ML18012A296

LER 96-010-00:on 960614,identified Deficiency in Quarterly Residual Heat Removal System Surveillance Test Procedures. Caused by Inadequate Surveillance Test Procedures.Revised Surveillance Procedures OST-1008 & OST-1092.W/960715 Ltr

ML18012A296
Person / Time
Site:	Harris
Issue date:	07/15/1996
From:	Donahue J, Verrilli M CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
HNP-96-120, LER-96-010, LER-96-10, NUDOCS 9607180270
Download: ML18012A296 (8)

Text

CATEGORY l REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM,(RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR$ 9607180270 DOC.DATE$ 96/07/15 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET FACIL$ 50-F00 Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1, Carolina 05000400 AUTH. NAME 'UTHOR AFFILIATION VERRILLI,M. Carolina Power a Light Co.

DONAHUE,J.W. Carolina Power 6 Iight Co.

RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT:

LER 96-010-00:on 960614,identified deficiency in quarterly Residual Heat Removal System surveillance test procedures.

Caused by inadequate surveillance test procedures. Revised A surveillance procedures OST-1008 6 OST-1092.W/960715 ltr. T DZSTRZBDTZON CODE: ZE22T COPZES RECEZVED:LTR I ENCL i SZEE:

TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.

NOTES$ Application for permit renewal filed. 05000400 G RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES .

ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL PD2-1 PD 1 - 1 LE,N 1 1 INTERNAL: ACRS 1 1 2 2 AEOD/SPD/RRAB 1 1 LE CENTE 1 1 NRR/DE/ECGB 1 1 NRR DE EELB 1 1 NRR/DE/EMEB 1 1 NRR/DRCH/HHFB 1.'

NRR/DRCH/HICB 1 1 NRR/DRCH/HOIB 1" 1 NRR/DRCH/HQMB 1 1 NRR/DRPM/PECB 1 1 NRR/DSSA/SPLB '1 1 NRR/DSSA/SRXB 1 1 D RES/DSIR/EIB 1 1 RGN2 FILE 01 1 1 0

EXTERNAL: L ST LOBBY WARD 1 1 LITCO BRYCE,J H 2 2 NOAC MURPHY,G.A 1 1 NOAC POORE,W. 1 1 NRC PDR 1 1 NUDOCS FULL TXT 1 1 U

N NOTE TO ALL "RIDS" RECIPIENTS:

PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE ! CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK ROOM OWFN 5D-5(EXT. 415-2083) TO ELIMINATE YOUR NAME FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DON'T NEED!

FULL TEXT CONVERSION REQUIRED TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 26 ENCL 26

Carolina Power 8 light Company Harris NucIear Plant PO Box 165 New Hill NC 27562 JUL 15 1996 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Serial: HNP-96-120 ATT¹ NRC Document Control Desk 10CFR50.73 Washington, DC 20555 SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT 1 DOCKET NO. 50-400 LICENSE NO. NPF-63 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 96-010-00

Dear Sir or Madam:

In accordance with Title 10 to the Code of Federal Regulations, the enclosed Licensee Event Report is submitted. This report concerns a testing deficiency in the Residual Heat Removal System surveillance test that caused Technical Specification 3.0.3 entries during past testing.

t I

Sincerely, J. W. Donahue Director of Site Operations Harris Plant MV Enclosure c: Mr. J. B. Brady (NRC - HNP)

Mr. S. D. Ebneter (NRC - RII)

Mr. N. B. Le (NRC - PM/NRR) 9607i80270 9607i5 PDR ADGCK 05000400 S PDR State Road 1134 New Hill NC

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk / HNP-96-120 Page 2 of 2 cc: Ms. P. B. Brannan Mr. W. R. Campbell (BNP)

Mr. J. M. Collins Mr. J. P. Cowan Mr. G. W, Davis Ms. S. F. Flynn Mr. G. D. Hicks (BNP)

Mr. M. D. Hill Mr. W. J. Hindman Ms. C. W, Hobbs (HEEC)

Mr. R. M. Krich (RNP)

Ms. W. C. Langston Mr. C. W. Martin (BNP)

Mr. R. D. Martin Mr. P. M. Odom (RNP)

Mr. W. R. Robinson Mr. G. A. Rolfson Mr. R. F. Saunders Mr. C. T. Sawyer Mr. R, S. Stancil Mr. G. M. Stokes Mr. C. N. Sweely Mr. J. P. Thompson (BNP)

