ML18011A939

LER 95-004-00:on 950524,identified Possibility That Blown Fuse in Control Power Circuit Could Affect Hydraulic Pump. Caused by Discrepancy Between Circuit Wiring & Diagrams for Control Board Alarm.Drawing Review completed.W/950623 Ltr

ML18011A939
Person / Time
Site:	Harris
Issue date:	06/23/1995
From:	Robinson W, Verrilli M CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
HO-950628, LER-95-004-01, LER-95-4-1, NUDOCS 9506280407
Download: ML18011A939 (6)

Text

PRIORITY 1 ~

(ACCELERATED RIDS PROCESSING)

REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR:9506280407 DOC.DATE- 95/06/23 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET FACIL:50-400 Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1, Carolina 05000400 P AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION VERRILLI,M. Carolina Power & Light. Co.

ROBINSON,W.R. Carolina Power & Light Co.

RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT:

LER 95-004-00:on 950524,identified possibility that blown fuse in control power circuit could affect hydraulic pump. 0 Caused by discrepancy between circuit wiring & diagrams for control board alarm. Drawing review completed.W/950623 ltr.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22T COPIES RECEIVED:LTR l ENCL l SIZE:

TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Inciden&Rpt, etc.

NOTES:Application for permit renewal filed. 05000400 RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL PD2-1 PD 1 1 LE,N 1 1 INTERNAL: ACRS 1 1 AEO~D~3Q,B 2 2 AEOD/SPD/RRAB NRR/DE/ECGB 1

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1 NRR/DE/EMEB 1 1 NRR/DISP/PIPB 1 1 NRR/DOPS/OECB 1 1 NRR/DRCH/HHFB 1 1 D NRR/DRCH/HICB 1 1 NRR/DRCH/HOLB 1 1 NRR/DSSA/SPLB 1 1 NRR/DSSA/SPSB/B 1 1 NRR/DSSA/SRXB 1 1 RES/DSIR/EIB 1 1 RGN2 FILE 01 1 1 EXTERNAL: L ST LOBBY WARD 1 1 LITCO BRYCE,J H 2 2 NOAC MURPHY,G.A 1 1 NOAC POORE,W. 1 1 NRC PDR 1 1 NUDOCS FULL TXT 1 - 1 U N

NOTE TO ALL "RZDS" RECIPIENTS:,

PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE! CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK, ROOM OWFN 5D8 (415-2083) TO ELIMINATE YOUR NAME FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS FOR- DOCUMENTS YOU DON'T NEED.'ULL TEXT CONVERSION REQUIRED TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 27 ENCL 27

Carolina Power & Light Company William R. Robinson PO Box 165 Vice President New Hill NC 27562 Harris Nuclear Plant JUN 2 3 1995 Letter Number: HO-950628 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATT¹ NRC Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT 1 DOCKET NO. 50-400 LICENSE NO. NPF-63 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 95-004-00 Gentlemen:

In accordance with Title 10 to the Code of Federal Regulations, the enclosed Licensee Event Report is submitted. This report fulfills the requirement for a written report within thirty (30) days of a reportable occurrence.

Sincerely, W. R. Robinson MV Enclosure CC: Mr. S. D. Ebneter (NRC - RII)

Mr. N. B. Le (NRC - PM/NRR)

Mr. S. A. Elrod (NRC - SHNPP)

Mr. W. R. Robinson 9506280407 950623 PDR ADOCK 05000400 S PDR State Road 1134 New Hill NC Tel 919362-2502 Fax 919362-2095

NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COHMISS ION APPROVED BY OHB NO. 3150-0104 (5-92) EXPIRES 5/31/95 ESTINA BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS.

FORWARD CONNENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS NNAGENENT BRANCH (See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block) (NNBB 7714). U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY CONISSIOM.

WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001 AMD TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PRMECT (3160-0104). OFFICE OF NANAGENENT AND BUDGET WASHINGTON DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1) DXKET NUMBER (2) PAGE (3)

Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant-Unit ¹1 05000/400 1 OF 4 TITLE (4) Technical SpeciTication violation due to not identifying inoperable condition for IMS-62, S/G "C" PORV.

