ML17244A518
| ML17244A518 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Ginna  |
| Issue date: | 05/17/1979 |
| From: | White L ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP. |
| To: | Ziemann D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7905220031 | |
| Download: ML17244A518 (37) | |
Text
REGULA
~
Y INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)
ACCESSION NBR:7905220031 DOC ~ DATE: 79/05/17 NOTARIZED:
NO DOCKET FACILe50, 244 ROBERT EMMET,GINNA NUCLEAR P'LANTi UNIT 1 p ROCHESTER G
05000244 AUTH'AME AUTHOR AFF ILIATION NHITEe L ~ D ~
ROCHESTER GAS 8
ELECTRIC CORP'
'EC IP ~ NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION ZIEMANNgD ~ L ~
OPERATING REACTORS BRANCH 2
SUBJECT:
RESPONDS TO REQUEST FOR ADDL INFO RE PRESSURE SHIELDING STEEL DIAPHRAGM~ INCLUDES 'INFO SUMMARIZING CALCULATED PRESSURE TRANSIENTS i<HIGH RESULT FROM BREAKS I'N 20" FEEDWATER LINE OR 12 STEAM LINE ~
DISTRIBUTION CODE:
A001S COPIES RECEIVED:LTR g ENCL +
SIZE:
TITLE: GENERAL DISTRIBUTION FOR AFTER ISSUANCE OF OPERATING LIC gp~gq:~ay.
~~mxson/
C. aoz~pysa
', ACTION:
INTERNAL:
RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME 05 BC 4@8 4P~
0,1 12 15 CORE PERF-BR 17 ENGR BR 19 PLANT SYS BR 21 EFLT TRT SYS EXTERNAL: 03 LPDR 23 ACRS COPIES LTTR ENCL 7
7 1
1 2
2 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 IV 1
1 16 16 RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME 02 NRC PDR 10 TA/EDO 16 AD SYS/PROJ 18 REAC SFTY BR 20 EEB 22 BR INKMAN 04 NSIC COPIES LTTR ENCL 1
1 1'1 1
1 TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED:
LTTR 38 ENCL 38
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~l wit.zÃll irew ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORPORATION o
89 EAST AVENUE, ROCHESTER, N.Y. 14649 LEON D. WHITE, JR.
VICC PRCSIDCNT TCLEPHONK
- ac* cooc 7io 546-2700 May 17, 1979 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Attention:
Mr. Dennis L. Ziemann, Chief Operating Reactors Branch No.
2 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555
Subject:
Pressure Shielding Steel Diaphragm R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Docket No. 50-244
Dear Mr. Ziemann:
This letter is in response to requests from members of your Staff for additional information regarding the proposed modifica-tion. It supplements our letters of February 6, 1978, August 25,
- 1978, and October 11, 1978.
Attachment 1 to this letter summarizes the calculated pressure transients which result from breaks in the 20" feedwater line or the 12" steam line in the Turbine Building at Ginna.
Larger lines in the Turbine Building, the 24" and 36" steam lines, are not postulated to break based on the augmented inservice inspection program which has been implemented.
This program is discussed further below.
The design basis breaks are selected so as to maximize the mass and energy release into the Turbine Building and therefore to maximize the pressure.
No credit is taken for the trip of the feedwater pumps or for closure of the feedwater control valve.
In addition no credit is taken for closure of the check valves at the containment penetrations,
- again, maximizing the mass and energy release.
Credit is taken for small vent areas existing between the Turbine Building and the environment and for failure of a small section of unreinforced block wall.
These vent areas are discussed further below.
" The results from the pressure calculations are that the peak pressure in the basement/mezzanine levels is 0.848 psi and the peak pressure on the operating level is 0.456 psi.
Thus, there is considerable margin between the calculated peak pressure and the values being used in the design of the pressure wall of 1.14 psi at the basement/
mezzanine levels and 0.7 psi at the operating level.
O5~S0O>(
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ROCHESTER GAS AND EL TRIC CORP.
DATE May 17, 1 97 9 To Mr. Dennis L ~ niemann SHEET NO.
An augmented inservice inspection program for high energy piping was proposed by RGB on October 31, 1974.
This program included main steam and feedwater piping in the intermediate building and the turbine building.
In the turbine building, the 36" and 24" main steam lines and a portion of the 20" main feedwater line are included in order to preclude the potential for adverse consequences from pipe whip due to postulated full diameter breaks.
This program was approved by the NRC in Amendment No.
7 to the Ginna license, issued May 14, 1975.
In the Safety Evaluation which accompanied the transmittal, the NRC stated, "We conclude that this augmented inspection program is a prudent measure to ensure a very low probability of any break in the main steam and feedwater lines."
Inspections of the piping have been performed as required since May 1975. It is on the basis of the inspection program and its approval by the NRC that the 36" and 24" main steam have been eliminated from consideration.
Because three welds in the 20" line are not included in the program, a break is postulated in that line.
