ML17244A518
| ML17244A518 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Ginna  |
| Issue date: | 05/17/1979 |
| From: | White L ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP. |
| To: | Ziemann D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7905220031 | |
| Download: ML17244A518 (37) | |
Text
REGULA ~ Y INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)
ACCESSION NBR:7905220031 DOC ~ DATE: 79/05/17 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET FACILe50, 244 ROBERT EMMET,GINNA NUCLEAR P'LANTi UNIT 1 p ROCHESTER G 05000244 AUTHOR AFF ILIAT ION CORP' AUTH'AME NHITEe L ~ D ~ ROCHESTER GAS 8 ELECTRIC IP ~ NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION 'EC ZIEMANNg D ~ L ~ OPERATING REACTORS BRANCH 2
SUBJECT:
RESPONDS TO REQUEST FOR ADDL INFO RE PRESSURE SHIELDING STEEL DIAPHRAGM~ INCLUDES 'INFO SUMMARIZING CALCULATED PRESSURE TRANSIENTS i<HIGH RESULT FROM BREAKS I'N 20" FEEDWATER LINE OR 12 STEAM LINE ~
DISTRIBUTION CODE: A001S TITLE:
COPIES RECEIVED:LTR g ENCL + SIZE:
GENERAL DISTRIBUTION FOR AFTER ISSUANCE OF OPERATING LIC gp~gq:~ay. ~~mxson/ C. aoz~pysa .
RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ACTION: 05 BC 4@8 4P~ .,
7 7 INTERNAL: 0,1 1 1 02 NRC PDR 1 12 2 2 10 TA/EDO 1 15 CORE PERF- BR 1 1 16 AD SYS/PROJ 1 17 ENGR BR 1 1 18 REAC SFTY BR '1 19 PLANT SYS BR 1 1 20 EEB 1 21 EFLT TRT SYS 1 1 22 BR INKMAN 1 IV EXTERNAL: 03 LPDR 1 1 04 NSIC 23 ACRS 16 16 TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 38 ENCL 38
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~l wit.zÃll irew ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORPORATION o 89 EAST AVENUE, ROCHESTER, N.Y. 14649 LEON D. WHITE, JR. TCLEPHONK VICC PRCSIDCNT *ac* cooc 7io 546-2700 May 17, 1979 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Attention: Mr. Dennis L. Ziemann, Chief Operating Reactors Branch No. 2 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555
Subject:
Pressure Shielding Steel Diaphragm R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Docket No. 50-244
Dear Mr. Ziemann:
This letter is in response to requests from members of your Staff for additional information regarding the proposed modifica-tion. It supplements our letters of February 6, 1978, August 25, 1978, and October 11, 1978.
Attachment 1 to this letter summarizes the calculated pressure transients which result from breaks in the 20" feedwater line or the 12" steam line in the Turbine Building at Ginna. Larger lines in the Turbine Building, the 24" and 36" steam lines, are not postulated to break based on the augmented inservice inspection program which has been implemented. This program is discussed further below. The design basis breaks are selected so as to maximize the mass and energy release into the Turbine Building and therefore to maximize the pressure. No credit is taken for the trip of the feedwater pumps or for closure of the feedwater control valve. In addition no credit is taken for closure of the check valves at the containment penetrations, again, maximizing the mass and energy release. Credit is taken for small vent areas existing between the Turbine Building and the environment and for failure of a small section of unreinforced block wall.
These vent areas are discussed further below. The results from the pressure calculations are that the peak pressure in the basement/mezzanine levels is 0.848 psi and the peak pressure on the operating level is 0.456 psi. Thus, there is considerable margin between the calculated peak pressure and the values being used in the design of the pressure wall of 1.14 psi at the basement/
mezzanine levels and 0.7 psi at the operating level.
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ROCHESTER GAS AND EL TRIC CORP. SHEET NO.
DATE May 17, 1 97 9 To Mr. Dennis L ~ niemann An augmented inservice inspection program for high energy piping was proposed by RGB on October 31, 1974. This program included main steam and feedwater piping in the intermediate building and the turbine building. In the turbine building, the 36" and 24" main steam lines and a portion of the 20" main feedwater line are included in order to preclude the potential for adverse consequences from pipe whip due to postulated full diameter breaks. This program was approved by the NRC in Amendment No. 7 to the Ginna license, issued May 14, 1975. In the Safety Evaluation which accompanied the transmittal, the NRC stated, "We conclude that this augmented inspection program is a prudent measure to ensure a very low probability of any break in the main steam and feedwater lines." Inspections of the piping have been performed as required since May 1975. It is on the basis of the inspection program and its approval by the NRC that the 36" and 24" main steam have been eliminated from consideration. Because three welds in the 20" line are not included in the program, a break is postulated in that line. The welds were not included because no adverse effects in safety related equipment would result from pipe whip if a break occurred at, those locations. Previous correspondence had included consideration of the 36" and 24" line breaks for pressure analyses, however, these were performed prior to approval of the augmented inservice inspection program.
