ML18040B046
| ML18040B046 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Susquehanna  |
| Issue date: | 03/16/1984 |
| From: | Curtis N PENNSYLVANIA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| To: | Schwencer A Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| PLA-2138, NUDOCS 8403220102 | |
| Download: ML18040B046 (169) | |
Text
SSES-FSAR 6.2.4.3.3
~ ~ ~ Evaluation Against General Design Criteria 56 6.2.4.3.3.1 Containment Purge The drywell and suppression chamber purge lines have isolation capabilities commensurate with the importance of safely isolating these lines. Each line has two normally closed, air opened, spring closed valves located outside the primary containment.
Containment isolation requirements are met on the basis that the purge lines up to the outboard isolation valves are normally closed, low pressure lines, constructed to the same quality standards as the containment. The iso3.atiori valves for the purge lines are interlocked to preclude opening of the valves while a containment isolation signal exists as noted in Table 6.2-12 and fail closed on loss of electrical signal with the following exceptions:
After a time delay of 45 minutes, a manual override of the LOCA isolation is available usingrthe valve hand switches on the following valves: HV-15713, HV-15703, SV 15737'V 15767I SV 15768I SV 25789 HV 15705/
HV-15711, and SV-15738.
- 2. Target Hock valves, SV-.15742A,B; SV-15740A,B; SV-15752AIB SV 15750AgB SV 15774AIB SV 15776AIB SV 15734A,B; SV-15736A,B; SV-15782A,B and SV-15780A,B can be opened 10 minutes after receipt of a LOCA isolation signal by using the valve hand switches.
Screens are provided on the drywell inlet and outlet purge lines.
The purpose of the screens is to prevent debris generated by an accident, such as a pipe break, from entering the purge lines and preventing the containment isolation valves from closing. The screen is an expanded metal mesh with openings of .750 by 1.687 inch. The screens are safety related components designed to withstand the design basis earthquake.
Purge line debris screens are not required in the wetwell since the wetwell contains no high energy lines or insulation.
Additionally, there is no mechanism that would allow debris, such as insulation from the drywell, to reach the penetrations in the wetwell before the containment isolation valves close.
Therefore, debris screens have been provided in the drywell only.
6.2-57 8403220102I
TABI/E 6.2-12 CONTAINHBIT PENETVATION DATA PRI SECOND- LENGIH F.. NARY ARY CLO ACTVA- PIPE PIPE NRC S. ACIVA- ACIUA- POHER VAI.VE AR VALVE VALVE I'OS ITION SURE TION TO PENEIRA- SI7E DES. F. VALVi'. Tl ON TION SOURCE lOCA RANCE TYPE SliUI- POMER TINE SI CHAI. Vhi VF.
T ION NO. SERVICE FIUID (IN) CRlT. (30) NIRiBER HETIiOD HEIIIOD (17) TION(13) HENT(12) (I) NORHAL DOL'N FAILS (SECS) (2) (OUIFR) REMARKS i
X-7A Hain Stean Stean 26 55 Ycs IF028A Con- SprLng II/RPSB 0 A GB Open Closed Closed Closed 3-5 (3)(26) and HSIV ICS presscd Air 2 IFOOIB AC Hot Nanua1 II CT Closed Closed Closed As Is 13 (75)(27) 26 IF022A Inst Cas Spring I/RPSA GB Open Closed Closed Closed 3-5 (26)(4)
X-8 Hain Stean Hater 3 55 No IF016 AC Hot Henuel I G GT Open Closed Closed As ls 10'0 (a) 6 Drain 3 IF019 DC Hot Hanual 0 ' GT Open 'losed Closed As Is (a) '
I X-9A Feed Meter Heter 24 55 Ycs 1F032A AC Hot Nenual CK Open Closed As Is 120 17 (14)(ll) end llPCI >
RCIC, end 14 IF006 DC Hot Henna I II 0 8 CI Closed Closed Open As Is 20 X-9S Only RHCU punp 155038 Henual 0 8 GB Closed Closed Closed Closed X-98 Only discharge li013 DC Hot Hanna 1 I 0 8 CI Closed Closed Open hs Is 15 X-9A Only 149020 Hanual 0 8 CB Closed Closed Closed Closed X-9A Only 1F042 DC Hot Hanual I 0 B GB Open Open Open As Is (8) 1F104 AC Hor Hanual I B GB Closed Closed Closed As Is 80 (8)
IF010A Floe CK Open Open (II)(5)
X 10 Stean to Stean 4 55 No IF007 AC Hot Hanua1 11 C CT Open Closed Open As Is 20 (15)
RCIC Turbine IF088 Insr. Ces Spring C I
GT Open Closed Open As Is 20 (k) o'4)(4) (l8)
II'008 DC Hot Henual C CT Open Closed Open As Is 20 (k) (15)
X-1) Stean to Stean 10 55 Yes IF003 DC Hot Henua1 C GT Open Closed Open As ls 50 (I) 0~ (15) liPCI I IF100 Inst Ces Spring C CB 'losed Closed Closed Closed 3 (I) (18)(4)
Turbine 10 IF002 AC Hot Hanual C GT, Open Closed Open hs Is . 50 (I) (15)(4)
X-12 RNR Shut- Hater 20 55 Ho IF008 DC Hot Hanua1 H CT Closed Open Closed As Is 100 (b) 0 doun Supply 70 1F009 AC Hot Hanual H GI Closed Open - Closed hs ls 100 (b)
PSV1F126 Hater RLF Closed Closed Closed (4)
X )3A PJIR Shut- Ma ter 24 55 Ycs 1F015A AC Hot. Henue1 CT Closed Open Open As Is 24 0 ( ll) dovn Return 24 IF050h Flow Spring TCK Closed Open Open (IL)(5)
IF122A inst Cas SprLng I CB Closed Closed Closed Closed . 3
dt TABLE 6.2 12 (Cont'd)
PRI SECOND- ISPCTII llhRY ARY CLO- ACTUA- Pll'E PIPE NRC S. ACYUA ACTUA- POMER VAI.VE AR- VAI.VE VALVE POSITlON SllRE TION TO PENIBRA- SIZE DES. F. VALVE TION TION SOURCE llXA RANGE- TYl'E Sln>T POMER TlNE SIGNAL VAI.VE TION NO. SERVICE FLUID (IN) CRlT. (30) NUBBER HEllK)D HEYNOD (11) TI ON( I 3) BENI(12) (I) NOQNL (Kali LOCA FAILS (SECS) (2) (OUIER) REHARLS X-14 Reactor Mater 6 55 No IF001 AC Hot Hanual I I 0 CI'pen Open Closed As la 30 (c)
Mater Clean 6 IF004 DC Not Hanual ll 0 C CT Open Open Closed As Is 30 (c3 > I 0 Up Supply X-16A Core Spray Mater 12 12 55 Yes IF005A IF006A AC Hot I'lov Hanna l I I
N N
CT TCK Closed Closed Closed Closed
.Open Open As Is 12 0 'll)
(11)(5)
IF037A Inst Gas Spring, I I N GS Closed Closed . Closed X-11 RPV Bead Mater 6 55 No IF023 DC Hot Hanual II U GS Closed Open Closed As Is 20 (4'0 Spray 6 IF022 AC Hot Hanual I U GZ Closed Open Closed As Is (dl I
X-19 Instruocnt N /hir 3 56 No SV12651 AC Coll I GB Open Open Closed Closed '2 FIG Gas H x 126074 Flov I CK Open Open Closed X 21 Instruocnt N /Air ~ 1 56 Yes SV126548 DC Coil I GB Open Open Open Open Gas H x 126152 Flow I CK Open Open Open X-23 Closed Cooling Mater 4 56 No BV11314 AC Hot Hanua1 I 0 2 GT Open Closed Closed As Is 30 FI G Mater Supply BV11346 AC Hot Hanual II I 2 GT Open Closed Closed As Is 30 F,G X 24 Closed Cooling, Mater 4 56 No BV11313 AC Hot Hanual I Open Closed Closed As Is 30 F,C Mater Return BV11345 AC Hot Hanual II Open Closed Closed As Is 30 F, G X-25 Dryvell Purge Air/82 24 56 No BV15722 Coop Alr Spring, I(IB) 0 BF Closed Closed Closed Closed 30/15 B,F>R 0 (4)(32)
Supply 24 BV15723 Coop Air Spring II 0 Y BF Closed Closed Closed ,Closed 30/15 B >FIR 14 (8)(32) 6 BV15721 Coop Air Spring II Y SF Closed Closed Closed Closed 6 B I FIR 18 BV15724 Coop hlr Spring II Y BF Closed Closed Closed Closed 19/15 B>F,R 10 (8)(32)
X-26 Dryvell Purge Air/N 24 56 No BV15713 Coop Air Spring 1(IS) 0 E BF ," Closed Closed Closed Closed 30/15 B>F,R 0(4) (22) 45 oln.(32)
Return (23) NS-) 1508AA (24)BS 15713A 24 BV15714 Coop Air Spring 11 0 E SF Closed Closed Closed Closed 30/15 B,F,R (32)
~
BV15711 'oop Air Spring, II 0 E CS Closed'losed Closed Closed 5 'IF>R (21) 45 oln.
(23)15-17508SA (24)BS-1571IB
TABLE 6.2-12 (Cont'd) l'R I- SECOND IJ2tGIll E. NARY ARY CLO ACIUA- PIPF.
PIPE NRC S. ACIUA- ACIUA Ã>tER VALVE AR VALVE VAI.VE POSlTION SURE TION TO I'FHETR- SIZE DES. F, VALVE T ION TION SOURCE MCA- RANGE- TYPE SIIUT POWER TINE SICNAL VALVE ATI NO. SERVICE FLUID (IN) CRlT. (30) NUNBER NEIllOD tKTIIOD (17) TION(13) tK!tT(12) (1) NORt!AL lan LOCh FAILS (SECS) (2) (OUIER) RFJIARKS X-35A TIP Drivers 3/8 56 No J004 AC Coll I None 0 M BL Closed Closed Closed As Is 5 A, F 2'70)(21) and C J004 AC Expto I(one 0 W Shear Open Open Open Open I - 2'20)(2l) thru F sion X-37A>B CRD Insert. Mater 1 55 Yes (19)
C>D X-38A>B CRD Wlthdraval Mater 3/4 55 Ycs (19)
C,D X-39A Dryvell Mater 12 54 Yes IF016A AC )lot Hanual D CB Closed Closed Closed As Is 90 F,G 7'6)(11)'
Spray 41 Instruocnt N /hir I 56 Yes SV12654A DC Coll I CB Open Open Open Open Cas Hfx 126154 F lov CK Open Open Open X-42 Standby Water 1-1/2 55 Yes IB)06 AC tlot Nanual I 0 K GCK Open Open -
Open hs Is 34 6~
Liquid IF007 F lov I K CK Closed Closed Closed 16'>>)
Control X-53 Chilled Water Mater 8 56 No IIV1878181 Coop Air Spring L GT Open Open Closed Closed 40 Supply "8" NV18787AI Inst Cas Spring L Bf Open Open Closed Closed 6, F>C X-54 Chilled Water Mater 8 56 No tlV1878I 82 Co>>p Air Spring 0 L GT Open Open Closed Closed 40 F>G Return "Bv llV18782A2 Inst Cas Spring I L BF Open Open Closed Closed 6 F>C X-55 Chilled Water Mater 8 56 No IIV18781AI Coop Air Spring L GT Open Open Closed Closed 40 F,C Supply "A" llv1878281 inst Cas Spring L BP Open Open Closed Closed 6 F>G X-56 Chilled 'Water Water 8 56 No tlV18781A2 Coop Air Spring Open Open Closed Closed 40 F,C Return "Av ttVI878282 Inst Gas Spring Open Open Closed Closed 6 X 6>OA Saoplc 6 I 56 Yes SV15740A AC Coil Spring I Q GB Open Open Closed Closed I B>F (22) 10 Hln.
Anal yxer SV15750A AC Coll Spring I 0 CB Open Open Closed Closed I B,F (27) 10 Nin.
SV15742A AC Coll Spring I 0 CB Open Open Closed Closed 1 B>F (22) IO ttln.
SVI5752A 'C Coll Spring I 0 GB Open Open Closed Closed I B,F (22) 10 Hln.
TABLE 6.2-12 (Cont 'd)
PRI- SKrAV>D- .~,. IENCItt E. tlARY ARY CLO- . ACTUA- Pt I'5 PIPE NRC S ACTUA ACTI>A- POWER VALVE AR- VALVE VALVE POSITIOtt SURE TION TV PFydt IRAZ SlZE t>K9. F VALVE TIO:I TION SOURCE LOCA- RhtiCE TYPE SIIU1- POWER TlttE SICNAL VALVE TION ttO. SERVICE FLUID (IN) CRIT. (30) NUttBKR tKIltOD HKIttOD (17) TION(13) HKNT(12) (I) NORtlAI, DOWN MCA FAILS (SECS) (2) (OUIKR) RFUIARKS X 60A Reclrc Puop Water 1 55 No XVlt017A , Ftnv SB XFC Open Open Open 0 (20) "5>'atvcs o I
Seal Water IF013A F few 88 CK Open Open Open (20) pcnctrnti>>n Supply X 3lB X 608 Saople & Water 3/4 55 No IF019 Inst Cas Spring I Q CB Closed Closed, Closed Closed 2 ',C Analyzer 1F020 Coop Afr Spring II CB Closed Closed Closed Closed 2 B>C 2'-6th Deofn. Water Water 1 56 No 141018 Hanual CB Closed Closed Closed Closed 141017 its nual CB Closed Closed Closed Closed X.GIA ILRT Leak 1 56 No InM. ttanua I CB Closed Closed Closed Closed 157193 (Unit I) 257200 (Unit 2)
Verification Outbd. Hsnual 0 ~ CB Closed Closed Closed Closed 157194 (Unit 1) 257199 (Unit 2)
X 72A Kqufpoent Water 3 56 No BV16116Al Coop hir Spring 1 O(18) F CT Closed Closed Closed Close4 15 B,F Drain ttV16116A2 Coop Afr Spring Il 0 F CT Closed Closed Closed Closc4 15 8>F X-718 Floor Drain Water 3 56 No BV16108A1 Coop Alr Spring I 0(18) F CT Closed Closed Closed Closed 15 8>F ttv16108A2 Coop hlr Spring 11 0 F CT Closed Closed Closed Closed 15 B>F X BOC tt 0 Analyzer Cas 1 56 Yes SV157508 AC Coil Spring II 0(18) 'CB Open Open Closed Close4 "
1 8>F (22) 10 Ntn.
& Dry>>ef I N ttakeup SV151408 AC Coll Spring 11 0(IS) CB Open Open Closed Closed 1 8>F (22) Iu tttn.
SV15776P. AC Coll Spring Il 0(IB) Q CB Open Open Closed Close4 1 B,F,R (22) 10 Nln.
(24) HS 157365 SVI 57425 AC Coil = Spring 11 CS . Open Open Closed Closed I B,F (22) 10 Hfn.
SV157525 AC Coll Spring II CB Open Open Closed Closed 1 B>P (22) IO Htn.
SVI57748 AC Coll Spring II CB Open Open Closed > Closed 1 B,F (22) 70 ttln.
SVI 5761 AC Coil Spring II CB Closed Closed Closed Close4 1 B,F,R (27) 45 Hln.
X-85A Chilled Water Water 3 56 No ttV18191AI Coop hir Spring I 0 L CT Open Closed Closed Closed 15 5>F to Rccfrc IIV1879251 lnr.t Cas Spring II I I. SF Open Closed Closed Closed 4 B>F Puop A X-855 Ct>filed Water Water 3 56 No tlV1879 IA2 Coop Alr Spring I L CT Open Closed Closed Closed 15 B>F froo Reclrc ttVI879282 Inst Cas Spring II L SF Open Closed Closed Closed 4 B>F Puop A
TABLE 6 ~ 2-1? (Cont'd)
FR)- S FAX}HD LEHCT) I NARY ARY Clh}- ACTUA- Pl)'f.
Pl)'8 HRC S. ACIUA ACIUA- POWER VALVE AR- Vhl VE VALVE POSITION SURE ~ T ION Tl>
PENETRA- Sl EE DES. F. VALVE T ION T ION SOURCE LOCA RANCE- TYPE Sl IUT- P(X}ER TI}K SIGNAL VALVE TION ho SERVICE FLUlD (IN) CRIT. (30) NUHBER tKTI}OD HEI)ID (17) T)OH(13) HENT(12) (1) NOR}IAL DOL'N FAILS (SECS) (2) (OUTER) REHARKS X.86A Ct>f t)cd Water Water 3 56 Ho l}V)879)B1 Crap Alr I Spring 11 0 CT Open Closed Closed Closed 15 S,F 0 to Reclrc HV1879?AI Inst Cas Spring I I L I'F Open Closed Closed Closed 4 S,f Punp B X 868 Chilled Water Water 3 56 No t}V)879)B2 Coop Afr Spring ll 0 L GT Open Closed Closed Closed 15 B,F 0 Iron Recfrc HV18792A2 Inst Cas Spring I I L BF Open Closed Closed Closed 4 B,F Poop B X 87 N /Afr 2 '56 Ho SV12605 AC Coil Spring CB Open Closed Open Closed I FIG 0 (4)
X.888'nstruoent Cas Return H x HV12603 AC Hot Hanua I CB Open Closed Open As ls 20 F>G l
tl202 Anal f acr Gas I 56 Yes SV-15776A Coup Air Spring 0()S) CS Open Open Closed Closed B,F 0 (22) 10 Hin ~
& Ctat. Rad. I 56 Yea SV-15774A Coap hlr Spring I 0 GB Open Open Closed Closed 1 B IF (22) 10 Hln.
Det. Return I X-93 TIP Instruocnts N /Air 1 56 Ho SV12661- AC Coll Spring I 0 AA CB Open Closed Closed Closed 1 B>F
}t x 126072 Flu>I I AA CK Open Closed X-20)A Suppression hfr/H2 18 56 Ho HV15725 Ccap Air Spring I 0(IB) Y BF Closed Closed Closed Closed 19/15 S,F,R 0 (4)(32)
Chaobcr 18 HV15724 Coop Air .
Sprtng 11 0 Y SF Closed Closed Closed Closed 19/15 S>F>R 10 (8)(32)
Purge 6 HV1572) Ccap hir Spring II 0 Y BF Closed'losed Closed Closed 6 B,F>R (8)
Supp)F 24 HV15723 Coop Alr Spring II 0 Y SF Closed Closed Closed Closed 30/15 B >FIR )4 (8)(32)
X 202 Suppression Alr/N 18 56 Ho HV) 5703 Ccap Air Spring 0(I 8) 8 BF Closed Closed Closed Closed )9/15 S,F,R 0 (22)45 Nln. (37)
Chaober (24)HS 15703A Purge (23)HS-I 750})AA Exhaust 18 HV)5704 Coop Air Spr H>g II 0 BF Clo~ed Closed Closed Closed 19/15 B,F,R 15 (32)
HV15705 Coap Air Spring II 0 CS Closrd Closed Closed Closed 5 B>F>R (22) 45In. (23) }5-)750}>t'A (24)l}S )57053 X-20)h RHR Poop Water 24 56 Ycs IF004A AC ttot }lanual I IO CT Open Closed Open hs Is 123 0 (4)(6)(29) Suction X 204A RHR Puop Water 18 56 Ycs IF028A AC ttot Ha nun 1 I 0 X GT Closed Closed Closed As Is 90 F,G 24 (8)(6)(II)(28) Test Line & Stean Conden- 4 Ho 1F01)A AC ttot Hanual I 0 X GT Closed Closed Closed hs Is 23 F>G 150 (8)(6)(ll) sing Reclrc.
