ML111320302
| ML111320302 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Cook  |
| Issue date: | 05/13/2011 |
| From: | Jamnes Cameron NRC/RGN-III/DRP/B6 |
| To: | Weber L Nuclear Generation Group, Indiana Michigan Power Co |
| References | |
| IR-11-011 | |
| Download: ML111320302 (23) | |
See also: IR 05000315/2011011
Text
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
2443 WARRENVILLE ROAD, SUITE 210
LISLE, IL 60532-4352
May 13, 2011
Mr. Larry Weber
Senior Vice President and
Chief Nuclear Officer
Indiana Michigan Power Company
Nuclear Generation Group
One Cook Place
Bridgman, MI 49106
SUBJECT:
D. C. COOK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 - NRC TEMPORARY
INSTRUCTION 2515/183 INSPECTION REPORT 05000315/2011011;
Dear Mr. Weber:
On April 29, 2011, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at
your D. C. Cook Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2, using Temporary Instruction (TI) 2515/183,
Followup to the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Station Fuel Damage Event. The enclosed
inspection report documents the inspection results which were discussed on April 29, 2011,
with Mr. J. Gebbie, and other members of your staff.
The objective of this inspection was to promptly assess the capabilities of the D. C. Cook
Nuclear Power Plant to respond to extraordinary consequences similar to those that have
recently occurred at the Japanese Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Station. The results from this
inspection, along with the results from this inspection performed at other operating commercial
nuclear plants in the United States will be used to evaluate the U.S. nuclear industrys readiness
to safely respond to similar events. These results will also help the NRC to determine if
additional regulatory actions are warranted.
All of the potential issues and observations identified by this inspection are contained in this
report. The NRCs Reactor Oversight Process will further evaluate any issues to determine if
they are regulatory findings or violations. Any resulting findings or violations will be documented
by the NRC in a separate report. You are not required to respond to this letter.
L. Weber
-2-
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter
and its enclosure will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC
Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of
NRCs document system (ADAMS), accessible from the NRC Web site at
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Jamnes L. Cameron, Chief
Branch 6
Division of Reactor Projects
Docket Nos. 50-315; 50-316
Enclosure:
Inspection Report 05000315/2011011; 05000316/2011011
cc w/encl:
Distribution via ListServ
Enclosure
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Docket Nos:
05000315; 05000316
License Nos:
Report No:
05000315/2011011; 05000316/2011011
Licensee:
Indiana Michigan Power Company
Facility:
D. C. Cook Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2
Location:
Bridgman, MI
Dates:
March 23, 2011, through April 29, 2011
Inspectors:
J. Lennartz, Senior Resident Inspector
P. LaFlamme, Resident Inspector
Approved by:
Jamnes L. Cameron, Chief
Branch 6
Division of Reactor Projects
1
Enclosure
INSPECTION SCOPE
IR 05000315/2011011; 05000316/2011011, 03/23/2011 - 04/29/2011; D. C. Cook Nuclear
Power Plant Temporary Instruction 2515/183 - Followup to the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear
Station Fuel Damage Event.
This report covers an announced Temporary Instruction inspection. The inspection was
conducted by resident inspectors. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of
commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process,
Revision 4, dated December 2006.
INSPECTION SCOPE
The intent of the TI is to provide a broad overview of the industrys preparedness for events
that may exceed the current design basis for a plant. The focus of the TI was on (1) assessing
the licensees capability to mitigate consequences from large fires or explosions on site,
(2) assessing the licensees capability to mitigate station blackout (SBO) conditions,
(3) assessing the licensees capability to mitigate internal and external flooding events
accounted for by the stations design, and (4) assessing the thoroughness of the licensees walk
downs and inspections of important equipment needed to mitigate fire and flood events to
identify the potential that the equipments function could be lost during seismic events possible
for the site. If necessary, a more specific follow-up inspection will be performed at a later date.
INSPECTION RESULTS
All of the potential issues and observations identified by this inspection are contained in this
report. The NRCs Reactor Oversight Process will further evaluate any issues to determine if
they are regulatory findings or violations. Any resulting findings or violations will be documented
by the NRC in a separate report.
2
Enclosure
03.01 Assess the licensees capability to mitigate conditions that result from beyond design basis events, typically bounded
by security threats, committed to as part of NRC Security Order Section B.5.b issued February 25, 2002, and severe accident
management guidelines and as required by Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 50.54(hh). Use Inspection
Procedure (IP) 71111.05T, Fire Protection (Triennial), Section 02.03 and 03.03 as a guideline. If IP 71111.05T was recently
performed at the facility the inspector should review the inspection results and findings to identify any other potential areas of
inspection. Particular emphasis should be placed on strategies related to the spent fuel pool. The inspection should include,
but not be limited to, an assessment of any licensee actions to:
Licensee Action
Describe what the licensee did to test or inspect equipment.
a. Verify through test or
inspection that equipment is
available and functional. Active
equipment shall be tested and
passive equipment shall be
walked down and inspected. It
is not expected that
permanently installed
equipment that is tested under
an existing regulatory testing
program be retested.
