until the condition of the reactor vessel head upper and lower surfaces are "proved to be identical to the as-purchased condition ". The NRC considers your request as a short-term ,

immediate action given that IP3 is in the process of restarting from its refueling outage. On June 22, 2017, your request for immediate action was reviewed by members of the Petition Review Board (PRB), which includes staff from the NRC's Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) and Region I. After its review and discussion, the PRB determined that there were no immediate safety significant concerns which would adversely impact the public's health and safety; therefore, the PRB denied your request for immediate action in the restart of IP3.

In accordance with NRC Management Directive 8.11 , you have the opportunity to address the PRB, either in person at the NRC Headquarters in Rockville, MD, or by telephone conference.

The purpose of this interaction is so that the petitioner can discuss the petition and verbally supplement the petition with any new information. During the meeting , the PRB is in listening mode and will not make any decisions regarding your petition.

I would appreciate if you could advise me by Friday, June 30, 2017 , if you agree to the NRC's processing your request under the 2.206 process. In addition, please advise me if you would like to address the PRB . If you wou ld like to meet in person , I will need to schedule a formal public meeting at the NRC Headquarters. If you would prefer to address the PRB via phone, I will also work with you to coordinate a date/time during the upcoming weeks.

If you have other questions on the 2.206 process, or regarding the role as petition manager, please contact me at 301-415-1030 .

Thank you,


DRAFT-----------------------------------------------

From: Evans, Michele Sent: 22 Jun 2017 14:21:36 -0400 To: Guzman, Richard;Helton, Shana

Subject:

RE: ACTION: 2.206 Immediate Action Request re: Indian Point Unit 3 Rx Head 0 -rings and Restart (LTR-17-0235)

Rich, I agree with the recommended approach to deny the immediate actions.

Thanks Michele


Original Message --------

From: "Guzman, Richard" <Richard.Guzman@nrc.gov>

Date: Thu, June 22, 2017 1:59 PM -0400 To: "Helton, Shana" <Shana.Helton@nrc.gov>

CC: "Evans, Michele" <Michele.Evans@nrc.gov>

Subject:

RE: ACTION: 2.206 Immediate Action Request re: Indian Point Unit 3 Rx Head 0-rings and Restart (LTR-17-0235)

Shana, As we discussed, please* obtain Michele's concurrence on the PRB's determination to deny the immediate action requested by the petitioner as summarized below. I understand you have concurred on this PRB determination. I would like to contact the petitioner by 3pm today, if possible. Looping in Michele to expedite this request and for your convenience.

SUMMARY

We've received a 2.206 petition from Tom Gurdziel concerning the reactor vessel head o-rings at Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 3 (IP3). He requests that NRC prevent restart of IP3 until they essentially determine a root cause. Because of the timing of their startup, we are treating the petitioner's request to keep IP3 shutdown as a request for immediate action. While the licensee has already synchronized to the grid (completed ahead of schedule earlier this a.m.), we intend to follow the process per MD 8.11, to the extent possible and 'promptly' notify the petitioner of the pending staff action (i.e., per MD 8.11 , when the staff plans to take an action contrary to the requested action in the petition (i.e., permitting restart of a facility when the petitioner has requested that restart not be permitted).

ACTION:

Per MD 8.11 , NRR concurrence is needed prior to communicating the PRB's determination regarding the petitioner's requested action for immediate action.

JUSTIFICATION:

After its review and discussion, the PRB determined that there were no immediate safety significant concerns which would adversely impact the public's health and safety;

therefore, the PRB recommends the petitioner's request to keep IP3 shutdown be denied.

Additional technical justification:

1. The licensee is meeting their TSs (1.0 gpm unidentified leakage). The TS requirements for leakage provide reasonable assurance of adequate protection. The IP3 TSs dictate requirements for monitoring unidentified leakage in containment and have limits that ensure they shut down the plant with adequate margin to safety. The unidentified leak rate is 0. 1 gpm which is 10% the limit of the TS and lower than the UIL of 0.14 gpm at time of shutdown.
2. The outer o-ring is currently holding RCS pressure. The system was designed to operate on j ust the outer o-ring. There is no engineering, licensing , of sufficient regulatory basis for preventing the plant startup.
3. The staff has determined there is no safety concern with the current condition at Unit 3 (i.e., the inner o-ring is leaking, but the outer is holding). The outer o-ring is a fully qualified 100% pressure seal, so it is designed to provide adequate seal ing on its own. An enforcement action to prevent startup would not be warranted.
4. The licensee's leak monitoring systems and TS limits are sufficient to identify the issue before it causes a larger concern.
5. Historically, the licensee has identified the leakage at a very low level and have taken prudent, conservative action to shut down the plant to repair.

If you or Michele have any questions, I can be reached at 301-415-1030.

Thanks, Rich Rich Guzman Sr. PM, Division Operator Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office: 0 -9C7 I Phone: (301) 415-1030 Richard.Guzman@nrc.gov From: Helton, Shana Sent: Thursday, June 22, 2017 12:09 PM To: Guzman, Richard <Richard.Guzman@nrc.gov>

Subject:

Re: ACTION: 2.206 Immediate Action Request re: Indian Point Un it 3 Rx Head 0 -rings and Restart (LTR-17-0235)

I concur on denying immediate action request, Shana On: 22 June 2017 11:52, "Guzman, Richard" <Richard.Guzm an@nrc.gov> wrote:

I believe we have a consensus (step 1 complete) and can move forward with getting Michele Evan's concurrence on our recommendation . I will update the response appropriately to include the additional technical basis provided by EVIB and the Region (Tom and Jon - I will run these by you as well).

Forthcoming steps for addressing petitioner's request for immediate action:

1. 1. PRB members to concur on determination to deny petitioner's immediate action request -

respond to PM via email today by 1200

2. 2. Obtain NRR concurrence on the PRB recommendation for addressing the petitioner's requests for immediate action
3. Inform petitioner of staffs decision or pending actions regarding the petitioner's immediate action requests (NOTE: per MD 8.11 , if the staff plans to take an action that is contrary to an immediate action requested in the petition (permitting restart of a facility when the petitione r has requested that restart not be permitted), the petitioner must promptly be notified of the pending staff action).

Shana - please let me know if you need anything additional to get Michele's okay. I'd like to respond to Mr. Gurdziel by 3p today ~(b)(6) ~

Thanks to all for the quic k-turn!

On: 22 June 2017 09:09, "Guzman, Richard" <Richard.Guzman@nrc.gov> wrote:

All, Good morning. We've received a 2.206 petition from T om Gurdziel concerning the reactor vessel head a-rings at Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No . 3 (IP3). He requests that NRC prevent restart of IP3 until they essentially determine a root cause.

Because of the timing of their startup, we are treating the petitioner's request to keep IP3 shutdown as a request for immediate action. While the licensee has already synchronized to the grid (completed ahead of schedule earlier this a.m.), we intend to follow the process per MD 8.1 1, to the extent possible and 'promptly' notify the petitioner of the pending staff action (i.e., per MD 8.1 1, when the staff plans to take an action contrary to the requested action in the petition (i.e., permitting restart of a facility when the petitioner has requested that restart not be permitted).

To expedite this step in the process, I would like to forego a PRB F2F meeting and get your concurrence and/or comments via e-mail today by 12 pm, if possible.

ACTION by 1200 6/22: Please review the petition request (1-page email attached) and let me know if you have any objections or concerns with the proposed path to reject the petitioner's request for immediate action (i.e., to prevent the restart of IP3), based on the PRB determination that t here are no immediate safety significant concerns which would

adversely impact the public's health and safety. Also, provide comments/mark-ups, if any on the proposed e-mail response to the petitioner (draft e-mail below). Also, note that as stated in today's 0800 RI call, the Region does not have any immediate safety concerns with licensee's decision to startup as the reactor vessel head outer o-ring is currently holding RCS pressure.

Forthcoming steps for addressing petitioner's request for immediate action:

1. 1. PRB members to concur on determination to deny petitioner's immediate action request - respond to PM via email today by 1200
2. 2. Obtain NRR concurrence on the PRB recommendation for addressing the petitioner's requests for immediate action
3. Inform petitioner of staff's decision or pending actions regarding the petitioner's immediate action requests (NOTE: per MD 8.11 , if the staff plans to take an action that is contrary to an immediate action requested in the petition (permitting restart of a facility when the petitioner has requested that restart not be permitted), the petitioner must promptly be notified of the pending staff action).

3.

4. Follow-on steps:
5. 1. A follow-on PRB meeting will be scheduled on a later date to make an initial recommendation as to whether or not the petition meets the criteria for review under 10 CFR 2.206
6. 2. Inform petitioner of staff's initial recommendation (whether to accept or reject the petition for review).
7. 3. Offer a meeting or teleconference for the petitioner to address the PRB in light of its initial recommendation.
4. Issue an acknowledgement (or closure) letter to the petitioner Proposed PRB/Contacts:

Chair: Shana Helton Petition Manager: Rich Guzman 2.206 Coordinator: Lee Banic / Jim Kim DE: Dave Rudland RI: Tom Setzer OE: TBD OGC: David Cylkowski/ Olivia Mikula Other key points (from Region I)

1. The outer o-ring is currently holding RCS pressure. The system was designed to operate on just the outer o-ring. There is no engineering or licensing basis for not performing a plant startup.
2. There was no root cause completed as a result of the double o-ring leak. The apparent cause determination may not bound the problem (i.e. there may be another cause).
3. Corrective actions that could be taken to fix o-ring leakage problems beyond what was done during the last outage require a minimum of 2-3 months lead time.
4. The unidentified leak rate was just determined to be 0.1 gpm which is lower than the UIL of 0.14 +.4 gpm at the time of the shutdown.

Current IP3 startup status (0800 6/22)

Reactor went critical at 4:34 pm on 6/21 Mode 1 at 11 :36 pm on 6/21 Synched to the grid at 2:26 am on 6/22 100% expected -1 :30 on 6/23 I appreciate your help on this short-fuse request. Standing by for any questions/concerns.

Thanks, Rich Rich Guzman Sr. PM, Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office: 0 -9C07 I Phone: 301 -415-1030

*------------------------DRAFT-----------------------------------------------

Good Afternoon, I have been assigned as a Petition Manager for the 10 CFR 2.206 petition you submitted to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) on June 11 , 2017, regarding your concerns with the reactor vessel head o-rings at Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 3.

Section 2.206 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations describes the petition process - the primary mechanism for the public to request enforcement action by the NRC in a public process. This process permits anyone to petition NRC to take enforcement-type action related to NRC licensees or licensed activities. Depending on the results of its evaluation, NRC could modify, suspend or revoke an NRG-issued license or take any other appropriate enforcement action to resolve a problem. The NRC staff's guidance for the disposition of 2.206 petition requests is in Management Directive 8.11 , which is publicly available.

The 2.206 process provides a mechanism for any member of the public to request enforcement action against NRC licensees. The 2.206 process is separate from the allegations process which affords individuals who raise safety concerns a degree of protection of their identity. In the 2.206 process, all of the information in your letter will be made public, including your identity.

You specifically requested in your letter for the NRC to keep Indian Point, Unit 3 (IP3) in cold shutdown until the condition of the reactor vessel head upper and lower surfaces are "proved to be identical to the as-purchased condition". The NRC considers your request as a short-term, immediate action given that IP3 is in the process of restarting from its maintenance outage. On June 22, 2017, your request for immediate action was reviewed by members of the Petition Review Board (PRB), which includes staff from the NRC's Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) and Region I. After its review and discussion, the PRB determined that there were no immediate safety significant

concerns which would adversely impact the public's health and safety; therefore , the PRB denied your request for immediate action in the restart of IP3.

In accordance with NRG Management Directive 8.11 , you have the opportunity to address the PRB , either in person at the NRG Headquarters in Rockville , MD, or by telephone conference. The purpose of this interaction is so that the petitioner can discuss the petition and verbally supplement the petition with any new information.

During the meeting , the PRB is in listening mode and will not make any decisions regarding your petition .

I would appreciate if you could advise me by Friday, June 30 , 2017 , if you agree to the NRG's processing your request under the 2.206 process. In addition , please advise me if you would like to address the PRB. If you would like to meet in person , I will need to schedule a formal public meeting at the NRG Headquarters. If you wou ld prefer to address the PRB via phone, I will also work with you to coordinate a date/time during the upcom ing weeks .

If you have other questions on the 2.206 process, or regarding the role as petition manager, please contact me at 301-415- 1030 .

Thank you ,


DRA FT-----------------------------------------------

From: Guzman, Richard Sent: 22 Jun 2017 11:52:56 -0400 To: Helton, Shana;Greives, Jonathan;Setzer, Thomas;Mikula, Olivia Cc: Rudland, David;Haagensen, Brian;Siwy, Andrew;Rich, Sarah;Broaddus, Doug;Danna, James;Kim, James;Benner, Eric;Jordan, Natreon;Tobin, Jennifer;Cylkowski, David;Banic, Merrilee

Subject:

RE: ACTION: 2.206 Immediate Action Request re: Indian Point Unit 3 Rx Head 0 -

rings and Restart (LTR-17-0235)

I believe we have a consensus (step 1 complete) and can move forward w ith getting Michele Evan's concurrence on our recommendation. I will update t he response appropriately to include the additional technical basis provided by EVIB and the Region (Tom and Jon - I will run these by you as well).

Forthcoming steps for addressing petitioner's request for immediate action:

1. 1. PRB members to concur on determination to deny petitioner's immediate action request - respond to PM via email today by 1200
2. 2. Obtain NRR concurrence on the PRB recommendation for addressing the petitioner's requests for immediate action
3. Inform petitioner of staff's decision or pending actions regarding the petitioner's immediate action requests (NOTE: per MD 8.11 , if the staff plans to take an action that is contrary to an immediate action requested in the petition (permitting restart of a facility when the petitioner has requested that restart not be permitted), the petitioner must promptly be notified of the pending staff action).

Shana - please let me know if you need anyt hing additional to get M ichele's okay. I'd like to respond to M r. Gurdziel by 3p today 1(b)(6) ~ Than ks to all for the quick-turn!

Ric h Rich Guzman Sr. PM , Division Operator Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office: 0-9C7 I Phone: (301) 415-1030 Richard .Guzman@nrc.gov From : Helton, Shana Se nt: Thursday, June 22, 2017 11:33 AM To: Guzman, Richard <Richard .Guzman@nrc.gov>; Greives, Jonathan <Jonathan.Greives@nrc.gov>;

Setzer, Thomas <Thomas.Setzer@nrc.gov>; Cylkowski, David <David.Cylkowski @nrc.gov>; Banic, M errilee <Merrilee.Banic@nrc.gov>

Cc: Rudland, David <David .Rudland@nrc.gov>; Haagensen, Brian <Brian.Haagensen@nrc.gov>; Siwy, Andrew <Andrew .Siwy@nrc.gov>; Rich, Sarah <Sarah.Rich@nrc.gov>; Broaddus, Doug

<Doug.Broaddus@nrc.gov>; Danna, James <James.Danna@nr c.gov>; Kim, James

<James.Kim@nrc.gov>; Benner, Eric <Eric.Benner@nrc.gov>; Mikula, Olivia <0 livia.Mikula@nrc.gov>;

Jordan, Natreon <Natreon.Jordan@ nrc.gov>; Tobin, Jennifer <Jennifer.Tobin@nrc.gov>

Subje ct: Re: ACTION: 2.206 Immediate Action Request re: Indian Point Unit 3 Rx Head 0 -rings and Restart (LTR-17-0235)

I'm ok as long as safety is assured and the discussion below is very helpful with t hat. I see no need to stop IP from starting back up.

On: 22 June 201711:10, "Guzman, Richard" <Richard.Guzman@nrc.gov> wrote:

Shana - I will defer to you as our PRB chair, if you would like to have a conference call before making a determination, I can set up a bridgeline and get a conference room for 1200 today.

From: Greives, Jonathan Sent: Thursday, June 22, 2017 10:36 AM To: Guzman, Richard <Richard.Guzman@nrc.gov>; Setzer, Thomas <Thomas.Setzer @nrc.gov>; Helton, Shana <Shana.Helton@nrc.gov>; Cylkowski, David <David.Cylkowski@nrc.gov>; Banic, Merrilee

<Merrilee.Banic@nrc.gov>

Cc: Rudland, David <David.Rudland@nrc.gov>; Haagensen, Brian <Brian.Haagensen@nrc.gov>; Siwy, Andrew <Andrew.Siwy@nrc.gov>; Rich, Sarah <Sarah.Rich@nrc.gov>; Broaddus, Doug

<Doug.Broaddus@nrc.gov>; Danna, James <James.Danna@nrc.gov>; Kim, James

<James.Kim@nrc.gov>; Benner, Eric <Eric.Benner@nrc.gov>; Mikula, Olivia <Olivia.Mikula@nrc.gov>

Subject:

RE: ACTION: 2.206 Im mediate Action Request re: Indian Point Unit 3 Rx Head 0-rings and Restart (LTR-17-0235)

Rich, Should be put together a quick call this morning to get everyone on the page? This important action/communication appears difficult via email.

I agree with all that the licensee needs to understand the cause of the repeat leaks and then we need to follow-up on their assessment. However, I don't believe a small amount of leakage from this joint (even if both o -rings were to leak) presents a safety concern that would jeopardize the ability of the plant to safely shut down or respond to any accident. Their TSs dictate requirements for monitoring unidentified leakage in containment and have limits that ensure they shut down the plant with adequate margin to safety. Historically, they have identified the leakage at a very low level (as Rich said, less than 10% of the TS limit) and have taken prudent, conservative action to shut down the plant to repair.

Thanks, Jon From: Guzman, Richard Sent: Thursday, June 22, 2017 10:29 AM To: Setzer, Thomas <Thomas.Setzer@nrc.gov>; Helton, Shana <Shana .Helton@nrc.gov>; Cylkowski, David <David.Cylkowski@nrc.gov>; Banic, Merrilee <Merrilee.Banic@nrc.gov>

Cc: Rudland, David <David .Rudland@nrc.gov>; Greives, Jonathan <Jonathan.Greives@nrc.gov>;

Haagensen, Brian <Brian .Haagensen@nrc.gov>; Siwy, Andrew <Andrew.Siwy@nrc.gov>; Rich, Sarah

<Sarah. Rich@nrc.gov>; Broaddus, Doug <Doug.Broaddus@nrc.gov>; Danna, James

<James.Danna@nrc.gov>; Kim, James <James.Kim@nrc.gov>; Benner, Eric <Eric.Benner@nrc.gov>;

Mikula, Olivia <Olivia.Mikula@nrc.gov>

Subject:

RE: ACTION : 2.206 Immediate Action Request re: Indian Point Unit 3 Rx Head 0-rings and Restart (LTR-17-0235)

Also please note the highlighted error in my original message. The unidentified leakage at time of shutdown was 0.14 (vice 1.4 gpm). The current 0.1O gpm UIL rate is 1/10 the TS limit for UIL.

Thanks, Rich From : Setzer, Thomas Sent: Thursday, June 22, 2017 10:17 AM To: Helton, Shana <Shana.Helton@nrc.gov>; Guzman, Richard <Richard.Guzman@nrc.gov>; Cylkowski, David <David.Cylkowski@nrc.gov>; Banic, Merrilee <Merrilee.Banic@nrc.gov>

Cc: Rudland, David <David .Rudland@nrc.gov>; Greives, Jonathan <Jonathan.Greives@nrc.gov>;

Haagensen, Brian <Brian. Haagensen@nrc.gov>; Siwy, Andrew <Andrew.Siwy@nrc.gov>; Rich, Sarah

<Sarah.Rich@nrc.gov>; Broaddus, Doug <Doug.Broaddus@nrc.gov>; Danna, James

<James.Danna@nrc.gov>; Kim , James <James.Kim@nrc.gov>; Benner, Eric <Eric.Benner@nrc.gov>;

M ikula, Olivia <Olivia.Mikula@nrc.gov>

Subject:

Re: ACTION: 2.206 Immediate Action Request re: Indian Point Unit 3 Rx Head 0 -rings and Restart (LTR-17-0235)

Thats a great point Shana. I guess l would need the definition of "adequate protection" to understand this better. The fact is that Indian Point has had numerous oring leaks, and h as yet to identify the smoking gun or root cause as to why this plagues Unit 3. Incidentally, Unit 2 has 1 of its 2 orings leaking at this moment.

We do not have a safety concern with the current condition at Unit 3 (the inner oring isleakong but theouter is holding). Theouter ring is a fu lly qualified 100% pressure seal, so it is designed to provide adequate sealing on its own.

I would not fee l an enforcement action to prevent startup would be warranted. The situation begs more inspection and review but both the NRC and licensee, but it is not a safety concern at this point.

VR, Tom


Original Message --------

From: "Helton, Shana" <Shana.Helton@nrc.gov>

Date: Thu, June 22, 20 17 9:38 AM-0400 To: "Guzman, Richard" <Richard.Guzman@nrc.gov>, "Cylkowski, David"

<David.Cylkowski@nrc.gov>, "Setzer, Thomas" <Thomas.Sctzcr@nrc.gov>, "Banic, Merrilee"

<Merrilee.Banic@nrc.gov>

CC: "Rudland, David" <David.Rudland@nrc.gov>, "Greives, Jonathan"

<Jonathan.Greives@nrc.gov>, "Haagensen, Brian" < Brian.Haagensen@nrc.gov>, "Siwy, Andrew" <Andrew.Siwy@nrc.gov>, "Rich, Sarah" <Sarah.Rich@nrc.gov>, "Broaddus, Doug"

<Doug.Broaddus@nrc.gov>, "Danna, James" <James.Danna@nrc.gov>, "Kim, James"

<Jamcs.Kim@nrc.gov>, "Benner, Eric" <Eric.Benncr@nrc.gov>, "Mikula, Olivia"

<Olivia.Mikula@nrc.gov>

Subject:

Re: ACTION: 2.206 Immediate Action Request re: Indian Point Unit 3 Rx Head 0-rings and Restart (LTR-17-0235)

I would like to understand why we have confidence that this o-ring repair provides adequate protection, given it's a repair that allegedly (per the petitioner) had been made repeatedly. Tneed this before concurring - thanks.

On: 22 June 2017 09:09, "Guzman, Richard" <Richard.Guzman@nrc.gov> wrote:

All, Good morning. We've received a 2.206 petition from Tom Gurdziel concerning the reactor vessel head o-rings at Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 3 (IP3). He requests that NRC prevent restart of IP3 until they essentially determine a root cause. Because of the timing of their startup, we are treating the petitioner's request to ke,ep IP3 shutdown as a request for immediate action. While the licensee has already synchronized to the grid (completed ahead of schedule earlier this a.m.), we intend to follow the process per MD 8. 11 , to the extent possible and 'promptly' notify the petitioner of the pending staff action (i.e., per MD 8.11, when the staff plans to take an action contrary to the requested action in the petition (i.e., permitting restart of a facility when the petitioner has requested that restart not be permitted).

To expedite this step in the process, I would like to forego a PRB F2F meeting and get your concurrence and/or comments via e-mail today by 12 pm, if possible.

ACTION by 1200 6/22: Please review the petition request (1-page email attached) and let me know if you have any objections or concerns with the proposed path to reject the petitioner's request for immediate action (i.e., to prevent the restart of IP3), based on the PRB determination that there are no immediate safety significant concerns which would adversely impact the public's health and safety. Also, provide comments/mark-ups, if any on the proposed e-mail response to the petitioner (draft e-mail below). Also, note that as stated in today's 0800 RI call, the Region does not have any immediate safety concerns with licensee's decision to startup as the reactor vessel head outer a-ring is currently holding RCS pressure.

Forthcoming steps for addressing petitioner's request for immediate action:

1. 1. PRB members to concur on determination to deny petitioner's immediate action request - respond to PM via email today by 1200
2. 2. Obtain NRR concurrence on the PRB recommendation for addressing the petitioner's requests for immediate action
3. Inform petitioner of staffs decision or pending actions regarding the petitioner's immediate action requests (NOTE: per MD 8.11, if the staff plans to take an action that is contrary to an immediate action requested in the petition (permitting restart of a facility when the petitioner has

requested that restart not be permitted), the petitioner must promptly be notified of the pending staff action).

3.

4. Follow-on steps:
5. 1. A follow-on PRB meeting will be scheduled on a later date to make an initial recommendation as to whether or not the petition meets the criteria for review under 10 CFR 2.206
6. 2. Inform petitioner of staff's initial recommendation (whether to accept or reject the petition for review).
7. 3. Offer a meeting or teleconference for the petitioner to address the PRB in light of its initial recommendation.
4. Issue an acknowledgement (or closure) letter to the petitioner Proposed PRB/Contacts:

Chair: Shana Helton Petition Manager: Rich Guzman 2.206 Coordinator: Lee Banic / Jim Kim DE: Dave Rudland RI: Tom Setzer OE: TBD OGC: David Cylkowski / Olivia Mikula Other key points (from Region I)

1. The outer o-ring is currently holding RCS pressure. The system was designed to operate on just the outer o-ring. There is no engineering or licensing basis for not performing a plant startup.
2. There was no root cause completed as a result of the double o-ring leak. The apparent cause determination may not bound the problem (i.e. there may be another cause).
3. Corrective actions that could be taken to fix o-ring leakage problems beyond what was done during the last outage require a minimum of 2-3 months lead time.
4. The unidentified leak rate was just determined to be 0.1 gpm which is lower than the UIL of 0.14 44 gpm at the time of the shutdown.

Current IP3 startup status (0800 6/22)

  • Reactor went critical at 4:34 pm on 6/21
  • Mode 1 at 11 :36 pm on 6/21
  • Synched to the grid at 2:26 am on 6/22
  • 100% expected -1 :30 on 6/23 I appreciate your help on this short-fuse request. Standing by for any questions/concerns.

Thanks, Rich Rich Guzman Sr. PM , Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office: 0-9C07 I Phone: 301-415-1030


DRAFT-----------------------------------------------

Good Afternoon, I have been assigned as a Petition Manager for the 10 CFR 2.206 petition you submitted to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) on June 11, 2017, regarding your concerns with the reactor vessel head o-rings at Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 3.

Section 2.206 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations describes the petition process -

the primary mechanism for the public to request enforcement action by the NRC in a p,ublic process. This process permits anyone to petition NRC to take enforcement-type action related to NRC licensees or licensed activities. Depending on the results of its evaluation, NRC could modify, suspend or revoke an NRG-issued license or take any other appropriate enforcement action to resolve a problem. The NRC staffs guidance for the disposition of 2.206 petition requests is in Management Directive 8.11 , which is publicly available.

The 2.206 process provides a mechanism for any member of the public to request enforcement action against NRC licensees. The 2.206 process is separate from the allegations process which affords individuals who raise safety concerns a degree of protection of their identity. In the 2.206 process, all of the information in your letter will be made public, including your identity.

You specifically requested in your letter for the NRC to keep Indian Point, Unit 3 (IP3) in cold shutdown until the condition of the reactor vessel head upper and lower surfaces are "proved to be identical to the as-purchased condition". The NRC considers your request as a short-term ,

immediate action given that IP3 is in the process of restarting from its refueling outage. On June 22, 2017, your request for immediate action was reviewed by members of the Petition Review Board (PRB), which includes staff from the NRC's Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) and Region I. After its review and discussion, the PRB determined that there were no immediate safety significant concerns which would adversely impact the public's health and safety; therefore, the PRB denied your request for immediate action in the restart of IP3.

In accordance with NRC Management Directive 8.11 , you have the opportunity to address the PRB, either in person at the NRC Headquarters in Rockville, MD, or by telephone conference.

The purpose of this interaction is so that the petitioner can discuss the petition and verbally supplement the petition with any new information. During the meeting , the PRB is in listening mode and will not make any decisions regarding your petition.

I would appreciate if you could advise me by Friday, June 30 , 2017 , if you agree to the NRC's processing your request under the 2.206 process. In addition, please advise me if you would like to address the PRB. If you wou ld like to meet in person, I will need to schedule a formal public meeting at the NRG Headquarters. If you would prefer to address the PRB via phone, I will also work with you to coordinate a date/time during the upcoming weeks .

If you have other questions on the 2.206 process, or regarding the role as petition manager, please contact me at 301-415-1030.

Thank you,


DRAFT-----------------------------------------------

From: Mikula, Olivia Sent: 22 Jun 2017 11:39:48 -0400 To: Helton, Shana;Guzman, Richard;Greives, Jonathan;Setzer, Thomas;Cylkowski, David;Banic, Merrilee Cc: Rudland, David;Haagensen, Brian;Siwy, Andrew;Rich, Sarah;Broaddus, Doug;Danna, James;Kim, James;Benner, Eric;Jordan, Natreon;Tobin, Jennifer

Subject:

RE: ACTION: 2.206 Immediate Action Request re: Indian Point Unit 3 Rx Head 0-rings and Restart (LTR-17-0235)

Good afternoon, (b)(5)

Thank you ,

Olivia Olivia J. Mikula, Esq.