TABID 6.2-12 (Cont'd) PRI SECOND- IXtIGIII E. NARY ARY CLO- ACIUA- PIPE nrE NRC S. ACTUA- ACTUA- POWER VALVF. AR- VALVE VALVF. POSlTION SURE T I ON TO PENEIRA-'ION SIZE DES ~ F. VALVE TION T ION SOURCE LOCA- RANGE- TYPE SNUT- POWER TINE SI(2IAL VALVE NO. SERVICE FLUID (IN) CRIT. (30) NIRIBER MEIIIOD HEIMOD (17) TION(13) Pd?II(12) (I) NORMAL DOWN )ABACA Fhl LS (SECS) (2) (OUIER) RDIARKS X-205A Containncnt Water 18 56 Ye@ 1FO?8A AC Hot I Manual I X CY Closed Closed Closed As Is 90 F,G (8)(6)(ll) (28) Spray 4 No IFO IIA AC Hot Manual I X GT ~ ClOSCcl (:) CISCd CIOSed ~ AS Ia 23 F,G 137 (8)(6)(11) X-206A Core Spray Water 16 56 Ycs IF001A AC Hot Hanual I 0 GT Open Open Open As Is 83 - 0 (4)(6)(ll) Pusp Suction X-20?A Core Spray Water 10 56 Yes IF015A AC Not Manual I R CB Closed Closed Closed As Is 60 F, G 0 (4) (6) (11) Punp Test 6 Flush X 208A Core Spray Water 3 56 Yes IF031A AC Hot Manual I Closed Closed As Is 20 (4)(6)(11) Pusp Nin. Recirc X 209 NPCI Pusp Water 16 56 Yes IF042 Manual II 0 GT Closed Closed Open As Is 90 (1) 0 (4)(16) Suction X-210 MPCI Turb Stean 20 56 Yes 1F066 DC Hot Manual II 0(IB) M GT Open Open Open .As Is 0 (4)(5)(9) Exl canst IF049 Flov 0 N CK Closed Closed Open X-211 Ml'CI Puap 'Water 4 56 Yes IF012 DC Hot Hanua1 II 0(18) H GT Closed Closed Closed As Is 10 0 (I ) Nln. Recirc IF046 Flov 0 H CK Closed Closed Closed (5)(9) X-214 RCIC Pusp Water 6 56 No IF031 Manual I Cy GT Closed Closed Open As Is 35 (4)(16) Suction X-215 RCIC Turb Stean 10 56 No IF059 DC Not Na nun l I 0(IB) Open Open Open As Is 60 0 (4) Exhaust IF040 Flov 0 Closed Clos~ed Open (5)(9) X-216 RCIC Punp Later 2 56 No IF019 DC Hot Manual I 0(18) H CB Closed Closed Closed hs Is (4) Res ice IFO? 1 Flew 0 N CK Closed Closed Closed (5)(9) X-217 RCIC Vacuun Alr 2 56 No I F060 DC Hot H.snual I 0(IB) M CB Open Open Open As ls 25 (4) I'uap Dlsclc I FO?8 Flew 0 M CK Closed Clolled Open (5)(9) X 218 Instruacnt N I 56 No SV12671 AC Coil Spring I 0 CC GB Closed Closed Closed Closed B,F Cas 126164 Flew 0(18) CC CK Closed Close'd Closed (9)(5) X 22IA M 0 Anaiyccr, I 2/hir I 56 Yes SV15780A AC Coil Spring I CB Open Open Closed Closed B,F (22) 10 Nin. (11-Unit, 2 Only) Ctnt. Rad Dct., H(x SV1578?h AC Coil Spring I Q GB Open Open Closed Closed B,F (22) 10 Nln. Sasple Pts (11-Unit 2 Only)
TABLE 6.2-12 (Cont'd) PRI- SECOND- IJAGIII
}!ARY ARY CLO- ACTUA PIPE PIPE NRC S. ACTUA ACIUA- POWER VALVE AR- VALVE VALVE POSlTION SURE TION TO PENETRA- SIZE DES ~ F. Vhl VE TION TION SOURCE USA- RANGE TYPE SllUT POWER TINE SIGNAL VALVE SERVlCE FLUID (IN) CRIT. (30) HETlkO (17) TION(13) HFJlT(12) ( I) (2)
'10N NO. NUBBER HETiiOD NORHAL DOWN LOCA FAILS (SPAN) (OUIER) RF31ARKS X 226A RNR Hln. Mater 6 54 Yes IFOOIA AC Hot Hanna 1 I R CT Open CI nxcd Closed As Is 32.5 - 0 (6)(4)(11)
Recirc X-233 8 0 Analyzer, N /Alr 1 56 Ycs SVI 51828 AC Coll Spring Il 0 CB Open Open Closed Closed I B,F (22) 10 Nln. (Unit I Ctnt. Rad Det., Hlx SV157808 AC Coll Spring II 0(18) GB Open Open Closed Closed I B,F (22) 10 Hln. Only) Sssple Pts X 238h N 0 Analyzer N /Air 1 56 Ycs SV15736A AC Coll Spring I GB Open Open Closed .Closed 1 B>F (21) 10 Nin. Return, Ctnt. H x (24)NS 15136A Rsd Det. 6 Poet- SV15734A AC Coll 'pring I GB Open Open Closed Closed I B,F' (22) IO Hln. Accident Sasple X-23SB N 0 Analyzer 6 N/Afr 1 56 Yes SV157348 AC Coll Spring 11 0(18) DP GB Open Open Closed Closed I 8>F (22) 10 llln. Ctnt. Rad Det. Hfx Yes SV157348 AC Coll Sprfng II 0 I)D GB Open Open Closed Closed I 8>F>R> (22) 10 Hln. Return and LNG Hakcup No SV15131 AC Coll Spring 11 DD GB Closed Closed Closed Closed B>F,R (22) 45 Hln. X-243 . Suppression Mater 6 56 Nn NV15766 -AC Hot Nsnual I 0(IB) S GT Closed Closed Closed As Is 35 A,F 0 (4) Fool Cleanup NV15768 DC Ilot Hanna 1 11 0 S GT Closed Closed Closed As Is 30 AF 1 6 Drain X-244 MPCI il /Air 3 56 Yes IF079 DC Hot Hanua1 I 0(ig) P GT Open Open Open As Is 15 F,L 8 0 (4) Vacuun H x IF075 DC Hot Hanual II 0 P GT Open Open Open As Is 15 F,L 8 7 Breaker I X 145 RCIC Vacuun hir/N 2 56 No IF084 DC Hot Hanual II 0(IB) P GT'pen Open Open As Is 10 F>K 8 (4) Breaker IF062 DC Hot Hanual I 0 P GT Open Open Open hs Is 10 F>K 8 X-246A RNR Relief Mater/ 8 56 Yes PSVIFOSSA Mater J RLF . Closed Closed Closed (6)(11) Valve Dls Stean/ Press charge hir/Gas 1 PSV15106A Mater 0 J RLF Closed Closed Closed (6)(11) Presr. NVlFIOIA AC Hot itious l I 0 J GB Closed Closed Closed As Is (e)(4)(11)(3i) PSVIF097 Mater J RLF Closed Closed Closed X-2468 only Pressure
I SSES-FS AR TABLE 6.2-12 QContinuedp NOTES PAGE 8 Va l ve Tyne Ball BL Butterfly BF Check CK Gate GT Globe GB Globe Stop Check GCK Pressure Relief RLF Testable Check TCK Excess Flow Check XFC Explosive (Shear) SHEAR Isolation Signal Codes All power-operated isolation. valves 'are capable of beinq operate d. remote-manually from the control room. Automatic isolation siqnals are listed and described below: Siana1 DescriDtion Reactor Vessel Rater Level Low Level 3 Feactor Vessel Mater Level Low Level 2 t<ain Steam Line Radiation High D Hain Steam Line Flow Hiqh EA Reactor Building Steam Line Tunnel Temperature -" High EB Reactor Building Steam Line Tunnel D'ifferential Temperature Hiqh F.C Turbine Building Steam Line Tunnel Temperature - High Drvwell Pressure Hiqh G Reactor Vessel Rater Level Low, Low, Low Level I Standby Liquid Control System Manual Ini,.iation JA RWCS Differential Flow High RRCS Different'al Pressure High RCIC Steam Line Pressure High
SSES-FSAR TABLE 6. 2-12 /Continued) NOTES PAGE 9 Sianal Descr i at ion KB BC IC . S team 'Supply P ressure Low KC RCIC Turbine Exhaust Diaphragm Pressure High KD BCTC Equipment Boom Temperature Hiqh BCIC Equipment Boom Temperature High KF RCIC Pipe Routing Area Temperatu"e H'gh RCIC Pipe Routing Area Temperature High KH RCTC Emergency Area Cooler Temperature High IA HPCI Steam L ine Pressure High LB HPCI Steam Supply Pressure Low LC HPCT Turbine Exhaust Diaphragm Pressure High LD HPCI Fquipment Room Temperature High HPCI Fquipment Boom Temperature - High HPCI Fmerqency Air Cooler Temperature High LG HPCI Pipe Routing Area Temperature High HPCI Pipe Routinq Area Temperature High RHR Equipment Area Differential Temperature High MB BHP. Fquipment Area Temoerature - High MC RHR System Flow High p Tu"bine First Stage Pressure Low SGTS Exhaust Radiation High UA Ma n Condenser Vacuum Low UB Reactor Vessel Pressure High
h SSES-P SAR TABLE 6.2-12 /Continued} NOTES PAGE 10 Sianal Description WA RHCS .Area. Temperature High RHCS Area Ventilation Differential Temperature High Isolation Actuation Groupings (a) . B, C, D, EA, EB, ECg pg UA (b) Ag MAg MB~ MC~ UB (c) 8,. JA~ OB, RA, RB (d) A, P, MA/ MB@ MC, UB (k) KA/ KBg KCg KDg KEg KF~ KGg KH (1) LA LBg LCJ LDJ LEg LPg LG~ LH Test pressure is less than operating pressu e see Sec+ion 6.2.6. Test pressure is applied .in reverse direction. Unassisted check valve is used as one containment boundary. Fxternal piping system provides one containment boundary. Intentionally deleted. Valve 'solates two piping penetrations. Exemotion required for check. valve outside containment. Intentionally deleted. enetration data is identical with 'A'ene "ation data bu+ with 'B'uffix except that, where applicable, power for 'A'- penetration 'solation valves are supplied from Division I power and power for 'B'enetration isolation valves are supplied from Division IT. See Piaure 6.2-QQ. Letters in this column refe to details in the figure.
SSES-PSAR TABLE 6.2-12 /Continued} NOTES PAGE (13) For valve location, I indicates a valve inside the primary containment: 0 ind'ca+es a valve outside the primary containment. (IB) 'indicates thy i.nboard of two or more series isolation valves loca+ed outside the containment. (14) Check valve closed on reverse flow ' feedwater is not available. Closure may be assisted remo+e-manually with motor-operator. (15) Val've does not receive a LOCA siqnal but does receive a closure siqnal. (k or 1) for a break in the steam line to the turbine. (16) Opens on condensate storaqe tank low level or suppression pool hiqh level, and system isolation signal is not present. (17) For air or qas operated valves, the powe source listed is for the associated solenoid valve. (18), These valves do not receive an isolation siqnal but they cannot be opened when a stea m line break signal (k or 1) is open. I (19) No conta'nment isolation valves are prov'ded. For explanation, refer o Subsection 4. 6.1. (2o) The con+a'ment isolation. scheme for this penotration has been analyzed "on some o" her defined basis" than CDC 55. 'See S ub sec t ion 6. 2. 4. 3. 2. (21) Isolation of the Traversinq Incore Probe (TIP) guide tube 's accomplished no mally be a solenoid-op rated ball valve when the TIP cable is withdrawn. The PxDlos ve (shear) valve is fired only when-the cable jams in the inser.ed position. (22) Interlock of the valve is designed to close upon LOCA signal hu+t can be reopened after noted t'me (See 7.3.1 . lb. 1. 3 and 6.2.4.3.3. 1) . (23) Interlock of the valve is designed to close upon LOCA siqnal, hut that siqnal can be bypassed and "he valve c an be reopened bv note5 handswitch (HS) . LOCA bypass has no effect on H. H. Radiation
~
closure and H. H. Radiation override has no effect on LOCA closure. (2") Interlock of the valve is designed to close upon high radiation siqnal from the Standby Gas Trea+ment System exhaust, but that signal can be overridden and the valve reopened by noted handsw'ch (HS) . LOCA bypass has no effect on H. H. Radiation closure and H. H. Rad Override has not effect on LOCA closure.
SSES-FSAR TABLE 6.2-12 (Continued) NOTES PAGE 12 (25) MSIVLCS isolation valves E32-F001 B, F, K & P are controlled by combf.ned logic of MSIV position, time, and RPV pressure. The valve is normally-closed and locked out when the RPV pressure is greater than 35 psig or the inboard MSIV is not closed. (26) Data in table for A penetration and valve also applies to B, C, and D penetrations and valves. (27) The MSIVLCS isolation valves associated with steam lines A, B, C and D are E32-F001 B, F, K and P respectively. (28) These valves can be opened post-LOCA if LPCI injection valve Ell-F015 'is closed or by manual isolation signal bypass, E11A-S18. (29) "C" penetration data is identical to "A" penetration data but with "C" suffix. "B" and "D" penetration data, is identical to "A" penetration data but with "B" and "D" suffixes and power supplied by Viv. II. (30) Engineered safety features systems are defined in Section 6.0. (31) Valve HV-F103A must be remote-mannually opened when taking liquid samples post-accident. (32) For these valves the first closure time is for Unit 1 valves and second is for the Unit 2 valves.
I' SSES-FS AR exists. The operator may control the BHR sys em manually after ini.iation o use i s capabilities in the other modes of the RHR e system, if the: core is beinq cooled by oth er ECCS., Temperature, flow, pressure, and valve position indicat ions are available in
.he main control room for the operator to assess the IPCI system operation accurately., Valves have indicat ions of full open, in+ermediate, and full closed. posi+ions. Pumps have indications fo- pump running and pump stooped. Alarm and 'dication devices are shown in Fiqures 5. 4-13 and 7. 3-10.
- 7. g. 1. 1a. 1. 6. 11. 3 'et Points Refer +o the Technical Specifications for safety set points.
7.3.1.1a.2 Prima y Containment and Peactor Vessel Isolation Cont"ol Sys+em for NSSS Instrumentation and Con trol s 7.3.1.1a.g.1 System Identification The PCRVICS includes the instrument channels, logics and actuation circuits +ha.. activate valve closing m'chanisms associated with the valves, which, when closed, effect isolation of he p=imary containment or reactor vessel or both. The PCRVICS include the followinq ins rumentation and control, subsystems: (1) Reacto Vessel Low Pate Level (2) Main Steamline - High Radiation (3) Main Steamline Tunnel Hiqh Temperature 6 Diffe"ential Temperature (4) Main Steamlire Hiqh Plow (5) Main Turbine Inlet - Low Steam Pressure (6) D. ywell High Pressure (7) Reactor Hater Cleanup System High Differential Flow (8) Peactor Water Cleanup System- Area High Temperature 8 Differen ial Temperature (9), RHRS Area High emperature'6 Differential,Tempera+ure . I- 3-29
SSES-FSAR I (10) (11) Main Steamline Main Condenser (12) Peactor This system provides Leak Detection Vacuum Trip Hater Cleanup System initiat'on to Hiqh Flow non-NSSS systems as follows: (1) Containment Isolation (See Suhsection 7.3.1.1b.1) (2) Standhy Gas Treatment System (See Subsection 7.3.1.1b. 0) (3) Reactor Buildinq Isolation and HVAC Suppor+ System (See Suhsect'on 7.3.1.1b.6)
.he purpose of the system is to prevent the gross release of radioactive material in the event of a breach in the RCPB by au omatically isolatinq the appropriate pipelines that penetrate the primary containment. The power gene a ion objective of this system is to avoid spurious closure of particular isolation valves as a =esult of sinqle failure. Iden"ification of NSSS and non-!tSSS valves closed hy the PCRVICS is provided in Table 6.2-12.
7,3,1.1a,2,2 System power Sources Power for the system channels and loqics of the isolation control system and main steamline isolation valves are supplied from the two electrical buses that supply the reactor protection system
.r' systems. Each bus has its own motor-generator set and can receive alterna+e oower from the preferred power source. Each bus can he supplied from only one of its powe" sources at any qiven time. Motor-operated isolation valves receive powe" from emerzencv buses. Power for the operation of any two valves moun"ed series 's supplied from separate or different sources.
Inboard solation valves are powered from the Division I ac power source. Outboard isolation valves use' Division II dc power sou rce.
- 7. 3. 1. 1g. g. Q System Rcrgipment Des iver.
Pipelines +hat penetrate the primary containment and drywell and directly communicate with the reactor vessel generally have two isolation valves, one inside the primary con+ainment and one outside the primary containment. These automatic isolation valves are considered essential for protection against the gross release of radioactive material in the event of a breach in the RCPB.
- 7. 3-30
tl SSES-FSAR Power cables run in raceways from the elect "ical source to each motor-operated isolation valve. Solenoid valve power goes from i.s source to the control devices for the valve. The main steamline isolation valve controls 'nclude pneumatic piping, and an accumulator for the qas operated valves as 'the emergency mo+'e power source in addition to the springs. Pressure, temperature, and wate" level. sensors are mcun.ed on instrument racks or locally in either the secondary containment or the turbine buildinq. The location of these sensors is shown on FSAR Fiqures 032. 16-1 throuqh 032.16-29. Valve position switches are mounted on mo+or and qas-operated valves. Switches are encased to protect them from environmental conditions. Cables from each senso are routed in raceways to the control structu e. All siqnals transmitted to the ma'n control room are electrical; no oipinq from the reactor pressure coolant boundary penetrates the main control room. The sensor cables and power supply cables are routed to cabinets in the control or electrical eguipment rooms, where the sensor siqnals and supplied power are arranged accordina to system loqic requirements.
- 7. 3. 1,18. 2. 4 System lnitga+inq Circuits Durinq normal plan operation, the isolation control system sensors and trip controls that are essential to safety are enerqized. Hhen abnormal conditions are sensed, contacts in the trip logic initiate isolation. Loss of both power supplies also initiates isolation.
Each main steaml'ne 'solation valve is fitted with two control solenoids. For any valve to close automatically, both of its solenoids must be deene qized." Fach solenoid receives inputs from +wo logics; a siqnal from either can deenergize the solenoid. Fo" the main steamline isola ion valve control, four instrument channels are prov'ded fo" each measured variable. The four channels (A, B, C, and D) are independent and separate. One ou put of .he Channels A and C logic actuators control one solenoid in both the inboard and outboard valves of all four main steamlines. One output of the Channels B and D log'c actuators control +he other solenoid in both inboard and outboa d valves for all four main steamlines. The main steamline drain valves and inboard valves close two of the main steamline isolation logics are tripped, and the if outboard valves close if the other two logics are tripped. 7~3 3 1
II h l> i
SSES-FSAR TheI reactor water c3eanup system and RHR system isolation valves t are each con.rolled by two logic circuits; one for the inboard valve and
~ a second for the outboard valve.
7.3. 1.1a.2.4.1 Iso/a+'n Functions and Settings The isolation trip settings of the PCRVXCS a e lis+ed in Table 7.3-5. The functional control diaqram (Fiqure 7.3-8) illustrates how these siqnals initiate closure of isolation valves. 7.Q. 1.1a.g.4.'1. 1 Reactor Vessel Low Pater Level 7,3,1. 1a,2,4,1,1,1 Subsystem I dent ificat ion low water level in the reactor vessel could indicate that reactor coolant is beinq lost through a breach in the RCPB and that the core is in danqer of becoming overheated as the reactor coolant 'nventory diminishes. Reactor vessel low water level initia+es c3osure of various valves. The closure of these valves is intended to isolate a breach in any of the pipelines in which the valves are contained, conserve reactor coolant by closirrg off prccess lines, or prevent +he escape of radioactive materials from the pr'mary containment .hrouqh process 1'nes that communicate with he primary containment interior. Th ee reac..o.. vessel low water level isolation t ip se" tinqs are used to complete the isolation of the primary containment and the reactor vessel. The first low water level settinq (which is the HPS low water level scram setting, Low Level 3) is selected to initiate isolation at the earliest indication of a possible breach in the reactor coolant pressure boundary, yet far enough below normal operational levels to avoid spurious isolation. Isolation of the followinq pipelines is initiated when reactor vessel low wa.er ,level falls to Level 3: (l), RHR-Reactor Vessel head spray (2) Rf(R shutdown cooling suction (3) TEP quide tube (4) Non-NSSS system isolat ion as described in Subsection
- 7. 3. 1. 1h.
