ML18022A969

LER 95-008-00:on 950902,charging/SI Pump B (Csip) Returned to Svc Prior to Required Acceptance Testing.Caused by Personnel Error.Csip a Placed in Svc on 950902 & Csip B Declared inoperable.W/950928 Ltr

ML18022A969
Person / Time
Site:	Harris
Issue date:	09/28/1995
From:	Donahue J, Verrilli M CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
HO-950703, LER-95-008-01, LER-95-8-1, NUDOCS 9510050289
Download: ML18022A969 (7)

Text

PRIUS J.'l'X L REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR:9510050289 DOC.DATE: 95/09/28 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET g FACIL:50-400 Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1, Carolina 05000400 P AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION VERRILLI,M. Carolina Power & Light Co.

DONAHUE,J.W. Carolina Power & Light Co.

RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT:

LER 95-008-00:on 950902,charging/SI pump B (CSIP) returned to svc prior to required acceptance testing. Caused by O personnel error.CSIP A placed in svc on 950902 & CSIP B declared inoperable.W/950928 ltr. R ~

DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22T COPIES RECEIVED LTR ENCL SIZE-TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Inciden Rpt, etc.

NOTES:Application for permit renewal filed. 05000400 RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL PD2-1 PD 1 1 LE,N 1 1 INTERNAL: ACRS 1 1 AEODj~D/RAB 2 2 AEOD/SPD/RRAB 1 1 FIXE CBNTER~ 1 1 NRR/DE/ECGB 1 1 RR/>>DE/EEI"B 1 1 NRR/DE/EMEB 1 1 NRR/DISP/PIPB 1 1 NRR/DRCH/HHFB 1 1 NRR/DRCH/HICB 1 1 NRR/DRCH/HOLB 1 1 NRR/DRPM/PECB 1 1 NRR/DSSA/SPLB 1 1 NRR/DSSA/SPSB/B 1 1 NRR/DSSA/SRXB 1 1 RES/DSIR/EIB 1 1 RGN2 FILE Ol 1 1 C

EXTERNAL: L ST LOBBY WARD 1 1 LITCO BRYCE i J H 2 2 NOAC MURPHY,G.A 1 1 NOAC POORE,W. 1 1 NRC PDR 1 1 NUDOCS FULL TXT 1 1 N

NOTE TO ALL "RIDS" RECIPIENTS:

PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE! CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK, ROOM OWFN 5DS (415-2083) TO ELIMINATE YOUR NAME FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DON'T NEED!

FULL TEXT CONVERSION REQUIRED TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 27 ENCL 27

Carolina Power & Light Company Harris Nuclear Plant PO Box 165 New Hill NC 27562 SEP 28 1995 Letter Number: HO-950703 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: NRC Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT 1 DOCKET NO. 50-400 LICENSE NO. NPF-63 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 95-008-00 Gentlemen:

In accordance with Title 10 to the Code of Federal Regulations, the enclosed Licensee Event Report is submitted. This report concerns returning the "B" Charging/Safety Injection Pump to operable status without having completed all required operability verification testing.

Sincerely, J. W. onahue General Manager Harris Plant MV Enclosure c: Mr. S. D. Ebneter (NRC - RII)

Mr. N. B. Le (NRC - PM/NRR)

Mr. S. A. Elrod (NRC - SHNPP) 9510050289 950928 PDR ADOCK 05000400 8 PDR State Road 1134 New Hill NC

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 2 cc: Ms. D. B. Alexander Mr. W. R. Campbell (BNP)

Mr. J. M. Collins Mr. J. P. Cowan Ms. S. D. Floyd Mr. H. W. Habermeyer, Jr.

Ms. T. A. Head (GLS File)

Mr. G. D. Hicks (BNP)

Mr. M. D. Hill Mr. R. M. Erich (RNP)

Mr. P. M. Odom (RNP)

Mr. C. W. Martin (BNP)

Mr. R. D. Martin Admiral K. R. McKee Mr. J. P. McKone Mr. J. W. Moyer (RNP)

Mr. W. R. Robinson Mr. G. A. Rolfson Mr. C. T. Sawyer Mr. R. S. Stancil Mr. J. P. Thompson (BNP)

Mr. T. D. Walt HNP Real Time Training INPO NLS File: HI/A-2D (L. M. Randall)

NRC FORM 366, U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMHISSION 0 E 8 NO. 3150-0104 (5-92) EXPIRES 4/30/98 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 MRS.

REPORTED LESSONS LEARNED ARE INCORPORATED INTO THE LICENSING PROCESS AND FED BACK TO INDUSTRY.

(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block) FORWARD CONENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION. WASHINGTON.

DC 20555-0001. AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PR(UECT (3150-0104). OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAHE (1) DXKET NUMBER (2) PAGE (3)

Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant-Unit ¹1 1 of 3 TITLE (4) "B" Charging/Safety Injection Pump was returned to service prior to required acceptance testing, resulting in Technical S ecification violation.

