ML18005A532

LER 87-059-02:on 871011,incoming Line Breaker Tripped Initiating Safety Bus Blackout.Caused by Hammering & Drilling of in Relay Cabinet by Employee.Switchyard Breaker Reclosed & off-site Power Restored to bus.W/880808 Ltr

ML18005A532
Person / Time
Site:	Harris
Issue date:	08/08/1988
From:	Schwabenbauer, Watson R CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM)
References
LER-87-059, LER-87-59, NUDOCS 8808160292
Download: ML18005A532 (7)

Text

AC CELEMTED DI I BUTION DEMONS TION SYSTEM REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR: 8808160292 DOC. DATE: 88/08/08 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET FACIL:50-400 Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1, Carolina 05000400 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION SCHWABENBAUER Carolina Power & Light Co.

WATSON,R.A. Carolina Power & Light Co.

RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT:

LER 87-059-02:on 871011,loss of offsite power due to incoming line breaker.

W/8 ltr.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22D COPIES RECEIVED:LTR ENCL SIZE: D TITLE: 50.73 Licensee Event Report (LER), Inci ent Rpt, etc.

NOTES:Application for permit renewal filed. 05000400 RECIPIENT COPIES COPIES ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL A PD2-1 LA 1 1 PD2-1 PD 1 1 BUCKLEY,B 1 1 INTERNAL: ACRS MICHELSON 1 1 ACRS MOELLER 2 2 AEOD/DOA AEOD/DSP/ROAB 1

2

.1'ECIPIENT 1

2 AEOD/DSP/NAS AEOD/DSP/TPAB 1

1 1

1 ARM/DCTS/DAB 1 1 DEDRO 1 1 NRR/DEST/ADS 7E 1 0 NRR/DEST/CEB 8H 1 1 NRR/DEST/ESB 8D 1 1 NRR/DEST/ICSB 7 1 1 NRR/DEST/MEB 9H 1 1 NRR/DEST/MTB 9H 1 1 NRR/DEST/PSB 8D 1 1 NRR/DEST/RSB 8E 1 1 NRR/DEST/SGB 8D 1 1 NRR/DLPQ/HFB 10 1 1 NRR/DLPQ/QAB 10 1 1 NRR/DOEA/EAB 11 1 1 NRR/DREP/RAB 10 1 1 NRR/DREP/RPB 10. 2 2 NRR/j)Eg S SIB 9A 1 1 NUDOCS-ABSTRACT 1 1 02 1 1 RES TELFORD,J 1 1 RES DSIR DEPY 1 1 RES/DSIR/EIB 1 1 RES/DSR DEPY 1 1 RGN2 FILE 01 1 1 EXTERNAL: EG&G WILLIAMS,S 4 FORD BLDG HOYiA 1 1 H ST LOBBY WARD 1 1 LPDR 1 1 NRC PDR 1 1 NSIC HARRIS,J 1 1 NSIC MAYSiG" 1 A

TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 46 ENCL 45

NRC Form 3ES U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (84LII APPROVED OMS NO. 31600104 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT ILER) EXPIRES: 8/31/88 FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (1) PA E 3 SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER 'PLANT 0 5 0 0 0 QQ 1 OFQ 5 LOSS OF OFF-SITE POWER DUE TO INCOMING LINE BREAKER OPENING CAUSED BY PERSONNEL ERROR AND A LOSS OF EMERGENCY SERVICE WATER DUE TO PROCEDURE DEFICIENCY.

EVENT DATE (5) LEA NUMBER (6) REPORT DATE (7) OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)

MONTH OAY YEAR YEAR rlr" SEGVENYIAL REVISION MONTH OAY YEAR FACII.ITYNAMES DOCKET NUMBER(S)

NVMSER NVMSER 0 5 0 0 0 101 1 87 87 0 5 9 0 2 0 808 8 8 0 5 0 0 0 THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT T0 THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR (ir rchech one or more of the follortlnpl (11 OPERATING MODE (8) 20.402(E) 20.405(c) 50.734) (2)(ir) 73.71(II) 20AOS( ~ l(1)(0 SOM(c) (I ) 50.'734)(2)(rl 73.71(cl

00) Q 0 Q 20.405(cll1)(SI 50.38(cll2) 50,73 (c) l2) (r8) OTHF R (Specify In Ahttrect helow end In Text, HRC Form 20.405(cl(1)(iiil 50.73(cl(2)(i) 50.73(c) (2) (riii)(Al 3b'SAI 20A05 4) lll(irl 60.734) (2) (8) 50.73(c) (2 I(rit)IS)

,r.,A;C > ., 5)NO> 20AOS(c I (1)(rl 50 73(e) l2) (iii) 50.73(c) (2) (xl LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE RICHARD SCHWABENBAUER REGULATORY COMPLIANCE TECHNICIAN 9 1936 2 266 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS AEPOAT (13)

MANUFAC. FPOATASLE MANUFAC. EPORTASL CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT TO NPADS CAUSE SYSTfM COMPONENT TVAEA TVRER TO NPRDS B I SCN E 2. 4 3 Y '~gk %PWCA SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14) MONTH OAY YEAR EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)

YES Ilfyet, complete EXPECTED SUBEIISSIDII DATEI NO AssTRACT ILlmit to f400 tpecet, I e., epproxlmetely fifteen rfnpleepece typewritten lln<<l lISI The plant was tn Node 5, Cold Shutdown, at 0 percent reactor power on October 11, 1987 'perations Surveillance Test (OST) - 1825, Safety Injection: ESF Response Time, Train A 18-month Interval Node 5-6, was being performed nnd n Safety injection (Sl ) signal to the IIA<< train was initiated by OST-1825 at 1517 hours0.0176 days <br />0.421 hours <br />0.00251 weeks <br />5.772185e-4 months <br />. Oue to unrelated work activities, one of the two incoming power lines to lA Star t-up Transformer for off-site power was under clearance for relay cabinet modifications, At 1550 hours0.0179 days <br />0.431 hours <br />0.00256 weeks <br />5.89775e-4 months <br />, the remaining tncoming line breaker tripped initiating a IA-SA Safety Bus blackout, The IA-SA train sequencer actuated and 1A-SA Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) started to assume IA-SA Safety Bus train loads. All plant systems functioned ns required with the exception of 1A-SA Emergency Service Water Traveling Water Screen which did not start, and the service water valves, which aligned Emergency Service Water (ESW) to the Normal Service Water (NSW) system and did not realign to ESW when the IA-SA ESW pump restarted.

Operators had to manually align the valves to provide service water to the operating EDG, The 18-SB ESW Pump started on low system pressure because the running NSW pump was lost when the IA Start-up Transformer was deenergtzed, The cause of the incoming breaker tripping was accidental Jarring of the protection relays, This was due to relay personnel drilling in the relay cabinet for n Sedificntion installation. The cause of the haSN)ertng nnd valves not responding to the restart of the ESW pump was due to lifted leads required by OST-1825 required the leads to be lifted to block the ESW pump start signal to several valves so that it could be

'he test confirmed that n Sl stgnnl would actuate the valves, This configuration prevented a successful automatic realignment of the ESW system, if offslte power was lost to n safety bus.

The IBTSedtate corrective action wns to stop all hammering and drilling In the relay cabinet. Off-site power was restored nt 1655 hours0.0192 days <br />0.46 hours <br />0.00274 weeks <br />6.297275e-4 months <br /> and 1A-SA OGB secured at 1700 hours0.0197 days <br />0.472 hours <br />0.00281 weeks <br />6.4685e-4 months <br />. Site management has Issued n letter stressing the importance of cautious work habits to the relay crew management when working in SHNPP switchyard, Substation construction personnel have been instructed to notify site management prior to starting work on any project at the plant and the crew doing work at the plant will notify the Shtft Foreman upon arrival at the plant and before leaving the plant, OST-1825 is being revised to correct the deficiency In its procedural requirements.

This event is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50,73(a)(2)(iv) as an Engineered Safeguards Feature Actuation and a violation of Technical Specifications 3.8 ~ 1.2.

8808160292 SSOSOS PDR 4DOCK 05000400 S PDC NRC Form 368 (94)3)

NRC Form SSSA U,S. NUCLEAR REGULA'TORY COMMISSION (983)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT ILERI TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVEO OMS NO. 3(50-OIOO EXPIRES: 8/31/88 FACILITy NAME (I 1 OOCKET NUMSER (2) LER NUM8ER (5) ~ AGE 13) ysAR . r'N SSGvsNTr*L p'j) iSyrsloN NVM SA r+i NVM SA SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT 1 o s o o o 400 8 7 5 9 0 2 O 2 OF 0 5 TEXT /lfmoro <<coo /I rRr/krorE rNo RFRSOorV/I//IC Arrrr 3/3/AS/1(T)

DESCRIPTION:

The plant was in Mode 5, Cold Shutdown, at 0 percent reactor power on October 11, 1987. Operations Surveillance Test (OST) 1825, Safety Injection. 'ESF Response Time, Train A 18-month Interval Mode 5-6, was being performed and a Safety. Injection (SI) Signal (EIIS:BP) for "A" train was initiated by OST-1825 at 1517 hours0.0176 days <br />0.421 hours <br />0.00251 weeks <br />5.772185e-4 months <br />. Due to unrelated work activity, one of the two incoming power lines to 1A Start-up Transformer (EIIS:EA) for off-site power was under clearance for switchyard relay cabinet (EIIS:FK) tie ins for a new line to the switchyard.

At 1550 hours0.0179 days <br />0.431 hours <br />0.00256 weeks <br />5.89775e-4 months <br /> the remaining feed to the lA Startup Transformer from the switchyard (breaker 52-3) tripped open. This was caused by vibration from modification work in the relay cabinets for the switchyard breakers. This caused a loss of offsite power to the lA-SA Safety Bus.,The bus under voltage caused the trip of running 1A-SA equipment and a start of the lA-SA Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) (EIIS:EK). Offsite power was also lost to the non-safety buses lA and .1D and caused 'the loss of the running Normal Service Water (NSW) pump (EIIS:KG). 1A-SA Sequencer (EIIS:JE) actuated and lA-SA EDG started as required and assumed 1A-SA Safety Bus train loads.

When the 1A-SA Emergency Service Mater (ESW) pump (EIIS:BI) was reenergized, approximately 15 seconds after the 1A-SA bus was reenergized, the pump started, but the valves in the ESW flow path continued to realign to NSW (refer to Figure 1). As a result, flow in the 1A"SA ESW header was lost. The 1B"SB ESW pump started automatically on low pressure in the 1B-SB header, but the valves remained aligned to. the NSW header. OST"1825 cautioned operators to this potential problem and the control operators observed the valves positions and manually realigned both ESW headers to allow flow.

4 Other plant systems functioned as required with the exception of the 1A-SA Emergency Service Mater Traveling Water Screen (EIIS:BI) (Rexnord Company Model-Envir'ex) which.did not start. This was incorrectly reported to the NRC as being the lA-SA Emergency Service Water Screen Mash Pump via the notification.

Recovery actions were performed in accordance with applicable procedures.

Switchyard .breaker 52-3 was reclosed per Operations Procedure (OP)-156.02, AC Electrical Distribution, and the lA-SA Safety Bus resynchronized to off-site power per OP-155, Diesel Generator Emergency Power System. Off-site power was restored to the lA Start-up Transformer at 1655 hours0.0192 days <br />0.46 hours <br />0.00274 weeks <br />6.297275e-4 months <br />. The EDG was secured per OP-155 at 1700 hours0.0197 days <br />0.472 hours <br />0.00281 weeks <br />6.4685e-4 months <br />.

NRC SO/IM 3OSA oU.S.GPO;1988.0-82O 538/455 (9831

NRC Form 3CCA U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (9831 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT tLER) TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVEO OMB NO, 3150MI04 EXPIRES: 8/31/BB FACILITY NAME I'l DOCKET NUMBER 131 LER NUMBER ICI PACE 131 YEAR CCQUCNTIAL N>> AC Y IC ION

/gal NUM 5 II NUM C/l SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT 1 o s o o o 4 0 059 02 03 OF 0 5 TEXT //F more NMoe /I ICCUCCIE ooe aRIR/onc/ H/IC Frnrl 3/FSA3/1171 CAUSE:

The cause of switchyard breaker 52-3 tripping open was due to vibration in the relay cabinets for the breaker. A modification in the switchyard reI.ay house required hammering and drilling in the relay cabinet.

I'r The failure of the ESW screen to start could not be duplicated through several attempts after the event and is considered operable.

The manual actions required to align the ESW systems were caused by the leads being lifted in accordance with OST-1825. One purpose of OST-1825 was to verify that an SI signal alone would properly realign the A 6 B train ESW valves and the signal to the valves .from an ESW pump start during a loss-of-offsite power sequence alignment was blocked. However, the signal which realigns the valves on an ESW pump trip was not blocked. When the 1A ESW pump

,tripped on bus undervoltage .the logic required the A header to align to NSW.

When the EDG was connected to the 1A-SA bus, the valves aligned ESW to NSW.

Only a B train SI or manual action would align the B header, ESW valves. This same response would have occurred on B train had power also been lost to that bus ~

ANALYSIS:

This event is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv) as an Engineered Safeguards Feature Actuation and a violation of Technical Specifications 3.8.1.2.

There were no safety consequences as a result of this event. The plant was shutdown at the time and all plant systems responded as required with the exception of'he 1A-SA Emergency Service Water Traveling Water Screen which did not start and the service water valves which did not automatically open to feed the EDG.

This particular event occurred while the plant was shutdown. The work being done in the switchyard is not done during power operations of the plant. It is not reasonable to postulate a similar event of inadvertently opening switchyard breakers while the plant is under load.

With regard to the ESW valves, OST-1825 is only done while the plant is shutdown. The control of the lifted leads are explicit steps in the procedure and this condition 'would be restored to normal by . the conclusion of the procedure. In the event, the leads were restored approximately 11 hours1.273148e-4 days <br />0.00306 hours <br />1.818783e-5 weeks <br />4.1855e-6 months <br /> after the event. I NIIC SDIIM SCCA AU.S OPO.19884.835 538/555 19831

NRC form 355A V.S. NUCLEAR REOVLATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION APPROYEO OMS NO. 3)50WIOO EXPIRES: 8/31/88 FACILITYNAME (I) OOCKET NUMSER (2) LER NVMSER (8) ~ AOE (3)

YEA/I r/y SEQUErrtlAL /so) rr(erarorr raw'rVM ER .7.i'I/M ER SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT 1 o s o o o 4 0 0 87 059 02 0 4 OF 0 5 TEXT (// mare apace la eRR(tror/. Iree ~ Sc/arro/HRC Farrrr 3538 3( (12)

ANALYSIS: (continued)

The procedure specifically cautioned the operators about the fact that ESW valves would not respond properly in the event of a loss-of-offsite power.

However Technical Specifications require that at least 1 EDG be operable in Modes 5 6 6. In this case neither EDG was operable because prompt operator action would be required to maintain ESW flow to the EDG to prevent damage to the EDG.

There have been no similar events reported.

CORRECTIVE ACTION/ACTION TO PREVENT RECURRENCE:

1. When it was determined that the loss of the lA Startup Transformer was inadvertent, switchyard breaker 52-3 was, reclosed and off-site power restored to,the lA-SA bus.

2. OST-1825 is being revised to correct the deficiency. (The B train procedure, OST-1826, has been corrected.)

3. SHNPP site management has issued a letter to the appropriate relay crew management stressing the need to be cautious when working in the SHNPP switchyard.

I

4. Substation construction personnel have been instructed to notify plant management prior to starting work on any project at the plant. Also, the substation crew doing work at the plant will notify the Shift Foreman upon arrival at the plant and prior to leaving the plant.

N/Ic po/IM 3aaA oU.S OPO I 885.0524 538/455 (883)

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C~L Carolina Power & Light Company HARRIS NUCLEAR PROJECT P.O. Box 165 New Hill, NC 27562 AUG 0 8 1988 File Number: SHF/10-13510C Letter Number'. HO-880152 (0)

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: NRC Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT 1 DOCKET NO. 50-400 LICENSE NO. NPF-63 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 87-059-02 Gentlemen'.

In accordance with Title 10 to the 'Code of Federal Regulations, the enclosed Licensee Event Report is submitted. This report fulfills the requirement for a written report within thirty (30) days of a reportable occurrence and is in accordance with the format set forth in NUREG-1022, September, 1983.

Revision 1 was submitted as a result of corrective action/action to prevent recurrence corrections.

Revision 2 is being submitted due to the discovery of an additional event which occurred concurrent with the before reported event.

Very truly yours, R. A. Watson Vice President Harris Nuclear Project RJS:acm Enclosure cc.'Dr. J. Nelson Grace (NRC RII)

Mr. B. Buckley (NRR)

Mr. W. H. Bradford (NRC - SHNPP)

MEM/LER-87-059/1/OS1