7 ~ 3 32
SSES-FSAR The second (and lower) reactor vessel low water level isolation setting (the same water level setting at which the RCIC system is placed in operation, Low, Low Level 2) is selected low enough to allow the removal of heat from the reactor for a predetermined time following the scram and high enough to complete isolation in time for ECCS operation in-the event of a large break in the RCPB. Isolation of the following pipelines is initiated when the reactor vessel water level falls to Level 2: ! (1) Main steamlines (2) Main steamline drain (3) Reactor water sample line (4) RNCU system suction (5) Non-NSSS system isolation as described in Subsection
- 7. 3. l. lb The third (and lowest) reactor vessel low water level isolation setting (Low Low Low Level 1) is selected low enough to allow operation of those systems which may alleviate the effects of a LOCA inside of containment, yet high enough to allow isolation of those systems when an uncovered core may be imminent. Isolation of the following pipelines is initiated when the reactor vessel water level falls to Level 1:
(1) RHR Drywell Spray (2) RHR Suppression Pool Spray (3) RHR Heat Exchanger= Drain to Suppression Pool (4) Core Spray Test Line (5) Non-NSSS System isolation as described in Section 7.3.1.1b Reactor vessel low water level signals are initiated from indicating type differential pressure switches. One contact on each of four redundant switches per trip system is used to indicate that water level has decreased to Low Level 3; one contact on each of four other redundant switches per trip system are used to indicate that water level has decreased to Low, Low Level 2 or low, low, low level 1 as required. Three instrument lines, one common line above water level and one from each differential pressure switch to the below water level taps, are provided for each redundant, pair of level switches. Each switch pair provides signals into one trip logic. There is a different trip logic for each switch pair. The three lines of each pai:r terminate outside the primary containment and inside 7 ~ 3 33
SS~G-r SAR +he reactor build'~q; they are physically separated from each t and tap of f the reactor vessel at widely separated po'ts. other The reac+or vessel low water level e switches e sense level from +hese pipes. This arrangement assures that no single physical T event can prevent isolation, if required. Cables f rom the level sensors are routed to the con.rol structure. Temperature equalization is used to.increase the accuracy of the level measurements.
- 7. 3. 1. 1g. 2. 4. 1. 1. 2 Subsystem Power Supolies For the power supplies for main steamline isolation valves and other isolation valves, see Figures 7.3-2 and 7.3-3, respectively.
7.3 1.1a.p.4.1.1.$ Subsystem Initiating Circui.s Four level sensinq circuits monitor the reactor vessel water level. One level circuit is associated with each of four logic channels. Pour lo vel switches at two separate locations on the reactor vessel allow the earliest possible detection of reactor vessel low water level. 1 7,3,1,1a.2.4.1.1.4 Subsystem Logic and Seguencing Mhen a significant decrease in reactor water level 's detected, trip sianals are transmitted to the PCRVXCS, which initiates closure of the main steamline isolation valves, main steamline drain valves, RHR process samplinq valve, RHR d'scharge valve to radwaste, reactor ~ater sample valve, and TIP system valves. There are four instrumentation channels provided to assure that pro+ective action occurs when required bu prevents inadvertent isolation resultinq f om instrumentation malfunctions. The output trip signal of each instrumenta ion channel initiates a loqic channel tr'p. Loqic channel trips are combined as shown in Piaures 7.3-2 and 7.3-3. 7.Q. 1,1g,2. 4.1. 1. 5 S>>bsgg",.em Redundancy and Divers Redundancy of trip initiation for each reactor vessel low water level setpoint is provided by four level switches installed at separate locat'ons in secondary containment. Each trip system is 7.3-34
SSKS-PSAR powered from diverse and r'edundant power supplies. ~ Diversity to reactor vessel low water level (level 3) for pipe breaks inside the primary containment is provided by drywell high
~
pressure. RHR leak detection instrumentation provides diversity to reactor vessel low water level for pipe breaks outside of primary containment. No diversity is provided for pipe breaks outside the primary containment for TIP guide tube isolation. Diversity to reactor vessel low low water level (Level 2) which .results in isolation as indicated in Subsection 7.3.1.1a.2.4.1.1.1, for pipe breaks outside the primary containment, is provided by main steamline and RNCS leak detection instrumentation. No diversity is provided for breaks inside the primary containment.- 7,3,1. 1a.g.tl.1. 1.6 Subsystem Rggasses and Inter"ocks The"e are no bypasses for reactor vessel low water level trip. Beac t or vessel e e low wa.er level t trip has r provisions to it in'iate
+he standby qas treae "ment e te sys.em.
- 7. 3. 1. 1a.2. 4.1. 1. 7 Sub~ygt em Teggabilitg Testability 's discussed in Subsections 7. 3. 2a. 2.2. 3.1. 9 and
- 7. 3. 2a. 2. 2. 3. 1. 10.
7.:3
~ g 1.1a.7.0.1.
~ 0 ~ % e 0 7 Nain S eamline Hicrh Radiation
- 7. 3. 1. 1a. g. tI. 1. 7. 1 Subsystem Ident ifica tion Hiqh rad'a.ion in the v'cinity of the main steamlines could indicate a q"oss release of fission products from he fuel. High radiation near the main steamlines initiates isolation of the followinq p'elines:
(1) All main steamlines (2) Nain steaml'ne drain (3) Reactor water sample line 7.3-35
SS FS-FS A P. The hiqh radiav-'on~rip settinq is selected hiqh enouqh above background =adiation levels to avoid spurious isolation, ye low enouqh .o promptly detect a gross release of fission products from the fuel. Refer to Section 11e5 for subsystem description. The objective of the main steamline radiation monitorinq subsystem 's to monitor for the qross release of fission products from the fuel and, upon indication of such release', to initiate appropriate action to limit fuel damage and contain the released fission products. This subsystem c assification is provided in Table 3.2-1.. r 7.8.1.1a.$ .4.1.$ . g Subsystem Power Sources he 120 V ac RPS Buses k and .B are the power sources for the main steamline radiation monitoring subsystem. Two channels are powered from one RPS 'bus and the other two channels are powered f on he other RPS bus.
- 7. 3. 1. 1a. 2. 4.1. 2. 3 Subsist em Init iat in@ Circuits Four gamma-sensitive instrumen ation channels monitor the qross qamma radiation from the main steamlines. The detectors are physically located near the main s eamlines just downstream of the outboard main steamline isolation valves. The detectors are qeometrically arranqed to detect sianificant increases in rad'ation level with any number of main steamlines in operation.
The.r location along the main steamlines allows the earliest practical detection of a qross fuel failure. Fach monitoring channel consists of a gamma-sensitive ion chamber and a loq radia tion monitor, as shown in Fiqure 7. 3-11. Capabili ies of the monitoring channel are listed in Table 7.3-6.. Fach loq radiat.ion monitor has three trip circuits. One upscale trip circuit is used .o ini iate scram, isola+ion, and alarm. The second circui+ is used for an. alarm and is set at a level below that of the upscale trip circuit, used for scram and i olation. The third circuit is a downscale trip that actuates an alarm in the main control room and produces an isolation and scram trip siqnal. The output f"om each log radiation moni+or is
~
displayed on a six-decade meter on back row panel in the main con t rol room. 7,g. 1. 1g.g.4.1. 2.4 Subsystem Logic and Sequencing 7.3-36
SSFS-FSAR When a siqnificant increase in the main steamline radiation level is detected, trip signals are transmitted to the reactor p" otection system, the PCRVICS, and to condenser e air removal t systems. Upon receipt of the high radiation trip signalsi =he RpS initiates a sc am; .he pCRVICS initiate closure oZ- all main steamline isolation valises. II Four instrumentation channels are provided to assure p otective ac" ion when needed and to prevent inadv'ertent scram and isolation resultinq from instrumentation malfunctions. The output trip signals of each monitor'q channel are combined as shown in Fiqures 7.3-2 and 7.3-3. Failure of any one monitoring channel does not result in inadver.ent action. 7.3.1.1g.2.4.1. 2.5 Subsystem By2asses and Interlocks Ho operational bypasses are provided with this subsys em. However, the individual loq radiation monitors may be bypassed for maintenance or calibration by the use o+ test switches on each monitor. Bypassing one log xadiation m'onitor. will not cause an isolation, but will cause a single trip system trip to occur. 'The main steamline radiation monitor isola+'on signals provide i..+erlocks to prev nt operation of the condenser mechanical vacuum pump. 7,3,1,1a.2. 4.1. 2.6 Subsystem Redundancy and Divers'g
- he number of moni.oring channels in this subsystem pzovides the required redundancy and 's verified in the circuit description.
nhe single failure criterion has been met in the design by 9 0
~
vid'nq redundant sensors, channels, division logics and trip sys ems which are seismically and environmentally qualified. The failure of a sinqle component will no. preven the system fro m functioninq in the even- protective action is requ'red. In add ition, a sinqle failure w'll not initiate an isolation fun ction, due to the use of two independent trip systems. 7.3.1.1a.2.4.1. P.7 Testabilitv A bu'lt-in source of adjustable curren. is provided with each log xadiation monitor for test purposes. The operability of each monitorinq channel can he rout'nely verified by comparinq the outputs of the channels during power operation. 7 &3 37
SSES-.FS AR 7.3 1.1a.2.4.1.7.R Fnv~ronmental Considerations I ~ This subsvs em is desiqned and'as been qual'ified to meet the
~ ~
environmental condi ions indicated in Section 3. 11. In addition,
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
~
~
this subsystem has been seismically qualified as described in Sec.ion 3.10a.
- 7. 3. 1. 1z. 2. 4. 1. 2. 9 Qooz ationa1 Considerations In the event of a high or low radiation level trip within any of the channels, the subsystem will automatically activate the
'ppropriate alarm annunciator and provide a mete indication in +he main control room. Similarly, the occurrence of a high-high or an inoperable trip within any of the channels of the system will result in a siqnal beinq sent to the RPS and the PCRVICS.
The panels in the main control room, associated with the PCRVICS, are iden..ified by colored nameplates which indica.e the panel funct'on and iden+ification of the contained logic channels. The only direct. support required for the PCHVICS is the elect ical power system, which is provided from 120 V ac FPS Buses 1'nd B as de,cribed in Subsection 7. 3.1. 1a.2.4.1.2.2 and Chapter 8.0. 7.3.1.1a.2.4.1.3 Main Steamline Tunnel High Temperature and Di ~ ferential Temperature
- 7. 3. 1. 1g. 2. 4.1. 3. 1 Sugisystem Ident ification Hiqh temperature in the tunnel in which the main steamlines are located outside of the primary containment could indicate a breach 'n a main steamline. Also, such a breach may be indicated by hiqh differential emperature between the outlet and inlet ventilat'n air for this steamline tunnel. The automa ic closure of various valves prevents the excessive loss of reactor coolan t and the release of a siqnificant amount of radioact've material from the RCPB. Main steamline tunnel temperatures are monitored
'n h'e Reactor Building and Turbine Building por" ions of the steam tunnel; steam'unnel differential temperature is monitored only in the Reactor Building portion of the s+eam tunnel. Shen hiqh temperatures occur 'n the main steamline tunnel, the followinq pipel'nes are isolated:
(l) Ma in steam).ines
- 7. 3-38
I The main f (2)~'.la-in s eamline drain SSZS-FS steamline tunnel hiqh temperature AR trips are set faz enouqh above the temperature expected durinq operation at rated power to avoid sou vous isolat on, yet low enough to p"ovide early .indication of a steamline break. Hiqh temperature in the vicinity of the main steamlines is detocted by four dual element thermocouples in each portion of he steam tunnel with remote readout in the control room. These hermocouples are located alonq +he main steamlines between the drywell wall and the Reactor Building wall, and between the Turbine Buildinq wall and the turbine. The detectors are located or shielded so +hat they are sensitive to a'r temperature and no the radiated heat from hot equipment. The temperature sensors activate an alarm at h'gh temperature. The main steamline tunnel +emperature detec ion system is designed to detect leaks equivalent to 25 qpm water. A total of four main steamline space hiqh temperature channels are provided in each portion of the steam tunnel. Each main steamline isolation logic receives an input signal from one main steamline Reactor Building tunnel hiqh emperatuze, one Turbine Building tunnel high temperature, and one Feactor Bui1dinq tunnel ventilation high d'ferential te mpe a ture cha nne 1. 7.3 . 1. 1a.2. 4.'1. 3.2 Subsystem Power Supplies For the powe" supplies for the main steamline isolat:on valves and other isolation valves, see Figures 7.3-2 and 7.3-3, respectively. 7,$ ,1,1a,2.4~ 1.3.$ Subsvstom Initiating Circuits Four space and four dif erent'al temperature sensing circuits monitor the Reactor Building main steamline area temperatures. Four space tempera+uze sensinq cizcu'ts monitor the Turbine Building main steamline area temperatures. One space temperature circuit from each por ion of the steam tunnel and one Reactor Buildinq differential temperature circuit is connected to each of four instrumentation channels. Both sets of space temperature elemen.s are physically located near the main steamlines in the ma'n steamline tunnel. The eiqht temperature elements for differential temperature monitorinq are located in the ventilation supply and exhaust ducts for the Reactor Building portion of the main steamline tunnel. The locat'ons of the emperature elements provide the earliest practical detection of ma n 'steamline breaks.
- 7. 3-39
SSES-FS AR 73,1.1a.2.4.1.3.4 Subsystem Logic and Sequencing When a s'nificant increase in main s+eamline tunnel +emperature o- differential +emperature is detected, trip signals are transmitted to the PCRVICS. The PCRVXCS initiate closure of all ma steamline isolation and. drain valves. Four instrumentation channels are provided .o assure protective action when needed and o prevent inadvertent isolation resulting from instrumentation malfunctions. The output trip siqnal of each instrumentation channel 'n'tiates a loqic trip. 'Zhe output trip signals of the logic are combined as shown in Fiqure 7.3-2 and 7. 3-3. Failure of any one logic does not result in inadvertent action. 7.3.1.1g.g.4.1. 3.5 I Suhgysgeg Redundancy and Diversity,
.,edundancy of trip initiation siqnals for high space temperature 's provided by four temperature 'elements ins+alled at different loca 'ons within both po tions of the main steamline tunnel. ..ach dev'ce is associated with one of four logic division's.
Temperature e'lements A and B are supplied from one power source, and C and D are supplied from a'ifferent power source. Redundancy of trip 'itiation siqnals for hiqh differen.-al temperature is p ovided by four temperature element pa'rs ins+alled at d'feren+ locations within the ventilat.on supply and exhaust areas of the Reac or Buildinq portion of the main steamline tunnel. Each pair of temperature elements is assoc'ated with one of four loqic divisions. Diversity of trip initiation siqnals for main steamline break is ,provided by main steamline tunnel temperature, hiqh differential tempe ature, main s.eamline high flow, low p=essure instrumentation and reactor vessel 'low low water level, Level 2. An increase in tunnel temperature, Reactor Building steam tunnel dif feren+ial temperature, ma'n steamline flow, or a decrease in pressure will 'nitiate main steamline and main steaml'ne drain valve 'ola+ion. 7,3,1,1a,7 4.1.3.6 Sghgygtem Bypasses and Interlocks There are no bypasses associa+ed wi+h this subsystem or inte locks to other systems f rom main steamline hiqh space or diffe ential temperatu"e trip.
- 7. 3-40
C, SS FS-FS AR II
- 7. 3. 1. 1a. 2. 4. 1. 3. 7 Subsist em Testa bilitg Testabili.y is discussed in Subsections 7.3.2a.2.2.3.1. 9 and
- 7. 3. 28. 2. 2. 3. 1. 10.
~ ~
7,3. 1,1a.g. 4.1. 4 Hain Steamline High Flow 7,3. 1. 1a. g. 4. 1. 4. 1 Subsystem 1dentif ica ion Main steamline hiqh flow could indicate a break in a main steamline. Automatic closure of various valves prevents excessive loss of reactor coolant and release of significant amounts of radioactive material from the RCPB. On detection of main steaml'ne high ~low, the followinq pipelines are isolated: (l) Hain steamlines (2) Hain steamline drain The main steamline high flow trip settinq was selected h'gh enough to perm't 'solation of one main steamline for test at ra+ed power without causinq an automatic isolation of the other steamlinos, yet low enough to permit early detec+ion of a
".tea mline break.
Hiqh flow in each main steamline is sensed by four indicating type differential pressure switches that sense the pressure dif ference across the flow element in that line.
- 7. Q,1. 1~. 2. 4."I. 4. 2 Subsvstep Powe~ Supplies For power suppl'es, refer to Figures 7.3-2 and 7.3-3.
7.3.1.1a.g.4.1.4.3 Subsystem initiating Circui:s Six een differential pressure sensing circuits, four for each main steamline, monitor the main steamline flow. One differen.ial pressure circuit for each main steamlin. is
- a. sociated with each of four logics. Four differential pressure indicatinq switches are installed on each main steamline and provide .he earliest practical detection of a ma'n steam line break.
- 7. 3-41
fi SS FS-FS AB
- 7. g. 1. 1a. 9. 4. 1. 4. 4 Subsystem Logic a nd Sequencing
~
When a siqnificant increase in main steamline flow is detected, trip siqnals are transmitted to the PCRVICS. The PCRVICS in +iate closure of all main steamline isolation and drain l va vesa Four ins" rumentation loqics are provided to assure protective action when equired and to prevent inadvertent isolation result'nq from instrumentation malfunctions. The output trip signal of each ins rumentat ion channel initiates a logic trip'. The ou.put trip signals of the logics are combined as shown in Fiqures 7. 3-2 and 7. 3-3 in a one-out-of-two-twice and two-out-of-
'wo logics. Loqic A or C and B or D are required to initiate main steamline isola.ion. Logics A and B or C and D are required t o initiate main s eamline drain isolation. Failure of any one loqic does not result in inadvertent action.
7,3,1. 1a. 2. 4.1. 4. 5 Subsystem Redundancy and Diversity
..edundancy of trip initiation siqnals for hiqh flow is provided by four different al pressure switches for each main steamline.
Hach diffe.ent'al pressure s~itch for each main steamline is associated with one of four loqics. Two differential pressure e switches for each main steamline are supplied from one power sou ce .and two are supplied from a'ifferent power source. D'versity of trip initiation siqnals is described ir. Subsection
- 7. 3. 1. 1a. 2. 4. 1. 3. S.
7,3,1,1a.2. 4.1. 4. 6 Subsystem Bypasses and Interlocks There are no bypasses associated with this Subsystem or interlocks to other systems from main steaml'ne high flow trip signals.
- 7. '3. 1. 1g . 2. 4. 1. 4. 7 Subsvstem Testabilitv Testability is discussed in Subsections 7.3.2a.2.2.3.1. 9 and
- 7. 3. 2a. 2. 2. 3. 1. 10.
7 3,1,1a,g,4,1 5 gain Turbine Inlet Low Steam Pressure
- 7. 3,1,1a,p. 4.1. 5.1 Subsystem e t Identification 7.3-42
SS ES-FS AR Low steam pressu e at the turbine inlet while the reactor is operat'q could indicate a malfunction of the steam pressure requlator in which +he turbine control valves or turbine bypass valves become f oily open, and causes rapid depressurization of the reactor vessel. From part-1oad operatinq conditions, the rate of dec ease of saturation temperature could exceed the allowable ra.e of change af. vessel temperature. A rapid depressurization of the reactor vessel while the reactor is near " full power could result in undesirable differential pressures across the channels around some fuel bundles of sufficient magnitude to cause mechanical deformation of channel walls. Such depressurizations, without adequate preventive action, could requ're thorouqh vessel analysis or core inspection pr'" to returning the reactor to power operat'on. To avoid these equ'rements followina a rap'd depressurization, the steam pressure at the turbine inlet is monitored. Pressure falling below. a pre-selected value with the reactor in the BUN mode init'ates isolat'on of the followinq p'elines: (1) Hain s+eamlines (2) Hain steaml'e drain The low steam pressure isolation setting was selected far enough below normal turbine inlet pressures to avoid spurious isolation, yet hiqh enouqh to provide timely de" ection of a pressure reaulator malfunction. Althouqh his isolation function is not reauired to satisfy any of,.the safety desiqn bases for this, system, .he discussion is included to complete the listing of isolation f unctions. (lain steamy ine low pressure is sensed by four bourdon-+ube-opera+ed pressure switches that sense p essure downstream of the outboard main steamline 'solation valves.. The sensinq point is .located at the header that connects the four s+eamlines upstream to .he turbine s.op valves. Each switch 's pa" of an indeDendent channel. Each channel provides a signal to one isolation loqic. 7.3. 1. 1a. 2. 4. 1. 5.? Subsvst em Power SuvDlies P For power supplies, refer to Figures 7.3-2 and 7.3-3. 7.3,1 1a,g,4.1.5.3 Subsystem Tnitiatinq Circuits Fou pressure sensitive circuits, one for each main steamline, monitor main- steamline p essure. One pressure circuit is associa ted wi+ h each of four logics. The locat ions of the 7 ~ 3-4 3
SSES-FSAR oressure switches provide the earliest pract'cal detection of low main steamline pressure.