The welds were not included because no adverse effects in safety related equipment would result from pipe whip if a break occurred at, those locations.
Previous correspondence had included consideration of the 36" and 24" line breaks for pressure
- analyses, however, these were performed prior to approval of the augmented inservice inspection program.
The analysis assumed a small vent area from the building during normal operation and additional vent area as a result of failure of a section of 12" unreinforced block wall.
The vent area available during normal operation has been conservatively estimated based on measurements taken in the field.
This vent area does not include openings through or around doors from the turbine building to other structures.
In addition, it does not include relief through the turbine building ventilation louvers since these are blocked during the winter.
Rather, it includes a
summation of gaps known to exist around the turbine building windows and overhead door.
Analyses which develop the failure capacity of the 12" unreinforced block wall are presented in Attachment 2 to this letter.
As reported in Attachment 1, a
sensitivity study was performed in which the 12" wall was not permitted to fail.
The results of this sensitivity study demon-strated that pressures on the basement/mezzanine levels and the operating level did not exceed the pressure shielding wall design bases and, in fact, increased by less than 2% and 20%, respectively from the pressures calculated when the wall was allowed to fail.
An additional sensitivity study was performed to determine the impact on the design if the stresses resulting from pressure and seismic are combined by the square root of the sum of the squares (SRSS) instead of by direct absolute addition.
0
ROCHESTER GAS AND EL TRIC CORP.
- DATE, May j 7, 1979 Mr. Dennis L. Ziemann SHEET NO.
A summary of calculated stresses assuming the design pressures of 1.14 psi and 0.70 psi and allowable stresses in the most critical elements of the structural steel framing supporting the new steel diaphragms was reported in our letter of October 11, 1978 based on absolute addition.
The following presents those results as well as results for the SRSS combination.
Stress at Design Pressure Absolute SRSS Addition Allowable Stress Top Chord of Roof Truss 9430 psi 8923 psi 21600 psi Bottom Chord of Roof Truss Roof Truss Diagonal Columns-various 6470 psi 9600 psi 77%
5450 psi 8686 psi 70%
6500 psi 9900 psi 100%
Horizontal Members of Steel Diaphragm 22700 psi 20980 psi 24000 psi This demonstrates additional margin available in the design.
As discussed with your Staff, analyses of the impact of high energy line breaks on Turbine Building walls other than those adjacent to the Control Building and the Diesel Generator annex will be integrat,ed into the Systematic Evaluation Program.
Xn
- addition, any reinforcement of the Turbine Building structural connections will also be integrated into the conclusions of the Systematic Evaluation Program.
Ne believe that these responses address all remaining questions regarding the pressure shielding wall.
Very truly yours, L. D. Nhi e, Jr.
-Attachment 1
Table of Contents
- 1. 0 Introduction Page 1
2.0 Break Identification Page 1
3.0 Hass and Energy Release 3.1.20" Feedwater Break 3.2 12" Hain Steam Break Page 1
Page 2
Page 2
4.0 Turbine Building Pressurization 4.1 Pressurization Hodel 4.2 Pressurization Results Page 3
Page 3
Page 4
- 5. 0 Summary Page 5
6.0 References Page 6
~
~
List of Tables and Fi ures Table 1 - 20" Feedwater Mass and Energy Release Table 2 12" Hain Steam Mass and Energy Release Table 3 Turbine Building Pressurization Hodel Volume and Flow Path Descriptions Figure 1 Turbine. Building Pressurization.
Model Schematic Figure 2 - Operating Level, Pressure-Time History Figure 3 Operating Level, Relief Area-Time History Figure 4 - Mezzanine/Basement Level, Pressure-Time History Figure 5 - Mezzanine/Basement Level, Relief Area-Time History
1.0 Introduction Following a postulated pipe rupture, subcompartments surrounding the break location will pressurize.
The resultant pressure differential across these walls necessitates a structural analysis to determine the design adequacy of the walls for this loading along or in combination with some other loading such as a safe shutdown earthquake.
The study deals with the pressurization phase only for the R.
E.
Ginna turbine building.,
The study covers the areas of break identification, determination of mass and energy release, and subcompartment pressurization.
2.0 Break Identification The two largest high energy lines within the turbine building are the 36" and the 24" Hain Steam Lines.
- However, these pipes are covered by an in-service-inspection program which precludes all breaks except the (1) crack break.
This program reduces the maximum break area for these pipes to under 0.10 ft.
The two largest high energy lines subject to a double-ended rupture are the 20" feedwater line and the 12" Hain Steam line, both on the mezzanine level of the turbine building.
These two lines were analyzed in detail to determine their mass and energy release following a postulated pipe rupture.
3.0 Hass
& Energy Release
~
~ 1
\\'
'L ~
3.1 20" Feedwater
.Break The worst'ase break of the 20" feedwater line is a double-ended rupture 2
(1.755 ft ) while the.plant is operating at full power conditions.
To maximize mass and energy release, the break location chosen is in the 20" line just downstream of the No.
This location maximizes the available energy and inventory for the short term release from the feedwater system.
Determination of this mass and energy release-is made using the FLASH computei code series assuming a one millisecond (2) break opening time and Moody flow with a 1.0 multiplier.
Sihce the turbine building pressurization is a short term phenomena (less than 1.0 second),
only short term mass and energy release from the feedwater break is required.
Therefore, no provision is made for feedwater pump trip or feedwater control valve closure.
To further assure maximizing the mass and energy release, a single failure of one downstream check valve, R06, is assumed and no credit is taken for the flow limiter just upstream of the R06 check valve.
The mass and energy release rates as determined by this analysis are presented'in Table 1.
3.2 12" Main Steam Break A double ended rupture (0.71 ft ) of the 12" main steam dump to the 2
condenser while the plant is in the hot-standby condition was analyzed as the worst main steam line break.
The break location chosen is just downstream of the 36" header.
Mass and energy release from this break is determined using FLASH computer code series assuming a one millisecond (2) break opening time and Moody flow with a 1.0 multiplier.
Since only short term mass and energy release data is required, no provision
~M for safety valve closures are made.
To maximize the available inventory from the condenser side of the break, check valve RN12A is assumed to fail.
The mass and energy release rates as determined by this analysis are
'resented in Table 2.
4.0
'Turbine Building Pressuri'zation 4.1 Pressurization Hodel The turbine building response to a pipe rupture within the building itself is a'nalyzed using a
3 node model and the COMPARE computer code.
The (3) turbine building model is depicted in Figure l.
Both the feedwater and the main steam breaks occur in the western half of the mezzanine level of the turbine building.
Node 1 of the model represents both the mezzanine and the basement levels
~
of the turbine building, since flow area between the two levels is large.
The operating level of the turbine building is represented by node 2.
The outside environment corresponds to node 3.
Flow path no.
1 represents the open access hatch between the mezzanine and operating levels.
Flow path nos.
2 and 3 represent actual physical openings to the environment from the mezzanine/basement and operating levels respectively.
Flow path nos.
4 and 5 represent the concrete block wall between column lines F10 and Fll.
The concrete block wall between elevations 274'-0" and 289'-0" which is within the mezzanine level corresponds to flow path no.
4.
The concrete block wall between elevations 289'-6" and 304'-4" which is within the operating level corresponds to flow path no.
5.
These
concrete block walls have an ultimate horizontal. load carrying capacity of 0.13 psid.
For the purposes of this analysis, these concrete wall
. sections are conservatively assumed to fail independently of each other.
When the pressure differential across the concrete block reaches 0.13 psid, theblock is assumed to begin moving horizontally outward (gravity, effects neglected) due to the pressure induced force acting on the wall, thus additional relief area from the turbine building becomes available.
The method used to analyze the dynamic effects of the wall movements is discussed in reference 4.
4.2 Pressurization Results Table 3 presents volume descriptions, flow path description, and the peak nodal pressures (both calculated and design) for the accident cases analyzed.
Four cases involve the 20" feedwater break and an initial conditions sensitivity study.
This'ensitivity study analyzes the feedwater'reak assuming initial conditions of minimum/maximum temperature and minimum/maximum relative humidity.
The fifth case analyzes the 12" main steam break assuming initial conditions of maximum temperature and minimum relative humidity.
Results of the analysis show that the peak calculated pressure within the mezzanine/basement level of 0.85 psi occurs for the case of a 20" feedwater break w'ith initial conditions of minimum temperature and minimum relative humidity.
The calculated differential pressure-time history between the mezzanine/basement level and the 'environment is given in Figure 2.
The available relief area time history for this case is presented in Figure 3.
Results of the analysis also show that the peak calculated differential pressure across the operating level walls is 0.46 psid and occurs for the case of' 20" feedwater break with initial conditions of minimum temperature and maximum relative humidity.
The calculated differential pressure time history between the operating level of the turbine building and the environment is presented in Figure 4.
The available relief area 'time history for this case is presented.in Figure 5.
A further study of the pressurization within the turbine building following a postulated 20" feedwater rupture was made.
This study assumed that the concrete block wall at column F10 and Fll did not fail.
Results of the study indicate that the design differential pressures given in Table 3 are conservative
- 5. 0 Summary Results of this study show that the 20" feedwater breaks causes the most severe pressure transients within the turbine building.
Calculated pressure differentials are determined to be 0.46 psid for the operating level and 0.85 psid for the mezzanine/basement level.
Design nressure differentials used for structural evaluation of the building are 0.70 psid for the operating level-and 1.14 psid for the mezzanine/basement levels.
~ ~
5
- 6. 0 References 1.
GAI Report No.
1815, ".Effects of Postulated Pipe Breaks Outside the Containment Building Robert E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant,, Unit 1,"
October 1973.
2.
J.
A'. Redfield, J.