Attorney, Office of the General Counsel United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office: OWFN 15-A03 (301) 287-9107 Olivia.Mikula@nrc.gov

~~~,-~~~;~:rr~=o r 1= T ~

~YJ~~GD COMMUNICATIONS NAO I HORIZATION.J or PRIVILEGED WORK-PRQDI ICT.

From : Helton, Shana Sent: Thursday, June 22, 2017 11:33 AM To: Guzman, Richard <Richard.Guzman@nrc.gov>; Greives, Jonathan <Jonathan.Greives@nrc.gov>;

Setzer, Thomas <Thomas.Setzer@nrc.gov>; Cylkowski, David <David.Cylkowski@nrc.gov>; Banic, Merrilee <Merrilee.Banic@nrc.gov>

Cc: Rudland, David <David.Rudland@nrc.gov>; Haagensen, Brian <Brian.Haagensen@ nrc.gov>; Siwy, Andrew <Andrew.Siwy@nrc.gov>; Rich, Sarah <Sarah.Rich@n rc.gov>; Broaddus, Doug

<Doug.Broaddus@nrc.gov>; Danna, James <James.Danna@nr c.gov>; Kim, James

<James.Kim@nrc.gov>; Benner, Eric <Eric.Benner@nrc.gov>; M ikula, Olivia <0livia.Mikula@nrc.gov>;

Jordan, Natreon <Natreon.Jordan@nrc.gov>; Tobin, Jennifer <Jennifer.Tobin@nrc.gov>

Subject:

Re: ACTION: 2.206 Immediate Action Request re: Indian Point Unit 3 Rx Head 0 -rings and Restart (LTR- 17-0235)

I'm ok as long as safety is assured and the discussion below is very helpful with t hat. I see no need to stop IP from starting back up.

On: 22 June 201711:10, "Guzman, Richard" <Richard.Guzman@nrc.gov> wrote:

Shana - I will defer to you as our PRB chair, if you would like to have a conference call before making a determination, I can set up a bridgeline and get a conference room for 1200 today.

From: Greives, Jonathan Sent: Thursday, June 22, 2017 10:36 AM To: Guzman, Richard <Richard.Guzman@nrc.gov>; Setzer, Thomas <Thomas.Setzer @nrc.gov>; Helton, Shana <Shana.Helton@nrc.gov>; Cylkowski, David <David.Cylkowski@nrc.gov>; Banic, Merrilee

<Merrilee.Banic@nrc.gov>

Cc: Rudland, David <David.Rudland@nrc.gov>; Haagensen, Brian <Brian.Haagensen@nrc.gov>; Siwy, Andrew <Andrew.Siwy@nrc.gov>; Rich, Sarah <Sarah.Rich@nrc.gov>; Broaddus, Doug

<Doug.Broaddus@nrc.gov>; Danna, James <James.Danna@nrc.gov>; Kim, James

<James.Kim@nrc.gov>; Benner, Eric <Eric.Benner@nrc.gov>; Mikula, Olivia <Olivia.Mikula@nrc.gov>

Subject:

RE: ACTION: 2.206 Im mediate Action Request re: Indian Point Unit 3 Rx Head 0-rings and Restart (LTR-17-0235)

Rich, Should be put together a quick call this morning to get everyone on the page? This important action/communication appears difficult via email.

I agree with all that the licensee needs to understand the cause of the repeat leaks and then we need to follow-up on their assessment. However, I don't believe a small amount of leakage from this joint (even if both o -rings were to leak) presents a safety concern that would jeopardize the ability of the plant to safely shut down or respond to any accident. Their TSs dictate requirements for monitoring unidentified leakage in containment and have limits that ensure they shut down the plant with adequate margin to safety. Historically, they have identified the leakage at a very low level (as Rich said, less than 10% of the TS limit) and have taken prudent, conservative action to shut down the plant to repair.

Thanks, Jon From: Guzman, Richard Sent: Thursday, June 22, 2017 10:29 AM To: Setzer, Thomas <Thomas.Setzer@nrc.gov>; Helton, Shana <Shana .Helton@nrc.gov>; Cylkowski, David <David.Cylkowski@nrc.gov>; Banic, Merrilee <Merrilee.Banic@nrc.gov>

Cc: Rudland, David <David .Rudland@nrc.gov>; Greives, Jonathan <Jonathan.Greives@nrc.gov>;

Haagensen, Brian <Brian .Haagensen@nrc.gov>; Siwy, Andrew <Andrew.Siwy@nrc.gov>; Rich, Sarah

<Sarah. Rich@nrc.gov>; Broaddus, Doug <Doug.Broaddus@nrc.gov>; Danna, James

<James.Danna@nrc.gov>; Kim, James <James.Kim@nrc.gov>; Benner, Eric <Eric.Benner@nrc.gov>;

Mikula, Olivia <Olivia.Mikula@nrc.gov>

Subject:

RE: ACTION : 2.206 Immediate Action Request re: Indian Point Unit 3 Rx Head 0-rings and Restart (LTR-17-0235)

Also please note the highlighted error in my original message. The unidentified leakage at time of shutdown was 0.14 (vice 1.4 gpm). The current 0.1O gpm UIL rate is 1/10 the TS limit for UIL.

Thanks, Rich From : Setzer, Thomas Sent: Thursday, June 22, 2017 10:17 AM To: Helton, Shana <Shana.Helton@nrc.gov>; Guzman, Richard <Richard.Guzman@nrc.gov>; Cylkowski, David <David.Cylkowski@nrc.gov>; Banic, Merrilee <Merrilee.Banic@nrc.gov>

Cc: Rudland, David <David .Rudland@nrc.gov>; Greives, Jonathan <Jonathan.Greives@nrc.gov>;

Haagensen, Brian <Brian. Haagensen@nrc.gov>; Siwy, Andrew <Andrew.Siwy@nrc.gov>; Rich, Sarah

<Sarah.Rich@nrc.gov>; Broaddus, Doug <Doug.Broaddus@nrc.gov>; Danna, James

<James.Danna@nrc.gov>; Kim , James <James.Kim@nrc.gov>; Benner, Eric <Eric.Benner@nrc.gov>;

M ikula, Olivia <Olivia.Mikula@nrc.gov>

Subject:

Re: ACTION: 2.206 Immediate Action Request re: Indian Point Unit 3 Rx Head 0 -rings and Restart (LTR-17-0235)

Thats a great point Shana. I guess l would need the definition of "adequate protection" to understand this better. The fact is that Indian Point has had numerous oring leaks, and h as yet to identify the smoking gun or root cause as to why this plagues Unit 3. Incidentally, Unit 2 has 1 of its 2 orings leaking at this moment.

We do not have a safety concern with the current condition at Unit 3 (the inner oring isleakong but theouter is holding). Theouter ring is a fu lly qualified 100% pressure seal, so it is designed to provide adequate sealing on its own.

I would not fee l an enforcement action to prevent startup would be warranted. The situation begs more inspection and review but both the NRC and licensee, but it is not a safety concern at this point.

VR, Tom


Original Message --------

From: "Helton, Shana" <Shana.Helton@nrc.gov>

Date: Thu, June 22, 20 17 9:38 AM-0400 To: "Guzman, Richard" <Richard.Guzman@nrc.gov>, "Cylkowski, David"

<David.Cylkowski@nrc.gov>, "Setzer, Thomas" <Thomas.Sctzcr@nrc.gov>, "Banic, Merrilee"

<Merrilee.Banic@nrc.gov>

CC: "Rudland, David" <David.Rudland@nrc.gov>, "Greives, Jonathan"

<Jonathan.Greives@nrc.gov>, "Haagensen, Brian" < Brian.Haagensen@nrc.gov>, "Siwy, Andrew" <Andrew.Siwy@nrc.gov>, "Rich, Sarah" <Sarah.Rich@nrc.gov>, "Broaddus, Doug"

<Doug.Broaddus@nrc.gov>, "Danna, James" <James.Danna@nrc.gov>, "Kim, James"

<Jamcs.Kim@nrc.gov>, "Benner, Eric" <Eric.Benncr@nrc.gov>, "Mikula, Olivia"

<Olivia.Mikula@nrc.gov>

Subject:

Re: ACTION: 2.206 Immediate Action Request re: Indian Point Unit 3 Rx Head 0-rings and Restart (LTR-17-0235)

I would like to understand why we have confidence that this o-ring repair provides adequate protection, given it's a repair that allegedly (per the petitioner) had been made repeatedly. Tneed this before concurring - thanks.

On: 22 June 2017 09:09, "Guzman, Richard" <Richard.Guzman@nrc.gov> wrote:

All, Good morning. We've received a 2.206 petition from Tom Gurdziel concerning the reactor vessel head o-rings at Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 3 (IP3). He requests that NRC prevent restart of IP3 until they essentially determine a root cause. Because of the timing of their startup, we are treating the petitioner's request to ke,ep IP3 shutdown as a request for immediate action. While the licensee has already synchronized to the grid (completed ahead of schedule earlier this a.m.), we intend to follow the process per MD 8. 11 , to the extent possible and 'promptly' notify the petitioner of the pending staff action (i.e., per MD 8.11, when the staff plans to take an action contrary to the requested action in the petition (i.e., permitting restart of a facility when the petitioner has requested that restart not be permitted).

To expedite this step in the process, I would like to forego a PRB F2F meeting and get your concurrence and/or comments via e-mail today by 12 pm, if possible.

ACTION by 1200 6/22: Please review the petition request (1-page email attached) and let me know if you have any objections or concerns with the proposed path to reject the petitioner's request for immediate action (i.e., to prevent the restart of IP3), based on the PRB determination that there are no immediate safety significant concerns which would adversely impact the public's health and safety. Also, provide comments/mark-ups, if any on the proposed e-mail response to the petitioner (draft e-mail below). Also, note that as stated in today's 0800 RI call, the Region does not have any immediate safety concerns with licensee's decision to startup as the reactor vessel head outer a-ring is currently holding RCS pressure.

Forthcoming steps for addressing petitioner's request for immediate action:

1. 1. PRB members to concur on determination to deny petitioner's immediate action request - respond to PM via email today by 1200
2. 2. Obtain NRR concurrence on the PRB recommendation for addressing the petitioner's requests for immediate action
3. Inform petitioner of staffs decision or pending actions regarding the petitioner's immediate action requests (NOTE: per MD 8.11, if the staff plans to take an action that is contrary to an immediate action requested in the petition (permitting restart of a facility when the petitioner has

requested that restart not be permitted), the petitioner must promptly be notified of the pending staff action).

3.

4. Follow-on steps:
5. 1. A follow-on PRB meeting will be scheduled on a later date to make an initial recommendation as to whether or not the petition meets the criteria for review under 10 CFR 2.206
6. 2. Inform petitioner of staff's initial recommendation (whether to accept or reject the petition for review).
7. 3. Offer a meeting or teleconference for the petitioner to address the PRB in light of its initial recommendation.
4. Issue an acknowledgement (or closure) letter to the petitioner Proposed PRB/Contacts:

Chair: Shana Helton Petition Manager: Rich Guzman 2.206 Coordinator: Lee Banic / Jim Kim DE: Dave Rudland RI: Tom Setzer OE: TBD OGC: David Cylkowski / Olivia Mikula Other key points (from Region I)

1. The outer o-ring is currently holding RCS pressure. The system was designed to operate on just the outer o-ring. There is no engineering or licensing basis for not performing a plant startup.
2. There was no root cause completed as a result of the double o-ring leak. The apparent cause determination may not bound the problem (i.e. there may be another cause).
3. Corrective actions that could be taken to fix o-ring leakage problems beyond what was done during the last outage require a minimum of 2-3 months lead time.
4. The unidentified leak rate was just determined to be 0.1 gpm which is lower than the UIL of 0.14 44 gpm at the time of the shutdown.

Current IP3 startup status (0800 6/22)

  • Reactor went critical at 4:34 pm on 6/21
  • Mode 1 at 11 :36 pm on 6/21
  • Synched to the grid at 2:26 am on 6/22
  • 100% expected -1 :30 on 6/23 I appreciate your help on this short-fuse request. Standing by for any questions/concerns.

Thanks, Rich Rich Guzman Sr. PM , Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office: 0-9C07 I Phone: 301-415-1030


DRAFT-----------------------------------------------

Good Afternoon, I have been assigned as a Petition Manager for the 10 CFR 2.206 petition you submitted to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) on June 11, 2017, regarding your concerns with the reactor vessel head o-rings at Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 3.

Section 2.206 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations describes the petition process -

the primary mechanism for the public to request enforcement action by the NRC in a p,ublic process. This process permits anyone to petition NRC to take enforcement-type action related to NRC licensees or licensed activities. Depending on the results of its evaluation, NRC could modify, suspend or revoke an NRG-issued license or take any other appropriate enforcement action to resolve a problem. The NRC staffs guidance for the disposition of 2.206 petition requests is in Management Directive 8.11 , which is publicly available.

The 2.206 process provides a mechanism for any member of the public to request enforcement action against NRC licensees. The 2.206 process is separate from the allegations process which affords individuals who raise safety concerns a degree of protection of their identity. In the 2.206 process, all of the information in your letter will be made public, including your identity.

You specifically requested in your letter for the NRC to keep Indian Point, Unit 3 (IP3) in cold shutdown until the condition of the reactor vessel head upper and lower surfaces are "proved to be identical to the as-purchased condition". The NRC considers your request as a short-term ,

immediate action given that IP3 is in the process of restarting from its refueling outage. On June 22, 2017, your request for immediate action was reviewed by members of the Petition Review Board (PRB), which includes staff from the NRC's Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) and Region I. After its review and discussion, the PRB determined that there were no immediate safety significant concerns which would adversely impact the public's health and safety; therefore, the PRB denied your request for immediate action in the restart of IP3.

In accordance with NRC Management Directive 8.11 , you have the opportunity to address the PRB, either in person at the NRC Headquarters in Rockville, MD, or by telephone conference.

The purpose of this interaction is so that the petitioner can discuss the petition and verbally supplement the petition with any new information. During the meeting , the PRB is in listening mode and will not make any decisions regarding your petition.

I would appreciate if you could advise me by Friday, June 30 , 2017 , if you agree to the NRC's processing your request under the 2.206 process. In addition, please advise me if you would like to address the PRB. If you wou ld like to meet in person, I will need to schedule a formal public meeting at the NRG Headquarters. If you would prefer to address the PRB via phone, I will also work with you to coordinate a date/time during the upcoming weeks .

If you have other questions on the 2.206 process, or regarding the role as petition manager, please contact me at 301-415-1030.

Thank you,


DRAFT-----------------------------------------------

From: Helton, Shana Sent: 22 Jun 2017 11:33:04 -0400 To: Guzman, Richard;Greives, Jonathan;Setzer, Thomas;Cylkowski, David;Banic, Merrilee Cc: Rudland, David;Haagensen, Brian;Siwy, Andrew;Rich, Sarah;Broaddus, Doug;Danna, James;Kim, James;Benner, Eric;Mikula, Olivia;Jordan, Natreon;Tobin, Jennifer

Subject:

Re: ACTION: 2.206 Immediate Action Request re: Indian Point Unit 3 Rx Head 0 -rings and Restart (LTR-17-0235)

I'm ok as long as safety is assured and the discussion below is very helpful with that. l see no need to stop IP from starting back up .

On: 22 June 201 7 11: 10, "Guzman, Richard" <Richard.Guzman@nrc.gov> wrote:

Shana - I will defer to you as our PRB chair, if you would like to have a conference call before making a determination, I can set up a bridgeline and get a conference room for 1200 today.

From: Greives, Jonathan Sent: Th ursday, June 22, 2017 10:36 AM To: Guzman, Richard <Richard.Guzman@nrc.gov>; Setzer, Thomas <Thomas.Setzer@nrc.gov>;

Helton, Shana <Shana.Helton@nrc.gov>; Cylkowski, David <David.Cylkowski@nrc.gov>; Banic, Merri lee <Merrilee.Banic@ nrc.gov>

Cc: Rudland, David <David .Rudland@nrc.gov>; Haagensen, Brian <Brian .Haagensen@nrc.gov>;

Siwy, Andrew <Andrew.Siwy@nrc.gov>; Rich, Sarah <Sara h.Rich@nrc.gov>; Broaddus, Doug

<Doug.Broaddus@nrc.gov>; Danna, James <James.Danna@nrc.gov>; Kim, James

<James.Kim@nrc.gov>; Benner, Eric <Eric.Benner@nrc.gov>; Mikula, Olivia

<0livia.Mikula@nrc.gov>

Subject:

RE: ACTION: 2.206 Immediate Action Req uest re : Indian Point Unit 3 Rx Head 0 -rings and Restart (LTR-17-0235)

Rich, Should be put together a quick call this morning to get everyone on the page? This important action/communication appears difficult via email.

I agree with all that the licensee needs to understand the cause of the repeat leaks and then we need to follow-up on their assessment. However, I don't believe a small amount of leakage from this joint (even if both o-rings were to leak) presents a safety concern that would jeopardize the ability of the plant to safely shut down or respond to any accident. Their TSs dictate requirements for monitoring unidentified leakage in containment and have limits that ensure they shut down the plant with adequate margin to safety. Historically, they have identified the leakage at a very low level (as Rich said, less than 10% of the TS limit) and have taken prudent, conservative action to shut down the plant to repair.

Thanks, Jon From: Guzman, Richard Sent: Thursday, June 22, 2017 10:29 AM To: Setzer, Thomas <Thomas.Setzer@nrc.gov>; Helton, Shana <Shana.Helton@nrc.gov>;

Cylkowski, David <David.Cylkowski@nrc.gov>; Banic, Merrilee <Merrilee.Banic@nrc.gov>

Cc: Rudland, David <David.Rudland@nrc.gov>; Greives, Jonathan

<Jonathan.Greives@nrc.gov>; Haagensen, Brian <Brian.Haagensen@nrc.gov>; Siwy, Andrew

<Andrew.Siwy@nrc.gov>; Rich, Sarah <Sarah.Rich@nrc.gov>; Broaddus, Doug

<Doug.Broaddus@nrc.gov>; Danna, James <James.Danna@nrc.gov>; Kim, James

<James.Kim@nrc.gov>; Benner, Eric <Eric.Benner@nrc.gov>; Mikula, Olivia

<Olivia.M ikula@nrc.gov>

Subject:

RE: ACTION: 2.206 Immediate Action Request re: Indian Point Unit 3 Rx Head 0 -rings and Restart (LTR-17-0235)

Also please note the highlighted error in my original message. The unidentified leakage at time of shutdown was 0.14 (vice 1.4 gpm). The current 0.10 gpm UIL rate is 1/ 10 the TS limit for UIL.

Thanks, Rich From: Setzer, Thomas Sent: Thursday, June 22, 2017 10:17 AM To: Helton, Shana <Shana.Helton@nrc.gov>; Guzman, Richard <Richard.Guzman@nrc.gov>;

Cylkowski, David <David.Cylkowski@nrc.gov>; Banic, Merrilee <Merrilee.Banic@nrc.gov>

Cc: Rudland, David <David.Rudland@nrc.gov>; Greives, Jonathan

<Jonathan.Greives@nrc.gov>; Haagensen, Brian <Brian.Haagensen@nrc.gov>; Siwy, Andrew

<Andrew.Siwy@nrc.gov>; Rich, Sarah <Sarah.Rich@nrc.gov>; Broaddus, Doug

<Doug.Broaddus@nrc.gov>; Danna, James <James.Danna@nrc.gov>; Kim, James

<James.Kim@nrc.gov>; Benner, Eric <Eric.Benner@nrc.gov>; Mikula, Olivia

<Olivia.Mikula@nrc.gov>

Subject:

Re: ACTION: 2.206 Immediate Action Request re: Indian Point Unit 3 Rx Head 0-irings and Restart (LTR-17-0235)

Thats a great point Shana. I guess I would need the definition of "adequate protection" to understand this better. The fact is that Indian Point has had numerous oring leaks, and has yet to identify the smoking gun or root cause as to why this p lagues Unit 3.

Incidentally, Unit 2 has 1 of its 2 orings leaking at this moment.

We do not have a safety concern with the current condition at Unit 3 (the inner oring isleakong but theouter is holding). Theouter ring is a fully qualified l 00% pressure seal, so it is designed to provide adequate sealing on its own.

I would not feel an enforcement action to prevent startup would be warranted. The situation begs more inspection and review but both the NRC and licensee, but it is not a

safety concern at this point.

VR, Tom


Original Message --------

From: "Helton, Shana" <Shana.Helton@nrc.gov>

Date: Thu, June 22, 2017 9:38 AM -0400 To: "Guzman, Richard" < Richard.Guzman@ nrc.gov>, "Cylkowski, David"

<David.Cylkowski@nrc.gov>, "Setzer, Thomas" <Thomas.Setzer@nrc.gov>, "Banic, Merrilee" <Merri lee.Banic@ nrc.gov>

CC: "Rudland, David" <David.Rudland@nrc.gov>, "Greives, Jonathan"

<Jonathan.Greives@nrc.gov>, "Haagensen, Brian" <Brian. Haagensen@nrc.gov>, "Siwy, Andrew" <Andrew.Siwy@nrc.gov>, "Rich, Sarah" <Sarah.Rich@nrc.gov>, "Broaddus, Doug" <Doug.Broaddus@ nrc.gov>, "Danna, James" < James.Danna@nrc.gov>, "Kim, James" <James.Kim@nrc.gov>, "Benner, Eric" <Eric.Benner@nrc.gov>, "Mikula, Olivia" <Olivia.Mikula@ nrc.gov>

Subject:

Re: ACTION: 2.206 Immediate Action Request re: Indian Point Unit 3 Rx Head 0-rings and Restart {LTR-17-0235)

I would like to understand why we have confidence that this o-ring repair provides adequate protection, given it's a repair that allegedly (per the petitioner) had been made repeatedly. I need this before concurring - thanks.

On: 22 June 2017 09:09, "Guzman, Richard" <Richard.Guzman@nrc.gov> wrote:

All, Good morning. We've received a 2.206 petition from Tom Gurdziel concerning the reactor vessel head a-rings at Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 3 (IP3). He requests that NRC prevent restart of IP3 until they essentially determine a root cause.

Because of the timing of their startup, we are treating the petitioner's request to keep IP3 shutdown as a request for immediate action. While the licensee has already synchronized to the grid (completed ahead of schedule earlier this a.m.), we intend to follow the process per MD 8.11 , to the extent possible and 'promptly' notify the petitioner of the pending staff action (i.e., per MD 8.11 , when the staff plans to take an action contrary to the requested action in the petition (i.e., permitting restart of a facility when the petitioner has requested that restart not be permitted).

To expedite this step in the process, I would like to forego a PRB F2F meeting andl get your concurrence and/or comments via e-mail today by 12 pm, if possible.

ACTION by 1200 6/22: Please review the petition request (1-page email attached) and let me know if you have any objections or concerns with the proposed path to reject the petitioner's request for immediate action (i.e., to prevent the restart of IP3), based on the PRB determination that t here are no immediate safety significant concerns which would adversely impact the public's health and safety. Also, provide comments/mark-ups, if any on the proposed e-mail response to the petitioner (draft e-mail below). Also, note that as stated in today's 0800 RI call, the Region does not have any immediate safety

staff's guidance for the disposition of 2.206 petition re,quests is in Management Directive 8.11, which is publicly available.

The 2.206 process provides a mechanism for any member of the public to request enforcement action against NRC licensees. The 2.206 process is separate from the allegations process which affords individuals who raise safety concerns a degree of protection of their identity. In the 2.206 process, all of the information in your letter will be made public, including your identity.

You specifically requested in your letter for the NRC to keep Indian Point, Unit 3 (IP3) in cold shutdown until the condition of the reactor vessel head upper and lower surfaces are "proved to be identical to the as-purchased condition". The NRC considers your request as a short-term, immediate action given that IP3 is in the process of restarting from its refueling outage. On June 22, 2017, your request for immediate action was reviewed by members of the Petition Review Board (PRB), which includes staff from the NRC's Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) and Region I. After its review and discussion, the PRB determined that there were no immediate safety significant concerns which would adversely impact the public's health and safety; therefore, the PRB denied your request for immediate action in the restart of IP3.

In accordance with NRC Management Directive 8.11 , you have the opportunity to address the PRB, either in person at the NRC Headquarters in Rockville, MD, or by telephone conference. The purpose of this interaction is so that the petitioner can discuss the petition and verbally supplement the petition with any new information.

During the meeting, the PRB is in listening mode and will not make any decisions regarding your petition.

I would appreciate if you could advise me by Friday, June 30, 2017, if you agree to the NRC's processing your request under the 2.206 process. In addition, please advise me if you would like to address the PRB. If you would like to meet in person, I will need to schedule a formal public meeting at the NRC Headqu.arters. If you would prefer to address the PRB via phone, I will also work with you to coordinate a date/time during the upcoming weeks.

If you have other questions on the 2.206 process, or regarding the role as petition manager, please contact me at 301-415-1030.

Thank you,

--*** -----*** ----** ----*---* --------------------DRAFT----***------**------*-------------------------

From: Rudland, David Sent: 22 Jun 2017 15:31:56 +0000 To: Greives, Jonathan;Guzman, Richard;Setzer, Thomas;Helton, Shana;Cylkowski, David;Banic, Merrilee Cc: Haagensen, Brian;Siwy, Andrew;Rich, Sarah;Broaddus, Doug;Danna, James;Kim, James;Benner, Eric;Mikula, Olivia

Subject:

RE: ACTION: 2.206 Immediate Action Request re: Indian Point Unit 3 Rx Head 0-rings and Restart (LTR-17-0235)

I think it might be good to have a quick phone call... to make sure we are all on the same page David L. Rudland, Ph.D.

Chief, Vessels and Internals Integrity Branch Division of Engineering Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mail Stop: OWFN-llFOl 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852-2738 Office: (301) 415-1896 Cell: !(b)(6) I Email: david.rudland@nrc.gov From: Greives, Jonathan Se nt: Thursday, June 22, 2017 10:36 AM To: Guzman, Richard <Richard.Guzman@nrc.gov>; Setzer, Thomas <Thomas.Setzer@nrc.gov>; Helton, Shana <Shana.Helton@nrc.gov>; Cylkowski, David <David.Cylkowski@nrc.gov>; Banic, Merrilee

<Merrilee.Banic@nrc.gov>

Cc: Rudland, David <David.Rudland@nrc.gov>; Haagensen, Brian <Brian.Haagensen@nrc.gov>; Siwy, Andrew <Andrew.Siwy@nrc.gov>; Rich, Sarah <Sarah.Rich@nrc.gov>; Broaddus, Doug

<Doug.Broaddus@nrc.gov>; Danna, James <James.Danna@nrc.gov>; Kim, James

<James.Kim@nrc.gov>; Benner, Eric <Eric.Benner@nrc.gov>; M ikula, Olivia <Olivia.Mikula@nrc.gov>

Subje ct: RE: ACTION: 2.206 Im mediate Action Request re: Indian Point Unit 3 Rx Head 0-rings and Restart (LTR-17-0235)

Rich, Should be put together a quick call this morning to get everyone on the page? This important action/communication appears difficult via email.

I agree with all that the licensee needs to understand the cause of the repeat leaks and then we need to follow-up on their assessment. However, I don't believe a small amount of leakage from this joint (even if both o-rings were to leak) presents a safety concern that would jeopardize the ability of the plant to safely shut down or respond to any accident. Their TSs dictate requirements for monitoring unidentified leakage in containment and have limits that ensure

they shut down the plant with adequate margin to safety. Historically, they have identified the leakage at a very low level (as Rich said, less than 10% of the TS limit) and have taken prudent, conservative action to shut down the plant to repair.

Thanks, Jon From: Guzman, Richard Sent: Thursday, June 22, 2017 10:29 AM To: Setzer, Thomas <Thomas.Setzer@nrc.gov>; Helton, Shana <Shana .Helton@nrc.gov>; Cylkowski, David <David.Cylkowski@nrc.gov>; Banic, Merrilee <Merrilee.Banic@nrc.gov>

Cc: Rudland, David <David.Rudland@nrc.gov>; Greives, Jonathan <Jonathan.Greives@nrc.gov>;

Haagensen, Brian <Brian.Haagensen@nrc.gov>; Siwy, Andrew <Andrew.Siwy@nrc.gov>; Rich, Sarah

<Sarah.Rich@nrc.gov>; Broaddus, Doug <Doug.Broaddus@nrc.gov>; Danna, James

<James.Danna@nrc.gov>; Kim, James <James.Kim@nrc.gov>; Benner, Eric <Eric.Benner@nrc.gov>;

Mikula, Olivia <Olivia.Mikula@nrc.gov>

Subject:

RE: ACTION : 2.206 Im mediate Action Request re: Indian Point Unit 3 Rx Head 0 -rings and Restart (LTR-17-0235)

Also please note the highlighted error in my original message. The unidentified leakage at time of shutdown was 0.14 (vice 1.4 gpm). The current 0.1 O gpm UIL rate is 1/10 the TS limit for UIL.

Thanks, Rich From: Set zer, Thomas Sent: Thursday, June 22, 2017 10:17 AM To: Helton, Shana <Shana.Helton@nrc.gov>; Guzman, Richard <Richard.Guzman@nrc.gov>; Cylkowski, David <David.Cylkowski@nrc.gov>; Banic, Merrilee <Merrilee.Banic@nrc.gov>

Cc: Rudland, David <David.Rudland@nrc.gov>; Greives, Jonathan <Jonathan.Greives@nrc.gov>;

Haagensen, Brian <Brian.Haagensen@nrc.gov>; Siwy, Andrew <Andrew.Siwy@nrc.gov>; Rich, Sarah

<Sarah.Rich@nrc.gov>; Broaddus, Doug <Doug.Broaddus@nrc.gov>; Danna, James

<James.Danna@nrc.gov>; Kim, James <James.Kim@nrc.gov>; Benner, Eric <Eric.Benner@nrc.gov>;

M ikula, Olivia <Olivia.Mikula@nrc.gov>

Subject:

Re: ACTION: 2.206 Immediate Action Request re: Indian Point Unit 3 Rx Head 0-rings and Restart (LTR-17-0235)

Thats a great point Shana. I guess I wou ld need the definition of "adequate protection" to understand this better. The fact is that Indian Point has had numerous oring leaks, and h as yet to identify the smoking gun or root cause as to why this plagues Unit 3. Incidentally, Unit 2 has 1 of its 2 orings leaking at this moment.

We do not have a safety concern with the current condition at Unit 3 (the inner oring isleakong but theouter is holding). Theouter ring is a fully qualified 100% pressure seal, so it is designed to provide adequate sealing on its own.

I would not feel an enforcement action to prevent startup would be warranted. The situation

begs more inspection and review but both the NRC and licensee, but it is not a safety concern at this point.

YR, Tom


Original Message --------

From: "Helton, Shana" <Shana. Helton@nrc.gov>

Date: Thu, June 22, 20 17 9:38 AM -0400 To: "Guzman, R ichard" <Ric hard.Guzman@nrc.gov>, "Cylkowski, David"

<David.Cylkowski@nrc.gov>, "Setzer, Thomas" <Thomas.Setzer@nrc.gov>, "Banic, MetTilee"

<Merrilee.Banic@nrc.gov>

CC: "Rudland, David" < Dav id. Rudland@nrc.gov>, "Greives, Jonathan"

<Jonathan.Greives@nrc .gov>, "Haagensen, Brian" <Brian .Haagensen@nrc.gov>, "Siwy, Andrew" <Andrew.Siwy@nrc.gov>, "Rich, Sarah" <Sarah.Rich@nrc.gov>, "Broaddus, Doug"

<Doug.Broaddus@nrc.gov>, "Danna, James" <Jarncs.Danna@nrc.gov>, "Kim, James"

<Jamcs.Ki m@nrc.gov>, "Benner, E ric" < Eric .Benncr@ nrc.gov>, "Mikula, O livia"

<Olivia.Miku la@nrc .gov>

Subject:

Re: ACTION: 2.206 Immediate Action Request re: Indian Point Unit 3 Rx Head 0-rings and Restart (LTR-1 7-0235)

I wou ld like to understand why we have confidence that this o-ring repair provides adequate protection, g iven it's a repair that allegedly (per the petitioner) had been made repeatedly. I need this before concurring - thanks.

On: 22 June 2017 09:09, "Guzman, Richard" <Richard.Guzman@nrc.gov> wrote:

All, Good morning. We've received a 2.206 petition from Tom Gurdziel concerning the reactor vessel head o-rings at Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 3 (IP3). He requests that NRC prevent restart of IP3 until they essentially determine a root cause. Because of the timing of their startup, we are treating the petitioner's request to keep IP3 shutdown as a request for immediate action. While the licensee has already synchronized to the grid (completed ahead of schedule earlier this a.m.), we intend to follow the process per MD 8. 11, to the extent possible and 'promptly' notify the petitioner of the pending staff action (i.e., per MD 8.11 , when the staff plans to take an action contrary to the requested action in the petition (i.e., permitting restart of a facility when the petitioner has requested that restart not be permitted).

To expedite this step in the process, I would like to forego a PRB F2F meeting and get your concurrence and/or comments via e-mail today by 12 pm, if possible.

ACTION by 1200 6/22: Please review the petition request (1-page email attached) and let me know if you have any objections or concerns with the proposed path to reject the petitioner's request for immediate action (i.e., to prevent the restart of IP3), based on the PRB determination that there are no immediate safety significant concerns which would adversely impact the public's health and safety. Also, provide comments/mark-ups, if any on the proposed e-mail response to the petitioner (draft e-mail below). Also, note that as stated in today's 0800

RI call, the Region does not have any immediate safety concerns with licensee's decision to startup as the reactor vessel head outer o-ring is currently holding RCS pressure.

Forthcoming steps for addressing petitioner's request for immediate action:

1. 1. PRB members to concur on determination to deny petitioner's immediate action request -

respond to PM via email today by 1200

2. 2. Obtain NRR concurrence on the PRB recommendation for addressing the petitioner's requests for immediate action
3. Inform petitioner of staffs decision or pending actions regarding the petitioner's immediate action requests (NOTE: per MD 8.11, if the staff plans to take an action that is contrary to an immediate action requested in the petition (permitting restart of a facility when the petitioner has requested that restart not be permitted), the petitioner must promptly be notified of the pending staff action).

3.

4. Follow-on steps:
5. 1. A follow-on PRB meeting will be scheduled on a later date to make an initial recommendation as to whether or not the petition meets the criteria for review under 10 CFR 2.206
6. 2. Inform petitioner of staffs initial recommendation (whether to accept or reject the petition for review).
7. 3. Offer a meeting or teleconference for the petitioner to address the PRB in light of its initial recommendation.
4. Issue an acknowledgement (or closure) letter to the petitioner Proposed PRB/Contacts:

Chair: Shana Helton Petition Manager: Rich Guzman 2.206 Coordinator: Lee Banic / Jim Kim DE: Dave Rudland RI: Tom Setzer OE: TBD OGC: David Cylkowski / Olivia Mikula Other key points (from Region I)

1. The outer o-ring is currently holding RCS pressure. The system was designed to operate on just the outer o-ring. There is no engineering or licensing basis for not performing a plant startup.
2. There was no root cause completed as a result of the double o-ring leak. The apparent cause determination may not bound the problem (i.e. there may be another cause).
3. Corrective actions that could be taken to fix o-ring leakage problems beyond what was done during the last outage require a minimum of 2-3 months lead time.

4 . The unidentified leak rate was just determined to be 0.1 gpm which is lower than the UIL of 0.14 +.4 gpm at the time of the shutdown.

Current IP3 startup status (0800 6/22)

  • Reactor went critical at 4:34 pm on 6/21
  • Mode 1 at 11 :36 pm on 6/21
  • Synched to the grid at 2:26 am on 6/22
  • 100% expected -1 :30 on 6/23

I appreciate your help on this short-fuse request. Standing by for any questions/concerns.

Thanks, Rich Rich Guzman Sr. PM , Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office: 0-9C07 I Phone: 301 -415-1030

DRAFT-----------------------------------------------

Good Afternoon ,

I have been assigned as a Petition Manager for the 10 CFR 2.206 petition you submitted to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) on June 11 , 2017, regarding your concerns with the reactor vessel head a-rings at Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 3.

Section 2.206 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations describes the petition process -

the primary mechanism for tlhe public to request enforcement action by the NRC in a public process. This process permits anyone to petition NRC to take enforcement-type action related to NRC licensees or licensed activities. Depending on the results of its evaluation, NRC could modify, suspend or revoke an NRG-issued license or take any other appropriate enforcement action to resolve a problem. The NRC staffs guidance for the disposition of 2.206 petition requests is in Management Directive 8.11 , which is publicly available.

The 2.206 process provides a mechanism for any member of the public to request enforcement action against NRC licensees. The 2.206 process is separate from the allegations process which affords individuals who raise safety concerns a degree of protection of their identity. In the 2.206 process, all of the information in your letter will be made public, including your identity.

You specifically requested in your letter for the NRC to keep Indian Point, Unit 3 (IP3) in cold shutdown until the condition of the reactor vessel head upper and lower surfaces are "proved to be identical to the as-purchased condition". The NRC considers your request as a short-term ,

immediate action given that IP3 is in the process of restarting from its refueling outage. On June 22, 2017, your request for immediate action was reviewed by members of the Petition Review Board (PRB), which includes staff from the NRC's Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) and Region I. After its review and discussion, the PRB determined that there were no immediate safety significant concerns which would adversely impact the public's health and safety; therefore, the PRB denied your request for immediate action in the restart of IP3.

In accordance with NRC Management Directive 8.11 , you have the opportunity to address the PRB, either in person at the NRC Headquarters in Rockville, MD, or by telephone conference.

The purpose of this interaction is so that the petitioner can discuss the petition and verbally supplement the petition with any new information. During the meeting, the PRB is in listening mode and will not make any decisions regarding your petition.

I would appreciate if you could advise me by Friday, June 30, 2017, if you agree to the NRC's processing your request under the 2.206 process. In addition, please advise me if you would like to address the PRB. If you would like to meet in person, I will need to schedule a formal

public meeting at the NRC Headquarters. If you would prefer to address the PRB via phone, I will also work with you to coordinate a date/time during the upcoming weeks .

If you have other questions on the 2.206 process, or regarding the role as petition manager, please contact me at 301-415-1030 .

Thank you ,


0 RAFT-----------------------------------------------

From: Broaddus, Doug Sent: 22 Jun 2017 10:57:34 -0400 To: Greives, Jonathan;Guzman, Richard;Setzer, Thomas;Helton, Shana;Cylkowski, David;Banic, Merrilee Cc: Rudland, David;Haagensen, Brian;Siwy, Andrew;Rich, Sarah;Danna, James;Kim, James; Benner, Eric;Mikula, Olivia

Subject:

RE: ACTION: 2.206 Immediate Action Request re: Indian Point Unit 3 Rx Head 0-rings and Restart (LTR-17-0235)

Rich, I recommend that the answer focuses on the licensee's compliance with specific requirements related to leakage of the o rings, including TS or license conditions that specify actions the licensee must take when leakage is identified. A statement that the TS/license provides limits on leakage that dictate specific actions the licensee must take, up to and including shutdown, along with a comparison to the current leakage level and rate of increase, should be able to demonstrate 1) how reasonable assurance is defined, 2) whether the licensee is in compliance with the limits that define reasonable assurance, and 3) whether or not specific NRC action is needed. You could also specify whether the licensee has additional action levels (below those specified in the TS) and the actions the licensee intends to take at those actions levels and whether this provides an additional level of assurance.

Doug From : Greives, Jonathan Sent: Thursday, June 22, 2017 10:36 AM To: Guzman, Richard <Richard.Guzman@nrc.gov>; Setzer, Thomas <Thomas.Setzer@nrc.gov>;

Helton, Shana <Shana.Helton@nrc.gov>; Cylkowski, David <David.Cylkowski@nrc.gov>; Banic, Merrilee <Merrilee.Banic@nrc.gov>

Cc: Rudland, David <David.Rudland@nrc.gov>; Haagensen, Brian <Brian.Haagensen@nrc.gov>;

Siwy, Andrew <Andrew.Siwy@nrc.gov>; Rich, Sarah <Sarah.Rich@nrc.gov>; Broaddus, Doug

<Doug.Broaddus@nrc.gov>; Danna, James <James.Danna@nrc.gov>; Kim, James

<James. Kim@nrc.gov>; Benner, Eric <Eric.Benner@nrc.gov>; Mikula, Olivia

<Olivia.Mikula@nrc.gov>

Subject:

RE: ACTION : 2.206 Immediate Action Request re: Indian Point Unit 3 Rx Head 0-rings and Restart (LTR-17-0235)

Rich, Should be put together a quick call this morning to get everyone on the page? This important action/communication appears difficult via email.

I agree with all that the licensee needs to understand the cause of the repeat leaks and then we need to follow-up on their assessment. However, I don't believe a small amount of leakage from this joint (even if both a-rings were to leak) presents a safety concern that would jeopardize the ability of the plant to safely shut down or respond to any accident. Their TSs dictate requirements for monitoring unidentified leakage in containment and have limits that ensure they shut down the plant with adequate margin to safety. Historically, they have identified the leakage at a very low level (as Rich said,

less than 10% of the TS limit) and have taken prudent, conservative action to shut down the plant to repair.

Thanks, Jon From: Guzman, Richard Sent: Thursday, June 22, 2017 10:29 AM To: Setzer, Thomas <Thomas.Setzer@nrc.gov>; Helton, Shana <Shana.Helton@nrc.gov>;

Cylkowski, David <David.Cylkowski@nrc.gov>; Banic, Merrilee <Merrilee.Banic@nrc.gov>

Cc: Rudland, David <David.Rudland@nrc.gov>; Greives, Jonathan

<Jonathan.Greives@nrc.gov>; Haagensen, Brian <Brian.Haagensen@nrc.gov>; Siwy, Andrew

<Andrew.Siwy@nrc.gov>; Rich, Sarah <Sarah.Rich@nrc.gov>; Broaddus, Doug

<Doug.Broaddus@nrc.gov>; Danna, James <James.Danna@nrc.gov>; Kim, James

<James.Kim@nrc.gov>; Benner, Eric <Eric.Benner@nrc.gov>; Mikula, Olivia

<Olivia.Mikula@nrc.gov>

Subject:

RE: ACTION: 2.206 Immediate Action Request re: Indian Point Unit 3 Rx Head 0-rings and Restart (LTR-17-0235)

Also please note the highlighted error in my original message. The unidentified leakage at time of shutdown was 0.14 (vice 1.4 gpm). The current 0.10 gpm UIL rate is 1/10 the TS limit for UIL.

Thanks, Rich From: Setzer, Thomas Se nt: Thursday, June 22, 201710:17 AM To: Helton, Shana <Shana.Helton@nrc.gov>; Guzman, Richard <Richard.Guzman@nrc.gov>;

Cylkowski, David <David.Cylkowski@nrc.gov>; Banic, Merrilee <Merrilee.Banic@nrc.gov>

Cc: Rudland, David <David.Rudland@nrc.gov>; Greives, Jonathan

<Jonathan.Greives@nrc.gov>; Haagensen, Brian <Brian.Haagensen@n rc.gov>; Siwy, Andrew

<Andrew.Siwy@nrc.gov>; Rich, Sarah <Sarah.Rich@nrc.gov>; Broaddus, Doug

<Doug.Broaddus@nrc.gov>; Danna, James <James.Danna@nrc.gov>; Kim, James

<James.Kim@nrc.gov>; Benner, Eric <Eric.Benner@nrc.gov>; Mikula, Olivia

<0livia.Mikula@nrc.gov>

Subject:

Re: ACTION: 2.206 Immediate Action Request re: Indian Point Unit 3 Rx Head 0 -rings and Restart (LTR-17-0235)

Thats a great point Shana. I guess I wou ld need the definition of "adequate protection" to understand this better. The fact is that Indian Point has had numerous oring leaks, and has yet to identify the smoking gun or root cause as to why this plagues Unit 3.

Incidentally, Unit 2 has 1 of its 2 orings leaking at this moment.

We do not have a safety concern with the current condition at Unit 3 (the inner oring isleakong but theouter is holding). Theouter ring is a fully qualified 100% pressure seal, so it is designed to provide adequate sealing on its own.

I would not fee l an enforcement action to prevent startup would be warranted. The situation begs more inspection and review but both the NRC and licensee, but it is not a safety concern at this point.

VR, Tom


Original Message --------

From: "Helton, Shana" <Shana.Helton@nrc.gov>

Date: Thu, June 22, 2017 9:38 AM-0400 To: "Guzman, Richard" <Richard.Guzman@nrc.gov>, "Cylkowski, David"

<David.Cylkowski@mc.gov>, "Setzer, Thomas" <Thomas.Setzer@nrc.gov>, "Banic, Merrilee" < Merrilcc.Banic@nrc.gov>

CC: "Rudland, David" <David.Rudland@ nrc.gov> , "Greives, Jonathan"

<Jonathan.Greives@nrc.gov>, "Haagensen, Brian" <Brian.Haagensen@nrc.gov>, "Siwy, Andrew" <Andrew.Siwy@nrc.gov>, "Rich, Sarah" <Sarah.Rich@nrc.gov>, "Broaddus, Doug" <Doug.Broaddus@nrc.gov>, "Danna, James" <Jamcs. Danna@nrc.gov>, "Kim, James" <James.Kim@ nrc.gov>, "Benner, Eric" <Eric.Benner@nrc.gov>, "Mikula, Olivia" <Olivia.Mikula@ nrc.gov>

Subject:

Re: ACTION: 2.206 Immediate Action Request re: Indian Point Unit 3 Rx Head 0-rings and Restart (LTR- 17-0235)

I would like to understand why we have confidence that this o-ring repair provides adequate protection, given it's a repair that allegedly (per the petitioner) had been made repeatedly. I need this before concurring - thanks.

On: 22 June 201 7 09:09, "Guzman, Richard" < Richard.Guzman@nrc.gov> wrote:

All, Good morning. We've received a 2.206 petition from Tom Gurdziel concerning the reactor vessel head o-rings at Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 3 (IP3). He requests that NRC prevent restart of IP3 until they essentially determine a root cause.

Because of the timing of their startup, we are treating the petitioner's request to keep IP3 shutdown as a req uest for immediate action. While the licensee has already synchronized to the grid (completed ahead of schedule earlier this a.m.), we intend to follow the process per MD 8.11, to the extent possible and 'promptly' notify the petitioner of the pending staff action (i.e., per MD 8.11, when the staff plans to take an action contrary to the requested action in the petition (i.e., permitting restart of a facility when the petitioner has requested that restart not be permitted).

To expedite this step in the process, I would like to forego a PRB F2F meeting and get your concurrence and/or comments via e-mail today by 12 pm, if possible.

ACTION by 1200 6/22: Please review the petition request (1-page email attached) and let me know if you have any objections or concerns with the proposed path to reject the petitioner's request for immediate action (i.e., to prevent the restart of IP3), based on the PRB determination that there are no immediate safety significant concerns which would

adversely impact the public's health and safety. Also, provide comments/mark-ups, if any on the proposed e-mail response to the petitioner (draft e-mail below). Also, note that as stated in today's 0800 RI call, the Region does not have any immediate safety concerns with licensee's decision to startup as the reactor vessel head outer o-ring is currently holding RCS pressure.

Forthcoming steps for addressing petitioner's request for immediate action:

1. 1. PRB members to concur on determination to deny petitioner's immediate action request - respond to PM via email today by 1200
2. 2. Obtain NRR concurrence on the PRB recommendation for addressing the petitioner's requests for immediate action
3. Inform petitioner of staff's decision or pending actions regarding the petitioner's immediate action requests (NOTE: per MD 8.11, if the staff plans to take an action that is contrary to an immediate action requested in the petition (permitting restart of a facility when the petitioner has requested that restart not be permitted), the petitioner must promptly be notified of the pending staff action).

3.

4. Follow-on steps:
5. 1. A follow-on PRB meeting will be scheduled on a later date to make an initial recommendation as to whether or not the petition meets the criteria for review under 10 CFR 2.206
6. 2. Inform petitioner of staff's initial recommendation (whether to accept or reject the petition for review).
7. 3. Offer a meeting or teleconference for the petitioner to address the PRB in light of its initial recommendation.
4. Issue an acknowledgement (or closure) letter to the petitioner Proposed PRB/Contacts:

Chair: Shana Helton Petition Manager: Rich Guzman 2.206 Coordinator: Lee Banic / Jim Kim DE: Dave Rudland RI: Tom Setzer OE: TBD OGC: David Cylkowski / Olivia Mikula Other key points (from Region I)

1. The outer o-ring is currently holding RCS pressure. The system was designed to operate on just the outer o-ring. There is no engineering or licensing basis for not performing a plant startup.
2. There was no root cause completed as a result of the double o-ring leak. The apparent cause determination may not bound the problem (i.e. there may be another cause).
3. Corrective actions that could be taken to fix o-ring leakage problems beyond what was done during the last outage require a minimum of 2-3 months lead time.
4. The unidentified leak rate was just determined to be 0.1 gpm which is lower than the UIL of 0.14 4---4 gpm at the time of the shutdown.

Current IP3 startup status (0800 6/22)

  • Reactor went critical at 4:34 pm on 6/21
  • Mode 1 at 11 :36 pm on 6/21
  • Synched to the grid at 2:26 am on 6/22
  • 100% expected -1 :30 on 6/23 I appreciate your help on this short-fuse request. Standing by for any questions/concerns.
Thanks, Rich Rich Guzman Sr. PM, Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office: 0-9C07 I Phone: 301 -415-1030

DRAFT-----------------------------------------------

Good Afternoon, I have been assigned as a Petition Manager for the 10 CFR 2.206 petition you submitted to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) on June 11 , 2017, regarding your concerns with the reactor vessel head o-rings at Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 3.

Section 2.206 of Title 1O of the Code of Federal Regulations describes the petition process - the primary mechanism for the public to request enforcement action by the NRC in a public process. This process permits anyone to petition NRC to take enforcement-type action related to NRC licensees or licensed activities. Depending on the results of its evaluation, NRC could modify, suspend or revoke an NRG-issued license or take any other appropriate enforcement action to resolve a problem. The NRC staffs guidance for the disposition of 2.206 petition requests is in Management Directive 8.11 , which is publicly available.

The 2.206 process provides a mechanism for any member of the public to request enforcement action against NRC licensees. The 2.206 process is separate from the allegations process which affords individuals who raise safety concerns a degree of protection of their identity. In the 2.206 process, all of the information in your letter will be made public, including your identity.

You specifically requested in your letter for the NRC to keep Indian Point, Unit 3 (IP3) in cold shutdown until the condition of the reactor vessel head upper and lower surfaces are "proved to be identical to the as-purchased condition". The NRC considers your request as a short-term, immediate action given that IP3 is in the process of restarting from its refueling outage. On June 22, 2017, your request for immediate action was reviewed by members of the Petition Review Board (PRB), which includes staff from the NRC's Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) and Region I. After its review and discussion, the PRB determined that there were no immediate safety significant concerns which would adversely impact the public's health and safety; therefore, the PRB denied your request for immediate action in the restart of IP3.

In accordance with NRC Management Directive 8.11 , you have the opportunity to address the PRB , either in person at the NRC Headquarters in Rockville, MD, or by telephone conference. The purpose of this interaction is so that the petitioner can discuss the petition and verbally supplement the petition with any new information.

During the meeting , the PRB is in listening mode and will not make any decisions regarding your petition.

I would appreciate if you could advise me by Friday, June 30 , 2017 , if you agree to the NRC's processing your request under the 2.206 process . In addition , please advise me if you would like to address the PRB . If you would like to meet in person , I will need to schedule a formal public meeting at the NRC Headquarters. If you would prefer to address the PRB via phone, I will also work with you to coord inate a date/time during the upcoming weeks.

If you have other questions on the 2.206 process, or regardi ng the role as petition manager, please contact me at 301-415-1030 .

Thank you,


DRA FT-----------------------------------------------

IP3 shutdown as a request for immediate action. While the licensee has already synchronized to the grid (completed ahead of schedule earlier this a.m.), we intend to follow the process per MD 8.11, to the extent possible and 'promptly' notify the petitioner of the pending staff action (i.e. , per MD 8.11 , when the staff plans to take an action contrary to the requested action in the petition (i.e., permitting restart of a facility when the petitioner has requested that restart not be permitted).

To expedite this step in the process, I would like to forego a PRB F2F meeting andl get your concurrence and/or comments via e-mail today by 12 pm, if possible.

ACTION by 1200 6/22: Please review the petition request (1-page email attached) and let me know if you have any objections or concerns with the proposed path to reject the petitioner's request for immediate action (i.e., to prevent the restart of IP3), based on the PRB determination that there are no immediate safety significant concerns which would adversely impact the public's health and safety. Also, provide comments/mark-ups, if any on the proposed e-mail response to the petitioner (draft e-mail below). Also, note that as stated in today's 0800 RI call, the Region does not have any immediate safety concerns with licensee's decision to startup as the reactor vessel head outer o-ring is currently holding RCS pressure.

Forthcoming steps for addressing petitioner's request for immediate action:

1. 1. PRB members to concur on determination to deny petitioner's immediate action request - respond to PM via email today by 1200
2. 2. Obtain NRR concurrence on the PRB recommendation for addressing the petitioner's requests for immediate action
3. Inform petitioner of staff's decision or pending actions regarding the petitioner's immediate action requests (NOTE: per MD 8.11 , if the staff plans to take an action that is contrary to an immediate action requested in the petition (permitting restart of a facility when the petitioner has requested that restart not be permitted), the petitioner must promptly be notified of the pending staff action).

3.

4 . Follow-on steps:

5. 1. A follow-on PRB meeting will be scheduled on a later date to make an initial recommendation as to whether or not the petition meets the criteria for review under 10 CFR 2.206
6. 2. Inform petitioner of staff's initial recommendation (whether to accept or reject the petition for review).
7. 3. Offer a meeting or teleconference for the petitioner to address the PRB in light of its initial recommendation .
4. Issue an acknowledgement (or closure) letter to the petitioner Proposed PRB/Contacts:

Chair: Shana Helton Petition Manager: Rich Guzman 2.206 Coordinator: Lee Banic / Jim Kim DE: Dave Rudland RI: Tom Setzer OE: TBD OGC: David Cylkowski / Olivia Mikula Other key points (from Region I)

protection of their identity. In the 2.206 process, all of the information in your letter will be made public, including your identity.

You specifically requested in your letter for the NRG to keep Indian Point, Unit 3 (IP3) in cold shutdown until the condition of the reactor vessel head upper and lower surfaces are "proved to be identical to the as-purchased condition". The NRG considers your request as a short-term, immediate action given that IP3 is in the process of restarting from its refueling outage . On June 22 , 2017 , your request for immediate action was reviewed by members of the Petition Review Board (PRB), which includes staff from the NRG's Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) and Region I. After its review and discussion , the PRB determined that there were no immediate safety significant concerns which would adversely impact the public's health and safety ; therefore, the PRB denied your request for immediate action in the restart of IP3.

In accordance with NRG Management Directive 8.11 , you have the opportunity to address the PRB , either in person at the NRG Headquarters in Rockville, MD, or by telephone conference. The purpose of this interaction is so that the petitioner can discuss the petition and verbally supplement the petition with any new information.

During the meeting , the PRB is in listening mode and will not make any decisions regarding your petition .

I would appreciate if you could advise me by Friday, June 30 , 2017 , if you agree to the NRG's processing your request under the 2.206 process. In addition, please advise me if you would like to address the PRB. If you would like to meet in person , I will need to schedule a forma l public meeting at the NRG Headquarters. If you wou ld prefer to address the PRB via phone, I will also work with you to coordinate a date/time during the upcoming weeks .