- 7. 3. 1. 1g. 2. 4. 1. 5. 4 Sub~ygtep Logic and Seguencinq When a siqnificant decrease in main steamline pressure is detected, trip signals are transmitted to the PCRVXCS. The PCRVXCS initiate closure of all main steamline isolation and drain valves.
Four: ns..rumentation channels aze provided .o assure pro+ective action when required a'nd to prevent inadvertent isolation esulting from 'nstrumentation malfunctions. The output trip signal of each ins rumentation channel initiates a logic division trip. The outpu. trip siqnals of the loqics are combined as shown.in Fiqures 7.3-2 and 7.3-3. Failure of any one channel does not result in inadvertent action. il 7,3.1.1a.2.4.1.5.5 Subsystem Redundancy and Diversity Redundancy of trip initiation signals for low pressure is provided by four pressure switches, one for each main steamline. >ach pressure switch is associated with one of four logics. 'Pwo p essure .zansmitters are supplied from one power source and the other two ar'e supplied from a different power source. D'versity of trip initiation signals is described in Subsection
- 7. 3. 1. 1a. 2. 4. 1. 3. 5.
7.$ .1.1a.g.4.1.5.6 Subsystem Bypasses and= interlocks The main s eamline low pressure trip is bypassed by the zeacto" mode swi.ch in the Shutdown, Refuel, and Startup modes of reactor operation. Xn the RUN mode, the low pressu e 'zip function is operative. There are no interlocks to o+her systems for main streamline low pressure trip siqnals. 7~3. 1. 1g. 2. 4. 1. 5. 7 Subsystem Testa bilitg Testability is discussed in Subsections 7.3.2a.2.2. 3.1. 9 and
- 7. 3. 2a. 2. 2. 3. 1. 10.
- 7. 3-44
SS ES-FS AR 7.$ .1.1a.2. 4.1. 6 Conta iLm'n t D rgwell-H igh Pressure Subsystem Identif ica+ ion High pressure in the drywall..could indicate a breach of the RCPB inside the drywell. The automatic clasu".e of va "ious valves prevents the re ease of siqnif icant amounts of radar oact. ve ma..erial from the primary containment. On detection of high drywell oressure, the followinq pipelines are isolated: (1) HPCI, RCIC Vacuum Belief Valves (2) RHR-Reactor Vessel Head Spray Valves (3) Traversing in-core probe quide tubes (") RHR-Drywell, Suppression Pool sprays (5) RHR-Heat Exchanger D ain to Suppression Pool (6) Core Spray Test Line Valve (7) Non-NSSS System isolation valves as described in Subsect'on 7. 3. 1.1b The drywell high pressure isolation setting was selected to be as low as possible without inducing spurious isola tion trips.
- 7. 3. 1. 1a. 2. 4.1. 6. 2 Subsystem Power Supplies For powe" supplies, refer to Fiqures 7.3-2 and 7.3-3.
- 7. ~.1.1a.).4.1.6.3 Suhsystem Initiating Circuits Drywell Pressnre is monitored by locally mounted pressure switches which a e located outside of containment. Three separate sets of pressure swi"ches, consistinq of four s~itches each'ori.or Drywell pressure for various 'solation valves.
Instrument sensing lines connect the switches ~ith the D=ywell interior. All Drywell pressure sensing lines aro wholly contained within the Reactor Building/secondary containment. The swi+ches are divisionally separate such hat no single failure w.'l preven. isolation trip system initiation on high Drywell pressure.
- 7. 3. 1. 1g. 2. 4. 1. 6. 4 Subsist.em Logic a nd Seauencinq
!~hen a siqnif icant increase in drywell pressure is detected, trip signals are transmitted to the PCRVICS. The PCRVICS initiate
- 7. 3-45
It je
SSES-FS AR closure of those system isolation valves identified 'n Subsection 7.3.1.1a.2.4.1.6.1. Four instrumentation channels are provided to assure protective actior. when required and to prevent inadvertent isolat: on resul ina from instrumentation malfunc..ions. The ou+put trip ..iqnals of the instrumentation channels are combined as shown in Fiqures 7.3-2 and 7.3-3. Failure of any one channel does ro+ esult in inadvertent actior..
- 7. 3.1.1g.2.4.1. 6.S - Subsystem Redundancy and Diversity Redundancy of trip .'itiation siqnals for drywell hiqh pressure is described in Subsections 7.3.1.1a.2.4.1.6.3 and
- 7. 3. 1. 1a. 2. 4. 1. 6. 4.
D'ersity of trip iri+iation signals for line breaks inside of +he primary con+ainment is provided by drywell high pressure and reactor low water level. An increase 'n drywell oressure or a 'decrease in reacto" water level will initiate isolatior., except for HPCI and RCIC vacuum rel'ef isolation valves which isolate on Drywell Pressure-high o Reactor Vessel/System Steam Supply low pressure. In these cases, Reactor Vessel low pressure provides the diverse isolation siqnal. 7.3.1.1a.2.4.1.6.6 Subsystem Bypasses and Interlocks There are no bypasses for drywell high pressure trip siqrals. 7,3,1,1a. 2,4. l. 6. 7 Subsystem Testa bility Testability is discussed in Subsections 7.3.2a.2.2.3.1.9 and
- 7. 3. 2a. 2. 2. 3. 1. '1 0.
- 7. 3. 1. 1a. 2. 4. 1. 7 and 7. 3. 1. 1a. p 4. 1. 8 These Subsection numbers were not used.
- 7. 3. 1. 1a. 2. 4. 1. 9 Reactor Hater Cleanup (RHCU) System-High Differential glow and Hiah Plow
- 7. 3. 1. 1a. 2. 4. 1. 9. 1 Suhsvst m Ident ifica. ion 7.3-46
SSES-FSAR Hiqh differential flow or high flow in the reactor water cleanup system could indicate a breach of +he BCPB in .he cleanup system. The RMCU system flow at the inlet to the heat exchanger is compared with the flow at the outlet of the filter/demineralize hiqh flow in the BVCU sucti.on. line is also monitored. High dif erential flow or high flow in'tiates isolation of the cleanup system. 7.3. 1. 1a.2. 0. 1 9. 2 Subsystem'm Power SuDDlies For power supply arrangements, see Figures 7.3-2 and 7.3-3.
- 7. 3. 1. 1a. 2. 4. 1. 9. 3 Subsystem 1nitiatina Circuits Two d' ferentia1 flow sensinq circuits monitor the reac tor water cleanup system flow. One circuit monitors +he flow from recirculation suction to the main condenser and one circuit mon'tors tne flow from recirculation sue+ ion to feedwater system.
Each flow circuit is associated with two instru menta ion channels. The flow transmitters a e located on the line to the main condenser, the line to feedwater, and "he suction line from ,he "eci culat'n system. The locations of the flow transm' ers provide the earliest practical detection of RMC U system line break. .wo high flow (differential pressure switches) sensors monitor the suction line to detect the line break. 7,3. 1. 1a. g. 0. 1. 9. 4 Subsist em T.nomic and Seauenc in'hen a s gnificant increase in reac.or wate= cleanup system differential low or hiqh flow is detected, trip signals are ,ransm'"ed to the PCPVECS. The PCRVECS initiate closure of all >RCU sys+em isolation valves. Two instrumentation channels a e provided to assure protective ac+'n when requ'ed. The output tr' s'qnal of each 'nstrumentation channel initiates a division loqic trip and closu "e of either the inboard or outboard RRCU system isolation valve. 7.3.1.1a.2. 4.1. 9.5 Subsystem e Redundancy e ~ and Diversity~ 7.3-07
JI SSHS-FSAR Hach of two instrumentation channels are supplied from a
~ ~ ~
dif ferent power source. One channel is supplied to inboard logic
~ ~
and the other to outboard loqic. ~ Diversity of trip initiation signals for BMCU system line break
~ ~ ~ ~
is provided by hiqh differential flow, hiqh flow, ambient and differential temperature, mnd Reactor Vessel low, low water level, Level 2. An increase in differential flow, space temperature, differential temperature or low Reactor vessel water level will initiate RWCU system isolation. 7,$ ,1,1a.g,4. 1,9,6 Subgggt,em Bypasses and Interlocks The RMCU system high differential flow trip is bypassed automatically during BMCU system startup by a time delay. There are no interlocks to other systems from reactor water cleanup system hiqh differential flow, or high flow trip signals. 7.3.1.1g.2. 4.1. 9.7 Subsystem Testability ~ -- To.s" abili<<y is discussed in Subsection 7.3.2a.2.2.3.1.10.
- 7. 3. 1. 1a. 2. 4. 1. 10 Reactor Mate Cleanup (RMCU) System-Area High Temperature and Differential Temoerature 7,$ ,1,1g,2.4.1. 10. 1'ubsystem Identification Hiah temperature in <<he area of the RMCU system could indicate a breach in the RCPB in the cleanup system. Hiqh area temperature and hiah differential temperature in +he area ventilation system ini 'ates 'solation of the RMCU system.
- 7. 3. 1.1a.2.4.1. \ 10.
~ & a ~ & ~ 2 Power Suoolies For the power supply arrangements, see Figures 7.3-2 and 7.3-3.
7,1,1,1a,g.4.1. 10. R Subsystem Initiating Circuits S'x . pace temperaturer and six differential temperature sensing circu'ts r monitor hee RMCU system aroa temperatures. Three space 7.3-48
SSFS-FSAR and three differential temperature circuits" are associated wi+h each of two instrumentat'on channels. Redundant space "emperature measurements and inlet and outlet differential
.empera+ures of +he Reactor Water Cleanup pump room, heat exchanqer room and filter demineralizer room are used to detect system line breaks.
- 7. 3. 1. 1a. 2. 4. 1. 10. 4 Subset~ tern Log ic a nd Sequencing When a siqnificant increase in RWCU system area. space or differen..ial temperature 's detected, trip siqna]s are "ransmitted to the PCRVICS. The PCHVICS initiate closuze of all reactor water cleanup system isolation valves.
N Two instrumentation channels are provided to assure protective ac ion when required. The output trip signal of each instrumentation channel initia es a division logic trip and closure of either the inboard or ou+board RWCU system isolation valve. Xn order to close both the inboard and outboard isolation valves, hoth division logics must trip. Protection aqainst inadvertent isolat'on due to instrumentation malfunction is not p o vid ed 7.3.1.1a.2.4.1.=10.5
~ ~ Subsystem Redundancy and Diversity Redundancy of trip initiation signals from high space temperature 's provided by .wo space tempera+ure elements installed in each PWCU system area, and which are associated with one of two division logics.
Redundancy of tzip ini'tiation siqnals for high difXeren ial temperature is provided by four temperature elements in each RRCU system area. Each pair of sensors is associated with one of two division loqics. Diversity is discussed in Subsection 7. 3. 1. 1a.2.4. 1.9.5. 7.3. 1. 1a.2.4. 1. 10.6 Subsystem Bypasses and Inte"locks The RWCU system high space and differential temperature "rips have no automatic bypasses associa+ed with them. The e are no interlocks to other sys ems from the RWCU system hiqh space and differential temperature trip s'qnals. 7.3-49
S SZS-FSAB Subsvstep T'instability 7.3. 1. 1a.2.4. 1. 11 RHF, System.-Area High Temperature and Differential Temperature
- 7. 3. 1. 1a. 2. 4. 1. 11. 1 Subsystem Tdentgfication Hiqh temperature in the area of the BHB system pumps could indicate a breach in the BCPB in the RHB shutdovn cooling system.
High area temperature and hiqh differential temperature in the area ventilation system initia es isolation of the RHB shutdown coolinq system. Hiqh temperature in the spaces occup'ed by the reactor shutdovn coolirq system piping and the BWCU system pipinq outside the drywell is sensed by thermocouples that indica+e possible pipe breaks. Temperature sensors in the equipment area and the inlet and outlet ventilation ducts of the BHB shutdovn cooling system and .he RVCU system will, when a hiqh differential temperature is de..ected, cause isolation. 7.3. 1. 1y. 2. 4. 1. 11. 2 Power Supplies Fo" pover supply ar"angements, see Figures 7.3-2 and 7.3-3. 7.3.1.1a.2. 4.1. 11. 3 Knit iatina Circuits Fou" space emperature and four differential temperature sensing c.'rcuits monitor the BHB system area emperatures. Two space and '.wo differential temperature circuits are associated with each of two inst"umentation channels. The space +empera"ure elements are located in each BHR equipmen+ area. Four pairs of +emperature elements are located in the ventilation supply and the ventilation exhaust of each RHR equipmen+ area. The locations of the temperature elements provides the earliest practical detection of any RHR system line break. Suhsgg+em Logic a nd Sequencing
- 7. 3-50
SSH S-F SAR Hhen a s qnificant increase in RHR system area space +empera ure or dif erential temperature is detected, trip signals are transmit+ed to the PCRVZCS. The PCRVXCS initiate closure of all PHR svstem isolation valves. Two instrumentation channels are provided to assure protective action, when required..Tke output trip siqnal of each instrumentation channel initiates a division logic trip and closure of either the inboard or outboard RHR system isolation valve. Tn order to close both the inboard and outboard isolation valves, bo".h division loq'cs must trip. Protection aqainst inadvertent isolation due to instrumentation malfunction is not provided. 7,3,1,1a.2.4.1.11.5 Subsystem Redundancy and Diversity Redundancy of trip initiation for high space temperature is prov'ded by two space tempera ure elements installed in each BHR equiome n". area. Each sensor -.is associated with one o. t wo div'sion loqics. !" thin each area, each tpmperature element is supplied from a diffe ent power source. Redundancy of trip 'nitiation s'qnals i for hiqh differen ial r temperature e is provided by four tempe ature elements in each BHB equipment area. Each pair is associated with one of two division 1 oqics ~ Diversity of trip initiation signals for RHR line break is provided by space temperature, differential temperature, excess flow and Reactor Vessel water level instrumentation. An increase in space .emperature, differential temperature, or flow or a decrease in Reactor Vessel water level will init'a te RHR system isola+ion e 7.3. 1.1g.2.4.1. 11. 6 Subsystem Byoasses and Interlocks There are no bypasses associated with the RHB system high space or differential temperature trip siqnals. BHB system high space and differential temperature trips are interlocked with the BHR system to provide system isolation when= leakage is detected. 7.3.1.1e.2.4.1.11.7 Suhsy~tem Testabilitg
- 7. 3-51
-GS H S -FS AH Testability,io--discussed in Subsection 7.3.2a.2 2~ ~ 1 ~ 10 ~
7 3. 1.1a.g. 4.1~~Hain Steamline-Leak Detection
- 7. 3 1.1a.2.4.1.12.1 Subsystem Identification The main steamlines are constantly monitored for leaks by the leak detection system (Figures 5.1-3a and 5.1-3b). Steamline leaks will cause changes in at, least one of the. followinq monitored operating parameters: Reactor Build'g steam tunnel ambient or differential temperatures, Turbine Building steam tunnel ambient tomperature, flow:ate, low turbine inlet pressure, or low water level in the reactor vessel. Zf a leak is detected, the detection system responds. by tr'gering an annunciator and initiating a steamline isola ion trip logic signal.
The main steamline break leak detection subsystem consists of three types of moni"orinq circuits: a) ambient and differential temperature monitors, which cause an alarm and main steamline isolation to be initiated when an observed temperature rises above a preset maximum, b) steamline mass glow rate monitors, which initiate an alarm and closure of isolation valves when the observed flop.rate exceeds a preset max'um, and c) reactor vessel water level detectors which'end a trip signal t'o the isolation valve loqic when level decreases below a pre-selected set point. The area temperatu e monitoring feature is d'scussed in Subsection 7. 3. 1.1a.2.4. 1.3. The main steamline flow monitorinq feature is discussed in Subsect ion 7. 3. 1. 1a. 2. 4. 1. 4. The reactor vessel leve'l monitorinq feature is d'scussed in Subsection 7. 3. 1. 1a. 2. 4. 1. 1. The main steamline pressure monitoring featu e is discussed in Sub sect ion 7. 3. 1. 1a. 2. 4. 1. 5.
- 7. 3. 1. 1a. g. 4.1. 13 Nai p Condenser Vacuum . rip 7 3.1.1a.>.4.1
~ 0 ~ ~ 4 g 13 g 1 Subsystem Identif'cation En addit'on to the present turbine stop valve trip resulting from low condenser vacuum which is a standard component of turbine 7.3-52
SSES-FSAB system instrumentation, a main steamline isola ion valve trip from a low condenser vacuum instrumentation system is provided, and meets the safety design basis of the PCBVICS. The main turbine condenser low vacuum signal would indicate a leak in =he condenser. Initiation of automatic closure of various Class A valves wj.kl ps'event excessive loss of reactor coolant and the release of siqnificant amounts of radioactive ma+ezial rom the BCPB. Upon de".ection of turbine condenser low vacuum, the followinq lines will be isolated: (1) Main steamline (2) Hain st aml'ne drain The turbine condenser low vacuum trip setting was selected far enouqh above the normal operating vacuum to avoid spurious solation, yet low enouqh to provide an isolation signal prior to the rupture of the condenser and subsequent loss of reactor coolant and release of radioactive material. 7.3.1.1a.2. 4.1. 13.2 Subsystem Power Supplies For power supply arrangement,
~
see Figures 7.3-2 and 7. 3-3.
- 7. 3. 1. 1a. 2. 4.1. 13.3
~ ~ ~ ~ Subsystem'nitiating Circuits Four pressure sensinq circuits monitor the main condenser vacuum.
One pressure circui. is; associa+ed with each of four ins+rumentation channels. Four pressure swi"ches are installed to provide the earliest practical de ection of main condenser leak. 7,3,1.1a.2.4.1. 13.4 Subsystem Toaic and Segnencing Vhen a siqnficant decrease in main condenser vacuum is detected, trip siqnals are transmit ted to the PCRVZCS. The PCBV1CS initiate closure of all main steamline isolat'on and drain valves. Four instrumentation channels are provided to assure protective action when required, and to prevent inadvertent isolation resultinq from instrmentation malfunctions. The output trip siqnal of each instrumentati'on channel init'-ates a logic trip. The output trip siqnals of'he loqics are combined as shown in Piqures 7.3-2 and 7.3-3. Failure of any one channel does not result in inadvertent isola ion action. 7.3-53
SSES-FS AR 7.3.1.1a.9.4.1,13.5 Subsystem Redundancy and Diversi y Redundancy~ of'rip initiation siqnals
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
for low condenser vacuum is provided by
~
four pressure switches.
~
~ Each pressure siqnal is associated with one of four logics. Two pressure sw'tches are suPPlied by one Power source. and the other two are supplied from a different power source.
Diversity of triP initiation siqnals is not provided. 7.3. 1. 1a.2. 4. 1. 13. Fi Subsystem Bypasses and Interlocks Each main condenser low vacuum trip system isolation signal can* be. bypassed manually when the appropriate turbine stop valve is less than 90% open, the reactor pressure is below the high pressure scram initiation setpoint, and the reactor mode switch not in run. There are no interlocks to other systems from the main condenser low vacuum triP siqnals. 7.3.1. 1a.7..4.1. 13.7 Suhgv~~~r m Testabilitg T t i Testability is discussed in Subsection 7.3.2a.2.2.3.1.10. 7,$ ,1,1a,2.4.1. 14 RHR Svs.em Hiqh Flow 7,$ ,1,1a,p,4,1. 14.1 Subsystem Identifica" ion Hiqh flow in the RHR system suction line could indicate a b" each in the RCPB in the RHR system. High flow initiates closure of eithe" the inboard or outboard BHB-Shutdown Coolinq system isolation valve.
- 7. 3,1. 1g. 2. 4. 1. 14. 2 Subsy~t em Power Sup olio s For power suPPly arranqements, see Fiqures 7.3-2 and 7. 3-3.
- 7. Q. 1. 1a. 2. 4. 1. 14. 3 Subsystem Initiating Circuit" Two redundant differential pressure switches monitor the BHR shu .down coolinq mode suction line. t The ou =put .rip siqnal of
- 7. 3-54
SSES-FSAR I each sensor init'ates closure of eitherr the inboard or outboard BHB system isolation valve.
- 7. 3. 1.1a. 2. 4. 1. 14. 4 Subsystem Logic and Seauencing Hhen BHR system high flow is detected, trip signals are
+ransmitted to the BHB system suction line isolation valves. Two instrumentation channels are p ovided to assure protective action when required. The output trip signal of each instrumentation channel 'nitia es a division, logic trip and closure of either the inboard or outboard BHB system suction line isolation valve. 7,3,1. 1g. 2. 4. 1. 14. 5 Subsystem Redundancy and Diversity Hach of +wo instrumentation channels are supplied from a different power source. One channel is supplied to inboard loqic and the other to outboard logic. Dive"se siqnals for isolation of the BHR system suction line isola+ion'valves are provided by vessel low level (level 3), and BHR area high temperature, in addition to excess flow.