This review should be done for
a reasonable sample of
mitigating
strategies/equipment.
Licensee actions included identifying the equipment (active and passive) as directed
by the Extensive Damage Mitigation Guidelines (EDMGs) utilized for implementing
B.5.b actions and the Severe Accident Management Guidelines (SAMGs). The
scope was defined as that equipment specifically designated for B.5.b or SAMG
mitigation (i.e., special hoses, fittings, onsite fire truck, etc.). All equipment,
permanent and temporary, that is used to perform the EDMGs was walked down to
verify the equipment was in the correct physical location, and properly labeled. All
procedures were reviewed and, based on the in-plant walkdowns, credited equipment
was verified to be able to meet the EDMGs functional requirements. Licensee
personnel then identified surveillances/tests and performance frequencies for the
identified equipment and reviewed the results of recent tests. Also, active equipment
within the scope defined above that was not permanently installed was tested (i.e.,
plant fire truck was tested to verify the capability to meet specified pressure and
flow).
3
Enclosure
Describe inspector actions taken to confirm equipment readiness
(e.g., observed a test, reviewed test results, discussed actions, reviewed
records, etc.).
The inspectors assessed the licensees capabilities by reviewing the licensees
walkdown activities and previously performed surveillance tests. In addition, the
inspectors independently walked down and inspected all major B.5.b contingency
response equipment staged throughout the site and verified that required testing had
been completed satisfactorily. This included verifying that hoses, fittings, the onsite
fire truck, tool boxes, ladders, quick identifiers/ tags and labels were accounted for,
properly staged and in adequate material condition as specified by plant procedures.
Discuss general results including corrective actions by licensee.
Licensee personnel identified that components used for implementing the loss of
spent fuel pool procedure required enhanced labeling. The inspectors verified this
issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program.
The inspectors did not identify any issues of concern.
Licensee Action
Describe the licensees actions to verify that procedures are in place and can
be executed (e.g. walkdowns, demonstrations, tests, etc.)
b. Verify through walkdowns or
demonstration that procedures
to implement the strategies
associated with B.5.b and
10 CFR 50.54(hh) are in place
and are executable. Licensees
may choose not to connect or
operate permanently installed
equipment during this
verification.
The licensee performed walkdowns and demonstrations using their Abnormal
Operating Procedures, EDMG, and SAMG procedures credited for B.5.b strategy
actions. The licensees walkdowns included using Auxiliary Equipment Operators to
lay out hoses required to provide water as credited in their B.5.b analysis, and
verifying valve lineups using drawings for credited flow paths. The licensee
evaluated their ability to perform the procedures, as well as a review of equipment
and plant accessibility needed to perform proceduralized actions.
4
Enclosure
This review should be done for
a reasonable sample of
mitigating
strategies/equipment.
Describe inspector actions and the sample strategies reviewed. Assess
whether procedures were in place and could be used as intended.
The inspectors assessed the licensees capabilities by reviewing the licensees
walkdown activities. In addition, the inspectors walked down several procedure
sections that were walked down by the licensee to independently verify the licensees
conclusions. These walkdowns included verifying actions required by operators to
mitigate a loss of spent fuel pool inventory and/or cooling; to mitigate a large fire; to
establish alternate refueling water storage tank makeup; to support steam generator
depressurization; to flood containment for core cooling; and to establish an alternate
supply to the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump, could be accomplished as
specified by the procedures.
Discuss general results including corrective actions by licensee.
The licensee identified that the procedure for a loss of spent fuel pool cooling should
be enhanced to include instructions for closing the weir gate, which separates the
fuel transfer canal from the spent fuel pool. The inspectors verified that this condition
was entered into the licensees corrective action program.
The inspectors did not identify any issues of concern.
Licensee Action
Describe the licensees actions and conclusions regarding training and
qualifications of operators and support staff.
c. Verify the training and
qualifications of operators and
the support staff needed to
implement the procedures and
work instructions are current
for activities related to Security
Order Section B.5.b and
severe accident management
guidelines as required by
10 CFR 50.54 (hh).
The licensee reviewed the required training and qualifications of staff needed for
activities related to B.5.b and SAMG procedures to verify that they were current,
which included qualification requirements for the fire brigade, operations personnel,
and the emergency response organization. Additionally, the licensee reviewed the
number of individuals qualified for each of the positions in each department to ensure
credited actions could be performed.
Describe inspector actions and the sample strategies reviewed to assess
training and qualifications of operators and support staff
The inspectors assessed the licensees training and qualification activities by
reviewing training and qualification materials, and records related to B.5.b and SAMG
event response training. Additionally, the inspectors verified that the training was
documented and current. Specifically, the inspectors reviewed a sample of training
lesson plans, attendance verification sheets, and training slides.
5
Enclosure
Discuss general results including corrective actions by licensee.
Licensee personnel identified that continuing training on SAMG and B.5.b strategies
for the emergency response organization decision makers had not been done in
2010. The inspectors verified that this condition was entered into the licensees
corrective action program.
The inspectors did not identify any issues of concern.