If you have other questions on the 2.206 process, or regarding the role as petition manager, please contact me at 301-415-1030.

Thank you ,


0 RA FT-----------------------------------------------

From: Setzer, Thomas Sent: 22 Jun 2017 10:27:54 -0400 To: Rudland, David;Helton, Shana;Guzman, Richard;Cylkowski, David;Banic, Merrilee Cc: Greives, Jonathan;Haagensen, Brian;Siwy, Andrew;Rich, Sarah;Broaddus, Doug;Danna, James;Kim, James;Benner, Eric;Mikula, Olivia

Subject:

RE: ACTION: 2.206 Immediate Action Request re: Indian Point Unit 3 Rx Head 0 -rings and Restart (LTR-17-0235)

Both orings were replaced. The orings are typically replaced both at a time.


Original Message --------

From: "Rudland, David" <David.Rudland@nrc.gov>

Date: Thu, June 22, 2017 l 0:25 AM -0400 To: "Setzer, Thomas" <Thomas.Setzer@nrc.gov>, "Helton, Shana"

<Shana.Helton@nrc.gov>, "Guzman, Richard" <Richard.Guzman@nrc.gov>,

"Cylkowski, David" <David.Cylkowski@nrc.gov>, "Banic, Merrilee"

<Merrilee.Banic@nrc.gov>

CC: "Greives, Jonathan" <Jonathan.Greives@nrc.gov>, "Haagensen, Brian"

<Brian.Haagensen@nrc.gov>, "Siwy, Andrew" <Andrew.Siwy@nrc.gov>, "Rich, Sarah"

<Sarah.Rich@nrc.gov>, "Broaddus, Doug" <Doug.Broaddus@nrc.gov>, "Danna, James"

<James.Danna@nrc.gov>, "Kim, James" <James.Kim@nrc.gov>, "Benner, Eric"

<Eric.Benner@nrc.gov>, "Mikula, Olivia" <Olivia.Mikula@nrc.gov>

Subject:

RE: ACTION: 2.206 Immediate Action Request re: Indian Point Unit 3 Rx Head 0 -rings and Restart (LTR-17-0235)

Tom and Shana I see Tom's point. The safety concern comes from both a-rings leaking, but it is worrisome that this keeps happening and moving forward we need to take a very close look at the root cause. Since the one o-ring is holding at pressure, there does not appear to be an immediate safety concern that requires enforcement action. In fact, the leak detection and tech spec limits were sufficient to catch the issue before it caused a large concern.

Did they replace both a-rings during this outage, or just one? If they replaced both and now one is leaking, that may be a different story Thanks Dave David L. Rudland, Ph.D.

Chief, Vessels and Internals Integrity Branch Division of Engineering

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mail Stop: OWFN-llFOl 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852-2738 Office: (301) 415-1896 Cell: (b)(6)

Email: nrc. ov From: Setzer, Thomas Sent: Th ursday, June 22, 2017 10:17 AM To: Helton, Sha na <Shana.Helton@nrc.gov>; Guzman, Rich ard <Richard.Guzman@nrc.gov>;

Cylkowski, David <David.Cylkowski@nrc.gov>; Banic, Merrilee <Merrilee.Banic@nrc.gov>

Cc: Rudland, David <David .Rudland@nrc.gov>; Greives, Jonathan

<Jonathan.Greives@ nrc.gov>; Haagensen, Brian <Brian.Haagensen@nrc.gov>; Siwy, Andrew

<Andrew.Siwy@nrc.gov>; Rich, Sarah <Sarah.Rich@nrc.gov>; Broaddus, Doug

<Doug.Broaddus@nrc.gov>; Danna, James <James.Danna@nrc.gov>; Kim, James

<James.Kim@nrc.gov>; Benner, Eric <Eric.Benner@nrc.gov>; Mikula, Olivia

<Olivia.Mikula @nrc.gov>

Subject:

Re: ACTION : 2.206 Immediate Action Request re: Ind ian Point Unit 3 Rx Head 0 -r ings and Restart (LTR-17-0235)

Thats a great point Shana. I guess I would need the de fin ition of "adequate protecti on" to understand this better. The fact is that Indian Point has had numerous oring leaks, and has yet to identify the smoking gun or root cause as to why this plagues Unit 3.

Incidentally, Unit 2 has 1 of its 2 orings leaking at this moment.

We do not have a safety concern with the current condition at Unit 3 (the inner oring isleakong but theouter is holding). Theouter ring is a fully qualified 100% pressure seal, so it is designed to provide adequate sealing on its own.

I would not feel an enforcement action to prevent startup would be wa1Tanted. The situation begs more inspection and review but both the NRC and licensee, but it is not a safety concern at this point.

VR, Tom


Origina l Message --------

From: "Helton, Shana" <Shana.Helton@nrc.gov>

Date: Thu, June 22, 2017 9:38 AM -0400 To: "Guzman, Richard" < Richard.Guzman@ nrc.gov> , "Cylkowski, David"

<David.Cylkowski@nrc.gov>, "Setzer, Thomas" <Thomas.Setzer@nrc.gov>, "Banic, Merrilee" <Merrilee.Banic@nrc.gov>

CC: "Rudland, David" <David.Rudland@nrc.gov>, "Greives, Jonathan"

<Jonathan.Greives@nrc.gov>, "Haagensen, Brian" <Brian.Haagensen@nrc.gov>, "Siwy,

Andrew" <Andrew.Siwy@nrc.gov>, "Rich, Sarah" <Sarah.Rich@nrc.gov> , "Broaddus, Doug" <Do ug.Broaddus@nrc.gov>, "Danna, James" < James.Danna@nrc.gov> , "Kim, James" <James.Kim@nrc .gov>, "Benner, Eric" <Eric.Benner@nrc.gov>, "Mikula, Olivia" <Olivia.Mikula@ nrc.gov>

Subject:

Re: ACTION: 2.206 Immediate Action Request re: Indian Point Unit 3 Rx Head 0 -rings and Restart (LTR-17-0235)

I would like to understand why we have confidence that this o-ring repair provides adequate protection, given it's a repair that allegedly (per the petitioner) had been made repeatedly. I need this before concurring - thanks.

On: 22 June 20 17 09:09, "Guzman, Richard" <R ichard.Guzman@nrc.gov> wrote:

All, Good morning. We've received a 2.206 petition from Tom Gurdziel concerning the reactor vessel head o-rings at Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 3 (IP3). He requests that NRC prevent restart of IP3 until they essentially determine a root cause.

Because of the timing of their startup, we are treating the petitioner's request to keep IP3 shutdown as a request for immediate action. While the licensee has already synchronized to the grid (completed ahead of schedule earlier this a.m.), we intend to follow the process per MD 8.11 , to the extent possible and 'promptly' notify the petitioner of the pending staff action (i.e., per MD 8.11, when the staff plans to take an action contrary to the requested action in the petition (i.e., permitting restart of a facility when the petitioner has requested that restart not be permitted).

To expedite this step in the process, I would like to forego a PRB F2F meeting andl get your concurrence and/or comments via e-mail today by 12 pm, if possible.

ACTION by 1200 6/22: Please review the petition request (1-page email attached) and let me know if you have any objections or concerns with the proposed path to reject the petitioner's request for immediate action (i.e., to prevent the restart of IP3), based on the PRB determination that there are no immediate safety significant concerns which would adversely impact the public's health and safety. Also, provide comments/mark-ups, if any on the proposed e-mail response to the petitioner (draft e-mail below). Also, note that as stated in today's 0800 RI call, the Region does not have any immediate safety concerns with licensee's decision to startup as the reactor vessel head outer o-ring is currently holding RCS pressure.

Forthcoming steps for addressing petitioner's request for immediate action:

1. 1. PRB members to concur on determination to deny petitioner's immediate action request - respond to PM via email today by 1200
2. 2. Obtain NRR concurrence on the PRB recommendation for addressing the petitioner's requests for immediate action
3. Inform petitioner of staff's decision or pending actions regarding the petitioner's immediate action requests (NOTE: per MD 8.11 , if the staff plans to take an action that is contrary to an immediate action requested in the petition (permitting restart of a facility when the petitioner has requested that restart not be permitted), the petitioner must promptly be notified of the pending staff action).

3.

4. Follow-on steps:
5. 1. A follow-on PRB meeting will be scheduled on a later date to make an initial recommendation as to whether or not the petition meets the criteria for review under 10 CFR 2.206
6. 2. Inform petitioner of staff's initial recommendation (whether to accept or reject the petition for review).
7. 3. Offer a meeting or teleconference for the petitioner to address the PRB in light of its initial recommendation.
4. Issue an acknowledgement (or closure) letter to the petitioner Proposed PRB/Contacts:

Chair: Shana Helton Petition Manager: Rich Guzman 2.206 Coordinator: Lee Banic / Jim Kim DE: Dave Rudland RI: Tom Setzer OE: TBD OGC: David Cylkowski/ Olivia Mikula Other key points (from Region I)

1. The outer o-ring is currently holding RCS pressure. The system was designed to operate on just the outer o-ring. There is no engineering or licensing basis for not performing a plant startup.
2. There was no root cause completed as a result of the double o-ring leak. The apparent cause determination may not bound the problem (i.e. there may be another cause).
3. Corrective actions that could be taken to fix o-ring leakage problems beyond what was done during the last outage require a minimum of 2-3 months lead time.
4. The unidentified leak rate was just determined to be 0.1 gpm which is lower than the UIL of 1.4 gpm at the time of the shutdown.

Current IP3 startup status (0800 6/22)

  • Reactor went critical at 4:34 pm on 6/21
  • Mode 1 at 11 :36 pm on 6/21
  • Synched to the grid at 2:26 am on 6/22
  • 100% expected -1 :30 on 6/23 I appreciate your help on this short-fuse request. Standing by for any questions/concerns.

Thanks, Rich Rich Guzman Sr. PM, Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office: 0 -9C07 I Phone: 301 -415-1030


0 RAFT-----------------------------------------------

Good Afternoon, I have been assigned as a Petition Manager for the 10 CFR 2.206 petition you submitted to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) on June 11, 2017, regarding your concerns with the reactor vessel head o-rings at Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 3.

Section 2.206 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations describes the petition process - the primary mechanism for the public to request enforcement action by the NRC in a public process. This process permits anyone to petition NRC to take enforcement-type action related to NRC licensees or licensed activities. Depending on the results of its evaluation, NRC could modify, suspend or revoke an NRG-issued license or take any other appropriate enforcement action to resolve a problem. The NRC staff's guidance for the disposition of 2.206 petition re,quests is in Management Directive 8.11, which is publicly available.

The 2.206 process provides a mechanism for any member of the public to request enforcement action against NRC licensees. The 2.206 process is separate from the allegations process which affords individuals who raise safety concerns a degree of protection of their identity. In the 2.206 process, all of the information in your letter will be made public, including your identity.

You specifically requested in your letter for the NRC to keep Indian Point, Unit 3 (IP3) in cold shutdown until the condition of the reactor vessel head upper and lower surfaces are "proved to be identical to the as-purchased condition". The NRC considers your request as a short-term, immediate action given that IP3 is in the process of restarting from its refueling outage. On June 22, 2017, your request for immediate action was reviewed by members of the Petition Review Board (PRB), which includes staff from the NRC's Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) and Region I. After its review and discussion, the PRB determined that there were no immediate safety significant concerns which would adversely impact the public's health and safety; therefore, the PRB denied your request for immediate action in the restart of IP3.

In accordance with NRC Management Directive 8.11 , you have the opportunity to address the PRB , either in person at the NRC Headquarters in Rockville, MD, or by telephone conference. The purpose of this interaction is so that the petitioner can discuss the petition and verbally supplement the petition with any new information.

During the meeting, the PRB is in listening mode and will not make any decisions regarding your petition.

I would appreciate if you could advise me by Friday, June 30, 2017, if you agree to the NRC's processing your request under the 2.206 process. In addition, please advise me if you would like to address the PRB. If you would like to meet in person, I will need to schedule a formal public meeting at the NRC Headqu.arters. If you would prefer to address the PRB via phone, I will also work with you to coordinate a date/time during the upcoming weeks.

If you have other questions on the 2.206 process, or regarding the role as petition manager, please contact me at 301-415-1030.

Thank you,


DRAFT-----------------------------------------------

From: Rudland, David Sent: 1 Sep 2017 12:42:26 +0000 To: Guzman, Richard

Subject:

RE: ACTION: 2.206 Immediate Action Request re: Indian Point Unit 3 Rx Head 0-rings and Restart (LTR-17-0235)

The other issue is that I will be in DLR and not DE David L. Rud land, Ph.D.

Chief, Vessels and Internals Integrity Branch Division of Engineering Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mail Stop: OWFN-llFOl 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852-2738 Office: (301) 415-1896 Cell: !(b)(6) I Email: david.rudland@nrc.gov From : Guzman, Richard Se nt: Friday, September 01, 2017 8:41 AM To: Rudland, David <David.Rudland@nrc.gov>

Subject:

RE: ACTION: 2.206 Immediate Act ion Request re: Indian Point Unit 3 Rx Head 0-rings and Restart (LTR-17-0235)

That is great news. Congrats!!! I was thinking that you can still concur as PRB member from EVIB (not as BC) - are you okay w/concurring on the letter for completion and continuity purposes?

From : Rud land, David Se nt: Friday, September 01, 2017 8:38 AM To: Guzman, Richard <Richard.Guzman@nrc.gov>

Subject:

RE: ACTION : 2.206 Im mediate Action Request re: Indian Point Unit 3 Rx Head 0 -rings and Restart (LTR-17-0235)

Today is my last day as BC of EVIB ... Steve Ruffing will be acting come Tuesday.

I was promoted to SL yesterday Dave David L. Rudland, Ph .D.

Chief, Vessels and Internals Integrity Branch

Division of Engineering Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mail Stop: OWFN-llFOl 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852-2738 Office: (301) 415-1896 Cell: !(b)(6) I Email: david.rudland@nrc.gov From: Guzman, Richard Sent: Friday, September 01, 2017 8:32 AM To: Rudland, David <David.Rudland@nrc.gov>

Subject:

Re: ACTION: 2.206 Immediate Action Request re: Indian Point Unit 3 Rx Head 0 -rings and Restart (LTR-17-0235)

Thanks Dave. I really appreciate the quick turnaround. As a heads up, I expect to send you another 2.206 closeout letter by next week - that one concerns the IP baffle former bolts (Friends of the Earth).

Rich Guzman Sr Project Manager NRR/DORL US NRC Phone: (301) 415-1030 On: 01 September 2017 08:20, "Rudland, David" <David .Rudland@nrc.gov> wrote:

Rich Here are a couple of comments and a few nits for your consideration. I concur on the document.

Thanks Dave David L. Rudland, Ph.D.

Chief, Vessels and Internals Integrity Branch Division of Engineering Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mail Stop: OWFN-llFOl 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852-2738 Office : (301) 415-1896

Cell: l<b_)(_6)_ _ __.

Email: david.rudland@nrc.gov From : Guzman, Richard Sent: Thursday, August 31, 2017 11:58 AM To: Rudland, David <David.Rudland@nrc.gov>

Subject:

RE : ACTION: 2.206 Im mediate Action Request re: Indian Point Unit 3 Rx Head 0 -rings and Restart (LTR-17-0235)

Dave, Good Morning. Attached for your review and concurrence is the subject closure letter. Would appreciate if you can complete your 'sanity check' and provide concurrence by Tuesday (9/5) next week, if possible (sorry for the short turn-around request). Please reach out to me if you have any questions.

View ADAMS Properties Mll 7243A186 Open ADAMS Document (LTR-17-0235 Response/Closure Letter to Thomas Gurdziel re: 2.206 Petition, Indian Point Reactor Vessel Head 0-rings)

Thanks, Rich From : Rud land, David Sent: Thursday, June 22, 2017 10:26 AM To: Setzer, Thomas <Thomas.Setzer@nrc.gov>; Helton, Shana <Shana.Helton@nrc.gov>; Guzman, Richard <Richard.Guzman@nrc.gov>; Cylkowski, David <David.Cylkowski@nrc.gov>; Banic, Merrilee

<Merrilee.Banic@nrc.gov>

Cc: Greives, Jonathan <Jonathan.Greives@nrc.gov>; Haagensen, Brian <Brian.Haagensen@nrc.gov>;

Siwy, Andrew <Andrew.Siwy@nrc.gov>; Rich, Sarah <Sarah.Rich@nrc.gov>; Broaddus, Doug

<Doug.Broaddus@nrc.gov>; Danna, James <James.Danna@nrc.gov>; Kim, James

<James.Kim@nrc.gov>; Benner, Eric <Eric.Benner@nrc.gov>; Mikula, Olivia <Olivia.Mikula@nrc.gov>

Subject:

RE: ACTION: 2.206 Immediate Action Request re: Indian Point Unit 3 Rx Head 0-rings and Restart (LTR-17-0235)

Tom and Shana I see Tom's point. The safety concern comes from both a-rings leaking, but it is worrisome that this keeps happening and moving forward we need to take a very close look at the root cause.

Since the one a-ring is holding at pressure, there does not appear to be an immediate safety concern that requires enforcement action. In fact, the leak detection and tech spec limits were sufficient to catch the issue before it caused a large concern.

Did they replace both a-rings during this outage, or just one? If they replaced both and now one is leaking, that may be a different story Thanks

Dave David L. Rudland, Ph.D.

Chief, Vessels and Internals Integrity Branch Division of Engineering Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mail Stop: OWFN-11F01 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852-2738 Office: (301) 415-1896 Cell: !(b)(6) I Email: david.rudland@nrc.gov From : Setzer, Thomas Sent: Thursday, June 22, 2017 10:17 AM To: Helton, Shana <Shana.Helton@nrc.gov>; Guzman, Richard <Richard.Guzman@nrc.gov>; Cylkowski, David <David.Cylkowski@nrc.gov>; Banic, Merrilee <Merrilee.Ban ic@nrc.gov>

Cc: Rudland, David <David .Rudland@nrc.gov>; Greives, Jonathan <Jonathan.Greives@nrc.gov>;

Haagensen, Brian <Brian. Haagensen@nrc.gov>; Siwy, Andrew <Andrew.Siwy@nrc.gov>; Rich, Sarah

<Sarah.Rich@nrc.gov>; Broaddus, Doug <Doug.Broaddus@nrc.gov>; Danna, James

<James.Danna@nrc.gov>; Kim, James <James.Kim@nrc.gov>; Benner, Eric <Eric.Benner@nrc.gov>;

M ikula, Olivia <0livia.Mikula@nrc.gov>

Subject:

Re: ACTION: 2.206 Immediate Action Request re: Indian Point Unit 3 Rx Head 0 -rings and Restart (LTR-17-0235)

Thats a great point Shana. I guess I wou ld need the definition of "adequate protection" to understand this better. The fact is that Indian Point has had numerous oring leaks, and has yet to identify the smoking gun or root cause as to why this plagues Unit 3. Incidentally, Unit 2 has 1 of its 2 orings leaking at this moment.

We do not have a safety concern with the current condition at Unit 3 (the inner oring isleakong but theouter is holding). Theouter ring is a fu lly qualified 100% pressure seal, so it is designed to provide adequate sealing on its own.

I would not feel an enforcement action to prevent startup would be warranted. The situation begs more inspection and review but both the NRC and licensee, but it is not a safety concern at this point.

VR, Tom


Original Message --------

From: "Helton, Shana" <Sha na.Helton@nrc.gov>

Date: Thu, June 22, 2017 9:38 AM -0400 To: "Guzman, Richard" <Richard.Guzman@nrc.gov>, "Cylkowski, David"

<David.Cylkowski@nrc.gov>, "Setzer, Thomas" <Thomas.Setzcr@nrc.gov>, "Banic, MeITilee"

<Merrilee.Banic@ nrc.gov>

CC: "Rudland, David" <Dav id.Rudland@ nrc.gov>, "Greives, Jonathan"

<Jonathan.Greives@nrc.gov>, "Haagensen, Brian" <Brian.Haagensen@nrc.gov>, "Siwy, Andrew" <Andrew.Siwy@nrc.gov>, "Rich, Sarah" <Sarah.Rich@nrc.gov>, "Broaddus, Doug"

<Doug.Broaddus@nrc.gov>, "Danna, James" <Jamcs.Danna@nrc.gov>, "Kim, James"

<James.Kim@nrc.gov>, "Benner, E ric" <Eric.Benner@ nrc.gov>, "Mikula, Olivia"

<Olivia.Mikula@nrc.gov>

Subject:

Re: ACTION: 2.206 Immediate Action Request re: Indian Point Unit 3 Rx Head 0-rings and Restart (LTR- 17-0235)

I would like to understand why we have confidence that this o-ring repair provides adequate protection, given it's a repair that allegedly (per the petitioner) had been made repeatedly. I need this before concurring - thanks.

On: 22 June 2017 09:09, "Guzman, Richard" < Richard.Guzman@nrc.gov> wrote:

All, Good morning. We've received a 2.206 petition from Tom Gurdziel concerning the reactor vessel head a-rings at Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 3 (IP3). He requests that NRC prevent restart of IP3 until they essentially determine a root cause. Because of the timing of their startup, we are treating the petitioner's request to ke,ep IP3 shutdown as a request for immediate action. While the licensee has already synchronized to the grid (completed ahead of schedule earlier this a.m.), we intend to follow the process per MD 8.11, to the extent possible and 'promptly' notify the petitioner of the pending staff action (i.e., per MD 8.11, when the staff plans to take an action contrary to the requested action in the petition (i.e., permitting restart of a facility when the petitioner has requested that restart not be permitted).

To expedite this step in the process, I would like to forego a PRB F2F meeting and get your concurrence and/or comments via e-mail today by 12 pm, if possible.

ACTION by 1200 6/22: Please review the petition request (1-page email attached) and let me know if you have any objections or concerns with the proposed path to reject the petitioner's request for immediate action (i.e., to prevent the restart of IP3), based on the PRB determination that there are no immediate safety significant concerns which would adversely impact the public's health and safety. Also, provide comments/mark-ups, if any on the proposed e-mail response to the petitioner (draft e-mail below). Also, note that as stated in today's 0800 RI call, the Region does not have any immediate safety concerns with licensee's decision to startup as the reactor vessel head outer o-ring is currently holding RCS pressure.

Forthcoming steps for addressing petitioner's request for immediate action:

1. 1. PRB members to concur on determination to deny petitioner's immediate action request -

respond to PM via email today by 1200

2. 2. Obtain NRR concurrence on the PRB recommendation for addressing the petitioner's requests for immediate action
3. Inform petitioner of staffs decision or pending actions regarding the petitioner's immediate action requests (NOTE: per MD 8.11, if the staff plans to take an action that is contrary to an immediate action requested in the petition (permitting restart of a facility when the petitioner has requested that restart not be permitted), the petitioner must promptly be notified of the pending staff action).

3.

4. Follow-on steps:
5. 1. A follow-on PRB meeting will be scheduled on a later date to make an initial recommendation as to whether or not the petition meets the criteria for review under 10 CFR 2.206
6. 2. Inform petitioner of staffs initial recommendation (whether to accept or reject the petition for review).
7. 3. Offer a meeting or teleconference for the petitioner to address the PRB in light of its initial recommendation.
4. Issue an acknowledgement (or closure) letter to the petitioner Proposed PRB/Contacts:

Chair: Shana Helton Petition Manager: Rich Guzman 2.206 Coordinator: Lee Banic / Jim Kim DE: Dave Rudland RI: Tom Setzer OE: TBD OGC: David Cylkowski / Olivia Mikula Other key points (from Region I)

1. The outer o-ring is currently holding RCS pressure. The system was designed to operate on just the outer o-ring. There is no engineering or licensing basis for not performing a plant startup.
2. There was no root cause completed as a result of the double o-ring leak. The apparent cause determination may not bound the problem (i.e. there may be another cause).
3. Corrective actions that could be taken to fix o-ring leakage problems beyond what was done during the last outage require a minimum of 2-3 months lead time.
4. The unidentified leak rate was just determined to be 0.1 gpm which is lower than the UIL of 1.4 gpm at the time of the shutdown.

Current IP3 startup status (0800 6/22)

  • Reactor went critical at 4:34 pm on 6/21
  • Mode 1 at 11 :36 pm on 6/21
  • Synched to the grid at 2:26 am on 6/22
  • 100% expected -1 :30 on 6/23 I appreciate your help on this short-fuse request. Standing by for any questions/concerns.

Thanks, Rich Rich Guzman Sr. PM , Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Office: 0 -9C07 I Phone: 301-415-1030


*------------------------DRAFT-----------------------------------------------

Good Afternoon, I have been assigned as a Petition Manager for the 10 CFR 2.206 petition you submitted to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) on June 11 , 2017, regarding your concerns with the reactor vessel head o-rings at Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 3.

Section 2.206 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations describes the petition process -

the primary mechanism for the public to request enforcement action by the NRC in a public process. This process permits anyone to petition NRC to take enforcement-type action related to NRC licensees or licensed activities. Depending on the results of its evaluation, NRC could modify, suspend or revoke an NRG-issued license or take any other appropriate enforcement action to resolve a problem. The NRC staffs guidance for the disposition of 2.206 petition requests is in Management Directive 8.11 , which is publicly available.

The 2.206 process provides a mechanism for any member of the public to request enforcement action against NRC licensees. The 2.206 process is separate from the allegations process which affords individuals who raise safety concerns a degree of protection of their identity. In the 2.206 process, all of the information in your letter will be made public, including your identity.

You specifically requested in your letter for the NRC to keep Indian Point, Unit 3 (IP3) in cold shutdown until the condition of the reactor vessel head upper and lower surfaces are "proved to be identical to the as-purchased condition". The NRC considers your request as a short-term, immediate action given that IP3 is in the process of restarting from its refueling outage. On June 22, 2017, your request for immediate action was reviewed by members of the Petition Review Board (PRB), which includes staff from the NRC's Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) and Region I. After its review and discussion, the PRB determined that there were no immediate safety significant concerns which would adversely impact the public's health and safety; therefore, the PRB denied your request for immediate action in the restart of IP3.

In accordance with NRC Management Directive 8.11, you have the opportunity to address the PRB, either in person at the NRC Headquarters in Rockville, MD, or by telephone conference.

The purpose of this interaction is so that the petitioner can discuss the petition and verbally supplement the petition with any new information. During the meeting, the PRB is in listening mode and will not make any decisions regarding your pet1ition.

I would appreciate if you could advise me by Friday, June 30, 2017, if you agree to the NRC's processing your request under the 2.206 process. In addition, please advise me if you would like to address the PRB. If you would like to meet in person, I will need to schedule a formal public meeting at the NRC Headquarters. If you would prefer to address the PRB via phone, I will also work with you to coordinate a date/time during the upcoming weeks.

If you have other questions on the 2.206 process, or regarding the role as petition manager, please contact me at 301-415-1030.

Thank you,


*------------------------DRAFT-----------------------------------------------

From: Elliott, Robert Sent: 17 Sep 2015 17:52:38 +0000 To: Kunowski, Michael Cc: Dickson, Billy;Jandovitz, John;Grover, Ravinder;Chernoff, M argaret

Subject:

RE: fyi isi code We have put a hold on the generic communication because the industry has proposed a clarification to the standard tech specs that would provide clarification to what constitutes RCPB leakage and clarifies the Jicensee?s obligation to try and isolate any RCPB leakage. We expect their formal submittal within the next month or two. So, we?ve put a hold on the RIS since it looks likely that we?ll be developing an improvement to the tech specs which would negate the original purpose of the RIS, which was to clarify the existing tech spec requirements.

From: Kunowski, Michael Sent: Thursday, September 17, 2015 11 :55 AM To: Elliott, Robert Cc: Dickson, Billy; Jandovitz, John

Subject:

FW: fyi isi code

Rob, Quick question for you?.and not related to pressure-temperature limit curves?.. in the two top e-mails, we in Region III are discussing a position by Perry that seems to desigmate the vessel flange o-rings as the reactor coolant system pressure boundary. I thought you were working on a generic communication on RCS boundary leakage that at least talked about leakage past the first closed isolation valve of a drain or instrument line?

Mike Kunowski Branch Chief Division of Reactor Projects, Rill Branch 5 (Fermi, LaSalle, and Peny)

(630) 829-9618 From: Jandovitz, John Sent: Thursday, September 17, 2015 10:44 AM To: Hills, David; Kunowski, Michael

Subject:

RE: fyi isi code I am not sure I agree, this could set a precedent,i.e. should we classify lines past the RCP seals non safety for the same argument. How about past the fust closed isolation valve off a RC drain line. I think 50.2 is clear and we should enforce that definition and not try to adjudicate it arbitrarily.

From: Hills, David Sent: Thursday, September 17, 2015 9:07 AM To: Kunowski, Michael <Michael.Kunowski@nrc.gov<mailto:Michael.Kunowski@nrc.gov>>; Jandovitz, John <John .Ja ndovi tz@nre.gov<ma iIto :John .Jandovi tz@nrc.gov> >

Subject:

FW: fyi isi code From: Holmberg, Mel Sent: Thursday, September 17, 20 15 8:01 AM To: Hills, David <David.Hills@nrc.gov<mailto:David.Hills@nrc.gov>>

Subject:

RE: fyi isi code T d isagree with the licensee?s position that the 0-ring is the RCPB. That said, T believe a case could be made that because this line is located beyond a ?gasket/mechanical joint? (e.g. 0-ring) the line has no safety function and hence can be reclassified as non-safety.

M From: Hills, David Sent: Thursday, September 17 , 20 15 7:58 AM To: Holmberg, Mel <Mel.Hol.mberg@nrc.gov<mailto:Mel.Holmberg@nrc.gov>>

Subject:

RE: fyi isi code Thanks Mel. And what about the Fermi Reactor Vessel 0-ring leak off line?

From: Holmberg, Mel Sent: Thursday, September 17 , 20 15 7:56 AM To: Hills, Dav id <Dav id.Hills@nrc.gov<mailto:David.Hills@nrc.gov>>

Cc: Bilik, Tom <Tom.Bilik@nrc.gov<mailto:Tom.Bilik@nrc.gov>> ; Bozga, John

<John.Bozga@nrc.gov<mailto:John.Bozga@nrc.gov>>; Meghani, Vijay

<Vijay.Megbani@ nrc.gov<mailto:Vijay.Meghani@nrc.gov>>; Neurauter, James

<James.Neurauter@ nrc.gov<mailto:James.Neurauter@ nrc.gov>>; Park, Joon

<Joon.Park@nrc.gov<mailto:Joon.Park@ nrc.gov>>; Sanchez Santiago, Elba

<Elba.SanchezSantiago@ nrc.gov<mailto:Elba.SanchezSantiago@ nrc.gov>>; Shaikh, Atif

<Atif.Shaikh@ nrc.gov<mailto:Atif.Shaikh@nrc.gov>>; Smith, Laura

<Laura.Smith@nrc.gov<mailto:Laura.Smith@nrc.gov>>; Ward, Laura

<Laura.Ward@ nrc.gov<mailto:Laura.Ward@nrc.gov>>; Jandovitz, John

<John.Jandovitz@ nrc.gov<mailto:John.Jandovitz@nrc.gov>>; Robbins, John

<John.Robbins@nrc.gov<mai lto:John.Robbins@nrc.gov>>; Lupold, Timothy

<Timothy.Lupold@nrc.gov<mailto:Timothy.Lupold@nrc.gov>>; Alley, David

<David.Alley@ nrc.gov<mailto:David.Alley@ nrc.gov>>

Subject:

RE: fyi isi code

Dave, My view is that the ANO finding is likely incorrect because it represents a new interpretation in that the EOG fuel oil pipe does not contain steam, water or radioactive waste and is therefore not covered by RG 1.26 classification rules. The QC RHR service water line is likely covered by RG 1.26 and should have been in their ISI program.

M From: Hills, David Sent: Thursday, September 17 , 20 15 7:32 AM To: Bozga, John <John.Bozga@mc.gov<mailto:John.Bozga@nrc.gov>>

Cc: Bilik, Tom <Tom.Bilik@nrc.gov<mailto:Tom.Bilik@nrc.gov>>; Bozga, John

<John.Bozga@nrc.gov<mailto:John.Bozga@ nrc.gov>>; Holmberg, Mel

<Me l.Holmberg@nrc.gov<mailto:Mel.Holmberg@nrc.gov>>; Meghani, Yijay

<Vijay.Meghani@ nrc.gov<ma ilto:Vijay.Mcghani@nrc.gov>>; Neurauter, James

<James.Neurauter@nrc.gov<mailto:James.Neurauter@nrc.gov>>; Park, Joon

<Joon.Park@nrc.gov<mailto:Joon.Park@ nrc.gov>>; Sanchez Santiago, Elba

<Elba.SanchezSantiago@ nrc.gov<mailto:Elba.SanchezSantiago@ nrc.gov>>; Shaikh, Atif

<Atif.Shaikh@ nrc.gov<mailto:Atif.Shaikh@nrc.gov>>; Smith, Laura

<Laura.Smith@nrc.gov<mailto:Laura.Smith@nrc.gov>>; Ward, Laura

<Laura. Ward@nrc.gov<mailto:Laura. Ward@nrc.gov>>; Jandovitz, John

<John.Jandovitz@nrc.gov<mailto:John.Jandovitz@nrc.gov>>; Kunowski, Michael

<Michael.Kunowski@nrc.gov<mailto:Michael.Kunowski@nrc.gov>>

Subject:

FW: fyi isi code Thanks John. Interesting issue. The referenced A O and Quad Cities inspection reports might be interesting reading as well. Do we have a branch position/view?

From: Bozga, John Sent: Thursday, September 17, 2015 7:12 AM To: Hills, David <David.Hills@nrc.gov<mailto :David.Hills@nrc .gov>>

Subject:

FW: fy i isi code Operating Expe1ience to share with the rest of DRS EB 1.

From: Robbins, John Sent: Thursday, September 17, 2015 7: 10 AM To: Bozga, John <John.Bozga@nrc.gov<mailto:John.Bozga@nrc.gov>>; Holmberg, Mel

<Mel.Holmberg@nrc.gov<mailto:Mel.Holmberg@nrc.gov>>

Subject:

FW: fyi isi code Gentlemen, I thought that you might be interested in this.

JR

From: Lubinski, John Sent: 15 Jul 2015 13:39 :55 -0400 To: Tsao, John;Ross-Lee, MaryJane Cc: Fairbanks, Carolyn;McHale, John;Alley, David

Subject:

RE : Indian Po int 3-- RPV head flange 0 -ri ng leak Thanks for the heads up and for supporting the Region!

From: Tsao, John Sent: Wednesday, July 15, 2015 11:32 AM To: Lubinski, John; Ross-Lee, MaryJane Cc: Fairbanks, Carolyn; McHale, John; Alley, David

Subject:

Indian Point 3--RPV head flange 0-ring leak John/MJ Last night Indian Point Unit 3 detected a leakage (0.035 gpm) off the outer 0-ring. The unit started up in March 2015. During the startup evolution, the inner 0-ring was damaged.

This morning , Carolyn Fairbanks, Doug Pickett and I talked with Arthur Burritt who is the branch chief in Region I responsible for Indian Point. Right now Region I is gathering information. We in NRR are on a stand-by mode ready to help Region I.

John

From: Ross-Lee, MaryJane Sent: 16 Ju l 2015 10:07:12 -0400 To: Fairbanks, Carolyn;Tsao, John;Lubinski, John Cc: McHale, John;Alley, David

Subject:

RE: Indian Point 3--RPV head flange 0 -ring leak Great - thanks for the info Mary Jone Ross-Lee (MJ)

Deputy Director, Division of Engineering Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation OWFN 9H1 US Nuclear Regulatory Commission a Office: 301-415-3298 a> Mobile: !(b)(6) I

  • 1 e-mail: mary1ane.ross-lee@nrc.gov From : Fairban ks, Carolyn Sent: Thursday, July 16, 2015 10:06 AM To: Ross-Lee, M aryJane; Tsao, John; Lubi nski, John Cc: McHale, John; Alley, David

Subject:

RE: Indian Point 3--RPV head flange 0 -ring leak I spoke to the PM this morning, here's the latest information:

Last night, a high humidity alarm in containment and a high level fan cooler condenser level alarm went off very briefly. The Region is following up on the cause(s) - whether those were due to an outdoor temperature effect, steaming and condensation from the 0-rings, etc. The licensee will provide an operability determination to the Region today. The current status is that the plant is within Tech Specs for leakage and the licensee has indicated they plan to continue operating (not replace the 0-rings before the next outage in Feb. 2017). We'll get some feedback from the Region via the PM after the operability determination, and remain available for any support needed by the Region.

From : Ross- Lee, MaryJane Sent: Thursday, July 16, 2015 9:22 AM To: Tsao, John; Lubinski, John Cc: Fairbanks, Carolyn; McHale, John; Alley, David

Subject:

RE: Indian Point 3--RPV head flange 0-ring leak Any new news on this?

Mary Jone Ross-Lee (MJ)

Deputy Director, Division of Engineering Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation OWFN 9H1 US Nuclear Regulatory Commission a Office: 301-415-3298

Q) Mobile: l(b)( 6) I

~ e-mail: mary jane .ross-lee@n rc.gov From: Tsao, John Sent: Wednesday, July 15, 2015 11:32 AM To: Lubinski, John; Ross-Lee, MaryJane Cc: Fairbanks, Carolyn; McHale, John; Alley, David

Subject:

Indian Point 3--RPV head flange 0-ring leak John/MJ Last night Indian Point Unit 3 detected a leakage (0.035 gpm) off the outer 0-ring. The unit started up in March 2015. During the startup evolution, the inner 0-ring was damaged.

This morning , Carolyn Fairbanks, Doug Pickett and I talked with Arthur Burritt who is the branch chief in Region I responsible for Indian Point. Right now Region I is gathering information . We in NRR are on a stand-by mode ready to help Region I.

John

From: Tsao, John Sent: 15 Ju l 2015 12:40:17 -0400 To: Alley, David

Subject:

RE: Indian Point 3--RPV head flange 0 -ring leak

Dave, Arthur said that the licensee used telemetry and found that the leakage is in a "channel". Arthur is not sure what kind of channel it is. we asked whether the leakage flows down the side of RPV instead of into the drain line. This is why region I is gathering information regarding exactly where the leak is John From: Alley, David Sent: Wednesday, July 15, 2015 11:50 AM To: Tsao, John

Subject:

Re: Ind ian Point 3--RPV head flange 0 -ring leak John Is this leak leaking directly into containment or is it being collected in a leakoff line Dave From: Tsao, John Sent: Wednesday, July 15, 2015 10:32 AM To: Lubinski, John; Ross-Lee, MaryJane Cc: Fairbanks, Carolyn; McHale, John; Alley, David

Subject:

Indian Point 3--RPV head flange 0-ring leak John/MJ Last night Indian Point Unit 3 detected a leakage (0.035 gpm) off the outer 0-ring. The unit started up in March 2015. During the startup evolution, the inner 0-ring was damaged.

This morning, Carolyn Fairbanks, Doug Pickett and I talked with Arthur Burritt who is the branch chief in Region I responsible for Indian Point. Right now Region I is gathering information. We in NRR are on a stand-by mode ready to help Region I.

John

From: Guzman, Richard Sent: 24 Jul 2017 18:19:01 -0400 To: Rudland, David

Subject:

RE: Internal PRB Meeting: 2.206 from T.Gurdziel re: Indian Point Unit 3, Rx Head 0 -rings (LTR-17-0235-1-NRR)

Dave - I apo logize, as I couldn't get everyone's chedules to line up; I'm more than happy to wing by tomorrow whenever convenient for you to give yo u a roll-up of latest statu on thi petition and expected outcomes of the meeting. I recommend that the PRB reject the petition for review under 2.206, so unless you have any obj ections to that initial determination - I can convey your concurrence during the meeting.

I'll then have a closure letter drafted up fo r your input and official concurrence (ticket due date is 8/7).

Thanks, Ri ch

Original Appointment-----

From: Rudland, David Sent: Monday, July 24, 20 17 3:02 PM To: Guzman, Richard

Subject:

Tentative: Internal PRB Meeting: 2.206 from T.Gurdziel re: Indian Point Unit 3, Rx Head 0-rings (LTR-17-0235 RR)

When: Tuesday, July 25 , 20 17 2:30 PM-3 :00 PM (UTC-05 :00) Eastern Time (US & Canada).

Where: HQ-OWF - 10804-25p Rich I can't make this, I have another industry meeting at the same time Dave

To: Burritt, Arthur; Floyd, Niklas Cc: Setzer, Thomas; Newman, Garrett; Pinson, Brandon; Stewart, Scott

Subject:

IP3 Reactor Vessel Head Flange 0 -ring Leak ODMI

All, I have attached the operational decision-making issue (ODMI) document on the reactor vessel head flange a-ring leakage. It was approved this morning .

Sarah

From: King, Mark Sent: 26 Jun 2017 11:53:30 +0000 To: Telson, Ross

Subject:

RE: Oring leak at IP3 My take on this issue ...

Yes it it t he RPV to Head 0-ring that is leaking ...the indian point units have a history of issues with this problem. R-1 is doing a detailed Pl&R review on this concern is my understanding.

Leak rate is lower than the TS limit.

I doubt much greater than green potential here.

Regarding SCAQ... certainly is repetitive issue... and may involve previous extent of condition reviews ...whether it is a SCAQ or not...l'm not sure ...

Please define SIGNFICANT and Significant Condition Adverse to Quality.

I think per CAP-2 it would be ... right since it results in a Unit shutdown and mode 5 entry... affecting production .... LOL??

From : Telson, Ross Sent: Monday, June 26, 2017 7:48 AM To: King, M ark <Mark.King@nrc.gov>

Subject:

RE : Oring leak at IP3

Mark, FYI. ..

Given that there are many 0-rings in use and no one is explicitly identified which 0-ring they are discussing, I'll assume they are referring to the RPV-to-Head 0-ring.

Do you know if there's:

a. A TS (beyond the identified leak rate limit) associated RPV 0-ring leakage?
b. Any GTG potential?
c. Anything that would make this an SCAQ?

Ross From : Anderson, Shaun Sent: M onday, June 26, 2017 7 :22 AM To: Agrawal, Ami <ami.agrawal@nrc.gov>; Beaulieu, David <David.Beaulieu@nrc.gov>; Campbell, Stephen <Stephen .Campbell@nrc.gov>; Cauffman, Christopher <Christopher.Cauffman@nrc.gov>;

Curran, Bridget <Bridget.Curran@nrc.gov>; Lewin, Aron <Aron.Lewin@nrc.gov>; Mabbott, Benjamin

<Benjamin.Mabbott@nrc.gov>; Telson, Ross <Ross.Telson@nr c.gov>

Subject:

FW: Oring leak at IP3

fyi

Thanks, Shaun Shaun M. Anderson, Acting Chief NRR/DIRS/IRIB Office: 301-4 15-2039 From: Miller, Chris Sent: Wednesday, June 21, 2017 1:08 PM To: Chernoff, Harold <Harold.Chernoff@nrc.gov>; Halter, Mandy <Mandy.Halter@nrc.gov>; Anderson, Shaun <Shaun.Anderson@nrc.gov>

Cc: King, M ichael <Michael.King2@nrc.gov>

Subject:

FW: Oring leak at IP3 FYI From: Scott, Michael Sent: Wednesday, June 21, 2017 11:17 AM To: Bowen, Jeremy <Jeremy.Bowen@nrc.gov>; M iller, Chris <Chris.M iller@nrc.gov>; King, Michael

<Michael.King2@nrc.gov>

Subject:

FW: Oring leak at IP3 FYI. Licensee deciding whether to cool back down and try again to successfully install an 0-rings, or start up and hope outer seal holds (not a great track record for that in recent years).

We are doing a sample regarding the repetitive 0-ring failures at IP and licensee actions (obviously unsuccessful to date) to address the issues and prevent recurrence. They reassembled the RPV and pressurized this time without knowing what caused the prior failure (evaluation still in progress).

Mike From: Setzer, Thomas Sent: Wednesday, June 21, 2017 7:39 AM To: Pelton, David <David.Pelton@nrc.gov>; Scott, M ichael <M ichael.Scott@nrc.gov>

Subject:

Oring leak at IP3 Brian H will call Dave Pelton w ith status (Im headed to Mi llstone). Just got informed that the inner oring at IP3 is leaking as of last night. I will folow this from Millstone (Mark Henrion is on leave so PB2 is all out of office).

No issues to report at M illstone.

From: Jackson, Christopher Sent: 11 Sep 2015 09:02:34 -0400 To: Lupold, Timothy;M anoly, Kamal;McHale, John Cc: Cast o, Greg;Elliott, Robert

Subject:

RE: Rx Vessel 0-ring leakage

Tim, I do not think this is an SRXB responsibility. However, we often participate in these discussions.

Having said that, I agree with your assessment. In my experience, leakage past flanges or o-rings is not classified as pressure boundary leakage.

I have included Rob Elliot who may have some responsibility in this area.

Thanks, CJ From: Lupold, Timothy Sent: Friday, September 11, 2015 7:15 AM To: Manoly, Kamal <Kamal.Manoly@nrc.gov>; Jackson, Christopher <Christopher.Jackson@nrc.gov>;

McHale, John <John.McHale@nrc.gov>

Cc: Casto, Greg <Greg.Casto@nrc.gov>

Subject:

FW: Rx Vessel 0-ring leakage Region TTI has a question regarding the proper classification of the reactor vessel leak off line that is connected to the reactor vessel between the two 0-rings that seal the Rx vessel head to the flange. I am not sure which branch has the responsibility to review the classification and state it is correct or not correct, but in the absence of finding a branch that acknowledges this responsibility, J have been speaking with Region III on this topic. My branch has typically determined if ASME requirements arc met for a given classification, but has fallen short of being responsible for establishing the classification of the system or component.

To the point of the matter. Region III wants to know what the proper classification for the Rx vessel leak off line is. Region Ill is currently challenging the Perry licensee on this issue (and the Perry licensee is challenging back). The Perry configuration has a leak off line connect between the 2 Rx vessel 0-rings and another line outside the outer 0-ring. These lines have valves which allow the licensee to isolate the line connected between the inner 0 -ring, which would result in pressurizing the line should a leak occur.. As you can read below the licensee has classified the leak off line as non-class, i.e. quality group D in RG 1.26. 1 have told Region Ill that my opinion is the leak off line is not part of the reactor coolant pressure boundary (i.e. the pressure boundary stops at the 0-ring) and based on this opinion, RG 1.26 guidance would not require the line classification other than quality group D. 1 think the biggest issue is my opinion that the line is not part of the reactor coolant pressure boundary, even if the 0-ring leaks. This opinion is in contrast to that of the inspection personnel in Region 111.

J would like to know if your branch has the responsibility for determining the appropriate classification for systems and components, and if not, do you know which branch does have this responsibility. 1 would also like your opinion on the classi.fication of the leak off line as reactor coolant pressure boundary or not reactor coolant pressure boundary based on the 10 CFR 50.2 definition of reactor coolant pressure boundaty .

I have seen many different classifications for the Rx Vessel leak off lines, ranging from class I , 2, and 3 and non-class. The Tnformation Notice (TN 2014-02) was issued to remind licensees that if they classify the line as an ASME class component, then they need to conduct the ASME Code required pressure tests applicable to that classification.

From: Shaikh, Atif Sent: Thursday, September 10, 2015 4:16 PM To: Lupold, Timothy <Timothy.Lupold@nrc.gov<mailto:Timothy.Lupold@nrc.gov>>

Cc: Jandovitz, John <John.Jandovitz@nrc.gov<mailto:John.Jandovitz@nrc.gov>>

Subject:

RE: Rx Vessel 0-ring leakage Perry Classified the flange seal leak-off line as class 3 for construction and then opted to classify the line as non-safety and therefore, non-code for section XI purpose (removed from ISI program) because they believed it was not RCS pressure boundary. Our understanding from you is that this line is NOT RCS pressure boundary and therefore, does not have to be classified as class 2 or 3. Therefore, IN 2014-02 would not apply to them.

From: Lupold, Timothy Sent: Thursday, September IO, 2015 3:00 PM To: Shaikh, Atif Cc: Jandovitz, John

Subject:

Rx Vessel 0-ring leakage I just looked at lN 2014-02. In the ANO example, the licensee had classified the leak off line at ASME Class 2. The IN does not state that he 0-ring leak off line needs to be ASME Class 2. What the IN does state is that if a component is classified as an ASME Class I , 2, or 3 component, then it needs to be pressure tested in accordance with the applicable ASME Code pressure testing requirements.

There is an error in the IN in that it states that a system leakage tests need to be conducted prior to plant tartup fo llowing each refueling outage. This i only true of Class 1, not class 2 or 3.

Regardless, the IN does not state that the leak off line need to be class 2. The intent of the TN is to remind licensees that if you classify an item as an ASME Class component the applicable rules for pressure testing need to be followed. Extrapolating that this IN requires these lines to be class 2 is in appropriate.

Timothy R. Lupold Branch Chief ? Mechanical & Civil Engineering Branch Division of Engineering Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation 301-415-6448

From: King, Mark Sent: 3 Nov 2017 15:57:38 +0000 To: Elliott, Robert

Subject:

RE: Tomorrow's News Ton ight - and Question on IP units - yes, it is the Reactor Vessel 0-ring leaks that were discussed in the last quarterly report RE: Just curious, is the 0 -ring the Rx vessel head?

Yes - it is the RV head 0-ring that they are talking about:

From last Inspection Report (ML is linked at the bottom of this email) 40A2 Problem Identification and Resolution (71152 - 4 samples) .. .

.3 Annual Sample: Reactor Vessel Head 0-ring Leaks

a. Inspection Scope The inspectors performed an in-depth review of Entergy's evaluation and corrective actions associated with repeated reactor coolant system (RCS) leakage through the reactor vessel head 0-rings. The inspectors reviewed CRs and corrective actions associated with the eight reactor vessel head 0-rings leaks that had occurred at Indian Point since 2003. Specifically, the inspectors reviewed the corrective actions to verify they were addressing the identified conditions adverse to q uality. The inspectors reviewed Entergy's maintenance history records and causal analyses.

The inspectors assessed Entergy's problem identification threshold, cause analyses, extent of condition reviews, compensatory actions, and the prioritization and timeliness of corrective actions to determine whether Entergy was appropriately identifying, characterizing, and correcting problems associated with this issue and whether the planned or completed corrective actions were appropriate. The inspectors compared the actions taken to the requirements of Entergy's CAP and IO CFR Part 50, Appendix B.

In addition, the inspectors performed fie ld walkdowns and interviewed engineering personnel to assess the effectiveness of the implemented corrective actions.

The reactor pressure vessel (RPV) is designed to be sealed by two large diameter (different size), concentric, circular, silver-coated, stainless steel gasket 0 -rings. These 0-rings are seated in machined grooves between the RPV head and the vessel. Two new 0-rings are routinely installed each outage when the RPV head is bolted closed.

The inner 0-ring normally maintains the pressure seal for the RCS boundary. The o uter 0-ring is a pre-installed redundant spare that is designed to be used if the inner 0-ring leaks. Leakage through the inner 0-ring can be identified via a leakoff line between the ioner and outer 0-rings. The operators can place the outer 0-ring in service by c losing the leakoff line. This transfers the RCS boundary sealing surface to the outer 0-ring.

TS 3.4. 13, " RCS Operational Leakage," establ ishes limits for the leak rate for identified and unidentified RCS leakage. Leakage through the RPV 0-rings is not classified as "pressure boundary leakage" under TS 1. 1, " Definitions," because the leakage is past a

mechanical joint (gasket) and not through a "non-isolable fault in an RCS component body, pipe wall or vessel wall." Leakage through the 0 -rings into containment would be measured and compared to the limits in TS 3.4.1 3.

The inspectors reviewed CRs and corrective actions associated with the eight reactor vessel head 0-rings leaks that occurred since 2003, when a design change to the Orings occurred. Leakage through the 0-rings prior to the design change may have been in part caused by the original design. In each case when both the inner and outer Orings leaked, Entergy identified and monitored the leakage at a very low level and took prudent, conservative action to shut down the plant before approaching the TS limit to effect repairs and identify causal factors that potentially led to the leakage. Corrective actions since the design change have been primarily focused o n revisions to procedures and processes. Changes to procedures 2-REF-002-GEN and 3-REF-002-GEN included new instructions to manually clean and dry the vessel flange seating surface prior to landing the head instead of relying on the underwater flange-cleaning machine.

Additional revisions directed the use of a "star" pattern when torque ing the 0-ring retainer clips, use of a feeler gauge to verify the 0-ring was centered in the groove, performance of a second verification, and ensuring an 0-ring handling rig was used for installation. Corrective actions a lso included replacement of the 0-rings with new Orings during the next opportunity. The most recent corrective actions were implemented to prevent changes in residual heat removal flow from disrupting the 0 -ring seal surfaces prior to final bolting of the RPV head.

Corrective actions to address the various causal factors over the years have not been completely effective at preventing recurrence of the issue. This is acceptable per Entergy's CAP because each leak is characterized as a condition adverse to quality, vice a significant condition adverse to quality. Entergy has the ability to monitor for leakage and take actions to maintain compliance with their TS. Leakage through the Orings has not challenged the limits of TS 3.4.13. Both Units 2 and 3 are currently operating on the outer 0 -rings with no measurable leakage.

In review of all the corrective actions taken since 2003, the inspectors noted that Entergy had not taken detailed depth measurements of the RPY flange seating surface degradation since 2015, when surface defects identified were small. These surface defects had been noted again during the May 201 7 outage to repair the leaking 0-rings.

However, this degradation had been visually assessed to be minor in nature and the replacement 0-ring was evaluated as being capable of deforming to seal these minor defects. Entergy is presently planning to conduct laser measurement and mapping of these defects during the next refueling outage on each unit.

Finally, the inspectors also noted that procedure EN-HU-106, " Procedure and Work Instruction Use and Adherence," states that technical procedures should be designated "continuous use" if the activity is complex or is performed infrequently to ensure that the procedural steps are performed as written in stepwise sequence. Although the reactor vessel head 0 -ring replacement and head installation are compfox activities typically performed only once per cycle, the governing procedures are designated as "reference use." EH-HU-106 also defines a "continuous use" procedure, "for complex or infrequent work activities for which consequences of an improper action could have immediate, possibly irreversible impact on safety, production or reliability." Though the usage designation of 2-REF-GEN-002 and 3-REF-G EN-002 has not been identified as causal

to any of the leaks, inspectors determined that Entergy should further evaluate the categorization of the RPV head installation procedure to ensure it meets their requirements and expectations and ensures that previous corrective actions continue to be implemented as intended.

SOURCE: View ADAMS Properties MU 7303A977 click to 6iiea ADAMS Document (Indian Point Nuclear Generating - Integrated Inspection Report 05000247/2017003 and 05000286/201 7003.)

FYI, Mark Mark King Senior Reactor Systems Engineer NRC/NRR/DIRS/IOEB - Operating Experience Branch 0-13E16 301-415-1150 NRC- One Mission - One Team From : Ell iott, Robert Sent: Friday, November 03, 2017 11:45 AM To: King, M ark <Mark.King@nrc.gov>

Subject:

FW: Tomorrow's News Tonight Mark Do you know the answer to Brian McDermott's question about Indian Point below? At the bottom of the email chain below is the incoming that led to his question.

Thanks!

Rob From : M iller, Chris Se nt: Friday, November 03, 2017 10:56 AM To: Elliot t, Robert <Robert.Elliott@nrc.gov>

Cc: Thomas, Eric <Eric.Thomas@nrc.gov>

Subject:

Fwd: Tomorrow's News Tonight Can you or your staff answer? Thanks chris Begin Forwarded Message:

From: "McDermott, Brian" <Brian.McDermott@nrc.gov>

Subject:

Fwd: Tomorrow's News Tonight Date: 03 November 2017 09:47 To: "Miller, Chris" <Chris.Miller@nrc.gov>, "King, M ichael" <Michael. King2@nrc.gov>

Just curious, is the o ring the Rx vessel head or something smaller, perhaps EQ related?

Begin Forwarded Message:

From: "Castelveter, David" <David.Castelveter@nrc.gov>