H. Murphy, V.
C. Davis, "FLASH-2 A Fortran IV Program for the Digital Simulation of 'a Hultinode Reactor Plant During Loss of Coolant," WAPD-TH-666, April 1967.
T. A. Porsching, J.
H. Murphy, J.
A. Redfield, V.
C. Davis, "FLASH-4:
A Full Implicit Fortran IV Program for the Digital Simulation of Transients
,in a Reactor Plant," WAPD-TM-840, March 1969.
3.
R.
G. Gido, C. I. Grimes, R.
G. Lawton, J.
A. Kudrick, "COMPARE:
A Computer Program for the Transient Calculation of a System of Volumes Connected by Flowing Vents," LA-NUREG-6488-HS, September 1976.
4.
AS.
W. Webb, "Blowout Panel Considerations in Subcompartment Pressure Analyses," submitted for publication in Nuclear Engineering and Design, North-Holland Publishing Co.
.Table 1
20" Feedwater Break Mass
& Energy Release un
'~
~
4
~ I F 1
'ime Sec) 0.0
- 0. 001
- 0. 002
, 0.003
- 0. 004
- 0. 005
- 0. 008
- 0. 009
- 0. 015
'.016
- 0. 020
- 0. 100"
- 0. 200
- 0. 300
- 0. 400
- 0. 500
- 0. 575
- 0. 650
- 0. 725 0.
800'.
875
- 0. 950
- 1. 025 Mass Flow (lb/sec 0.0 5.204 + 4 4.468
'4. 450 3.999 + 4 1.540 + 4 1.540 + 4 1.539 + 4, 1.539 + 4 1.538 + 4 1.538 + 4 1.527 + 4 1.513 + 4 1.497 + 4 1.480 + 4 1.461 + 4
- 1. 451
- l. 434 1.417 + 4 1.397 + 4 1.376 + 4 1.353 + 4 1.299 + 4 Ener Rate (BTU/Sec) 2.185 + 7 2.185 + 7 1;804 + 7 1.796 +
7 1.614 +
7 6.217 + 6 6.217 + 6 6.213 + 6 6.213 + 6 6.209 + 6 6.209 + 6 6.165 + 6 6.105 + 6 6.036 + 6 5.961 + 6 5.878 + 6 5.833 + 6 5.758 + 6 5.682 + 6 5.592 + 6 5.498 + 6 5.394 + 6 5.205 + 6
Table 2
12" Hain Steam Break Hass
& Energy Release
- Time Sec 0.0 0.
005'.
010
.0. 015
-0. 020
- 0. 025 0.'03
.0.04
- 0. 05
- 0. 06
- 0. 08
- 0. 10
- 0. 12
- 0. 16
-0. 20
- 0. 30
- 0. 40
- 0. 50
- 0. 575
- 0. 70 0.'80
- 1. 00 Hass Flow. lb/sec 0.0 2.779 + 3
~
2.921 + 3 2.856 + 3 2.802 + 3 2.752 + 3 2.709 + 3 2.638 + 3 2.587 + 3 2.543 + 3 2.456 + 3 2.347 + 3 2.283 + 3 2.115 + 3 1.992 + 3 1.742 + 3
',588+
3 1.478 + 3 1.423 + 3 1.425 + 3 1.349 + 3 1.349 +'3 Ener Rate (BTU/Sec) 3.312 + 6 3.312 + 6 3.482 + 6 3.406 + 6 3.344 + 6 3.286 + 6 3.235 + 6 3.153 + 6 3.093 + 6 3.040 + 6 2.937 + 6 2.807 + 6 2.731 + 6 2.530 + 6 2.383 + 6 2.081 + 6 1.895 + 6 1.764 + 6 1.699 +. 6 1.641 + 6 1.581 + 6 1.581 + 6
I 4
Table 3A
.Turbine Building Pressurization Model Description Case HoP Volume ffo.
~DI DI Initial Conditions Desi n Brcak Relative Break Volume Temp.
Pressure Humidity Location Break
~ISS
~P
~PSIA
~S Pol S
LI Conditions Calculated Design Break Peak Pressure Peak Pressure Area Break Dfffcrentfal. Differential
~PS>
IW
~PSID
~PSID Mezzanfne
& Basement Levels Operating Level Environment Mezzanine
& Basement Levels Operating Level Environment 847> 519 2,066,419 1.0 + 9 120 120 120 847>519 120 2>066,419 '20 1.0 + 9 120
- 14. 696
- 14. 696
- 14. 696
- 14. 696
- 14. 696 14.696 100 0
0 0
0 0
Feeduater
- l. 755 Double-ended
.Feed>>ater 1.755 Double-ended
- 0. 412
- 0. 321 0.749 0.180
- l. 14
- 0. 70 1.14
- 0. 70 Mezzanine
& Basement Levels Operatfng Level Environment Mczzanfnc
& Basement l.cvcls Operating Level Environment Mczzanfne
& Basement Levels Operating Level Environment 847,519 2,066,419 1.0 + 9 847,519 2,066,419 1.0+
9 847,519 2,066,419 1.0+ 9 60 14.696 60 14.696 60 14.696 60
- 14. 696 60 14.696 60 14.696 120
- 14. 696 120
- 14. 696 120
- 14. 696 0
0 0
100 0
0 Feed>>ater
- l. 755 Double-ended Feed>>ater 1.755 Double-ended Main Stcam 0.71 Double-ended 0.848 0.426 0.751 0.456
- 0. 259 0.233
- l. 14
- 0. 70 1.14 0.70
- 1. 1>f
- 0. 70 Design Case for 'fczranine
& Basement Levels
<* Design Case for Operating Level
C ~
d')
'(
e 0
o Table 3B Turbine Building Pressurization Vent Path Description Case No.