- 7. 3,1. 1y. 2. 3. 1. 14.
~ ~ 6 Subsvsgep Bypasses and Interlocks There are no interlocks or bypasses associated with RHR system hiqh flow trip siqnals.
7.3. 1. 1a. 2. 4.1. 14. 7 Suh"system Tes+abilitg Testability is discussed in Subsection 7.3.2a.2.2.3.1.10.
- 7. 3.1.1a.2.4.$ System Instrumentation Sen'ors providinq inputs to the PCBVXCS are not used for the au+omatic control of the process system, thereby achievinq seoaration of the protection and process systems. Channels are physically and electrically separated to reduce the probability that a single phvsical event will prevent isolation. Redundant channels for one monitored variable provide inputs to different isola ion trip systems. The functions of the sensors in the isolation control system are shown in Figures 7.3-2 and 7.3-3.
.able 7. 3-5 lists instrumen+ characteristics. 7.3-55
SSFS-FSAH
- 7. 3. 1. 1a. 2. S System Logic The variables and logic arrangements that initiate automatic actuation of all subsystems associated with the PCRVICS are provided in Subsection 7.3.1.1a.2.4.
- 7. 3. 1. 1a. 2. 6 Sgs+em Seauen cine A discussion of all sequencinq of all subsystems of the PCRVTCS
's orovided in Subsec.ion 7.3.1.1a.2.4. 7.$ .1.1a.g.7 System Bypasses and interlocks Bypasses and interlocks for all subsystems associated with the PCRVICS are detailed in Subsection 7. 3. 1. 1a. 2. 4. 1.
- 7. 3. 1. 1a. 7,8 System redundancy and Diversity he va iables which initiate isolation are listed in the circuit desc iption, Subsection 7.3.1.1a.2.4.1. Also listed there are the number of initiatinq sensors and channels for the isolation va ives.
- 7. 3.1.1a. >. 9 System Actuated Devices To preven+ the reactor vessel water 'level from falling belo~ the top of the active fuel as a result of a pipeline break, the valve closinq mechanisms are desiqned to meet the closure times specif ied in Ta ble 6. 2-12.
The main steamline isola ion valves are spring-closinq, pneumatic, piston-operated valves. They close on loss of pneumatic pressure to the valve operator. This is fail-safe design. The control arranqement is shown in Figure 7.3-4. Closure time for the valves is adjustable between 3 and 10 seconds. "=ach valve 's piloted by +wo three-way, packless, direct-acting, solenoid-operated pilo+. An accumula.or located close to each isolation valve provides pneumatic pressure for valve closinq in the event of failure of the normal gas supply system. The senso t"ip channel and trip logic relays fo" the instrumentation used n the systems described are hiqh
- 7. 3-56
SSZS-FSAP, "eliability relays. The relays are selected so that the ,con+inuous load w
~
ll not exceed 50% of the continuous duty ratinq. Chapter 16, Technical Specifications lists the minimum
~ ~ ~ ~
numbers of trip channels needed +o ensure that the isola+ion
~
control system retains its functional capabilities.
~
7.3.1.1a.2.10 System Seoa ation Sensor devices are separated physically such that no single fa'lure (open, closure, or short) can prevent the safety action. Bv the use of separa+ed raceways, the single failure c"iterion is met from the sensors to the logic cabine+s in the relay control rooms. The logic cabinets are so arranqed that redundant
'equipment and w'nq are not present in the same bay of a cabinet excep. as noted in Section 3. 12. A bay is a cabinet section separated from othe cabinet sections by a fire barrier.
Yormally the barrier is of full cabinet heiqht and depth. Redundant equipment and wirinq may be present in control room bench boards, where separation is achieved by surrounding redundant wire and equipment in meta1 encasements. Prom .he loqic cabinets to the isolation valves, separated raceways are emoloyed to complete adherence to the sinqle failure criterion. 7.3,1.1a.2.11 Svs,.em Testahility The main steamline isolation valve instrumen+ation is capable of complete testing durinq power ope "ation. The isola tion siqnals include low reacto" vater level, high steamline radiation, high main steamline flow, high main steamline tunnel temperatu e, low condenser vacuum, and low u bine pressure. The wate" level, turbine pressure, and steamline flow sensors are pressure or d'erential a+pressure type sensors wh'ch may be valved service one a time and func+ ionally tested using a test ou'f pressure source..he radiation measuring amplif'er is provided with a test switch and internal test source by which operabil'ty may be veri f ied. Func ional operabil'ty of the temperature swi+ches may be verified by applying a heat source to the locally mounted temperature sensinq elements. Control room indications include annunciation and panel'liqhts. The condition of each sensor is indicated by at least one of these methods ' addition to annunciato" s common to sensors of one variable. Xn addi"..'on, the functional availability of each isolation valve may be confirmed by comoletely or oartially closing each valve individually at "educed power using test switches located in the control structure.
- 7. 3-57
SSFS-FS AR The FV'CO system isolation siqnals include low reactor wa+er t level, equipment area hiqh ambient temperature and differential temperatu e,e hiqh flow, high differential f1ow, high temperature e downstream o+f the non-reqenerative heat exchanger, and standby liquid control system actuation. The water level sensor is of the differential pressure type and can be periodically tested by valv'nq each sensor out.of service and applying a test pressure. The tempera"ure switches may be functionally tested by removing from service and applyinq a heat source to he temperatu e sensing elements. The differential flow switches may be tested by applying a test input. The various t"ip actuations are annunciated in the main control room. Also, valve indicator lights in the main control room provide indication of RICO isolation valve position. 7,3,1,1g,2. 12 System Fnvirogmental Considerations The physical and electrical arrangement of the PCRVICS was selected so that no single physical even will prevent achievement of isolation functions. Hotor operators for valves inside the drywell are of the totally enclosed type; those outside the containment have wea+herproof-type enclosures. Soleno'd valves, whether used for direct valve isolation or as a qas pilot, are Provided with watertight enclosures. All cables and operators are capable of operation in the most unfavorable ambient conditions anticipated for normal operations. TemPerature, pressure, humidity, and radiation are considered in the select on of equipment for the system. Cables used in high rad'ation areas have radiation-resistant insulation. Shielded cables a e used where necessary to eliminate interference from maqnetic f ields. Spec'al consideration has been given to isolation 'requirements during a LOCA inside the drywell. Components of the PCRVICS that are located inside the d" ywell and that must operate du" ing a LOCA are the cables, control mechanisms, and valve operators of isolation valves ins'de the drywell. These'isola 'on components are reauired to be functional in a LOCA environment (See Tables 3.11-1, 3.11-2, and 3.11-3) . Electrical cables are selected with insulation designed for this service. Clo inq mechanisms and valve operators are considered satisfactory for use in the PCRVICS only after completion of environmental testinq under LOCA condit'ons or submission of evidence from the manufacturer describinq the results of suitable prior tests. 7.3.1.1g.2.13 System Operational Considerations 7,'3 1,1a,g 13. 1 General Information 7.3-58
SS ES-FS AR
.he PCRVICS are not required for normal operation. The system are initiated automatically when one of the monitored var'ables exceeds preset limits. No operator action is required for at least 10 minutes followinq initiation.
All automatic isolation valves can be closed by manipulatinq switches in the main control. oom, thus providinq the reactor operator with control which is independent of the automa tic isolation f unctions. 7.3.1.1g.2. 13.2 Reactor Operator Information In qeneral, once isolation 'is initiated, the valve continues to close even if the condition that caused isolation is res ored to normal. The reactor operato must manually operate switches in the main control room to reopen a valve that has been automa+ically closed. Except where manual override features are provided in the manual control circuitry, the operator cannot reopen the valve until the conditions that initiated isolation have cleared. rip of an isola+ion control system channel is annunciated in
.he main con+rol room so that the reacto operator is 'mmediately in ormed of the condition. The response of isolation valves is 0 indicated by OPEN-CLOSED status liqhts in the main control room.
All CLOSED moto -operated status liqh and s qas-operated isolation valves in the main control room. have OPEN-Inputs to annunciators and indicators are arranqed so that no malfunction of the annunciatinq or indicatinq equipment can furc+'onally disable the system. Direct siqnals from the isola.ion control system sensors are not used as inputs to anrunciatinq o- indicatinq equipment. Relay isolation is provided between +he primary siqnal and the information output. (Refer .o Sectior. 7.7 for fur+her discussion of 'nformat'on available to the reactor operator.) 7 3. 1. 1a.
~ ~ ~ 2g 13.' 3 Set >oints 'format'n.
Refe" to Technical Specifications for the safety set poirt
- 7. $ ,1,1g,g /ST V-LCS- Igsg~u peg t ai.. ig n a nd Controls 7.$ .1.1a.3.1 System Identification
- 7. 3-59
SSES-PSAR lt The MSIV-LCS is desiqned to minimize the release of fission products which could bypass the Standby Gas Treatment System af+er the. pos+ulated LOCA. This is accomplished by d'rec+ing the leakaqe throuqh the closed main steamline isolat'on valves (NSIVs) 'o bleed lines which pass the leakage flow into an area served by the Standby Gas Trea "ment System. The instrumentation and controls of the MSIV-LCS are shown on Fiqures 6.7-1 throuqh 6.7-3. I The instrumentation necessary for control and status indication of the NSIV-LCS are classified as essential and as such are desiqned and qualified in accordance with applicable IEEE S andards, to f unction under Seismic Class IE and LOCA 'nvironmental loadinq conditions appropriate to their
'nstallation with the control circuits designed to satisfy the mechanical and electrical separation criteria.
- 7. 3. 1. la. 3. 2 Power Sources The instrumentat'on and controls of the main steamline isolation valve leakaqe con+rol system (NSIV-LCS) is powered by seoarate l20 V ac divisional power with each subsys em (inboard and outboard) powered hy a different division (II and I, resoectively) .
- 7. 3 1 laR. 3 Eguioment Design The instrumentation componen+s for the MSIV-LCS are located ou" s'de the con+ainmen+. Cables connect the sensors and
-:.ransduccrs to control circuitry within the loqic panel. A functional +est of +he system instrumentation can be performed durinq normal reac+or power opera.ion. Powever, the MSIV-LCS 'solation valves can only be tested one at a time. Inboard and outboard subsystem controls and instrumentation are electrically and mechanically separated to assure that no sinqle failure event can disable the NSIY-LCS. The NSIV-LCS is desiqned to operate from normal offsite auxiliary power sources or from a divisional diesel qenerato se. if offsite power is not available.
7.3.1.1a.3.4 Initiating Circui s The MSIV-LCS can be manually actuated af er a LOCA has occurred, provided hat the reactor and steamline pressure are below the pressure permiss'e 'nterlock set. points and the inboa=d MSIVs are'ully closed. The outboard subsystem is provided with one
- 7. 3-60
SSES-PSAB remo.e manual initiatinq switch,
~ ~ ~ ~
while the inboard subsystem s provided with one remote manual
~
initiatinq switch per steamline.
~ ~
~
The inboard subsystem has individually controlled process lines
~
orovided for each steamline (see Piqures 6.7-1a and 6.7-1b) . ~ When the inboard subsystem..is. initia ed, the exhaust blower is actuated. When dilution air flow is established by the exhaust blowers, the bleed and bypass valves are opened, heaters are ac+uated and timers are initiated. If the steamline pressure is qreater than 5 psiq after one minute, the bleed valves will close. If the pressure is not excessive,'he 'bleed valves will remain open. Afte another minute, +he bypass valve is closed. The flow is thus routed through the flow element. Within the nex minute, a th'rd timer allows'flow to be mon'tored and the bleed valves to be closed if necessary by high flow. The outboard subsystem process lines from each main steamline are connected +o a header connectinq to the depressurization and bleed of f brarch (see Fiqure 6. 7-1) . When the outboard subsystem is initiated, depressurization valves are opened and the exhaust blowers are activated. When the s+eamlines have depressurized to approximately atmospheric pressure, the depressurization branch valves are closed and flow is diver.ed o the blower suction lines.
- 7. 3. 1. 1a. 3. 5 Locric and Seauencina A LOCA is siqnalled by hiqh drywell pressure and low-1ow water level. After a LOCA has occurred, the MSIV-LCS system can be manually initia+ed.
Indicators for both reactor and steamline pressures for the inboard and outboard subsystems are available on the control cabinet. 7~ 3. 1. 1a. 3. 6 Bypasses and Int eglocks Bo+h the inboard and outboard subsystem are provided with reactor and steamline pressure interlocks +o preven+ inadvertent sys..em initiatina durinq normal reactor po~er operation. An inboard NSIV closure interlock is provided for each of the l'nes by a position switch wh'ch will prevent initiation of the NSIV-LCS the inboard val ve is open. Hl if
- 7. 3-61
SSPS-PS AR Durinq test operation, the two motor-operated isolation valves in any flow path from the main steamlines cannot be opened simultaneously. e
- 7. 3.1. 1g. 3. 7 Recur.dancy and Diversity The NSIV-LCS consists of two subsystems; namely, inboard and outboard. Each subsystem has instrumentation, controls and power sources which are separa+e and independent from each other.
Eithe. system may be manually initiated afte" a LOCA. This manually initiated system is not requ red to be diverse. I is interlocked by diverse parameter inputs. 7~3. 1. 1g. 3. 8 Actuated Devices All actuated devices can be ndividually tested during normal pla nt opera t.'n. 7.3. 1. 1a. 3. 9 S~oaration The 'nstrumentation, controls and sensors of each subsystem have sufficient physical and electr'cal separation to prevent environmental, electrical or phys'cal accident consequences from inhibitinq the HSIV-LCS from performinq its protective action. Physical a nd electrical separat ion is main+ ained by use of separate divisional cabinets, racks, and raceways for each subsystem.
- 7. 3. 1. 1a. 3. 10 Testabili~g The operation of each subsystem up to and including the actuators can be independently verified du inq normal plant operation.
Ins+rument setpoints are tested by simulated siqnals of suffic'ent maqnitude to verify the alarm poin s.
- 7. 3. 1. 1a. Q. 11 Egvj,rggmagtal Condit 'ons Controls and indicators are located on backrow panel in the main control room. The sensors are located outside the containment.
All control instrumentatiors and sensors have been selected to meet the normal, accident and post-accident worst case 7.3-62
SSES-FSAR environ'mental conditions of temperature, pressure, humidity, t radiation, chemical and vibrations expected at their respective locations (Refer to Table 3.11-1 and 3.11-3 for equ'pment gualif ication) .. 7~3. 1. 1a. 3. 12 Onerat iona 1..Considerations 7.3.1.1a.3.12.1 General 1nformation The MSIV-LCS is designed to permit manual actuation within aoproximately 20 minutes after a LOCA. All controls and instrumentation and indicators needed for effective ope"ation are on back row panels in the main cont ol room. 4 7,3,1,1g,3,12,2 - Reactor Opegatog information
- he mechanical sys+em description and performance evaluations in Subsections 6.7.2.1 and 6.7.2.2 provide a de+ailed discussion of the operato s information and +he necessary ac" ion to complete the system functional ob electives. Refer also to Fiqur s 6.7-1 throuah 6. 7-3.
- 7. 3. 1~1a. 3. 12. 3 Set Points
~ here are no setpoints. The system is manually actuated. The ranges of safety-related instrumentation used within the MSZV-LCS a e described in Table 7. 3-27. 7.3.1.1a.4 RHRS/Containment Spray Coolinq System instrumentation and Controls
- 7. 3. 1. 1a. 4. 1 Syst: em Identification The containment spray cooling system is an operating mode of the Residual Heat Removal System. 1t is designed to provide the capability of condensinq steam in the suppression pool air volume and/or the drywell atmosphere and removinq heat from the suppression pool water volume. The system is manually initiated when necessary.
The RHR system is shown 'in Fiqure 5.4-13.
- 7. 3-63
SSES-FSAR 7.3.1.1a.4.2 Powe~ Sources The oover supplies for the RHR
~ system are described in Subsection 7.~ 3.~ 1.~ 1a. 1.~ 6.
- 7. 3. 1. 1a. 4. 3 gguioment Qesiqn Control and instrumentation for the follovinq equipment is requ'red for this mode of operation:
(1) Two RHR main system pumps (2) Pump suction valves (3) Containment spray discharqe valves Sensors needed fo" operation of the equipment are drywell oressure switches, eactor water level indicating svitches, and valve lim'. switches. The instrumentation foz containment spray coolinq operation allovs the opezatoz to assure that water vill be routed from the ~ -- suppress on pool to the containment spray system for use in the d yvell and/or suppression pool air volumes. Containment spray operation uses tvo pump loops, each loop vith
'ts ovn separate dischazqe valve. All components pertinent to containment spray coolinq operation are located outside of the d ywell. The system can be operated such that 'he spray can be directed to the drywell and/or suppression pool air volume-
- 7. 3. 1. 1a. 4. 4 Initiating Circuits A loop A containmen. sozay cooling mode of the BHR System
~ may be initiated by the operator when the followinq conditions (permissive) have been satisfied:
(1) A LOCA signal mus. be present, i.e. reac.or vessel lov wate" level a ndf'or d z ywell'igh pressure ' a one out of t wo twice logic conf iauration. (2) The LPCI in jection valve must be closed. These permissives may be bypassed by a manual override switch. The Loop B containment spray cooling mode of the RHR System initation is identical to that of Loop A. 7.3-64
SS ES-PS AB 7.3.1.1a.4.5 Loqic and Sequencing The operatinq sequence of containmentt spray following receipt of thee necessary i initiatinq siqnals is as follows: (1) The RHB system.pumps continue to'perate. (2) Valves in other RHB modes are manually positioned or remain as positioned dur'nq LPCI. (3) The RHB service water pumps are started. (4) RHB service water discharqe valves to the RHR heat exchanqer are opened. The containment spray system will continue to operate until the ooerator closes the containment spray injection valves. The operator can then initiate another mode of BHR permissives are satisfied. if appropriate 7.3.1,1a.4.6 Bypasses and Egterlocks Ho bypasses are provided for the containment spray system.
- 7. 3,1.1a,4,7 Fedundancy and Diyorsity Redundancy is provided for the containment spray function by two separated loqics, one for each divisional loop. Redundancy and diversity of init ation permissive sensors is described in Subsection 7. 3. 2a. 4.
- 7. 3. 1. 1a. 4. 8,Act uat ed Devices Fiqure 7.3-10 shows functional control arranqement of he containment spray system.
<he RHB 5 and RHR 8 loops are utilized for containment spray. Therefore, the pump and valves are the same for LPCX and containment sprav function except that, each has its own discharge valve. See Subsection 7.3.1.1a.1.6.7 for specific informat'on.
- 7. 3. 1. 1a. 4. 9 Separation 7.3-65
'I II
SSFS-PSAH For separation. refer to Subsection 7.3.1.1a.1.6.8 Trustability
- 7. 3. 1. 1a. 4. 10
~ ~ ~
Containment spray coolinq system is capable of being tested up to he last discharge valve durinq normal operation. Testinq for functional operability of the control loqic relays can be accomplished by use of pluq-in test jacks and switches in conjunction with sinqle sensor tests.'ther control equipment 's functionally tested durinq manual testinq of each loop. Adequate indication in the form of panel lamps and annunciators are provided in the main control room.
- 7. 3. 1. 1a. 4. 11 Enyo,ronmental Considerations Refer to able 3.11-1 and 3.11-3 for environmental qualifications of the containment spray system components.
- 7. 3. 1,1a. 4,12 Qne~at j,opal Considerations 7.3.1.1a.4.12 1 r information General Containment spray is. a mode of the RHR and is not required during
, normal operation.
- 7. 3. 1. 1g. 4. 12. 2 H~actog Ope a"o Informa tion Sufficient temperature, flow, pressure, and valve position
'ndications are available in he control room for'he operator to accurately assess containment spray operation. Alarms and indications are shown in Figures 5. 4-13 and 7. 3-10.
- 7. 3.1.1a.4. 12.3 Set points Setpo'nts fo" the con"ainment spray pe missives (drywell pressure and reac or vessel water level) are shown in the Technical Specifications.
- 7. 3-66
SSFS-FS AB 7.3.1.1a.5 HHHS/Suppression Pool Cooling Node- instrumentation and Controls 7.3,1. 1a,5,1 System Identification Suppression pool cooling is an operating mode of the Residual Heat Removal System. It is designed to provide the capability of removinq heat from the suppression pool water volume. The system is manually initiated when necessary.
- 7. 3. 1. 1a. 5. 2 Power Sou" ces Power for the RHH system pumps is supplied from four ac buses that can receive standby ac power. Notive and control power for the two loops of suppression pool coolinq instrumentation and control equi.pment are the same as that used for the two I.PCI loops; see Subsection 7.3.1.1a.1.6.
- 7. Q. 1. 1a. 5. 3 Eguinment Design Control and instrumentation for the following eguipmen. is
~
required e for this mode of operation: {1) PHH pumps, {2) Pump suction valves, and {3) Suppression pool re-'rn valves Suppression pool coolinq uses two pump loops, each loop containinq two pumps. All components pertinent to suppress'on pool coolinq operation are located outside the drywell. The supp.ession pool cooling mode is manually initiated from the control room. This mode is put into operation to maintain the water temperature in the suppression pool within specified limits. 7.3. 0 ~ 1.~ 1a.5.4
~ ~ Tnitiatina Circuits
% g Initiation of either suppression pool cooling loop is performed manually by the control room operator.
7.3-67
SSKS-PS AR 7.3.1.1a.5.5 Logic and Seguencing The ~ operatinq sequence of suppression
~ ~
pool cooling mode is as follows: (1) Valves are manuaLly..positioned. (2) 'The RHR pumps opera.e. (3) The RHR heat exchanger service water system is placed into service. The suppression. pool coolinq mode will continue to operate un.il terminated by manual operator action. 7,$ .1.1a.5. 6 Bgoasse~ agd Interlocks Mo bypasses are provided for the suppression pool cool'ng mode. The suppression pool coolinq mode is interlocked wi.h reactor water level'nd drywell pressure functions by the repositioninq of valves associated with the initiation of the LPCI mode on LOCA signal. See Subsec 'on 7.3.1.1a.1.6.4.
- 7. 3.1.1g.5.7 Redundancy e agd Diversity Redundancy is provid d for the suppression pool cooling mode by separate logics, one for each loop.
- 7. 3. 1. 1g..>. 8 Actuated Device="-
Figure 7. 3-10 (PHR FCD) shows f unctional control arrangemen't of the pump= and valves used durinq the suppression pool coolinq mode.
- 7. 3. 1. 1g. 5. 9 Sogarat jon Suppression pool cooling is a two divisional system. Manual control, logic circuits, cabling, and inst umentation for suppression pool cooling are mounted so that divisional separation is maintained.
7.3-68
gl SSES-FSAR
- 7. 3. 1. 1a. 5. 10 Testability Suppress on pool coolinq is capable of being tested during normal r
operation. Testing for functional operability can be accomplished during manual estinq of each loop. Panel lamps and annunciators provide control room indications. 7,3. 1. 1a. 5. 11 Env jronment al Con~idera tions Refer to Section 3. 11 and the Susquehanna SES Environmental Equipment Qualifica+ion Proqram for environmental qualifications of +he system componen s. 7.3,1. 1a.5. 12 Ogerationa1.,Considerations
- 7. 3. 1. 1a. 5. 12. 1 General Tnforma+ion Suppression pool cooling is used to limit suppression pool tempera ture.
7.3.1.1a.5 ~ 12.2
~ A ~ ~ Reactor Onerator Informa ion Temperature, floe, pressure, and valve position indications are available in +he control room for the operator to assess suppression pool coolinq operation. Annunciator identification and system logic are shorn in Fiqure 7.3.10 (RHR FCD) .
- 7. 3. 1. 1a. 5. 12. 3 Set Points There are no set points. The system is only manually ini+iated.
- 7. 3. 1. 1b System baser'tion /Non-NSSSQ 7.3.1.1b.1 Primary Containment Isolation Control System for Non-NSSS Instrumentation and Control The isolation descr'bed in this subsection as non-NSSS and that described in I Subsection
~ ~I
~I s
~
7.II 3.I 1.I 1a. 2 as NSSS provide the complete
~
containment I ~ isolation ~ ESF. E
~
- 7. 3-69
SSES-FSAR 7.)~1. 1Q. 1~1 System Qescription , he primary containment isolation for non-VASSS is designed to nsure the containment inteqrity in the event of a LOCA. system includes divisionalized loqic and The actuation circuits that iri..iate the closinq of .non-NSSS containment isola ion valves. The initiatinq contact for each division is provided by the NSSS initiatinq logic for the primary containment. isolation control system and is a combination of the followinq: (1) Beactor vessel low water level (2) D" y well high pressure Ir. addition, containment purqe supply and exhaust lines isolate on hiqh radiation measured a+ the SGTS exhaust stack. Sensors and initiatinq circuits are provided in the NSSS-PCHVICS. Ref er to 7. 3. 2a. 2. 2. 3. 1. 9 and 7. 3. 2a. 2. 2. 3. 1. 10 for discussion of calibration and testing. For discussion of test provis'ons of the non-h'SSS circuits refer to Subsection 7.3.2b.2-4.10. For descript'on of the SGTS exhaust radiat'on monitors, re er +o Subsection 11. S. 2. 1. 4.
~
he objective of the system is to provide automatic t solation of all no. ->JSSS pipel'ne penetrations of the primary containment upor.r a LOCA. A speci f' iden+if icatior. of containment isola t ion valves is provided in Table 6. 2-12. Isolation of the followinq pipelines is iritia+ ed by this system: (1) Beac+o Building Closed Cooling Rater Supply and Be+urn (2) Drywell F. Suppression Chamber Purge Supply and Fxhaust Lines (3) Drywell 6 Suppression Chamber Gas Sampl ng and Return Lines'4) Instrumen Gas Supply and Return Lines (5) Drywell Floor Drain to Radwaste (6) Fau'ment Drain to Radwaste (7) Chilled Rater Supply and Return Lines (8) Suppression Pool Cleanup 7.3-70
k, SSFS-FS AR The followinq interlocks are provided: (1) initiation of the Standby Gas Treatment System (2) Trip of the Drywell Cooling Fans o lnitiytina
~ ~
7.3.1. 1h. 1.2 Cj~c,'uj,ts and Logic The non-VASSS isolation logics are derived from inputs from the PCHVTCS. Re fe to Subsection 7. 3. 1. 1a. 2 for description of initiat'nq circu'ts, logic, bypasses, interlocks, redundancy and diversity of the NSSS portion of this system. Two relay contacts, one per division, represent the interface from NSSS to non-NSSS containment isolation. These relays will be deenerqized and 'nitiate isolation on any of the followir.q conditions: r1) Manual Xsolation (2) Low Reactor water Level (3) High Drywell Pressure Fo Containment Pu"ge lines, these signals s i with r e comb'ned are tri'p r signals .from the SGTS Kxhaus Radiation hiqh sensors. s Normally energized relays are used to multiply these signals. The assiqnment of electrical divisions to containment isolation valves is as shown in Table 6. 2-12.
- 7. 3. 1. 1b.1 3 -Byoasses'~ Interlocks and Seauercina Tnterlocks are provided to in'tiate,the. standby gas treatment system, to isolate the eactor building ven ilation system, and to trip +he drywell coolinq fan units.
Ho sequencinq is reauired for th's system. A timinq circuit is 'mplemen ed to allow manual opening of isolation valves after the isolation sianal is received and the timer times out. These timinq circuits reset when the isolation siqnal is manually reset to er.sure closu're upon receivinq the next isolation s-qnal.. he ime varies to meet post LOCA monitorinq of the. containment. Four valves in the Containment Atmosphere Control System have provisions for manually bypassinq their isolation siqnals. Refer to Table 6. 2-12, Remarks column, for identification of valves, times, and bypasses. 7~ 3 7 1
SS ES-FS AR
- 7. 3. 1. 1b. 1~4 Redundancy and Diversity The Divis'on I ini~iation circuit is independent and redundant to the Division II circuit. t Diversity of measurements ms. discussed in Subsection 7. 3.1. 1a.
7,3.1.1b.1.5 Actuated Devices
.able 6.2-12 list= all valves actuated by the containment isolation con rol system.
- 7. 3. 1. 1b. 1. 6 Sunoor ting System s The power sources for the isolation logic are supplied from two divisionalized and redundant 120 V ac buses. Refer to Chapter 8.0 .for division.
Two addi;ional'divisionalized and redundant 125 VDC Power sou ces are supplied to auxiliary isolation timinq logics for drywell and supo ession chamber purge supply and exhaust lines, drywell and suooression chamber samplinq and return lines, and drywell burp ~ and purge line.
~
- 7. 3. 1. 1$ . 1. 7 Inst pungent S~psigg Lines All 'strument line penetrations of the primary containment a"e equ'pped with excess flow check valves which isolate upon a hiqh flow and differential pressure across the valve. This would be caused by either a downstream line break on a high pressure system o" a downstream line break concurren with a LOCA on a low oresure system.. t<hen isolation of any excess flow check valve occurs, control room alarm alerts the operator. Two position indicatinq liqhts on a backrow panel in the main control room oanel provide the status of each valve. A test push button allow a circuit tes+ for the indicatinq liqhts as well as the annuncia.inq loq'c for all excess flow check valves.
Annunciat ion is provided on the unit operating benchboard to indicate excess flow check valve operation.
- 7. 3.1.1h. 2 Comhus+ ibge. Gas Cogtgol System 0 7~ 3 72
SSES-FSAR .he concentration ~ of the combustible gas inside the prima y containment
~ may increase after
~
a LOCA as describod in Subsection 6.2.5. 7,3,1,1h. g,1 System D~ecription Two pair of redundant hydrogen recombiner units are controlled from two 'divisional'ed panels located in the upper and lower relay rooms. The instrumentation and controls for each hydrogen ecomhiner are listed in Subsect'on 6.2. 5.5.1. Refer to Suhsec ion 6.2.5.4 for periodic test requirements. 7.3.1.1b.2.1.1 Xnitiatinq Circuits, Loq'c, Bypasses, interlocks and Sequencing Each hydroqen recomhiner is initiated by manual on-off control from the divisionalized system panels. Bypasses of hydrogen recombiners are 'dentified in the description for the Bypass Tndication System (BZS) in Section 7.5. !!o in erlocks or sequencing is provided fog this sys+em. 7 3.1 11.2.1.2 pedvndancv and Diversi"g ~wo redundant hvdroqen recomb ners are located in the p imary containment and two redundant units are in the suppression chamber. Controls and instrumentation are redundant and divisionalized on a one-to-one basis with the mechanical equ'me nt,. The primary containment atmospheric moni.oring system (hydrogen and oxyqen analyzers) indicate the perf ormance of the hydrogen =ecombiner system. Pefer to Subsection 6.2.5.2 for system descr'ption and to Section 7.5 for safety-"elated display 'strumentation. 7.3.1.1b.3 Primary Containment Vacuum Relief Instrumentatjon and Contpol. 7.3.
~ 1. 1h.3. 1 Systeme Description 7.3-73
I SSES-FSAH The system is designed to allow periodic testing of all 5 pairs of primary containment vacuum relief valves to ensure their func.ional capability. This is accomplished by opening each valve by remote ac uation of the solenoid valve. S+atus "indicatinq liqhts of the..relief valve position verifies the opera" i on. 7.3.1.1b.3.2 Initiatinq Circuits, Ioqic, Bypasses, In+er locks and Seauencing One test selector switch per division permits the testing of each relief valve in that group. A momentary test pushbutton will cause. a selective opening of each valve. All valves will close aqain when the selector switch is returned into normal position. Mo system bypasses, interlocks or sequencing are provided.
- 7. 3,1.1h. 3. 3 Redundancy and Diversi+y Redundancy i i r i isis not Piversity qiven by the divisionalized system design.
i for this manually operated system. required 7,3.1,1b. 3. 4 Actuated Devices The vacuum elief valves are the only actuated devices. 7.3.1.1Q.4 Standby Ga~ Treatment System gSGTS) For 'he description and operation of the SGTS, refer to Subsec ions 6.5.1. 1. and 9. 4. 2.
- 7. 3. 1. 1h. 4. 1 In'iatinq Circuits Each tra'n of the SGTS may be 'n'tiated or stopped in a protective f unction mode as follows:
a) H'crh radiation sensed hy any of the five gamma sensors located as follows (See Section 11.5 and Table 11. 5-1):
- 1) Unit 1 Refuelinq floor h gh exhaust duct 7.3-74
SSES-FSAR
- 2) Unit 2 Refuelinq floor high exhaust duct
- 3) Unit 1 Refueling floor wall exhaust duct l)) Unit 2 - Refuelinq floor wall exhaust duct
- 5) Railroad access. shaft exhaust duct b) LOCA signals provided by NSSS to non-NSSS output initia ting contacts (See Subsection 7. 3. 1. 11.1. 1) .
c) Primary Containment vent and purge operation will be stopped by hiqh radiation detected at the SGTS exhaust vent. d) An operatinq train will be stopped by low pressure differential between outdoors and any of the three zones of the reactor building, and the standby train will be started. e) An operatinq train will be stopped by low air flow and the standby train initiated. f) Secondary pro. ection is prov ded by sensors monitoring an operatinq filter train for malfunction conditions that will trip an operating train and cause the standby train to start. Malfunction conditions are as follows:
- 1) High-high charcoal f'lter temperature (also cont ols fire protection delugeternwater valves and drain valves)
- 2) Low differential temperature across the electric air heater (heater failure) q) Hiqh inlet header static pressure of the SGTS will initiate a SGTS train.
System protection (not safety-rela ed) is provided to in'tiate the filter tra'n fan in a cooling mode on hiqh ch a rcoa 1 tempera ture (pre- iqnit ion pe ra -'re) . Each channel provides:
- 1) Continuous monitor'ng of radiation
- 2) Alarms in the control room fo" downscale/inoperative, hiqh, and hiqh-high radiation
- 7. 3-75
SSES-FS AB
- 3) Analoq signals for the radiation ind.cator and recorder and trip circuit for initiating, isolation and stop siqnals Capability for sensor checks and capability for test and calibration is provided as described, in Subsection 7.3. 2b.2-4. 10.
- 7. 3. 1. 1b. 4. 2 Logic a nd Seguenc in@
The two SGTS redundant filter trains are normally set up 'n a "lead-laq" fashion. Shen an emergency start signal exists, the tra'n automatically starts and the other train remains on 'ead standby. An airflow switch 'n the common discharge duc. monitors the operation of the lead tra'n. Xf the lead 'train fails and the system loses airflow, the standby train will start. flow control of the operatinq SGTS uses 'nlet header pressure to outside air pressure differential as a set point to ensure the inlet header pressure is less than .atmospheric. This prevents reactor buildinq a'r exhaust to the atmosphere, throuqh the outside air intake plenum. The SGTS is provided with redundant control loops to control the followinq variables: a) .otal airflow of the system b) Relative hum'dity of air entering the charcoal adsorber c) Pressure in the SGTS inlet header d) Air pressure in the reactor bu i1ding e) Rate-of flow of cooling a'r through the charcoal adsorbers Operation of the above loops is descr'bed in Subsection 6.5.1.1.
- 7. 3. 1. 1h. 4. Q interlocks
Ão outpu s of reacto" building zone pressure d'fferential controllers (PDEC-07554AGB) are present under the f ollowing conditions: a) No reactor building isolation signal b) Respective SGTS fan is not runninq
- 7. 3-76
TABLE 7.3-6 PROCESS RADIATION MONITORING SYSTEM CHARACTERISTICS DOWN-UPSCAI E SCALE TRIPS TRIPS MONITORING INSTRUMENT PER PER SUBSYSTEM RANGE (1) SCAI E CHANNEL CHANNEL 6 Main Steamline 1 to 10 mr/hr 6 Decade log 6 Air Ejector Offgas 1 to 10 mr/hr 6 Decade log Offgas .Vent 10 to 10 7 Decade log counts per second (2) Liquid Process 10 to 10 7 Decade log counts per second (2) Reactor Bldg. 0.01 mr/hr to 4 Decade log 100 mr/hr (1) Range of measurements in dependent on items such as the source of geometry, background radiation, shielding, energy levels, and methods- of sampling (2) Readout is dependent upon the pulse height discriminator setting (3) The main steamline radiation monitoring system output is part of the primary containment and reactor vessel isolation control system (PCRVICS) See Subsection 7.3.l.la. 2.4.1.2 (4) The reactor building ventilation exhaust high radiation monitoring system ouput is part of the PCRIVICS. See Subsections 7.3.l.lb.4, 7.3.1b.5, 9.14.2.1 and Table 7.3-5.
SS ES-FS AR 7.6.1a.4.3 Fa>>ioment Desian The systems or parts of .systems which contain water or steam cominq from the reac+or vessel or supply water to the reactor vessel, and which are in direct, communication with the reactor vessel, are provided with leakage detection systems. The main steamlines w'.hin the steam tunnel inside the containment are mon'tored by temperature detectors w'thin the tunnel. Outside ~he drywell, the pipinq within each system monitored for leakage is in compartments or rooms separate from other systems wherever feasible so that leakaqe may be detected in drains, by area temperature indications, or hiqh process flow. 7,6,1a,4,3,$ Nain Steamline Leak Detection The Hain Steamline Leak Detection subsystem 's discusse'd in Subsec+ ion 7. 3. 1. 1a. 2. 4. 1. 12. 7.6.1a.4.3. R RCIC System Leak Detection 7.6. 1a.4. 3. 3.1 Subsystem Identification The steamlines of +he RCIC system are constan.ly monitored for leaks by the leak detection system. Leaks from the 3CIC will cause a change in a+ least one of the following monitored operat'g paramete "s: area +empera ure, steam pressure,'r steam flow rate. I the monitored parameters indicate that a leak may exist, the de+ect'on system "esponds by activating an annunciator and ini+'atirq a RCIC isola,.ion trip logic signal. The PCIC leak detec ion suhsys em consists of three type" of monitoring circuits. 'he first of these monitors ambient and differential temperature, triqaering an annunciator when the temperature rises above a preset maximum. The second type of circuit utilized by +he leak detection system monitors the flow rate (differential pressure) through the steamline, +riggering an annunciator when the differential pressure rises above a preset maximum. The third type of ci"cuit utilized by the leak detectior. system mon'+ors the steamline pressure upstream of the 7 ~ 6-7
r k
SSr.S-FSAH differen.ial pressure element and also is annunciated. Alarm outputs from all three circuits are also used to generate the FCIC auto-isolation s gnal. For instrument specifications and setpoints, refer to the Technical Specifications.
- 7. 6. 1a. 4. 3. 3. 2 HCTC Area. TemDerature Monitor in a 4 7,6,1a,4,3. 3.g 1 Circui t Descript ion The area temperature monitorinq circuit is similar +o the one described for the HPCI area temperature monitoring system. (See Subsection 7.6. 1. 1a. 4.3. 9. 2) .
7.6. 1a.4.3.3.2. 2 Logic and Secruenc3.na's'nq one-out-of-two loqic, the RCIC area temperature monitoring ci cuit activates an annunciator and initiates a HCIC isolation siqnal when the temperature rises above a preset lim't. 7,6.1a.4.3.3.2. 3 Bypasses and Interlocks A bypass/test switch is pro v'ded in each logic fo- the purpose of .estinq he temperature mon i or without initiating HCIC system iso lati on. Placinq +he keyswitch in By pass position in one division will not prevent operation of the te mperature monito= in the oppos'te division when-required for HCIC system isolation. 'to interlocks are provided from th' subs ys em.
- 7. 6. 1g. 4. 3. 3. 2. 4 Redund agcy a H d Di v .rs y Two physicallv and electrically independent channels of leak detection are supplied to those systems designed to isolate upon receipt of the leak de ection signal(s) and required to mee" he sincrle failure and redundancy criteria.
7.6-8
7,6,1a.4. 3. 3. 3 RCIC S+eamline Pressure Honitoring
- 7. 6. 1a. 4. 3. 3. 3.
~ ~ ~ 1 Circuit Description
~ ~ ~
Steaml'ne pressure to the >CXC turbine is monitored to detect qross system leaks that may occur upstream of the dP element (elbow), causinq the line pressure to drop to an abnormally low level. This line pressure is monitored by the pressu"e sensors (see Subsection 7. 4. 1. 1. 3. 6) . 7,6,1a,4.3,3,3.$ Logic and -Sequencing Pressure sensors usinq two-out-of-two loqic detect abnormal low steamline pressure and initiate BCXC isolation signal. 7,6,1a,4.3. 3.3.-3 Bypasses and Interlocks No bypass or in+erlock provided. 7.6.1a.4.3.3.3.4
~ ~ ~ ~ Redundancy and Diversity Redundancy is,prov'ded by redundant pressure sensors. No diverse method is employed to detect qross system leaks upstream of the elbow.