Mr. T. D. Walt Mr. R. L. Warden (RNP)

HNP Real Time Training INPO NLS File: HI/A-2D Nuclear Records

NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150%104 (4.05I EXPIRES 04/30/96 ESTUAATED BUROBI PER RESPONSE TO COMPlY WITH TNS MAND TORY OIFORMATION COMECTION REDDEST: QN HRS. REPORTED LESSONS lEARNED ARE LICENSEE ZWENT REPORT (LER) OICORPORATED OITO THE UCENSOIG PROCESS ANO FED BACK TO OIOUSTRY, FORWARD COMMENTS REGAROOIG BURDEN ESHMATE TO THE OIFORMATIN ANO RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH Ira F33l, US. NUCIMl REGUIATORY COMIDSSIIE (See reverse for required number of WASSNGTOIE OC 2055$ 000l, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTIN PROJECT 150.

digits/characters for each block) 0104L OFFICE Of MANAGEMENT ANO BUDGET, WASHINGTOIL OC 2050L FACIUTY NAME ITI FAOE I3)

Harris Nuclear Plant Unit-1 50-400 1 OF4 TULE Iel Residual Heat Removal System surveillance testing deficiency that caused past entries into TS 3.0.3.

EVENT DATE (5) LER NUMBER (6) REPORT DATE (7) OTHER FACILmES INVOLVED(6)

FACIUTY NAME DOCKET NUMBER SEOUENTIAL REYISION MONTH OAY MONTH DAY YEAR NUMBER NUMBER 05000 FACIUTY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 14 96 96 010 00 15 96 05000 OPERATING THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR BT (Check one or more) (11)

MODE (9) 20,2201(b) 20.2203(a) (2)(v) X 60.73(a)(2)(i) 60.73(a) (2)(viii)

POWER 20.2203(a) (1) 20.2203(a) i3)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(ii) 50.73(a) (2) (x)

LEVEL (10) 100% 20.2203(a) (2) (i) 20.2203(a)(3) (ii) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 73.71 20.2203(a) (2)(a) 20.2203(a) (4) 60.73(a)(2)(iv) OTHER 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) 50.36(c) (1) 60.73(a)(2)(v) Specify in Abstract bel w or in NRC Form 3BBA 20.2203(a) (2) (iv) 50.36(c)(2) 60.73(a) (2) (vii)

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME TETEFNONE NUMBER eodude Area Code)

Michael Verri(li Sr. Analyst - Licensing (919) 362-2303 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

REPORTABlE CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER TO NPROS TO NPROS SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14) EXPECTED MONTH OAY

~ YES SUBMISSION X (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).

NO DATE (16) 9 15 96 ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)

On June 14, 1996 with the plant operating in Mode-1 at 100% power, Operations personnel identified a deficiency in the quarterly Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System surveillance test procedures (OST-1008 & OST-1092). Section 7.1 verifies that the RHR pump discharge check valves properly back seat during system operation. Prior to performing this section of OST-1008, Operators realized that during the check valve back seat test, a system alignment is established that cross connects the operable RHR train, with the inoperable train being tested, and in this condition the operable train would be incapable of providing the minimum required low head safety injection flow to the Reactor Coolant System. While in this cross~nnected test alignment, the plant is actually m Technical Specification 3.0.3, which is reportable per 10CFR50.73.

This condition was caused by inadequate surveillance test procedures resulting from personnel error during revisions to OST-1008 and OST-1092 in October 1992. These revisions implemented a change in the back seat testing methodology without fully assessing the impact on the RHR system. Subsequent technical and safety reviews also failed to identify that the test alignment resulted in a Technical Specification 3.0.3 entry.

Immediate corrective actions included not performing the scheduled test as written and placing both procedures on administrative hold. Procedure revisions were then completed for OST-1008 and OST-1092 to allow for proper check valve testing without entry into TS 3.0.3. Additional actions will include reviewing this event with appropriate personnel and sampling additional procedures to identify any similar deficiencies.

NRC FORM 344A LLS. NUCLEAR REGUlATORT COMMISSION 14OQ uCENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

TEXT CONTINUATION FACIUTT NAME II) OOCXET PAGE ISI SEOUEKnAi RENSIOK NUMBER NUMBER Shaaron Harris Nuclear Plant - Unit N1 50400 2 OF 4 96 - 010 - 00 TEXT fff'foxpro oPooo fo foqoa4 ooo sdNwol oopioo of fffrCfact 36'I TI EVENT DESCRIPTION:

On June 14, 1996 with the plant operating in Mode-1 at 100% power, Operations personnel in the main control room identified a deficiency in the quarterly interval Residual Heat Removal (RHR, EIIS Code - BP) Pump surveillance tests (OST-1008 and OST-1092). Section 7.1 of these tests are performed to satisfy the RHR pump In-Service-Testing Program requirements and verify that the RHR pump discharge check valves (1RH-70 and 1RH-34) properly back seat during system operation. Prior to performing this section of OST-1008, Operators realized that during the check valve back seat test, a system alignment is established that cross connects the operable RHR train, with the inoperable train being tested. Specifically, the A-train check valve (1RH-34) back seat test is performed by using the discharge pressure of the associated RHR pump. The A-train of RHR pump is started and is aligned to recirculate to the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST), with the opposite hot leg crossover valve (1SI-327) shut. In this alignment, the B-train of RHR is completely isolated from the A-train and is fully operable. To verify that "A" RHR Pump check valve (1RH-34) is on it's backseat, 1SI-327 is then opened and a pump discharge flow measurement is taken. A flow rate increase of less than 50 gpm indicates that 1RH-34 is properly back seated. After observing and recording pump flow, 1SI-327 is shut. (reference page 4 for flow diagram)

During the time period when 1SI-327 is open, the two RHR trains are cross-connected. In this condition, the path of least resistance would be the recirculation line to the RWST. This would create the potential for a significant reduction in low head safety injection flow to the Reactor Coolant System in the event of an accident that required Safety Injection. Based on this, both trains of RHR are rendered inoperable and the plant is in Technical Specification 3.0.3, which is reportable per 10CFR50.73.

Investigation revealed that this back seat testing process was incorporated into OST-1008 and OST-1092 in October 1992 as a new testing methodology. Prior to this, the recirculation flow path to the RWST was secured prior to opening the cross-over valve, thus eliminating the potential for a reduction in low head safety injection flow during testing. Since October 1992, the A-train has been tested 18 times by performing OST-1008 and OST-1092 has been performed to test the B-train 15 times.

CAUSE:

This condition was caused by inadequate surveillance'est procedures resulting from personnel error during revisions to OST-1008 and OST-1092 in October 1992. These revisions implemented a change in the RHR pump discharge check valve back seat testing methodology without fully assessing the impact on the RHR system. Subsequent technical and safety reviews also failed to identify that the test alignment resulted in a Technical Specification 3.0.3 entry.

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE:

The consequences of this event are still under investigation. During previous testing, precautions and limitations in OST-1008 and OST-1092 have required an operator to be stationed at the recirculation valve to the RWST (1SI-331) and be in direct communication with the control room.

PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS:

There have been no previous Harris Plant LERs caused by deficient procedures that resulted in an inadvertent Technical Specification 3.0.3 entry. A similar conditon did occur in June 1996 and will be reported in LER 96411, which is currently being developed.

NRC FORM 366A US. NUCLEAR REGULATORT COMMISSION I696I LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITT NAME II) DOCKET PAGE ISI m SEQUENTIAl NUMBER R ENSIGN NUMOER Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant ~ Unit N1 50400 3 OF 4

- 010>>

TEXT Rr nm Aooot rt nyet oto ~ toyer tfNRC fuae 36SV IITI 96 00 CORRECTIVE ACTIONS COMPLETED:

1. Surveillance test procedure OST-1008 and OST-1092 have been revised to allow for required RHR system testing without cross-connecting the safety trains and entering Technical Specification 3.0.3. The revision to OST-1008 was approved on July 5, 1996 and the revision to OST-1092 was approved on June 28, 1996.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS PLANNED:

This event will be reviewed with appropriate operations personnel involved in developing and reviewing procedures. '1'his will include insight on how this deficiency occurred and how it can be prevented in the future. This will be completed by August 1, 1996 for procedure group personnel or if unavailable by this date, the review will be provided for personnel prior to writing and reviewing procedures.

2. An additional sample of procedures will be reviewed to identify any similar procedure deficiencies. This review will be completed by September 30, 1996.

EIIS Codes:

Residual Heat Removal System BP

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