ML18005A907

LER 89-008-00:on 890410,deficiencies Discovered in Testing of Thermal Overload Bypass Circuit for motor-operated Valve. Caused by Procedural Inadequacies Which Resulted in Insufficient Testing of circuit.W/890508 Ltr

ML18005A907
Person / Time
Site:	Harris
Issue date:	05/08/1989
From:	Howe A, Richey R CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
HO-890053-(O), LER-89-008-01, LER-89-8-1, NUDOCS 8905170134
Download: ML18005A907 (6)

Text

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ACCESSION NBR: 8905170134 DOC. DATE: 89/05/08 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET FACIL:50-400 Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1, Carolina 05000400 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION HOWE,A. Carolina Power & Light Co.

RICHEY,R.B. Carolina Power & Light Co.

RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT:

LER 89-008-00:on 890410,procedure deficiencies cause missed surveillance for thermal overload protection bypass.

W/8 DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22D COPIES RECEIVED:LTR ENCL SIZE:

TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.

NOTES:Application for permit renewal filed. o5ooo4oo /

RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL PD2-1 LA 1 1 PD2-1 PD 1 1 BECKER,D 1 1 INTERNAL: ACRS MICHELSON 1 1 ACRS MOELLER 2 2 ACRS WYLIE 1 1 AEOD/DOA 1 1 AEOD/DSP/TPAB 1 1 AEOD/ROAB/DSP 2 2 DEDRO 1 1 IRM/DCTS/DAB 1 1 NRR/DEST/ADE 8H 1 1 NRR/DEST/ADS 7E 1 0 NRR/DEST/CEB 8H 1 1 NRR/DEST/ESB 8D 1 1 NRR/DEST/ICSB 7 1 1 NRR/DEST/MEB 9H 1 1 NRR/DEST/MTB 9H 1 1 NRR/DEST/PSB 8D 1 1 NRR/DEST/RSB 8E 1 1 NRR/DEST/SGB 8D 1 1 NRR/DLPQ/HFB 10 1 1 NRR/DLPQ/QAB 10 1 1 NRR/DOEA/EAB 11 1 1 NRR/DREP/RPB 10 2 2

~DRIiS/ IB 9A 1 1 NUDOCS-ABSTRACT 1 1 REG E 02 1 1 RES/DSIR/EIB 1 1 S DSR PRAB 1 1 RGN2 FILE 01 1 1 R EXTERNAL: EG&G WILLIAMS,S 4 4 FORD BLDG HOY,A 1 1 I L ST LOBBY WARD 1 1 LPDR 1 1 NRC PDR . 1 1 NSIC MAYS,G 1 1 D NSIC MURPHY,G.A 1 1 S

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NRC Form 355 US. NUCLEAII REGULATORY COMMISSION (903) APPROVED OMS NO. 316041St EXPIRES: 5/31/BS LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

DOCKET NUMBER l2) PA FACILITY NAME (II SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT ONE o s o o o 400 i or0 TITLE(l'ROCEDURE DEFICIENCIES CAUSE MISSED SURVEILLANCE FOR THERMAL OVERLOAD PROTECTION BYPASS EVENT DATE IS) LER NUMBER (5) REPORT DATE (7) OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (5)

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NUM(1 5 R MONTH OAY YEAR FACILI7 Y NAMES DOCKET NUMBER(S) 0 5 0 0 o 0 508 89 of the follow'nPI (11) 0 5 0 0 0 REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REOUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR ()t fCheck One or n ore OPERATING MODE IS) 20A02(o) 20.405(c I 50.734)(2) (Ivl 73.71(BI POWER 20AOS(e) (1)(II 50.35(c) (I) 50.73(e)(2) (rl 73.71(c)

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CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT TURER TURER TO NPRDS SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (Il) EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR SU 5 MISSION DATE (15I YES (if yet, compiete EKPECTPD S(fphtlSSIOrf OA TEI NO ABSTRACT gimir to te00 rpectt, f e., epproelmerely fifteen einpie rpeCe ryoewrrtren h'nevi (15)

ABSTRACT:

'n April 10, 1989, a deficiency was discovered in the testing of the thermal overload bypass circuit for motor-operated valve 1MS-72. This valve is the steam supply for the Turbine-driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump from the C Steam Generator.

The test procedure would not detect the postulated failure of a relay in the bypass circuit because the normal control circuit remained functional during the test, so that the valve would cycle properly as long as no actual thermal condition existed The valve was declared inoperable at 1530 on April 10 in accordance with the action requirements of Specification 3.8.4.2. A test procedure was revised to address the deficiency by lifting a lead in the normal control circuit to simulate a thermal overload condition and then cycling the valve. The test was satisfactorily completed at 1750 that same day, and the valve was returned to service.

The Technical Specification Equipment List Program identifies those motor-operated valves which require the thermal overload protection bypass function. A footnote was improperly applied to valve 1MS-72 which identified that the safeguards actuation circuit testing satisfied the testing requirements of the bypass function.

The deficiency was discovered during an independent review of thermal overload bypass testing procedures, and no further deficiencies were identified. Revisions to the test procedure and to the Technical Specification Equipment List program will correct the deficienc 8905170134 890508 NIIC Form 355 (9.53) PDR ADGCK 05000400 S PDC

NRC Form 30$ A U J. NUCLEAR REOULATORY COMMISSION (043 I LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVEO OMB NO. 3150M(0e EXPIRES: 0/31/BB FACILITY NAME (II OOCKET NUMBER l21 LER NUMBER (BI PACE (31 SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT YEAR Y<~ SEQVENTIAL '/g>

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On April 10, 1989, the On-site Nuclear Safety Unit identified a surveillance test procedure deficiency for testing of motor-operated valve thermal overload bypass circuits (Technical Specification 3.8.4.2, Surveillance 4.8.4.2). The bypass circuit for valve 1MS-72, the C Steam Generator steam supply to the Turbine-driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (EIIS:BA), was not adequately tested in that the failure of a relay in the bypass circuit would not have been detected.

There are two design approaches used to provide bypass for the thermal overload protection. For most safety-related motor-operated valves requiring bypass of thermal overload protection during accident conditions, the function is accomplished by actuation of relays in the motor control center of the valve. The relays for all valves of each safety train are actuated by a single circuit in the emergency load sequencing system. This circuit is actuated on a safety injection or loss of off-site power signal. For other valves, the bypass function is accomplished using the Engineered Safeguards Feature actuation control circuit, so that no separate, bypass relay is required. This is explicitly identified in the Technical Specification Equipment List Program in the table listing of valves to which Specification 3.8.4.2 applies. A footnote to such valves identifies that testing requirements for 'the bypass function are satisfied by testing of the safeguards actuation circuit since both functions are accomplished by the same circuit Valve 1MS-72 is identified in the table with this footnote applicable since the bypass function is actuated using the safeguards actuation control circuit. However, the circuit has two relays, one of which actuates the valve and one which bypasses the thermal overload circuit. During testing, if the bypass relay failed to actuate, the normal control power circuit would still be energized as long as no thermal overload condition developed, and the valve would cycle normally. Thus, the failure of the bypass relay to function would not have been detected during testing.

Valve 1MS-72 was declared inoperable at 1530 on April 10 as per the action requirements of the Specification 3.8.4.2 ~ A change to a test procedure was made to lift a I.ead in the normal control power, circuit to simulate a thermal overload condition, thus interrupting the normal control circuit, and ensuring that the valve cycled during the test. The revised test was successfully completed and the valve was returned to operable status at 1750 on April 10.

NRC FORM SeoA o U.S.OPO:10dd 0424 ddd/4dd 10431

US. NUCLEAR REOULATORY COMMISSION KRC Corm 3EEA

$ 431 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT {LER) TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVEO OMB NO. 31 SO&ICE EXPIRES: 0/31/BB FACILITY NAME 111 OOCKET NUMBER Il) LER NUMBER (0) PACE 131 SEQUENTIAL .">r'0 hEYISION SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT YEAR $>$ NUM Eh Ir~lr NUM ~ 4 UNIT ONE OF 0 5 0 0 0 TExT //F moro opoco ir roorrkmE Uoo o//ooh'o/ //Rc hnrr 3PBA 3/ (Ill CAUSE:

The cause of this event was procedural inadequacies which resulted in the insufficient testing of the thermal overload bypass circuit. The test procedure did not verify proper operation, of all relays in the bypass circuit. The Technical Specification Equipment List Program improperly applied a footnote which states that the testing of the safeguards actuation circuit satisfies the testing requirements of Specification 3.8.4.2 when in fact a successful actuation of the valve is possible during safeguards testing with the bypass function not operable.

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE:

Successful testing completed after discovery of the problem verified that the bypass circuit was in fact functioning correctly, so if a thermal overload condition had occurred during a demand for valve 1MS-72 to open, it would not have prevented the valve from performing its safety function. Even if the bypass circuitry had been proven to be inoperable by the testing, a redundant steam supply valve would have been available to operate the Turbine-driven Auxiliary Feedwater pump, the the two Motor-driven Auxiliary Feedwater pumps would also have been available.

Previous Licensee Event Reports have identified inadequate surveillance test procedures where components were not included in the test: LERs87-030, 87-043,87-057, and 87-066. Of these, only LER 87-066 involves' similar deficiency where a portion of the actuation logic for containment purge isolation was not included in the monthly test procedure. The zoot cause of LER 87-066 was an administrative omission in the procedure and is not therefore relevant to this report.

This report is required in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) as a noncompliance with Technical Specifications, due to the failure to satisfactorily perform surveillance requirement 4.8.4.2 within its specified interval.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

1. The valve 1MS-72 was satisfactorily tested to ensure operability of overload bypass circuit, and was returned to service at 1750 on the'hermal April 10, 1989.

2. The review which discovered the inadequacy in thermal overload bypass testing included all valves subject to this requizement, and no further deficiencies were identified.

NhC FORM SSEA 4U.S.OPO:10BILOB2E.BSB/EBB 10431

NRC Foc>> 3SSA UA. NUCLEAR REOULATORY COMMISSION ISA l LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION APPROV EO OMB NO. 3ISOWIOC EXPIRES: 0/31/BB FACILITY NAME III DOCKET NUMBER IEI LER NUMBER IS) PACE (3)

SEQUENTIAL REVISION SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT YEAR NVM ER M4 NVM ER UNIT ONE TEXT /// /I>>cc Z>>ce /I ccqv/cNE I>>c CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

~ HRC Fcnn 3//SA'c/ I IT I (continued) o s o o o 400 89 008 00 04 oF 0

3. The procedure for testing the thermal overload bypass circuit for 1MS-72 will be revised to ensure all relays are verified to function properly.

4. The Technical Specification Equipment List Program table will be revised for valve 1MS-72 to correctly identify its testing requirements.

NRC FORM SEBA *U.S.OPO:10dbEHI34 ddd/Edd

/043 I

Carolina Power & Light Company HARRIS'UCLEAR PROJECT P.O. Box 165 New Hill, NC 27562 MAY 8 589 File Number'SHF/10-13510C Letter Number'HO-890053 (0)

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: NRC Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT 1 DOCKET NO. 50-400 LICENSE NO. NPF-63 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 89-008-00 Gentlemen:

In accordance with Title 10 to the Code of Federal Regulations, the enclosed Licensee Event Report is submitted. This report fulfills the requirement for a written report within thirty (30) days of a reportable occurrence and is in accordance with the format set forth in NUREG-1022, September 1983.

Very truly yours, R. B. Richey, Ma ger Harris Nuclear P oject AJH:acm Enclosure cc'Mr. R. A. Becker (NRR)

Mr. W. H. Bradford (NRC SHNPP)

Mr. S. D. Ebneter (NRC RII)

(Pgg MEM/LER-89-008/1/OS1