ML18010B072

LER 93-001-00:on 930308,discovered That Operations Surveillance Test for Onsite Power Distribution Did Not Check Position of Battery 2CB Input Breakers.Caused by Procedure Rev Oversight.Procedure revised.W/930407 Ltr

ML18010B072
Person / Time
Site:	Harris
Issue date:	04/07/1993
From:	Robinson W, Verrilli M CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
HO-930078, LER-93-001-03, LER-93-1-3, NUDOCS 9304120271
Download: ML18010B072 (4)

Text

ACCELERAT>'0 DOCUMENT DISTR IzIUTION SYSTEM REGULAT I INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION YSTEM (RIDE) 4 ACCESSiON NBR:9304120271 DOC.DATE: 93/04/07 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET FACIL:50-400 Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1, Carolina 05000400 NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION 'UTH.

VERRILLIFM. Carolina Power & Light Co.

ROBINSON,W.R. Carolina Power & Light Co.

RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT:

LER 93-001-00:on 930308,discovered that operations surveillance test for onsite power distribution did not D check position of battery 2CB input breakers. Caused by procedure rev oversight. Procedure revised.W/930407 ltr.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: ZE22T COPIES RECEIVED:LTR ENCL / SIZE: 3 TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), QIncident Rpt, etc.

NOTES:Application for permit'enewal filed. 05000400 A RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES D ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL PD2-1 LA 1 1 PD2-1 PD 1 1 D LE,N 1 1 INTERNAL: ACNW 2 2 ACRS 2 2 AEOD/DOA 1 1 AEOD/DSP/TPAB 1 1 AEOD/ROAB/DSP, 2 2 NRR/DE/EELB 1 1 NRR/DE/EMEB 1 1 NRR/DORS/OEAB 1 1 NRR/DRCH/HHFB 1 1 NRR/DRCH/HICB'RR/DRIL/RPEB 1 1 NRR/DRCH/HOLB 1 1 1 1 NRR/DRSS/PRPB NRR/DSSA/SPLB 1 1 NRR/DSSA/SRXB RES/DSIR/EIB 2

1 1'

2 1 ~REG

~GN2 2~,FILE 02 Ol 1

1 1

1 EXTERNAL: EG&G BRYCEFJ.H 2 2 L ST LOBBY WARD 1 1 NRC PDR 1 1 NSIC MURPHYFG.A 1 1 NSIC POORE,W. 1 1 NUDOCS FULL TXT 1 1 D

D NOTE TO ALL"RIDS" RECIPIENTS:

PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE! CONTACI'HE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK ROOM Pl-37 (EXT. 504-2065) TO ELIMINATEYOUR NAME Fl<OM DISmIIIUTION LISTS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DON'T NEED!

FULL TEXT CONVERSION REQUIRED TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 32 ENCL 32

0 gfj8+L Carolina Power & Light Company HARRIS NUCLEAR PLANT P.O. Box 165 New Hill, North Carolina 27562 APR G'7 l99~

Letter Number: HO-930078

~ U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: NRC Document, Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT 1 DOCKET NO. 50-400 LICENSE NO. NPF-63 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 93-001-00 Gentlemen:

In accordance with Title 10 to the Code of Federal Regulations, the enclosed Licensee Event Report is submitted. This report fulfills the requirement for a written report within thirty (30) days of a reportable occurrence and is in accordance with the format set forth in NUREG-1022, September 1983.

Very truly yours W. R. Robinson General Manager Harris Nuclear Plant MV:kls Enclosure cc: Mr. S. D. Ebneter (NRC - RII)

Mr. N. B. Le (NRC - PM/NRR)

Mr. J. E. Tedrow (NRC - SHNPP)

Mr. G. E. Vaughn MEM/LER93-014.1/1/Osl 9304l2027l 930407 05000400 PDR ADOCK 5 PDR

0 U.S. IN)CLEAR REGULATORY CQNIISSION APPROVED BY QNI NO. 3150-0104 NRC FORM 366 EXPIRES 5/31/95 (5-92)

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY MITM THIS INFORMATION COLLECTIOH REQUEST: 50.0 HRS.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) FORNARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AHD RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (HHBB 7714), U.ST NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, of digits/characters for each block) MASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AHD TO THE PAPERNORK (See reverse for required number REDUCTION PROJECT (3150.0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEHENT AND BUDGET IIASHIHGTOH DC 20503.

(2) PAGE (3)

FACILITY NAME (1) Shearon Harris Nuclear Power DOCKET NNNIER Plant Unit 1 05000 400 1 OF 2 TITLE (4) Surveillance test procedure deficiency resulting in failure to adequately verify instrument inverter breaker ali nment.

EVENT DATE (5) LER NNIBER (6) REPORT DATE (7) OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)

FACILITY HAME DOCKET HUHBER SEQUENTIAL REVI SION MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR HUHBER HUHBER MONTH DAY YEAR 05000 03 08 93 93 -- 001 00 07 FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 05000 THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREHENTS OF 10 CFR %: (Check one or mor e) (11)

OPERATING MODE (9) 20.402(b) 20.405(c) 50.73(a)(2)(iv) 73.71(b) 20 '05(a)(1)(i) 50.36(c) (1) 50.73(a)(2)(v) 73.71(c)

POUER LEVEL (10) 100 20.405(a)(1)(ii) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(vii) OTHER 20.405(a)(1)(iii) 50 '3(a)(2)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) (Specify in 50 '3(a)(2)(viii)(B)

Abstract below 20 '05(a)(1)(iv) 50.73(a)(2)(ii) and in Text, 20.405(a)(1)(v) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(x) NRC Form 366A LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)

NAME Michael Verrilli (919) 362-2303 DNPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH GNPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

REPORTABLE REPORTABLE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER CAUSE SYSTEH COMPONENT MAHUFACTURER CAUSE TO HPRDS TO HPRDS SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14) MONTH DAY YEAR

, EXPECTED YES SUBM I SSI ON (If yes, complete EXPEClED SUBHISSIOH DAlE). DATE (15)

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typeMritten lines) (16)

On March 8, 1993, while performing the weekly surveillance test for the on-site power distribution system, a procedural deficiency was identified related to the operability verification for the 7.5 Kva instrument inverters. Technical Specifications (TS) require that the instrument inverters be "connected to their 125-volt DC Bus".'o satisfy this have requirement, breaker alignment and voltage indication verifications test been performed. Operators performing the March 8, 1993 surveillance noted that the procedure did not verify the position of the inverter backup DC supply breakers and therefore did not specifically satisfy the TS.

requirement. Based on this, a determination was made that TS operability had never been adequately verified and that a TS violation existed. The cause of this event was an oversight during the procedure revision process that occurred'in 1986. Immediate corrective actions included verifying that the backup DC supply breakers were closed on all four instrument inverters. In addition, the surveillance'test procedure was revised to include position verification for these breakers.

NRC FORM 366 (5 92)

HRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY CQHISSION APPROVED BY QHI NO. 3150-0104 (5-92) EXPIRES 5/31/95 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTIOH REQUEST: 50.0 HRS.

FORliARD COMMEHTS REGARDIHG BURDEN ESTIMATE TO LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MAHAGEMEHT BRANCH (MHBB 7714)i U S NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIOHi WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AHD TO THE PAPERNORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AHD BUDGET MASHIHGTOH DC 20503.

FACILITY NAKE 1 DOCKET NIMSER 2 LER IRMBER 6 PAGE 3 Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION Unit gl 05000/400 M

2 OF 2 93 001 ,00 TEXT If more s ce is r vired use additional co ies of HRC Form 366A (17)

EVENT DESCRIPTION:

On March 8, 1993 with the plant in Mode-1 at 100 percent power, the weekly surveillance test for on-site power distribution verification Operations Surveillance Test (OST-1024) -was being performed. During this test, members of the Control Room Staff identified that the procedure did not check the position of the 2CB Battery Input Breakers to the 7.5 KVa Instrument Inverters. These breakers must be closed to ensure that the inverters receive a backup DC power supply from their associated 125-Volt DC busses as required by Technical Specification (TS) 3.8.3.1.c-f.

Personnel performing the test immediately verified that the 2CB breakers were in the closed position on each inverter.

This condition was determined to constitute a TS violation, due to not specifically verifying that the Instrument Inverters were connected to their 125-Volt DC bus and is being reported in .accordance with 10CFR50.73 (a)(2)(i). There have been no previous similar reports submitted.

CAUSE:

Investigation revealed that the original version of OST-1024 did include a position verification for the 2CB breakers. When revision gl to OST-1024 was completed in May of 1986, the requirement to verify these breakers was removed. This revision took place prior to initial plant startup so the weekly performance of OST-1024 has not included verification of these breakers. The cause of this event was an oversight that occurred during the development of this revision in 1986.

SAFETY SIGNIFICTcHC~:

There were no safety consequences as a result of this event. The primary electrical source for the Instrument Inverters is the 480 Volt AC Emergency bus. The Inverter supply breaker from this source is included in the procedure and has therefore been checked weekly to verify availability.

The weekly surveillance test also includes an Inverter output'oltage verification, thereby ensuring that the inverters were functional and were adequately supplying their associated 118-Volt AC Vital Busses.

Backup DC Supply breakers had tripped or been inadvertently opened, an If the 2CB alarm would have annunciated on the Main Control Board to alert operators of this condition.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

1. Operations Surveillance Test Procedure OST-1024 has been revised to include position verification for the 2CB Backup DC Suppl'y Breakers.

Operations personnel will receive training on this change to ensure a complete understanding of the Instrument Inverter surveillance requirement.

NRC FORM 366A (5-92)