Licensee Action
Describe the licensees actions and conclusions regarding applicable
agreements and contracts that are in place.
d. Verify that any applicable
agreements and contracts are
in place and are capable of
meeting the conditions needed
to mitigate the consequences
of these events.
This review should be done for
a reasonable sample of
mitigating
strategies/equipment.
The licensee reviewed their procedures and commitments to determine what
agreements or contracts would be needed to support necessary B.5.b and SAMG
actions. The licensee verified that applicable agreements and contracts were in
place and current, and that they were capable of meeting the conditions needed to
mitigate the consequences of events related to B.5.b and SAMG actions.
For a sample of mitigating strategies involving contracts or agreements with
offsite entities, describe inspector actions to confirm agreements and
contracts are in place and current (e.g., confirm that offsite fire assistance
agreement is in place and current).
The inspectors reviewed the licensees B.5.b commitments and that verified the
licensee had the appropriate letters of agreement and contracts in place. The
inspectors sampled the letters of agreement and contracts to verify that they were
current and that they could reasonably meet the conditions needed to mitigate the
consequences of these events. The sample included agreements with state and
local officials, the local health care provider, and local offsite fire departments.
Discuss general results including corrective actions by licensee.
The inspectors did not identify any issues of concern or any conditions requiring
corrective actions.
6
Enclosure
Licensee Action
Document the corrective action report number and briefly summarize problems
noted by the licensee that have significant potential to prevent the success of
any existing mitigating strategy.
e. Review any open corrective
action documents to assess
problems with mitigating
strategy implementation
identified by the licensee.
Assess the impact of the
problem on the mitigating
capability and the remaining
capability that is not impacted.
The following Action Requests (AR) were entered into the licensees Corrective
Action Program in response to issues identified in Section 03.01:
AR 2011-3416 - Enhance 12-OHP-4021-018-001, Loss Of Spent Fuel Pit Cooling.
AR 2011-4027 - SAMG, EDM, B.5.6 Training Not Given as Required by TPD-600-
EPT, Emergency Preparedness Training Program Description.
The inspectors reviewed each AR and did not identify any significant potential to
impact the licensees mitigation strategy.
03.02 Assess the licensees capability to mitigate station blackout (SBO) conditions, as required by 10 CFR 50.63, Loss of
All Alternating Current Power, and station design, is functional and valid. Refer to TI 2515/120, Inspection of
Implementation of Station Blackout Rule Multi-Plant Action Item A-22 as a guideline. It is not intended that TI 2515/120 be
completely reinspected. The inspection should include, but not be limited to, an assessment of any licensee actions to:
Licensee Action
Describe the licensees actions to verify the adequacy of equipment needed to
mitigate an SBO event.
a. Verify through walkdowns and
inspection that all required
materials are adequate and
properly staged, tested, and
maintained.
Licensee actions included identifying equipment utilized/required to mitigate an SBO
and conducting walkdowns to ensure that the equipment was in adequate material
condition and properly staged.
Describe inspector actions to verify equipment is available and useable.
The inspectors assessed the licensees capability to mitigate SBO conditions by
reviewing the licensees walkdown activities. In addition, the inspectors selected a
sample of equipment utilized/required to mitigate an SBO and independently walked
down that equipment to verify that the equipment was properly aligned and staged.
The sample of equipment selected by the inspectors included tool boxes, ladders,
and hoses that were staged in the 765 kilovolt (KV), 345 KV and 69 KV switchyards,
the 4 KV switchgear rooms, the emergency diesel generator rooms and the auxiliary
building.
7
Enclosure
Discuss general results including corrective actions by licensee.
The licensee identified during material staging walk downs that hoses for aligning
demineralized water to the spent fuel pool during a loss of inventory needed to be
designated and staged in closer proximity to the spent fuel pool. Additionally, the
licensee identified that specified materials required to repair or reduce spent fuel pool
leakage are currently stored off site and need to be stored on site. The inspectors
verified these conditions were entered into the licensees corrective action program.
The inspectors did not identify any issues of concern.
Licensee Action
Describe the licensees actions to verify the capability to mitigate an SBO event.
b. Demonstrate through
walkdowns that procedures for
response to an SBO are
executable.
Licensee actions included identifying the time critical operator actions associated with
an SBO. These actions were then walked down and validated during the
performance of a simulator scenario on April 8, 2011, consisting of a dual unit loss of
offsite power and an SBO in Unit 1.
Describe inspector actions to assess whether procedures were in place and
could be used as intended.
The inspectors reviewed the procedure actions associated with the loss of all
Alternating Current (AC) power, restoration of 4KV power and supplemental diesel
generators, loss of component cooling water, and steam generator level and power
operated relief valve control. The inspectors also observed the simulator scenario on
April 8, 2011, to compare the procedure actions with the time critical actions
implemented during the simulator scenario.
Discuss general results including corrective actions by licensee.
The inspectors concluded that the time critical operator actions were executable and
reasonable and did not identify any conditions requiring corrective actions.
8
Enclosure
03.03 Assess the licensees capability to mitigate internal and external flooding events required by station design. