ML18022A562

LER 87-044-00:on 870713,Tech Spec Surveillance for Axial Flux Difference Missed.Caused by Personnel Error.Operator Counseled.Repairs in Progress to Repair Automatic Axial Flux Difference monitor.W/870812 Ltr

ML18022A562
Person / Time
Site:	Harris
Issue date:	08/12/1987
From:	Hudson O, Watson R CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM)
References
HO-870475-(O), LER-87-044, LER-87-44, NUDOCS 8708180046
Download: ML18022A562 (7)

Text

UL RY INFORMATION DIST TI SYSTEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR: 8708180046 DOC. DATE: 87/08/12 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET FACIL: 50-400 Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Planti Unit ii Carolina 05000400 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION HUDSON'. N. Carolina Power 5 Light Co.

WATSON. R. A. Carolina Poeer 8; Light Co.

RECIP. NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION SUB'JECT: LER 87-044-00: on 870713'ech Spec surveillance for axial flux difference missed due to personnel error. Operator counseled. Repairs in progress to repair automatic axial flux difference monitor. W/870812 ltr.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22D COPIES RECEIVED: LTR ENCL SIZE:

TITLE: 50. 73 Li censee Event Report (LER) i Incident Rpti etc.

NOTES: Application for permit reneeal filed. 05000400 RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL PD2-1 L* 1 PD2-1 PD 1 1 BUCKLEY'S B 1 INTERNAL: ACRS MICHELSQN 1 ACRS MQELLER 2 2 AEOD/DOA 1 1 AEOD/DSP/N*S 1 1 AEOD/DSP/RQAB 2 2 AEOD/DSP/TPAB 1 1 DEDRO 1 1 NRR/DEST/ADE 1 0 NRR/DEST/ADS 0 NRR/DEST/CEB 1 1 NRR/DEST/ELB 1. 1 NRR/DEBT/ ICSB 1 1 NRR/DEST/MFB 1 1 NRR/DEST/MTB 1 1 NRR/DEST/PSB 1 1 NRR/DEST/RSB 1 1 NRR/DEST/SGB 1 NRR/DLPG/HFB 1 1 NRR/DLPG/GAB 1 1 NRR/DOEA/E*B 1 1 NRR/DREP/RAB 1 1 RR~QE B 2 2 NRR/PMAS/ILRB 1 02 1 1 RES DEPY GI 1 1 RES TELFORDi J 1 1 RES/DE/EIB 1 1 RGN2 FILE 01 1 1 EXTERNAL: EGS.G GR QH) M 5 5 H ST LOBBY WARD 1 1 LPDR 1 1 NRC PDR 1 1 NSIC HARRIS' 1 NSIC MAYS> G 1 1 TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 44 ENCL 42

NRC Farm 385 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 194)3)

APPROVED OMB NO. 3(500104 EXPIRES: 8/31/88 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT HLER)

FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) PA E 3 Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1 0 5 0 0 0 400 1 OFO Technical Specification Surveillance for Axial Flux Difference EVENT DATE (5) LER NUMBER (8) REPORT DATE (7) OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED IS)

MONTH OAY YEAR YEAR SEGVENTIAL .@~X RCVtSKÃc MONTH OAY YEAR FACILITYNAMES DOCKET NUMBER(5)

?p+> NUMBER kr1: NUMBER 0 5 0 0 0 0 7 1 8 7 8 7 0 4 4 0 0 081 2 0 5 0 0 0 OPERATING THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT T 0 THE REOUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR (It /Chect one or more of the follovtlnp/ (11 MODE (9) 20A02(bl 20A05(c) 50.73(el(2)(lvl 73.71(hl POWER 20.405( ~ ) I'I I(B 50.38(cl(1) 50.73(e)(2)(vl 73.71(c)

LEVEL (10) 20.405( ~ ) (11(SI 50.38( ~ ) (2) 50.73(e) (2) (vNI OTHER /Specify ln Apt trect below end ln Teel, /IRC Form

/vcr ~

. Ro (Npv, 20.405( ~ ) (1)(III) x 50.73(e) (2)(I) 50.73(e)(2)(vllll(A) 3SEA/

e o 20.405(e) (1)(lv) 50.73(e) I 2) (Nl 50 73(e) (2) ( vli()(BI rp~~@jqgi~@s 20,405( ~ l(1)(vl 50.73(e l(2) (III) 50.73(el(21(el LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12I NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER

0. N. Hudson AREA CODE Senior Engineer Regulatory Compliance 9 1936 2- 2363 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

MANUFAC EPORTABLE MANUFAC. EPORTABLE +re cpa CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT TURER TO NPRDS SFI3$ I CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT TURER ILS%

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14) MONTH DAY YEAR EXPECTED SU 8 MISSION DATE (15)

YES /If yet, complete EXPECTED SIII/4IISSIDII DATE/ NO=

ABSTRACT /Limit to te00 rpeceL I e., epproelmetely lifteen tinpie tpece typewritten llnnl (18)

On July 13, 1987, the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant was operating at full power. Axial flux difference (AFD) monitoring and logging was ongoing in accordance with Technical Specifications. This logging was necessary because the automatic AFD c";.;uter alarm was not operable. At 1230, the AFD reading was missed because the operator was distracted by a power escalation after a 3S NW turbine runback. This error was discovered during the next shift's review of the logged data.

The cause of the event was personnel. error. Actions taken to prevent recurrence were (1) the operator was counseled and (2) repairs are in progress to repair the automatic AFD monitor.

8708180046 8708l2 PDR ADOCK 05000400 8 PDR NRC Form 385 (9-83)

NRC Form 388A US, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 1943)

LI SEE ENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CO. INUr ON APPROVEO OMS NO. 3(50&104 EXPIRES: 8/31/88 FACILITYNAME Ill OOCKET NUMSER (2) LER NUMBER LS) PAGE (3)

SEQUENTIAL REVISION YEAR Shearon Harris NUMBER NUMBER Unit 1 0 6 o 0 0 40 0 8 7 0 4 4 00 02 OF 0 2 TEXT ////ooro BPBBB /4/e/IIIIBILIIBB ar//oooo/I HRC Fenrl 35549/ (17)

Des" i tion of Event On July 13, 1987, the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant was operating at full poweia The automatic axial flux difference (AFD) monitor (EIIS:ID) was not in service. At approximately 1100, a turbine runback of approximately 35 MW occurred. Around 1200, a power increase back to full power using dilution was commenced. Technical Specification 4.2.1.1.b requires monitoring and logging the indicated axial flux difference (AFD) for each operable excore channel (EIIS:IG) at least once per 30 minutes when the AFD monitor alarm is inoperable. This monitoring and logging had been ongoing, but the 1230 reading was missed by the reactor operator. The plant was operating at ap"r"ximately 99/.'ower at this time. The 1300 reading was taken. The missed reading was discovered during the back shift's review of procedur'es.

Cause The cause of the event was personnel error, an action contrary to an approved procedure. Procedure OST-1070, "AFD Monitoring and Logging," was in progress. The operator was distracted by the power escalation and missed taking the 1230 reading.

~Anal aia This event is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) due to a missed Technical Specification surveillance.

There are no safety consequences as a result of this event. The logged AFD before and after the missed surveillance were both -3.5. This value is well within the target band of -1.6 to -11.6. There was very little rod motion through the event and therefore no reason to assume that AFD was not

=aintained within band dur'ng "=e hour interval.

There have been no previous LERs that deal with missing this event related surveillance. Other event related surveillances have been missed in 1987 due to personnel errors', refer to LER Nos.87-015, 87-022,87-036, and 87-040.

Corrective Actions

1. The operator was counseled o prevent recurrence.

2. Repairs are in progress ior the au omatic AFD monitor.

NRC FORM BBBA *U.S.GPO:1988.0.824 538/455 (983)

DUXZ POWER COMPANY P.O. BOX 33i89 GHhRLOTTBI N.G. 28949 HAL B. TUGKER TELEPHOÃE VICE PREEIDERI (704) 373-4531 IIDCEEAR PRODCCVIDE August 11, 1987 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention: Document Control Desk

,Washington, D. C. 20555

Subject:

Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2 Docket Nos. 50-413 and 50-414 McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2 Docket Nos. 50-369 and 50-370 Technical Specification Amendment Ice Condenser Lower Inlet Door Surveillance

Dear Sir:

By letters dated July 12, 1985, August 7, 1985, November 8, 1985, April 14, 1986, September 18, 1986 and March 16, 1987 Duke Power proposed and provided justification for an increase to the required surveillance interval for the ice condenser lower inlet doors.

