ML18005B052

LER 89-013-00:on 890814,technician Inadvertently Jumpered Contacts Starting Emergency Svc Water Booster Pump B.Caused by Personnel Error.Testing Stopped & Personnel Counselled on Attention to Work activities.W/890911 Ltr

ML18005B052
Person / Time
Site:	Harris
Issue date:	09/11/1989
From:	Howe A, Richey R CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
HO-890089-(O), LER-89-013-01, LER-89-13-1, NUDOCS 8909200287
Download: ML18005B052 (5)

Text

ACCELERATED OISTR1BUTION DEMONS%4TION SYSTEM REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR:8909200287 DOC.DATE: 89/09/01 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET I FACIL:50-400 Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1, Carolina 05000400 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION.

HOWEgA.J. Carolina Power & Light Co.

RICHEY, R. B. Carolina Power & Light Co.

RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT:

LER 89-013-00:on 890814,inadvertent actuation of svc water booster pump during load sequence trouble shooting.

W/8 ltr.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22T COPIES RECEIVED:LTR TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.

L ENCL J SIZE:

NOTES:Application for permit renewal filed. 05000400 RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL PD2-1 LA 1 1 PD2-1 PD 1 1 BECKERiD 1 1 INTERNAL: ACRS MICHELSON 1 1 ACRS MOELLER 2 2 ACRS WYLIE 1 1 AEOD/DOA l. 1 AEOD/DSP/TPAB 1 1 AEOD/ROAB/DSP 2 2 DEDRO 1 1 IRM/DCTS/DAB 1 1 NRR/DEST/CEB 8H 1 1 NRR/DEST/ESB 8D 1 1 NRR/DEST/ICSB 7 1 1 NRR/DEST/MEB 9H 1 1 NRR/DEST/MTB 9H 1 1 NRR/DEST/PSB 8D 1 1 NRR/DEST/RSB 8E 1 1 NRR/DEST/SGB 8D 1 1 NRR/DLPQ/HFB 10 1 1 NRR/DLPQ/PEB 10 1 1 NRR/DOEA/EAB 11 1 1 PB 10 2 2 NUDOCS-ABSTRACT 1 1 R 2 1 1 RES/DSIR/EIB 1 1 1 1 EXTERNAL EG&G WILLIAMSg S 4 4 L ST LOBBY WARD 1 1 LPDR 1 1 NRC PDR 1 1 NSIC MAYSgG 1 1 NSIC MURPHY,G.A 1 1 NUDOCS FULL TXT 1 1 NOTE 'Il3 AIL 'KIDS"

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FULL TEXT CONVERSION REQUIRED TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED:'LZTR 40 ENCL 40

Carolina Power & Light Company HARRIS NUCLEAR PROJECT P.O. Box 165 New Hill, NC 27562 SEP1 I 1989 File Number'SHF/10-13510C Letter Number'HO-890089 (0)

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: NRC Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT 1 DOCKET NO. 50-400 LICENSE NO. NPF-63 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 89-013-00 Gentlemen:

In accordance with Title 10 to the Code of Federal Regulations, the enclosed Licensee Event Report is submitted. This report fulfills the requirement for a written report within thirty (30) days of a reportable occurrence and is in accordance with the format set forth in NUREG-1022, September 1983.

Very truly yours, dd/fly>

Harris Nuclear Project AJH:djs Enclosure cc.'Mr. R. A. Becker (NRR)

Mr. W. H. Bradford (NRC - SHNPP)

Mr. S. D. Ebneter (NRC " RII)

MEM/LER-89-0'3/1/OSl 85'092002S7 S5'0902 PDR CiDDCN 05000000 S PNU

NR~ORM 366 U.S. NUCLE1A REGULATORY COMMI('>ION APPAOVED 0MB NO. 31504104 (665)

EXPIRES: 4I30I92 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REOUESTr 50.0 HRS. FORWARD LICENSEE EVENT REPORT ILER) COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P630). U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATOAY COMMISSION. WASHINGTON. DC 20555. AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (31504104). OFFICE OF MANAGEMENTAND BUDGET, WASHINGTON,OC 20503, FACILITYNAME (II DOCKET NUMBER 12) PA f Sl Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant Unit One o 5 o o o 1 QF 3 TITLE (41 INADVERTENT ACTUATION OP SERVICE WATER BOOSTER PEIP DURING LOAD SEQUENCER TROUBLESHOOTING EVENT DATE (5) LER NUMBER (6) REPORT DATE (71 OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (6)

YEAR YEAR M>>O SEOVE NrrAL rl4 vre>0N MONTH DAY YEAR FACILITYNAMES DOCKfT NUMBER(SI MONTH DAY NVMef A NVMefrl 0 5 0 0 0 0 8 1 4 8 9 0 1 0 0 N/A 0 5 0 0 0 THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT T 0 THE RLDUIREMfNTs oF 10 cF A ('I: Icneco one or more ol tne Iollowlnp) lll OPERATING Moof (el 20.402(e) 20.405(el X 50.73( ~ I (2)(NI 73.7((e)

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NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE Andrew J. Howe Sr. Specialist Regulatory Compliance 91 93 62- 271 9 COMPLETE ONE LINf FOA EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPOR'T 113)

MANUFAC MANUFAC CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT SYSTEM COMPONENT TURER TVRER N/A ~>>to>c ypr>~xerox>>1 aoyl> lcc SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14) MONTH DAY YEAR EXPECTED SUBMISSION DA'Tf (15)

YfS III yet, complete EXPECTED SUSotlSSIO>V OA TEI NO ABSTRACT (Limit ro IetXI rpecel. I.e., epproalmetely rilreen tlnple.opere ryPewrltren lined (16)

On August 14, 1989 at 1123, with the plant at 100X power, a technician troubleshooting an indication pxoblem in the Emergency Load Sequencer Panel B, inadvertently jum'pered contacts which caused the Emergency Service Water Booster Pump B to start. This pump functions to increase pressure in the contaix.sent building service water header following an accident to ensure service water pressure exceeds peak containment accident pressure, and so eliminate the possibility of leakage from containment.

Control room opexators detected the pump start by flow alarms on the service water system, and the pump was stopped from the control room within one minute.

The cause of the event was personnel error in that the incorrect contacts were jumpered. Troubleshooting was being conducted by the system engineex using the control wiring drawings to determine which contacts to jumper. The technician jumpered across contacts directly above the pair called for by the engineer. The congested arrangement of wire bundles in the panel contributed to the error. The jumper was immediately removed, and testing was stopped until the event was investigated and understood. Personnel involved were counselled on attention to work activities and the consequences of their actions resulting in an unnecessary challenge to safety systems.

NRC Form 356 (560)

NRC FORM 366A VS, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM)( %ION (64)9) APPROVED OMB NO. 3)500)04 EXPIRES: 4/30/92 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) INFORMATION COLLECTION REOUESTI 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS TEXT CONTINUATION AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P430). V.S. NUCL'EAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON. OC 20555. AND TO 1ME PAPERWORK REDUCTION PRO/ECT (31500(04). OFFICE OF MANAGFMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON. DC 20503.

FACILITYNAME (II DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)

YE*4 g@'EQUENTIAL NUMSEA )'UM PQ REVISION 44 Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant 5 0 0 0 4 0 0 89 01 0 0 2 OF 0 3

'I TEXT /// more space le reelr/red, rree eddlo'erN/ IVRC form 366'4'4/ (IT)

INITIAL CONDITIONS' The plant was operating in Mode 1 at 100Z'power throughout the event. The "B" Emergency Service Water (ESW) header was in service being supplied from normal service water, with the "B" ESW pump declared inoperable for instrument calibrations. Troubleshooting activities were in progress on an indication problem for the "B" Emergency Load Sequencer.

EVENT DESCRIPTION:

On August 14, 1989 at 1123, a technician troubleshooting an'indication problem in the Emergency Load Sequencer Panel B inadvertently jumpered contacts which caused the ESW Booster Pump B to start. Control room operators observed alarms for service water flow and noted the pump indicating lights. The pump was secured by 1124 from the main control room. Troubleshooting activities were halted until the event was investigated and understood.

CAUSE:

The cause of the event was personnel error in that the incorrect contacts were jumpered. Troubleshooting was being conducted at the direction of the system engineer using the control wiring drawings to determine which contacts to jumper to simulate a sequencer start signal to a component. After applying this simulated start signal, personnel would verify the appropriate indicating lights illuminated. Wire bundles run throughout the panel, and cover the terminal blocks, requiring the technician to move them aside to access the contacts to be jumpered. The technician indicated that he had located the appropriate pair of contacts, then obtained a jumper and installed it on directly above the pair called for. The congested arrangement of the'ontacts wiring in the panel directly contributed to this event.

Panel labelling was not believed to have contributed to this event. Labelling in the sequencer panel is limited by space available to the individual relays; contacts on the terminal blocks are not labelled, but are physically the same layout for each reI,ay.

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE:

The ESW Booster Pump supplies service water at high pressure to the Containment Fan Coolers following an accident. This ensures that the containment service water header pressure exceeds the containment peak accident pressure, so that any leakage will be into, rather than out of, the containment building.

The actuation of the ESW Booster Pump during this event did not result in its unavailability to perform its safety function. The "B" Emergency service water header was on service at the time of the event supplied from normal y 366A (64)9)

NRC FORM36SA U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

~ (049) a APPROVED OM 9 NO. 31500104 EXPIRES: O/30/92 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) INFORMATION COLLECTION REOVESTI 50/) HRS, FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS TEXT CONTINUATION AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT SRANCH IP430), V.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON. OC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3)50010(I, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENTAND BUDGET;WASHINGTON. DC 20503, FACILITY NAME (11 DOCKET NUMBER (21 LER NVMSER (Sl PAGE (3)

YEAR "M. SEQuENTIAL Cg~ REVISION NVMSER 'SS NVMSER Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant 0 5 0 0 0 4 0 0 89 01 3 00 03 OF 0 3

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TEXT /I/ more Joe ee /I rer)uk', oee edd/dorre/ NRC /rorrrr 3SSA'e/ ((2)

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE:

service water, which resulted in the ESW Booster Pump providing full flow. If the header had not been in service, the pump is designed to operate up to one hour .on the mini-flow recirculation line. The redundant "A" ESW header and Booster Pump were operable throughout this event.

This event is reported in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a) (2) (iv) as .an actuation of an engineered safety feature. There have previously been no such actuations caused directly by troubleshooting activities. LER 87-008-00 discussed an event where inadvertent shorting of 'ontacts during troubleshooting of a turbine governor valve caused a load swing which tripped pumps in the main feedwater system and eventually required a manual reactor trip.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

Personnel involved in this event were counselled on attention to work activities and the consequences of their actions, resulting in an unnecessary challenge to safety equipment.

EIIS CODES:

Emergency Service Water System BI Emergency Load Sequencer JE Main Turbine TA Main Feedwater SJ NRC Form 35SA (SS9)

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