7.6.1a. 4.3. 3.4 RCIC Flow Rat e Nonitorina
- 7. 6. 1a. 4. 3.3. 0. 1 Circu t Description The steamline from the nuclear boiler to the HClC turbine is instrumen ed with two di ferential pressure switches, one connecteR across each of two elbows in the line. The steam flow ra+e throuqh the line is mon'tored by the switches, and a trip
('solation) occurs when leakaqe c eates a steam line high flow condition. A time delay is incorporated to prevent inadvertent isolation. RCXC isolation is discussed in Subsection
- 7. 4.1.1. 3. 6.
- 7. 6-9
SSES-FSAH 7.6.1a.4.3.3.4.2 Logic and Sequencing R edundant instrumentation consists of one differential pressure switch in each logic, sensing high flow through the BCZC inlet steam line. Since isolation of the RCIC system is accomplished by independen actuation of either loqic, a sinqle failure of a system component in either logic will not prevent the required isolation function. A 3 sec. time delay in each logic division prevents inadvertent system isolations due to pressure spikes.
- 7. 6. 1a. 4. 3. 3. 4. 3 Bypass and Interlocks No byoasses or interlocks are provided.
7.6. 1a.4.3.3.4.4 Redundancy and Diversity isolation of the RCZC system 's accomplished using two separate loqics, each feeding the- r respective inboard and outboard isolation valves. Hach logic incorporates a single channel of RCXC high steam flow monitoring instrumentation. 7,6,1g.4.3,4 p~cgrgulation Pump Leak Detection
- 7. 6. 1a. 4. 3. 4. 1 Suhsgstem Xd ent ifica" ion The purpose of .he rec'rculation pump leak detec ion subsystem 's
+o monitor the rate of coolant seepaqe or leakage pas,. the pump shaft seals. Hxcessively high rates. of coolant flow past the seal will result in annunciator activation. There are two reci culation pump leak detec+ion systems, one for each of .he pumps 'n the recirculation loop. The reci" cula+ion pump leak detec+ion system consists of two types of monitorinq circu'ts, {Figure 7.6-1). The first of these monitors the nressure levels within the seal cavities, presentinq the plant operator with a visual display of the sensed pressure in each of the two cavit'es. The second type of monitoring circuit utilized hy ".he leak detection system monitors the rate c. liquid flow from the seal cavit'es.
- 7. 6-10
SS ES-PS AR ,7.6.1a.4.3.4.2 Pump Seal Cavity Pressure t Monitoring
- 7. 6. 1a. 4. 3. 4. 2. 1 Circuit Descr iption The pressure levels within. seal cavity No. 1 and seal cavity No.
2 are measured wi+h identical instruments arranged similarly. Only one circui., seal cavity No. 1 pressure monitoring, will be d'scussed. The pressure w'thin seal cavi+y No. 1 is measured usinq a pressure transmitter. The pressure transmit er, produces an output siqnal who e maqnitude is proportional to +he sensed pressure within i.s dynamic range. This output signal is then applied to pressure indicators for plant operator readou 7.6.1a.4.3.4.2.$ Logic and Sequencing No action is initiated by the pump seal cavity pressure moni+orinq circuit.
- 7. 6. 1a. 4,3. 4. 2. 3 Bypasses and Interlocks No bypass and interlocks are provided.
7.6.1a. 4.3. 4.g. 4 Redundancy and Diversity No redundancy is provided in this monitoring circuit.;he pump seal cav ty pressure monitoring is a diverse method of leak de ection to ~he seal cavi+y flow rate monitoring.
- 7. 6. 1a. 4. 3. 4. 3 Liquid Flow Rat e Monitoring
- 7. 6. 1a. 4. 3. 4. 3. 1 Ci "cuit Description All condensa+e flow'ng past the recirculation pump seal packings and into the seal cavities is collected and sent by one of two drain systems to the drywell equipment sump for disposal. The first drain system drains the major portion of the condensate collected within the No. 2 seal cav'ty. The condensate flow rate throuqh the drain svstem is measured (high/low) by a flow swi" ch.
The point at which +he microswitch closes can be adjus"ed so tha+ switch actuat'on occurs only above or below certain flow rates. 7.6-11
SSES-FSAR Excessively hiqh or low flow rates through this drain system will ac+ivate an annunciator in the main control'oom. The second drain system drains the cavity beyond the No. 2 seal cavity collec+inq "he condensate that has seeped {or leaked) past the outer seal. Th condensate flow rate through this drain system is also measured (hiqh), using a flow swi ch. The physical construction of this switch is similar to the flow switch described above, with only one contact set used to indicate the h'qh flow rate. A high flow rate through this system will activate an annuncia.or in the main control zoom.
- 7. fi. 1a. 4.3. 4. Q. p Logic and Soguencing
- 7. 6. 1a. 4. 3.4. 3. 3 Bvoasses and interlocks The function of the pressure and flow. rate instrumentation is to provide indication and annunciation. There are no bypasses or interlocks associated with this subsystem.
- 7. 6. 1a. 4. 3. 4. 3. 4 ReduTTdaT!cy and Diversity Redundant pressure and flow sensing instrumentation fo detecting shaft seal leakaqe is not provided since the function of this
'strumentation is to provide indication and annunciat'on. Back-up indica.ion of seal leakage is provided, however, by monitoring both seal cavities +o allow verification of seal failure. Excessive shaft seal leakage is collected by the d ywell equipment sump. 7,6,1g,,4. 3. 5 RHR System Teak Detection 7 6,1a,4,3. 5,1 Sub system Identification The steamline of the PHD system are constantly moni+ored for. leaks by the leak detection system. Teaks from the HHR system are detected by ambient and differential temperature monitoring, and in addit'on, hy flow rate, and system pressure. Loqic from all these channels is used to generate BHP, auto 'olation siqnals and alarm communication. If the mon'tored paramete s 'ndicate that a leak may exist, the detec.ion system responds by activatinq an annunciato= and initiatinq a BHH isola.ion trip loqic "iqnal. 7he RHR leak detection subsys+em consis's of three
- 7. 6-12
I I'
1 SSF S-FSAR
+ypes of monitorinq circuits. 'he first t of thesee monitors ambien and differential temperature, triqqerinq an annunciator when the temperature rises above a preset maximum. The second .ype of circuit utilized by this leak detection subsystem monitors the flow rate (differential pressure) through the steamline, triggering an annunciator when the differential pressure (flow) rises abov~ a. preset maximum. The third .ype of circu't ut'lized by this subsystem monitors the line pressure upstream of the differential pressure elemen+ and also is annunciated. Ou" puts from all three circuits are also used to aenerate the BHR aut.o-isolation siqnal.
- 7. 6. 1a. 4. 3. 5. 2 RHP Area Temperature Nonitoring
- 7. 6. 1a. 4. 3. 5. 2. 1 C' cui" D escr ipt ion The area temperature monitorinq circuit is similar to the one described for the main steamline tunnel temperature monitoring system (See Subsect ion 7. 3. 1. 1a. 2. 4.1. 12 and Figure 7. 6-2) .
- 7. 6. 1a. 4. 3. 5. 2. 2 Logic and Sequencing Usinq one-out-of-.wo loqic, the RBR area temperature t monitor act" vates an annuncia+orr and initiates RHR isolation s'gnal when e the observed temperature exceeds a preset limi+.
7,6,1a. 4. 3. 5. 2. 3 Bypasses and Tnt erlocks
!<o bypasses or interlocks are associated with this subsys..em.
- 7. 6. 1a. 4. 3. 5. 2,4 >nRundancy and Diversity Dual channels of ambient and differential temperature monitoring are p-ovided for leak detection =n the RHR system equipment area for each of the two loqic trains A and B. Since BHR system
.'solation 's accomplished by independent actuation of the inboard and outboard isolation valves from their respective loaic trains, a sinqle failure of a system component in either train will no. prevent the required isolation function.
- 7. 6-13
SSES-FS AR 7.6.1a.4.3.5.3 pPHR Flow Bate monitoring
- 7. 6. 1a. 4. 3. 5. 3. 1 Circuit Description Flow rate monitorinq is,.prqvj.ded on the RHR shutdown cooling return 1 ne and the RHR steamline to the RHB condensing heat exchanger.
I Flow rates in excess of the predetermined maximum are indicative of line leak or break, and will generate differential pressure a heads of sufficient maqnitude to cause dPZS actuation and provide au+oma+ic closure of RHB inboard and outboard isolation valves.
- 7. 6. 1a. 4. 3. 5. 3. 2 Logic and Seauencing Us'nq one-out-of-two logic, the flow ra+e monitoring circuit initiates a signal to isolate RHR inboard and outboard isolat'on valves when flow rate exceeds a preset limit-.
7.6. 1a. 4. 3. 5. 3. 3 Bypasses and Interlocks There are no bypasses or interlocks in th's system.
- 7. 6. 1g. 4. 3. 5. 3. 4 Redunda ncy ag d Diversity RHR steamline isolation is accomplished usinq the combined RCIC/BHR flow-mon'torinq system described in Subsection 7.6.1a.4.3.3.4.1. An independent flow monitorinq channel is orovided for each logic (i. e., A and B) . Flow monitoring in the shutdown coolinq return line utilizes two differential pressure switches, one for each logic. Zn both cases, BHR isolation is accomplished by'ndependent actuation of either logic; consequently, a single failure in either logic will not prevent
+he required'solation f unction. 7,6,1g,4.$ ,5,4 QHR Pgocegg Line Pressure Honitorinq Process line pressure for the common RHR/HPCX steamline is monitored to detect q oss system leaks that may occur upstream of the flow element, causinq the. line pressure to drop to an abnormally low level. Line pressure is monitored by fou"
- 7. 6-14
SSES-FSAR 7.6.1a.4.3.7.2.
~ 2 Logic and Sequencing
~ ~
Ho action is in'tiated
~
hy the safety/relief valve
~
temperature mon itori circuit. ng 7~6,1g,~4. 3. 7. 2. 3 Bypasses and Ent e~locks There are no bypasse or interlocks associated with this subsystem~ 7.6. 1a.4.3.7.2.4 Redundancv and Diversity No redunda. ncy or d 'ersity is required for t his system.
- 7. 6. 1a. 4. 3. 8 B~ar.+gr Vesse], Head Leak Detection
- 7. 6. 1a . 4. 3. 8. 1 Suhsgs tern Ident ifi cat. ion A pressure e between the inne- and outer head seal ring will be sensed hv a pressure indicator. If the inne- seal leaks, the pressure indicator will monitor t the pressure.
The plant will continue to operate with the outer seal as a backup and the inner seal can be repaired at the next outage when
.he head is removed. If both the inner and outer head seals leak, the leak will be detected by an increase in drywell "emperature and pressure.
7,6.1g.4.g.8.g Head Seal Inteqgitv Pressu e monitoring 7 6,1a. 4. 3 8 2. 1 Ci."cuit Descr'tion A pressure indicator will monitor the pressure between the inner and outer head seals.
- 7. 6-16
7.6.1a.4.3.8.2. 2 Logic and Seauenc'ng ~ No action is initiated
~
~
by the reactor vess'el head pressure mon itorinq circuit.
~ ~ ~
~
7,6. 1g. 4. 3. 8. 2. 3 Bypasses an d Int e~locks There ar~ no bypasses or interlocks associated vith this subsystem. 7.6.1a.4.3.8.2.4 Rednndancg and Diversity Redundant pressure-sensing instrumentation for detecting inner seal failure is not provided. The outer seal assembly prov'des back-up in +he event that, inner seal leak should occur. 7,6,1a. 4. 3. 9 HPCI System Leakage Detection 7,6. 1a. 4. 3. 9. 1 Subsystem Ident ificat 'n The s eamline of the high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) sys.em are constantly monitored for leaks by the leak detection system. least Leaks from the HPCI steamline vill cause a change in at one of the followinq monitored operatinq parameters: sensed area temperature, steam pressure, or steam flov rate. If
+he monitored parameters indicate that a leak may exist, the detection sys'em "esponds by act'vatinq an alarm and, dependinq upon the ac+'va+'nq parameter, in'tiates HPCI au.oisolat'on action.
The HPCI leakage de+ection system consis "s of three types of monitor'nq circui+s. The first of these monitors area ambient temperature, trigqerinq the alarm circui+ vhen the temperature r'ses above the prese" maximum. The second type of circuit utilized by the leakage detection sys".em monitors the flov rate, or d'erential pressure, +hrouqh the steam line, triggering an alarm circuit when ".he flov rate exceeds a preset maximum. The "bird type of circuit utilized by the HPCI leakaqe detection system mon'ors the steam line pressure upstream of the d'ferential pressure element. Alarm outputs from all three circuits are also used'o generate the HPCI auto-isolation siqnal. The ambient temperature moni orinq is similar to .hat described in main steamline leakage detection system.
- 7. 6-17
SSES-PS AH
- 7. 6. 1a. 4. 3. 9.2 HPCI Area Temperature Nonitoring
- 7. 6. 1a. 4. 3. 9. 2.~
~ 1 Circuit Description
~ ~ ~
The HPCI area and tunnel gobi.ent and differential temperature sen'sing elemen+s are thermocouples. Their outputs qo to temperature switches set to activate at a preset temperature. Closinq the temperature switches will liqht the point module alarm indicator and sound the high temperature alarm in the main control room. In addition, activation of the tunnel temperature switches will start +he timer, which after a suitable delay period, initiates HPCI isolation valve closure. If at any time durinq the timir.q cycle, the temperature switch contacts are opened, the timer 'w'll automatically reset and no isolation valve closure will result. Before timer timeout, the operator can ini".iate isolation by depressing pushbutton sw'+ch HPCI ISOLATE. This action will bypass +he timer circuits and, providinq no loqic test is in progress, the HPCI isolat'on valves will close. HPCI equ.'pment area ambient temperatures are mon'tored by local and emerqency area cooler inlet temperature sensors. Hiqh amb'er.. ar.d differential temperature from the HPCI area ini"iates i sola'tion valve closure. I' he HPCT isolation valves do not receive an isolation siqnal for approximately one (1) second followinq actuation of either HPCl area temperature moni..orinq system or the .unnel temperature monitorinq system'. This time delay prevents false isolation siqnals from heinq sen+ to HPCI loqic every time the temperature sw: tches are enerqized. 7.6.1a.4.$ .9 2. p Lyric and Sequencing The two division HPCI temperature monitors wo k on a one out of two loqic tha initiates the 'sola tion loqic. There are five temperature monito=s per d v'ion which consist of three area (.two ambient and one differential) and two tunnel {one ambier.+ and one differe r.t 'l) temperature monito s. The +unnel .emperature siqnals are time delay ed before 'ni+iating the isolat on loqic. 7.6.1a.4.3.9.2. 3 RyDasses and Interlock"
- 7. 6-18
SSZS-PSAR t A bypass/test switch is provided in each logic divis on for the purpose of testing the HPCI logic vithout initia ing HPCI system isolation. Placing the keyswitch in Bypass pos'tion in one divisior. vill not prevent operation of the temperature monitor in the opposite division vhen required for HPCI system isolation. Ho interlocks are provided from this subsystem. 7.6. 1a. 4.3. 9.P,4 redundancy and Diversity Theze are tvo indeoendent HPCI leakage detection divisions. The HPCI area ambient temperature monitorinq is a diverse method of HPCI leaR detection to the HPCI steam'ine pressure and flow rate (diffe ential pressure) monitoring. 7,6. 1a. 4. 3. 9. 3 HPCI Steam Flow tJon itor in@ 7,6,1a. 4. 3. 9. 3. 1 T)escription The steamline from the nuclear boiler leading to the HPCI turbine is '.strumented so .hat the steam flow rate through it, and its oressure, can be monitored and used to ind'cate the p esence of a leak'r break. In the presence of a leak, the HPCI system esponds by operatirq the auto-isolation signal. This portion of the discussion on HPCI system leakaqe detection is lim'ed to the flow rate nstrumentation and does not cover the system isolation procedures. Steam flovinq through the steam line vill develop a differential pressure head ac oss the elbow located inside the primary containment. The magnitude of the head propoztional to he square of the flow rate is measured by a dPIS. Flow rates in excess of ..he predetermined maximum irdicative of a line leak or b eak will qenerate diffezential pressure heads of sufficient magnitude to cause a dPIS actuation. Ac+uation occurs following a preset time delay to prevent inadvertent isolation. HPCI isola+ion is discussed in Subsection 7. 3. 1. 1a. 1.3.7.
- 7. 6. 1a. 4. 3. 9. 3. g Loaic and Seguencinq Usinq one-out-of-tvo logic, the HPCI steam flow monitoring circuit initiates a HPCI isolation signal when the flov rate exceeds a Dreset limit.
- 7. 6. 1a. 4. 3. 9. 3. 3 Bypass@ s and Interlocks
- 7. 6-19
SSES-FSAB See paragraph 7. 6. 1a. 4. 3. 9. 2. 3.
- 7. 6. 1a. 4. 3. 9. 3. 4
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ Redundancy an d D jyers ity There are two independen" QPCI leakaqe detection channels.
7 6.1a.4.3.9.4 HPCI Steamline Pressure Nonitorina
- 7. 6. 1a ~4 3. 9. 4. 1 C'cu it D esrr ipt ion Steamline pressure to the HPCI turbine is mon'tored to detect gross system leaks that may occur upstream of the dP element, causinq he line pressure to drop to an abnormally low level.
Line pressure is monitored by pressure switches, actuatinq on low pressure to also qenerate the auto-isolation signal. 7.6.1a.4.3.9.4. 2 Logic and Sequencing IJsinq two-out-off two t logic, the t HPCI steamline pressure s moni.orinq circu't i initiates a HPCI isolation s signal when, the pre "sure f alls below a preset limit.
- 7. 6. 1a. 4. 3. 9. 4. 3 Bypasses and Inte locks See Subsection 7.6.1a.4.3.9. 2. 3 for discussion
- 7. 6. 1a. 4. 3. 9. 4. 4 Redundancy and Diversity There are two independent HPCI leakaqe detection channels.
7.6.1a.4 4 System and Subsystem Separation Criteria See Section 3.12 for discussion on separation. 7 A 6.1a.4.5
~ ~ -- System
'yw
--and Subsvstem z Testability 7.6-20
SSHS-FS AH The proper operation of the sensor and the loqic associatede with the leak detection systems is verified during the leak detection system preoperational test and, durinq inspection tests that are r provided for the various components during plan+ operation. Hach temperature switch, both ambient and differential types, is connec+ed to dual thermocouple elements. Hach temoerature switch contains a trip light which lights when the temperature exceeds the set point. Xn addition, keylock tes+ switches are provided so tha+ logic can be tested without sending an isolation siqnal to the sys+em involved. Thus, a complete sys.em check can be confirmed by checkinq activation of the isolation relay associated w'th each switch. RRCO differential flow leak detection alarm units are tested by inputtinq a millivolt siqnal to simulate a high differential flow. Alarm and indicator lights monitor the status of the trip c'rcu't. Testinq of flow, reactor vessel level, and pressure leak detection equipment is described in Subsections 7.3.1.1a.1, and
- 7. 3.1.1a.2.
7.6.1a.4.6 ~ System and Subsystem environmental Considerations ,The r wirinq, and elec"t onics of the leak detec-ion system sensors, which are associated with the isolation valve logic are designed
+o w'hstand the envelope conditions that follow a LOCA. (See Tables 3. 11-1, 3. 11-2, and 3. 11-3.)
All port'ns of the leak detection system which provide for isolation of other systems or portions of systems are environmentally qualified o meet the requiremen s for Class electrical equipment (See Section 3.11.) . 7,6 Qa 0.7 System and subsystem operational Considerations The operator is ken aware of the status of the leak detection system throuqh meters and recorders which indicate +he measured variables in the control room. Xf a trip occurs, the condition
's continuously annunicated in the main control room.
Leak detection system bypass switches are provided on a backrow panel in the main control room to allow bypassinq of certain trip functions dur'nq testinq.
- 7. 6-21
SS ES-FS AR The operator can manually operate valves which are affected by the leak detect on system during normal opera" ion. Shen a trip ~
'conditions exists, the isolation logic must be reset before
~
'ur.her manual valve operations can ~ be performed. Manual reset switches are provided in the main control room.