Subject:

Tomorrow's News Tonight Date: 02 November 2017 16:57 To: "Castelveter, David" <David.Castelveter@nrc.gov>

~o~ideA!R;

/I/fa ra Nov.2,2017 Traditional Media SEABROOK - NextEra, the plant's owner, has appealed an ASLB ruling granting a hearing on a watchdog group on the company's license amendment request regarding concrete degradation at the facility. The Newburyport Daily News (Mass.) spoke with OPA Region I about next steps.

INDIAN POINT -A reporter for S&P Global Platts asked for additional information regarding the 0-ring leakage at both units addressed in our latest quarterly inspection reP.ort for the plant. OPA Region I responded .

URANIUM ONE - OPA HQ received follow-up inquiries from The Hill, The Washington Post and Fox News (Sean Hannity) regarding the recent Uranium One export news coverage. We clarified facts with the Washington Post and The Hill and provided a general response to Fox News.

Press Releases None

~ o distribution outside NRC;

. t~

David A. Castelveter Office Director U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Office of Public Affairs (Mail Stop 0-16D3) 11S55 Rockville Pike, MD 20852 301-415-8200 (0)

!(b)(6)  !(Cl david .caste lveter@n re .gov www .nrc.gov

From: Pickett, Douglas Sent: 22 Sep 2015 08:18:46 -0400 To: Tsao, John;Fairbanks, Carolyn;Alley, David;McHale, John Cc: Beasley, Benjamin

Subject:

Update RE: IP3 Reactor Vessel Head Flange 0-ring Leak Attachments: FW: Status of IP3 0-ring inspections, FW: IP3 Reactor Vessel Head 0-Ring Update Sunday, September 20, 2015 as of 1400 Folks-Indian Point Unit 3 shut down on September 14 to replace the damaged 0-rings. The attached emails describe the damage observed to the 0-rings. As indicated, there was no significant degradation to the RV studs due to boron corrosion. The licensee expects to be back to full power next weekend.

Doug From: Tsao, John Sent: Friday, July 17, 2015 3:34 PM To: Burritt, Arthur; Rich, Sarah; Floyd, Niklas Cc: Pickett, Douglas; Alley, David; Fairbanks, Carolyn; McHale, John

Subject:

RE: IP3 Reactor Vessel Head Flange 0-ring Leak ODM I Sarah/Nick, I have reviewed the Operational Decision Making Issue (ODMI) report regarding the RPV head flange 0-ring leakage at Indian Point Unit 3.

I do not have concerns regarding allowing Indian Point Unit 3 to continue operating with an 0-ring leakage because the licensee has implemented trigger points (administrative controls) based on leak rates as shown on pages 5 and 6 of ODMI. The Corrective Actions associated with each trigger points are reasonable. The temperature sensor in the drain line appears to work well.

The 0-ring (seal) leakage is permitted per RG 1.45 and ASME Code,Section XI.

I presume the leak rates are recorded via sensors in the Reactor Coolant Drain Tank (or maybe some other instrument). It is not clear in the ODMI report how the leak rates are measured and whether the measurements are accurate. [I do not need this information. I was just wondering].

It is important that the leak rate measurement is accurate because the trigger points are based on leak rate.

Tech Spec requires plant shutdown when the leak rate reaches 10 gpm. This regulation provides sufficient defense-in-depth measures.

The ODMI listed 4 operating experience of 0-ring issues at Indian point units 2 and 3. I hope the licensee would looking into the problems and come up with some improvements. [again this is just my side comment]

John Tsao Component Performance, NDE, and Testing Branch Division of Engineering NRR From : Bu rritt, Arthur Sent: Friday, July 17, 2015 2:31 PM To: Tsao, John Cc: Pickett, Douglas

Subject:

FW: IP3 Reactor Vessel Head Flange 0 -ring Leak ODMI For review, Sara Rich and Nick Floyd are the Resident Office and Regional points of contact.

Please review the attached and share any concerns From: Rich, Sarah Sent: Friday, July 17, 2015 10:57 AM To: Burritt, Arthur; Floyd, Niklas Cc: Setzer, Thomas; Newman, Garrett; Pinson, Brandon; Stewart, Scott

Subject:

IP3 Reactor Vessel Head Flange 0 -ring Leak ODMI

All, I have attached the operational decision-making issue (ODMI) document on the reactor vessel head flange a-ring leakage. It was approved this morning .

Sarah

From: Burritt, Arthur Sent: 22 Sep 2015 07 :49:16 -0400 To: Pickett, Douglas

Subject:

FW: Status of IP3 0 -ri ng inspections From: Kulp, Jeffrey Sent: Saturday, September 19, 2015 11:19 PM To: Gray, Mel <Mel.Gray@nrc.gov>

Cc: Burritt, Arthur <Arthur.Burritt@nrc.gov>; Newman, Garrett <Garrett.Newman@nrc.gov>; Rich, Sarah <Sarah.Rich@nrc.gov>; Gray, Harold <Harold.Gray@nrc.gov>; Tifft, Doug <Doug.Tifft@nrc.gov>

Subject:

Status of IP3 0-ring inspections As of 2300, I reviewed the videos of the as-found condition of the RV head o-rings/flange area and the RV flange seating surfaces. No obvious degradation was noted, although cleaning and a more thorough examination will take place early morning of September 20th _ I walked down the removed studs that will undergo cleaning. Studs 6 and 7, which were determined to have the most obvious degradation/boron deposits, will be subjected to a VT1 inspection after cleaning. Based upon the results of those inspections, a possible sample size expansion may occur.

My intention is to leave site and come back to be on site around 9am. The licensee should have the results of their inspections and evaluations completed by then, and have a course of action for any potential repair activities.

The NY State Inspection was briefed and will meet up with me in the morning.

Jeff

From: Burritt, Arthur Sent: 22 Sep 2015 07:48:51 -0400 To: Pickett, Douglas

Subject:

FW: IP3 Reactor Vessel Head 0-Ring Update Sunday, September 20, 2015 as of 1400 From : Kulp, Jeffrey Sent: Sunday, September 20, 2015 2:50 PM To: Gray, Mel <Mel.Gray@nrc.gov>

Cc: Newman, Garrett <Garrett .Newman@nrc.gov>; Rich, Sarah <Sarah.Rich@nrc.gov>; Burritt, Arthur

<Arthur.Burritt@nrc.gov>; Lorson, Raymond <Raymond.Lorson@nrc.gov>; Gray, Harold

<Harold.Gray@nrc.gov>; Suber, Gregory <Gregory.Suber@nrc.gov>

Subject:

IP3 Reactor Vessel Head 0 -Ring Update Sunday, September 20, 2015 as of 1400

  • The decision process for repairs is in progress. Based upon my observations and discussions with the licensee, I do not expect to see any required significant repairs.
  • Updates since last night.

o VT1 inspection on Reactor Vessel Head Closure Studs 5 and 6 (correction to previous report where I said 6 and 7) was completed satisfactorily last night (verbal). These were the two studs with the most significant boron deposits. The VT1 Report is being drafted and should be ready for review on Monday 5/21. All removed stud s (20) are being cleaned. There 54 total studs.

o Inner 0 -ring inspection

  • Found deformation indicating a possible shift in o-ring location during reassembly following last refueling outage. The damage was in the vicinity of studs 7, 8, 9. This coincides with observed boron deposits on the reactor vessel.
  • Found deformation caused by o-ring clip damage in the vicinity of stud 50, which also coincides with observed boron deposits on the reactor vessel.

o Outer 0-ring inspection

  • {verbal report} There was a verbal report of a radial split in the outer o-ring. This would provide a path from the inner ring leakoff area to containment atmosphere.
  • There are deposits of magnetite (corrosion product) on the reactor vessel flange o-ring sealing surfaces and the outer o-ring, extending the full circumference of the a-ring. A sample of the deposit has been taken for analysis.

o RV-Flange: inspection complete, no damage noted.

o RV Head Flange, minor pitting in the inner o-ring seating surface in the vicinity of stud 45, no indication of leakage due to this minor pitting.

o 0 -ring seal leal<off lines have been shown to be unblocked by passing water through the lines.

  • Additional Corrective Actions o Change to 0-ring installation procedure (3-REF-002-GEN Section 2.10) based upon input from o-ring manufacturer.
  • More personnel to hold a-ring into position while tightening a-ring clips.
  • Use of star pattern vice alternating circular (180 degrees out, North first, then south, then rotate one clip clockwise) pattern to tighten the clip screws.
  • Use of a feeler gage to ensure that o-ring is centered in groove.
  • Schedule o If decision is that no repairs required , 0-ring installation is scheduled for 1600-1900, installation of RV Head onto RV flange from 1900-2200. Installation of studs/washers/nuts should be complete around noon on Monday.

My intention is to leave site and return Monday morning to review the Critical Decision Paper and the completed VT1 inspections on the studs. I will then head to HC for the CDBI.

Jeff

From: WHITLEY, STEPHEN To: lohnson lason; SCH ULTZE ROBIN PAU L: MCKINNEY MICHAEL R; SMITH IEANNIE M: SCHLUTERMAN DEBRA J; Loy. Dustyn: MILLS VICKI L; BLACK ANTHONY L; Young Amanda; entergy@ggtb.com; Holman Garen; Cope. Ryan : PHILLIPS. RANDY D; NICHOLSON. ERIC: Tindell. Brian : Blankenship. Anthony: Seiter. Mary: .!::@!1..

~ Ayers. Brandon: Marvin. Lisa E; SO!KA. DANIEL I: BEAIRD. ROBERT K; Bryan, lamey: B.o.ll.N..E...

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MICHAEL RAY* WEAVER PATRICK W; French. Albert; GRAY BILLY I: REHM PHILIP E: OWINGS. ROGER L; FAULKNER. HOWARD B: MARTIN. DONNIE; Shurter. Tony: Nietert. Elizabeth Morgan; Harkreader. Mary:

WILLIAMS. KEVIN: RASMUSSON. DAVID C: san dbothels@inpo.org; Gresh. Amber M; COOPER. MARCUS A:

DARBY KELLY: POPE NICHO LAS T: RUDER MICHAEL V STEPH ENSON GREGORY C: TOPLEY DAVID; GIJ.E.S.

GERALD R; Vest Derrick: FOX. ANDREW; KINNEY IOHN W; Maston Michael; CORLISS EDWARD A* BREGAR CURT A: chapman. daniel; TITUS. RUSSE LL; BARTES. KEVIN : Barker. David W; Carpenter. Stephen; LABEAF.

RQ.LAN.D; SIWIEC. GARY WAYNE : Smart. Shannon : Pridgin. David; MOSHER. NATALIE B; Bailey lll. Asa: .6ill!ley.

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FLOYD. VICTORIA B; Couch. Cheryl: SEITER. IEFFERY ALAN; Tobin . Margaret: TESSIER. ROBERT: HENDERSON.

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.E.PWA.B..P.: McGee Francis* Epperson Pa ula: HILL IESSICA; Barrett Andy; HEFLIN IACKIE L: REM ER CHAR LES A; ANO Training Instructers; HELMS. STEVE; ~So=t"';om

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Subject:

[Externa l_SenderJ 09/08/15 ANO CRG Report Note : Of the 202-page attached report . only one page is a Date: Thursday, September 03, 2015 3:11:12 PM respons ive record .

Attachments: At.JO_CR G_Repru:t. pdf' Report -Attached Stephen Whitley Performance Improvement I CAA Adm in Arkansas Nuclear One External: 479-858-4082

Vt i tl rholtl clocu111cat in Ctit i1tt) PF@~ri elnry Indian Point 3 Controlled Vendor Manual NYPA #:/902--lQQLL!i.10.J' Control Copy # : __ t_ __

INSTRUCTION MANUAL FOR HELICOFLEX 11 0" RINGS FOR THE REACTOR VESSEL HELICOFLEX CO.

2770 THE BOULEVARD P.O. BOX 9889 COLUMBIA, SC 29209 REACTOR VESSL HEAD 0-RINGS

r NEW YORK POWER AUTHORITY

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Authority INSTRUCTION MANUAL FOR HELICOFLEX "O" RINGS FOR THE REACTOR VESSEL HELICOFLEX CO.

2770 THE BOULEVARD P .0. BOX 9889 COLUMBIA, SC 29209 REACTOR VESSL HEAD 0-RINGS

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  • @ HELICOFLEX Company
  • REACTOR VESSEL 0-RING PAeKAGING

/

ZIP SEAL PACKING SAVES 50°/o MAN REM HOURS We have developed a packaging method to reduce possible exposure time during reactor vessel 0-ring installation by making unwrapping easier and therefore quicker.

Reactor vessel 0-rings are wrapped with several materials to ensure protection.

1 Tarnish retardant paper 2 Plastic film sheath 3 Split polyethylene tube 4 ZipSeal ne "Zip Sear' can be removed, like opening a sandwich bag, and resealed at will. The 0-rings can be inspected and repackaged without possible damage.

OPENING AND CLOSING INSTRUCTIONS e

step t step i Pull tab and peel off tape to open Separate Zip Seal tube step 3 step 4 Separate and peel zipper Re-press to close The hard plastic tube can also be peeled away and the plastic film and tarnish retardant paper removed. The areas that have small sections of hard plastic tube marked with black tape(s) are weld areas; one black plastic either side of section is weld number 1 for this 0-ring, the section marked with two tapes either side of the section is weld e number 2 and so on.

REACTOR PRESSURE VESSEL 0-RING SEALS STORAGE, HANDLING & INSTALLATION e INSTRUCTIONS STORAGE Remove the A-Frame support from the shipping crate and store the crate indoors.

Alternatively. the 0-Rings may be removed from the shipping crate and stored indoors.

The 0-Rings can be hung on padded supports, but should not touch the floor. The packaging material should remain on the 0-Rings during storage. The storage area should be dry.

Each 0-Ring is identified with a serial number tag. and care should be taken to prevent loss of this tag.

HANDLING If the 0-Rings are heat sealed in aluminum foil. (for protection during ocean transport) this foil may be removed before or after long tenn storage. Removal of this foil may

  • be accomplished by cutting the foil and tearing it away from the 0-Ring .

Each 0-Ring is wrapped in tarnish retardant paper and then covered with plastic tubing, which is taped closed. These materials must be carefully removed prior to installation.

For best results, it is recommended that a small "hook" blade with a flat back be used to remove the packaging material. Please note that the 0-Rings are plated with silver, and are very susceptible to scratching. Care must be exercised to avoid scratching the plated 0-Ring.

The taped portion of the plastic tubing should be toward the inside of the 0-Ring. The tape should be cut with the flat back of the blade toward the 0-Ring and the hooked blade cutting the tape. After all of the tape is removed, the plastic tubing can be removed by "peeling" the tubing away from the O*Ring. The remaining packaging materials can then be easily stripped away from the 0-Ring.

If the 0-Rings are packaged in the "Zip-Seal" sheath, the plastic tape should be cut at the weld locations (indicated by black tape), and the "Zip-Seal" should be pried away from the 0-Ring. The"Zip-Seal" may be removed for inspection purposes and re-used.

but the tarnish retardant paper should be replaced. The serial number tags should not be removed until immediately prior to installation.

e

e INSTALLATION Prior to installation of the 0-Rings. the grooves should be cleaned with a solvent and inspected for scratches across the sealing surfaces. Scratches should be removed by wet stoning the area. The wet stoned area should be blended into the adjacent surfaces over a minimum of six inches ( 15 cm). The groove should be inspected to insure that no more than 0.0005 inch per inch of circumference (0.005 mm per cm) has been removed. The groove should then be re-cleaned with a solvent and re-inspected.

After removing all of the packaging material, and prior to installation, the 0-Rings should be wiped down with acetone or other similar substance. The 0-Rings should be installed using a minimum of four (4) people. The 0-Ring should be held up to the groove with the slots adjacent to the clip positions. Place one area of the 0-Ring into the groove and with the flat of the hand, work the remaining areas into the groove.

The clips should then be installed. Please note that scratches on the outer periphery of 1he 0-Ring will not affect the performance of the seal.

If the silver plating becomes damaged, there is a good chance that the damage can be repaired. This repair can often be performed at the plant site, and will not affect the sealabiltiy of the 0-Ring. A shallow scratch, less than 0.002 inch (0.05 mm) can usually be bar polished with little difficulty. A deeper scratch may have to be locally e re-plated, but this can also be done at the plant site.

For further information and assistance, please contact one of our offices listed below:

}Yorldwide; Heliconex Company 2770 The Boulevard Columbia, SC 29209 Telephone: (803) 783-1880 FAX: (803) 783-4279 Europe; Le Carbone Lorraine 90 rue de la Roche du Geai 42029 Saint-Etienne Cedex I France Telephone: (33) 77 25 22 77 FAX (33) 77 37 18 14 Japan; Nishiyama Corporation Toshin 24 Ohmori Bldg.

6-8, 1-chome Ohmori-kita Ohta-ku, Tokyo 143 Japan Telephone: (03) S493-88S6 FAX (03) 3778 3057

2nOll-lE BOll.EVARD P.O. BOX 9889 Helicoflex COLUMBIA, SC 29209 USA TELEPHONE: (803) 783-1880 TELEFAX: (803) 783-4279 HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS FOR HELICOFLEX RPV SEALS:

DO:

1. Wear clean white gloves
2. Orient hands palms facing up with an open grip
3. Have a minimum of 5 people, with arms sprea~ spaced evenly on the perimeter to cany a 170 inch diameter seal e DONOT:

I. Handle with bare hands

2. Orient hands palms facing down with a tightly closed grip
3. Use less than the recommended number of people to cany the ring.

INS1RUCTIONS FOR TIGHTENING RETAINER SCREWS:

Do not overtighten the retainer screws. Excessive torque may cause the retainer pins to slip. Screws should be "finger" tight only.

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From: Haagensen, Brian To: Gray Haeold * .G.cay._.M.fil Cc: Schroeder, Daniel; Sjwy Andrew* satouri, Christopher; Setzer Thomas: McKown Loujs

Subject:

Task Status Report: 71111.18 U2 RPVo-ring replacement u nder EC72951 on 12/13 Date: Wednesday, Decem ber 13, 2017 12:55:36 PM I mportance: High Here is my quicklook review on the EC for the a-ring replacement at IP2. I have two observations - one of which is concerning to me but not an immediate safety concern. See below.

I will take these up with IPEC Engineering. I consider resolution to be a mode 4 hold for us.

Brian


Original Task-----

Subject:

71111.18 U2 RPV o-ring replacement under EC72951 on 12/13 Priority: High Start date: Wed 12/13/2017 Due date: Thu 12/21/2017 Status: In Progress

% Complete: 50%

Actual work: 1.0 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> Requested by: Haagensen, Brian (b)(5)

(b)(5)

Scope: Review replacement of RPV flange a-ring with an oversized a-ring under the equivalence change process.

Personnel Contacted:

Walt Wittich, Senior Engineer Angela LoPiccolo, Documents Reviewed:

EC72951, Oversized 0 -Ring Modification, Revision O (b)(4)

(b)(4)

From: Haagensen Brian To: Schroeder Daniel; Setzer Thomas: Henrioo Mark* Rossi Matthew Cc: ~  ; Safouri Christopher

Subject:

Postmortem

  • RC S leakage trends on Unit 2
  • how did we not see this coming?

Date: Monday. December 11, 201711 :16:00 AM Atta chments: External Sender FW RCS keakage ueods on Uoit 2 msg unideorified leakage srats treads rnsg External Sender msg Dan ,

l<b )(5)

Two weeks ago (on 11 /28), we identified a small but steady increase in the gross (total) RCS leak rate (see 1st attached email

- from 0.08 to 0.13 gpm). IP2 attributed this trend to an increase in eves leakage which did not make a lot of sense to me (CVCs leakage tends to trend in steps, not slow increases, when shifting charging pumps). However, the absolute value was tor the leak rate was still very small, On 12/8, we noted that IP2 wou ld be in AL 1 (see 2nd attached email) on Monday (today) but the small absolute value (0.05 apm UIL) seemed to be inconsequential CR-IP2-2017-05071 (see 3rd attached email) showed that there may have been indications of increased RCS leakage into containment following the MBFP outage last September based on Xe-133 / Ar-41 ratio trending, but nobody jdentjfjed it at the time b 5

!(b)( 9) I The most battling piece is that there was never any indication of a leak on the tell-tale drain line ram the external o-nng. In fact, the leakoff line temperature actually dropped slowly from 94 F to 73 F over the since September. Th is may have been caused by the line being plugged with boric acid from the previous inner a-ring leak.

The overall gross RCS leakage trend from September to December is as follows (see graph below) :

(Note - the gross leakage spike on 9/ 18 was caused by the MBFP outage)

(b)(4)

IPEC has written a CR to determine how their ODMI for the inner o-ring leak failed to catch the outer o-ring leak.

Brian C. Haagensen Senior Resident Inspector Indian Point Energy Center

/914) Z39-936Q /Office)

[(b )(6) I(Cell)

From: Haagensen, Brian Sent: 11 Dec 2017 15:02:37 +0000 To: Haagensen, Brian

Subject:

[External_Sender] FW: RCS keakage trends on Unit 2 Brian C. Haagensen Senior Resident Inspector Indian Point Energy Center 914-739-9360 (Office)

!(b)(6) ~cell)

In plant x5347 From: Safourl, Christopher Sent: Tuesday, November 28, 2017 1:35 PM To: Haagensen, Brian

Subject:

RE: RCS keakage trends on Unit 2 Understood, I'll check it out.

Thanks, Chris From: Haagensen, Brian Sent: Tuesday, November 28, 2017 9:02 AM To: Safouri, Christopher Cc: andrew.siwy@nrc.gov

Subject:

RCS keakage trends on Unit 2 Chris, Take a look at the Unit 2 total leakage trend below. Since 11/16, gross RCS leakage has slowly increased from 0.08 gpm to 0.13 gpm. This appears to be caused by an increase in non-RCS pressure bounda ry leakage (i.e. CVCS leakage) from 0.01 gpm to 0.05 gpm. These are still very small numbers so no action is needed but they apparently are seeing leakage through the charging pump packing again.

Brian

(b)(4)

Brian C. Haagensen Senior Resident Inspector Indian Point Energy Center 914-739*9360 Office)

(b)(6) cell) n pant x

Brian C. Haagensen Senior Resident Inspector Indian Point Energy Center 914-739-9360 (Office)

!(b)(6) I(cell)

In plant x5347 3

From: Burritt, Arthur Sent: Tuesday, August 04, 2015 11:50 AM To: Tsao, John Cc: Pickett, Douglas; Stewart, Scott; Newman, Garrett; Rich, Sarah; Floyd, Niklas

Subject:

FW: Indian Point Unit 3 flange leakage.docx Attachments: 8-4-15.docx

John, Thanks for your questions, we will use them as part of our longer term inspection of the underlying cause. I provided a couple of answers below (in red). Our current focus is the acceptability of continued operation in this condition and Nik Floyd will be contacting you for some help related to that. I have attached our daily status sheet which includes the questions we have asked to date and the answers we got back. The licensee's initial responses were very high level and Nik will be taking the lead to develop the next round of questions and potentially setting up a conference call.

From: Pickett, Douglas Sent: Monday, August 03, 2015 11:11 AM To: Burritt, Arthur Cc: Gray, Mel; Pinson, Brandon; Schussler, Jason; Stewart, Scott; Rich, Sarah; Newman, Garrett; Tsao, John; Floyd, Niklas; Hutchins, Lauren Subje ct: RE: Indian Point Unit 3 flange leakage.docx Art - Did anyone follow-up with John's questions below?

From: Tsao, John Sent: Thursday, July 23, 2015 10:04 AM To: Burritt, Arthur; Floyd, Niklas; Hutchins, Lauren Cc: Gray, Mel; Pinson, Brandon; Schussler, Jason; Pickett, Douglas; Stewart, Scott; Rich, Sarah; Newman, Garrett

Subject:

RE: India n Point Unit 3 flange leakage.docx

Art, I have the following questions but I do not know if my questions are out-of-process (outside of Inspection Manuals or Regional Office guidance) or inappropriate. If my questions are inappropriate and out-of-process, please ignore them. I do not need answers to my questions.

1.what examination the licensee performed on the 2 0-rings prior to installing the reactor vessel closure head?

[I presume that the licensee performed a visual exam which probably is not the ASME Code,Section XI qualified. It is probably similar to a walkdown. I presume that the 0-rings sit inside a groove. So the licensee can only see the top of the 0-ring, and not the entire circumference of the 0-ring (cross section). I wonder if the licensee would visually exam the 0-ring 360 degree of the RPV circumference. The guy probably stands on a platform way above the RPV head flange. He may not be able to see any little cracks on the 0-ring.].

2. Did the licensee's visual exam detect any degradation on the inner 0 -ring before the installation of the RPV head? If degradation was detected, did the licensee correct the problem? If the degradation was detected but the licensee did not correct the problem before RPV head installation, the licensee needs to provide justification why the degradation was not corrected.
3. If the licensee did not detect any degradation on the inner 0-ring before RPV head installation, we can assume that (a) the inner 0-ring was degraded during the operation by whatever degradation mechanism, or (b) the 0-ring degradation occurred prior to RPV head installation but the licensee's visual examination missed the degradation.
4. For Item 3(a) above, would the licensee perform a failure analysis in the next refueling outage when the RPV head is removed to determine the cause of degradation. If the cause of degradation is determined, would the licensee implement changes to the plant procedures/processes to minimize future degradation? If yes, which document(s)?

For Item 3(b), would the licensee enhance its examination of the 0-rings in the future? If so, how.

5. Would the licensee replace the inner 0-ring in the next refueling outage? If not, why not?

Yes, since the 0-ring crushed during the closure and torqueing process they are replaced every outage

6. Would the licensee replace the outer 0-ring in the next refueling outage? if not, why not?

Yes, since the 0 -ring crushed during the closure and torqueing process they are replaced every outage

7. Has the licensee pressure tested the drain line according to the ASME Code,Section XI, IWA-5000? If not, why not.

John From: Burritt, Arthur Sent: Wednesday, July 22, 2015 4:20 PM To: Tsao, John; Floyd, Niki as; Hutchins, Lauren Cc: Gray, Mel; Pinson, Brandon; Schussler, Jason; Pickett, Douglas; Stewart, Scott; Rich, Sarah; Newman, Garrett

Subject:

FW: Indian Point Un it 3 flange leakage.docx Attached are the questions that the residents have asked Entergy to date, regarding the IP3 flange inner and outer O ring failures. Please provide any additional questions or concerns so the residents can follow-up. We will update the questions and answers as we learn more through our inspections. Thanks for your support.

2

From: Gray, Harold Sent: Monday, December 11, 2017 2:26 PM To: Kulp, Jeffrey

Subject:

FW: Postmortem - RCS leakage trends on Unit 2 - !...,,

(b_)(,_,.5..,.

) ...,.,_.....,.,,,.__,..,,.......,-----

Attachments: [Exte rnal_Sender] FW: RCS keakage trends on Unit 2; Unident ified leakage stat s trends;

[External_Sender]

From: Haagensen, Brian Sent: Monday, December 11, 20171:15 PM To: Gray, Harold <Harold.Gray@nrc.gov>

Subje ct: FW: Postmortem - RCS leakage trends on Unit 2 -1 ...(b_)_(s_) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___.

From: Haagensen, Brian Sent: Monday, December 11, 201711:16 AM To: Schroeder, Danie l <Daniel.Schroeder@nrc.gov>; Setzer, Thomas <Thomas.Setzer@nrc.gov>; Henri on, Mark

<M ark. Henrion@nrc.gov>; Rossi, Matthew <Matthew.Rossi@nrc.gov>

Cc: Siwy, And rew <Andrew.Siwy@nrc.gov>; Safouri, Christopher <Christopher.Safouri@nrc.gov>

Subject:

Postmortem - RCS leakage trends on Unit 2 -1(b)(5) I Dan, Two weeks ago (on 11 /28), we identified a small but steady increase in the gross (total) RCS leak rate (see 151 attached email - from 0.08 to 0.13 gpm). IP2 attributed this trend to an increase in CVCs leakage which did not make a lot of sense to me (CVCs leakage tends to trend in steps, not slow increases, when shifting charging pumps). However. the absolute value was for the leak rate was still very small.

On 12/8, we noted that IP2 would be in AL 1 (see 2nd attached email) on Monday (today) but the small absolute value (0.05 gpm UIL) seemed to be inconsequential.

CR-IP2-2017-05071 (see 3rd attached email) showed that there may have been indications of increased RCS leakage into containment following the MBFP outage last September based on Xe-133 / Ar-41 ratio trending, but nobody identified it at the time.

(b)(5)

(b)(5) The most baffling piece is that there was never any indication o a ea on e e - a e rain ine ram e ex ernal o-ring. In fact, the leakoff line temperature actually dropped slowly from 94 F to 73 F over the since September. This may have been caused by the line being plugged with boric acid from the previous inner o-ring leak.

The overall gross RCS leakage trend from September to December is as follows (see graph below):

(Note - the gross leakage spike on 9/18 was caused by the MBFP outage)

(b)(4)

IPEC has written a CR to determine how their ODMI for the inner o-ring leak failed to catch the outer o-ring leak.

Brian C. Haagensen Senior Resident Inspector Indian Point Energy Center (914) 739-9360 (Office) l(b)(6)  !(Cell A 2

From: Grejves. 1onathan To: Screnci Diane; Sheehan Neil; Tifft Doug Cc: Setzer Thomas; Henrion Mark; Haagensen. Brian: Siwy Andrew; Rossi Matthew

Subject:

IP Quarterly Inspection Report Date: Tuesday, October 24, 2017 3:50:47 PM We will be issuing the IP quarterly inspection report (likely early next week). There are a couple issues in it that may draw some attention. We will email you a copy of the report when it is issued, but wanted to give you a couple bullet points. Let me know if you think a communication plan for the report is needed or if you think this is sufficient.

Thanks, Jon
  • DRS performed a review of their corrective actions, material testing reports, and root cause evaluation.
  • Entergy"s actions and overall response appears appropriate.
  • Previously identified URI (IR 2016-001) was closed based on the adequacy of Entergy's corrective actions and assessment.
  • No findings were identified during the review.
  • Pl&R Sample- Reactor Vessel Head 0 -Ring Leaks
  • Both units have a history of leaks from the RPV head 0 -rings. In many cases, leakage has only occurred past the inner 0 -ring and the outer, redundant 0 -ring has maintained the RPV head leak tight. Some of the occurrence have involved both 0 -rings leaking, which results in a rise in containment unidentified leakage. The report may indicate the current status, in which the inner 0 -ring only is leaking on both units.
  • TS 3.4.13 specifies limits for RCS leakage. While no pressure boundary leakage is allowed in TSs, leakage past seals and gaskets, such as the reactor vessel head 0 -ring, is acceptable to a specified limit because this type of minor leakage does not jeopardize reasonable assurance of adequate protection. The TS allows up to 1 gpm unidentified leakage.
  • In each case when both the inner and outer 0 -ring leaked, Entergy has identified the leakage at a very low level and has taken prudent, conservative action to shut down the plant to make the appropriate repairs before approaching the TS limit.
  • Entergy has taken corrective actions after each leak to replace the 0-rings and identified causal factors that potentially led to the leakage.
  • Corrective actions to address the various causal factors over the years has not be completely effective at preventing recurrence of the issue. This is acceptable per Entergy's CAP because each leak is characterized as a condition adverse to quality, vice a significant condition adverse to quality.

This characterization appears appropriate because of Entergy's ability to monitor for leakage, both initially from the inner 0 -ring and subsequently as unidentified leakage if both 0 -rings leak, and take actions to maintain compliance with their plant TSs.

  • Notwithstanding this, Entergy has identified additional actions they intend to take in the next outage that appear appropriate.
  • Discussion of Previous NOV- Inadequate Control of Floor Drains to Minimize Groundwater Contamination
  • The IR will include a discussion of Entergy's planned actions to address the NOV and actions that are still outstanding.
  • Outstanding actions identified as necessary to complete prior to NOV closeout include completion of a modification to the drain system, and inspection/cleaning of remaining Units 2 and 3 floor drains.

Jonathan Greives Branch Chief (Acting)

Branch 2- Division of Reactor Projects U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Region 1 610-337-5120 (W)

!(b )(6)  !( C) jonathan greives@orc gov

From: Grejves. 1ooathan To: Haagensen Brian Cc: Rieb Sarah Subj ect: RE: oring leakage Date: Wednesday, July OS, 2017 3:21 :30 PM Thanks Brian. I think this confirms my understanding. I'll follow-up with Diane to make sure she got what she needed.

From: Haagensen, Brian Sent: Wednesday, July 05, 2017 3:09 PM To: Greives, Jonathan <Jonathan.Greives@ nrc.gov>

Cc: Rich, Sarah <Sarah.Rich@nrc.gov>

Subject:

FW: oring lea kage Jon, I am responding to your email from June 30th (below).

(b )(5)

Sarah is concluding a Pl&R sample that will lay out the history and related causal analysis problems with o-ring leakage on both units. See her email below.

(b )(5)

We are still waiting to see that final approved version of the causal analysis that is completed from the o-ring failure that led to the June outage.

Brian From: Rich, Sarah Sent: W ednesday, July 05, 2017 10:45 AM To: Haagensen, Brian <Brian.Haagensen@nrc.gov>

Subject:

RE: oring leakage In 2015, Entergy determined that the cause of the reactor vessel flange leakage was improper o-ring installation due to vague procedural guidance. This year, they proposed that the current o-ring leakage, and possibly previous a-ring leakage, was caused by foreign material introduced into the sealing surface from water movement during reactor

vessel head installation. They took actions to mitigate that potential cause during the recent o-ring outage. However, there is not a lot of evidence to support that cause.

Entergy has not addressed potential causes such as sealing surface irregularities, incomplete procedure adherence, or o-ring design, although they may choose to do so in future corrective actions.

Please note that Unit 3 experienced leakage from the inner o-ring prior to start up from the o-ring replacement outage, but that information is not common public knowledge.

From: Haagensen, Brian Sent: Friday, June 30, 2017 4:45 PM To: Rich, Sarah <Sarah Rich@nrc.gov>

Subject:

Fw: oring leakage Sarah, Please draft the response to these questions.

Brian C. Haagensen Senior Reside nt Inspector Indian Point Energy Center 914-739-9630/1 (office) l(b)(6) l(cell)

(home)

From: Greives, Jonathan Sent: Friday, June 30, 2017 2:14:45 PM To: Screnci, Diane Cc: Haagensen, Brian; Setzer, Thomas; Rich, Sarah; Siwy, Andrew

Subject:

Re: oring leakage They did not identify a "smoking gun" when removing the two orings. Based on that, I don't think the licensee has or will be able to identify a definitive cause. They identified a number of potential causes in their failure modes and effect analysis and took corrective actions to address a number of those causes. In reality, it was probably a combination of a number of those causes.

In 2015, they took a similar approach, but only addressed one of the causes that they felt was the most likely. This year, they took the approach of address ing any cause that couldn't be definitively ruled out. I would have to confirm with the residents and licensee next week if there were any possible causes that were not addressed.

Let me know if that answer is sufficient.

Jon Jonathan Greives

Regional State Liaison Officer U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission- Region 1 61 0-337-5337 (W) l<b )(6) Icq jonathan.greives@nrc.gov On: 30 June 2017 12:03, "Screnci, Diane" <Diane.Screncj@nrc.gov> wrote:

I've been asked whether we know the cause of the most recent U3 o-ring leakage , yet?

What about the leakage in 2015, what was the cause?

Thanks-Diane Screnci Sr. Public Affairs Officer USNRC, RI 610-337-5330

From: Guzman Richard To : Greives looathan; Setzer Thomas* I iftt Doug: Haagensen Brian: Siwv Andrew* Rossi Matthew* ~

Diane; Sheehan Neil: Tifft Doug

Subject:

LTR-1 7-023 5 Response/Closu re l ett er to Mr. Thomas Gurdziel Re: 10 CFR 2. 206 Peti tio n Rega rding the Reactor Vessel Head 0 -Rings at I ndian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 3 Date: Friday, Septem ber 22, 2017 9: 48:08 AM ML17243A186 is publicly Att achments: ML17243AJ86 pdf available in ADAMS .

FYI - attached is Closeout letter in response to Tom Gurdziel 2.206 petition.

Subject:

LTR-17-0235 Response/Closure Letter to Mr. Thomas Gurdziel Re: 10 CFR 2.206 Petition Regarding the Reactor Vessel Head 0 -Rings at Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 3 ADAMS Accession No. ML17243A186 ADAMS Package Accession No. ML17163A255 View ADAMS Properties ML17163A255 Open ADAMS Package /LJR-17-0235 -1 OEDO Ticket - E-mail re* A Serious and Repetitive Matter\

Rich Guzman Sr. PM , Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office: 0-9C07 I Phone: 301-415-1030

From : s1wy. Andrew To: Haagensen Brian; Rossi Matthew Subj ect: RE: Request for comment/review on 40A.2 0 -Ring Pl&R sample Date: Thursday, October 19, 2017 2:26:33 PM Attachments: image001.ong image002.ong 20Jl.*OQ3 0 -riog_Pl&.R w.ci~-u.p Comments by S.lWY.Jiocx ORIGINAL REVISED Readability Statistics l ii I .I Counts Words 874 Characters 4792 I Paragraphs 8 I Sentences 34 Averages Sentences per Paragraph 4.8 Words per Sentence 25.5 Characters per Word 5.3 Readability Passive Sentences 38%

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Resident Inspector I Indian Point Region I I 1':9 14.739.9360 From: Haagensen, Brian Sent : Th ursday, Oct ober 19, 201711:17 AM

To: Siwy, Andrew <Andrew.Siwy@nrc.gov>; Rossi, Matthew <Matthew.Rossi@nrc.gov>

Subject:

Request for comment/review on 40A.2 0 -Ring Pl&R sample I have substantially re-written Sarah's 0 -ring Pl&R inspection observations. Please review and send me your edits/comments.

a. Findings and Observations (b)(5)

(b)(5)

Brian C-1..Haagensen Senior Resident Inspector Indian Point Energy Center 914 739-9360 (Office)

(b)(6) (Cell)

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From: Schroeder. Daniel To: Haagensen Brian; Pelton David Cc: Rossi Matthew; Setzer Thomas: Siwy Andrew Su bj ect : Re: IP3 Outage status as of 1000 11/5 Date: Sunday, Novem ber 05, 2017 10:33:48 AM

Brian, Than ks for the updat e. Looks like progress will be slow unt il Monday .

Dan From: Haagensen, Brian Sent: Sunday, November 5, 2017 10:23 AM To: Pelton, David; Schroeder, Daniel Cc: Fuller, Justin; Haagensen, Brian; Henrion, M ark; Highley, Christopher; M cKown, Lou is; Rossi, Matthew; Setzer, Thomas; Siwy, And rew

Subject:

FW: IP3 Outage status as of 1000 11/5 Dave, Dan, Unit 3 remains in mode 3, NOT/NOP with heat removal on the condenser steam dumps and MDAFW pumps feeding all 4 S/Gs. All 4 RCPs are in operation.

Nothing much happened overnight. The issues list remains as before with some minor updates. They are clearly limited in resources.

The critical path is clearly the main generator exciter repairs. They only have one qualified l&C tech to work on the exciter circuit. Siemens (the vendor) is sending in 2 technicians to support the work. One arrived late last night, the other comes this morning. Engineering has completed the possible FMA cause branches but have not yet started to rule out any failed components. There are 45 potential components that could cause this failure. They only have 14 of these components in the warehouse so parts supply may become problematic when the figure out what has failed.

The (unofficial) OPS assessment is that they can last for another day or two before decay heat reduces to a point where they have to shut the MSIVs and break vacuum in the condenser.

The post-trip review is not yet completed. We will review this document once it has been completed and approved. I am not sure why it is taking so long.

Matt Rossi will be relieving me at 1200 today and I will be driving back to my house in CT.

Current Issues List (in order of priority):

1. Determine and repair the cause of the main generator trip - mode 2 hold

- Troubleshooting is scheduled for today - repairs are scheduled for tomorrow

- Siemens (vendor) arriving today test equipment processed last night.

2. MS-116-2 steam leak at flange (this is a manual isolation valve for the heating steam strainer on the main turbine) - leak injection by Team Inc. scheduled for Monday, 11/6 (or shut MSIVs and weld repair bonnet flange)
3. Air leak on TCV-1104 (FCU SW outlet valve) - repair leak - shop work completed -

repair today

4. Engineering assessment of main turbine overspeed - mode 2 hold - ETC now 11 /5

- awaiting ABB input

5. RCS letdown isolated prematurely (4% high in PZR level) - in planning
6. 31 CCW pump needs to be replaced (was in progress at time of the trip) - mode hold or mode change with risk assessment - scheduled to be completed by Monday, 11 /6
7. 33 RCP vibrations are high - scheduled for 11/5
8. 32 RCP has a bad vibration probe - scheduled for 11/5
9. 10. 34 inverter auto-transferred to alternate AC source because of a failed 34 feedwater heater cascade valve - mode 2 hold ETC 11 /6 ready to work
11. 32 MBFP suction relief lifted - repair or accept as is with engineering evaluation -

mode 1 hold - decision needed to replace relief valve or retest lift setpoint - ETC 11 /6

12. 33 isophase heat exchanger leak - replace heat exchanger - mode 2 hold ETC 11/6
13. 34 isophase fan low flow alarm chattering repairs - planning completed
14. IA air leak on HP steam dump MS-PCV-1123 - ETC 11/6
15. Aux steam leak on drain from U2 to U3 steam - potential ground water issue - ETC 11/6
16. Can't add chemicals to 33 SG because of leak on CF-134 - repair leak - needs to be scheduled
17. Adjusted the bias on PC-409A controller (feedwater pump cutback controller) - PMT on startup Completed
  • Boric acid residue identified during o ring inspection Engineering assessment is tl9at tl9is not indicative of o ring leal(age Closed Next update - Sunday evening by Matt Rossi.

Brian From: Haagensen, Brian Sent: Saturday, November 04, 2017 1:15 PM To: Pelton, David <David.Peiton@nrc.gov>

Cc: Tifft, Doug (Doug.Tifft@nrc.gov) <Doug.Tifft@nrc.gov>; Screnci, Diane <Diane.Screoci@orc.gov>;

Sheehan, Neil <NejLSheehan@nrc.gov>; Guzma n, Richa rd <Richard Guzman@nrc.gov>; Fuller, Justin

<Justin.Fuiler@nrc.gov>; Haagensen, Brian <Brian.Haagensen@nrc.gov>; Henrion, Mark

; Highley, Christopher <Christopher Highley@nrc gov>; McKown, Louis

<Louis.McKowo@nrc.gov>; Rossi, Matthew <Matthew.Rossi@orc gov>; Schroeder, Da niel

<DaoieLSchroeder@nrc.gov>; Setzer, Thomas <Thomas.Setzer@nrc.gov>; Siwy, Andrew

<Andrew.Siwy@nrc.gov>

Subject:

Restart efforts are delayed

IP3 remains stable in Mode 3 on the condenser steam dumps at NOT/NOP. They are conducting a containment entry to walkdown systems inside the VC and especially to look for evidence of a-ring leakage.

My assessment is that Indian Point Unit 3 is several days away from restarting the plant.

The issues list continues to grow as discovery identifies more problems from the trip. The OCC has not yet put a restart schedule together. They are discussing the possibility of cooling the plant down to mode 4 to effect some repairs.

They are having significant problems getting craft resources to come in over the weekend to repair the items on the issues list. Management is escalating the issue "to the highest level" to the Union.

Last night, the SM evaluated the need to declare a NOUE (EAL HU3.1) because of the CO2 discharge into the turbine building. He ultimately decided it was not required because the "asphyxiant gas did not adversely affect normal operations," but he looked hard at declaring the event. We should ask DRS EP to review this decision.

The Post Trip review report is not yet completed. Apparently, Engineering did not get support from the other departments (maintenance, OPS, planning, l&C, electrical etc.) to conduct the PTR and the FMA analysis for the cause of the trip.

Current Issues List (in order of priority):

1. Determine and repair the cause of the main generator trip - mode 2 hold - no time estimate for completion - Siemens (vendor) arri1ving tomorrow morning.
2. MS-116-2 steam leak at flange (this is a manual steam heater valve on the main turbine) - leak injection by Team Inc. scheduled for Monday, 11 /6 (or shut MSIVs and weld repair bonnet flange)
3. Air leak on TCV-1104 (FCU SW outlet valve) - repair leak - in progress ETC
4. Engineering assessment of main turbine overspeed - mode 2 hold - ETC 11 /5
5. RCS letdown isolated prematurely (4% high in PZR level) - has not been scheduled
6. 31 CCW pump needs to be replaced (was in progress at time of the trip) - mode 21 hold or mode change with risk assessment - scheduled to be completed by Monday, 11 /6
7. 33 RCP vibrations are high - needs to be scheduled
8. 32 RCP has a bad vibration probe - needs to be scheduled
9. 34 inverter auto-transferred to alternate AC source because of a failed 34 feedwater heater cascade valve - mode 2 hold ETC 11 /6
10. 32 MBFP suction relief lifted - repair or accept as is with engineering evaluation -

mode 1 hold - decision needed to replace relief or retest

11. 33 isophase heat exchanger leak - plug tube or replace heat exchanger - mode 2 hold ETC 11 /6
12. Can't add chemicals to 33 SG because of leak on CF-134 - repair leak - needs to be scheduled At their present pace, restart will be sometime in the middle of next week. This will be a race between the reduction in decay heat and being able to maintain the RCS on the

condenser steam dumps. When decay heat gets too low, they will have to shut the MSIVs and break vacuum in the condenser to prevent cooling down the RCS . Recovery will take much longer.

I completed my plant walkdowns and did not find any additional significant issues.

Next email update at 1900 this evening.

Brian C. Haagensen Senior Resident Inspector Indian Point Energy Center 914 739-9360 (Office)

(b)(6) (Cell)

From: Haagensen , Brian To: Haagensen Brian

Subject:

[Externa l_Sender]

Date: Monday, Dece mber 18, 20171 1: 10:23 AM Note: 20-page Condition Report withheld in its entirety Attachments: crsl 13.odf under FO IA exemption 4.

From: Schroeder Daniel To: Gre;ves looathan; Tifft Doug; Sheehan Neil; Screnci Diane Cc: Haagensen Brian

Subject:

I ndia n Point Outreach Date: Tuesday, Decem ber 12, 2017 8:1 7:51 AM Indian Point is not planning any near term outreach to stakeho lders regarding the Unit 2 forced outage. The outage scope includes replacement of 21 RCP seal, replacement of RPV o ring seals (inner and outer), and repair of an isolation valve for the steam driven aux f eedwater pump.

Daniel Schroeder Projects Branch 2 Divisio n of Reactor Projects 610-337-5262

From: Schroeder. Daniel To: ~  ; Gray Harold: Kulp leffrey Cc: Grejyes lonathan: Tifft Doug; Screnci Diane: Pelton Dayjd* Lorson Raymond; Welling Blake: Yerokun liroi:

Haai:ensen. Brian

Subject:

FW: IP2 Outage Status PM 1630 12/11 Date: Tuesday, December 12, 2017 6:21:26 AM The decision to replace the RPV o-ring seals has been finalized. The new seals are slightly thicker than the old seals. Revised start-up date pushes back three days to December 23rd.

Dan From: Haagensen, Brian Sent: Monday, December 11, 2017 4:52 PM To: Fuller, Just in <Just in.Fuller@nrc.gov>; Haagensen, Brian < Brian.Haagensen@nrc.gov>; Henrion, Mark <M ark.Henrion@nrc.gov>; Highley, Ch ristopher <Ch ristopher. High ley@ nrc.gov>; McKown, Louis <Louis.McKown@nrc.gov>; Rossi, Matthew <Matthew. Rossi@nrc.gov>; Schroeder, Dan iel

<Daniel.Schroeder@nrc.gov>; Setzer, Thomas <Thomas.Setzer@nrc.gov>; Siwy, Andrew

<Andrew .Siwy@nrc.gov>; Safouri, Christopher <Christopher.Safouri@nrc.gov>

Cc: Guzman, Richard <Richard.Guzman@nrc.gov>; Weil, Jenny <Jenny.Weil@n rc.gov>; Tifft, Doug

<Doug.Tifft@nrc.gov>; Sheehan, Neil <Neil.Sheehan@nrc.gov>

Subject:

IP2 Outage Status PM 1630 12/11 IP2 has decided NOT to laser scan or depth mic/measure the RPV flange surface defects during this outage (option #2 in the critical decision paper) .

Instead, they intend to:

  • Drain down the RCS to 68 ft (below the flange but above the SIG tube sheet)
  • remove the RPV head,
  • clean the flange sealing surfaces,
  • replace the leaking o-rings with new, oversized o-rings,
  • replace the 21 RCP seals,
  • reset the head, refill the RCS and
  • proceed to plant restart The RCS drain down has been delayed until tomorrow on day shift. They plan to remove the equipment access hatch this evening.

Plant conditions are essentially what they were this morning.

Brian C. Haagensen Senior Resident Inspector Indian Point Energy Center (914) 739-9360 (Office) l<b)(6) I(Cell)

From: Schroeder Daniel To: Lorson Raymond: Pelton David; Welling Blake; Yerokun limi Cc: Scre nci Diane; Sheehan Neil; Greives i onathan; Tifft Doug; Safou ri Christopher; Siwy Andrew* Haage nse n Brian

Subject:

Indian Poi nt Unit 2 Update Date: Saturday, Decem ber 09, 20 17 9:12: 58 AM Indian Point Unit 2 shut down at 0119 to sta rt a forced outage to rep lace the 21 reactor coolant pump seal. An initial containment entry was made by the licensee, and boron accumu lation was found on the RPV, indicating leakage past the outer o-ring. THis has been an issue in the past, and the licensee believed that the inner seal was leaking and the outer sea l was hold ing. The licensee is eva luating t he current situation . Un it 2 wil l have a refue l outage in the sp ring. The unid entified leak rate for Unit 2 has been low, cons istent ly less than 0.1 gpm . The licensee is eva luating the situation . Outage to replace the seal requires drain ing water leve l below RPV flange, but removing the head to replace the o-ri ngs would extend the outage.

An update wi ll be provided once the licensee has made a decision, and DRS assistance is requested next wee k if the licensee decides to leave the current seals in place . Dra in down to a level be low the RPV flange is scheduled for Monday.

Dan

From: Bl PBPMAIL RESOURCE To: Hochmuth Diane: Bich Sarah; Haagensen Brian; Setzer Thomas* Siwy Andrew: Henrjon Mark: ~

~

Subj ect: FW: LTR-17-0235 Response/Closure Letter to Mr. T homas Gurdziel Re: 10 CFR 2.206 Petition Regarding the Reactor Vessel Head 0-Rings at Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 3 Date: Thursday, September 21 , 2017 2 :14:25 PM From: RidsRgn1 MailCenter Resource Sent: Thursday, September 21, 2017 2:1 4:23 PM (UTC-05:00) Eastern Time (US & Canada)

To: R1 DRPMAIL RESOURCE; R1DRSMAIL RESOURCE

Subject:

FW: LTR-17-0235 Response/Closure Letter to Mr. Thomas Gurdziel Re: 10 CFR 2.206 Petition Regarding the Reactor Vessel Head 0 -Rings at Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 3 From: Chen, Qiao-Lin Sent: Wednesday, September 20, 2017 2:35 PM To: RidsNrrDorl Resource <RidsNrrDorl. Resource@ nrc.gov>; RidsNrrPMlndianPoint Resource

<RidsN rrPM lndianPoint.Resou rce@nrc.gov>; RidsACRS_MailCTR Resource

<RidsACRS_Ma ilCTR. Resource@ nre.gov>; RidsSecyMai ICenter Resource

<RidsSecyMailCenter.Resource@nrc.gov>; RidsNrrDss Resource <RidsNrrDss.Re source@ nre.gov>;

RidsRgnlMai lCenter Resource <RidsRgn1MailCenter.resource@ nrc.gov>; RidsNrrDorllpll Resource

<RidsN rrDorlLpll.Resource@n rc.gov>; RidsNrrLALRonew icz Resource

<RidsN rrLALRonewicz. Resource@ nrc.gov>; RidsOpa Mai I Resource

<RidsOpaMail.Resource@nrc.gov>; RidsOcaMailCenter Reso urce

<RidsOcaMailCenter.Resource@nrc.gov>; Bowen, Jeremy <Jeremy.Bowe n@nrc.gov>; RidsNrrDeEvib Resource <RidsNrrDeEvib.Resou rce@nrc.gov>; Banic, Merrilee <Merrilee. Banic@ nrc.gov>; Clark, Theresa <Theresa.Clark@ nrc.gov>; RidsEdoMailCenter Resource

<RidsEdoMailCenter.Resou rce@nrc.gov>; RidsN rrDorl Lspb Resource

<RidsNrrDorl Lspb.Resource@ nrc.gov>; Greives, Jonathan <Jonathan.Greives@ nrc.gov>

Cc: Cox, Linda <Linda.Cox@ nrc.gov>

Subject:

LTR-17-0235 Response/Closure Letter to Mr. Thomas Gurdziel Re: 10 CFR 2.206 Petit ion Regard ing t he Reactor Vessel Head 0 -Rings at Indian Poi nt Nuclear Generati ng Unit No. 3 Date: September 18, 2017 To: Thomas Gurdziel

Subject:

L TR- 17-0235 Response/Closure Letter to Mr. T homas Gurdziel Re: l O CFR 2.206 Petition Regarding the Reactor Vessel Head 0-Rings at Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 3 ADAMS Accession Nos.

PKG MLl 7 163A255 Incoming ML17166A097 a nd ML17163A254 Response MLl 7 l l 7243A l 86

View ADAMS Properties M L1 7163A255 Open ADAMS Package (LTR-17-0235- J OEDO Ticket - E-mail re: A Serious and Repetitive Matter)

From: Grejves. 1ooathan To: Pelton Davjd; Lorson Raymond Cc: Haagensen Brian; Setzer Thomas: Guzman Richard

Subject:

RE: NRC Perspectives on Indian Point Unit 2 and 3 Date: Thursday, August 03, 2017 4: 13:03 PM Attachments: NRC Perspectives on Entergy Plants I P- rev 2.docx Here"s another version with a couple editorial issues addressed.

From: Greives, Jonathan Sent: Thursday, August 03, 2017 3:36 PM To: Pelton, David <David.Pelton@nrc.gov>; Raymond Lorson (Raymond.Lorson@nrc.gov)

<Raymond.Lorson@nrc.gov>

Cc: Haagensen, Brian <Brian.Haagensen@nrc.gov>; Thomas Setzer (Thomas.Setzer@nrc.gov)

<Thomas.Setzer@nrc.gov>; Guzman, Richard <Richard.G uzman@nrc.gov>

Subject:

RE: NRC Perspectives on Indian Point Unit 2 and 3 Ray and Dave, Attached is a revision to the IP paper with comments addressed. Let me know if th is hit the mark.

Thanks, Jon From: Greives, Jonathan Sent: Thursday, August 03, 2017 10:24 AM To: Pelton, David <Dayid.Peiton@nrc.gov>

Cc: Raymond Lorson (Raymond.Lorson@nrc.gov) <Raymond.Lorson@nrc.gov>; Haagensen, Brian

<Bria n.Haagensen@nrc.gov>; Thomas Setzer (Thomas.Setze r@nrc.gov) <Thomas.Setzer@nrc.gov>;

Guzma n, Richard <Richard Guzma n@nrc gov>

Subject:

NRC Perspectives on Indian Point Unit 2 and 3

Dave, Attached is PB2"s input on Indian Point Units 2 and 3. Please let me know if you have any comments or need additional detail. Note that the last page has some detail on licensing actions that I thought would be of interest to you and Ray, but it can be deleted from the package sent up to Dan and Dave if you think it's too much.

Very Respectfully, Jon Jonathan Greives Branch Chief (Acting)

Branch 2- Division of Reactor Projects U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission- Region 1

610-337-5120 (W) l<b)(6) I(C) jonatha n.greives@nre.gov

OFFICIAL USE ONLY - SENSITIVE IN I ERNA[ INFORMATION NRC Perspectives on Indian Point Units 2 and 3 Current NRC Assessment of Performance

  • Unit 2: Licensee Response Column
  • Unit 3: Licensee Response Column o Recently transitioned out of Column 2 (in November 2016) o IPEC has had fewer plant events resulting in trips and power reductions this year when compared to recent years.

Perspective on Actions Taken in Past 12-18 Months

  • In February, 2017, Entergy announced the early plant closure of Units 2 and 3 in 2020 and 2021 , respectively. Employees initially reacted with uncertainty to the announcement as expressed to resident inspectors during routine interactions. Some of these concerns were allayed for non-union staff with the offer of retention packages.

Entergy expects to further address staffing concerns with the union labor force during the upcoming contract negotiations (Operations, Maintenance, and Radiation Protection contract expires January 18, 2018). Recent discussion with senior site leadership indicates that they are concerned about the impact of the early plant shutdown on labor negotiations that will be taking place this fall.

  • The spring Unit 3 refueling outage, 3R 19, was completed on time and without any major events. This was a substantial improvement over the previous Unit 2 refueling outage.
  • Historically, the station has struggled with rigorously implementing station processes.

Emphasis by senior leadership, and in particular the new SVP who started in August, 2016, has reinforced the commitment to do things right the first time and follow formal station processes. This has resulted in some improvement in equipment reliability as evidenced by fewer reactor trips and equipment failures in the past 12 months.

Continuing Challenges/Concerns

  • Entergy is planning extensive troubleshooting for the next two refueling outages to further identify the cause of repetitive reactor pressure vessel (RPV) head a-ring leaks.

o Unit 3 experienced a double o-ring leak following the spring refueling outage, requiring plant shutdown to repair. This was the second consecutive forced outage following a refueling outage for Unit 3 for this reason.

o Currently, the inner o-rings on both units are leaking and the RPV head seal is being maintained on the redundant outer a-ring.