EVENT DATE (5) LER NUMBER (6) REPORT DATE (7) OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)

SEQUENTIAL REViSION FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR NUMBER NUYBER MONTH DAY 05000 FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 09 02 95 95 008 00 09 28 95 05000 OPERATING THIS REPORT IS SUBHITTEO PURSUANT TO iHE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 5: (Check one or more) (11)

HODE (9) 20.402(b) 20.405(c) 50.73(a)(2)(iv) 73.71(b)

POWER 20.405(a)(1)(i) 50.36(c)(1) 50.73(a)(2)(v) 73.71(c)

OX LEVEL (10) 20.405(a)(1)(ii) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(vii) OTHER 20.405(a) (1) (i i I ) Z 50.73(a)(2)(i) 50.73(a)(2)<viii)<A) (Specify in 20.405(a)(1)(iv) 50.73(a)(Z)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) Abstract and in Text.

belaw 20.405(a)(1)(v) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(x) NRC Form 366A)

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME TELEPHONE M%HER (Include Area Code)

Michael Verrilli Sr. Analyst - Licensing (919) 362-2303 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH CDHPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

REPORTABLE REPORTABLE CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER CAUSE SYSTEM COYPONENT MANUFACTURER TO NPRDS TO NPRDS SUPPLEHENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14) EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR YES SUBHISSION (If yes. complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE). X NO DATE (15)

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e.. approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)

On July 27, 1995, a modification was made to the internals of the "B" Charging/Safety Injection Pump (CSIP)

Mini-Flow Recirculation Check Valve (1CS-193) to correct identified back leakage problems. During post-modification testing conducted on August 2, 1995, 1CS-193 failed the forward-flow portion of the acceptance test. This test failure however, was not annotated on the Equipment Inoperable Record (EIR ¹95-E0067T) that had been generated to track inoperability and ensure proper restoration of the "B" CSIP. At 1432, on September 2, 1995, to prepare for refueling outage surveillance testing, the "B" CSIP was returned to service and declared operable. The documentation review that was performed prior to declaring the "B" CSIP operable did not identify the forward flow test failure. Approximately seven hours after placing the "B" CSIP in service, the pump's operability status was questioned by the NRC Resident Inspector, which resulted in determining that adequate testing had not been performed to properly restore the "B" CSIP to operation. Operations personnel promptly restored the "A" CSIP and declared the "B" CSIP inoperable. This condition constitutes a violation of Technical Specification 3.1.2.1, which requires one boron injection flow path, including a CSIP, to be operable in Modes 4-6.

The cause of this event was personnel error on the part of the control room staff following performance of the post-modification surveillance test for 1CS-193. The failed forward flow condition was not properly documented in the appropriate EIR as required by procedure. Corrective actions will include counseling the involved individuals, training other appropriate operations personnel and revising applicable Operations procedures to enhance the EIR management process.

NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION PROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 (5-92) .EXPIRES 5/31'/95 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS.

FORWARD CQSENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO LICENGEE EVENT REPORT (LER) THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNBB 7714) ~ U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION.

WASHINGTON. OC 20555-0001. ANO TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET WASHINGTON. OC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1) DXKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)

SEQUENTIAL REVISION NUMBER NUMBER Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant - Unit ¹1 05000/400 2OF3 95 008 00 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

EVENT DESCRIPTION:

On July 8, 1995, Equipment Inoperable Record (EIR) ¹95-E0066T was generated to track inoperability and ensure proper restoration of the "B" Charging/Safety Injection Pump (CSIP) Mini-Flow Recirculation Check Valve (1CS-193), after it failed backseat leakage testing. EIR ¹95-E0067T was also initiated at this time for the "B" CSIP, due to closing the isolation valve upstream of 1CS-193 to ensure operability of the "A" and "C" CSIP's. The cause of the 1CS-193 backseat leakage condition was determined to be a failure of the check valves internals. To correct this problem a modification (Engineering Service Request / ESR 9500641) was implemented on July 27, 1995. Following implementation of the modification, EIR ¹95-E0066T for 1CS-193, was properly annotated by control room personnel to indicate the need for the ESR 9500641 post-modification testing. EIR ¹95-E0067T for the "B" CSIP was however, not annotated to reflect this requirement. On August 2, 1995, Operations Surveillance Test (OST-1093) was performed as post-modification testing for 1CS-193. This test revealed a failure of the valve to pass minimum forward flow requirements. Again, the "B" CSIP EIR was not annotated to ensure resolution of the forward flow problem prior to restoring the"B" CSIP. On September 2, 1995, the plant was in Mode-4 (Hot Shutdown) for Refueling Outage ¹6. During preparations for performing outage related surveillance testing, a decision was made to return the "B" CSIP to service. A review of pertinent documentation was performed, including EIR ¹95-E0067T for the "B" CSIP, but the failed forward flow condition of 1CS-193 was not identified. At 1432 the "B" CSIP was declared operable and at 1455 the "A" CSIP was removed from service and declared inoperable. At 2142 hours0.0248 days <br />0.595 hours <br />0.00354 weeks <br />8.15031e-4 months <br /> that evening, the operability status of the "B" CSIP was questioned by the NRC Resident Inspector due to his involvement during the post-modification acceptance testing for ESR 9500641. As a result, it was determined that testing had not been performed to restore properly the "B" CSIP. Operations personnel restored the "A" CSIP at 2354 hours0.0272 days <br />0.654 hours <br />0.00389 weeks <br />8.95697e-4 months <br /> and declared the "B" CSIP inoperable. This condition constitutes a violation of Technical Specification 3.1.2.1, which requires one boron injection flow path, including a CSIP, to be operable in Modes 4-6.

