ML18012A313

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LER 96-010-01:on 960628,surveillance Test Deficiencies Identified in Quarterly RHR Sys.Caused by Inadequate Test Procedures Resulting from Personnel Errors.Scheduled Tests on Administrative Hold & Procedures revised.W/960729 Ltr
ML18012A313
Person / Time
Site: Harris Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 07/29/1996
From: Donahue J, Johnny Eads
CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
HNP-96-123, LER-96-010, LER-96-10, NUDOCS 9608020161
Download: ML18012A313 (13)


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REGULA'I RY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

. ACCESSION NBR:9608020161 DOC;DATE: 96/07/29 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET FACIL:50-400 Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Fiant, Unit 1, Carolina 05000400 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION 0 EADS,J. Carolina Power & Li-ht Co.

DONAHUE,J.W. Carolina Power 6 Light Co.

RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT:

LER 96-010-01:on 960628,surveillance test deficiencies identified in quarterly RHR Sys.Caused by inadequate test procedures resulting from personnel errors. Scheduled tests on administrative hold a procedures DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22T COPIES RECEIVED:LTR l revised.W/960729 ENCL TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.

NOTES:Application for permit renewal filed.

2 SIZE:

ltr.

05000400 G RECIPIENT COPIES

,0 RECIPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL R PD2-1 PD 1 1 LE,N 1 1 Y

INTERNAL: ACRS AEOD/SPD/RRAB 1 1 AEOD SP ~B 2 2 1 1 C&TE 1 1 NRR/DE/ECGB 1 1 NRR7DE EELB 1 1 NRR/DE/EMEB 1 1 NRR/DRCH/HHFB 1 1 NRR/DRCH/HICB 1 1 NRR/DRCH/HOLB 1 1 NRR/DRCH/HQMB 1 1 NRR/DRPM/PECB 1 1 NRR/DSSA/SPLB 1 1 NRR/DSSA/SRXB 1 1 D RES/DSIR/EIB 1 1 RGN2 FILE 01 1 1 EXTERNAL: L ST LOBBY WARD 1 1 LITCO BRYCE,J H 2 2 NOAC MURPHY,G.A 1 1 NOAC POOREEW. 1 1 NRC PDR 1 1 NUDOCS FULL TXT 1 1 U

N NOTE TO ALL "RIDS" RECIPIENTS:

PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE! CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK, ROOM OWFN SD-5(EXT. 415-2083) TO ELIMINATE YOUR NAME FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DON'T NEED!

FULL TEXT CONVERSION REQUIRED TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 26 ENCL 26

I 11

Carolina Power 4 Light Company Harris Nuclear Plant PO Box 165 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Serial: HNP-96-123 ATTN: NRC Document Control Desk 10CFR50.73 Washingtori, DC 20555 SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT 1 DOCKET NO. 50-400 LICENSE NO. NPF-63 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 6 1

Dear Sir or Madam:

In accordance with Title 10 to the Code of Federal Regulations, the enclosed revision to Licensee Event Report 96-010 is submitted. This revision reports an additional surveillance test deficiency that caused Technical Specification 3.0.3 entries during past testing.

Sincerely, J. W. Donahue Director of Site Operations Harris Plant JHE/jhe Enclosure c: Mr. J. B. Brady (NRC - HNP)

Mr. S. D. Ebneter (NRC - RII)

Mr. N. B. Le (NRC - PM/NRR)

('p 9608020i61 960729 PDR ADOCK 05000400 8 PDR State Road 1134 New Hill NC

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0 NRC FOAM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

)6951 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME II) OOCKET LEA NUMBER I6) PAGE I3)

SEOUENBAL AEVI IoN YEAR NUMBER NUMBER Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant ~

Unit P1 50400 2 OF 5 96 - 010 - 01 TEXT rffstost sptot fs stooitd, tst tddnd) otl oopfts of HRC Feet 36QI LIT)

EVENT DESCRIPTION:

On June 14, 1996 with the plant operating in Mode-1 at 100% power, Operations personnel in the main control room identified a deficiency in the quarterly interval Residual Heat Removal (RHR, EIIS Code - BP) Pump surveillance tests (OST-1008 and OST-1092). Section 7.1 of these tests are performed to satisfy the RHR pump In-Service-Testing Program requirements and verify that the RHR pump discharge check valves (1RH-70 and 1RH-34) properly back seat during system operation. Prior to performing this section of OST-1008, Operators realized that during the check valve back seat test, a system alignment is established that cross connects the operable RHR train, with the inoperable train being tested. Specifically, the A-train check valve (1RH-34) back seat test is performed by using the discharge pressure of the opposite loop RHR pump. The B-train RHR pump is started and is aligned to recirculate to the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST), with the opposite hot leg cross-over valve (1SI-326) shut. In this alignment, the B-train of RHR is completely isolated from the A-train and is fully operable. To verify that "A" RHR Pump check valve (1RH-34) is on it's backseat, 1SI-326 is then opened and a pump discharge flow measurement is taken. A flow rate increase of less than 50 gpm indicates that 1RH-34 is properly back seated. After observing and recording pump flow, 1SI-326 is shut. (reference page 5 for flow diagram)

During the time period when 1SI-326 is open, the two RHR trains are cross-connected. In this condition, the path of least resistance would be the recirculation line to the RWST. This would create the potential for a significant reduction in low head safety injection flow to the Reactor Coolant System in the event of an accident that required Safety Injection. Based on this, both trains of RHR are rendered inoperable and the plant is in Technical Specification 3.0.3, which is reportable per 10CFR50.73.

Investigation revealed that this back seat testing process was incorporated into OST-1008 and OST-1092 in October 1992 as a new testing methodology. Prior to this, the recirculation flow path to the RWST'was secured prior to opening the cross-over valve, thus eliminating the potential for a reduction in low head safety injection flow during testing. Since October 1992, the A-train has been tested 18 times by performing OST-1008 and OST-1092 has been performed to test the B-train 15 times.

On June 28, 1996 while investigating LER 96-010 Revision 0, one additional surveillance testing deficiency was identified. With the plant operating in Mode-1 at 100% power, Operations personnel identified a deficiency in Maintenance Surveillance Test MST-I0417, "Containment Ventilation Isolation Area Radiation Monitors Relay Actuation Test." The surveillance test as written caused both trains of Containment Vacuum Relief System (EIIS Code - BF) to become inoperable requiring entry into Technical Specification (TS) 3.0.3.

The deficiency within MST-I0417 has existed since it was originally developed in December 1987. MST-I0417 provides instructions for performing a Relay Actuation Logic Test for Containment Ventilation Isolation System (EIIS Code - JM) actuation on a Two-of-Four High Radiation test signal from the Containment Ventilation'Isolation Signal Area Radiation Monitors. This procedure satisfies part of the Monthly Surveillance Requirements of TS 4.3.2.1 (Table 4.3-2, Items 3.c.2 and 3.c.4.a) and TS 4.3.3.1 (Table 4.3-3, Item l.a). The surveillance as originally written generates a Containment Ventilation Isolation Signal which blocks the automatic Containment Vacuum Relief function which causes both trains of Containment Vacuum Relief to become inoperable. This MST deficiency has resulted in the Containment Vacuum Relief system being inoperable for approximately 45 minutes during each monthly performance of this surveillance test since December 1987.

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