  • Notwithstanding the improvements noted above, Engineering, Operations, Maintenance and Production continue to struggle with rigorously implementing processes that require working across departments, indicating this is an area of continued focus. Specifically, several recently documented violations were either caused by or attributed to poor communications between work groups.
  • INPO/NANT has placed the operator training prog rams on probation as of July 20. IPEC is currently organizing for the recovery effort. Initial review of the report by the resident OfifilCIAL USE ONLY .... SENSITIVE INTERNAL INFORMATION

OfifilCIAL USE ONLY - SENSITIVE INTERNAL INFORMATION inspectors did not identify any immediate safety concerns. The residents, in consultation with regional operations examiners, will continue to review Entergy's efforts to improve performance in this area in accordance with EDO Policy 220.

Significant Licensing Issues

  • License Renewal Review: The staff has sent several rounds of RAls regarding issues related to the overall adequacy of the Service Water Integrity Program Aging Management Program. A site audit was performed to address the remaining issues.

NRC staff is targeting completion of the environmental and safety reviews by August 2017 and February 2018, respectively, with expected issuance of the renewed license projected for June 2018.

  • Spent Fuel Pool Criticality Analysis License Amendment: Entergy plans to submit an LAR in Oct 2017 to resolve non-conservative spent fuel pool technical specifications and a revised SFP criticality analysis. Based on a discussion during a recent pre-application meeting, the NRC staff expects the LAR will be uniquely complex as certain aspects of the proposed analysis would involve a first of a kind review.
  • Deferrals Associated with Early Plant Closure: In Feb 2017, Entergy notified the NRC that power operations will permanently cease by April 30, 2020 and 2021 at Units 2 and 3, respectively. In light of this, Entergy has requested numerous licensing actions and/or deferral of actions for NRC approval that would extend the required completion dates until after unit shutdown. Some of the more notable proposed actions include:

o Cyber Security Plan Milestone 8 Implementation*

o Seismic Reevaluations*

o Flooding Reevaluations*

o Unit 3 Containment Integrated Leak Rate Test Frequency Extension o Unit 3 Reactor Vessel Weld Inspections (10 year ISi) o Unit 3 Reactor Vessel Cold Leg Nozzle Inspections o Unit 3 ISi Program Period/Interval Extension o Unit 3 MRP-227 Reactor Vessel Internals Inspection

  • Indicates the LAR has already been submitted.

Additional Observations or Questions

  • The critical path to decommissioning the reactors is the capability to expedite transfer of the spent fuel and greater than class C (GTCC) waste to the ISFSI pad.

o The ISFSI pad will have to be increased in size from a capacity of 75 dry casks to at least 130 dry casks to store all fuel assemblies (more when GTCC waste is considered).

o At current transfer capabilities (4 casks per year), it will take approximately 18 years to transfer all 4094 fuel assemblies that will be generated at shutdown.

Largely, this is constrained by the licensing restriction that Unit 3 spent fuel cannot be transferred to Unit 2 until after it has been in the pool for at least 1O years.

o Entergy is evaluating options to increase the rate of dry cask transfer, including installation of dry cask loading equipment into the Unit 3 spent fuel pool.

o Approval of the Unit 2 SFP LAR is critical to decommissioning on a reasonably short time frame.

OFFICIAL USE ONLY .. SENSITIVE INTERNAL INFORMATION

From: Rich, Sarah To: Grejves lonathan; Setzer Thomas* Haagensen Brian: Guzman Richard Cc: Siwy. Andrew; Henrion Mark Subj ect : RE: NRC Perspectives on Entergy Plants Rev 2 Date: Thursday, August 03, 2017 8:43:43 AM Inn (b)(5)

Sarah From: Greives, Jonathan Sent: Thursday, August 03, 2017 7:52 AM To: Setzer, Thomas <Thomas.Setzer@nrc.gov>; Haagensen, Brian <Brian. Haagensen@nrc.gov>;

Guzma n, Richard <Richard.Guzma n@nrc.gov>

Cc: Rich, Sa rah <Sa rah.Rich@nrc.gov>; Siwy, Andrew <Andrew.Siwy@nrc.gov>; Henrion, M ark

<Mark.Henrion@nrc.gov>

Subject:

NRC Perspectives on Entergy Plants Rev 2

See attached. As discussed , I would like to submit to Division management by lunch. Let me know if I have made any changes that are inaccurate.

Jon

From: Bl Radiation safety Officer To: Haagensen Brian Subj ect: RE: Request for neutron dosimeters next week Date: Wednesday, August 16, 2017 7:59: 11 AM Ok. Than ks!

From: Haagensen, Brian Sent: Tuesday, August 15, 20 17 1:39 PM To: Rl_Radiation_Safety_Officer <Rl_Rad iation_Safety_Officer.Resource@nrc.gov>

Cc: Seeley, Shawn <Shawn.Seeley@nrc.gov>; Rich, Sarah <Sarah.Rich@nrc.gov>

Subject:

RE: Request for neutron dosimeters next week

Harry, We never had to go into containment at power (as we had expected) as IPEC made the prompt decision to shutdown and fix the a-ring instead.

Brian From: Rl_ Radiation_Safety_ Officer Sent: Tuesday, August 15, 2017 1:34 PM To: Haagensen, Brian <Brjan.Haagensen@nrc.gov>

Cc: Seeley, Shawn <Shawn Seeley@nrc.gov>; Rich, Sarah <Sarah.Rjch@nrc gov>

Subject:

RE: Request for neutron dosimeters next week Brian; I got my original neutron dosimeter log sheet back, and it is blank.

Did you folks NOT need to use the neutron dosimeters that I sent with Jeff Ku lp? Just trying to close the loop on 2Q2017.

Harry From: Anagnostopoulos, Harold Sent: Thursday, June 01, 2017 10:50 AM To: Haagensen, Brian <Brian Haagensen@nrc gov>; Setzer, Thomas <Thomas Setzer@ nrc gov>;

Kulp, Jeffrey <Jeffrey Kulp@nrc.gov>

Cc: Seeley, Shawn <Shawn Seeley@nrc gov>

Subject:

RE: Request for neutron dosimet ers next week Neut ron dosimet ers were handed t o Kulp.

The envelope includes a sheet of instruct ions to follow.

Harry Harold (Harry) Anagnostopoulos, CHP, CSP (6 10) 337-5322 Office From: Haagensen, Bria n Sent: Wednesda y, May 31, 2017 10:22 AM To: Setzer, Thomas; Kulp, Jeffrey Cc: Anag nostopou los, Ha rold

Subject:

Request fo r neutron dosimeters next w eek As a contingency measure, please send up 3 neutron dosimeters next week with the 71111.1?T team - or with Jeff Kulp . We may be looking at accompanying the licensee on an at-power entry. If the decision is made to try to defer the IP3 outage until the fall , we may want to look in at the conditions ourselves .

Brian C. Haagensen Senior Resident Inspector Indian Point Energy Center 914 739-9360 (Office)

(b)(6) (Cell)

From: Siwy Andrew To: Haagensen Brian

Subject:

RE : Uni t 3 o-ring leakage inspection - SAT Date: Friday, January 05, 2018 12:04:38 PM I know it doesn ' t matter, but for what it's worth, the entry/inspection was Thursday ©

~ S:W,'1, P.E.

Resident Inspector I Indian Point Region I I ir :914.739.9360 From: Haagensen, Brian Sent: Friday, Ja nuary OS, 2018 11:10 AM To: Schroeder, Daniel <Daniel.Schroeder@nrc.gov>

Cc: Siwy, Andrew <And rew.Siwy@ nrc.gov>; Safouri, Christ opher <Christopher.Safouri@nrc.gov>

Subject:

Unit 3 o-ri ng lea kage inspection - SAT Unit 3 completed a containment entry this morning for the expl icit purpose of inspecting the Unit 3 RPV head and flange area for any boric acid leakage past the outer o-ring.

The inspection showed no evidence of leakage pas the outer o-ring .

Brian C. Haagensen Senior Resident Inspector Indian Point Energy Center (914) 739-9360 (Office)

!(b)(6) I (Cell)

From: Paul To: HbH6l Cc: Sheehan Neil: Screnci Diane; William B,Corcoran@J9S9.USNA.com; dlochbaum~yc~~~*:~~;

mannaio@clearyyater.org; rwebster@riyerkeeper.org: mcoulter@riverkeeper.org;T.._1(b,...i...,.<6,,..,..______,

!(b)(6) t:odQ@scwe.net; Haagensen. Bnan; __IL __ Brian

Subject:

[External_Sende r] Re: NRC continues to keep public in the dark about major event at Indian Point Date: Tu esday, January 02, 2018 5:47:26 PM Attachments: PastedGraphic-J tiff Even after all this communication, the NRC has not acknowledged that anything occurred other than the plant did shutdown at some point.

Paul B~ la=n=ch_______

Home (b)(6)

Cell (b)(6) 6 On Jan 2, 2018, at 3:09 PM, _l(b_)_(_)_ _ _ _ _ wrote: I Thanks Paul. Happy New Year.

<William B Corcoran@1959 USNA com>; Dave Lochbaum <dlochbaum@ucsusa org>; Manna Jo Greene <roannajo@clearwater.org>; Richard Webster < * >; Maggie Coulter

< mcoulter@riverkeeper.org>; Amy Rosmarin< (b)(6)  ; Gary Shaw j (b)(6)  !>; Susan Babdolden b 6  ; Ellen Weininger (b)(6) (>; Michael Quinn <mdq@scwe.net>; Haagensen. Brian

<brian haagensen@nrc gov>; Holian, Brian <Brian Holiao@nrc gov>

Sent: Tue. Jan 2, 2018 2:01 pm

Subject:

NRC continues to keep public in the dark about major event at Indian Point Neil:

This is a major safety event discovered in early December of last year and the public has intentionally been kept in the dark. The NRC and Entergy both know this is a major safety issue too expensive to fix.

You are now telling the world that it may be another 1O+ days for the NRC to conjure up a story. The entire story should be available in Entergy"s Root Cause Analysis required by Federal Regulations to be conducted prior to restart (Dec,ember 23, 2017) 10 CFR 50 Appendix B XVI. Corrective Action Measures shall be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective material and equipment, and nonconformances are promptly identified and corrected. In the case of significant conditions adverse to quality, the measures shall assure that the cause of the condition is determined and corrective action taken to preclude repetition. The identification of the significant condition adverse to quality, the cause of the condition, and the corrective action taken shall be documented and reported to appropriate levels of management.

Paul Blanch (b)(6)

Cell (b)(6)

On Jan 2, 2018, at 1:32 PM, Sheehan, Neil <NejLSheehan@nrc.gov> wrote:

Happy New Year to you, too, Paul We hope to provide responses to your questions next week.

Neil Sheehan NRC Public Affairs (610) 337-5331 From: Paul (mai ltoJ(b)(6)

Sent: Tuesday, Janua ry 02, 2018 11:33 AM To: Sheehan, Neil <Nei l Sheehan@nrc gov>; Screnci, Diane <Djane,Screncj@nrc gov>

Cc: Paul M Blanch ~(b)(6)  !>; Dave Lochbaum

<dlochbaum@ucsusa .org>; DR CORCORAN WILLIAM DR

<William B Corcoran@1959 USNA com>; Manna Jo Greene

<manna jo@clearwater org>; Susa n Babdolden <..,,!(b...,.)"""

(6.,....

) - - - - - - - - - . l Amy Rosmarin ~(b)(6) k Ellen Weininger ~....(b_.).._ (6.._

) _ _ _ _ ___,~;

Kathryn Miles ~(b)(6) p

Subject:

[External_Sender] Fwd: Indian Point questions Neil:

Happy New Year.

When can I expect a response?

I have also calculated the upward force on the reactor head to be about 50 million pounds. Is this in the ballpark?

We are starting to get some media attention Paul Blanch l(b)(6)

Cell !(b)(6)

Begin forwarded message:

From : "Sheehan, Neil" <NeiLSheehan@nrc.gov>

Subject:

RE: Indian Point questions Date: December 26, 2017 at 10:40:23 AM EST To: Paul <J(b)(6) ~ ' "Screnci, Diane"

<Diane.Screnci@orc.gov>

Cc: Dave Lochbaum <dlochbaum@ucsusa.org>, DR CORCORAN WILLIAM DR

<William.R.Corcoran@1959.USNA.com>

Paul, You have probably seen by now that Indian Point 2 is back at 100-percent power. I will work on getting your answers to these questions.

And a belated Merry Christmas to you ,

Neil Sheehan NRC Public Affairs (610) 337-5331 From: Pau l [rn.aillQJ,_

(b_)(_6_

) _ _ _ _ __,

Sent: Monday. December 25, 2017 9:09 AM To: Screnci, Diane <Diane,Screncj@nrc.gov>; Sheehan, Neil

<Neil.Sheehan@nrc.gov>

Cc: Dave Lochbaum <dlochbaum @ucsusa.org>; DR CORCORAN WILLIAM DR <William.R.Corcoran@1959.USNA.com>

Subject:

[External_Sender] Indian Point questions Dianne and Neil The following questions have been picked up on social media and I would appreciate a response ASAP Merry Christmas Paul NRC questions

  • Why and when was Unit 2 initially shutdown?
  • What has delayed the restart?
  • Our government officials have indicated that both reactor head seals were leaking with boron deposits observed external to the reactor. If our information is accurate, will a Root Cause Analysis (RCA) be performed prior to restart?
  • Why were previous RCA 's deficient in preventing this reoccurring problem?
  • Will both a-rings be replaced?
  • Has there been any collateral damage due to the corrosive boron?
  • Have any formal reports been made to the public or to the State and Media? Why not?
  • What assurances does the public have that there will not be a catastrophic failure of the reactor head?
  • How much water leaked from the reactor and what was the flow rate?
  • Why did the leak detection fail to detect this leak from the primary cooling system?

Paul Blanch Home (b)(6)

Cell (b)( 6)

From: Paul To: Hb)<6l Cc: Sheehan Neil: Screnci Diane; William B,Corcoran@J9S9.USNA.com; dlochbaumi;ffl~'org; mr~i2@c1earwat:r.org; rwebster@riverkeeoer (r~H~} ~

r i:= mcou11er@riverkeeper.ori:: <

_ mdQ@scwe.net; Haagensen. Brian; Holian. eciao; J.QeJ; 1

I/ (

Subj ect: [External_Sender) Re: NRC continues to keep public in the dark about maj or event at Indian Point Date: Tuesday, January 02, 2018 5:29:37 PM Compliance with this regulation would strongly infer this condition has been promptly "identified and corrected". Not 10 days from now!

On Jan 2, 2018, at 3:09 PM, !(b ...._)(_6)_ _ _ ____,~ wrote:

Thanks Paul. Happy New Year.


Original M ...e

....s__s__a..

g__

e_--_

From: Paul <!{b)(6) l>

To: Neil Sheehan <NeiLSheehan@nrc.gov>; Screnci, Diane <Piane.Screncj@nrc.gov>

Cc: Paul M Blanch <J(b)(6) ~ ; DR CORCORAN WILLIAM DR

<William B Corcoran@1959 USNA com>; Dave Lochbaum <dlochbaum@ucsusa org>; Manna Jo Greene <mannajo@dearwater.org>; Richard Webster <rwebster@rjverkeeper.org>; Maggie Coulter

<mcoulter@riverkeeper.org>; Amy Rosmarin l(b)(6)

,t(b)(6) l3usan Babdolden ~

1Gary Shaw

~; Ellen Weininger

~ l>; Michael Quinn <mdq@scwe.net>; Haagensen, Brian

<brian.haagensen@nrc.gov>; Holian, Brian <Brian Holian@nrc .gov>

Sent: Tue, Jan 2, 2018 2:01 pm

Subject:

NRC continues to keep public in the dark about major event at Indian Point Neil :

This is a major safety event discovered in early December of last year and the public has intentionally been kept in the dark. The NRC and Entergy both know this is a major safety issue too expensive to fix.

You are now telling the world that it may be another 1O+ days for the NRC to conjure up a story. The entire story should be available in Entergy's Root Cause Analysis required by Federal Regulations to be conducted prior to restart (December 23, 2017) 10 CFR 50 Appendix B XVI. Corrective Action Measures shall be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective material and equipment, and nonconformances are promptly identified and corrected. In the case of significant conditions adverse to quality, the measures shall assure that the cause of the condition is determined and corrective action taken to preclude repetition. The identification of the significant condition adverse to quality, the cause of the condition, and the corrective action taken shall be documented and reported to appropriate levels of management.

<PastedGraphic-1.tiff>

Cell (b)(5)

On Jan 2, 2018, at 1:32 PM, Sheehan, Neil <NeH,Sheehan@nrc,gov> wrote:

Happy New Year to you, too, Paul We hope to provide responses to your questions next week.

Neil Sheehan NRC Public Affairs (610) 337-5331 From: Paul [~ ....

(b_)(_6__

) _________________,

Sent: Tuesday, Janua ry 02, 2018 11:33 AM To: Sheehan, Neil <Nei l.Sheeha n@nrc.gov>; Screnci, Diane <Dia ne.Screnci@ nrc.gov>

Cc: Pa ul M Blanch ~(b)(6) l>; Dave Lochbaum

<dlochbaum@ucsusa org>; DR CORCORAN WILLIAM DR

<Will iam RCorcoran@l959 USNA,com>; Ma nna...J__ o__G_r __

ee__n__e________.,.

<manna jo@clea rwater.org>; Susan Babdolden ~(b)(6)  !; Amy Rosmarin + b)(6) ~; Ellen Wein inger 4._(b__)__(6__

) _____ __.I; Kathryn Miles 1 (b)(6) l>

Subject:

[External_Sender] Fwd: Indian Point questions Neil:

Happy New Year.

When can I expect a response?

I have also calculated the upward force on the reactor head to be about 50 million pounds. Is this in the ballpark?

We are starting to get some media attention Paul Blanch l(b)(6)

Cell !(b)(6)

Begin forwarded message:

From : "Sheehan, Neil" <NeiLSheehan@nrc.gov>

Subject:

RE: Indian Point questions Date: December 26, 2017 at 10:40:23 AM EST To: Paul ~ (b)(6)  !>, "Screnci, Diane"

<Diane.Screnci@orc.gov>

Cc: Dave Lochbaum <dlochbaum@ucsusa.org>, DR CORCORAN WILLIAM DR

<William.R.Corcoran@1959.USNA.com>

Paul, You have probably seen by now that Indian Point 2 is back at 100-percent power. I will work on getting your answers to these questions.

And a belated Merry Christmas to you ,

Neil Sheehan NRC Public Affairs (610) 337-5331 From: Pau l [~ (b)(6) I Sent: Monday. December 25, 2017 9:09 AM To: Screnci, Diane <Diane,Screncj@nrc.gov>; Sheehan, Neil

<Neil.Sheehan@nrc.gov>

Cc: Dave Lochbaum <dlochbaum @ucsusa.org>; DR CORCORAN WILLIAM DR <William.R.Corcoran@1959.USNA.com>

Subject:

[External_Sender] Indian Point questions Dianne and Neil The following questions have been picked up on social media and I would appreciate a response ASAP Merry Christmas Paul NRC questions

  • Why and when was Unit 2 initially shutdown?
  • What has delayed the restart?
  • Our government officials have indicated that both reactor head seals were leaking with boron deposits observed external to the reactor. If our information is accurate, will a Root Cause Analysis (RCA) be performed prior to restart?
  • Why were previous RCA 's deficient in preventing this reoccurring problem?
  • Will both a-rings be replaced?
  • Has there been any collateral damage due to the corrosive boron?
  • Have any formal reports been made to the public or to the State and Media? Why not?
  • What assurances does the public have that there will not be a catastrophic failure of the reactor head?
  • How much water leaked from the reactor and what was the flow rate?
  • Why did the leak detection fail to detect this leak from the primary cooling system?

From: Paul To: Haa~enseo Brian; Holian Brian Subj ect: [External_Sender) Fwd: 0-ring FO!As Date: Tuesday, J anuary 02, 2018 5:24:00 PM FYI Begin forwarded message:

From: Dave Lochbaum <DLochbaum@ucsusa.org>

Date: January 2, 2018 at 3:09:05 PM EST To: paul blanch 1 (b)(6)

Richard Webster <rwebster@riverkeeper.~g>, "Paul Gallay" <pgallay@riverkeeper.org>

!' Manna Jo Greene <mannajo@c1earwater.org>,

Subject:

0 -ring FOIAs Good Day:

FYI - earlier today, I submitted FOIA requests for records about o-ring problems at Indian Point and other US reactors since January 1, 2003. I submitted two separate requests hoping to get the Indian Point records sooner rather than later. Here are those requests:

This message IS to confirm your request submrSS1on to the FOIAonllne apphcatioo; ~ . Request information is as follows:

  • Requester Name: DaOO A. Loch.baum
  • 0.1e Submitted: 01/02/2018

, Requtit Stana:: Subm1tttd

  • DescnpltOn: Dtg1tal cop.es of records about reactor v~sel o-nng fa1ture$fp<obltms expe-nenced at the Indian Point Energy Center since January 1, 2003. An NRC inspectJOn report dati!d October 27, 2017 (Ml17303A97n ~ntt0ned eight o*ring problems at the f.cility since 2003.

This message is to confirm your reqll1!:st submission to lht!' fOIAonlt~ apphcatton: ~ Request mform.uion IS- as follows:

  • Tracking Numbtr. NRC*2018*0001Sl
  • Requester Name: Dav1d A l ochbaum
  • Date Subm11ted: 01/01/2018
  • Request Status: Submitted

Description:

Dtg1tal copies of records about reactor vessel o*ring problems experienced at operating nuclear power reactors m the United States. except for t he Indian Point Umt Z and 3 reactors.

since January 1, ZOCH. Information for o*ring problems at Indian Point was previously requested.

I'll send you copies of the records received in response to these requests, or links to the folders containing them in NRC's online ADAMS library.

Thanks, Dave Lochbaum ucs

From: 6 To: ""l(_b)_( _)_ _ _ __.! Sheehan Neil: Screnci Diane Cc: William B,Corcoran@J 959.USNA.eom; dlochbaum@ucs~p rg; mannaio@clearwater.org:

rwJbsW@nverkeeper.org: mcoulter@riyerkeeper.org; ... 0...

6....a,. . __________

)l... j~

!{b)(fil j mda@scwe.net; Haagensen. Brian; Holian. Brian

Subject:

[External_Sender] Re: NRC continues to keep public in the dark about major event at Indian Point Date: Tu esday, January 02, 2018 3:09:35 PM Attachments: PastedGraphic-J tiff Thanks Paul. Happy New Year.


Original Message-----

From: Paul <1'""<b""")"""(6""')-------.I>

To: Neil Sheehan <Neil.Sheehan@nrc.gov>; Screnci, Diane <Diane.Screnci@nrc.gov>

Cc: Paul M Blanch ~(b}(6} ~ ; DR CORCORAN WILLIAM DR

<William.R.Corcoran@1959.USNA.com>; Dave Lochbaum <dlochbaum@ucsusa.org>; Manna Jo Greene <mannajo@clearwater.org>; Richard Webster <rwebster@riverkeeper.org>; Maggie Coulter

<mcoulter@riverkeeper.org>; Amy Rosmarinl(b)(6) t; Gary Shaw (b)(6) p usan Babdolden ~ _; Ellen Weininger l b; Michael Quinn <mdq@scwe.net>; Haagensen, Brian

<brian.haagensen@nrc.gov>; Holian, Brian <Brian.Holian@nrc.gov>

Sent: Tue, Jan 2, 2018 2 :01 pm

Subject:

NRC continues to keep public in the dark about major event at Indian Point Neil:

This is a major safety event discovered in early December of last year and the public has intentionally been kept in the dark. The NRC and Entergy both know this is a major safety issue too expensive to fix.

You are now telling the world that it may be another 10+ days for the NRC to conjure up a story. The entire story should be available in Entergy*s Root Cause Analysis required by Federal Regulations to be conducted prior to restart (December 23, 2017) 10 CFR 50 Appendix B XVI. Corrective Action Measures shall be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective material and equipment, and nonconformances are promptly identified and corrected. In the case of significant conditions adverse to quality, the measures shall assure that the cause of the condition is determined and corrective action taken to preclude repetition. The identification of the significant condition adverse to quality, the cause of the condition, and the corrective action taken shall be documented and reported to appropriate levels of management.

Paul Blanch (b)(6)

CelJ !(b)(6)

On Jan 2, 2018, at 1 :32 PM, Sheehan, Neil <NejLSheehan@nrc.gov> wrote:

Happy New Year to you, too, Paul We hope to provide responses to your questions next week.

Neil Sheehan NRC Public Affairs (610) 337-5331 From: Paul [mailtol<b)( 6)

Sent: Tuesday, Janua ry 02, 2018 11:33 AM To: Sheehan, Neil <Nej l,Sheehan@nrc.gov>; Screnci, Diane <Djane.Screncj@nrc.gov>

Cc: Pau l M Blanch ~(b)(6) l>; Dave Lochbaum

<dlochbaum@ucsusa.org>; DR CORCORAN WILLIAM DR

<William R.Corcoran@1959 USNA com>; Manna Jo Greene

<mannaio@clearwater.org>; Susa n Babdolden <l"(b "'....,.)""'(6,.,...

) - - - - - - , ~; Amy Rosmarin <J(b)(6) [>; Ellen Weininger i(b)(6) ~;

Kathryn Miles ~(b)(6)  !> - - ------

Subject:

[External_Sender] Fwd: Indian Point questions Neil:

Happy New Year.

When can I expect a response?

I have also calculated the upward force on the reactor head to be about 50 million pounds. Is this in the ballpark?

We are starting to get some media attention Paul Blanch l(b)(6)

Cell !(b)(6)

Begin forwarded message:

From : "Sheeh an, Neil" <NeiLSheehan@nrc.gov>

Subject:

RE: Indian Point questions Date: December 26, 2017 at 10:40:23 AM EST To: Paul <l(b)(6) h "Screnci, Diane"

<Diane.Screoci@orc.gov>

Cc: Dave Lochbaum <dlochbaum@ucsusa org>, DR CORCORAN WILLIAM DR

<William.R.Corcoran@1959.USNA.com>

Paul, You have probably seen by now that Indian Point 2 is back at 100-percent power. I will work on getting your answers to these questions.

And a belated Merry Christmas to you, Neil Sheehan NRG Public Affairs (610) 337-5331 From: Pa ul [mailto J(b)(6)

Sent: Monday. December 25, 2017 9:09 AM To: Screnci, Diane <Diane,Screnci@nrc.gov>; Sheehan, Neil

<Neil.Sheehan @nrc.gov>

Cc: Dave Lochbaum <d lochbaum@ ucsusa.org>; DR CORCORAN WILLIAM DR <Wj]Jiam,R Corcoran@ l 959,USNA.com>

Subject:

[External_Sender] Indian Point questions Dianne and Neil The following questions have been picked up on social media and I would appreciate a response ASAP Merry Christmas Paul NRC questions

  • Why and when was Unit 2 initially shutdown?
  • What has delayed the restart?
  • Our government officials have indicated that both reactor head seals were leaking with boron deposits observed external to the reactor. If our information is accurate, will a Root Cause Analysis (RCA) be performed prior to restart?
  • Why were previous RCA 's deficient in preventing this reoccurring problem?
  • Will both o-rings be replaced?
  • Has there been any collateral damage due to the corrosive boron?
  • Have any formal reports been made to the public or to the State and Media? Why not?
  • What assurances does the public have that there will not be a catastrophic failure of the reactor head?
  • How much water leaked from the reactor and what was the flow rate?
  • Why did the leak detection fail to detect this leak from the primary cooling system ?

Paul Blanch Home ...!(b-).....

(6_)_ ____,

Cell !(b)(6)

From: Paul To: Sheehan Neil: Screnci Diane Cc: Paul MBlanch; PB CORCORAN WILLIAM PB; Dave Lochbaum; Manna IP Greene; Richard Webster; Me.m

~  ; Amy Rosmarin; Gary Shaw; Susan Babdolden; Ellen Weinini:er; Michael Ouinn; Haai:ensen. Brian; Honan. Brian

Subject:

[External_Sende r] NRC continues to keep public in the dark about major event at Indian Point Date: Tu esday, January 02, 201 8 2:01 :57 PM Attachments: PastedGraphic-J tiff Neil:

This is a major safety event discovered in early December of last year and the public has inte ntio nally been kept in the dark. The NRC and Entergy both know thi s is a major safety issue too expensive to fi x.

You are now telling the world that it may be another 1O+ days for the NRC to conjure up a story. The entire story should be available in Entergy's Root Cause Analysis required by Federal Regulations to be conducted prior to restart (December 23, 2017)

LO CFR 50 Appendix B XVI. Corrective Action Measures shall be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as fa ilures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective material and equipment, and nonconformances are promptly identified and corrected. In the case of significant conditions adverse to quality, the measures shall assure that the cause of the condition is determined and corrective action taken to preclude repetition. The identification of t he significant condition adverse to quality, the cause of the condition, and the corrective action taken shall be documented and reported to appropriate levels of management.

Paul Blanch l(b)(6)

Cell !(b)(6)

On Jan 2, 2018, at 1:32 PM, Sheehan, Neil <Neil.Sheehan @nrc.gov> wrote:

Happy New Year to you, too, Paul We hope to provide responses to your questions next week.

Neil Sheehan NRC Publ ic Affairs (610) 337-5331 From: Paul [~ ....

~b-)(_6)_ _ _ ____,~

Sent: Tuesday, Janua ry 02, 2018 11:33 AM To: Sheehan, Neil <Neil Sheeha n@nrc.gov>; Screnci, Diane <Dia ne.Screoci@ nrc.gov>

Cc: Pa ul M Blanch ~(b)(6)  !; Dave Lochbaum

<dlochbaum@ucsusa org>; DR CORCORAN WILLIAM DR

<William.R.Corcoran@1959.USNA.com>; Manna Jo Greene

<manna jo@clea rwater.org>; Susa n Babdolden <J....(b-)-(6_) _ _ _ _ _ _ Amy h Rosmarin <1(b)(6)  !; Ellen Weininger <1..._(b....}(.._6.._)_ _ _ _ _....,.l>;

Kathryn Miles <1(b)(6) t>

Subject:

[External_Sender] Fwd: Indian Point questions Neil:

Happy New Year.

When can I expect a response?

I have also calculated the upward force on the reactor head to be about 50 million pounds. Is this in the ballpark?

We are starting to get some media attention Paul Blanch (b)(6)

Ce11 l(b)(6) I Begin forwarded message:

From: "Sheehan, Neil" <Neil.Sheehan@nrc.gov>

Subject:

RE: Indian Point questions Date: December 26, 2017 at 10:40:23 AM EST To: Paul <j(b)(6) t,, "Screnci, Diane"

<Piane.Screnci@nrc.gov>

Cc: Dave Lochbaum <dlochbaum@ucsusa.org>, DR CORCORAN WILLIAM DR

<Wi11iam.R.Corcoran@1959.USNA.com>

Paul, You have probably seen by now that Indian Point 2 is back at 100-percent power. I will work on getting your answers to these questions.

And a belated Merry Christmas to you ,

Neil Sheehan NRG Public Affairs (610) 337-5331 From: Pa ul [~ ....

(b_)(_6_)_ _ _ _ __,

Sent: Monday, December 25, 2017 9:09 AM To: Screnci, Diane <Diane.Screncj@nrc.gov>; Sheehan, Neil

<Neil.Sheehan@nrc gov>

Cc: Dave Lochbaum <dlochbaum@ucsusa.org>; DR CORCORAN WILLIAM DR<William.R.Corcoran@l959.USNA.com>

Subject:

[Externa l_Sender) Indian Point questio ns Dianne and Neil The following questions have been picked up on social media and I would appreciate a response ASAP Merry Christmas Paul NRC questions

  • Why and when was Unit 2 initially shutdown?
  • What has delayed the restart?
  • Our government officials have indicated that both reactor head seals were leaking with boron deposits observed external to the reactor. If our information is accurate, will a Root Cause Analysis (RCA) be pe,formed prior to restart?
  • Why were previous RCA' s deficient in preventing this reoccurring problem?
  • Will both o-rings be replaced?
  • Has there been any collateral damage due to the corrosive boron?
  • Have any formal reports been made to the public or to the State and Media? Why not?
  • What assurances does the public have that there will not be a catastrophic failure of the reactor head?
  • How much water leaked from the reactor and what was the flow rate?
  • Why did the leak detection fail to detect this leak from the primary cooling system?

Paul Blanch Home ~!(b..,..)(.,.,,.6),_...--,

From: Paul To: Michael Quinn; PR CORCORAN WILLIAM DR* J.Q.eJ; Lawrence crjscjone; Sheehan Nejl* Haagensen Brian; l::l.w.i.an..

a.cia.n; Raspa Rossana Cc: Paul M Blanch; Madison Hopkins: steve hopkins: Amy Rosmarin: Susan Babdolden; Ellen Weininger; Gary Shaw

Subject:

[External_Sender] From the NRC"s Inspection report dated October 27, 2017 (60 days ago)

Date: Wednesday, December 27, 2017 1:50:59 PM Emphasis added in red by PMB.

Note the words "improper action could have immediate, possibly irreversible impact on safety, production or reliabi lity."

The reactor pressure vessel (RPV) is designed to be sealed by two large diamete r (different size), concentric, circular, silver-coated, stainless steel gasket 0-rings. These 0-rings are seated in machined grooves between the RPY head and the vessel. Two new 0-rings are routinely installed each outage when the RPV head is bolted closed. The inner 0 -ring normally maintains the pressure seal for the RCS boundary. The outer 0 -

ring is a pre-installed redundant spare that is designed to be used if the inner 0-ring leaks. Leakage through the inner 0 -ring can be ide ntified via a leakoff line between the inner and outer 0-rings. The operators can place the outer 0-ring in service by closing 24 the leakoff line. This transfers the RCS boundary sealing surface to the outer 0-ring.

TS 3.4. l 3, "RCS Ope rational Leakage," establishes limits fo r the leak rate for identified and unidentified RCS leakage. Leakage through the RPV 0 -rings is not classified as "pressure boundary leakage" under TS 1.1, "Definitions," because the leakage is past a mechanical joint (gasket) and not through a "non-isolable fault in an RCS component body, pipe wall or vessel wall." Leakage through the 0-rings into containment wou ld be measured and compared to the limits in TS 3.4. l 3. The inspectors reviewed CRs and corrective actions associated with the eight reactor vessel head 0 -rings leaks that occurred since 2003, when a design change to the Orings occurred. Leakage through the 0-rings prior to the design change may have been in part caused by the original design.

In each case when both the inner and outer Orings leaked, Entergy identified and monitored the leakage at a very low level and took prudent, conservative action to shut down the plant before approaching the TS limit to effect repairs and identify cau sal factors that potentially led to the leakage. Corrective actions since the design change have been primarily focused on revisions to procedures and processes. Changes to procedures 2-REF-002-GEN and 3-REF-002-GEN included new instructions to manually clean and dry the vessel flange seating surface prior to landing the head instead of relying on the underwater fl ange-cleaning machine. Add itional revisions directed the use of a "star" pattern when torqueing the 0-ring retainer clips, use of a feeler gauge to verify the 0 -ring was centered in the groove, performance of a second verification, and ensuring an 0 -ring handling rig was used for installation. Corrective actions also included replacement of the 0 -rings with new Orings during the next opportunity. [what does this mean?}

The most recent corrective actions were implemented to prevent changes in residual heat removal flow from disrupting the 0-ring seal surfaces prior to final bolting of the RPY head. Corrective actions to address the various causal factors over the years have not been completely effective at preventing recurre nce of the issue. This is acceptable per Entergy's CAP because each leak is characterized as a condition adverse to quality,

vice a significant condition adverse to quality. Entergy has the ability to monitor for leakage and take actions to maintain compliance with their TS. Leakage through the Orings has not challenged the limits of TS 3 .4.13. B oth Units 2 and 3 are currently operating on the outer 0 -rings with no measurable leakage. In review of all the corrective actions taken since 2003, the inspectors noted that Entergy had not taken detailed depth measurements of the RPV flange seating surface degradation since 2015, when surface defects identified were small. These surface defects had been noted again during the May 2017 outage to repair the leaking 0-rings. However, this degradation had been visually assessed to be minor in nature and the replacement 0-ri ng was evaluated as being capable of deforming to seal these minor defects. Entergy is presently planning to conduct laser measurement and mapping of these defects during the next refueling outage on each unit. Finally, the inspectors also noted that procedure EN-HU-106, "Procedure and Work Instruction Use and Adherence," states that technical procedures should be designated "continuous use" if the activity is complex or is performed infreque ntly to ensure that the procedural steps are performed as written in stepwise sequence. A lthough the reactor vessel head 0-ring replacement and head installation are complex activities typically performed only once per cycle, the governing procedures are designated as "reference use." EH-HU-106 also defines a "continuous use" procedure, "for complex or infrequent work activities for which consequences of an improper action could have immediate, possibly irreversible impact on safety, production or reliability." Though the usage designation of 2-REF-GEN-002 and 3-REF-GEN-002 has not been identified as causal to any of the leaks, inspectors determined that Entergy should further evaluate the categorization of the RPV head installation procedure to ensure it meets the ir requirements and expectations and ensures that previous corrective actions continue to be implemented as intended.

Paul Blanch l(b)(6)

Cell l(b)(6)

On Dec 27, 2017, at 1:27 PM, Paul ~....(b_)(_6_) _ _ _ _ _ _.Pwrote:

I am sure they fixed it this time. After all, the Regulations require it. Since the last time they "fixed" it in 2003 their have only been 9 failures since then. WTF are they waiting for? A 3000 PSI pressure cooker explosion?

There are clear requirements to identify and fix problems in 10 CFR 50 Appendix B but Donald may have done away with these?

Neil Sheehan at the NRC is working on the magic works as to why thi s is OK and why there is no need to inform the public. He has recalled Sean Spicer to help.

OBTW:

The NRC hasn't yet acknowledged anything or possibly Entergy hasn' t told them yet.

10 CFR 50 Appendix B XVI. Corrective Action Measures shall be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective material and equipment, and nonconformances are promptly identified and corrected . In the case of significant conditions adverse to quality, the measures shall assure that the cause of the condition is determined and corrective action taken to preclude repetition. The identification of the significant condition adverse to quality, the cause of the condition, and the corrective action taken shall be documented and reported to appropriate levels of management.

See summary from Dave Lochbaum enclosed.

Paul Blanch l(b)(6)

Begin fo rwarded message:

From: Dave Lochbaum <DLochbaum@ucsusa.org>

Subject:

Indian Point 0-Rings: Sequel or So What?

Date: December 27, 2017 at 12:47:36 PM EST To: paul blanch <l(b)(6) l Cc: "Corcoran, Bill" ¥b)(6) ~ , Neil Sheehan <neil,sheehan@nrc.gov>

Hello Paul:

Root causes of nuclear safety problems seem to hide better from Entergy than from other plant owners.

Theo-ring problems experienced at Indian Point in May 2017 were chronicled in an NRC inspection report issued in May 2017 (cited in the attached backgrounder).

Hopefully a future NRC inspection report (or Congressional inquiry) will reveal what the real problem with 0 -rings at Indian Point is along with its real solution.

"Two wrongs don't make a right" is a cliche. Entergy seems to have embarked on an effort to determine how many wrongs it does take.

I think they misunderstood the intent behind the cliche.

Thanks, Dave Lochbau m ucs

<201 71 227-ip-ucs-o-ring-backgrounder.pdf>

Unionof d . . ucsusa.org Two Bratt le Square, Cambridge, MA 02138-3780 t 617.547.5552 f 617.864.9405

[ Concerne Sctenttsts 1825 I< Street NW, Suite 800, Washington, DC 20006-1232 t 202.223.6133 f 202.223.6162 2397 Shattuck Avenue, Suite 203, Berkeley, CA 94704-1567 t 510.843.1872 f 510.843.3785 One North LaSalle Street, Su ite 1904, Chicago, IL 60602-4064 t 312.578.1750 f 312.578.1751 Indian Point 0-Rings: Sequel or So What?

On January 28, 1986, NASA attempted to blast the space shuttl e Challenger and its seven astronauts into space. Instead, they blasted them into smithereens. The shuttle lhad two cylindrical tanks containing fuel to propel the vehicle into earth orbit. The fuel tanks consisted of metal rings bolted together. Metal-to-metal surfaces te nd not to form leak-tight connections, so two o-rings were placed in each fl anged connection. The softer (compared to metal) material of the o-rings sealed the connection to keep the fuel from leaking out. Only one o-ring was needed to sea l each connection- the design featured two o-rings for redundancy. One o-ring could fail and the flange would remain sealed if the other o-ring remained intact.

During about nine prior shuttle launches, burning fuel caused the inner o-ring to fail. 0-rings w ere not supposed to fai l, yet they repeatedly failed. NASA tolerated this intolerable outcome based on the second o-ring having never fail ed. Until January 28, 1986 when both failed and the shuttle blew up 73 seconds after launch.

0-Rings: Not Just Rocket Science 0 -rings are used in nuclear power plants, too. Among the places o-rings are used are in the flanged connections where the metal reactor vessel head is bolted atop the reactor vessel.

Figure 2 Source: Bob Lochbaum Source: Bob Lochbaurn

Figure I looks upward at the reactor vessel head for Watts Bar Unit I . Some of the holes for the studs used to fasten the bead to the reactor vessel appear to the upper left. Portions of the two o-rings used to seal this flanged connected pass through the center of the picture and off its right edge. Figure 2 shows a close-up of the two o-rings used to seal the reactor vessel head o n Watts Bar Unit I to its reactor vessel.

Like the external fuel tanks on the shuttle Challenger, the o-rings are redundant in that only one intact o-ring is needed to seal the flanged connection. The second o-ring is installed for increased re liability that the sealing function gets performed. Unlike in the original shuttle design, the flanged connections for nuclear plant flanged connectio ns have a leak-off line from the space between the two o-rings. ]f the inner o-ring fai ls, water passing through the failed o-ring flows through the leak-off line (a small diameter metal tube). Instrumentation in the leak-off line alerts workers to the failed inner o-ring.

If the outer o-ring were to also fail, reactor cooling water would leak through the failed o-rings into the containment building. Instruments are installed in containment to monitor for water leaking from pipes, valves, and many other sources. Figure 3 is a snapshot from the Technical Specifications issued by the N uclear Regulatory Commission for Indian Point Unit 2. If the instruments monitoring leakage inside containment exceed any of the Technical Specification limits, the reactor must be shut down within a handful of hours.

Figure 3 RCS Operational Leakage 3.4.13 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) 3.4.13 RCS Operational LEAKAGE LCO 3.4.13 RCS operational LEAKAGE shall be limited to:

a. No pressure boundary LEAKAGE,
b. 1 gpm unidentified LEAKAGE,
c. 10 gpm identified LEAKAGE, and
d. 85 gallons per day primary to secondary LEAKAGE through any one steam generator (SG).

Source: Nuclear Regulatory Commission (ML052720262)

Indian Point: Burning Through 0-Rings at an Atypical Pace The two reactors at the Indian Point nuclear plant in New York seem to experience reactor vessel o-ring fa ilures at a higher frequency than other reactors (even at other reactors also owned by Entergy). The above average failure rate contributed to NRC inspectors selecting Entergy's corrective actions for recurring o-ring failures for the annual sample. The NRC's findings are documented in an inspection report dated October 27, 2017 (MLl 7303 A977). The NR C inspectors noted that recurring o-ring failures prompted a design change in 2003. Since that change to the o-ring design, eight failures have occurred.

The NRC inspectors noted that the inner o-rings on Indian Point Units 2 and 3 were fa iled at the time and the reactors were running with onJy their outer o-rings intact. The NRC inspectors concluded: "Corrective December 27, 20 17 Page 2

actions to address the various causal factors over the years have not been completely effective at preventing recurrence ofthe issue."

Indian Point Unit 2 was shut down in early December 20 17 so workers could repair leaking seals on a reactor coolant pump. Workers noticed boric acid crystals on the outer surface of the reactor vessel flange area- unambiguous indications that the outer o-ring had also failed and was leaking borated cooling water. The outage was extended to allow workers to replace, once again, the failed o-rings.

Browns Ferry Unit J: 0-Ring Prequel Tbe Tennessee Valley Authority shut down all th.ree reactors at the Browns Ferry nuclear plant in Alabama in the mid 1980s due to a myriad of safety problems. TVA spent millions of dollars fixing enough of the safety problems on Units 2 and 3 to allow their restart in the early 1990s, but Unit I remained on the sidelines until the 21 51 century. Circa 2002, TVA began fixing the safety problems on Unit 1 to permit it to be restarted. As part of that recovery efforts, workers initiated a problem report on March 14, 2006, about recurring failu res of the o-rings on the Unit l reactor vessel flange, including indications that the leakage was damaging the metal surfaces of the reactor vessel and its head. But little was done about this known problem before Unit l was restarted on May 21, 2007.

As often happens, the uncorrected known problem with the o-rings caused problems during reactor operation. The instruments monitoring for leakage inside containment detected leakage inside containment-elevated temperatures inside containment as well as the measured leak rate increasing from less than 0.1 gallons per minute to over 1.2 gallons per minute. TVA continued to operate Unit 1 until a scheduled refueling outage in October 2008. When workers removed the reactor vessel head on October 28, 2008, they observed that the reactor water leaking through the failed o-rings had damaged the reactor vessel head flange. The reactor cooling water was pressurized to over 1,000 pounds per square inch inside the reactor vessel. As it leaked through the failed o-rings, the water flashed to steam. The high velocity steam jetting by the failed o-rings gouged grooves in the reactor vessel metal. TV A concluded that the reactor vessel metal degradation was caused by "existing damage on the RPV [reactor pressure vessel]

flange at the time of U I restart" that was not repaired.

Indian Point 0-Rings: Sequel or So What?

NASA's space shuttles experienced recurring fa ilures of the o-rings on their external fuel tanks. Theo-ring failures were tolerated until Challenger exploded shortly after launch due to failure of both o-rings. Then and only then were the external fuel tanks re-designed to eliminate the o-ring vulnerability.

TV A's Browns Fe1Ty Unit I had recurring reactor vessel flange o-ring fa ilures known to cause damage to the reactor vessel. Theo-ring problems and associated damage were essentially ignored en route to restarting Unit I in 2007. The pre-existing problem resulted in more extensive damage that had to be repaired in late 2008.

Entergy's lndian Point nuclear plant experiences recurring reactor vessel flange o-ring fail ures. A design change installed in 2003 to resolve the o-ring failure problems failed to achieve that outcome, given at least nine o-ring fai lures since that "fix."

Time will tell whether tolerating the intolerable at Indian Point leads to a sequel to the book by Allan McDonald and James Hansen about the worst o-ring failure catastrophe to date or a sequel to the costly efforts by TVA to belatedly correct known problems.

December 27, 20 17 Page 3

From: Paul To: Haagensen Brian Cc: Paul MBlanch

Subject:

[External_Sender] Fwd: Indian Point 0-Rings: Sequel or So What?

Date: Wednesday, December 27, 2017 12:55:40 PM Attachments: 20111227-io-ucs-o-ring-backgrounder.odf ATT00001 htm Paul Blanch (b)(6)

Cell l(b)(6)

Begin forwarded message:

From: Dave Lochbaum <PLochbaum@ucsusa.org>

Subject:

Indian Point 0-Rings: Sequel or So What?

Date: December 27, 2017 at 12:47:36 PM EST To: paul blanch ~(b)(6) I Cc: "Corcoran, Bill" 4 (b)(6) ~ . Neil Sheehan

<oeil.sheehan@nrc.gov>

Hello Paul:

Root causes of nuclear safety problems seem to hid better from Entergy than from other plant owners.

The o-ring problems experienced at Indian Point in May 2017 were chronicled in an NRC inspection re port issued in May 2017 (cited in the attached backgrounder).

Hopefully a future NRC inspection report (or Congressional inquiry) will reveal what the real problem with 0-rings at Indian Point is along with its real solution.

"Two wrongs don't make a right" is a cl iche. Entergy seems to have e mbarked on an effort to determine how many wrongs it does take.

I think they misunderstood the intent behind the cliche.

Thanks, Dave Lochbaum ucs

From: Sheehan Neil To : Lorson Raymond: Pelton David: Yerokun limi; Welling Blake* Schroeder Daniel: Haagensen Br;an Cc: Lew David

Subject:

Questions from Pa ul Bla nch on In di an Point 2 shu tdown Date: Tuesday, December 26, 2017 10:38 :50 AM Attach ments: IndianPointBlanchOuestions .12-2017 .docx Good morning , all Paul Blanch posed a number of questions yesterday about the Indian Point 2 outage. You will find them in the attached . I have drafted proposed answers to several of them but could use DRP and/or DRS help with others. Can you take a look at provide input?

Thanks, Neil
Paul, Sorry about the delay in responding You're probably aware by now that Indian Point 2 has returned to service. It began powering up on 12/23 and achieved 100-percent over the weekend : https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/event-status/reactor-status/2017 /20 171226ps. html . As your questions:
  • Why and when was Unit 2 initially shutdown?

A.)Around 12/9/17

  • What has delayed the restart?

A.) Entergy shut the unit down to fix reactor coolant pump leakage. While it was down, plant personnel also addressed reactor pressure vessel head o-ring leakage.

  • Our government officials have indicated that both reactor head seals were leaking with boron deposits observed external to the reactor. flour information is accurate, will a Root Cause Analysis (RCA) be pe1formed prior to restart?

A.) Entergy perfonned an operability detennination regarding any impacts of boric acid deposits identified. lt did not identify any adverse impacts. NRC inspectors did their own evaluation and was satisfied that safety margins remain intact.

  • Why were previous RCA 's deficient in preventing this reoccurring problem?

Can DRP help with this?

  • Will both a-rings be replaced?

And this?

  • Has there been any coLLateral damage due to the corrosive boron?

A.) None that has been observed.

  • Have any formal reports been made to the public or to the State and Media? Why not?

A.) We maintain ongoing communications with the respective liaison officers in each state.

New York State offic ials were aware of the shutdown and any key developments during the outage. We did not receive any media questions regarding the shutdown until this weekend. We cannot speak to what Entergy did or didn't do in terms of communicating about the forced outage to tbe media.

  • What assurances does the public have that there will not be a catastrophic failure ofthe reactor head?

A.) We addressed the reactor pressure vessel head o-ring issues at both Indian Point units in our third-quarter inspection report for the plant. We stated in that report that while Entergy needs to do more to address the leakage, we have not identified any concerns about the integrity of the reactor vessel heads.

  • How much water leaked from the reactor and what was the flow rate?

Can DRP help with this one?

  • Why did the leak detection fail to detect this leak.from the primary cooling system?

Can DRP help with this one, too?

From: Pau l [mailto:!(b)(6)  !)

Sent: Monday, December 25, 2017 9:09 AM To: Screnci, Diane <Diane.Screnci@nrc.gov>; Sheehan, Neil <Neil.Sheehan@nrc.gov>

Cc: Dave Lochbaum <dlochbaum @ucsusa.org>; DR CORCORAN WILLIAM DR

<William.R.Corcoran@1959.USNA.com>

Subject:

[External_Sender) Indian Point questions Dianne and Neil The fo llowing questions have been picked up on socia l media and I would appreciate a response ASAP Merry Christmas Paul NRC questions

  • Why and when was Unit 2 initially shutdown?
  • What has delayed the restart?
  • Our government officials have indicated that both reactor head seals were leaking with boron deposits observed external lo the reactor. If our information is accurate, will a Root Cause Analysis (RCA) be pe1formed prior to restart?
  • Why were previous RCA 's deficient in preventing this reoccurring problem?
  • Will both o-rings be replaced?
  • Has there been any collateral damage due to the corrosive boron?
  • Have any formal reports been made to the public or to the State and Media? Why not?
  • What assurances does the public have that there will not be a catastrophic failure of the reactor head?
  • How much water leaked from the reactor and what was the flow rate?
  • Why did the leak detection fail to detect this leak from the primary cooling system?

From : ~heehan, Ne~

To: aagensen, rian

Subject:

Fwd: Questions about recent IP2 problems Date: Monday, December 25, 2017 11:44:21 AM FYI From: "Sheehan, Neil"' <Neil.Sheehan@nrc.gov>

Subject:

Re: Questions about recent IP2 problems Date: 25 December 2017 11 :43 To: r ~~) r

Gary, Entergy typically issues a press release when it has a shutdown. I'm not sure why it did not issue one in this case. Our daily plant status report has indicated that the unit was at zero power.

Indian Point 2 entered an outage on Dec. 8 or 9 to fix leakage from a reactor coolant pump. While it has been down, the company has also been addressing some other issues, including reactor vessel head o-ring leakage. You may recall that this has been an issue for both units for several years; we discussed it at some length in our third-quarter inspection report for the plant.

There was some boric acid found on the reactor vessel head studs. That is not unexpected given the outer o-ring leakage. Plant personnel have cleaned off the boric acid and performed an assessment to ensure it will not adversely affect the integrity of the studs/bolts. Our inspectors have found no safety concerns after reviewing the evaluation.

We can't discuss exact start-up dates and times because Indian Point is a merchant power plant and that information would be market sensitive.

Merry Christmas to you ,

Neil Sheehan NRC Public Affairs (610) 337-5331

On:t24 December 201714:44, *J....<b_)<_

wro e:

5)_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _...... F Dear Neil and Diane -

I was contacted by an acquaintance who told me that IP2 had been shut down and I was surprised since I usually receive notices about problems that result in shutting a reactor down. I called NRC emergency phone number and I was told that IP2 was at zero power on Friday. Can you please respond to the following questions?

  • When was Unit 2 taken offline and has it been brought back online?

o If it was not brought back on line, is there a guess wen it will be back?

o Why was there no public/media notification?

  • I was told the reason for the shutdown was another 0-ring leak. Is that true?

o How much radioactive water was released?

  • I was also told that both reactor head seals were leaking. Is that true?
  • I was also told that there were boron deposits o the outside of the reactor. Is that correct?

o My understanding is that Boron is corrosive. Was there any collateral damage from boron leakage?

  • If this was a reactor head failure , isn't this a repeat of prior incidence? What is the magnitude of danger if we are having repeated problems?

Given that the closure dates have been announced, I and other stakeholders have concerns that standards for operations and safety are becoming more lax. I hope your responses will make me feel that my concerns are unwarranted .

Thank you and Merry Christmas.

Gary Shaw - IPSEC l(b )(6)

From: Paul To: Haagensen Brian; Holian Brian Cc: Screnci Riane; Sheehan Nejl; Raspa. Rossana; Dave Lochbaum

Subject:

[External_Sender] Fwd: Indian Point qu estions Date: Monday, December 25, 2017 10:27:52 AM Brian's Sorry I didn' t include you on this. Some of the questions were added by myself and others.

Paul Blanch Home""! (b~)(~6)~ - - - .

Cell !(b)(6)

Begin forwarded message:

From: Paul .q(b)(6)  !>

Date: December 25, 20 17 at 9:08:50 AM EST To: Qiane.Screncj@nrc.gov, Neil Sheehan <oeiLsheehan@nrc.gov>

Cc: Dave Lochbaum <d)ochbaum@ucsusa.org>, DR CORCORAN WILLIAM DR

<Wi11iam.R.Corcoran@I959.USNA.com>

Subject:

Indian Point questions Dianne and Neil The following questions have been picked up on social media and I would appreciate a response ASAP Merry Christmas Paul NRC questions

  • Why and when was Unit 2 initially shutdown?
  • What has delayed the restart?
  • Our government officials have indicated that both reactor head seals were leaking with boron deposits observed external to the reactor. If our information is accurate. will a Root Cause Analysis (RCA) be performed prior to restart?
  • Why were previous RCA 's deficient in preventing this reoccurring problem?
  • Will both a-rings be replaced?
  • Has there been any collateral damage due to the corrosive boron?
  • Ha ve any formal reports been made to the public or to the State and Media? Why not?
  • What assurances does the public have that there will not be a catastrophic failure of the reactor head?
  • How much water leaked from the reactor and what was the flow rate?
  • Why did the leak detection fail to detect this leak from the primary cooling system?

From: Paul To: pave Lochbaum: Haagensen Brian

Subject:

[External_Sender) Fwd: Questions about recent IP2 problems Date: Monday, December 25, 2017 8:23:40 AM Merry white Christmas Paul Blanch Home (b)(6)

Cell (b)(6)

Begin forwarded message:

From: Susan Yan Dolsen <4(b)(6) ~

Date: December 24, 2017 at 2:54:30 PM EST To: Paul Blanch ~ (b)(6) ~

Subject:

Fwd: Questions about recent I 2 problems


Forwarded message ----------

From: <l(b)(6) f>

Date: Sun, Dec 24, 2017 at 2:44 PM

Subject:

Questions about recent IP2 problems