CAUSE:

The cause of this event was personnel error on the part of the licensed control room operators and Shift Supervisor involved with the performance of the post-modiTication surveillance test for 1CS-193. The failed forward flow condition was not properly documented in the appropriate EIR as required by procedure.

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE:

There were no significant consequences a result of this event. During the approximate seven hour period when the "B" CSIP was in service on September 2, 1995, an adequate minimum recirculation flow path exsisted for "B" CSIP. In addition the "A" and "C" CSIP's were functional and available for use. This ensures that the even during the below described postulated scenarios where 1CS-193 fails to allow adequate forward flow, the plant was still capable of complying with the operational design requirements to provide a boron injection flow path for reactivity control and Emergency Core Cooling capability while in Mode<. In addition, an evaluation was performed of the "B" CSIP's capability for the two events relevant to Mode-4 operation that could result in a Safety Injection and the subsequent termination of SI flow. These events are a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) and an Inadvertent SI:

LOCA:

During Mode 4 and 5 operations a large break LOCA is not credible and can be assumed not to occur. In the event of a Small Break LOCA, operating procedures direct the manual alignment and initiation of SI when the break flow exceeds the normal make-up capability of 120 gpm. In this case, break flow would be expected to increase due to the higher RCS pressure caused by SI initiation. In other words, the break would provide the "miniflow" path, and therefore result in "B" CSIP flow remaining well above the 60 gpm minimum flow requirement.

f NRC FORM 366A .S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COHHISS ION PROVED BY OHB NO. 3150-0104 (5-92) EXPIRES 5/31/95 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS.

LXCENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNBB 7714). U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON. DC 20555-0001 AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104). OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET. WASHINGTON OC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUHBER (2) LER NUHBER (6) PAGE (3)

SEQUENTIAL REVISION NlSBER NlL%ER Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant - Unit ¹1 05000/400 3OF3 95 008 00 TEXT ilfmore space is required. use additional copies of NRC Form 366'A) (17)

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE: (continued)

Inadvertent SI:

A pressure increase caused by inadvertent SI flow during Mode-4 would be terminated at 495 psig by the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Pump suction relief valves. At 49S psig these valves would relieve approximately 900 gpm each, therefore miniflow through 1CS-193 would not be required.

SI Termination:

Termination of SI flow, as directed by operating procedures, would include establishing miniflow by opening the normal minifiow isolation valves, securing flow to the RCS by closing the Boron Injection Tank (BIT) isolation valves and realigning/starting normal charging flow. During the time period that exists between closing the BIT isolation valves and aligning normal charging, "B" CSIP miniflow could be reduced below 60 gpm due to the condition of 1CS-193. The only other discharge flow path available would be to the Reactor Coolant Pump seals, but this flow value is dependent upon Reactor Coolant System pressure at the time of SI termination and the maximum flow that can be considered is 24 gpm. Therefore, during the process of terminating SI flow, when the Boron Injection Tank (BIT) isolation valves are closed prior to re-establishing normal charging flow, the 60 gpm minimum fiow requirement could not be met and degradation of the "B" CSIP would be possible.

PREVIOUS SIMILAR LERs:

There have been no similar LER's submitted.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS COMPLETED:

1. The "A" CSIP was placed in service at 23S4 on September 2, 1995 and the "B" CSIP was declared inoperable.

2. Involved Operations personnel have been counseled on this event.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS PLANNED:

1. Expectations related to the processing of EIR's will be clarified and communicated to Operations personnel

2. Procedure revisions will be made to OMM-014 and PLP-710 to enhance the process for administering EIR's.

EIIS INFORMATION:

S stem Name/Code:

Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS) - CB Residual Heat Removal/Low Pressure Safety Injection - BP High Pressure Safety Injection - BQ Com onent Code:

CSIP: Pump - P 1CS-193: Valve - V