The analysis assumed a small vent area from the building during normal operation and additional vent area as a result of failure of a section of 12" unreinforced block wall. The vent area available during normal operation has been conservatively estimated based on measurements taken in the field. This vent area does not include openings through or around doors from the turbine building to other structures. In addition, it does not include relief through the turbine building ventilation louvers since these are blocked during the winter. Rather, it summation of gaps known to exist around the turbine building includes a windows and overhead door. Analyses which develop the failure capacity of the 12" unreinforced block wall are presented in Attachment 2 to this letter. As reported in Attachment 1, a sensitivity study was performed in which the 12" wall was not permitted to fail. The results of this sensitivity study demon-strated that pressures on the basement/mezzanine levels and the operating level did not exceed the pressure shielding wall design bases and, in fact, increased by less than 2% and 20%, respectively from the pressures calculated when the wall was allowed to fail.
An additional sensitivity study was performed to determine the impact on the design if the stresses resulting from pressure and seismic are combined by the square root of the sum of the squares (SRSS) instead of by direct absolute addition.
0 ROCHESTER GAS AND EL TRIC CORP. SHEET NO.
DATE, May j 7, 1979 Mr. Dennis L. Ziemann A summary of calculated stresses assuming the design pressures of 1.14 psi and 0.70 psi and allowable stresses in the most critical elements of the structural steel framing supporting the new steel diaphragms was reported in our letter of October 11, 1978 based on absolute addition. The following presents those results as well as results for the SRSS combination.
Stress at Design Pressure Allowable Absolute SRSS Stress Addition Top Chord of Roof Truss 9430 psi 8923 psi 21600 psi Bottom Chord of Roof Truss 6470 psi 5450 psi 6500 psi Roof Truss Diagonal 9600 psi 8686 psi 9900 psi Columns-various 77% 70% 100%
Horizontal Members of Steel Diaphragm 22700 psi 20980 psi 24000 psi This demonstrates additional margin available in the design.
As discussed with your Staff, analyses of the impact of high energy line breaks on Turbine Building walls other than those adjacent to the Control Building and the Diesel Generator annex will be integrat,ed into the Systematic Evaluation Program. Xn addition, any reinforcement of the Turbine Building structural connections will also be integrated into the conclusions of the Systematic Evaluation Program.
Ne believe that these responses address all remaining questions regarding the pressure shielding wall.
Very truly yours, L. D. Nhi e, Jr.
-Attachment 1 Table of Contents
- 1. 0 Introduction Page 1 2.0 Break Identification Page 1 3.0 Hass and Energy Release Page 1 3.1 .20" Feedwater Break Page 2 3.2 12" Hain Steam Break Page 2 4.0 Turbine Building Pressurization Page 3 4.1 Pressurization Hodel Page 3 4.2 Pressurization Results Page 4
- 5. 0 Summary Page 5 6.0 References Page 6
- ~ ~
List of Tables and Fi ures Table 1 - 20" Feedwater Mass and Energy Release Table 2 12" Hain Steam Mass and Energy Release Table 3 Turbine Building Pressurization Hodel Volume and Flow Path Descriptions Figure 1 Turbine. Building Pressurization. Model Schematic Figure 2 - Operating Level, Pressure-Time History Figure 3 Operating Level, Relief Area-Time History Figure 4 - Mezzanine/Basement Level, Pressure-Time History Figure 5 - Mezzanine/Basement Level, Relief Area-Time History
1.0 Introduction Following a postulated pipe rupture, subcompartments surrounding the break will pressurize.
location The resultant pressure differential across these walls necessitates a structural analysis to determine the design adequacy of the walls for this loading along or in combination with some other loading such as a safe shutdown earthquake.
The study deals with the pressurization phase only for the R. E. Ginna turbine building., The study covers the areas of break identification, determination of mass and energy release, and subcompartment pressurization.
2.0 Break Identification The two largest high energy lines within the turbine building are the 36" and the 24" Hain Steam Lines. However, these pipes are covered by an in-service-inspection program (1) which precludes all breaks except the crack break. This program reduces the maximum break area for these pipes to under 0.10 ft .
The two largest high energy lines subject to a double-ended rupture are the 20" feedwater line and the 12" Hain Steam line, both on the mezzanine level of the turbine building. These two lines were analyzed in detail to determine their mass and energy release following a postulated pipe rupture.
3.0 Hass & Energy Release
~ ~ 1 \'
3.1 20" Feedwater .Break
'L
~ The worst'ase break of the 20" feedwater line is a double-ended rupture (1.755 ft2 ) while the .plant is operating at full power conditions. To maximize mass and energy release, the break location chosen is in the 20" line just downstream of the No. 5 feedwater heaters. This location maximizes the available energy and inventory for the short term release from the feedwater system. Determination of this mass and energy release-is made using the FLASH (2) computei code series assuming a one millisecond break opening time and Moody flow with a 1.0 multiplier.
Sihce the turbine building pressurization is a short term phenomena (less than 1.0 second), only short term mass and energy release from the feedwater break is required. Therefore, no provision is made for feedwater pump trip or feedwater control valve closure. To further assure maximizing the mass and energy release, a single failure of one downstream check valve, R06, is assumed and no credit is taken for the flow limiter just upstream of the R06 check valve.
The mass and energy release rates as determined by this analysis are presented'in Table 1.
3.2 12" Main Steam Break A double ended rupture (0.71 ft2 ) of the 12" main steam dump to the condenser while the plant is in the hot-standby condition was analyzed as the worst main steam line break. The break location chosen is just downstream of the 36" header. Mass and energy release from this break is determined using (2) computer code series FLASH assuming a one millisecond break opening time and Moody flow with a 1.0 multiplier.
Since only short term mass and energy release data is required, no provision
~ M for safety valve closures are made. To maximize the available inventory from the condenser side of the break, check valve RN12A is assumed to fail.
The mass and energy release rates as determined by this analysis are in Table 2. 'resented 4.0 'Turbine Building Pressuri'zation 4.1 Pressurization Hodel The turbine building response to a pipe rupture within the building itself is a'nalyzed using a 3 node model and the COMPARE (3) computer code. The turbine building model is depicted in Figure l. Both the feedwater and the main steam breaks occur in the western half of the mezzanine level of the turbine building.
Node 1 of the model represents both the mezzanine and the basement levels
~ of the turbine building, since flow area between the two levels is large.
The operating level of the turbine building is represented by node 2. The outside environment corresponds to node 3.
Flow path no. 1 represents the open access hatch between the mezzanine and operating levels. Flow path nos. 2 and 3 represent actual physical openings to the environment from the mezzanine/basement and operating levels respectively.
Flow path nos. 4 and 5 represent the concrete block wall between column lines F10 and Fll. The concrete block wall between elevations 274'-0" and 289'-0" which is within the mezzanine level corresponds to flow path no. 4. The concrete block wall between elevations 289'-6" and 304'-4" which is within the operating level corresponds to flow path no. 5. These
concrete block walls have an ultimate horizontal. load carrying capacity of 0.13 psid. For the purposes of this analysis, these concrete wall
. sections are conservatively assumed to fail independently of each other.
When the pressure differential across the concrete block reaches 0.13 psid, theblock is assumed to begin moving horizontally outward (gravity, effects neglected) due to the pressure induced force acting on the wall, thus additional relief area from the turbine building becomes available. The method used to analyze the dynamic effects of the wall movements is discussed in reference 4.
4.2 Pressurization Results Table 3 presents volume descriptions, flow path description, and the peak nodal pressures (both calculated and design) for the accident cases analyzed. Four cases involve the 20" feedwater break and an initial conditions sensitivity study. This'ensitivity study analyzes the feedwater'reak assuming initial conditions of minimum/maximum temperature and minimum/maximum relative humidity. The fifth case analyzes the 12" main steam break assuming initial conditions of maximum temperature and minimum relative humidity.
Results of the analysis show that the peak calculated pressure within the mezzanine/basement level of 0.85 psi occurs for the case of a 20" feedwater break w'ith initial conditions of minimum temperature and minimum relative humidity. The calculated differential pressure-time history between the mezzanine/basement level and the 'environment is given in Figure 2. The available relief area time history for this case is presented in Figure 3.
Results of the analysis also show that the peak calculated differential pressure across the operating level walls is 0.46 psid and occurs for the case of' 20" feedwater break with initial conditions of minimum temperature and maximum relative humidity. The calculated differential pressure time history between the operating level of the turbine building and the environment is presented in Figure 4. The available relief area 'time history for this case is presented .in Figure 5.
A further study of the pressurization within the turbine building following a postulated 20" feedwater rupture was made. This study assumed that the concrete block wall at column F10 and Fll did not fail. Results of the study indicate that the design differential pressures given in Table 3 are conservative
- 5. 0 Summary Results of this study show that the 20" feedwater breaks causes the most severe pressure transients within the turbine building. Calculated pressure differentials are determined to be 0.46 psid for the operating level and 0.85 psid for the mezzanine/basement level. Design nressure differentials used for structural evaluation of the building are 0.70 psid for the operating level- and 1.14 psid for the mezzanine/basement levels.