~~~M !ii!orc VO\/ Diaoe Sci:eoci lliloo:c vol/

lu4ce@ ioseciota arn Dear Neil and Diane -

I was contacted by an acquaintance who told me that IP2 had been shut down and I was surprised since I usually receive notices about problems that result in shutting a reactor down. I called NRC emergency phone number and I was told that IP2 was at zero power on Friday. Can you please respond to the following questions?

  • When was Unit 2 taken offline and has it been brought back online?

o If it was not brought back online, is there a guess wen it will be back?

o Why was there nio public/media notification?

  • I was told the reason for the shutdown was another 0-ring leak. Is that true?

o How much radioactive water was released?

  • I was also told that both reactor head seals were leaking. Is that true?
  • I was also told that there were boron deposits o the outs ide of the reactor. Is that correct?

1 o My understanding is that Boron is corrosive. Was there any collateral damage from boron leakage?

  • If this was a reactor head failure, isn't this a repeat of prior incidence? What is the magnitude of danger if we are having repeated problems?

Given that the closure dates have been announced, I and other stakeholders have concerns that standards for operations and safety are becoming more lax. I hope your responses will make me feel that

my concerns are unwarranted.

Thank you and Merry Christmas.

Gary Shaw - IPSEC

From: Schroeder. Daniel To: Haagensen Briao

Subject:

RE: RCS lesson plan and RCP seal description Date: Friday, December 15, 2017 10:27:13 AM Thanks Brian.

From: Haagensen, Brian Sent: Friday, December 15, 2017 10:21 AM To: Schroeder, Daniel <Dan iel.Schroeder@nrc.gov>; Setzer, Thomas <Thomas.Setzer@nrc.gov>;

Rossi, Matthew <Matthew.Rossi@nrc.gov>; Henrion, Mark <Mark. Henrion@nrc.gov>

Subject:

RCS lesson plan and RCP seal description Dan, I am sending a copy of the RCS lesson plan (attached) in case you need to answer RCP /

RPV stud questions. This lesson plan has high-level descriptions of the RCP seals and RCS system as well as simplified drawings of various components. Any more detailed information can be provided if needed.

The email below has a extract from this lesson plan on the RCP seals.

Brian From: Haagensen,Briancom

Sent: Friday, December 15, 2017 9:49 AM To: Haagensen, Brian <Brian.Haagensen@nrc gov>

Subject:

[Externa l_Sender]

(b)(4)

..,l(b

.._.1).(4

) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ____.lKt.AC IU K COOLANT SYSTEM SD 1.0 Rev. 16 40

(b)(4)

(b )( 4) IREACTOR COOLANT

' - - - - - - - - - -::,""'y"""'*:s=T=*E,.,..,,...,

M:S""""'" LJ ..-

1..,..

U..,....... Jt,"""4 t<.ev- . """ """'1. . . . . - - - - - - - - '

(b)(4)

(b)(4)

(b)(4) _____

43

_,!REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM SD 1.0 Rev. 16

(b)(4)

Brian C. Haagensen Senior Resident Inspecto r Indian Point Energy Center 914-739-9360 (Office)

!(b)(6)  !(ce ll )

In plant x5347

From: SIWY Andrew To: Haaecosro Bcian

Subject:

RE: Creative writing assignment Date: Tuesday. October 24. 2017 4:26:28 PM I think I've exhausted my brain on this issue. I'll be here tomorrow if you have any questions. I1 may be helpful to discuss in person the changes that were made. I'm sure both you and Jon won't be completely satisfied with the currelll version, but keep in mind that I tried to ensure you would both be at the same level of satisfaction.

a..A- s;:.,7., P.E.

Resident Inspector I Indian Point Rcgion l I lf:914.739.9360 From: Haagensen, Brian Sent: Monday, Octobe r 23, 2017 5:33 PM To: Siwy, Andrew <Andrew. Siwy@nrc.gov>

Cc: Hochmuth, Diane <Diane.Hochmuth @nrc.gov>

Subject:

Creative writing assignment Andrew, Please revise the o-ring sample section in the quarterly report to address Jon's concerns. 1will review what you have written when I return on Wednesday with the goal to publish the quarterly report by Friday.

(b)(5)

Please complete the revisions on the linked file below, not in the report file (contrary to our usual practice of only making changes directly to the report file).

G:\Sites\lP\Documents\ lnspection Reports\2017\2017-003\Annual PIR Sample on a-ring leaks.docx Diane will be working in the report an d I don't want any version conflicts at this late hour.

Brian From: Haagensen, Brian Sent: Monday, Octobe r 23, 2017 5:17 PM To: Diane Hochmuth (Diane Hochmuth@nrc gov) <Diane Hochmuth@nrc gov>

Cc: Siwy, Andrew <Andrew Siwy@nrc gov>; Rossi, Matthew <Matthew Rossi@nrc gov>

Subject:

Quarterly Report for fina l review Diane, I will be out of the office tomorrow (Tuesday). We will be moving to our new apartment.

The quarterly report is (almost) readiy for your final review. Andrew changed the TOC and now there is an errant code that should be fixed. Please read it over for editorial problems, abbreviations and the other formatting issues that you check so well.

We removed the closure of two LERs from the last section.

23. LER U3 2017 002*00: Manual Isolation of the eves letdown to stop a valve leak resulted in an exceedance of TS 3.4.9 condition A Limit for Pressurizer Level Andrew S LER
  • The LER U3 2017-002-00 for the excessive leakage was not completed by Andrew and will be closed next quarter.

The following item has been deleted from the report:

"(}5fJ(}(}286/2(}17 (}(}2 (}(} LER Marwal lse,'8Ncri et G!Jemieal am:J VG,'time GeritffJI

s,sftJm f','e,me.l LeldeHl'I It! Slt!tJ e. 'lBl,e LeBlc Resfj1'fed il'I Bl'1 ExeeedBJ'lee at T'eehl'lieBI S13ee,~*ee.ti8l'1 3.4.9 Cal'lf'iifial'I A Limif far Pressfj, iz:er Le~'/ (-Seeh*al'I 40A3)"

  • The LER U2 2017 -001 -00 for the Manual Reactor Trip was determined to have a performance deficiency (at our pre-exit meeting last Friday) and will be closed to a new finding next quarter. This sample will have to be backed out of RRPS for this quarter.

I have modified the inspection sample plan to reflect these changes. Please remove from RRPS as appropriate.

I believe I have reconciled all other comments from Andrew and Jon.

Please do your magic but do not send it to Jon until I see it one more time. Feel free to work directly with Jon if you need to better understand his comments (wh ich are attached to this email).

Brian C. Haagensen Senior Resident Inspector Indian Point Energy Center 914 739-9360 (Office)

(b)(6) Cell)

From: Reid Katherine R To: HAAGENSEN BRIAN C; NEWMAN GARREU A: RICH SARAH C

Subject:

Mid-cycle PI&R sa mples. key messages and oth er items of interest Date: Friday, Jun e 24, 20 16 1: 57 : 15 PM ~N-o-te-: -T-he

-p-a-ge- dr_a_ft_a-tt-ac_h_m_e_n_t -is-w-it-h-he

_l_

d -in- i-ts~

Attachments: Key messages and PI&R samo les working document.docx entirety under FO IA exemption 5, Hello Indian Point Residents ,

It is Mid-Cycle assessment time! I am putting together the package, but while I am trying to get it as good as I can get it here is the Pl&R sample , other items of interest and key messages sections to work on when you get time . I figured I would send these sections out ahead of the draft package to give you some extra time.

I updated the Pl&R sample section to reflect through the 102016 report. Please feel free to make changes as you see necessary. The key messages and other items of interest sections are from the ROP- 16 End of Cycle package .

Until I send out the Draft Plant Performance Summary please update the document attached located here:

G:\DRP\BRANCH2\ROP\ROP 17 Good luck with all that is going on onsite. Please let me know if you have any questions, com ments, or concerns .

Thanks, Kat herin e Reid Rl /DRP/PB2 Project Enginee r 610-337-5389

From: Lorson Raymond To: Haagensen Brian; Schroeder Panjel* Pelton David Cc: Setzer Thomas; Henrjon Mark; Safouri Christopher: Sjwy Andrew

Subject:

RE: Unit 3 susceptibility to flange leakage and detection of the problem - !PRO assessment Date: Wednesday, December 20, 2017 4:56:40 PM Brian - thanks. Quite an explanation. Look forward to the update.

Ray From: Haagensen, Brian Sent: Wednesday, December 20, 2017 10:25 AM To: Lorson, Raymond <Raymond. Lorson@nrc.gov>; Schroeder, Daniel <Daniel.Schroeder@nrc.gov>;

Pelton, David <David.Pelt on@nrc.gov>

Cc: Set zer, Thomas <Thomas.Setzer@nrc.gov>; Henrion, Mar k <Mark.Henrion@ nrc.gov>; Safouri, Christopher <Christopher.Safouri@nrc.gov>; Siwy, Andrew <And rew.Siwy@nrc.gov>

Subject:

RE: Unit 3 susceptibility to flange leakage and detection of the problem - !PRO assessment Summary:

Bob Walpole (Licensing Manager) initiated a CR on 12/9 that asked this (Ray's) question (without our prompting). IPEC closed this CR (broke/fix) without taking any action or completing an assessment Our follow-on questions in this area should cause them to reevaluate this issue (why they missed the RPV flange leak on Unit 2 but did not miss the flange leak on Unit 3). IPRO will track this evaluation, if it is performed, and continue to question the validity of the Unit 2 unidentified leak rate detection.

More

Background:

I have thought for a long time that the UIL value for Unit 2 is not accurate because of the way the RCS mass balance is measured in the plant process computer (PICs). I raised these concerns to the IPEC last year when I inspected the Pl for leakage on Unit 2.

Unfortunately, the ROP leakage Pl measures and reports IDENTIFIED leakage not unidentified leakage so the regulatory hook was not there. Tech Spec 3.4.15 RCS (Leakage Detection Instrumentation) requires measuring UIL using:

1. the containment RAD monitors,
2. the containment sump monitor and
3. the fan cooler unit ( FCU) condensate flow monitor.

The process computer mass balance is not a Tech Spec UIL measurement system, yet this is what they report and we track in our daily spreadsheets.

I have been told that the Unit 2 containment sump is much larger than the Unit 3 containment sump and therefore the sensitivity of the UIL measurement based on sump pump outs may be less for Unit 2. The FCU flow monitors are often unreliable because the weir blocks up with debris over time. They rely on the process computer RCS mass balance which appears not to be accurate for total (or gross) leakage but not for UIL because of the way they manually measure and subtract identified leakage (IL) and CVCS leakage (which they call non-reactor coolant pressure boundary leakage). They measure IL and eves leakage every Saturday night by diverting the leakage into various tanks and

measuring how fast these tanks fill up. The value for IL and eves leak rate is only valid for the time it was measured (about I hour). Variations in IL and CVCs leak rate will not be measured throughout the following week. They then subtract this fixed constant for an entire week period of time from total leakage to come up with UIL. The equation is:

Gross leak rate - identified leak rate (IL) - non-RCBP (CVCS) leak rate - unidentified leak rate (UIL).

Both identified leak rate and non-RCPB leak rate are determined by a manual surveillance (manually measuring various tank level changes over a 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> period) by the operators every Saturday night and these constants are subtracted from the real time gross leak rate over then next week on a daily basis to determine UIL. Any variations in in IL and non-RCPB leakage are not captured by the process computer. 1 (b)(5)

I (b)(5)

There was a generic communication following the event at Davis-Besse that asked the licensees to evaluate the sensitivity of their Tech Spec leak detection systems to measure RCS leakage in light of the fact that RCS activity levels had been reduced by an order of magnitude since the TS were first implemented. The assumptions used for the leak-before-break (LBB) license amendments were that the leak detection systems could detect a through-wall RCS leak in sufficient time to shutdown the plant before the flaw propagated into a catastrophic failure. If the underlying assumption of the sensitivity of the leak detection systems were inadequate to detect a through-wall leak, then this would invalidate the LBB license amendment. All plants had to evaluate the concerns communicated by this generic communication (I need to look up the precise concerns and requirements). IPEC would have evaluated this on the CLB record. I need to re-look at this evaluation in light of the Unit 2 failure to detect this leak.

It is entirely possible that that the RPV flange leak rate was too small to be detected by the tech spec systems and the inherent inaccuracies of the process computer mass balance obscured the issue. More to follow ...

Brian From: Lorson, Raymond Sent: Wednesday, December 20, 2017 8:59 AM To: Schroeder, Daniel <DaoieLSchroeder@nrc.gov>; Pelt on, David <David.Pelton@nrc.gov>;

Haagensen, Brian <Brian .Haagensen@nrc.gov>

Subject:

RE : Unit 3 susceptibility to flange leakage and detection of t he prob lem Dan - thanks. Any idea if IPEC is going to adjust the leakage detection at U2 to match the sensitivity of U3?

Ray From: Schroeder, Da niel Sent: Wednesday, December 20, 2017 7:57 AM To: Pe lton, David <David .Pelton@nrc.gov>; Lo rson, Raymond <Raymond Lorson@nrc gov>

Subject:

FW: Unit 3 susceptibi li ty t o fla nge leakage and det ection of the problem The licensee has the question regarding extent of condition regarding o ring seal leakage and boron wastage of the studs on Unit 3. Brian has received a partial answer from the licensee as stated below. They know that this issue should be addressed in their Corrective Action Process.

From: Haagensen, Bria n Sent: Wednesday, December 20, 2017 7:38 AM To: Schroeder, Daniel <Dan iel.Schroeder@nrc.gov>

Subject:

RE : Unit 3 susceptibility to flange leakage and detection of t he prob lem I received an email last night from Engineering that essentially restated all of the methods and mechanisms that they have available to detect UIL. They restated my original question and addressed the fact that they had no indications of a leak at present. I responded by asking the original question - what is different between Unit 2 and Unit 3? I expect that they will be revising their answer based on my next round of clarifying questions.

I think the best answer at this po int is that Unit 3 proved that it cou ld detect a small leak from the RPV flan e last June. The real question is why did they not detect the leak on Unit 2? I have asked them (again) to address the differences between the units. They had addressed this question verbally by stating that the leak measurement systems in Unit 3 are "more sensitive" than Unit 2.

From: Haagensen, Brian To: Haagensen Brian

Subject:

[External_Sender) FW: Unit 3 Vessel 0 -ring Leakage Evaluation Date: Wednesday, December 20, 2017 7:41:55 AM These eight pages of Attachments: Historical data with O-rin2 leaka2e at Unit 3 in 2017.odf attachments are withheld in Un it 3 VC Radiation Mooitor R1 1-and R12 Trend.since lune to December 2017.odf their entirety under UOJlll'.C Saro pl~u.l.lfmro.J u.ne. ~c.emhfL201.2. pelf

  • exemption 4.

Unit 3 vc sump In-leakage comparison between last l uly to December 2016 and 2017 pdf Brian C. Haagensen Sen ior Resident Inspector Indian Point Energy Center 914-739-9360 (Office)

!(b)(6) I(cell)

In plant x5347 From: Chan, Tat Sent: Tuesday, December 19, 2017 6:20 PM To: Haagensen, Brian; Walpole, Robert W Cc: Andreozzi, VincentJoseph; Kaczmarek, Adam; Gioggia, Richard

Subject:

Unit 3 Vessel 0 -ring Leakage Eva luation Brian, The following has been entered in CA-00003 on CR-IP2-2017-05095 Based on the cu rrent information at Unit 3, there is no ind ication of an externa l lea k associated with t he reactor vessel out er 0 -ring. The specific deta il and associated explanation are as follows:

1. All leakage within t he Vapor Containment (VC) includ ing t he RCS would event ually be condensed by the Containment Fan Cooler Units and drai n to t he VC sump. In-leakage to t he sump is monitored by the VC sump pum p system. This system automatically pumps out approximat ely 120 ga llon bet ween the actuation point s and alarms in t he control room, "VC Sump Pump Run ning". As such, a hist orical (sim ilar period in 2016) where we did not an external vessel 0 -ri ng lea k and confi rmed by observation in 3Rl9. Th is is compared to the recent historical value afterthe last 0 -ring replacement in June 2017. The compa rison indicates that the in-flux rate to t he VC sum p is around 0.01 GPM or less. Th is is wit hin t he nomina l fluctuation . Additionally, a review of t he VC sump pump out during May and June of 2017, w here there was an active leak, VC sump pu mp out frequency is almost da ily as compared to the nomina l frequency of approximat ely once weekly. Th is support t he current assessment of a t ight RCS at Unit 3 based on amount of influx to the VC sump. These data is attached .
2. Out leakage from the RCS can also be captured by the insta lled radiation monitors (R-11 particu late/ R12 gas). A review of trend since the 0 -ring outage has been stable and recently showed a downwa rd t rend. Th is support t he current assessment of a tight RCS at Unit 3 based on indicat ion from t he installed radiat ion monitors. However, keep in mind

that magnitude and det ectability is a function of the RCS cond ition . See attached for trend information .

3. Out leakage of RCS can also show up in short live fission products. In this case, Xe-133 with a half-life of approximately 5.2 days could be a good indicator. Based on the periodic samp le of the VC atmosphere since September 2017, Xe-133 has been less than detectable. This support the current assessment of a tight RCS at Unit 3. VC samp le resu lt is attached .

As for the amount of erosion/ wastage of the closure head stud(s), this wou ld be a function of the leakage rate and impingement. With all th ings being equal, the amount of impingement shou ld be negligible if the leakoff line is not obstructed where the leakoff line is routed to the Reactor Coolant Drain Tank (RCDT) normally maintained less than 2 psig. This in -leakage is captured in the weekly RCS inventory determination .

In summary, based on the available indications that wou ld support an RCS externa l leakage from the vessel outer 0 -ring within the containment building discussed above, it is reasonable to conclude currently, the overall integrity of the vesse l outer 0-ring is intact.

From: Schroeder. Daniel To: Haagensen Briao

Subject:

RE: Unit 3 susceptibility to flange leakage and detection of the problem Date: Wednesday, December 20, 2017 7:08:51 AM

Brian, I think that their answer for extent of condition regarding o ring leakage needs to include periodic containment tours at power to look for boron coming through the insulation, What about chemistry samples of the sump that would determine which type of leak is present?

Have there been leaks on U3 outer o ring in the past that have been detected by their outer o ring leak monitoring system? What is the answer to this question for U2? Past performance may be indicative of future performance.

Dan From: Haagensen, Brian Sent: Tuesday, December 19, 2017 4:3 1 PM To: Schroeder, Daniel <Daniel.Schroeder@nrc.gov>

Subject:

Unit 3 susceptibility to f lange lea kage and detection of the problem

Dan, I have the :t.er.baJ. answers to the Region's questions regarding the extent of condition on Unit 3 from Tat Chan (Engineering Supervisor).

Q: Could Entergy detect a small flange leak through the outer a-ring on Unit 3 (in light of the fact that this was not detected on Unit 2)?

ANS: There are two distinct differences between Unit 2 and Unit 3 that ensure Unit 3 can detect this leak whereas Unit 2 did not.

1. The Unit 3 sump is smaller and other physical differences in leak measuring systems ensure that Unit 3 can detect unidentified leakage with greater sensitivity. There is currently no indication of a leak into containment from this sump (UIL=O gpm this morning). Unit 2 has lesser sensitivity for detecting UIL. (I asked them to quantify this relative sensitivities).
2. The Unit 2 containment had a small secondary system leak into containment that was masking the increase in RCS leakage. (This is true (and we knew it) but I am not sure that this matters.)

Comment: We saw a statistically significant increase in the UIL on Unit 2 since the last MBFP outage. Entergy also noted boric acid deposits on the head insulation package during a containment entry (for an unrelated reason) in November. The UIL increase did not trip the ODMI trigger level that would have required further action. However, the methodology for measuring UIL at Unit 2 is flawed. Gross (total) leakage is a more accurate surrogate for RCS condition. And the boric acid deposits on the head insulation

were rationalized as old deposits from water left over from the last refueling outage (wishful thinking) . The statement that the UIL increase was masked by a small secondary leak could be plausible but it is a red herring in light of the fact that we noted the increase in gross leakage and no action was taken to identify the cause.

Q: If a leak on Unit 3 was undetected, how long could the leakage last before the studs reached an unacceptable level of degradation?

ANS : Entergy cannot answer this question because there are too many variables.

However, if Unit 3 can detect an increase in UIL, then this should not be an issue.

Comment: The answers to both of these questions are inadequate. I asked them to put their answers in writing into their CAP. The discipline/reviews involved in committing this answer to writing and getting the analysis approved by management should allow them to see that their verbal answers are inadequate and apply more focus/analysis to answer these questions.

I do not want to perturb the Engineering Organization further at this time by demanding they answer this question now - as they are over-stretched trying to get Unit 2 back on line and I am concerned that if we disrupt their attention from the restart , we may get a bigger problem. Unless you have an immediate safety concern on Unit 3, I recommend we wait for the official answer to come back in writing.

Brian C. Haagensen Senior Resident Inspector Indian Point Energy Center (914) 739-9360 (Office)

!(b)(6) I(Cell)

From: Haagensen, Brian To: Haagensen Brian

Subject:

[External_Sender) FW: Request for EC-75297 Date: Monday, December 18, 2017 2:04:13 PM EC-72951 , consisting of 12 pages, is Attachments: EC-75297 tooic notes.doc. withheld in its entirety under exemption 4.

Brian C. Haagensen Sen ior Resident Inspector India n Point Energy Center 914-739-9360 (Office)

!(b)(6)  !(cell)

In p lant x5347 From: Alexander, Richard Sent: Monday, December 18, 2017 2:01 PM To: Haagensen, Brian

Subject:

RE: Request for EC-75297 Topic notes for EC-75297 From: Haagensen, Brian Sent: Monday, December 18, 2017 1:51 PM To: Alexander, Richard; Pineda, Juan J; Singh, Ravi

Subject:

Request for EC-75297 Please send me a copy of EC-75297 (supporting CR-IP2-2017-05245, RPV stud #20 stuck).

I cannot seem to locat e t his EC after searchi ng M er li n.

Brian C. Haagensen Sen ior Resident Inspector India n Point Energy Center 914-739-9360 (Office)

!(b)(6)  !(cell)

In p lant x5347

From: Haagensen, Brian To: ~

Cc: Gray Harold: fuller 1ustjn; Haagensen Brian: Henrjon Mark: Highley Christopher: McKown Loujs: B2ill

~  ; Schroeder, Daniel: Setzer, Thomas; Siwy. Andrew

Subject:

RE: I P2 Outage Status PM 1630 12/ 11 Date: Wednesday, December 13, 201 7 4:51: 13 PM Note: 58 pages of licensee-originated Attachments: Zl l 1l 1au2 BPY o-rjng replacement under EC72951 on 1213 msg documents, which are attachments to these 3 fW fW Oyersjzed P-Rjng Mod msg - emails, have been withheld in their entirety External Sender EW .msg under FO IA exemption 4.

Mel, You asked excellent questions in your previous email - so I just completed a mods sample on the replacement o-ring (attached) and have some concerns.

(b)(5)

The senior engineer who prepared the EC could not answer these questions.

Please help! Thoughts?

Brian From: Gray, Mel

Sent: Wednesday, December 13, 2017 10:31 AM To: Gray, Harold <Harold.Gray@nrc.gov>

Cc: Haagensen, Brian <Brian.Haagensen@nrc.gov>

Subject:

FW: IP2 Outage Status PM 1630 12/11 Do we know what process Entergy Is applying in installing a larger o-ring (inner and outer?) Is it considered a replacement in kind or a mod? This may dictate the ROP sample applied.

Do we have any questions on the appropriateness of the replacement or process used?

Anyone have safety concerns? (I am not in office this week and may have missed in office discussions on this)

From: Pelton, David Sent: Tuesday, December 12, 2017 7:35 AM To: Haagensen, Brian <Brian.Haagensen@nrc.gov>; Yerokun, Jimi <Jimi Yerokun@nrc gov>;

Schroeder, Daniel <DanieLSchroeder@nrc.gov>; Gray, Mel <Mel.Gray@nrc.gov>; Gray, Harold

<Harold.Gray@nrc.gov>; Kulp, Jeffrey <Jeffrey.Kulp@nrc.gov>

Cc: Greives, Jonathan <Jonathan.Greives@nrc.gov>; Tifft, Doug <Doug.Tjfft@nrc.gov>; Screnci, Diane

<Diane Screncj@nrc gov>; Lorson, Raymond <Raymond Lorson@orc gov>; Welling, Blake

<Bia ke.WelIi ng@nrc.gov>

Subject:

RE: IP2 Outage Status PM 1630 12/11

... thanks all.

dave p.

From: Haagensen, Brian Sent: Tuesday, December 12, 2017 7:25 AM To: Yerokun, Jimi <Jimi.Yerokun@nrc.gov>; Schroeder, Daniel <Daniel Schroeder@nrc gov>; Gray, Mel <Mel Gray@nrc gov>; Gray, Harold <Harold Gray@nrc gov>; Ku lp, Jeffrey

<Jeffrey Ku lp@nrc gov>

Cc: Greives, Jonat han <Jonathan.Greives@ nrc.gov>; Tifft, Doug <Doug.Tifft@nrc.gov>; Screnci, Dia ne

<Diane Screnci@orc gov>; Pelton, David <David Pelton@orc gov>; Lorson, Raymond

<Raymond Lorson@orc gov>; Welling, Blake <Blake Welling@orc gov>

Subject:

RE: IP2 Outage Status PM 1630 12/11 The schedule continues to change. As of this morning, criticality is again officially scheduled for 12/21 . I am certain this will change again.

From: Yerokun, Jimi Sent: Tuesday, December 12, 2017 7:23 AM To: Schroeder, Daniel <DanieLSchroeder@nrc.gov>; Gray, Mel <Mel.Gray@nrc.gov>; Gray, Harold

<Harold Gray@nrc gov>; Kulp, Jeffrey <Jeffrey.Kulp@nrc.gov>

Cc: Greives, Jonathan <Jonathan.Greives@nrc.gov>; Tifft, Doug <Doug.Tifft@nrc.gov>; Screnci, Diane

<Diane Screnci@nrc gov>; Pelton, David <David Pelton@nrc gov>; Lorson, Raymond

<Raymond Lorson@nrc gov>; Welling, Blake <Blake Welling@nrc gov>; Haagensen, Brian

<Brian Haagensen@nrc gov>

Subject:

RE: IP2 Outage Stat us PM 1630 12/11 Thanks Dan. I'll pass any questions I have to Harold Gray.

Jimi T. Yerokun 610 337-5128J1""' (b...,..)(=6), ----,1,,,

From: Schroeder, Da niel Sent: Tuesday, December 12, 2017 6:21 AM To: Gray, Mel <MeLGray@nrc.gov>; Gray, Harold <Harold,Grny@nrc.gov>; Ku lp, Jeffrey

<Jeffrey Ku lp@nrc gov>

Cc: Greives, Jonathan <Jonathan.Greives@ nrc.gov>; Tifft, Doug <Doug.Tifft@nrc.gov>; Screnci, Diane

<Diane,Screnci@nrc.gov>; Pelton, David <Davjd.Pelton@nrc.gov>; Lorson, Raymond

<Raymond Lorson@nrc.gov>; Welling, Blake <Blake.Welling@nrc gov>; Yerokun, Jimi

<Jimi.Yerokun@nrc gov>; Haagensen, Brian <Brian Haagensen@nrc.gov>

Subject:

FW: IP2 Outage Status PM 1630 12/11 The decision to replace the RPV o-ring seals has been finalized. The new seals are slightly thicker than the old seals. Revised start-up date pushes back three days to December 23rd_

Dan From: Haagensen, Brian Sent: Monday, December 11, 2017 4:52 PM To: Fuller, Just in <Justjn.Fuller@nrc.gov>; Haagensen, Bria n <Brian.Haagensen@nrc.gov>; Henrion, Mark <Mark.Henrion@nrc.gov>; Highley, Christopher <Christopher.Highley@nrc.gov>; Mc Kown, Louis <Loujs.McKown@nrc.gov>; Rossi, Matthew <Matthew Rossi@nrc.gov>; Schroeder, Daniel

<Daniel.Schroeder@nrc.gov>; Setzer, Thomas <Thomas.Setzer@nrc.gov>; Siwy, Andrew

<Andrew.Siwy@ nrc.gov>; Safouri, Christopher <Christopher.Safouri@nrc.gov>

Cc: Guzman, Richard <Richard.Guzman@nrc.gov>; Wei l, Jenny <Jenny.Wei!@nrc.goy>; Tifft, Doug

<Doug.Jifft@nrc.gov>; Sheehan, Neil <Neil Sheehan@nrc.gov>

Subject:

IP2 Outage Stat us PM 1630 12/11 IP2 has decided NOT to laser scan or depth mic/measure the RPV flange surface defects during this outage (option #2 in the critical decision paper).

Instead, they intend to :

  • Drain down the RCS to 68 ft (below the flange but above the SIG tube sheet)
  • remove the RPV head,
  • clean the flange sealing surfaces,
  • replace the leaking o-rings with new, oversized o-rings,
  • replace the 21 RCP seals,
  • reset the head , refill the RCS and
  • proceed to plant restart The RCS drain down has been delayed until tomorrow on day shift. They plan to remove the equipment access hatch this evening.

Plant conditions are essentially what they were this morning.

Brian C. Haagensen Senior Resident Inspector Indian Point Energy Center 914 739-9360 (Office)

(b)(6) (Cell)

From: Haagensen, Brian Sent: 13 Dec 2017 16:45:02 +0000 To: Gray, M el Cc: Gray, Harold;Schroeder, Daniel

Subject:

FW: FW: Oversized 0 -Ring Mod Note: 14-page attachment is withheld in its entirety under FOIA exemption 4.

Attachments: Oversized 0-ring Mod EC 72951.doc Attached is the EC justification for installing the oversized 0-rings at Unit 2. I can provide any of the references upon request.

From: Haagensen, Brian [1]

Sent: W ednesday, December 13, 2017 11:31 AM To: Haagensen, Brian <Brian.Haagensen@nrc.gov>

Subject:

[External_Sender] FW: Oversized 0-Ring Mod Brian C. Haagensen Senior Resident Inspector Indian Point Energy Center 914-739-9360 (Office)

!(b)(6) kcell)

In plant x5347 From: LoPiccolo, Angela Marie.

Sent: Wednesday, December 13, 2017 11: 15 AM To: Haagensen, Brian Cc: Wittich, Walter

Subject:

Oversized 0 -Ring Mod Hi Brian, I have attached the Topic Notes from the Oversized 0 -ring mod EC 72951 Rev 0. There is a P2E folder associated with this mod which contains more documents. Do you have access to P2E? If not, let me know if t here are any additional documents you require and I' ll send them over!

Angela LoPiccolo Engineering NSSS X5657

From: Haagensen, Brian Sent: 11 Dec 2017 21 :08 :14 +0000 To: Haagensen, Brian

Subject:

[External_Sender] FW: Note: The four attachments, consisting of Attachments: 9593.pdf, 12203.pdf, 19641.pdf, 29679 .pdf 42 pages , have been withheld in their entirety under FO IA exemption 4.

Brian C. Haagensen Sen ior Resident Inspector Indian Point Energy Center 914-739-9360 (Office)

!(b)(6) l(cell)

In plant x5347 From: Siwy, Andrew Sent: Monday, December 11, 2017 1:41 PM To: Haagensen, Brian; Safouri, Christopher

Subject:

a.,,,&,.,, ~r' P.E.

U.S. NRC Resident Inspector Indi an Point I W :914.739.9360

From: Haagensen, Brian To: Haagensen Brian Note: This attachment is identical to the

Subject:

[Externa l_Sender] FW : Oversized 0-Ring Mod same named attachment to an earlier email, Date: Wednesday, December 13, 2017 11 :41 :33 AM which was withheld in its entirety under FOIA Attachments: Ove rsized 0 - ring Mod EC 72951 .doc exemption 4.

Brian C. Haagensen Senior Resident Inspector Indian Po int Energy Center 914-739-9360 (Office)

(b )(6) (cell) n pant x From: LoPiccolo, Angela Marie.

Sent: Wednesday, December 13, 2017 11: 15 AM To: Haagensen, Brian Cc: Wittich, Walter

Subject:

Oversized 0-Ring Mod Hi Brian, I have attached the Topic Notes from t he Ove rsized 0 -ring mod EC 72951 Rev 0. There is a P2E folder associated with this mod which contains more documents. Do you have access to P2E? If not, let me know if there are any add itio nal documents you require and I'll se nd them over!

Angela LoPi ccolo Engineering NSSS X5657

From: ~

To: Gray Harold Cc: Haagensen Briao Subj ect : FW: I P2 Outage Status PM 1630 12/11 Date: Wednesday, December 13, 2017 10:31: 10 AM Do we know what process Entergy Is applying in installing a larger a-ring (inner and outer?) Is it considered a replacement in kind or a mod? This may dictate the ROP sample applied.

Do we have any questions on the appropriateness of the replacement or process used?

Anyone have safety concerns? (I am not in office this week and may have missed in office discussions on this)

From: Pelton, David Sent: Tuesday, December 12, 2017 7:35 AM To: Haagensen, Brian <Brian. Haagensen@nrc.gov>; Yerokun, Jim i <Jimi .Yerokun@nrc.gov>;

Schroeder, Daniel <Dan iel.Schroeder@nrc.gov>; Gray, M el <Mel.Gray@nrc.gov>; Gray, Harold

<Harold.Gray@nrc.gov>; Ku lp, Jeffrey <Jeffrey.Kulp@nrc.gov>

Cc: Greives, Jonat han <Jonat han.Greives@nrc.gov>; Tifft, Doug <Doug.Tifft@n rc.gov>; Screnci, Diane

<Diane.Screnci@nrc.gov>; Lorson, Raymond <Raymond .Lorson@nrc.gov>; Welling, Blake

<Blake.Welli ng@nrc.gov>

Subject:

RE: IP2 Outage Status PM 1630 12/11

... thanks all.

dave p.

From: Haagensen, Brian Sent: Tuesday, December 12, 2017 7:25 AM To: Yerokun, Jimi <Jimi.Yerokun@nrc.gov>; Schroeder, Daniel <Daniel Schroeder@nrc gov>; Gray, Mel <Mel Gray@nrc.gov>; Gray, Harold <Harold.Gray@nrc gov>; Ku lp, Jeffrey

<Jeffrey.Ku lp@nrc.gov>

Cc: Greives, Jonathan <Jonat han Greives@ nrc gov>; Tifft, Doug <Doug Tifft@nrc gov>; Screnci, Diane

<Diane.Screnci@orc.gov>; Pelton, David <David.Pelton@nrc.gov>; Lorson, Raymond

<Raymond.Lorson@nrc gov>; Welling, Blake <Blake Welliog@nrc.gov>

Subject:

RE: IP2 Outage Status PM 1630 12/11 The schedule continues to change. As of this morning, criticality is again officially scheduled for 12/21 . I am certain this will change again.

From: Yerokun, Jimi Sent: Tuesday, December 12, 2017 7:23 AM To: Schroeder, Daniel <DanjeLSchroeder@nrc.gov>; Gray, M el <Me!.Gray@nrc.gov>; Gray, Harold

<Harold.Gray@nrc.gov>; Kulp, Jeffrey <Jeffrey Kulp@nrc.gov>

Cc: Greives, Jonathan <Jonathan.Greives@nrc.gov>; Tifft, Doug <Doug.Tjfft@nrc.gov>; Screnci, Diane

<Diane Screnci@nrc gov>; Pelton, David <David Pelton@nrc gov>; Lorson, Raymond

<Raymond Lorson@nrc gov>; Welling, Blake <Blake Welling@nrc gov>; Haagensen, Brian

<Brian Haagensen@nrc gov>

Subject:

RE: IP2 Outage Stat us PM 1630 12/11 Thanks Dan. I'll pass any questions I have to Harold Gray.

Jimi T. Yerokun 610 337-5128~..,,.(b..,...,.

)(6=)---,1,,,

From: Schroeder, Da niel Sent: Tuesday, December 12, 2017 6:21 AM To: Gray, Mel <MeLGray@nrc.gov>; Gray, Harold <Harold,Grny@nrc.gov>; Ku lp, Jeffrey

<Jeffrey Ku lp@nrc gov>

Cc: Greives, Jonathan <Jonathan.Greives@ nrc.gov>; Tifft, Doug <Doug.Tifft@nrc.gov>; Screnci, Diane

<Diane,Screnci@nrc.gov>; Pelton, David <Davjd.Pelton@nrc.gov>; Lorson, Raymond

<Raymond Lorson@nrc.gov>; Welling, Blake <Blake.Welling@nrc gov>; Yerokun, Jimi

<Jimi.Yerokun@nrc gov>; Haagensen, Brian <Brian Haagensen@nrc.gov>

Subject:

FW: IP2 Outage Status PM 1630 12/11 The decision to replace the RPV o-ring seals has been finalized. The new seals are slightly thicker than the old seals. Revised start-up date pushes back three days to December 23rd_

Dan From: Haagensen, Brian Sent: Monday, December 11, 2017 4:52 PM To: Fuller, Just in <Justjn.Fuller@nrc.gov>; Haagensen, Bria n <Brian.Haagensen@nrc.gov>; Henrion, Mark <Mark.Henrion@nrc.gov>; Highley, Christopher <Christopher.Highley@nrc.gov>; Mc Kown, Louis <Loujs.McKown@nrc.gov>; Rossi, Matthew <Matthew Rossi@nrc.gov>; Schroeder, Daniel

<Daniel.Schroeder@nrc.gov>; Setzer, Thomas <Thomas.Setzer@nrc.gov>; Siwy, Andrew

<Andrew.Siwy@ nrc.gov>; Safouri, Christopher <Christopher.Safouri@nrc.gov>

Cc: Guzman, Richard <Richard.Guzman@nrc.gov>; Wei l, Jenny <Jenny.Wei!@nrc.goy>; Tifft, Doug

<Doug.Jifft@nrc.gov>; Sheehan, Neil <Neil Sheehan@nrc.gov>

Subject:

IP2 Outage Stat us PM 1630 12/11 IP2 has decided NOT to laser scan or depth mic/measure the RPV flange surface defects during this outage (option #2 in the critical decision paper).

Instead, they intend to :

  • Drain down the RCS to 68 ft (below the flange but above the SIG tube sheet)
  • remove the RPV head,
  • clean the flange sealing surfaces,
  • replace the leaking o-rings with new, oversized o-rings,
  • replace the 21 RCP seals,
  • reset the head , refill the RCS and
  • proceed to plant restart The RCS drain down has been delayed until tomorrow on day shift. They plan to remove the equipment access hatch this evening.

Plant conditions are essentially what they were this morning.

Brian C. Haagensen Senior Resident Inspector Indian Point Energy Center (914) 739-9360 (Office)

!(b)(6) I(Cell)

From: Haagensen, Brian To: Haagensen Brian

Subject:

[Externa l_Sender] FW:

Date: Monday, December 11, 2017 4:09:23 PM Attachments: 9593.f)l!f 12203.Ddf 19641 odr 29679 pdf Brian C. Haagensen Senior Resident Inspector Ind ia n Po int Energy Center 914-739-9360 (Office)

!(b)(6)  !(cell)

In plant x5347 From: Siwy, Andrew Sent: Monday, December 11, 2017 1:41 PM To: Haagensen, Brian; Safouri, Christopher

Subject:

~ '>iw'l, P.E.

U.S. NRC Resident Inspector Indian Point I W :9 14.739.9360

From: Haagensen, Brian Sent: 8 Dec 2017 13:23:39 +0000 To: Siwy, Andrew;Safouri, Christopher

Subject:

Unidentified leakage stats trends IP2 is at 8 consecutive days when UIL is > the mean.

December 2017 Da Rate Prev. mean, m 0.044 m+s 0.052 m +2 s 0.061 m+3 s 1-Dec 0.05 2-Dec 0.05 3-Dec 0.06 4-Dec 0.06 5-Dec 0.06 6-Dec 0.06 7-Dec 0.05 8-Dec 0.05 9-Dec 10-Dec IP3 is at 7 consecutive days.

December 2017 Prev. mean, m 0.019 m+s 0.028 m +2 s 0.037 m + 3s 1-Dec 0.01 2-Dec 0.02 3-Dec 0.02 4-Dec 0.02 5-Dec 0.02 6-Dec 0.02 7-Dec 0.02 8-Dec 0.02 9-Dec 10-Dec 11-Dec Although the absolute numbers are still very small, if the units go into AL 1 over the weekend, it will need to be reported next w eek. This is not a safety concern.

Brian C. Haagensen

Senior Resident Inspector Indian Point Energy Center 914 739-9360 (Office)

(b)(6) (Cell)

From: Sjwy. Andrew To: Haagensen Brian Subj ect: RE: Indian Point Unit 2 Update Date: Monday, December 11, 2017 7: 11:41 AM You are correct. However, laser mapping was never mentioned in mine or Dan' s emai l.

~ $:;w7, P.E.

Resident inspector I Indian Point Region I I 'ir:914 .739.9360 From: Haagensen, Brian Sent: Monday, December 11, 2017 6:55 AM To: Siwy, Andrew <Andrew.Siwy@nrc.gov>

Subject:

RE: India n Point Unit 2 Updat e We (IPRO) have no hesitation in saying they will replace the o-rings to the region - as you stated.

I just did not want the Region to think that this was a decision by Entergy and have someone in NRC publically announce it before Entergy had reached their own decision.

The region needs to know what we think, what the plant thinks. what Entergy thinks and what is appropriate for publ ic discussion. As of Sunday, they were still trying to decide if they were going to perform laser mapping of the head.

From: Siwy, Andrew Sent: Sunday, December 10, 2017 3:18 PM To: Haagensen, Brian <Brian.Haagensen@nrc gov>

Subject:

Re: Ind ian Poi nt Unit 2 Update

Brian, Did Tony mention that they are procu ri ng t wo new sets of rings and bringing Westinghouse and Areva onsite for the issu e? Not su re why we need to hold back on stating that they' re likely going to re place t hem when we had no hes itation to say that we may need DRS su ppo rt in case they don't.

From: Haagensen, Brian Sent: Sunday, December 10, 2017 11:54 AM To: Siwy, Andrew; Schroeder, Daniel; Safouri, Christopher Cc: Setzer, Thomas; Henrion, Ma rk

Subject:

Re: Ind ian Poi nt Unit 2 Update I just spoke w ith Tony Vitale . The final decision to repair the leaking o-ring is sti ll being vetted

by Ent ergy using the critica l decision making process. However, as Andrew states below, IPEC is making all preps (work order generation, schedule development etc.) to support that path forward.

We should not announce (or acknowledge) any path forward yet but the decision will be forthcoming soon. We w ill let you know when they make the official decision.

You may want to reach out to management/SLOs and give them a heads up. I got an email yesterday requesting the status of the outage from Jenny Weil at OCA. It is highly likely that word is getting out in the public regarding the a-ring leak.

Brian C. Haagensen Senior Resident Inspector Indian Point Energy Center 914-739-9630/1 (office) l(b)(6) I'.ce ll)

._._ _ __,_ (home)

From: Siwy, Andrew Sent: Sunday, December 10, 2017 7:59 AM To: Schroeder, Daniel; Haagensen, Brian; Safouri, Christopher Cc: Setzer, Thomas; Henrion, Mark

Subject:

Re: Ind ian Point Unit 2 Update Dan, It appears they are going to replace the 0 -rings. They have a preliminary schedule showing the start-up (withdrawa l of control banks) is scheduled for 12/21/17, three days later than originally scheduled. Reactor power of 100% scheduled for 12/23/17. The reactor head is scheduled to be lifted on 12/14/17. As always, schedules are subject to change.

Considering they have plenty of recent experience removing the reactor vesse l head and the fact that they had already planned to vent RCS and drain down for the 21 RCP work, it seems reasonab le that only three days would be added to the schedu le.

From: Yerokun, Jimi Sent: Saturday, December 9, 2017 7:35 PM To: Schroeder, Daniel; Lorson, Raymond; Pelton, David; Welling, Blake Cc: Screnci, Diane; Sheeha n, Neil; Tifft, Doug; Safouri, Ch ristopher; Siwy, Andrew; Haagensen, Brian; Greives, Jonathan; Gray, Mel

Subject:

Re: Ind ian Point Un it 2 Update Thanks Dan. And the a-ring issues continue, not a good thing. We'll definitely be glad to assist w ith this.


Original Message--------

From: "Schroeder, Daniel" < DanjeLSchroeder@nrq~oy>

Date: Sat, December 09, 2017 9:13 AM -0500 To: "Lorson, Raymond " <Raymond .Lorson@nrc.gov>, "Pelton, David"

<David.Pelton@nrc.gov>, "Welling, Blake " <Blake.Welliog@nrc.gov>, "Yerokun, Jimi"

<Jimi.Yerokun@nrc.gov>

CC: "Screnci, Diane" <Diaoe.Screncj@nrc.gov>, "Sheehan, Neil" <Neil.Sheehan@nrc.gov>,

"Greives, Jonathan" <Jonathan,Grejves@nrc.gov>, "Tifft, Doug" <Doug.Tifft@nrc.gov>,

"Safou ri, Ch ristopher" <Christopher.Safouri@nrc.gov>, "Siwy, Andrew"

<Andrew.Siwy@nrc.gov>, "Haagensen, Brian" <Brian.Haagensen@nrc.gov>

Subject:

Indian Point Unit 2 Update Indian Point Unit 2 shut down at 0119 to start a forced outage to rep lace the 21 reactor coolant pump seal. An initia l containment entry was made by the licensee, and boron accumulation was found on the RPV, ind icating leakage past the outer a-ring. THis has been an issue in the past, and the licensee be lieved that the inner seal was leaking and the outer seal w as holding. The licensee is evaluating the current situation. Unit 2 w ill have a refue l outage in the spring. The unidentif ied leak rate for Unit 2 has been low, consistently less than 0.1 gpm. The licensee is evaluating the situation . Outage to rep lace the sea l requires draining water level below RPV flange, but removing the head to replace the a-rings would extend the outage.

An update w ill be provided once the licensee has made a decision, and DRS assistance is requested next week if the licensee decides to leave the current seals in place. Drain down to a level below the RPV flange is scheduled for Monday.

Dan

From: Haagensen Brian To : Schroeder Daniel Cc: Siwy Andrew; Safou ri Christophe r

Subject:

Unit 3 o-ring leakage inspection - SAT Date: Friday, January 05, 2018 11:09:00 AM Unit 3 completed a containment entry this morning for the explicit purpose of inspecting the Unit 3 RPV head and flange area for any boric acid leakage past the outer o-ring.

The inspection showed no evidence of leakage pas the outer o-ring .

Brian C. Haagensen Senior Resident Inspector Indian Point Energy Center 914 739-9360 (Office)

(b)(6) (Cell)

From: Haagensen, Brian To: Sheehan Neil

Subject:

Fw: Fwd: Indian Point questions Date: Tuesday, December 26, 2017 12:32:21 PM Neil, I received the fol lowing email from Paul Blanch th is morning. I am on leave this w eek but wanted to ensu re you had specific information regard ing the potential responses. See my answers below. The words shou ld be reworked for public messaging. I w anted you to have the facts.

Brian C. Haagensen Senior Resident Inspector Indian Point Energy Center 914-739-9630/1 (office)

(b)(6) I(eelI]

l

. _(home )

From: Pa ul i....

~b_)(_6_) - - - - - -~

Sent: Monday, December 25, 2017 10:27 AM To: Haagensen, Brian; Holian, Brian Cc: Screnci, Diane; Sheeha n, Nei l; Raspa, Rossana; Dave Lochbaum

Subject:

[Ext erna l_Sender) Fwd : Ind ian Point quest ions 1

Brian s Sorry I didn't include you on this. Some of the questions were added by myself and others.

Pau l Blanch Hom~ (b)(6) ce1 q(b)(6)

Begin forwarded message:

From: Pau l ~.....

(b_)(_6)_ _ _ _ _.....~

Date: December 25, 2017 at 9:08:50 AM EST To: Diane.Screnci@nrc .gov, Neil Sheehan <nei l.sheehan@nrc.gov>

Cc: Dave Lochbaum <dlochbaum@ucsusa.org>, DR CORCORAN W ILLIAM DR

<William Rcorcoran@1959.USNA com>

Subject:

Indian Point questions Dianne and Neil The following questions have been picked up on social media and I wou ld appreciate a response ASAP Merry Christmas Pau l NRC questions

  • Why and when was Unit 2 initially shutdown?

o ANS: December 8th.

  • What has delayed the restart?

o ANS: The length of the outage was driven by the replacement of the 21 RCP seal. Although the reactor vessel a-rings were replaced, the work to replace the pump seal took longer (was critical path) than the work to replace the work to replace the a-ring.

  • Our government officials have indicated that both reactor head seals were leaking with boron deposits observed external to the reactor. If our information is accurate, will a Root Cause Analysis (RCA) be performed prior to restart?

o ANS: There was no root cause analysis performed prior to restart from this outage. However, Entergy has performed several causal analyses for these leaks in the past and is currently reviewing recommendations to prevent them in the future.

  • Why were previous RCA 's deficient in preventing this reoccurring problem?

o ANS: The previous causal analyses came to conclusions that plant operations and a-ring installation procedures/practices had caused the o-ring(s) to leak. See the Pl&R annual sample on a-ring leakage that was publically docketed in the 003 report (section 40A3) for specific details.

(NOTE: I have long considered the cause of the a-ring leakage to be defects in the flange surfaces.)

  • Will both a-rings be replaced?\

o ANS: Yes - the replacement 0-rings have improved sealing characteristics by incorporating a thicker malleable wrapper of silver.

Entergy expects these larger a-rings will seal any flange surface defects.

  • Has there been any collateral damage due to the corrosive boron?

o ANS: The 0-rings leak into the perimeter of the reactor vessel where the reactor vessel closure studs are located, thereby causing corrosion on these studs.. The studs are made of hi-tensile carbon steel. Some of the studs were degraded and had to be replaced. (One stud replaced, with a new stud, four studs were reused, and one stud could not be extracted and remains stuck in the reactor vessel. An engineering analysis was performed to demonstrate that the four degraded studs were within

specifications to be reused and the stuck stud was not credited for reactor vessel closure.)

  • Have any formal reports been made to the public or to the State and Media? Why not?

o ANS: Theo-ring leakage is not promptly reportable under 10 CFR 50.72 and was therefore not reported. However, the next NRC quarterly inspection report will have an update that will address the o-ring leakage.

  • What assurances does the public have that there will not be a catastrophic f ailure of the reactor head?

o ANS: Engineering analysis clearly shows that the reactor vessel closure system has sufficient strength and significant margin to prevent any catastrophic failure. There has never been a catastrophic failure of a reactor vessel.

  • How much water leaked from the reactor and who t was the flo w rate?

o ANS: The exact leak rate is still under analysis by Entergy but it appears to be very small. The unidentified leak rate (measured daily) never exceeded a small fraction of Tech Spec requirements. (UIL TS is 1gpm.

The max UIL for Unit 2 varied between 0.02 and 0.07 gpm. (NOTE: Our current estimate is that the UIL was too small to be detected by the containment RCS leak detection systems).

  • Why did the leak detection fail to detect this leak from the primary cooling system?

o ANS: This question is still under analysis but preliminary indications are that the leak rate was so small that it was below the threshold for detection by the RCS leak detection systems. (NOTE: Entergy may institute, periodic containment visual inspections for a-ring leakage during plant operations in the future according to Tony Vitale but no definite decisions have been made.)

Paul Blanch Home"""!

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From : Haagensen, Brian To: Schroeder Daniel

Subject:

RE: Unit 3 susceptibility to flange leakage and detection of the problem Date: Wednesday, December 20, 201 7 7:37:00 AM I received an email last night from Engineering that essentially restated all of the methods and mechanisms that they have available to detect UIL. They restated my original question and addressed the fact that they had no indications of a leak at present. I responded by asking the original question - what is different between Unit 2 and Unit 3? I can forward this email to you if you want to read it. I expect that they will be revising their answer based on my next round of clarifying questions.

I think the best answer at this point is that Unit 3 proved that it could detect a small leak from the RPV flange last June. The real question is why did they not detect the leak on Unit 2? I have asked them (again) to address the differences between the units. They had addressed this question verbally by stating that the leak measurement systems in Unit 3 are "more sensitive" than Unit 2 but this point was never written in the email.

We shall see what today brings.

From: Schroeder, Da niel Sent: Wednesday, December 20, 2017 7:09 AM To: Haagensen, Brian <Brian.Haagensen@nrc.gov>

Subject:

RE: Unit 3 susceptibility to flange leakage and detection of the problem

Brian, I think that their answer for extent of condition regarding o ring leakage needs to include periodic containment tours at power to look for boron coming through the insulation, What about chemistry samples of the sump that would determine which type of leak is present?

Have there been leaks on U3 outer o ring in the past that have been detected by their outer o ring leak monitoring system? What is the answer to this question for U2? Past performance may be indicative of future performance.

Dan From: Haagensen, Brian Sent: Tuesday, December 19, 2017 4:3 1 PM To: Schroeder, Daniel <Daniel Schroeder@nrc gov>

Subject:

Un it 3 susceptibilit y t o fla nge lea kage and detection of t he problem

Dan, I have the ~ answers to the Region"s questions regarding the extent of condition on Unit 3 from Tat Chan (Engineering Supervisor).

Q: Could Entergy detect a small flange leak through the outer o-ring on Unit 3 (in light of the fact that this was not detected on Unit 2)?

ANS: There are two distinct differences between Unit 2 and Unit 3 that ensure Unit 3 can detect this leak whereas Unit 2 did not.

1. The Unit 3 sump is smaller and other physical differences in leak measuring systems ensure that Unit 3 can detect unidentified leakage with greater sensitivity. There is currently no indication of a leak into containment from this sump (UIL=O gpm this morning). Unit 2 has lesser sensitivity for detecting UIL. (I asked them to quantify this relative sensitivities).
2. The Unit 2 containment had a small secondary system leak into containment that was masking the increase in RCS leakage. (This is true (and we knew it) but I am not sure that this matters.)

Comment: We saw a statistically significant increase in the UIL on Unit 2 since the last MBFP outage. Entergy also noted boric acid deposits on the head insulation package during a containment entry (for an unrelated reason) in November. The UIL increase did not trip the ODMI trigger level that would have required further action. However, the methodology for measuring UIL at Unit 2 is flawed. Gross (total) leakage is a more accurate surrogate for RCS condition. And the boric acid deposits on the head insulation were rationalized as old deposits from water left over from the last refueling outage (wishful thinking). The statement that the UIL increase was masked by a small secondary leak could be plausible but it is a red herring in light of the fact that we noted the increase in gross leakage and no action was taken to identify the cause.

Q: If a leak on Unit 3 was undetected, how long could the leakage last before the studs reached an unacceptable level of degradation?

ANS: Entergy cannot answer this question because there are too many variables.

However, if Unit 3 can detect an increase in UIL, then this should not be an issue.

Comment: The answers to both of these questions are inadequate. I asked them to put their answers in writing into their CAP. The discipline/reviews involved in committing this answer to writing and getting the analysis approved by management should allow them to see that their verbal answers are inadequate and apply more focus/analysis to answer these questions.

I do not want to perturb the Engineering Organization further at this time by demanding they answer this question now - as they are over-stretched trying to get Unit 2 back on line and I am concerned that if we disrupt their attention from the restart, we may get a bigger problem. Unless you have an immediate safety concern on Unit 3, I recommend we wait for the official answer to come back in writing.

Brian C. Haagensen Senior Resident Inspector Indian Point Energy Center 914 739-9360 (Office)

(b)(6) (Cell)

From: Haagensen, Brian To: Modes Michael

Subject:

Fl/v: FW: Request for EC-75297 Note: EC-72951 , consisting of 12 pages, is Date: Monday, December 18, 2017 2:05:00 PM withheld in its entirety under exemption 4.

Attachments: EC-75297 tooic not es.doc.

Mike, Finally, attached is Ec-75297 (topic notes only) that upd ates the Dominion Head Report for the IP2 power uprate.

Brian From: Haagensen, Brian [ma i1to:bhaag90@entergy.com]

Sent: Monday, December 18, 2017 2:03 PM To: Haagensen, Brian <Brian.Haagensen@nrc.gov>

Subject:

[Ext erna l_Sender] FW: Request for EC-75297 Brian C. Haagensen Sen ior Resident Inspector Indian Point Energy Center 914-739-9360 (Office)

!(b)(6) j(cell)

In p lant x5347 From: Alexander, Richard Sent: Monday, December 18, 2017 2:01 PM To: Haagensen, Brian

Subject:

RE : Request for EC-75297 Topic notes for EC-75297 From: Haagensen, Brian Sent: Monday, December 18, 2017 1:51 PM To: Alexander, Richard; Pi neda, J uan J; Singh, Ravi

Subject:

Request for EC-75297 Please send me a copy of EC-75297 (supporting CR-IP2-2017-05245, RPV stud #20 stuck).

I cannot seem to locate t his EC after searchi ng Merli n.

Brian C. Haagensen Sen ior Resident Inspector India n Point Energy Center 914-739-9360 (Office)

(b )(6) (cell)

In pant xS 47

From: Haagensen Brian To: Modes Michael Cc: Schroeder Daniel

Subject:

FW: [External_Sender]

Date: Monday, Decerµut!L.LlL.LlllL.LL.JLL.Ull..8J"'-- - - - - - - - ~

Attach ments: crs113.pdf Note : This 6-page attachment has been withheld in its entiret under FO IA exem tion 4.

Mike, Attached is the IP2 OD for RPV stud #20. This was the stud that was stuck in the RPV and could not be removed. This OD cites a Dominion report which will be sent by separate email (too large to include).

Brian From: Haagensen, Bria n [ma ilto:bhaag90@entergy.com]

Sent: Monday, December 18, 2017 11:09 AM To: Haagensen, Brian <Brian .Haagensen@nrc.gov>

Subject:

[Ext ernal_Se nder]

From: Haagensen Brian To: Schroeder Daniel; Setzer Thomas* Henrion Mark; Rossi Matthew Cc: Siwy Andrew; Safouri Christopher

Subject:

Outage status 12/15 at 1530 Date: Friday, December 15, 2017 3: 57:00 PM

Dan, The 21 RCP shaft will be milled to remove the degraded material and restore shaft roundness. They are bringing a milling machine in from New Jersey this evening . Current plans are to have the milling completed by noon on Saturday, and realign the shaft and install the seal by 2400 Saturday evening.

The head is now sitting on the stand. They will either:

1. Install the o-ring and reinstall the head without removing stud 20 (the stuck stud) -

with an EC to justify operating with one stud not credited for strength , or

2. Reinstall the head without the o-ring and try again to remove the stud this evening.

The final answer (to the head path - above) will depend on the progress on the path forward for the 21 RCP seal job.

The 21 condensate pump repairs are still being evaluated - they were able to establish condensate system isolation so they will be assessing the extent of damage to the impeller and support from the drop.

Currently, IPRO will continue to monitor the progress over the weekend (Andrew on Saturday, Chris on Sunday- I will come in as needed)

Brian C. Haagensen Senior Resident Inspector Indian Point Energy Center 914 739-9360 (Office)

(b)(6) (Cell)

From: Haagensen Brian To: Schroeder Daniel Cc: Setzer Thomas: Rossi Matthew; Henrion Mark

Subject:

FW: [ External_Sender] This 77-page attachm ent, IPEC Unit 2 System Description Date: Friday, Decem ber 15, 2017 10:40:00 AM No. 2, Rev. 5, Reactor Vessel and Intern als, has been Attachments: RPV and Internals.pdf withheld in its entirety under FO IA exemption 4.

Dan, Attached is the IP2 lesson plan for the reactor vessel internals. This has some excellent descriptions and high level diagrams for the reactor vessel head and RPV a-ring seal designs. FYI - if need to answer questions.

Brian From: Haagensen, Bria n [ma ilto:bhaag90@ent ergy.com]

Sent: Friday, December 15, 2017 10:34 AM To: Haagensen, Brian <Brian .Haagensen@nrc.gov>

Subject:

[Ext erna l_Se nder]

From: Haagensen, Brian To: Schroeder Daniel: Setzer Thomas: Rossi Matthew: Henrion Mark

Subject:

RCS lesson plan and RCP seal description Date: Friday, December 15, 2017 10:21:00 AM Attachments: External Sender .msg Dan, I am sending a copy of the RCS lesson plan (attached) in case you need to answer RCP /

RPV stud questions. This lesson plan has high-level descriptions of the RCP seals and RCS system as well as simplified drawings of various components. Any more detailed information can be provided if needed.

The email below has a extract from this lesson plan on the RCP seals.

Brian From: Haagensen, Brian [ma ilt o:bhaag90@entergy.com]

Sent: Friday, December 15, 2017 9:49 AM To: Haagensen, Brian <Brian.Haagensen@nrc.gov>

Subject:

[Externa l_Sender]

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Brian C. Haagensen Senior Resident Inspecto r Indian Po int Energy Center 914-739-9360 (Office)

!(b)(6)  !(ce ll )

In plant x5347

From: Haagensen, Brian Sent: 15 Dec 201715 :17:14 +0000 To: Haagensen, Brian

Subject:

[External_Sender]

The 135-page attachment , "I PEC Unit 2 System Description No. 1, Attachments: RCS Lesson Plan .pdf Rev . 16, Reactor Coolant System " has been withheld in its entirety under FOIA exemption 4.

From: Haagensen. Brian To: Gray. Harold Cc: Schroeder Daniel; Siwy Andrew* safouri Christopher; ..s.,.er...z..,er......_J....ho._.m....a.. ,s

Subject:

0-ring EC Conference ca ll Start: Thursday, December 14. 2017 2:00:00 PM End: Thu rs day, December 14, 2017 2:30 :00 PM Location: 888 446 7 584 ID to J oin 663317 Note: This attachment is an email (with same Attachments: RE I P2 Outage Status PM 1630 1211. msg subj ect line) already processed in this package.

The call is now confirmed for 1400.

We (Harold Gray and Brian) will pass our observations and concerns 10 IPEC regarding rheir 0-ring EC (see anached).

IPEC par1icipan1 s will include Bob Walpole. Jerry Bubniak (lhe o-ring EC aulhor) Bob Dolnasky. and Mark Crosskey

From: Haagensen, Brian To: McKown Louis <Louis McKowo@orc gov>

Subj ect: RE: IP2 Outage Status PM 1630 12/11 Date: Wednesday, December 13, 2017 11 :52:00 AM See - I TOLD you - the reactor vessel IS shrinking .. .

(b)(4)

From: Haagensen, Brian Sent: Tuesday, December 12, 2017 9:50 AM To: McKown, Louis <Louis.M cKown@nrc.gov>

Subject:

RE: IP2 Outage Statu s PM 1630 12/11 Eureka - you have solved it!

From: M cKown, Louis Sent: Tuesday, December 12, 2017 9:48 AM To: Haagensen, Brian <Brian.Haagenseo@orc.gov>

Subject:

RE: IP2 Outage Statu s PM 1630 12/ 11 Good Day, Oh no! Does that mean the baffle former plates are act ually to push the vessel back outward to preclude shrinkage? We'll need to look at those bolts again. You make have uncovered the bolt failure mode.

If you have any further questions, comments, or concerns please do not hesitate to contact me at the information provided below.

Very Respectfully, Lou McKown, Resident Inspector, Millstone Power Station Division of Reactor Projects, Branch 2 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region I 860-447-3170/31 79 (Desk)

Louis.McKowo@NRC.gov

From: Haagensen, Brian Sent: Tuesday, December 12, 2017 8:40 AM To: McKown, Louis <Louis.McKown@nrc.gov>

Subject : RE: IP2 Outage Status PM 1630 12/11 (b)(5)

Today, I told them that I thought their reactor vessel was shrinking ...

From: McKown, Louis Sent: Monday, December 11, 2017 5:01 PM To: Haagensen, Brian <Brjan.Haagensen@nrc.gov>

Subject:

RE: IP2 Outage Status PM 1630 12/11 Good Day, But they were so confident over the summer it was just a procedure issue with how and when they placed RHR into and out of service. If you need a PIR feel free to pencil me in for second quarter next year, after they have the latest root cause done.

r b)(5)

If you have any further questions, comments, or concerns please do not hesitate to contact me at the information provided below.

Very Respectfully, Lou McKown, Resident Inspector, Millstone Power Station Division of Reactor Projects, Branch 2 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region I 860-447-3170/3179 (Desk)

Louis.McKowo@NRC.gov From: Haagensen, Brian Sent: Monday, December 11,. 2017 4:52 PM To: Fuller, Just in <Justin.Fuller@nrc.gov>; Haagensen, Brian < Brjan.Haagensen@nrc.gov>; Henrion, Mark ; Highley, Christopher <Christopher Highiey@nrc gov>; McKown, Louis <Louis.McKown@nrc gov>; Rossi, Matthew <Matthew.Rossi@nrc gov>; Schroeder, Daniel

<Da ni el.Schroede r@nrc.gov>; Setzer, Thoma s <Thomas.Setzer@nrc.gov>; Siwy, Andrew

<Andrew Sjwy@nrc gov>; Safou ri, Christop her <Christopher Safouri@nrc gov>

Cc: Guzman, Richard <Richard .Gu zman@nrc.gov>; Weil , Jenny <Jenny.Weil@nrc.gov>; Tifft, Doug

<Doug.Tifft@nrc.gov>; Sheeha n, Nei l <Neil.Sheehan@nrc.gov>

Subject:

IP2 Outage Status PM 1630 12/11 IP2 has decided NOT to laser scan or depth mic/measure the RPV flange surface defects during this outage (option #2 in the critical decision paper).

Instead, they intend to:

  • Drain down the RCS to 68 ft (below the flange but above the SIG tube sheet)
  • remove the RPV head,
  • clean the flange sealing surfaces,
  • replace the leaking a-rin gs with new, oversized a-rings,
  • replace the 21 RCP seals,
  • reset the head, refill the RCS and
  • proceed to plant restart The RCS drain down has been delayed until tomorrow on day shift. They plan to remove the equipment access hatch this evening.

Plant cond itions are essentially what they were this morning.

Brian C. Haagensen Senior Resident Inspector Indian Point Energy Center 914 739-9360 (Office)

(b)(6) (Cell)

From : Haagensen, Brian To: Grejves 1onathan; Schroeder Daniel; Iiflt Doug; Sheehan Neil; Screnci Diane

Subject:

RE: I ndian Point Outreach Date: Tuesday, December 12, 201 7 8: 50:00 AM Bridget Frymire was on site yesterday so the State knows what is going on.

From: Greives, Jonathan Sent: Tuesday, December 12, 2017 8:41 AM To: Schroeder, Daniel <Dan iel.Schroeder@nrc.gov>; Tifft, Doug <Doug.Tifft@n rc.gov>; Sheehan, Neil

<Nei I.Sheehan@nrc.gov>; Screnci, Diane <Dia ne.Screnci@nre.gov>

Cc: Haagensen, Brian <Brian .Haagensen@nrc.gov>

Subject:

RE: Indian Point Outreach Thanks Dan. We"ll let Jenny know. We will be reaching out today to our state POCs, but I don't think we'll need any support.

From: Schroeder, Daniel Sent: Tuesday, December 12, 2017 8:18 AM To: Greives, Jonathan <Jonathan,Greiyes@nrc.gov>; Tifft, Doug <Doug.Tifft@nrc.gov>; Sheehan, Neil

<Neil,Sheehan@nrc.gov>; Screnci, Diane <Dia ne,Screoci@ orc.gov>

Cc: Haagensen, Brian <Brian Haagensen@nrc.gov>

Subject:

Indian Point Outreach Indian Point is not planning any near term outreach to stakeholders regarding the Unit 2 forced outage. The outage scope includes replacement of 21 RCP seal, replacement of RPV o ring seals (inner and outer), and repair of an isolation valve for the steam driven aux feedwater pump.

Daniel Schroeder Projects Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects 610-337-5262

From: Haagensen, Brian To: Schroeder Daniel Bee: wen, lenny

Subject:

RE: Indian Point Outreach Date: Tuesday, December 12, 2017 8:30:00 AM Dan, IPEC will be compelled to reach out to the local government stakeholders soon, although they are still maintaining that they will not. They are also maintaining that there will be not public release for the outage.

(b)(5)

I have also been answering questions directly to Jenny Weil at OCA regarding the design and availability of the o-rings.

Brian From: Schroeder, Da niel Sent: Tuesday, December 12, 2017 8:18 AM To: Greives, Jonathan <Jonathan.Greives@ nrc.gov>; Tifft, Doug <Doug.Tifft@ nrc.gov>; Sheehan, Neil

<Nei l.Sheeha n@nrc.gov>; Screnci, Diane <Diane.Screnci@nrc.gov>

Cc: Haagensen, Brian <Brian.Haagensen@nrc.gov>

Subject:

Indian Point Outreach Indian Point is not planning any near term outreach to stakeholders regarding the Unit 2 forced outage. The outage scope includes replacement of 21 RCP seal, replacement of RPV o ring seals (inner and outer), and repair of an isolation valve for the steam driven aux feedwater pump.

Daniel Schroeder Proj ects Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects 610-337-5262

From: Haagensen, Brian To: Weil leony

Subject:

RE: IP2 Outage Status PM 1630 12/11 Date: Tuesday, December 12, 2017 7:57:00 AM Attachments: 0 -ring.msg Theo-rings come in sets - one inner+ one outer. They have two sets of the current design

- which will not be used. They ordered two additional sets of oversized o-rings - one for unit 3 and one for unit 2. The Unit 2 rings are arriving on site tomorrow or Thursday. I have attached two photos of what they look like.

Brian From: Weil, Jenny Sent: Tuesday, December 12, 2017 7:35 AM To: Haagensen, Brian <Brian.Haagensen@nrc.gov>

Subject:

RE: IP2 Outage Status PM 1630 12/11 Interesting - thank you! One last question - the extra o-rings that they have stockpiled are all outer ones? Or do they keep both on hand?


Original Message --------

From: "Haagensen, Brian" <Brian.Haagensen@nrc.gov>

Date: Tue, December 12, 2017 7:09 AM -0500 To: "Wei l, Jenny" <Jenny.Wejl@nrc.gov>

Subject:

RE: IP2 Outage Status PM 1630 12/11

Jenny, No dumb questions here!

Theo-rings are not readily available at Home Depot © - Westinghouse fabricates them when ordered. They already have the over-sized o-ring needed for this outage. They had already ordered an over-sized o-ring for the Unit 3 outage and it will fit unit 2. The lead time to get them fabricated is fairly short. No special equipment involved .

They also keep two sets of o-rings for each unit on site for contingencies just this one. One set is stored inside containment, one set is in the warehouse. These sets are not oversized so they needed to order another set.

Brian From: Weil, Jenny Sent: M onday, December 11, 2017 5:33 PM To: Haagensen, Brian <Brian.Haagenseo@nrc.gov>

Cc: Tifft, Doug <Doug.Tifft@nrc.gov>; Greives, Jonathan <Jonathan.Greives@nrc.gov>

Subject:

RE: IP2 Outage Statu s PM 1630 12/11 Thanks Brian - this may be a dumb question, but are o -rings something Entergy can get off

From: Haagensen Brian To: Grav Harold Note: This attachment is BHaagensen's 12/11/17 4:09:23

Subject:

RE : U2 RPV Sea l flange O ring drain line co nfigu ration Date: Monday, Dece mber 11, 2017 4: 11:00 PM email to which four attachm ents are em bedded, which is Attachments: Externa l Sende r FW .msg addressed elsewhere in this package.

Harold, See the last page of the attached pdf file in the attached email for the drawing - 19641.pdf.

Also have good descriptions of the o-rings.

Brian From: Gray, Harold Sent: M onday, December 11, 2017 4:04 PM To: Haagensen, Brian <Brian .Haagensen@nrc.gov>

Subject:

U2 RPV Seal flan ge O ring dra in line co nfi gurat ion

Brian, Do you have or can you get a drawing that shows the U2 RPV Seal flange inner and outer 0 ring drain line configuration?

I had one for U3 but it was deleted.

Thanks, H Gray

From: Haagensen Brian To: Schroeder Daniel; Setzer Thomas* Rossi Matthew* Henrjon Mark

Subject:

FW: 0 -ring Date: Monday, December 11, 2017 2: 16:00 PM Attachments:  !MG 0860.IPG. Note: The two attached photos have been withheld in IM._G 0_8.5_8. IE._G, their entirety under FO IA exemption 4.

Pictures of the 0 -rings.

From: Siwy, Andrew Sent: Monday, December 11, 2017 1:29 PM To: Gray, Harold <Harold.Gray@nrc .gov>

Cc: Haagensen, Bria n <Brian.Haagensen@nrc.gov>

Subject:

0-ring Pre-i nstallation. 0860 picture show s two 0 -rings (inner and outer) being removed from the transportation device in containment. 0858 picture shows an up-close shot of the 0-rings at the spacing in the protective sheath of the outer 0 -ring.

~ ~ , P.E.

Resident Inspector I Indian Point Region I I ir:914.739.9360

(b)(4)

From: Haagensen, Brian To: Gray Harold Cc: Sjwy, Andrew; safouci Christopher

Subject:

RE: C shape vs 0 -ring shape?

Date: Monday, December 11 , 2017 1:52:00 PM Note: This attachment is BHaagensen"s 12/11/17 Attachments: External sender ,msg 1:46 PM email, with one attachment embedded, which is previously addressed in this package.

Harold, After further research, it appears that the RPV 0-rings are "C" shaped but they are not the self-energizing type which rely on RCS pressure pushing against the internal surfaces to seal. The 50.59 safety evaluation (attached) states on page 6; "Since the opening in the C-shaped cross-section of the seal is to the outside, system pressure does not pressurize the interior of the seal rings, and there is no incremental sealing force due to internal pressure as with the self-energizing o-rings."

Thanks to Andrew Siwy for all the research !

Brian From: Haagensen, Brian Sent: Monday, December 11, 2017 1:38 PM To: Gray, Harold <Harold.Gray@nrc.gov>

Subject:

C shape vs 0 -ri ng shape?

Harold, Your statements regarding the shape of the 0 -ring prompted me (actually Andrew) to some further research. I now believe you were correct in your description of the o-ring being a "C" shape may be correct -we are researching the Vendor Tech Manual.

Brian C. Haagensen Senior Resident Inspector Indian Point Energy Center 914 739-9360 (Office)

(b)(6) (Cell)

From: Haagensen Brian To: Grav Harold

Subject:

C shape vs 0 -ring shape?

Date: Monday, Dece mber 11, 2017 1 :38:00 PM Harold, Your statements regard ing the shape of the 0 -ring prompted me (actually Andrew) to some further research. I now believe you were correct in your description of the o-ring being a "C" shape may be correct - we are researching the Vendor Tech Manual.

Brian C. Haagensen Senior Resident Inspector Indian Point Energy Center (914) 739-9360 (Office)

!(b)(6)  !(Cell)

From: Haagensen, Brian To: Weil lenny

Subject:

Re: IP-2 Date: Sunday, December 10, 2017 11:44:14 AM Jenny, There was slight delay of one hour but IP2 went offline to start the outage at 0119 on Saturday morning.

Subsequently, the discovered the outer o-ring on the reactor vessel flange was leaking into containment. They have made no final decisions on repa iring the leak but I fu lly expect them to have to remove the reactor vessel head and fix the leak.

Brian C. Haagensen Senior Resident Inspector Indian Point Energy Center 914-739-9630/1 (office)

(b)(6) l(celI)

l. .(home)

From: Weil, Jenny Sent: Saturday, December 9, 2017 8:40 PM To: Haagensen, Brian

Subject:

Re: IP-2 Hi Brian, Did IP-2 go offline as planned early this morning?

Thanks, Jenny

From: Haagensen, Brian To: Schroeder Daniel Subj ect: Re: Indian Point Unit 2 Update Date: Saturday, December 09, 2017 12:50:52 PM Entergy called o-ring leakage so you were on solid ground. I am j ust not sure at th is point after seeing the pictures.

Brian C. Haagensen Senior Resident Inspector Indian Point Energy Center 914-739-9630/1 (office)

(b)(6) t ce ll) l_____..... t home)

From: Schroeder, Dan iel Sent: Saturday, December 9, 2017 12:24:58 PM To: Haagensen, Brian

Subject:

Re: Indian Poi nt Unit 2 Updat e Ok good plan. I j umped the gun by ca lling it o ring leakage.


Original Message --------

From: "H aagensen, Brian" <Brian.Haagensen@n rc.gov>

Date: Sat, December 09, 2017 10:53 AM -0500 To: "Schroede r, Dan ie l" <Daniel.Schroeder@n rc.gov>

Subject:

Re: Indian Point Unit 2 Update Dan, I decided to drive back to my house in CT in order to arrive before the snow got too bad.

Connecticut is expecting 6 inches. My absence will also be good for Andrew who real ly wants t o be in charge of the site. I wi ll be monitoring the situation using the Entergy Remote network from my house but w ill rely on Andrew as the man on site today. I will go back tomorrow after the snow has fal len and I clean off the driveway.

The boric acid leakage may not be from the o-ring flange surface. The leakage appears to be com ing from somewhere in the insulation above the flange. This looks a bit like a situation that I experienced at Millstone when a greylock fitting on a CET developed a leak. Entergy won 't know where the leakage is coming from until they pull the head insulation. In the past, the o-ring leakage leaked out horizontally w ithout travel i ng in the vertical direction. BA could always go vertically but it may also be leakage from a fitting that is higher in the head and dribbling down through the insulation.

Approximately two weeks ago, we noted that the gross leak rate had trended up from -0.1 gpm to 0.2 gpm over a period of about a week. They attributed th is to a change in CVCVs leak rate but that seems a bit dubious in my opinion because of the nature of the trend. Changes in eves leakrate are generally step changes rather than slow increases. There was no indication of BA leakage through the outer a-ring telltale drain line (sometimes, this line gets plugged up) nor was there any increase in the identified leak rate which would show a leak through the drain line into the PDT.

So we shou ld standby by and wait for more information before concluding that this was a RPV o-rinig leak.

Brian Brian C. Haagensen Senior Resident Inspector Indian Point Energy Center 914-739-9630/1 (office)

Ice II) l (b)(6)

_. home)

From : Schroeder, Daniel Sent: Saturday, December 9, 2017 9:12 AM To: Lorson, Raymond; Pe lton , David; We lling, Blake; Yerokun, Jimi Cc: Screnci, Diane; Sheehan, Nei l; Greives, Jonathan; Tifft, Doug; Safouri, Christopher; Siwy, Andrew; Haagensen, Bria n

Subject:

Indian Point Unit 2 Update Indian Point Unit 2 shut down at 0119 to start a forced outage to rep lace the 21 reactor coolant pump seal. An in it ial conta inment entry was made by the licensee, and boron accumulation was found on the RPV, ind icating leakage past the outer o-ring . TH is has been an issue in the past, and the licensee believed that the inner seal was leaking and the oute r seal was holding. The licensee is evaluating the current situation . Unit 2 wil l have a refue l outage in the spring. The unidentified leak rate for Unit 2 has been low, consistently less than 0.1 gpm. The licensee is eva luating the situation. Outage to rep lace the seal requ ires draining water leve l below RPV flange, but removing the head to replace the o-rings wou ld extend the outage.

An update w ill be provided once the licensee has made a decision, and DRS assistance is requested next week if the licensee decides to leave the current seals in place . Drain down to a level be low the RPV flange is scheduled for Monday.

Dan

From: Haagensen, Brian To: Siwy Andrew; Safour; Christopher Subj ect: Fw: Indian Point Unit 2 Update Date: Saturday, December 09, 2017 10:56:24 AM Andrew, Chris, I am now back in my house in CT. They are expecting 6 inches of snow in southeastern CT.

Below is an email that I sent to Dan - FYI.

From: Haagensen, Brian Sent: Saturday, December 9, 2017 10:53 AM To: Schroeder, Daniel

Subject:

Re: Indian Point Unit 2 Update

Dan, I decided to drive back to my house in CT in order to arrive before the snow got too bad.

Con necticut is expecting 6 inches. I will be monitoring the situation using the Ente rgy Remote network from my house but w ill rely on Andrew as the man on site today w ith Chris as his backup. I will go back tomorrow after the snow has fal len and I clean off the driveway.

The boric acid leakage may not be from the o-ring flange surface. The leakage appears to be com ing from somewhere in the insulation above the flange. This looks a bit like a situation t hat I experienced at Millstone when a greylock fitting on a CET developed a leak. Entergy won 't know where the leakage is coming from until they pu ll the head insulation. In the past, the o-ring leakage leaked out horizontally w ithout travel i ng in the vertical direction. BA could always go vertically but it may also be leakage from a fitting that is higher in the head and dribbling down through the insulat ion.

Approximately two weeks ago, we noted that t he gross leak rate had t rended up from ~0.1 gpm to 0.2 gpm over a period of about a week. They attributed th is to a change in CVCVs leak rate but that seems a bit dubious in my opinion because of the nature of the t rend. Changes in eves leakrate are generally step changes rather than slow increases. There was no indication of BA leakage through the outer o-ring tellta le drain line (sometimes, th is line gets plugged up) nor was there any increase in the identified leak rate which would show a leak through the drain line into the PDT.

So we shou ld standby by and wait for more information before concluding that this was a RPV o-rinig leak.

Brian

Brian C. Haagensen Senior Resident Inspector Indian Point Energy Center 914-739-9630/1 (office)

~ (cel l)

~ (home)

From: Schroeder, Daniel Sent: Sat urday, December 9, 2017 9:12 AM To: Lorson, Raymond; Pe lton, David; We ll ing, Blake; Yerokun, Jimi Cc: Screnci, Diane; Sheeha n, Neil; Greives, Jonathan; Tifft, Doug; Safouri, Christopher; Siwy, Andrew; Haagensen, Brian

Subject:

Indian Point Unit 2 Update Indian Point Unit 2 shut down at 0119 to start a forced ou t age to rep lace the 21 reacto r coolant pump seal. An initia l conta inment entry was made by the licensee, and boron accumulation was found on t he RPV, indicating leakage past the outer o-ring. THis has been an issue in t he past, and the licensee believed that the inner seal was leaking and the oute r seal was holding. The licensee is evaluating the current situation. Unit 2 w ill have a refue l outage in the spring. The un identifi ed leak rate fo r Unit 2 has been low, consist ently less t han 0.1 gpm. The licensee is eva luating the situation . Outage to re pl ace the sea l requ ires draining

water leve l below RPV flange, but removing the head to replace the a-rings would extend the outage.

An update w ill be provided once t he licensee has made a decision, and DRS assistance is requested next week if t he licen see decides to leave the current seals in place . Dra in down to a level below the RPV flange is scheduled for Monday.

Dan

From: Haagensen, Brian To: Schroeder Daniel: Setzer Thomas: Henrjon Mark; Rossi Matthew Cc: Sheehan Neil: Tifft Doug moug,Jifft@nrc gay}; Sjwy Andrew: safouri Christopher; Guzman Richard

Subject:

FYI: Background info on I PEC 0 -rings Date: Wednesday, November 15, 2017 7:26:00 AM Dan, There seems to be continued interest in the press and among some stakeholders regarding the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) o-rings at IPEC. Some of the stories appear to attribute the design change in 2003 as the start of 0 -ring leakage. I thought I would pass on some additional background insights. FYI The design change in 2003 was not a cause of the leakage. Prior to the design change in 2003, they had experienced numerous 0 -ring leaks since original construction. We actually mapped the history of 0-ring leaks on a timeline back to 1990. The design change in 2003 actually worked and the leaks stopped for several years. The 0-ring leakage started back up after - 5 years and the extent and frequency of the leaks has been getting steadily worse with time. We believe that there are small defects in the RPV flange surfaces that cause these leaks. The flange defects were noted visually during the last outage but Westinghouse assessed them as not being significant - i.e. the 0-rings would crush and should seal any defects.

Following the last refueling outage, IPEC convinced themselves that it was water sloshing around inside the RPV during water level changes that disrupted the 0 -rings and prevented them from fully seating. We did not buy into this explanation but could not get IPEC to do anything more than change the RHR / RPV fill procedure to prevent water from impacting the 0-rings after the 0-rings had been set. This was an example of correlation is not causation. We were not too surprised when the 0 -rings leaked coming out of the last refueling outage nor that the inner 0-ring leaked after the subsequent outage to repair the 0 -rings.

We expect the problem will likely be solved if they conduct the laser mapping of the RPV flange surfaces, repair any defects identified and use the larger 0 -ring to seal the flange surfaces. These corrective actions are scheduled on Unit 2 in the spring of 2018. I would expect they will do the same on Unit 3 during the refueling outage in 2019.

Brian C. Haagensen Senior Resident Inspector Indian Point Energy Center 914 739-9360 (Office)

(b)(6) (Cell)

From: Haagensen, Brian To: Schroeder Daniel: Setzer Thomas: Henrjon Mark Cc: wen, leony; Iifft Doug <Doug Jifft@nrc gov\: Sheehan Neil: Screnci Diane; Guzman Richard

Subject:

Notes on the Entergy Stakeholders Meeting 11/13 Date: Monday, November 13, 2017 11 :22:00 AM Entergy held their "quarterly" stakeholders meeting today at the Buchanan Town Hall from 0930 to 1030. There were approximately 35 local government officials in attendance.

Presentations:

Tony Vitale (TV) (SVP) gave a presentation on recent plant performance which included:

1. 22 MBFP trip on June 25th and subsequent outage to repair in September
2. U2 and U3 o-ring challenges
3. 21 RCP seal leakoff issues - may have a planned outage coming up
4. U3 main generator exciter trip
5. UAW contract negotiations - coming up next month Mike Twomey (MT) (VP Corporate - External Affairs) gave a presentation on the following topics :
1. Update on the shutdown settlement agreement
a. Final supplement EIS from NRG - expected in the next 60 days
b. SER for License renewal from NRG - expected in the 151 quarter 2018
c. NYISO deactivation notice process
i. Filing deemed complete - notice today or tomorrow ii. NYISO will produce a grid reliability study within 90 days iii. They will likely identify a short term gap of 500-600 MWe with IPEC shutting down iv. They will look for the lowest cost, short term solution to filling this gap
v. "It is very unlikely that /PEG will operate beyond 2020 and 2021."
d. New AEOF is open in Fishkill - showed photos
e. Repairs to the discharge canal are completed (This was in response to NYS concerns over the oil leakage last year)
f. NYS IPEC Closure Task Force
i. NYS hired a consulting firm for this Task Force ii. Entergy is cooperating with the Task Force (as appropriate) iii. No decisions have been made regarding the division of the $15 M that Entergy will pay to fund decommissioning studies - not until next year 1 . Both Entergy and NYS have to agree on how these funds will be divided iv. Decommissioning planning - Entergy is several years away before announcing firm plans for decommissioning Qs and As :

Q: Grid reliability was supposed to be a problem when IPEC shutdown - why does Entergy now think that the NYISO report will determine that reliability will not be a problem?

A: (MT) The NYISO study only looks at short term power solutions at the lowest cost.

IPEC would require 2 years of 1000 MWe power for each unit. If the gap is only 500 MWe, then IPEC is unlikely to be judged as the low cost provider. It would be less

expensive to repower a gas or other fossil fuel to provide only 500 MWe. In addition, the northeast has experiences drops in load demand with solar power coming on line.

There are pending transmiss ion upgrades in progress that cou ld provide additional power and there are two gas plants being built in Dover and Orange county that could replace IPEC if NYS stops fighting the extension of the gas pipelines to these areas.

Q: (Bridget Frym ire - NYS DPS) Are the replacement o-rings manufactured by the same vendor as the o-rings that failed?

A: (TV) Yes- but they are of a different design that includes more silver content. The silver is the malleable material that deforms to seal the flange surfaces .

Upcoming events at IPEC (TV):

  • FoF drill on 11 /28
  • 2RF023 in the spring of 2018
  • FEMA-evaluated EP Exercise - fall 2018 My Assessment:

Overall, the tone of the room was much less confrontational than in the past. There were very few questions during the presentation and I received no questions at the end . I spoke to several of the local politicians and to Bridget Frymire. Everyone seems to be focused on the outcome of the decommissioning process and loss of tax revenues. They are no longer as concerned about safe, reliable operations as in the past.

Brian C. Haagensen Senior Resident Inspector Indian Point Energy Center

<9 14) 739-9360 (Office)

!(b)(6) ~Cell)

From: Haagensen Brian To: Brian Haagensen

Subject:

Emai ling: IPShutdown.11 2017.p df Date: Wednesday, November 08, 2017 7:41:00 AM Attachments: IPShutdown.11-6-2017 .odf

Indian Point reactor shuts down unexpectedly, NRC investigating Page 1 of 2 Indian Point reactor shuts down unexpectedly, NRC investigating Thomas C. Zamhlto, tznmbllo@lohud.com Published I :32 p.111. £T Nov. 6, 2017 One of Indian Point's two nuclear reactors shut down unexpectedly Friday night and remains without power while workers try to assess what went wrong.

Indian Point officials notified the Nuclear Regulatory Commission around 8:30 p.m. Friday that Unit 3 automatically shut down after a loss of power in a generator.

An NRC investigator arrived at the site shortly afterward to observe shutdown efforts.

(Photo: Peter Carrlrhe Journal News) SHUTDOWN: Indian Point 2 reactor back online after shutdown (lstory/news/2017/10/31/indian-point-leaks/818614001/l INDIAN POINT: Faulty bolts discovered at Indian Point nuclear power plant (lstory/ news/local/indian-point/2016/03/29/indian-point-nuclear-power-plant-faulty-bolts-colsure/82408462/l LEAKS: Nuclear Regulatory Commission says Indian Point must resolve leak issue in reactors (/story/news/2017/10/31/indian-point-leaks/818614001/l "No immediate safety concerns were identified,' said NRC spokesman Neil Sheehan. "NRC staff will continue to follow any repair activities at the plant, as well as planning for restart of the unit."

This aerial view of the Indian Point nuclear power station, located In Buchanan, N.Y. and taken from about 1000 feet above the ground, looks east from the Hudson River.

Photo by Spencer Ainsley (Photo: Spencer Ainsley)

Jerry Nappi, a spokesman for Indian Point owner Entergy, said that the shutdown went safely and that no radiation was released.

"All equipment operated as expected following the shutdown,' Nappi said. "Engineers are troubleshooting an issue with the electrical generator system to http://www.lohud.com/story/news/loca1/indian-point/2017/ 1 l/06/indian-point-reactor-shuts-down/8362... 11 /06/20 17

Indian Point reactor shuts down unexpectedly, NRC investigating Page 2 of 2 determine the exact cause of the shutdown."

It is unclear when Unit 3 will be up and running. The plant's second reactor, Unit 2, remains at 100 percent power.

The NRC' s latest inspection report for Indian Point, released last week, (lstory/news/2017/10/31/indian-point-leaks/818614001 /)identified a recurring issue with 0-rings used to seal off the plant's reactors.

The NRC says the 0-ring issue has been the cause of eight water leaks since 2003 and urged Entergy to do more to prevent leaks in the future.

"Corrective actions to address the causal factors over the years have not been completely effective at preventing recurrence of the issue," the NRC report says.

The 0-rings secure the lid of the reactor to the body of the reactor vessel, where nuclear fission occurs. The most recent leak occurred in June during a scheduled maintenance of Unit 3.

The NRC said that when the leaks have occurred, Entergy has been quick to shut down the plant and make repairs. But, the report noted, the company needs to evaluate its installation procedure for the 0-rings to prevent leaks of water determined to be slightly radioactive.

WASTE: Nuclear waste stranded at Indian Point l/story/news/lnvestlgations/2017/10/11/nuclear-waste-lndlan-polnt/713534001/l CRISIS: Nuclear plant shutdowns a crisis for small towns across the USA l/story/news/investiqations/2017/07/12/nuclear-plant-shutdowns/403656001/l Each of the leaks have been contained inside the reactor building and have not been released into the environment, the NRC says.

Indian Point is slated to shut down in 2021.

Read or Share this story: http://www.lohud.com/story/news/local/indian-point/2017/11/06lindian-point-reactor-shuts-down/836276001/

http://www.lohud.com/story/news/local/indian-point/2017/ 1 l/06/indian-point-reactor-shuts-down/8362... 11 /06/20 17

From: Haagensen, Brian To: Schroeder Daniel Cc: fuller lvstjn: Henrjon Mark* Highley Christopher; McKown Loujs: Ross; Matthew: Setzer Thomas; ~

~

Subject:

RE: IP3 Outage st atus as of 1200 11/ 5 Date: Sunday, November 05, 2017 12:35:00 PM Unit 3 remains stable in Mode 3 with heat removal on the condenser dumps and the MDAFW pumps in operation.

The RCS is within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> of not being able to maintain NOT/NOP. Once they reach this point, they will have to shut the MSIVs or they will cool down. If they shut the MSIVs, they will need an aux steam to supply various loads during restart. They cannot draw a vacuum in the main condenser without aux steam.

The normal supply for aux steam is from either the unit 2 aux steam reducer (when U2 is operating) or the unit 2 Aux Boilers. Either way, aux steam has to be fed via the aux steam cross-connect line from U2 to U3 which has a large steam leak. It is not clear that they can use this line with a leak of this size. Currently, the line and leak is isolated. Unit 3 has aux boilers but they have not been maintained and probably will not operate. Unit 3 is wholly dependent on this cross-connect line for aux steam. The time to repair this line is estimated to take several days.

The troubleshooting has just started on the main generator exciter. Two Siemens technicians are on site but their test equipment has not made it to the turbine building.

They also need a 480 VAC temp power supply which is not yet available. Finally, they have very different skill sets and cannot work 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />s/day. So they will have to be scheduled for down time (which will delay the troubleshooting and repairs) or they will need more techs.

The IPEC issues list shows 16 line items. All line items show estimated completion dates by 11 /6. These dates do not reflect reality. While some jobs may be completed by 11/6, other jobs are either going to have to be deferred or the restart will be delayed.

I am heading back to CT. Matt Rossi will follow the outage tonight and Andrew will be in tomorrow. I will return before startup.

Brian From: Haagensen, Brian Sent: Sunday, November 05, 2017 10:23 AM To: Pelton, David <David.Pelton@nrc.gov>; Schroeder, Da nie l <Daniel.Schroeder@nrc.gov>

Cc: Fuller, Justin <Just in.Fuller@nrc.gov>; Haagensen, Brian <Brian.H aagensen@nrc.gov>; Hen rion, Mark <M ark.Henrion@nrc.gov>; Highley, Christopher <Christopher.H igh ley@nrc.gov>; McKown, Louis <Louis.McKown@nrc.gov>; Rossi, Matthew <M atthew.Rossi@nrc.gov>; Setzer, Thomas

<Thomas.Set zer@nrc.gov>; Siwy, Andrew <Andrew.Siwy@nrc.gov>

Subject:

FW: IP3 Out age status as of 1000 11/5 Dave, Dan,

Unit 3 remains in mode 3, NOT/NOP with heat removal on the condenser steam dumps and MDAFW pumps feeding all 4 S/Gs. All 4 RCPs are in operation.

Nothing much happened overnight. The issues list remains as before with some minor updates. They are clearly limited in resources.

The critical path is clearly the main generator exciter repairs. They only have one qualified l&C tech to work on the exciter circuit. Siemens (the vendor) is sending in 2 technicians to support the work. One arrived late last night, the other comes this morning. Engineering has completed the possible FMA cause branches but have not yet started to rule out any failed components. There are 45 potential components that could cause this failure. They only have 14 of these components in the warehouse so parts supply may become problematic when the figure out what has failed.

The (unofficial) OPS assessment is that they can last for another day or two before decay heat reduces to a point where they have to shut the MSIVs and break vacuum in the condenser.

The post-trip review is not yet completed. We will review this document once it has been completed and approved. I am not sure why it is taking so long.

Matt Rossi will be relieving me at 1200 today and I will be driving back to my house in CT.

Current Issues List (in order of priority):

1. Determine and repair the cause of the main generator trip - mode 2 ho@' -

Troubleshooting is scheduled for today- repairs are scheduled for tomorrow

- Siemens (vendor) arriving today test equipment processed last night.

2. MS-11 6-2 steam leak at flange (this is a manual isolation valve for the heating steam strainer on the main turbine) - leak injection by Team Inc. scheduled for Monday, 11 /6 (or shut MSIVs and weld repair bonnet flange)
3. Air leak on TCV-1104 (FCU SW outlet valve) - repair leak - shop work completed -

repair today

4. Engineering assessment of main turbine overspeed - mode 2 hold - ETC now 11 /5

- awaiting ABB input

5. RCS letdown isolated prematurely (4% high in PZR level) - in planning
6. 31 CCW pump needs to be replaced (was in progress at time of the trip) - mod~

hold or mode change with risk assessment - schedu led to be completed by Monday, 11/6

7. 33 RCP vibrations are high - scheduled for 11/5
8. 32 RCP has a bad vibration probe - scheduled for 11/5
9. 10. 34 inverter auto-transferred to alternate AC source because of a failed 34 feedwater heater cascade valve - mode 2 hold ETC 11/6 ready to work 11 . 32 MBFP suction relief lifted - repair or accept as is with engineering evaluation -

mode 1 hold - decision needed to replace relief valve or retest lift setpoint - ETC 11 /6

12. 33 isophase heat exchanger leak - replace heat exchanger - mode 2 hold ETC 11 /6
13. 34 isophase fan low flow alarm chattering repairs - planning completed
14. IA ai r leak on HP steam dump MS-PCV-1 123 - ETC 11/6
15. Aux steam leak on drain from U2 to U3 steam - potential ground water issue - ETC 11/6
16. Can't add chemicals to 33 SG because of leak on CF-134 - repair leak - needs to be scheduled
17. Adjusted the bias on PC-409A controller (feedwater pump cutback controller) - PMT on startup Completed
  • BDfic acid residue ideAtified duriAg o riAg iAs19ectioA EAgiAeeriAg assessffirnt is that this Aot iAdicative of o riAg leal<age Closed Next update - Sunday evening by Matt Rossi.

Brian From: Haagensen, Brian Sent: Saturday, November 04, 2017 1: 15 PM To: Pelton, David <Dayjd.Pelton@nrqoy>

Cc: Tifft, Doug (Doug Iifft@nrc gov) <Doug Iifft@nrc.gov>; Screnci, Diane <Diane.Screoci@nrc.gov>;

Sheehan, Neil <Nejl,Sheehan@nrc gov>; Guzman, Richa rd <Richard Guzman@nrc.gov>; Fuller, Justin

<Justin.Fuller@nrc.gov>; Haagensen, Brian <Brian.Haagensen@nrc.gov>; Henrion, Mark

<Mark.Henrjon@nrc.gov>; Hi ghley, Christopher <Christopher.High ley@nrc.gov>; McKown, Louis

<Louis McKowo@orc gov>; Rossi, Matthew <Matthew Rossi@orc gov>; Sch roeder, Da niel

<Daniel Schroeder@nrc gov>; Setzer, Thomas <Jhomas.Setzer@nrc.gov>; Siwy, Andrew

<Andrew.Siwy@nrc.gov>

Subject:

Restart efforts are delayed IP3 remains stable in Mode 3 on the condenser steam dumps at NOT/NOP. They are conducting a containment entry to walkdown systems inside the VC and especially to look for evidence of a-ring leakage.

My assessment is that Indian Point Unit 3 is several days away from restarting the plant.

The issues list continues to grow as discovery identifies more problems from the trip. The OCC has not yet put a restart schedule together. They are discussing the possibility of cooling the plant down to mode 4 to effect some repairs.

They are having significant problems getting craft resources to come in over the we ekend to repair the items on the issues list. Management is escalating the issue "to the highest level" to the Union.

Last night, the SM evaluated the need to declare a NOUE (EAL HU3.1) because of the CO2 discharge into the turbine building. He ultimately decided it was not required because the "asphyxiant gas did not adversely affect normal operations," but he looked hard at declaring the event. We should ask DRS EP to review this decision.

The Post Trip review report is not yet completed. Apparently, Engineering did not get support from the other departments (maintenance, OPS, planning, l&C, electrical etc.) to conduct the PTR and the FMA analysis for the cause of the trip.

Current Issues List (in order of priority):

1. Determine and repair the cause of the main generator trip - mode 2 hold - no time estimate for completion - Siemens (vendor) arriving tomorrow morning.
2. MS-116-2 steam leak at flange (this is a manual steam heater valve on the main turbine) - leak injection by Team Inc. scheduled for Monday, 11 /6 (or shut MSIVs and weld repair bonnet flange)
3. Air leak on TCV-1104 (FCU SW outlet valve) - repair leak - in progress ETC
4. Engineering assessment of main turbine overspeed - mode 2 hold - ETC 11/5
5. RCS letdown isolated prematurely (4% high in PZR level) - has not been scheduled
6. 31 CCW pump needs to be replaced (was in progress at time of the trip) - mode hold or mode change with risk assessment- scheduled to be completed by Monday, 11 /6
7. 33 RCP vibrations are high - needs to be scheduled
8. 32 RCP has a bad vibration probe - needs to be scheduled
9. 34 inverter auto-transferred to alternate AC source because of a failed 34 feedwater heater cascade valve - mode 2 hold ETC 11 /6
10. 32 MBFP suction relief lifted - repair or accept as is with engineering evaluation -

mode 1 hold - decision needed to replace relief or retest

11. 33 isophase heat exchanger leak - plug tube or replace heat exchanger - mode 2 hold ETC 11 /6
12. Can't add chemicals to 33 SG because of leak on CF-134 - repair leak - needs to be scheduled At their present pace, restart will be sometime in the middle of next week. This will be a race between the reduction in decay heat and being able to maintain the RCS on the condenser steam dumps. When decay heat gets too low, they will have to shut the MSIVs and break vacuum in the condenser to prevent cooling down the RCS. Recovery will take much longer.

I completed my plant walkdowns and did not find any additional significant issues.

Next email update at 1900 this evening.

Brian C. Haagensen Senior Resident Inspector Indian Point Energy Center (914) 739-9360 (Office)

!(b)(6) I(Cell)

From: Haagensen, Brian To: Pelton Davjd; Lorson Raymond; Schroeder Daniel Cc: Sjwy, Andrew; Rossi Matthew

Subject:

RE: Boric acid leakage discovered on the Unit 3 RPV head Date: Saturday, November 04, 2017 7:03:00 PM Engineering has assessed these BA deposits and they believe that they are not indicative of an active leak through the RPV outer o-ring. They think the deposits may have originated from reactor reassembly in June.

From: Haagensen, Brian Sent: Saturday, November 04, 2017 6:22 PM To: Pelton, David <David.Pelton@nrc.gov>; Lorson, Raymond <Raymond.Lorson@ nrc.gov>;

Schroeder, Daniel <Dan iel.Schroeder@nrc.gov>

Cc: Siwy, Andrew <Andrew.Siwy@nrc.gov>; Rossi, Matthew <Matthew. Rossi@nrc.gov>

Subject:

Boric acid lea kage discovered on t he Unit 3 RPV head Importance: High Entergy identified small amounts boric acid deposits on the outer a-ring flange area on the reactor vessel head in the same axial location as last time. The amount of boric acid deposits are approximately the same as in June when they shutdown .

RCS UIL has been very low on Unit 3 since the 0 -ring outage July. The monthly average leak rate has been improving:

0.075 gpm - July 0.043 gpm - August 0.031 gpm - September 0.02 gpm - October You may want to forward this information to the SLOs and PAOs in case someone calls them to ask the question. Entergy just got this information and it is being assessed by Engineering.

Status email to follow after the OCC Status update at 1830-1900.

Brian C. Haagensen Senior Resident Inspector Indian Point Energy Center (914} 739-9360 (Office) l(b)(6) I (Cell)

From : Haagensen, Brian To: Pelton David

Subject:

RE: Restart efforts are delayed Date: Saturday, November 04, 2017 1 :32:00 PM Dave - Thanks for the offer. Crunch time will come next week.

Brian From: Pelton, David Sent: Saturday, November 04, 2017 1:30 PM To: Haagensen, Brian <Brian.Haagensen@nrc.gov>

Cc: Tifft, Doug <Doug.Tifft@ nrc.gov>; Screnci, Diane <Diane.Screnci@n rc.gov>; Sheehan, Neil

<Neil.Sheeha n@nrc.gov>; Guzman, Richard <Richard.Guzman@nrc.gov>; Fu ller, Justin

<Justin.Fuller@nrc.gov>; Haagensen, Brian <Brian.Haagense n@nrc.gov>; Hen rion, M ark

<Ma rk.Henrion@nrc.gov>; Highley, Christopher <Christopher.Highley@nrc.gov>; McKown, Louis

<Louis.McKow n@nrc.gov>; Rossi, Matthew <M atthew. Rossi@n rc.gov>; Schroeder, Da niel

<Daniel.Schroeder@nrc.gov>; Setzer, Thomas <Thomas.Setzer@nrc.gov>; Siwy, Andrew

<Andrew .Siwy@ nre.gov>

Subject:

Re: Restart effort s are delayed Brian, Thanks very much ...please do not be shy about asking for additional support, if needed/as needed.

dave p.

On: 04 November 2017 13:15, "Haagensen, Brian" <Brian.Haaicnsen@nrc,iQY> wrote:

IP3 remains stable in Mode 3 on the condenser steam dumps at NOT/NOP. They are conducting a containment entry to walkdown systems inside the VC and especially to look for evidence of o-ring leakage.

My assessment is that Indian Point Unit 3 is several days away from restarting the plant.

The issues list continues to grow as discovery identifies more problems from the trip. The OCC has not yet put a restart schedule together. They are discussing the possibility of cooling the plant down to mode 4 to effect some repairs.

They are having significant problems getting craft resources to come in over the weekend to repair the items on the issues list. Management is escalating the issue "to the highest level" to the Union.

Last night, the SM evaluated the need to declare a NOUE (EAL HU3.1) because of the CO2 discharge into the turbine building. He ultimately decided it was not required because the "asphyxiant gas did not adversely affect normal operations," but he looked hard at declaring the event. We should ask DRS EP to review this decision.

The Post Trip review report is not yet completed. Apparently, Engineering did not get

support from the other departments (maintenance, OPS, planning, l&C, electrical etc.) to conduct the PTR and the FMA analysis for the cause of the trip.

Current Issues List:

1. Determine and repair the cause of the main generator trip - mode 2 hold
2. MS-116-2 steam leak at flange (this is a manual steam heater valve on the main turbine) - leak injection (Team Inc.) or shut MSIVs and weld repair bonnet flange
3. Air leak on TCV-1104 (FCU SW outlet valve) - repair leak
4. Engineering assessment of main turbine overspeed - mode 2 hold
5. RCS letdown isolated prematurely (4% high in PZR level)
6. 31 CCW pump needs to be replaced (was in progress at time of the trip) - mode 2 hold or mode change with risk assessment - scheduled to be completed by Monday
7. 33 RCP vibrations are high
8. 32 RCP has a bad vibration probe
9. 34 inverter auto-transferred to alternate AC source because of a failed 34 feedwater heater cascade valve - mode 2 hold
10. 32 MBFP suction relief lifted - repair or accept as is with engineering evaluation -

mode 1 hold

11. 33 isophase heat exchanger leak - plug tube or replace heat exchanger - mode 2 hold
12. Can't add chemicals to 33 SG because of leak on CF-134- repair leak At their present pace, restart will be sometime in the middle of next week. This will be a race between the reduction in decay heat and being able to maintain the RCS on the condenser steam dumps. When decay heat gets too low, they will have to shut the MSIVs and break vacuum in the condenser to prevent cooling down the RCS. Recovery will take much longer.

I completed my plant walkdowns and did not find any additional significant issues.

Next email update at 1900 this evening.

Brian C. Haagensen Senior Resident Inspector Indian Point Energy Center (914) 739-9360 (Office) l(b)(6)  !(Cell)

From: Haagensen, Brian To: Schroeder Daniel: Henrjon Mark Cc: Sjwy, Andrew; Rossi Matthew

Subject:

FW: [External_Sender]

Date: Thursday, November 02, 2017 2:46:00 PM Note: Both attachments are excerpts from IPEC Unit 2 SD No. 1, Attachments: RCP diagrams.pd[ Rev. 16, which are withheld in their entirety under FOIA exemption RCP Lesson Piao pdC 4.

Attached is the RCP lesson plan and training diagrams showing the flow paths and instrumentation for the 21 RCP. These are standard Westinghouse RCPs.

From: Haagensen, Brian [2]

Sent: Th ursday, November 02, 2017 2:45 PM To: Haagensen, Brian <Brian.Haagensen@ nrc.gov>

Subject:

[External_Sender]

Brian C. Haagensen Sen ior Resident Inspector India n Point Energy Center 914-739-9360 (Office)

!(b)(6)  !(cell)

In plant x5347

From: Haagensen, Brian To: Schroeder Daniel: Greives Jonathan: Henrion Mark Cc: Iifft Doug <Doug,Iifft@nrc.gov}: Perry Neil: Screnci Diane: Sjwy Andrew

Subject:

From the NRC News Summary today Date: Wednesday, November 01, 2017 7:58:00 AM NRC Says Entergy Must Do More To Resolve Indian Point Water Leaks.

The Lower Hudson Valley (NY) Journal News (10/31 , Zambito, 337K) reports that the NRC's "latest inspection of Indian Point says the power plant's owners must do more to resolve a recurring problem with 0 -rings used to seal off nuclear reactors, the cause of eight water leaks since 2003." While the agency acknowledges that Entergy has taken "prudent, conservative action to shut down the plant" for repairs and to identify what may have caused leakage of slightly radioactive water, those efforts were not completely successful. The NRC report says, "Corrective actions to address the causal factors over the years have not been completely effective at preventing recurrence of the issue." The article adds that the "stainless steel 0-rings" secure the "lid or head of the reactor onto the body of the reactor vessel." The leakage is likely linked to a 2003 "design change that affected how 0-rings are installed during the plant's maintenance shutdowns, typically every two years," according to NRG.

Our report stated:

Annual Sample* Reactor Vessel Head O-riog Leaks

a. Inspection Scope The inspectors performed an in-depth review of Entergy's eval uation and corrective actions associated with repeated reactor coolant system (RCS) leakage through the reactor vessel head 0 -rings. The inspectors reviewed CRs and corrective actions associated with the eight reactor vessel head 0 -rings leaks that had occurred at Ind ian Point since 2003. Specifica lly, the inspectors review ed the corrective actions to verify they were addressi ng the identified cond it ions adverse to qual ity. The inspectors reviewed Entergy's maintenance history records and causa l analyses.

The inspectors assessed Entergy's problem identification th reshold, cause analyses, extent of cond it ion reviews, compensatory act ions, and the prioritization and timeli ness of corrective act ions to determine whether Entergy was appropriately identifying, cha racterizing, and correcting problems associated w ith t his issue and w hether the planned or completed corrective actions were appropriate. The inspectors compared the actions taken to the requirements of Entergy's CAP and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B.

In add it ion, the inspectors performed field walkdowns and interviewed engineeri ng personnel to assess t ile effectiveness of the implemented corrective actions.

b. Findings and Observations No findings were identified.

The reactor pressure vessel (RPV) is designed to be sealed by t wo large diameter (different size), concentric, circular, silver-coated, stain less steel gasket 0 -rings. These 0 -rings are

seated in machined grooves between the RPV head and t he vessel. Two new 0-rings are routinely instal led each outage when t he RPV head is bolt ed closed. The inner 0 -ring normally ma intains the pressure seal for the RCS bou ndary. The outer 0 -ring is a pre-instal led redundant spare that is designed to be used if the inner 0 -ring leaks. Leakage through the inner 0-ring ca n be identified via a leakoff li ne between the inner and outer 0-rings. The operators can place the outer 0 -ring in service by closing the leakoff line. This transfers the RCS boundary seal ing surface to the outer 0 -ring. TS 3.4.13, "RCS Operational Lea kage," establishes limits for the lea k rate for identified and un identified RCS leakage.

Lea kage through the RPV 0 -rings is not classified as "pressure boundary lea kage" under TS 1.1, "Defin itions," because the leakage is past a mecha nical joi nt (gasket) and not th rough a "non-isolable fa ult in an RCS component body, pipe wa ll or vessel wa ll." Leakage through t he 0 -r ings into cont ainment would be measu red and compared to the li mits in TS 3.4.13.

The inspectors reviewed CRs and corrective actions associated w ith the eight reactor vessel head 0-rings lea ks t hat occurred since 2003, when a design change to the 0 -rings occurred .

Lea kage through the 0 -rings prior to t he design change may have been in part caused by the original design. In each case when both the in ner and outer 0 -rings lea ked, Entergy identified and monitored the leakage at a very low level and took prudent, conservative act ion to shut down the plant before approaching the TS li mit to effect repairs and identify causal factors t hat potentially led to the leakage. Corrective actions since t he design change have been pri marily focused on revisions to procedu res and processes. Changes to procedu res 2-REF-002-GEN and 3-REF-002-GE N included new instructions to ma nually clean and dry t he vessel fla nge seati ng surface prior t o landing the head inst ead of relying on t he underwater flange-cleani ng machine. Additional revisions directed the use of a "star" pattern when torqueing t he 0 -ring reta iner clips, use of a feeler gauge t o verify t he 0 -ring was centered in t he groove, performa nce of a second verification, and ensuring an 0 -ring handling rig was used for inst allat ion. Corrective actions also incl uded replacement of t he 0 -

rings with new 0 -rings during the next opportun it y. The most recent correct ive act ions were implement ed to prevent changes in residual heat removal flow from disrupting the 0 -ring sea l su rfaces prior to final bolting of the RPV head.

Corrective actions to address the various causa l factors over the years have not been completely effective at prevent ing recurrence of the issue. This is accepta ble per Ent ergy' s CAP because each leak is characterized as a conditio n adverse to quality, vice a sign ificant cond ition adverse to quality. Entergy has t he ability to monit or for leakage and t ake actions to maintain compliance with t heir TS. Lea kage t hrough the 0-rings has not challenged the limit s of TS 3.4.13. Both Units 2 and 3 are currently operating on the outer 0-rings with no measurable leakage.

In review of al l t he corrective actions t aken since 2003, the inspectors not ed t hat Entergy had not ta ken detailed depth measurements of the RPV flange seating su rface degradation since 2015, when surface defect s identified were small. These surface defects had been noted agai n during the May 2017 outage to repair the leaking 0 -rings. However, th is degradation had been visually assessed to be minor in nature and t he replacement 0 -ring was evaluated as being capable of deforming t o seal these minor defects. Entergy is

present ly plan ning to conduct la ser measurement and mapping of these defects during the next refueling outage on each unit.

Finally, the inspectors also noted t hat procedure EN -HU-106, "Procedure and Work Instruction Use and Adherence," states t hat technica l procedures should be designated "cont inuous use" if the activity is complex or is performed infrequently to ensure that the procedu ral steps are performed as written in st epwise sequence . Although the reacto r vessel head 0 -ring replacement and head insta llation are comp lex activities typically performed only once per cycle, the govern ing procedures are designated as "reference use." EH-HU -106 also defines a "continuous use" procedure, "for comp lex or infrequent work activities for which consequences of an improper action could have immediate, possibly irreversible impact on safety, production or re liability." Though t he usage designation of 2-REF-GEN-002 and 3-REF-GEN-002 ha s not been identified as causal to any of the leaks, inspectors determined that Entergy shou ld further eval ua te the categorization of the RPV head insta llatio n proced ure to ensure it meets th ei r requ iremen t s and expectations and ensures that previous correct ive actions continue to be implemen ted as intended.

Brian C. Haagensen Senior Resident Inspector Indian Point Energy Center (914) 739-9360 (Office)

!(b)(6)  !(Cell)

From: Haagensen Brian To: Gre;ves looathan Cc: Siwy Andrew; Rossi Matthew; Setzer Thomas; Diane Hochmuth CP iane Hochmuth@n rc gov); Henrion Mark

Subject:

IP2&3 2017-003 .rO_SUBMITTED .docx Date: Wednesday, October 25, 2017 9:35 :00 AM Note: The attached 48-page draft inspection report is Attachments: I P2&3 2017-003. rO SU BM I TTED .docx withheld in its entirety under FOIA exemption 5,

Jon, Attached is the IPEC quarterly report with the all revisions incorporated as requested. The section on the 0-ring leakage has been substantially changed and should be reviewed . All other changes have been made as directed.

I concur on this report.

Brian C. Haagensen Senior Resident Inspector Indian Point Energy Center 914 739-9360 (Office)

(b)(6) (Cell)

From: Haagensen, Brian To: Tifft Doug: Grejyes Jonathan; Screnci Diane: Sheehan Neil Cc: Setzer Thomas; Henrjon Mark; Sjwy Andrew; Rossi, Matthew

Subject:

Re: IP Quarterly Inspection Report Date: Tuesday, October 24, 2017 4:17:53 PM One clarification for the o-ring issue. The limit for unidentified leakage is l gpm as you state if the leakage is through both o-rings into the containment atmosphere. But if the leak is channeled down the leakoff lines, it is considered as identified leakage because it is collected in closed tank. The limit for identified leakage is l O gpm, not l gpm.

Brian C. Haagensen Senior Reside nt Inspector Indian Point Energy Center 914-739-9630/ 1 (office)

(b)(6) Kcell) l ____

,__ ....., home)

K From: Tifft, Doug Sent: Tuesday, October 24, 20 17 4:01:56 PM To: Greives, Jonathan; Screnci, Diane; Sheeha n, Neil Cc: Setzer, Thomas; Henrion, Mark; Haagensen, Brian; Siwy, .Andrew; Rossi, Matthew

Subject:

RE: IP Quarterly Inspection Report I am good with the below info.

-Doug From: Greives, Jonathan Sent: Tuesday, October 24, 20 17 3:51 PM To: Screnci, Diane <Diane.Screnci@n rc.gov>; Sheehan, Neil <Neil.Sheehan@nrc.gov>; Tifft, Doug

<Doug.Tifft@n re.gov>

Cc: Set zer, Thomas <Thomas.Setzer@nrc.gov>; Henrion, Mark <Mark.Henrion@nrc.gov>;

Haagensen, Brian <Brian .Haagensen@nrc.gov>; Siwy, Andrew <And rew.Siwy@nrc.gov>; Rossi, M atthew <M atthew. Rossi@nrc.gov>

Subject:

IP Quarterly Inspection Report We will be issuing the IP quarterly inspection report (likely early next week). There are a couple issues in it that may draw some attention. We will email you a copy of the report when it is issued, but wanted to give you a couple bullet points. Let me know if you think a communication plan for the report is needed or if you think this is sufficient.

Thanks, J on

  • DRS performed a review of their corrective actions, material testing reports, and root cause evaluation.
  • Entergy's actions and overall response appears appropriate.
  • Previously identified URI (IR 2016-001) was closed based on the adequacy of Entergy's corrective actions and assessment.
  • No findings were identified during the review.
  • Pl&R Sample- Reactor Vessel Head 0 -Ring Leaks
  • Both units have a history of leaks from the RPV head 0-rings. In many cases, leakage has only occurred past the inner 0-ring and the outer, redundant 0-ring has maintained the RPV head leak tight. Some of the occurrence have involved both 0 -rings leaking, which results in a rise in containment unidentified leakage. The report may indicate the current status, in which the inner 0-ring only is leaking on both units.
  • TS 3.4.13 specifies limits for RCS leakage. While no pressure boundary leakage is allowed in TSs, leakage past seals and gaskets, such as the reactor vessel head 0 -ring , is acceptable to a specified limit because this type of minor leakage does not jeopardize reasonable assurance of adequate protection. The TS allows up to 1 gpm unidentified leakage.
  • In each case when both the inner and outer 0 -ring leaked, Entergy has identified the leakage at a very low level and has taken prudent, conservative action to shut down the plant to make the appropriate repairs before approaching the TS limit.
  • Entergy has taken corrective actions after each leak to replace the 0 -rings and identified causal factors that potentially led to the leakage.
  • Corrective actions to address the various causal factors over the years has not be completely effective at preventing recurrence of the issue. This is acceptable per Entergy's CAP because each leak is characterized as a condition adverse to quality, vice a significant condition adverse to quality.

This characterization appears appropriate because of Entergy's ability to monitor for leakage, both initially from the inner 0-ring and subsequently as unidentified leakage if both 0 -rings leak, and take actions to maintain compliance with their plant TSs.

  • Notwithstanding this, Entergy has identified additional actions they intend to take in the next outage that appear appropriate.
  • Discussion of Previous NOV- Inadequate Control of Floor Drains to Minimize Groundwater Contamination
  • The IR will include a discussion of Entergy's planned actions to address the NOV and actions that are still outstanding.
  • Outstanding actions identified as necessary to complete prior to NOV closeout include completion of a modification to the drain system, and inspection/clleaning of remaining Units 2 and 3 floor drains.

Jonathan Greives Branch Chief (Acting)

Branch 2- Division of Reactor Projects U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission- Region 1 610-337-5120 (W) l(b)(6) l(C)

jonatha n.greives@nre.gov From: Haagensen Bciao To: Slwv Andrew Cc: Diane Hochmuth (Diane Hochrrnuth@nrc goy)

Subject:

Creative writing assignment Date: Monday, October 23, 2017 5:3 2:00 PM Attachments: Greive$ comments on auarrertv ceP9rt odf Andrew, Please revise the o-ring sample section in the quarterly report to address Jon's concerns. I will review what you have written when I return on Wednesday with the goal to publish the quarterly report by Friday.

(b)(5)

Please complete the revisions on the linked file below, not in the report file (contrary to our usual practice of only making changes directly to the report file).

G*\Sjtes\lPIDocuments11ospec!jon Reports1201 z1201z-003\Annua1 PIB Sample on o-ring leaks docx Diane will be working in the report and I don't want any version conflicts at this late hour.

Brian From: Haagensen, Brian Sent: M onday, October 23, 2017 5:17 PM To: Diane Hochmuth (Diane.Hochmut h@nrc.gov) <Diane.Hochmuth@nrc.gov>

Cc: Siwy, Andrew <Andrew.Siwy@nrc.gov>; Rossi, M att hew <Matthew .Rossi@nrc.gov>

Subject:

Quarterly Report for fina l revie w Diane, I will be out of the office tomorrow (Tuesday). We will be moving to our new apartment.

The quarterly report is (almost) readiy for your final review. Andrew changed the TOG and now there is an errant code that should be fixed. Please read it over for editorial problems, abbreviations and the other formatting issues that you check so well.

We removed the closure of two LERs from the last section.

23. LER U3 2017-002-00: Manual Isolation of the eves letdown to stop a valve leak resulted in an exceedance ofTS 3.4.9 condition A Limit for Pressurizer Level Andrew S LER
  • The LEA U3 2017-002-00 for the excessive leakage was not completed by Andrew and will be closed next quarter.

The following item has been deleted from the report:

"()56()9286/~()17 ()92 ee LER Mt1Rtit1I ,'se,'8tieR et Gflemict1! 8Rc1 'le,'time Geritt(:)/

System NofffltJ.I Letdo ....'fl ffi StofJ 8 '18/b't) LeBk Res111tec1 iR BA ExeeeciBRee of TeefmieBI 5peeifieBh'oR 3.4.9 GoRc1ilioR A Limit for P."ess11rizer Level (-SeetieFJ 40A3)"

  • The LEA U2 2017-001-00 for the Manual Reactor Trip was determined to have a performance deficiency (at our pre-exit meeting last Friday) and will be closed to a new finding next quarter. This sample will have to be backed out of ARPS for this quarter.

I have modified the inspection sample plan to reflect these changes. Please remove from ARPS as appropriate.

r b)(5)

I believe I have reconciled all other comments from Andrew and Jon.

Please do your magic but do not send it to Jon until I see it one more time. Feel free to work directly with Jon if you need to better understand his comments (wh ich are attached to this email).

Brian C. Haagensen Senior Resident Inspector Indian Point Energy Center 914 739-9360 Office)

(b)(6) Cell)

From: Haagensen, Brian To: Siwy Andrew; Rossi Matthew

Subject:

Request for comment/review on 40A.2 0-Ring PI&R sample Date: Thursday, October 19, 2017 11 :17:00 AM I have substantially re-written Sarah"s 0 -ring Pl&R inspection observations. Please review and send me your edits/comments.

a. Findings and Observations (b)(5)

(b)(5)

Brian C. Haagensen Senior Resident Inspector Indian Point Energy Center 914 739-9360 (Office)

(b)(6) Cell)

From: Haagensen, Brian To: Grejves lonathan

Subject:

RE: Media question re: Indian Point Date: Thursday, October 05, 2017 10:22:00 AM l(b)(5)

From: Haagensen, Brian Sent: Thursday, October 05, 2017 9:55 AM To: Greives, Jonathan <Jonathan.Greives@nrc.gov>

Subject:

RE: M ed ia question re: Indian Point It is completed and was documented by Sarah in this quarter's report below. I have not yet reviewed it carefully but here is is .

.3 Annual Sample: Reactor Vessel Head 0-Ring Leaks (b)(5)

(b)(5)

From: Greives, Jonathan Sent: Th ursday, October 05, 2017 9:38 AM To: Haagensen, Brian <Brian.Haagensen@nrc.gov>

Subject:

Fwd: Media question re: India n Po int Whats the status on the PiR sample on RPV head 0-ring leakage? Is that being documented in this quarter's report or 4Q?

From: "Sheehan, Neil" <Neil.Sheehan@nrc.gov>

Subject:

Media question re: Indian Point Date: 05 October 201 7 09:00 To: "Greives, Jonathan" <Jonathan.Grejves@ nrc.gov>

Jon, Quick question: A reporter is asking if we issued our inspection findings yet on IP o-ring leakage. How should I answer that?

Neil

From: Haagensen Brian To: Gre;ves looathan

Subject:

RE : Media question re: Indian Point Date: Thursday, October 05, 2017 10:21:00 AM I recommend that we tell the reporter that the report is still being written and reviewed. We will not have any more information until it has been approved for public release.

From: Grei ves, Jonathan Sent: Thu rsd ay, Octobe r 05, 2017 9:38 AM To: Haagensen, Brian <Brian.Haagensen@nrc.gov>

Subject:

Fwd : Media quest ion re : Ind ian Point Whats the status on the PiR sample on RPV head 0-ring leakage? Is that being documented in this quarter's report or 4Q?

From: "Sheehan, Neil" <Neil.Sheehan@nrc.gov>

Subject:

Media question re: Indian Point Date: 05 October 2017 09:00 To: "Greives, Jonathan" <Jonathan .Greives@nrc.gov>

Jon, Quick question: A reporter is asking if we issued our inspection findings yet on IP o-ring leakage. How should I answer that?

Neil

From: Haagensen, Brian To: Siwy Andrew; Rossi Matthew

Subject:

Fl/v: Media quest ion re: Indian Point Date: Thursday, October 05, 2017 10:13:00 AM FYI - currently this is our office position on o-ring leakage. Please let me know if you have other thoughts/insights on t his issue.

From: Haagensen, Brian Sent: Thursday, October 05, 201710:12 AM To: Greives, Jonat han <Jonathan.Greives@nrc.gov>

Subject:

RE: M ed ia question re: Indian Point

Jon, (b)(5)

Brian From: Greives, Jonathan Sent: Thursday, October 05, 2017 9:38 AM To: Haagensen, Brian <Brjan,Haagensen@nrc.gov>

Subject:

Fwd: Media question re: Indian Poi nt

Whats the status on the PiR sample on RPV head 0 -ring leakage? Is that being documented in this quarter's report or 4Q?

From: "Sheehan, Neil" <Neil. Sheehan@nrc.gov>

Subject:

Media question re: Indian Point Date: 05 October 2017 09:00 To: "Greives, Jonathan" <Jonathan.Greives@nrc.gov>

Jon, Quick question: A reporter is asking if we issued our ins ection finding s yet on IP o-ring leakage. How should I answer that?

Neil

From: Haagensen Brian To: Rieb Sarah

Subject:

Re : Draft o-ring violation writ e- up Date: Friday, August 18, 2017 1:22:31 PM Thanks Sarah. We got it.

Brian C. Haagensen Senior Resident Inspector Indian Point Energy Center l_____ I 914-739-9630/1 (office)

(b )(6) (cell)

_, (home)

From: Rich, Sarah Sent: Friday, Aug ust 18, 2017 9:03:38 AM To: Haagensen, Brian

Subject:

Draft o-ring violation write-up Rri~n (b )(5)

Sarah

From : Haagensen, Brian To: Rieb Sarah

Subject:

RE: oring leakage Date: Wednesday, July 05, 2017 12:23:00 PM Actually, it is .. .. Blanch and Lochbaum have already asked about it and Gurdzeil submitted a 2.206 petition.

From: Rich, Sarah Sent: W ednesday, July 05, 2017 10:45 AM To: Haagensen, Brian <Brian.Haagensen@nrc.gov>

Subject:

RE: oring leakage In 2015, Entergy determined that the cause of the reactor vessel flange leakage was improper a-ring installation due to vague procedural guidance. This year, they proposed that the current a-ring leakage, and possibly previous o-ring leakage, was caused by foreign material introduced into the sealing surface from water movement during reactor vessel head installation. They took actions to mitigate that potential cause during the recent a-ring outage. However, there is not a lot of evidence to support that cause.

Entergy has not addressed potential causes such as sealing surface irregularities, incomplete procedure adherence, or a-ring design, although they may choose to do so in future corrective actions.

Please note that Unit 3 experienced leakage from the inner a-ring prior to start up from the o-ring replacement outage, but that information is not common public knowledge.

From: Haagensen, Brian Sent: Friday, June 30, 2017 4:45 PM To: Rich, Sarah <Sarah .Rich@nrc.gov>

Subject:

Fw: oring leakage Sarah, Please draft the response to these questions.

Brian C. Haagensen Senior Resident Inspector Indian Point Energy Center 14-73 -9630/1 (office)

(b)(6) cell)

.....____ ____, home)

From: Greives, Jonathan Sent: Friday, June 30, 2017 2:14:45 PM To: Screnci, Diane Cc: Haagensen, Brian; Setzer, Thomas; Rich, Sarah; Siwy, And rew

Subject:

Re : oring leakage

They did not identify a "smoking gun" when removing the two orings. Based on that, I don't think the licensee has or will be able to identify a definitive cause. They identified a number of potential causes in their failure modes and effect analysis and took corrective actions to address a number of those causes. In reality, it was probably a combination of a number of those causes.

In 2015, they took a similar approach, but only addressed one of the causes that they felt was the most likely . This year, they took the approach of addressing any cause that couldn't be definitively ruled out. I would have to confirm with the residents and licensee next week if there were any possible causes that were not addressed.

Let me know if that answer is sufficient.

Jon Jonathan Greives Regional State Liaison Officer U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission- Region 1 610-337-5337 (W)

!(b)(6)  !(C) jonathan.greives@nrc.gov On: 30 June 2017 12:03, "Screnci, Diane" <Diane.Screnci@nrc.gov> wrote:

I've been asked whether we know the cause of the most recent U3 o-ring leakage, yet?

What about the leakage in 2015, what was the cause?

Thanks-Diane Screnci Sr. Public Affairs Officer USNRC RI 610-337-5330

From: Sjwy. Andrew To: Haagensen Brian

Subject:

0 -ring PI&R Date: Tuesday, August 29, 2017 1 :45:26 PM Thoughts on the revisio n? I got stuck on the highl ig hted sentence. It was difficu lt to understand exactly what was being said s ince there's a mix-up in the use of terminology. I could wing it, but I tho ught maybe you might know the correct intent. (the circle back section)

.3 Annual Sample: Reactor Vessel Head 0-Ring Leaks (b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5) a..,.&.., >m7-, P.E.

Resident Inspector I Indian Point Region I I ir :914.739.9360

From: Rich, Sarah To: Haagensen Brian

Subject:

Draft o-ring violation write-up Note : The 4-page draft attachment is withheld in its Date: Friday, August 18, 2017 9:03:42 AM entirety under FO IA exemption 5, Attachments: o-ring.docx Rri::m (b )(5)

Sarah

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Base Tub ing 0-FLEX' METAL 0-RINGS The 0-FLEX'" is manufactured of Alloy 718 or Stainless Steel 304 tubing. Alloy 718 is the most common and preferred material because it offers optimum strength, spring back and resistance to radiation and corrosion. The base tubing is plated w ith pure (99.95%) silver. This combination of elastic core (tubing) with deformable plastic layer (silver) provides durable sealing for traditional Nuclear Reactor Pressure Vessels.

NRPV 0-FLEX"'

HELICOFLEX SPRING ENERGIZED SIEALS elical Spri ng The HELICOFLEXseal is a high performance, flexible, metal sea l that has exceptional compression and elastic recovery properties. The HELICOFLEX seal is composed of a close- Outer Jacket wound helical spring surrounded by two metal jackets. The spring is selected to have a specific compression resistance.

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Each coil of the helical spring acts independently and allows the seal to conform to surface irregularities on the flange surface. This combination of elasticity and plasticity makes the HELICOFLEX* seal the best choice for ageing reactors. NRPV HELiCOFLEX*

TECHNETICSGROUP EnPro Industries companies sales@technetics.com Tachnat1a GROUP technetics.com EnPro Industries companies so

TYPICAL SEAL APPLICATIONS RPV CLOSURE HEAD SEALS These seals are the primary seal for the reactor pressure vessel. Typically, the seals are used in tandem with an inner and outer seal for redundancy. The seals are positioned in the reactor pressure vessel head with clips and screws for easy installation and assembly.

CONTROL ROD DRIVE (CRD) SEALS PTFE coated 0-FLEXTMseals for CRD mechanisms.

SPENT FUEL CASKS Primary seals for casks used in the storage and t ransportation of spent fuel assemblies.

OTHER APPLICATIONS Steam Turbines Primary Loop Valves Waste Heat Syst ems Steam Pressurizer REACTOR TYPES BWR - All Types PWR-All Types Gas Cooled Navy Nuclear QA SYSTEM ASSESSMENT ISO 9001 Title 10 CFR 50 Appendix B ANSI / ASME N45.2 Favorable Audits by NUPIC Members ANSI / ASME NQA-1 KTA 1401 RPV 0 -FLEX' Seals with installation clips TECHNETICS GROUP EnPro Industries companies sales@technetics.com Tachnczt1a GROUP technetics.com EnPro Industries companies 51

GENERAL SERVICES GENERAL SERVICES Global leader for more than 50 years in nuclear RPV seal design and manufacturing. References available.

RPV seal design and manufacturing for most PWR Nuclear Power Plants (NPP) and all BWR NPPs worldwide and to major NSSS worldwide. References available.

Spent fuel cask seal design to all major spent fuel (transportation and storage) casks manufacturers worldwide. Reference available.

Individual RPV seal design and recommendations for newly built PWR and BWR units.

Seal and re tainer design improvements to meet today's industries requirements of tight outage itineraries and ALARA requirements.

Qualified and experienced on-site field services to evaluate the cause of numerous RPV seal problems, i.e. For RPV seal leakages, etc.

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Quality Assurance program based on the requirements of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, ASME, N45.2, ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Codes V and IX, NUPIC audited.

3,d party evaluation available for on-site laser scan & repair of mating surfaces, reactor pressure vessel Flange, and pressure vessel closure head grooves.

NPP field staff training available, i.e. handling, installation, removal of RPV seals.

Airfreight packaging and crating and airfreight arrangement for quick response transportation (airfreighl capability limitation given by seal design).

TECHNETICS GROUP EMERGENCY RESPONSE Emergency response For outage. Spare RPV seals available on demand.

24/7 emergency service phone (803) 695-3553 (U.S.A.)

24 - 36 hour4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> worldwide emergency site service available, on request.

Tachnczt1a TECHNETICS GROUP EnPro Industries companies sales@technetics.com GROUP technetics.com EnPro Industries companies 52

NUCLEAR RPV CLOSURE HEAD SEALS RPV 0 - FLEX' 0.375 0.038 40 to 180 2500 ALLOY 7 18 BASE TUBING Installation lnstatlat1on e,

0.030 0.037 0.045 8%

10%

12%

Total Compression Compression Springback Min.

0.009 0.009 0.009 0.060 16% 0.009 0.064 17% 0.009 0.040 8% 0.015 120 0.050 10% 0.015 0.500 0.050 to 0.060 0.015 2500 12%

>180 0.080 0.015 16%

0.085 17% 0.015 0.050 8% 0.017 120 0.062 10% 0.017 0.625 0.063 to 0.075 4000 12% 0.017

>180 0.100 16% 0.017 0.106 17% 0.017 Dimensions in inches N ~ Recommended compression% for NRPV 0-FLEX' is 16%

  • PCI = Pounds force per Circumferential Inch RPV HELICOFLEX: HN200
      • 0.520 N/A 40 to

>180 4000 0.052 10% 0.017 Dimensions in inches Tachnczt1a TECHNETICS GROUP EnPro Industries companies sales@technetics.com GROUP technetics.com EnPro Industries companies 53

CLIP ASSEMBLIES RPV Closure Head Seals are typically held in the pressure TYPE I CLIP (O* FLEX' ONLY)

-~~~

vessel head with specially designed clips. Technetics Group recommends a clip be located at a minimum every 30" . . . . ..

of seal circumference. This will ensure that t he seal is securely held in place. 0.37S 0.038. 0.281 0.125 0.:70 0.500 0.050 0.375 0.205 0.093 TYPEI 0.625 0.063 0.438 0.256 0.125 This clip can only be used with the traditional 0-FLEX' RPV Dimensions in inches seal. This clip is designed to penetrate either a slot (most .!iQlE; Type I clip can be used with a slot or hole (depending common) or a hole in ID of the 0-FLEX'. on ring design)

-- upto72" 72" to 144" 144"to200" 200" +

~

8 12 16 or 24 Dimensions in inches Threaded Insert

. cl'1p /

Retainer

~ - -Hex-socket

~ screw TYPE II This style clip can be used with either the 0-FLEX' or the HELICOFLEXRPV seals. It is designed to hold the seal to the outer circumference of the groove without having to penetrate the ring through a slot. This makes seal installation easier since t he seal does not require special alignment.

~ Th,eaded Insert Ji! "- "'""'hp

- - Hex-socket screw Tachnczt1a TECHNETICS GROUP EnPro Industries companies sales@technetics.com GROUP technetics.com EnPro Industries companies 54

PACKAGING & SHIPPING RPV CLOSURE HEAD SEAL PACKAGING Technetics Group offers two styles of protective packaging for RPV seals:

Regular "Casement Tubing" RPV Seal Polyethylene t ubing Polyethylene plastic pressure sensitive tape Spiral wound polyurethane foam or polyethylene ZIPPER LOCK TUBING PACKAGING This is a packaging upgrade that was developed using ALARA minded principles. This packaging is designed to be removed quickly and therefore reduce radiation exposure time during unpacking and installation.

Polyethylene Sheet Anti-oxidation Paper Spiral wound polyurethane foam or polyethylene SHIPPING Individually wrapped seals are securely packaged in wooden crates. Special provisions are made for extra protection during overseas shipments. Typically, the crate is transported by way of a specialized drop deck freight carrier. However, some crates may be custom designed for specialty ocean or air freight carriers.

Tachnczt1a TECHNETICS GROUP EnPro Industries companies sales@technetics.com GROUP technetics.com EnPro Industries companies 55

SPENT FUEL STORAGE CASKS TN-40 Dry Storage Cask Technetics Group metal seals offer the performance and flexibility to meet stringent spent fuel cask requirements.

The HELICOFLEXseal in particular can be made in a wide variety of geometries and shapes to meet t he demanding requirements of cask designers. Typical seal types are listed below. Please contact Applications Engineering to discuss your cask requirements.

TYPICAL CASK SEAL LOCATIONS:

Cask Lid Closures Fill Ports Drain Ports TN-32 Dry Storage Cask TYPICAL CONFIGURATIONS

  • HELi CO FLEX HN200 HN203 HN208 HNDE290 Groove assembly Tongue & Groove Raised Face Leak check-flanges - ANSI 816.S inert gas purge I

TECHNETICS GROUP EnPro Industries companies sales@technetics.com Tachnczt1a GROUP technetics.com EnPro Industries companies 56

APPLICATIONS DATA SHEET Tel: 800-233-1722 Fax: 803-783-4279 E-Mail: sales@technetics.com Tachncztaa GROUP EnPro Industries companies COMPANY: PHONE:

CONTACT: FAX:

ADDRESS: E*MAIL:

DATE:

APPLICATION: (please att ach custom er drawing/ sketch)

Brief

Description:

nriual quantities: RFQ Quantities:

Is This a New Design?


oYes o No Are Modifications Possible? o Yes o No Drawing or Sketch Attached? oYes o No What is the Seal Type? o Shaped o Circular SERVICE CONDITIONS:

Media: Life Expecta111cy:

Working Temperature: Max/Proof Pressure: @Temp.=

Working Pressure: Max Temperature: @Pressure=

Pressure Direction: Target Sealing Level: !Helium: Std.cc/sec

{lnternaljE:xternalj~ial)

Pressure Cycles: Flow Rate: cc/minute Temperature Cycles: Other:

FLANGE DETAILS: (Please Provide Drawing)

Amount of Flange Movement in Service: (1n,~**l Radial: Axial: #Cycles:

Material: Thickness:

o Groove/ Counter Bore: Please list dimensions in Groove Details section o ANSI Raised Face Size: # Rating: Face Surface Finish: (RMS) o Flange(s) with Clamping System: (ISO,KF, etc) Standard: Size:

o Other:

Description:

(Please Provide Drawing)

GROOVE DETAILS: (Please Provide Drawing) ype (Rectangular, Dovetail, etc.):

Outer Diameter: Tolerance: Depth: Tolerance:


I Inner Diameter: Tolerance: Finish (RMS) Type:

Finish Type: lathe (circular), endmill (multi-directional), other BOLTING DETAILS: (Please Provide Drawi ng)

Size: ype / Grade:

Number: _ _ _ _ Bolt Circle _ _ __ apped / T hrough:

OTHER:

Special coating/ plating specification:

Special quality/ inspection specifications:

Other: