ML18004B879

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LER 87-034-00:on 870611,air Leakage by Inner & Outer Doors of Personnel Air Lock Excessive.Caused by Flat Spots on O-ring Seal.Seals on Inner & Outer Doors Replaced & Procedure OMM-001 revised.W/870713 Ltr
ML18004B879
Person / Time
Site: Harris Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 07/13/1987
From: Hudson O, Watson R
CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:
NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM)
References
HO-870461-(O), LER-87-034, LER-87-34, NUDOCS 8707200497
Download: ML18004B879 (7)


Text

U ORY INFORMATION DISTR UT. SYSTEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR: 8707200497 DOC. DATE: 87/07/13 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET 0 FACIL: 50-400 Shearon Harris Nuclear Poeer Planti Unit ii Carolina 05000400 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION HUDSONI O. N. Car olina Poujer 8. Light Co.

WATSON'. A. Carolina Power 8. Light Co.

REC IP. NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT:

LER 87-034-00: on 870&iiI air leakage bg inner h outer doors of personnel air lock excessive. Caused bg flat spots on 0-ring seal. Seals on inner h outer doors replaced Procedure OMM-001 revised. W/870713 ltr.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22D COPIES RECEIVED: LTR / ENCL TITLE: 50. 73 Licensee Event Report (LER)I Incident Rpt>

+etc.SIZE:

NOTES: Application for permit renewal filed. 05000400 RECIPIENT COPIES REC IP IENT COPIES ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL PD2-1 L* 1 PD2-1 PD 1 BUCKLEYI B 1 1 INTERNAL: ACRS MICHELSON 1 1 ACRS MOELLER 2 2 AEOD/DOA 1 1 AEOD/DSP/ROAB AEOD/DSP/TPAB 1 1 DEDRO 1 1 NRR/DEST/ADE 1 0 NRR/DEST/ADS 1 0 NRR/DEBT/CEB 1 1 NRR/DEST/ELB 1 1 NRR/DEST/ICSB 1 1 NRR/DEST/MEB 1 1 NRR/DEST/MTB 1 1 NRR/DEST/PSB 1 1 NRR/DEST/RSB 1 1 NRR/DEST/SGB 1 1 NRR/DLPG/HFB 1 NRR/DLPG/GAB 1 1 NRR/DOE*/EAB 1 1 NRR/DREP/RAB 1 1 NRR/DREP/RPB 2 2 N ILRB 1 1 NRR/PMAS/PTSB 1 1 02 1 RES DEPY GI 1 1 RES TELFORDi J 1 1 RES/DE/EIB 1 1 RGN2 FILE 01 1 1 EXTERNAL: EGS.G GROHI M H ST LOBBY WARD 1 1 LPDR 1 1 NRC PDR 1 1 NSIC HARRISI J 1 1 NSIC MAYSI G 1 TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 44 ENCL 42

Cv NRC Form 355 US. NUCLEAR REOULATORY COMMISSION (933)

APPROVED OMB NO. 3160010(

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT tLER) EXPIRES: 5/31/55 FACILITY NAME (Il DOCKET NUMBER 12) PA E 1 a 0 5 0 0 0 1 OF TITLE (Cl Technical S ecification Violation Containment Personnel Air Lock EVENT DATE (5) LER NUMBER (5) REPORT PATE LT) OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (5)

MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR SEQUENTIAL:Crhrr RCY+~ MONTH OAY YEAR FACILITYNAMES DOCKET NUMBER(S)

NVMSEII NUMBER 0 5 0 0 0 0 11 87 7 3 4 O7 8 7 0 5 0 0 0 OPERATINQ THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT T0 THE REQUIREMENTs oF 10 cFR ()t (ccrc'nr or morr of tnr follovffnf) (11 MODE (9) 20.C02(lr) 73.71(5) 20AOS(c) 50.73(al(2)(lv) h POWER 20AOS(el(1) (0 50.35(cl(1) 50.73(el(2)(r) 7371(c)

LEVEI.

(10) 20.COB(a) (I) (4) 50.35(c) l2) 50.73(a) (2) (v5) OTHER ISprcit)h In AOttrect trriovy end In Text, flitC Form

((c~' r 'voh v' err( tv"vs,vcr 20.COS( ~ )(1)(BI) 50.73( ~ ) (2) (I) 50.73(el(2)(vBI)(Al JEEAI v

20AOS(a)(1)(lv) 50.73(a) (2)(5) 50.73(a l(2) (rIII ) (5)

)rty . r .rc 20AOS(a)(1)(vl 50.73(a) (2) (III) 50.73(ell2) (el LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE

0. N. Hudson, Senior Engineer Regulatory Compliance 9 1 36 363 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBEO IN THIS REPORT (13)

MANUFAC- EPORTABLE

'Nkc:3'" )iS CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAC EPORTABL TURER TO NPRDS TURER TO NPRDS

'r '

X B D SEAL I 302 Y " fraa,. ro)r cr((c I SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (Iel MONTH DAY YEAR EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)

YES Ilfyrt, complete EXPECTED SIIBefISSION DATEI NO ABSTRACT ILlmlt to tr00 tprcrt, I.r., rpproxlmeNIy fifteen elnrtrcprcr typrrvrtttrn linnl (15)

On June 11, 1987, the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant was operating at 100K power. At 1400 hours0.0162 days <br />0.389 hours <br />0.00231 weeks <br />5.327e-4 months <br />, the local leak rate test being performed indicated that air leakage by both the inner and outer doors of the personnel air lock was excessive. Technical Specifications only allow one door to be inoperable.

The outer door was repaired, retested, and declared operable within two hours, and the inner door within six hours. Later that day, the outer airlock door's 0-ring seal fell out of its groove. Due to miscommunication, personnel entered and exited through the airlock after the outer door was repaired, but prior to it being retested and declared operable. This constituted a Technical Specification violation. At approximately 0250 hours0.00289 days <br />0.0694 hours <br />4.133598e-4 weeks <br />9.5125e-5 months <br /> on June 12, the outer door was successfully retested and subsequently declared operable.

870720 0EI 5'7 8 I'07 l 3 PDR ADDCI< 05000'0PDI<

S h

NRC Form 355 (933)

e! NRC Form 368A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION IBa3) ~

LICENSEE ENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CO INU ION APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-GIOl EXPIRES: 8/31/88 FACILITY NAME ll) DOCKET NUMBER 12) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE 13)

YEAR P 4%gsEGUENTrAL NUM ER

+cQ'fvlsloN

+~ NUMBER

.,Shearon Harris, Unit tEXT ///mrr!o SPeeo 1

/e /)r)krrNL Iree ///Oroe/ HRC Forr!r 3//SA e/ l11) osooo400 034 0 0 2oF 0 4 Descri tion of Event On June 11, 1987, the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant was operating at 100X power. At 1400 hours0.0162 days <br />0.389 hours <br />0.00231 weeks <br />5.327e-4 months <br /> on June 11, during performance of surveillance test EST-219, "Personnel Air Lock Door Seals Local Leak Rate Test," air leakage by the personnel air lock was excessive. Both the inner and outer doors failed to meet the test acceptance criteria. The Shift Foreman was notified of the failure at 1410. Technical Specification 3.6.1.3 allows only one containment air lock door to be inoperable. A priority work request was initiated to

~ repair the air lock. doors. Since the Tech. Spec. limiting condition for operation could not be met, Tech. Spec. 3.0.3 was entered, which requires the plant to be in hot standby within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

The door seals on the outer door were replaced and then retested in accordance with EST-219. The retest was declared satisfactory at 1548 on June ll, and the outer door was declared operable. With one door operable, T.S. 3.0.3 action to go hot standby was no longer required. Operation was allowed to continue under Action "a" of Tech. Spec. 3.6.1.3.

The inner air lock door was inspected, and new seals were installed. The inner door was retested in accordance with EST-219. The retest was declared satisfactory at 1735, and the inner door was returned to operable status at 2000 on June 11, 1987.

On June ll, 1987, at approximately 2030 hours0.0235 days <br />0.564 hours <br />0.00336 weeks <br />7.72415e-4 months <br /> with the reactor operating at 100X power, Radiation Control (RC) personnel requested and received permission from the Main Control Room (MCR) to enter the Reactor Containment Building (RCB) to support an Instrumentation and Control (I&C) job in containment.

RC and I&C personnel entered the RCB through the primary personnel hatch airlock. Upon exiting the RCB at approximately 2140 hours0.0248 days <br />0.594 hours <br />0.00354 weeks <br />8.1427e-4 months <br />, the RC Technician noticed that the outer airlock door's 0-ring seal had fallen out of its groove. I&C personnel inserted the 0-ring back into the groove.

Following the exit, the Shift Foreman (SF) was notified of the 0-ring problem. At approximately 2150 hours0.0249 days <br />0.597 hours <br />0.00355 weeks <br />8.18075e-4 months <br />, the SF declared the outer door "inoperable" and notified Maintenance that repair and a Local Leak Rate Test (LLRT) was required. RC personnel were not informed of this.

At approximately 2200 hours0.0255 days <br />0.611 hours <br />0.00364 weeks <br />8.371e-4 months <br />, Maintenance personnel arrived at the personnel hatch and determined that replacement of the 0-ring was not necessary. They informed RC personnel that replacement of the 0-ring was not required. At the completion of the inspection, RC personnel understood that the door was ready for use.

'NAC'ORM BOBA w U.S/)PO:1888Oa34 538/455 "tean

NRC Form 358A US. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

)983) ~

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

~

APPROVED OMB NO. 3)50-0101 EXPIRES: 8/31/88 FACILITY NAME II,I DOCKET NUMBER I2) LER NUMBER (6) PAOE I3)

SEOUENTIAL YEAR NUM ER @g REVISION NUM ER

. Shearon Harris Unit 1 0 5 0 0 0 4 0 8 7 3 4 0 0 0 3 OF 0 4 TEXT (I'/Roro IEeco lr /o//r/oo/ Irro //I/orM/HRC furr 3551'g/ 07)

Descri tion of Event (continued)

At approximately 2235 hours0.0259 days <br />0.621 hours <br />0.0037 weeks <br />8.504175e-4 months <br />, a 'separate'rew consisting of an RC Tech. and 2 I&C Techs. entered the RCB through the primary personnel hatch without notifying the SF and unaware of the "inoperable" status of the outer door.

This constituted a violation of Technical Specification 3.6.1 ~ 3, which requires that "...with one containment air lock door inoperable, maintain at least the OPERABLE air lock door closed...".

At approximately 2315 hours0.0268 days <br />0.643 hours <br />0.00383 weeks <br />8.808575e-4 months <br />, the SF called RC to inform them that personnel would not be allowed entrance into the RCB. The lead RC Tech. informed the SF that personnel were already working inside. Meanwhile, the personnel in containment finished their work and exited the RCB through the personnel air lock at approximately 2320 hours0.0269 days <br />0.644 hours <br />0.00384 weeks <br />8.8276e-4 months <br />, prior to anyone being able to contact them about the inoperable status of the air lock door.

At approximately 0250 hours0.00289 days <br />0.0694 hours <br />4.133598e-4 weeks <br />9.5125e-5 months <br /> on June 12, 1987, Technical Support personnel performed a successful LLRT on the outer door and the personnel hatch was subsequently declared "operable" by .the SF. Five hours elapsed between the time the door was declared inoperable to being declared operable.

CAUSE The'nitial failure of the outer door seal was due to flat spots on the 0-ring seal. The probable cause of the seal damage was foreign debris coming in contact with the seal while the door was open for entry into containment and normal wear. The inner door failure was due to foreign debris and usage by personnel. Similar inner door failures have occurred in the past.

The second event was due to personnel error and equipment failure. Although the outer door passed its LLRT immediately following the previous seal replacement, the 0-ring later came out of its groove.. Poor communication and miscommunication between the SF, RC, and Maintenance then resulted in this event being a condition prohibited by Tech. Specs. The SF did not notify RC of the "inoperable" status of the outer door until about 90 minutes after the fact. RC did not notify the SF of the RCB entrance immediately prior to that entrance because they were continuing a job for which they had received prior approval to enter the RCB. Meanwhile, after the 0-ring was fixed, Maintenance personnel informed RC that the 0-ring did not require replacement, and RC personnel understood that to mean that the airlock was operable. As a result, the crew entered the RCB, completed their work, and exited prior to being informed that the airlock outer door was in fact not operable. Had RC informed the SF immediately prior to the crew's entry, the SF, being aware of the door's status, would not have allowed the entry.

IIRC 1'ORM 30OA *US.GPO:198MM21.538/155

)983)

NRC Form 388A U.S. NUCLEAR REOULATORY COMMISSION (84)3)

LICENSEE ENT REPORT HLER) TEXT CO INU ON APPROVEO OMB NO, 3160-0104 EXPIRES: 8/31/88 FACILITYNAME (1) COCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (8) PACE (3)

YEAR ( EEQUENTIAL NVM ER II>o REYIEIVN

'kr HVM ER

. Shearon Harris, Unit 1 o so o o 4 087 0 3 O40FO 4 TEXT //mme Epooo EI /opv)ort, vEE SEE/one/HRC FonII 3EE(4'4/ (17)

ANALYSIS Both events are being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) as a result of containment isolation failure and being in a condition prohibited by the plant's Tech. Specs.

The failure of the door seals was subsequent to the previous surveillance test conducted on June 8, 1987, three days prior to the unsuccessful test. The leakage past the seals exceeded the range of the instrument used to measure the leak rate so it cannot be determined what the total leakage from the air lock would have been during a design basis accident. Since at least one door was maintained closed and repairs were made expeditously, there were no adverse consequences from this event.

For the second event, only the outer door was inoperable. Use of the inner door is prohibited pending repairs and test of the outer door. Following the repair, but prior to the test, the outer door was relied upon for containment integrity during access and egress. Based on the subsequent acceptable test, it is concluded that the leakage of the airlock during a postulated accident would have also been acceptable.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS Immediate corrective actions taken were to'.

1. Replace the seals on the inner and outer personnel air lock doors for the first event.
2. Post a sign on the outer personnel air lock door as a reminder to notify the MCR prior to entry.

The following corrective actions have been taken or are planned to prevent recurrence.'.

Procedure OMM-001, "Operations Conduct of Operation," will be revised to add a Containment Access Log Book and notification requirements. This will enable the SF to maintain a better accountability of plant personnel inside the RCB.

2. Procedure HPP-046", "Containment Power and Initial Post"Shutdown Entries,"

will be .revised to require that the MCR is notified just before each personnel entry and immediately after each personnel exit.

3. Applicable personnel will be instructed on the requirements of these revised procedures for 1 and 2, above.

orRC FORM 3EEA Hr U.SQPO. I 8864)4) 24.638/466

'484)3)

Carolina Power & Light Company HARRIS NUCLEAR PROJECT P.O. Box 165 New Hill, NC 27562 JUL i ~ 1987 File Number'SHF/10-13510C Letter Number: HO-870461 (0)

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: NRC Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT 1 DOCKET NO. 50-400 LICENSE NO. NPF-63 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 87-034-00 Gentlemen:

In accordance with Title 10 to the Code of Federal Regulations, the enclosed Licensee Event Report is submitted. This report fulfills the requirement for a written report within thirty (30) days of a reportable occurrence and is in accordance with the format set forth in NUREG-1022, September, 1983.

Very truly yours, R. A. Watson Vice President Harris Nuclear Project RAW:skm Enclosure cc.'Dr. J. Nelson Grace (NRC RII)

Mr. B. Buckley (NRR)

Mr. G. Maxwell (NRC SHNPP)