~ ~
5
- 6. 0 Ref erences
- 1. GAI Report No. 1815, ".Effects of Postulated Pipe Breaks Outside the Containment Building Robert E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant,, Unit 1,"
October 1973.
- 2. J. A'. Redfield, J. H. Murphy, V. C. Davis, "FLASH-2 A Fortran IV Program for the Digital Simulation of 'a Hultinode Reactor Plant During Loss of Coolant," WAPD-TH-666, April 1967.
T. A. Porsching, J. H. Murphy, J. A. Redfield, V. C. Davis, "FLASH-4:
A Full Implicit Fortran IV Program for the Digital Simulation of Transients
,in a Reactor Plant," WAPD-TM-840, March 1969.
- 3. R. G. Gido, C. I. Grimes, R. G. Lawton, J. A. Kudrick, "COMPARE:
A Computer Program for the Transient Calculation of a System of Volumes Connected by Flowing Vents," LA-NUREG-6488-HS, September 1976.
- 4. AS. W. Webb, "Blowout Panel Considerations in Subcompartment Pressure Analyses," submitted for publication in Nuclear Engineering and Design, North-Holland Publishing Co.
.Table 1 20" Feedwater Break Mass & Energy Release Sec) Mass Flow (lb/sec Ener Rate (BTU/Sec) 0.0 0.0 2.185 + 7
- 0. 001 5.204 + 4 2.185 + 7
- 0. 002 4.468 1;804 + 7 4
un
'ime
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, 0.003
- 0. 004
'4. 450 3.999 + 4 1.796 1.614
+
+
7 7
- 0. 005 1.540 + 4 6.217 + 6
- 0. 008 1.540 + 4 6.217 + 6
- 0. 009 1.539 + 4, 6.213 + 6
- 0. 015 1.539 + 4 6.213 + 6
'.016 1.538 + 4 6.209 + 6
- 0. 020 1.538 + 4 6.209 + 6
- 0. 100" 1.527 + 4 6.165 + 6
- 0. 200 1.513 + 4 6.105 + 6
- 0. 300 1.497 + 4 6.036 + 6
- 0. 400 1.480 + 4 5.961 + 6
- 0. 500 1.461 + 4 5.878 + 6
~
I
- 0. 575 1. 451 5.833 + 6
- 0. 650 l. 434 5.758 + 6 F1
- 0. 725 1.417 + 4 5.682 + 6
- 0. 800'.
1.397 + 4 5.592 + 6 875 1.376 + 4 5.498 + 6
- 0. 950 1.353 + 4 5.394 + 6
- 1. 025 1.299 + 4 5.205 + 6
Table 2 12" Hain Steam Break Hass & Energy Release Time Sec Hass Flow. lb/sec Ener Rate (BTU/Sec) 0.0 0.0 3.312 + 6
- 0. 005'.
2.779 + 3 3.312 + 6 010 ~
2.921 + 3 3.482 + 6
.0. 015 2.856 + 3 3.406 + 6
-0. 020 2.802 + 3 3.344 + 6
- 0. 025 2.752 + 3 3.286 + 6 0.'03 2.709 + 3 3.235 + 6
.0.04 2.638 + 3 3.153 + 6
- 0. 05 2.587 + 3 3.093 + 6
- 0. 06 2.543 + 3 3.040 + 6
- 0. 08 2.456 + 3 2.937 + 6
- 0. 10 2.347 + 3 2.807 + 6
- 0. 12 2.283 + 3 2.731 + 6
- 0. 16 2.115 + 3 2.530 + 6
-0. 20 1.992 + 3 2.383 + 6
- 0. 30 1.742 + 3 2.081 + 6
- 0. 40 ',588+ 3 1.895 + 6
- 0. 50 1.478 + 3 1.764 + 6
- 0. 575 1.423 + 3 1.699 +. 6
- 0. 70 1.425 + 3 1.641 + 6 0.'80 1.349 + 3 1.581 + 6
- 1. 00 1.349 +'3 1.581 + 6
Table 3A I 4
.Turbine Building Pressurization Model Description Initial Conditions Desi n Brcak Conditions Calculated Design Relative Break Break Peak Pressure Peak Pressure Case Volume Volume Temp. Pressure Humidity Location Break Area Break Dfffcrentfal. Differential HoP ffo. ~DI DI ~ISS ~P ~PSIA ~S Pol . S . LI ~PS> IW ~PSID ~PSID Mezzanfne & Basement Levels 847>519 120 14. 696 100 Feeduater l. 755 Double-ended 0. 412 l. 14 Operating Level 2>066,419 '20 14. 696 0 0. 321 0. 70 Environment 1.0 + 9 120 14. 696 0 Mezzanine & Basement Levels 847> 519 120 14. 696 0 .Feed>>ater 1.755 Double-ended 0.749 1.14 Operating Level 2,066,419 120 14. 696 0 0.180 0. 70 Environment 1.0 + 9 120 14.696 0 Mezzanine & Basement Levels 847,519 60 14.696 0 Feed>>ater l. 755 Double-ended 0.848 l. 14 Operatfng Level 2,066,419 60 14.696 0 0.426 0. 70 Environment 1.0 + 9 60 14.696 0 Mczzanfnc & Basement l.cvcls 847,519 60 14. 696 100 Feed>>ater 1.755 Double-ended 0.751 1.14 Operating Level 2,066,419 60 14.696 0 0.456 0.70 Environment 1.0+ 9 60 14.696 0 Mczzanfne & Basement Levels 847,519 120 14. 696 Main Stcam 0.71 Double-ended 0. 259 1. 1>f Operating Level 2,066,419 120 14. 696 0.233 0. 70 Environment 1.0+ 9 120 14. 696
- Design Case for 'fczranine & Basement Levels
<* Design Case for Operating Level
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Table 3B Turbine Building Pressurization Vent Path Description Hinic)un Inertia Entrance Head Loss Exit Head Loss Case Junction Fror) To Flow Area L/A .Friction Friction No. c.v. c.v. ~(e) (Ee 1) .~(E r/0 ~E* ol co era el n vocal (1 EID) ~Ex alo C era el n Total 1 thru 5 1 1 2 1196.0 0,036 0 '2 0.50 0.52 1.00 1. 00 2 1 3 86.0 0.090 0.50 0.50 1.00 1. 00 3 2 3 51.0 0.016 0.50 0.50 1.00 1.00 4s 1 3 375.0* 0.065 0.50* 0.50 1.00* l. 00 5()) 2 3 375.0* 0.065 0.50~'.50 1.00>> 1.00
- These flow paths represent thc concrete block <alls uhich fail at 0 '3 PSID.
Relief Area increases as a function of time fror) 0 to 375 ft .
Head Loss in addition to the values given above are considered in the bloMout panel fonaulation (per Reference 4).
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Attachment 2 Twelve inch unreinforced block wall.
The analysis of the existing 12 inch unreinforced masonry wall to determine its capacity in resisting a horizontal pressure from the turbine building side is performed as follows: (Formulas for determining the allowable horizontal pressure on unreinforced block walls are taken from "Non Reinforced Concrete Hasonry Design Tables" published by the National Concrete Masonry Association).
The Concrete masonry wall is assumed to be a one foot wide beam spanning vertically or h'orizontally with supported ends or free ends.
The horizontal pressure load (lb/ft ) that may safely be resisted by these beams in a horizontal or vertical span is found as follows:
Horizontal S an H = 12xWL2 2
Cantilever End Mr = S (Ft) (2)
Vertical'S an H. = 12xWH2 Simply Supported Ends (3) 8 M ~ 12 xVH2 Cantilever End 2
H ~ S P + F (5)
A Where H = Moment due to horizontal force, in. lbs Hr = Ultimate resisting moment of wall, in. lbs W = Horizontal force, lb/SF P Axial vertical load, lb/ft Wall horizontal span, feet Wall vertical height, feet Wall section modulus, in 3 A Wall net area, in F ~ Ultimate tensile stress, psi Qfodulus of..rupture) 13N1-GR-L0565
From correspondence received from the National Concrete Masonry Association, (copies attached), the modulus of rupture for walls built with Type "N" Mortar is as follows:
Modulus of rupture single Wythe Walls of hollow units uniform load vertical span = 88 psi max.
>fodulus of rupture single Wythe Walls of hollow units uniform load horizontal span ~ 142 psi, max.
By setting the moment (M) due to the horizontal force equal to the resist-ing moment (M )
1
~
M=Mr (6),
The val'ues of "W" at failure of the wall is given as follows:
W = S
~1.5 P +.Ft Simply Supported Ends (7)
H A H
6 xHS : J Cantilever End (8)
= S Cantilever End (9)
W
~6x L I"1 The 12 inch unreinforced concrete block wall has been built between column lines F10 and Fll and from elevation 274'-0" to 304'-4". The horizontal span is 24'-8".
From reference data for 12 inch hollow block wall, Table 2, page 22.
Net Area {A) =.70.0 in, Section Modulus {S) 190.0 in3.
Table 2, page 145.
Average Unit Weight = 55 lbs/ft .
By substituting in the above equations 7, 8, and 9, the ultimate horizontal load is equal to the following: IL..LS<.: C t .(6 ZS ~
Loadin Condition (Pressure) 'ositive Case '1'eaaiaal Span >'L i~qLct'.y. gkLL .
Height (H) ~ 30.5 feet P = 55 x 30.5 ~ 838.75 lbs. Ig '-("
2
= 88 psi Q go iay Ft tA (Ho 8 ~o hr Tviy LpvCL)
~&Leg. 'X]g'-p 13N1-GR-L0565 2
W ~ S F
1.5 )) t 190. 0 838. 75 + 88 ~ 13.61 lbs/SF loa, 1.5 x (30.5) . 70.0 or 0.095 psi Ultimate Load 0.095 psi lC".
0 I Los)'pan
'Case '2'orizontal Span I i i ) I (L) = 24'-8" F 142 psi t 25+
W ~ S 6 xL 190. 0 142 = 7.384
~ lbs/SF 6 x (24.67)2 or 0. 0513 psi
~
Ultimate Load ~ 0.0513 psi Ne ative Loadin Condition (Suction)
'1'ertical Span 4 H)t J. 3rCg'j-Case
~
tPJe Height (H) = 15.0 feet P = 55.0 x 15.0 ~ 825 lbs. F ~ 88 psi W = S P 6xH A 190. 0 825.0 + 88 = 14.04 1bs/SP }) lh57)c x (15.0) 2 70, 0 (t4): Ayt5t 9 A1 6 or 0.0975 psi 'Vi>> g wr. v'6 }.g Ultimate Load = 0.0975 psi 13N 1-GR-L0565
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- 3. 2 C/hl STRL'NG11 I e a Not less than three specimens shall be made for each test.
bc Testing shall include tests in advance of beginning operations il'ue an at least one field test during conscruccion per each five
<'%s thousand'square feet (5,000 sq. ft.) of Mall but not less than chree such tescs for any building.
Each specimen constructed at the job site shall be protected and handled in such a manner that the mortar joints are not disturbed during transportation to che testing laboracory.
The standard age of test specirens shall bc 28 days, but 7-day tests may bc used, provided the relation betMeen the 7 and 28
.ter>> day strength of the masonry is established by test for the materi-als used.
3.3 ALLOh'ABLE SFRLSSES IN NCNREINNRCED CGXCRL1'E hSNRY ary 3.3.1 Except as provided" in Section 3.1.5.2, the allouable compressive pli- stresses in nonreinforced concrete masonry shall not exceed the iive follouing values:
':rom Axial Flexural - 0. 30 f 3.3.2 Shear and Tensile Stresses Exccpc as provided in Seccion '3.1.5.2, the allowable stresses in
'shear and tension in flexure for nonreinforced concrc'te masonry shall not exceed the values given in Table 3-2 4 ~
TABLE 3-2 ALLOWABLE STRESSES IN S11EAR AND TENSION IN FLEXURE FOR NONREIN FORCED CONCRETE HASONRY (a)
Hasonry Construction of:
Mroutc Hollow Units or Solid'nits Ailouable Stresses Type H or S Type N Types H or S Type N Hortar ". Hoztar " Hortar Hortar Shear, psi 34(d) 23 (d) 34 23 Tension in Flexure: (e) 4 Normal to bed joints (b) 23(d) 16(d)
Parallel to bcd joints (c) 46 (d) 32(d) 78 54
3.3 'ALLOWABLE STRESSES IN NONREINFORCED CONCRETE HASONRY (a) - See Section 3.7, (b) ,- Dl.rection of stress is normal to bed joints; vertically in
.* -', normal masonry constructi,on.
(c) . . Direction of stress is parallel to bed joints; horizontally in
', normal masonry construction. If masonry is laid in stack bond,
, tensile stresses in the horizontal direction shall not be per-mitted in the masonry (see Section 4.5.3) ~
(d) -
Net mortar bedded area.
(e) For computing flexural resistance due to horirontal load, thc section modulus of a cavity wall shall be assumed to be equal to the sum of the section moduli of each wythc.
5.4 ALLOh'ABLE STIQ!SSES IN IU!INfQIICEIICOIXCRL"fE hBSQNI<Y 3.4.1 Except as provided in Section 3.1.5.2, the allowable stresses in reinforced masonry shall not exceed the valu'cs given in Table 3-3 TABLE 3-3 ALLOWABLE STRESSES IN REINFORCED CONCRETE MASONRY (a)
Description Allowable Stresses Compressive Axial 'm (b)
Flexural 'm 0.33 fm but not to exceed 900 psi Shear No Shear Reinforcement:
Flexural Hcmbers m Maximum of 50 psi Shear Walls
=
Where H/Vd~ 1 vm 0.9~fmt Haximum'of 34 psi Where H/Vd % I vm 2 +tt Maximum of 40 (1.85 - H/Vd)
Reinforcement taking entire shear:
Flexural Members v 3g Haximum of 150 psi Shear Walls H/Vd~l v 1.5tttf Maximum of 75 H/Vd~ 1 'Fm Maximum o f 45 (2. 67-H/vd)
Bond Deformed bars 160 psi
.Bearing On full area fm o.25 fm On one-third area of less (c) fm 0.375 fm
-12
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AMt.lt ICA National Concrete Masoni.y A8 s 0 c I at lo n 1800 North Kent Street r P.O. Box 9185 Rosslyn'Station Arlinaton, Virginia 22209 Phone {703) 524 0815 April 24, 1975 Mr. Robert G. Brown Professional Engineer Gilbert Associates, Inc.
P. 0. Box 1498 Reading, Pennsylvania 19603
Dear Mr:
Brown:
With reference to your letter. of April 21, we are enclosing a copy of "Specification for the Design and Construction of Loadbearing Concrete Masonry",
The allowable stresses in Table 3-2 were based on the information contained in the attached sheets.
Sincerely, Kevin D. Callahan Senior Design Engineer" KDC/jb .
-4 TA))I.E 1 FLEXURAI STRIJGT)l S 1'll(sl E I)'llLL)S OV ))0) I OI'H'JTS UHEFO)U'I LOAD--V)'.RTICAL SPAi'l
>for tar Type ti I'ropor, on )foduIus of. Rupture AST:I C 270 p i, Iiet Area Re I'e r enc e tl 110 10 H 108 IJCHA tf 102 IO H 97 10 H 95 1)CI'IA S 94 tJC! IA tf 91 IJCi) h H 89 tlCi~)A H 88 4 S 84 10 S 83 HCHA S 81 10 S 75 I:C~IA S 69 HCI IA H 67 H 62 4 S 60 10 H 58 H 45 4 0 60 10 0 41 4 0 36 4 0 36 0' '33 32 0 30 10 0 27 4
lo I
~ ~
From Table 1, the average modulus of rupture for walls built with Types H and S mortar is 93 psi on net area. For Type )3 mortar., the value is 64 psi. For Type 0 mortar, the value is 37 psi, but is not permitted r
for load-bearing concrete masonry; he>>ce, no value for Type 0 is listed
\
in. Table 3-2, Applying a safety factor of 4 to t)ie a)>ove values results in al,lovable stresses for hollow units as 'follows:
Allowable Tension in Flexure H & S 23 psi
- 1) 16 psi To establish allowable tensile stresses for. walls of solid units, the 8-inch composite walls in Table 2 were used. These walls, composed of 4-inch concrete brick and 4-inch hollow block frere greater tha>> 75% solid, and thus were evaluated as solid masonry construction. )lodulus of rupture (gross area) for these walls averaged 157 psi, giving an alloirable stress of 39 psi when a safety factor of 4 is applied. The composite wall tests in Table 2 used Type S mortar. To establish allowable stresses for solid units with Type N mortar, the mortar. influence established previously for hollow units was used:
23 39 16 f = 27 psi Values for allowable tension in flexure for. walls supported i>> the hori-zontal,span are established by doubling the allowab)es in the vertical span.
While it is recognized that flexural tensile strength of walls span>>i>>g hori-zontally is more a function of unit strength than mortar,.it is conservative to use double tl>e vertical span, values. Table 3 lists a summary of all pub-lished tests and i>>dicates an average afety factor of 5.3 for the 43 walls
Mh TABI.L 2 FLLXVRAI. STI(E"iGTII, VI'.I>!. ICAL SLA?I COYCI<f'.TE I I KSO>~ffiY H> Kl Lg.
FIIOll Tl:STS AT I'CIIA 1.ABOI<ATOI<Y Hall I fodulus o f Rup tu>. e Net i!ax. Het Dl tar AS]1 I l<ominal Uniform ,. Section Gross Bedded
'Iol. tar Thickness Load >~fodulus Area, i Area, f y I'> e i> inh psf. in 3/ft psl psi Honovythe Halls of ?follow> Units H ~
8 85.15 80.97 61,74 88.73 H 8 87.) 0 80.97 63.15 90.76 H 8 91. 00 80.97 G5,97 ! 94.82 lf 8 103. 35 80.97 74.93 107.69 S 8 62.40 80.97 45. 24 ! 69.47 S'.