Hinic)un Inertia Junction Fror)
To Flow Area L/A
.Friction c.v.
c.v.
~(e)
(Ee 1)
.~(E r/0 Entrance Head Loss Friction
~E*
ol co era el n vocal (1 EID)
Exit Head Loss
~Ex alo C
era el n Total 1 thru 5
1 2
3 4s 5())
1 1
2 1
2 2
1196.0 3
86.0 3
51.0 3
375.0*
3 375.0*
0,036 0'2 0.090 0.016 0.065 0.065 0.50 0.52 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50*
0.50 0.50~'.50 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00*
1.00>>
- 1. 00
- 1. 00 1.00 l.00 1.00
- These flow paths represent thc concrete block <alls uhich fail at Relief Area increases as a function of time fror) 0 to 375 ft.
Head Loss in addition to the values given above are considered in 0'3 PSID.
the bloMout panel fonaulation (per Reference 4).
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Attachment 2
Twelve inch unreinforced block wall.
The analysis of the existing 12 inch unreinforced masonry wall to determine its capacity in resisting a horizontal pressure from the turbine building side is performed as follows:
(Formulas for determining the allowable horizontal pressure on unreinforced block walls are taken from "Non Reinforced Concrete Hasonry Design Tables" published by the National Concrete Masonry Association).
The Concrete masonry wall is assumed to be a one foot wide beam spanning vertically or h'orizontally with supported ends or free ends.
The horizontal pressure load (lb/ft ) that may safely be resisted by these beams in a horizontal or vertical span is found as follows:
Horizontal S
an H
= 12xWL2 2
Cantilever End Mr =
S (Ft)
Vertical'S an (2)
H.
= 12xWH2 8
Simply Supported Ends (3)
M
~
12 xVH2 2
Cantilever End H
~
S P
+
F A
(5)
Where H
= Moment due to horizontal force, in. lbs Hr = Ultimate resisting moment of wall, in. lbs W
= Horizontal force, lb/SF P
Axial vertical load, lb/ft Wall horizontal span, feet Wall vertical height, feet Wall section modulus, in3 A
Wall net area, in F
~ Ultimate tensile stress, psi Qfodulus of..rupture) 13N1-GR-L0565
From correspondence received from the National Concrete Masonry Association, (copies attached),
the modulus of rupture for walls built with Type "N" Mortar is as follows:
Modulus of rupture single Wythe Walls of hollow units uniform load vertical span
= 88 psi max.
>fodulus of rupture single Wythe Walls of hollow units uniform load horizontal span
~ 142 psi, max.
By setting the moment (M) due to the horizontal force equal to the resist-ing moment (M ) ~
1 M=Mr (6),
The val'ues of "W" at failure of the wall is given as follows:
W =
S
~1.5 H
H 6 xHS W =
S
~6x L P
+.Ft A
- J I"1 Simply Supported Ends Cantilever End Cantilever End (7)
(8)
(9)
The 12 inch unreinforced concrete block wall lines F10 and Fll and from elevation 274'-0" span is 24'-8".
has been built between column to 304'-4".
The horizontal From reference data for 12 inch hollow block Net Area
{A) =.70.0 in, Section Modulus
{S) wall, Table 2, page 22.
190.0 in3.
Table 2, page 145.
Average Unit Weight = 55 lbs/ft By substituting in the above equations 7, 8, load is equal to the following:
and 9, the ultimate horizontal IL..LS<.:
C
'ositive Loadin Condition (Pressure)
Case '1'eaaiaal Span Height (H) ~ 30.5 feet P = 55 x 30.5
~ 838.75 lbs.
2 Ft = 88 psi Ig Q
tA t.(6 ZS
~
>'L i~qLct'.y. gkLL.
'-("
go iay (Ho 8 ~o hr Tviy LpvCL) 13N1-GR-L0565 2
~&Leg. 'X]g'-p
W ~
S 1.5
))
190. 0 1.5 x (30.5)
Ft 838. 75
. 70.0
+
88 ~ 13.61 lbs/SF or 0.095 psi
- loa, Ultimate Load 0.095 psi
'Case '2'orizontal Span lC".
0 I
Los)'pan (L) = 24'-8" W ~
S 6 xL 190. 0 6 x (24.67)2 F
142 psi t
25+
142
= 7.384 lbs/SF
~
~
or 0. 0513 psi I
i i
)
I Ultimate Load ~ 0.0513 psi Ne ative Loadin Condition (Suction)
Case '1'ertical Span Height (H) = 15.0 feet 4 H)tJ. 3rCg'j-
~ tPJe P = 55.0 x 15.0
~ 825 lbs.
F
~ 88 psi W =
S P
6xH A
190. 0 6 x (15.0) 2 825.0
+
88
= 14.04 1bs/SP 70, 0 or 0.0975 psi
})lh57)c (t4):
Ayt5t9 A1
'Vi>>g wr. v'6 }.g Ultimate Load = 0.0975 psi 13N 1-GR-L0565
1 Ij4 4;b.,
p
~
'\\ ~
Q.'Mfa
~
mp g'. '.. +'v, ~,
'Q+f+,htJ4'~Q
.4 llgl)'N/
WW
+K+f~ P
~
g~l~~. <<~j4'4' /~oft y
I t, g. Ig DECI,F,,IC'Al,:IOM F,:0 RmT'H'E '0 E'S I;6
'@ '4'"'""='"'>~'"AM,D.-;COMSTjRU',CT4'..0:M
. "';+'." ',;$:-4~4.'":OFFALOA'D.-"-'BE'ARIMG.
.- " '~~.4~~;-'~5-'M'=",>CONCRETE'.".MA'SQM'8'. "
I ft d
q
'~pgv
'~ g.
'>, Q~> 'f~
H. +
~pWgp P~
+
Age
'~i ~~
t~
a kgbJF ~, ~~
fPgpjg '/~~
g >~'p
~Fwrp V ~
tP
~
T C
1
P
- 3. 2 C/hl STRL'NG11 I e a bc il'ue
<'%s Not less than three specimens shall be made for each test.
Testing shall include tests in advance of beginning operations an at least one field test during conscruccion per each five thousand'square feet (5,000 sq. ft.) of Mall but not less than chree such tescs for any building.
Each specimen constructed at the job site shall be protected and handled in such a manner that the mortar joints are not disturbed during transportation to che testing laboracory.
.ter>>
The standard age of test specirens shall bc 28 days, but 7-day tests may bc used, provided the relation betMeen the 7 and 28 day strength of the masonry is established by test for the materi-als used.
3.3 ALLOh'ABLE SFRLSSES IN NCNREINNRCED CGXCRL1'E hSNRY ary pli-iive
':rom 3.3.1 Except as provided" in Section 3.1.5.2, the allouable compressive stresses in nonreinforced concrete masonry shall not exceed the follouing values:
Axial Flexural
- 0. 30 f 3.3.2 Shear and Tensile Stresses Exccpc as provided in Seccion '3.1.5.2, the allowable stresses in
'shear and tension in flexure for nonreinforced concrc'te masonry shall not exceed the values given in Table 3-2 4 ~
TABLE 3-2 ALLOWABLE STRESSES IN S11EAR AND TENSION IN FLEXURE FOR NONREINFORCED CONCRETE HASONRY (a)
Hasonry Construction of:
Hollow Units Mroutc or Solid'nits Ailouable Stresses Type H or S
Type N
Types H or S
Type N
Hortar ".
Hoztar Hortar Hortar
- Shear, psi 34(d) 23 (d) 34 23 Tension in Flexure:
(e) 4 Normal to bed joints (b)
Parallel to bcd joints (c) 23(d) 16(d) 46 (d) 32(d) 78 54
3.3
'ALLOWABLE STRESSES IN NONREINFORCED CONCRETE HASONRY (a)
- See Section 3.7, (b)
,- Dl.rection of stress is normal to bed joints; vertically in normal masonry constructi,on.
(c)
. Direction of stress is parallel to bed joints; horizontally in
', normal masonry construction.
If masonry is laid in stack bond,
, tensile stresses in the horizontal direction shall not be per-mitted in the masonry (see Section 4.5.3)
~
(d)
- Net mortar bedded area.
(e)
For computing flexural resistance due to horirontal load, thc section modulus of a cavity wall shall be assumed to be equal to the sum of the section moduli of each wythc.
5.4 ALLOh'ABLE STIQ!SSES IN IU!INfQIICEIICOIXCRL"fE hBSQNI<Y 3.4.1 Except as provided in Section 3.1.5.2, the allowable stresses in reinforced masonry shall not exceed the valu'cs given in Table 3-3 TABLE 3-3 ALLOWABLE STRESSES IN REINFORCED CONCRETE MASONRY (a)
Description Allowable Stresses Compressive Axial Flexural Shear No Shear Reinforcement:
Flexural Hcmbers Shear Walls
= Where H/Vd~ 1 Where H/Vd % I
'm
'm m
vm 0.9~fmt vm 2 +tt (b) 0.33 fm but not to exceed 900 psi Maximum of 50 psi Haximum'of 34 psi Maximum of 40 (1.85 - H/Vd)
Reinforcement taking entire shear:
Flexural Members Shear Walls H/Vd~l H/Vd~ 1 v 3g v
1.5tttf
'Fm Haximum of 150 psi Maximum of 75 Maximum o f 45 (2. 67-H/vd)
Bond Deformed bars 160 psi
.Bearing On full area fm On one-third area of less (c) fm o.25 fm 0.375 fm
-12
nail
~.lils eu r
Net AMt.ltICA National Concrete Masoni.y r
April 24, 1975 eiV',gittlPi( <<$7<~
~ )
A8s 0 c Iat lo n 1800 North Kent Street P.O. Box 9185 Rosslyn'Station Arlinaton, Virginia 22209 Phone {703) 524 0815 Mr. Robert G.
Brown Professional Engineer Gilbert Associates, Inc.
P. 0.
Box 1498
- Reading, Pennsylvania 19603
Dear Mr:
Brown:
With reference to your letter. of April 21, we are enclosing a copy of "Specification for the Design and Construction of Loadbearing Concrete Masonry",
The allowable stresses in Table 3-2 were based on the information contained in the attached sheets.
Sincerely, Kevin D. Callahan Senior Design Engineer" KDC/jb
-4 TA))I.E 1 FLEXURAI STRIJGT)l S 1'll(sl E I)'llLL)S OV ))0) I OI'H'JTS UHEFO)U'I LOAD--V)'.RTICAL SPAi'l
>fortar Type I'ropor, tion AST:I C 270
)foduIus of. Rupture p i, Iiet Area Re I'e renc e tl H
tf H
H S
tf H
H S
S S
S S
H H
S H
H 0
0 0
00' 0
0 110 108 102 97 95 94 91 89 88 84 83 81 75 69 67 62 60 58 45 60 41 36 36
'33 32 30 27 10 IJCHA IO 10 1)CI'IA tJC! IA IJCi) h tlCi~)A 4
10 HCHA 10 I:C~IA HCI IA 4
10 4
10 4
4 10 4
lo I
~
~
From Table 1, the average modulus of rupture for walls built with Types H and S mortar is 93 psi on net area.
For Type
)3 mortar.,
the value is 64 psi.
For Type 0 mortar, the value is 37 psi, but is not permitted r
for load-bearing concrete masonry; he>>ce, no value for Type 0 is listed
\\
in. Table 3-2, Applying a safety factor of 4 to t)ie a)>ove values results in al,lovable stresses for hollow units as 'follows:
Allowable Tension in Flexure H &
S 1) 23 psi 16 psi To establish allowable tensile stresses for. walls of solid units, the 8-inch composite walls in Table 2 were used.
These walls, composed of 4-inch concrete brick and 4-inch hollow block frere greater tha>>
75% solid, and thus were evaluated as solid masonry construction.
)lodulus of rupture (gross area) for these walls averaged 157 psi, giving an alloirable stress of 39 psi when a safety factor of 4 is applied.
The composite wall tests in Table 2
used Type S mortar.
To establish allowable stresses for solid units with Type N mortar, the mortar. influence established previously for hollow units was used:
23 16 39 f =
27 psi Values for allowable tension in flexure for. walls supported i>> the hori-zontal,span are established by doubling the allowab)es in the vertical span.
While it is recognized that flexural tensile strength of walls span>>i>>g hori-zontally is more a function of unit strength than mortar,.it is conservative to use double tl>e vertical span, values.
Table 3 lists a
summary of all pub-lished tests and i>>dicates an average afety factor of 5.3 for the 43 walls
TABI.L 2 FLLXVRAI. STI(E"iGTII, VI'.I>!.ICAL SLA?I COYCI<f'.TE FIIOll Tl:STS AT I'CIIA 1.ABOI<ATOI<Y Mh I I KSO>~ffiY H> Kl Lg.
AS]1 I
'Iol. tar f y I'>e i>
l<ominal Thickness inh i!ax.
Uniform Load psf.
Hall Het
,. Section
>~fodulus in 3/ft Ifodulus o f Rup tu>. e Net Dl tar Gross Bedded
- Area, i
- Area, psl psi Honovythe Halls of ?follow> Units H
H H
lf S
S'.
S
~
8 8
8 8
8 8
12
'2 85.15 87.) 0
- 91. 00 103. 35 62.40 72.15 183.3
- 16).2 80.97 80.97 80.97 80.97 80.97 SO
~ 97 164.64 164.64 61,74 63.15 G5,97 74.93
- 45. 24 52.31 57.11 50 '2 88.73 90.76 94.82 107.69 69.47 75.18 93.94 82.62 Composit'e Halls of Concrete Brick 6 lfo]low C'IU S
S
'S S
S S
S S
S S
8 8
8 8
8 8
12 12 12 12 2
4
~ 3 219.7 187.2 228.8 2]8.4 223.6
]7].6 150.8 156.0 213.2 103. 82 103.82 78 '6 103.82 78.) 6 7S.) 6 139.83 139.83 139 '3 139,83
) 6.1..16
)59.29
)35.72
] 65.88 i
158. 34
)62,)1 53.46 46.98 48.60 66.42 I
]80. 67 178. 55 2Q2 Q9 185.95 235.77 241.38 103.55 91.00 94.) 4 128.66 Cavity Halls S
S S
S S
S S
S S
S 10 10 10
]0'0 10 12 (4> 4) 12 (4-4-4)
) 2 (6-2-4) 12 (6-2-4) 98 '
156.0 SS, 4i
))9.6
)]4.4
]09.2
'145.6
']45. 6
]35.?
119.6 50.36 50.36 48.16 50.36 50.36 48.]6 50.36 50.3G 77.80 77.80 158.62 250
]'<1, 9)
) 92.01
)83.66
]75.30 233 73 233.73 127.38
])2.68
)65.55 2GI.38
]
54.88'00.40
)91.68 191.32
~
24i 3, 9!>
'i3. 9'i 146.63 1"9.70 l..
Hortar type by proportion req>>irei. nts.
"* Air spaci not: i>>c) uded in Stoss
- a. <a of cavi ty valla.
(o
vp contain'ing no joint reinforcement.'einforcement
.an:I 5.6 for the '15 walls containirC joint TAB) E 3 FLEXURAI STREN(rT)l ~
)10)tT ZON'I'AL Sl AN ~
NOtsltElt'FORCED COt)CRI.'TL'ASOII)tY WAI.LS Construction Hohowytliu 8" llollow, 3-Core
."Iortar ape N
)I
'N N
N 0
0 Loadinp
~TY )Q Uniform Hodu)us of'tuptui e
~sf
< Net 127 136 122 169 173 123 158
- Urea< psi 132 141 132 176 180 128 164 S. I'.
Act ~ /Allow 4.13 4.41 4.13 5.50 5.63 4.00 5.13
)?ef.
4 4
4 4
4 4
4 Honowythe 8"
)lollow, Joint Reinf.
0 16 in.c tlonowyt)>e 8" Ilollow 8" Honowythe
'lollow, 2-Core 4-2-4 Cavity Wall, llollow Units 8" tlonowythe Ilollow 2-Core
(
Joint Re.
> 8"oc Honowyt.)ie 8" llollow Joint Iteinf. 9 8 in.cc N
N t) 0 0
tl N
0 0
N N
N H
tl H
tl H
H H
tl 1/4 pt Center 149 160 193 l50 186 203 196.
202 195 56 38 61 60 69 93 199 176 151 111 135 95 159 159 191 155 166 201 156 193 211 204 210 203 58 39 63 71 96 217 192 165 210 255.
180 173 l73 208 4.84 5.19 6.28 4.88 6.03 6.59 6.38
~ 6. 56 6.34 1,81 1.22 1.97
- 1. 94 2
~ 2 2 F 00 4
~ 72 4.17 3,59 4.57 5,54 3.91 3.76 3,76 4.52 4
4 4
4 4
4 4
4 4
6 6
6 6
6 6
26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 4-2-4 Cavity ol llollow'nits Tied w/Joint
)tub 9
8 oc I
H a'I H
159 159 159 300
-300 300 6.52 6.52 6.52 26 26
Pi TABI.E 3 (Continued)
Construction 1fortar Type psf INet: Area, psi Type lfodulus Load i~n of Rupture S.F.
A<<41Iow Ref.
4" Hollow lfonowytfte 8" Holi.ow Nonowythc N
N N
tf lf lf Center 138 157
)01 268 314 314 365 4 I.5 268 2 O'P 237 237 11.41 12.97
.8.38 4.39 5.15 5.15 25 25 25 25 25 25 8" Hollow itfonowyt:he N
N N
277 314 314 210 237 237 6'6 7.41 7.41 25 25 25 8" Hollow
~ follolty L'lie 0
0 0
259 277 277 195 210 210 6.09 6.56 6.56 25
') 5 25 8" Hollow
- fonowythc H ~
H
~ H 268 297 277 202 224 210 4.39 4.S7 4.56 25
') 5 25 8" Hollow i~fonowy L'he N
N N
277 259 297 210 195 224 6.56 6.09 7.00 25 25 25 8" Hollow "fonowytlto 0
00.
360 297 268 271
'1 24 202 8.45 7.00 6.31 25 25 25 12" Hollow lonowythe
.N ll N
352 314 333 142 127 134 4
~ 44 3.97 4.19 25 25 25 Shear Values proposed in Table 3-2 for. allowable shear for non-rcinCorced concrete masonry result from an evaluat:ion of t:est: walls Crom f'our sources, which included the three tnortar types permitted in the NC?ih recommendations, several wall sections, and both full and faceshell mortar bedding.
Average shear resistance of wallk laid up wit.h.Type lf a>>d S mortars (p