~
The e is no vital supporgm.q. system which supplies direct support for the leak detection systems. 7.6.1a.5 Neutron Monitorinq System-Instrumentation and Controls The neutron monitorinq system consists of six major subsystems:
.(1) Source ranqe monitor subsystem (SRM),
(2) Intermediate ranqe monitor subsystem m (IBM), (3) Local powe" range monitor subsystem (LPRM), (4) Averaqe power range monitor subsystem (APRM), (5) Bod block monitor subsystem (RBM), and (6) Traversinq 'n-core probe subsystem (TIP) .
>.6.1a.5.1 System Identification The purpose of ..his system is to monitor the power in the core and provide signals to the BPS and the rod block portion of the reac.o= manual control system. It also provides information for .opera ion and cont ol of the reactor.
he IRM and APBM subsystems provide a safety function, and have been des'ned to meet particular requirements established by the NRC., The LPBM subsystem has been designed to provide a sufficient numbe of LPRM 'nputs to the APBM subsystem to meet the. APRM reauiremen-'s. All other po"tions of the Neutron Monitorinq System have no safety function. The ystem is classif'ed as shown in. Ta'ble 3. 2-1. The safety related subsystems are qualified in accordance with Sections 3. 10 and
- 3. 11.
- 7. 6. 1a. 5. 2 Power Source
- 7. 6-22
SSE S-PS AR 7.6.1b.2.5 Standby Gas Treatment System Exhaust Vent Radiation Monitoring Subsystem The descriotion of the instrumentation and its function is provided in Subsection 11.5.2.1.4.
- 7. 6. 1b. 3 Diesel Generator Xnitia+ion-Instrumentation and Controls-Interlocks between NSSS systems and non-NSSS systems in Unit 1 and 2 provide the initiation for the start of the diesel generators and a"e identified as follows:
Diesel Generator A Start Signal {one signal each'from Units 1 and 2) Diesel Genera".or B Start Signal {one signal each from Units 1 and 2) Diesel Generator C Start Signal {one signal each from Units 1 and 2) Diesel Generator D Start. Signal {one signal each +rom Units 1 and 2)
- 7. 6. 1h. 3. 1 Xg it ia t ion The initiation circuit for the diesel genera. or start signal orinates in the NSSS system logic. Hiqh drywell pressure and/or. low reactor wate" level, arranged in two instrument channels taken twice, will initiate each of the four diesel s.art circuits. NSSS componenets in the RHR and core sp ay systems are utilized. manual initiation of a RHR or core spray system will sta t the d'esel associated w'th that system. Loss of offsite power also au+omatically initia es diesel start.
Individual manual start is also provided on the plant operating henchhoard.
- 7. 6-51
Page 1 TABLE 18.1-10 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION ACTUATION PROVISIONS (12) AUTOMATIC P&ID E OR BASIS PENETR. VALVE ACTUATION AUTO OPEN OTHER SYSTEM NE (1) NO. VALVE NO. ACTUATION SIGNALS (2) ON ISO SET R &fARKS M-113 X-24 HV-11313 AI F,G NO (6) REAC -11345 AI FJG NO (6) BLDG NE X-23 . HV-11314 AI F,G NO (6) CCW -11346 AI F,G NO (6) M-126 2. X-41 SV-12654A RM INSTRUM -126154 CKV GAS 2. X-21 SV-12654B RM
-126152 CKV NE 3. X-19 SV-12651 AI F,G NO
-126074 CKV NE 3. X-93 SV-12661 AI B,F NO
-126072 CKV NE 3. X-87 SV-12605 AI F,G NO HV-12603 AI F,G NO NE 3. X-218 SV-12671 AI B,F NO
-126164 CKV M-139 NE 4. X-7A E32-1F001B (3) N/A MSIV (B,C,D) (F,K,P)
LEAKAGE CONTROL SYSTEM M-141 NE 4, X-7A'B.C~D) B21-1F028A AI (a) NO (4) (11) NUCLEAR (B,C,D) BOILER -1F022A AI (a) NO (4) (11) (B,C,D) NE 4. X-8 B21-1F016 AI (a) NO (4)
=1F019 AI (a) NO (4)
- 5. X-9A B21-1F032A RM
F Page TABLE 18.1-10 (Continued) AUTOMATIC P&ID E OR BASIS PENETR. VALVE- ACTUATION AUTO OPEN OTHER SYSTEM NE (1) NO. VALVE NO. ACTUATION SIGNALS (2) ON ISO SET R&1ARKS M-141 B21-1F010A CK NUCLEAR E 5. X-9B B21-1F032B RM BOILER -1F010B CK (CONT.) NE 30. X-35A, J004 A,F NO C,D,E,F J004 M-143 8. X-60B B31-1F019 AI B,C NO (5) (11) REACTOR -1F020 AI B>C NO (5) (11) RECIRC NF. 29. N-60A B31-1F013A CK
-1F017A XFC NE 29. X-31B B31-1F013B CK
-1F017B XFC M-144 NE 7. X-14 G33-1F001 AI (c) NO RWCU -1F004 AI (c) NO NE 7. X-9A/B G33-1F042 RM
-1F104 RM M-148 9. X-42 C41-'1F007 CK STANDBY -1F006 RM LIQUID CONTROL M-149 6. X-9A E51-1F013 AC NO RCIC 6. X-10 E51-1F088 AI (k) YES
-1F007 AI (k) YES
-1F008 AI (k) YES
- 6. X-216 E5 1-1F019 AC N/A
-1F 021 CK
- 6. X-245 E51-1F084 AI F,K,B N/A
-1F062 AI F,K,B N/A
Page 3 TABLE 18.1-10 (Continued) AUTOMATIC P&ID E OR BASIS PENETR. VALVE ACTUATION AUTO OPEN OTHER SYSTEM NE (1) NO. VALVE NO. ACTUATION SIGNALS (2) ON ISO SET RBfARKS M-149 E 6. X-215 E51-1F059 RM RCIC -1F040 CK (CONT.) E 6. X-217 E51-1F060 RM
-1F028 CK
- 6. X-214 E51-1F031 M-151 NE 10. X-17 Ell-1F023 AI (d) NO RHR -1F022 AI (d) NO
- 11. X-39A Ell-1F016A AC F,G (9)
- 12. X-13A Ell-1F015A AC NO
-1F050A AC NO
-1F122A AC NO E 11. X-205A Ell-1F028A AC F,G (9)
NE 13. X-205A Ell-1F011A AI F,G NO E 13. X-204A Ell-1F028A AC F,G (9) NE 13. X-204A Ell-1F011A AI F,G NO E 14. X-226A Ell-1F007A AC N/A E 15. X-246A Ell-1F055A PSV
-15106A PSV
-1F103A RM
- 15. X-246B Ell-1F055B PSV
-15106B PSV
-1F103B RM
-1F097 PSV
- 16. X-203A Ell-1F004A RM
- 16. X-203C Ell-1F004C RM
- 11. X-39B Ell-1F016B AC F,G (9)
- 12. X-13B Ell-1F015B AC NO
-1F050B AC NO
-1F122B AC NO
- 12. X-12 Ell-1F008 AI (b) NO
-1F009 AI (b) NO
-1F126 PSV X-205B Ell-1F028B AC F,G (9)
Page TABLE 18.1-10 (Contlnued) AUTOMATIC PAID E OR BASIS PENETR. VALVE ACTUATION AUTO OPEN OTHER SYSTEM NE (1) NO. VALVE NO. ACTUATION SIGNALS (2) ON ISO SET REIlARKS M-151 NE Ell-1F011B AI F,G NO RHR. E 13. X-204B Ell-lF028B AC- F,G (9) (CONT. ) NE -1F011B AI F,G NO E 14. X-226B E1.1-1F007B AC N/A E 16. X-203D Ell-1F004D
- 16. X-203B Ell-1F004B M-152 17. X-16A E21-1F005A AC (10)
CORE -1F006A RM (11) SPRAY -1F037A c RM (>>)
- 17. X-16B E21-1F005B AC (io).
-1F006B RM (11)
-1F037B RM (ll)
NE 18. X-207A E21-1F015A AC (10) NE 18. X-207B E21-1F015B AC F,G (10) E 19. X-208A E21-1F031A AC F,G N/A
- 19. X-208B E21-1F031B AC N/A E 20. X-206A E21-1F001A RM E 20. X-206B E21-1F001B RM M-155 21. X-11 E41-1F002 AI (j.) YES HPCI -1F003 AI (I) YES
-1F100 AI (1) YES
- 22. X-211 E41-1F012 AC N/A
-1F046 CK
- 21. X-244 E41-1F079 AI F,LB N/A
-1F075 AI F,LB N/A
- 21. X-210 E41-1F066
-1F049 CK E 23. X-209 E41-1F042 AI NO E 5. X-9B E41-1F006 AC (10)
Page. TABLE 18.1-10-(Continued) AUTOMATIC P&ID E OR BASIS PFNETR. VALVE . ACTUATION AUTO OPEN OTHER SYSTEM NE (1) NO. VALVE NO. ACTUATION SIGNALS (2) ON ISO SET REMARKS M-157 NE 24. X-26 HV-15711'15713 AI B,F,R NO (7) CONTMT AI NO (7) ATMOS -15714 AI B,F,R NO (7) CONTROL E 25. X-60A SV-15740A AI B,F NO (8)
-15742A AI B,1',F NO (8)
- 25. X-60A SV-15750A AI NO (8)
-15752A AI B,F NO (8)
- 24. X-202 HV-15703 AI B,F,R NO (7)
-15704 AI NO (7)
-15705 AI NO (7)
- 25. X-221A SV-15780A AI B,F NO (S)
-15782A AI B,F NO (8)
- 25. X-238A SV-15736A AI B,F NO (8)
-15734A AI B,F NO (8)
- 25. X-80C SV-15740B AI B,F NO (S)
-15742B AI B,F NO (8)
- 25. X-80C SV-15750B AI B,F NO (8)
-15752B AI B,r NO (S)
- 25. X-80C SV-15776B AI B,F,R NO (8)
-15774B AI B,F NO (8)
-15767 AI B,F,R NO NE 24. X-25 HV-15722 AI NO (7)
-15723 AI NO (7)
-15721 AI NO (7)
-15724 AI NO NE 24. X-201A jjv-15725 AI NO (7)
-15724 AI NO (7)
-15721 AI NO
-15723 AI NO
- 25. X-238B SV-15734B AI B,F NO (8)-
-15736B AI B,F,R NO (8)
-15737 AI NO (7)
- 25. X-233 SV-15780B AI B,F NO (8)
-15782B AI B,F NO (8)
- 25. X-88B SV-15776A AI B,F NO (8)
'ABLE Page 18.1-10 (Continued)
AUTOMATIC PAID E OR BASIS PENETR. VALVE ACTUATION AUTO OPEN OTHER SYSTEM NE (1) NO. VALVE NO. ACTUATION SIGNALS (2) ON ISO SET REMARKS M-157 SV-15774'A AI B,F NO (8) CONTMT NE 26. X-243 HV-15766 AI A,F NO ATMOS -15768 AI A,F NO CONTROL (CONT.) M-161 NE 27. X-72B HV-16108A1 AI B,F NO (11) LIQUID -16108A2 AI B,F NO (11) RADWASTE NE 27. X-72A HV-16116A1 AI B,F NO (11) CONTROL -16116A2 AI B,F NO (ll) Mi-187 NE X-85B HV-18791A2 AI B,F NO (11) REACTOR -18792B2 AI B,F NO (11) BLDG NE X-85A HV-18791Al AI B,P NO (11) CHILLED -18792B1 AI B,F NO (11) WATER NE X-54 HV-18781B2 AI F,G NO (11)
-18782A2 AI F>G NO (11)
NE X-53 HV-18781B1 AI F,G NO (11)
-18782A1 AI F,G NO (11)
NE X-86B HV-18791B2 AI B,F NO (>>)
-18792A2 AI B,F .NO (>>)
NE X-86A HV-18791B1 AI B,F NO (11)
-18792A1 AI B,F NO (11)
NE X-56 HV-18781A2 AI F,G NO (11)
-18782B2 AI F,G NO (11)
NE X-55 HV-18781Al AI F>G NO (11)
-18782B1 AI F,G NO (11)
SSES-FSAB TABLE 18.1-10 /Continued) Page 7
~
BP.NARKS (1) Essential or non-essential classification basis codes are descr ibed in Table 18. 1-11.'2) Automatic actua+ ion siqnal codes are described in Table 18.1-12. Actuation signals not fo Primary Containment or for system 'solation are not listed. All power-operated isolation valves are capable of remote-manual operation from the Control Room. (3) E32-1F0018 au omatic actuation signal is dependent upon action of ilSXV's, +ime, RPV pressure. The valve is normally closed and inte locked when RPV pressure is greater than 35 Dsiq The valve, canno+ be opened unless the inboard HSIV is closed. Information presented is representative of tha+ for main steam lines B, C and D. (4) Automatic signal for isolation UA can be bypassed (B21-S25A, B, C, D) when the mode switch is not in Run, turbine stop valves are closed, and RPV pressure is less than the high pressure scram setpoint. (5'I Peactor recirculation system sample line valves B31- 1P019 and 1F020 receive h'qh "adiation siqnals for isola+ion but since the 1'ne does not provide an open path from the containment to the environs, the radiation isolation signal may he conside"ed a diverse siqnal in accordance with Standard Review Plan 6. 2. 4. This judgement is based on our defini+ion of an open path as a di"ect, untreated path to the outside envirori'ment. (6) ".ithe .valve openira (or closinq) vill energize a common open (close) s.atus liqht. HS-11314 controls both valves. Typ'cal for HV-11345 and HV-11346. (7) Closes on "LOCA~'ignal hut can be reopened after 45 minu.es. Valves can be administratively reopened if the h'qh drywell pressure is due to plant heat up or loss of drywell cooler.
SSES-FSAR TABLE 18. 1-10 /Continued) Page 8 (8) Closed on "LOCA" signal but can be reopened after 10 minutes. (9) initiation reset vill automatically reopen valve if valve handswitch is in open position. (l0) I ni tia tion re se t vill no t automatically reopen valve. e (l3.) Pneumat p ic actuated valve. (l2) Hand valves arrl 'strument sensing line excess floe check valves are listed in Tables 6. 2-12 and 6.2-12a.
SSES-FSA R TABLE 18. 1-11 FSSFNTIALQNON-ESSENTIAL PENETRATION CLASSIFICATION BASIS Closed Coolinq Water . Non-essential since used during normal operation only for reactor recircula.ion pum p coolinq, reactor water cleanup and other syst: em components. No,. required for design basis accident situation. (2) Containment Intstrument, Gas Essen ial to support safety equipment. (3) Instrument Gas Non-essential support to non-safe y rela+ed equipment, and or testing of safety related equipmont. (4) Hain Steam Line and NSIV Leakage Control System Non essen.ial for shutdown. (5) Feedwater Line - Not essential for shutdown hut desirable for makeup va er to vessel. Portion between reactor vessel and outermost containment isolation valve is essential for HPCI and RCIC injection. (6) Reactor Core I. oltion Coolinq - Essential for core coolinq follovinq isolation from turbine condenser and feedvater ma ko.u p. ('7 ) Reactor Rater Cleanup Not essential dur'nq or immediately follow'q an acciden . ?maybe importan in lonq +erm recovery operations. (8) Reactor Rate Sampling Not essent'al for safe shutdovn. Post-accident samples vill be taken utilizing the post-acc'ent samplinq system developed in response to i+em II ~ P ~ 3 ~ (9) Standby Liquid Con"rol Essential as backup to CRD system. (10) Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Head Spray Not essential for safe shutdown. (ll) RHR Containment/Suppression Pool Spray - Essent'al fo-pressure con"rol. (12) RHR Shutdown Cooling Essential to achieve cold shutdown. (13) RHR, Steam Condensing Recirc. j'st Retu n Line ??ot essen+ial since no,. a safety function. Used during ho+ standby and pump tests.
SSES-FSAR Page 2 TABLE 18. 1-11 /Cont inued} (14). RHR Pump Nin'mum Flow Recirculation Essential for protect pumps for safety function. (15) RHR heat Exchar.qer Relief Valve Discharge Line Essential to protect HX from..ovarpressurization for use in safety,. function. (16) RHR Suppression Pool Suction - Essential for vessel injection and pool cooling safety func+ions. (17) Core Spray Injection - E-sential safety function. (18) Core Spray Pump Test Return Lines -- ?ion-essen.ial. Used only durinq testing of pumps. (19) Core Spray Pumos Nin. Flow Bypass Esser.tail to protect pumps for safety function. 4 (20) Core Spray Suppression Pool Suction Essential for vessel injec ion safety function. (21) High Pressure Coolent Injection (HPCI) Turbine Steam Supply and Exhaust-Essent'al to drive HPCI pump for vessel in)ection safety function.
~
(22) HPCI Pump Nir.. Recirc. - Essential to protect pump for
~ ~
safe y functior..
\
(23) HPCI Suppression Pool Suction Essential for vessel injection safety'unction. Backup +o Condensate Storage ank ..uppl y. (2'4) Containment A tmospheric Pu rqe Non-essent ial vent path to Standby Gas Treatment System. Backup to four hydrogen recomb incr s. (25) Containment Atmoshere Samplinq Essential. Not required for shu down, but would be necessary for post-accident assessment. (26) Suopression Pool Rater Filtration - Not essential. Used only for periodic cleanup of pool water. (27) Liquid Rad waste collection Non-essential for safe shu down. (28) Reactor Bldg. Chilled Rater Non-essential supply to recirculation nump motor coolers, drywell coolers.
SSES-CESAR Page 3 TABT.E 18.1-11 /Continued} (29) Reactor Recirc. Pump Seal Vater Supply Yon-essential Recirc. Pump operation is not required for safe shutdown. (30) TIP Guide'ube Isolation Non-essential. TIP system not requi ed for safe shMdown.
SS F S-FSAR TABLE 18. 1-12 ACTUATIONQISOLATION STGNAL CODES Fi COPPESPONDING ACTUATING SMTTCHES Isola ion actuation siqnals are listed and descr'bed below. Interlocks and bypasses are identified and described, in Sections
- 7. 3. 1. 1a. 2 and 7. 3. 1. 1b..2..
Reactor Vessel Rater Level - Low Level 3 Reactor Ve sel Rate" Level Low Level 2 C hain Steam Line Radiation Hiqh
)lain Steam Line Flow - High EA Reacto" Buildinq Steam L'ne Tunnel Temperature - High Reactor Building,Steam Line Tunnel Differential Temperature-High Turbine Building Steam Line Tunnel Temperature High Drywell pressure High Reactor Vessel Mater Level Low, Low, Low Level I S andby Liquid Control System Nanual Initiation RMCS Diffe"ential Flow High RRCS Differential Pressu e High RCTC Steam Line Pressure Hiqh RCIC Steam Su pply Pressure Low RCIC Turbine Exhaust Diaphragm Pressure High RCIC Equipment Room Temperature High RCTC Equipment Room T~mper at ur e H'gh f'F RCIC Pipe Pouting Area ~
emperature High RCIC Pipe Routinq Area Temperature High FCTC Fmerqercy Area Cooler Temperature High LA HPCI Steam Line Pressure High HPCI Steam Supply Pressure Low
SSES-FSAR TABLE 18.1-12 /Page 2 of 2) LD ffPCI Turb'ne Exhaust Diaphragm Pressure fIPCI Equipment Room temperature Hiqh High LE HPCI Equi@ment Room Temperature - High HPCI Emergency Area Cooler Temperature High LG HPCI Pipe Routing Area Temper ature High LH HPCI .Pipe Routing Area Temperature High RHP Equipment Area Differential Temperature - Hiqh RffR Equipment Area Temperature Hiqh RHR System Flow - ffiqh Turbine First Staqe Pressure Low SGTS Exhaust Radiation High Main Condenser Vacuum Low Peactor Vessel Pressu e.- fgigp VA RMCS Area Temperatu e High RffCS Area Ventilation Di+ferential Temoerature High Isolation Actuat. on Groupinqs (a.) B, C, D, EA, EB, EC~ P, fIA (b) NA, MB, NC, UB (c) B, JA, JB, RA, MB A, F, MA, MB, MC, UB KAt KB@ KCt KDt KEr KFt KGt KH LA, LB, LC, LD, LE, LF~ LG, LH
CONTAINMENT DETAIL (q) I I I I I I I I TC TC DETAIL (r) TC SUPP POOL REV 1 (7/78) MO MOTOR OPERATED SUSQUEKANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION SV SOLENOID VALVE UNITS 1 AND 2 TC TEST CONN ECTION FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT COHTAZHMEHT PENETRA7ION DETAXLS FIGURE
a >(
TC SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION UNITS 1 AND 2 FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT CONTAINMENT PENETRATION DETAILS FIGURE 6.2-44n
V t
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