8 72.15 SO 97
~ 52.31 75.18 12 183.3 164.64 57.11 93.94 S
'2
- 16) .2 164.64 50 '2 82.62 Composit'e Halls of Concrete Brick 6 lfo]low C'IU S 8 2 4 ~ 3 103. 82 ) 6.1..16 ]80. 67 S 8 219.7 103.82 )59.29 178. 55
'S 8 187.2 78 '6 )35.72 2Q2 Q9 S 8 228.8 103.82 ] 65.88 i 185.95 S 8 2]8.4 78.) 6 158. 34 235.77 S 8 223.6 7S.) 6 )62,)1 241.38 S 12 ]7].6 139.83 53.46 103.55 S 12 150.8 139.83 46.98 91.00 S 12 156.0 139 '3 48.60 94.) 4 S 12 213.2 139,83 66.42 128.66 I
Cavity Halls S 10 98 ' 50.36 158.62 )65.55 S 10 156.0 50.36 250 2GI.38 S 10 SS, 4i 48.16 ]'<1, 9) ] 54.88'00.40 S , ]0'0 ))9.6 50.36 ) 92.01 S )]4.4 50.36 )83.66 )91.68 S 10 ]09.2 48.]6 ]75.30 191.32 S 12 (4> 4) '145.6 50.36 233 73 ~ 24i 3, 9!>
S 12 (4-4-4) ']45. 6 50.3G 233.73 'i3. 9'i S ) 2 (6-2-4) ]35.? 77.80 127.38 146.63 S 12 (6-2-4) 119.6 77.80 ])2.68 1"9.70 l..
Hortar type by proportion req>>irei. nts.
"* Air spaci not: i>>c) uded in Stoss a. <a of cavi ty valla.
(o
vp contain'ing no joint .an:I 5.6 for the '15 walls containirC joint reinforcement.'einforcement TAB) E 3 FLEXURAI STREN(r T)l )10)tT ZON'I'AL Sl AN
~ ~
NOtsltElt'FORCED COt)CRI.'TL'ASOII)tY WAI.LS Hodu)us S. I'.
."Ior tar Loadinp of'tuptui e Ac t /Al low Construction ape ~TY )Q ~sf < Net :Urea< psi ~
)?ef .
Hohowytliu 8" N Uniform 127 132 4.13 4 llollow, 3-Core )I 136 141 4.41 4
'N 122 132 4.13 4 N 169 176 5.50 4 N 173 180 5.63 4 0 123 128 4.00 4 0 158 "
164 5.13 4 Honowythe 8" N 149 155 4.84 4
)lollow, Joint N 160 166 5.19 4 Reinf. 0 16 in.c t) 193 201 6.28 4 0 l50 156 4.88 4 0 186 193 6.03 4 Honowyt.)ie 8" tl 203 211 6.59 4 llollow Joint N 196 . 204 6.38 4 Iteinf. 9 8 in.cc 0 202 210 ~ 6. 56 4 0 195 203 6.34 4 tlonowyt)>e 8" 1/4 pt 56 58 1,81 6 Ilol low 38 39 1.22 6 61 63 1.97 6 N 60 1. 94 6 N 69 71 2 ~22 6 N 93 96 F 00 6 8" Honowythe H Center 199 217 4 ~ 72 26 2-Core 'lollow, tl 176 192 4.17 26 H 151 165 3,59 26 4-2-4 Cavity tl 111 210 4.57 26 Wall, llollow H 135 255. 5,54 26 Units H 95 180 3.91 26 8" tlonowythe H 159 173 3.76 26 Ilollow 2-Core tl 159 l73 3,76 26 Joint Re. ( 8"oc 191 208 4.52 26 4-2-4 Cavity ol H 159 300 6.52 26 llollow'nits Tied a'I 159 -300 6.52 w/Joint )tub 9 8 oc H 159 300 6.52 26 I
Pi TABI.E 3 (Continued) lfodulus 1 for tar Load i~n of Rupture S.F.
Construction Type Type psf INet: Area, psi A<<41Iow Ref.
4" Hollow N Center 138 365 11.41 25 lfonowy tfte N 157 4 I.5 12.97 25 N )01 268 .8.38 25 8" Holi.ow tf 268 2 O'P 4.39 25 Nonowythc lf 314 237 5.15 25 lf 314 237 5.15 25 8" Hollow N 277 210 6 '6 25 itfonowyt:he N 314 237 7.41 25 N 314 237 7.41 25 8" Hollow 0 259 195 6.09 25
')
~ follolty L'lie 0 277 210 6.56 5 0 277 210 6.56 25 8" Hollow H ~ 268 202 4.39 25
')
- fonowythc H 297 224 4.S7 5
~ H 277 210 4.56 25 8" Hollow N 277 210 6.56 25 i~fonowy L'he N 259 195 6.09 25 N 297 224 7.00 25 8" Hollow 0 360 271 8.45 25 "fonowy tlto 0 297 '1 24 7.00 25
- 0. 268 202 6.31 25 12" Hollow .N 352 142 4 ~ 44 25 lonowythe ll 314 127 3.97 25 N 333 134 4.19 25 Shear Values proposed in Table 3-2 for. allowable shear for non-rcinCorced concrete masonry result from an evaluat:ion of t:est: walls Crom f'our sources, which included the three tnortar types permitted in the NC?ih recommendations, several wall sections, and both full and faceshell mortar bedding. Average shear resistance of wallk laid up wit.h.Type lf a>>d S mortars (p