EVENT DATE (5) LER NUHBER (6) REPORT DATE (7) OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)

SEQUENTIAL REVISION FACILITY NAYS DOCKET NUNBER NONTH DAY YEAR NUMBER NUNBER NONTH DAY YEAR 05000 FACILITY NAYS DOCKET NUYi8ER 05 24 95 95 004 00 23 95 05000 OPERATING THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO 'IHE RE IREHENTS OF 10 CFR 9: (Check one or mor e) (ll)

MODE (9) 20.402(b) 20.405(c) 50.73(a)(2)(iv) 73.71(b)

POWER 20.405(a)(1)(i) 50.36(c)(1) 50.73(a)(2)(v) 73.71(c) 100K 20.405(a)(1)(ii) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(vii)

LEVEL (10) OTHER 20.405(a)(l)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) (Specify in 20.405(a)(1)(iv) 50.73(a)(2)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) Abstract and in Text.

below 20.405(a)(1)(v) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(x) NRC Form 366A)

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

MANE TELEPHONE NEER (Include Area Code)

Michael Verrilli Sr. Specialist - Licensing (919) 362-2303 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

REPORTABLE REPORTABLE CAUSE SYSTEM CONPONENT NAMUFACTURER CAUSE SYSTEN COMPONENT NAMUFACTURER TO NPRDS TO NPRDS SUPPLEHENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14) EXPECTED NOMTH DAY YEAR YES SUBMISSION

( If yes. complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE). X NO DATE (15)

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces. i.e.. approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)

At 0930, on May 24, 1995, an Auxiliary Operator (AO) observed that no indicating lights were illuminated on breaker 1A31-SA-14D, "C" S/G Power Operated Relief Valve (1MS-62) hydraulic pump supply power. The AO replaced the red and green indicating lights, but could not replace the blue light due to the bulb being broken in the socket. He then initiated a Work Request & Authorization (WR&A) to have the condition corrected. During the Shift Supervisor Designee's (SSD) review and approval of this WR&A, which occurred later in the same shift at 1320, it was determined that there was no impact on the operability of the S/G PORV since the applicable main control board annunciator was not locked in. The following day at 1530, prior to authorizing work to begin per the WR&A, a different SSD identified the possibility that if the three indicating lights were out due to a blown fuse in the control power circuit, then supply power to the S/G PORV's hydraulic pump might also be affected. At 1540, a blown fuse was found in the circuit and replaced. This restored the indicating lights and also allowed the hydraulic pump on 1MS-62 to start. Based on this, it was determined that the valve had actually been inoperable from the time the AO observed three indicating lights not illuminated. Since 1MS-62 is a containment isolation valve, the 4-hour Technical Specification - Limiting Condition for Operation was exceeded. Investigation into this condition revealed that a discrepancy existed between the circuit wiring and the associated wiring diagrams for the 1MS-62 hydraulic pump control boa'rd alarm. The primary cause of this event is attributed to inadequate design configuration control prior to plant commercial operation on the associated valve circuitry. A contributing cause was wrong assumptions made on the part of the AO and SSD when the condition was identified. Corrective actions will include correction of the wiring discrepancy, a review to identify similar conditions, and training for appropriate plant personnel.

NRC FORH 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COHHISSION APPROVED BY OHB NO. 3150-0104 (5-92) EXPIRES 5/3i/95 ESTIHAM BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COHPLY WITH THIS INFORHATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS.

FORWARD COI4'iENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIHATE TO LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) THE INFORHATION AND RECORDS NNAGEHENT BRANCH (IIBB 7714). U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY CONISSION.

WASHINGTON. DC 20555-0001 AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PRMECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF HANAGEHENT AND BUDGET WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAHE (1) DXKET NUHBER (2) LER NUHBER (6) PAGE (3)

SEQUENTIAL REVISION NU%ER NU%ER Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant - Unit ¹1 05000/400 2OF4 95 004 00 TEXT (If more space fs required. use additional copies of NRC Form 3664) (17)

EVENT DESCRIPTION:

At 0930, on May 24, 1995, the Turbine Building Auxiliary Operator (TB-AO) observed that no indicating lights were illuminated on breaker 1A31-SA-14D. This is the "C".S/G Power Operated Relief Valve (1MS-62) Hydraulic Pump supply power breaker. The TB-AO replaced the red and green indicating lights, but could not replace the blue light because the bulb was broken in the socket. At this time he initiated a Work Request & Authorization (WR&A), to have the condition corrected by Instrumentation & Control personnel. During the Shift Supervisor Designee's (SSD) review and approval of this WR&A, which occurred later in the same shift at 1320, it was determined that there was no adverse impact on the operability of the S/G PORV since the applicable main control board annunciator was not locked in. On previous occasions when work was being performed on the 1MS-62 Hydraulic Oil Pump and power was interrupted by opening the supply breaker, a main control board annunciator was received. The SSD did not review any wiring diagrams to draw this conclusion. However, had the drawings been reviewed without additional field troubleshooting, the SSD would have drawn the same conclusion due to the drawing discrepancy subsequently discovered.

The following day at 1530, prior to authorizing work to begin in accordance with the WR&A, a different SSD identified the possibility that if the three indicating lights were out due to a blown fuse in the control power circuit, then supply power to the S/G PORV's hydraulic pump might also be affected. The valve operator for 1MS-62 utilizes a hydraulic pump and accumulator in conjunction with a control skid to open and close the valve. At 1540, I&C personnel found the fuse in question to be blown. This would have prevented the hydraulic pump from operating and supplying the needed hydraulic pressure to actuate the valve. When I&C personnel replaced the fuse, the indicating lights were restored and the hydraulic pump on 1MS-62 ran for a short period. Based on this, it was determined that the valve had actually been inoperable from the time of discovery (when the TB-AO observed three indicating lights not illuminated).

Since 1MS-62 is a containment isolation valve, Technical Specifications (TS) require that it be restored to operable status within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. As the above described time-line indicates, the TS requirement to restore 1MS-62 was exceeded and thus, the condition is being reported per 10CFR50.73.a.2.i.b as a TS violation.

At the time of the event, the plant was operating in mode 1 at 100% power.

Investigation into this condition revealed that a discrepancy existed between the circuit wiring and the associated wiring diagrams for the 1MS-62 control board alarm. During implementation of a plant modification (DCN 251-595) in November, 1985, design configuration for the 1MS-62 control board alarm circuit was not properly maintained, which resulted in the as-built configuration not matching the design as specified.

NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OHB NO. 3150-0104 (5-92) EXPIRES 5/31/95 ESTIN BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THiS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS.

FORWARD COHHENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIHATE TO LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) THE INFORNTION AND RECORDS NNAGEHENT BRANCH (HNBB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY CONISSION.

WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001 AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104) . OFFICE OF HANAGEHENT AND BUDGET WASHINGTON DC 20503.

FACILITY NAHE (1) DOCKET NUHBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)

SEQUENTIAL REVISION Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant - Unit ¹I 05000/400 NUMBER NUMBER 3OF4 95 004 00 TEXT (If more space Is required. use additional copies of NRC form 3664) (17)

EVENT DESCRIPTION Continued:

The design package DCN 251-595 upgraded the control circuits for the three Main Steam PORV Hydraulic Pumps from Non-Class 1E to Class 1E. The modification deleted the non-safety related cables and added the required safety related cables to the safety related MCCs, including 1A31-SA-14D for 1MS-62.

However, the cubicle installed at lA31-SA-14D did not have the same internal wiring as the non-safety related cubicle 1D21-1A. Cubicle 1D21-1A had only one alarm relay and one control power fuse. The safety related cubicle chosen had two alarm relays and two fuses. The alarm circuit for loss of control power function was actually off of the second fuse (FU2/1257). This fuse did not blow during this event; therefore, the operators did not receive an alarm in the control room when the control power fuse (FU1/1257) blew. The contacts of the alarm relay which was fed from the FU1/1257 control power fuse were not used. There are three Main Steam PORVs, and the power supply breakers for the other two PORV hydraulic pumps are distinctly different from 1MS-62. The other PORV hydraulic pumps utilize breakers that contain only one alarm relay and one control power fuse.

CAUSE:

This condition was caused by inadequate design configuration control during the implementation of DCN 251-595 as described above in the event description. A contributing cause was the wrong assumptions made by the TB-AO when the condition was identified and the SSD during his review. It is, however, important to note that due to the inaccurate design, had the SSD conducted additional research into the applicable wiring diagrams on May 24, 1994, without field trouble shooting, he would have come to the same conclusion made simply by the lack of control board annunciation.

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE:

There were no significant safety consequences as a result of this condition since 1MS-62 remained shut throughout the event. With no power for the hydraulic pump, the valve could not perform its intended function and was thus inoperable. Technical Specification 3.6.3 requires the valve to be restored within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />, isolated or deactivated shut. Since this valve has an oil accumulator, it may have opened in response to it's control system to open when steam generator pressure is high. Status of the oil inventory within the accumulator is unknown, thus it can not be assured that sufficient oil was available to shut the valve had it opened. If a Steam Generator Tube Rupture had occured, the S/G PORV may have been opened and then not shut when required resulting in a release that is longer than necessary. However, this failure mode is an assumption in the current SGTR analysis, hence this event was bounded by the current analysis.

Furthermore, the actual S/G PORV position is indicated on the Main Control Board, and there is an ERFIS computer alarm to alert the operator when the S/G PORV is open. Emergency Operating Procedures specify closing the associated block valve when the S/G PORV will not shut.

PREVIOUS SIMILAR LERs:

There have been no previous similar LERs submitted.

NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COHHISSION APPROVED BY OHB NO. 3150-0104 (5-92) EXPIRES 5/31/95 ESTIMAl BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS.

FORWARD CONENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO LZCENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MLAGEMENT BRANCH (YiNBB 7714) ~ U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY CONISSION.

WASHINGTON'C 20555-0001 AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PRMECT (3150-0104) . OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET WASHINGTON DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUHBER (2) LER NUHBER (6) PAGE (3)

SEQUENTIAL REVISION NUMBER N 8 R Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant - Unit ¹1 05000/400 40F4 95 003 00 TEXT (If more space fs required. use additional copies of NRC Form 3664) (17)

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS COMPLETED:

1. A drawing review and field walkdown was performed to confirm no discrepancies in the A&B PORV compartments.

The cubicle type installed in MCC lA31-SA-14D is a type B07. A review was performed of Equipment Specifications, Vendor Drawings and Control Wiring Drawings (CWDs) for cubicles containing this same cubicle type. A total of four type B07 cubicles were identified. No problems were identified in the remaining three cubicles.

3. Identified cubicle types with remote shutdown capability which includes two alarm circuits, two control power fuses, and a blue continuity indicating light that was used in safety related applications and verified the CWDs reflected these features.

Performed a field walkdown of safety related MCCs with the exception of 1A22-SA and 1B22-SB (these MCCs only contain containment fan cooler circuits) and identified those cubicles which have remote shutdown capabilities by observing the existence of a blue light on the cubicle door. One cubicle discrepancy was identified with cubicle 1B21-SB 1E. The Vendor Drawing indicates a remote shutdown feature utilized by this cubicle. The CWD, which correctly shows the installed breaker type, indicates there is no remote shutdown feature. An Engineering Service Request (ESR) has been initiated to correct the Vendor Drawing reference on the CWD and to correct two unused terminal location numbers..

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS PLANNED:

1. Provide training on this event to appropriate personnel in the Operations Unit.

2. Complete ESR to correct wiring discrepancy associated with 1MS-62.

3. Complete ESR to correct drawing deficiency associated with circuit 1B21-SB 1E EIIS INFORMATION:

S stem Name/Code Com onent Code:

Main Steam - SB Pressure Control Valve - PCV (1MS-62) Fuse - FU