During telephone conferences with members of the NRC Staff several questions were posed.

The NRC has requested a response to the following:

In the July 12, 1985 and April 14, 1986 letter to the NRC, Duke Power stated, "The doors are expected to rupture during an accident if they fail to open...". Address the possibility/probability and consequences of sump blockage due to fragments of ruptured doors and insulation.

~Res esse:

This statement assumed that an ice condenser door was incapable of opening.

Engineering judgement led to the conclusion that the door would rupture before the crane wall would.

Westinghouse conducted lower inlet door acceptance tests at 140K Design Basis Accident forces, which generated, no door missles or fragments. These tests are documented in WCAP-8110 Supplement 1 dated April 30, 1973.

g.2.:

Address long term performance of the door hinges and related hardware given the exposure to the containment and/or ice condenser atmosphere given that the surveillance interval will be lengthened.

g0

U. S. Nuclear Re ulat Commission 0 ~

August 11, 1987 Page Two

~Res ense:

The atmosphere in the ice bed environment is at 10'P - 20'F and the absolute humidity is very low. Therefore, corrosion of uncoated carbon steel is negligible.

To ensure that corrosion is minimized while the components of the ice condenser are in operation in the Containment, components are either galvanized, painted, or placed in a protective container. Galvanizing is in accordance with ASTM, A123, or A386.

Materials such as stainless steels with low corrosion rates have been used without protective coatings.

Corrosion has been considered in the detailed design of the ice condenser components, and it has been determined that the performance characteristics of the ice condenser materials of construction are not impaired by long term exposure to the ice condenser environment.

Since metal corrosion rates are directly proportional to temperature and humidity, corrosion of ice condenser components at operating temperatures has been almost non-existent.

Based on Duke Power experience, there has not been a problematical, out of compliance condition with the lower inlet door opening tests. Our experience includes four ice condenser units, the oldest of which has been in service 10 years since initial ice load.

Based on the previously provided information and the response to the questions presented here, Duke Power believes that an extension to the lower inlet door surveillance interval is justified.

If you need further clarification or have any other questions, please advise.

Very truly yours, Hal B. Tucker RWO/101/sbn

U. S. Nuclear Regulato Commission August 11, 1987 Page Three XC ~ Dr'. J. Nelson Grace, Regional Administrator U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II 101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323 Mr. Heyward Shealy, Chief Bureau of Radiological Health South Carolina Department of Health &

Environmental Control 2600 Bull Street Columbia, South Carolina 29201'NPO Records Center Suite 1500 1100 Circle 75 Parkway Atlanta, Georgia 30339 M&M Nuclear Consultants 1221 Avenue of the Americas New York, New York 10020 American Nuclear Insurers c/o Dottie Sherman, ANI Library The Exchange, Suite 245 270 Farmington Avenue Farmington, CT 06032 Mr. Dayne Brown, Chief Radiation Protection Branch Division of Facility Services Department of Human Resources, P. O. Box 12200 Raleigh, North Carolina 27605 Mr. P. K. Van Doom NRC Resident Inspector Catawba Nuclear Station Mr. W. T. Orders NRC Resident Inspector McGuire Nuclear Station

Carolina Power 8 Light Company HARRIS NUCLEAR PROJECT P.O. Box 165 New Hill, NC 27562 AUG $ 2 1987 File Number'SHF/10-13510C Letter Number'HO-870475 (0)

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: NRC Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT 1 DOCKET NO. 50-400 LICENSE NO. NPF-63 L1CENSEE EVENT REPORT 87-044 Gentlemen:

In accordance with Title 10 to the Code of Federal Regulations, the enclosed Licensee Event Report is submitted. This report fulfills the requirement for a written report within thirty (30) days of a reportable occurrence and is in accordance with the format set forth in NUREG-1022, September, 1983.

Very truly yours, R. A. Watson Vice President Harris Nuclear Project RAW:lkd Enclosure cc '. Dr. J. Nelson Grace (".RC - R'I)

Mr. B. Buckley (NRR)

G Maxwe.iRC MEM/LER-87-044/Page 1/OS1 gpzz I (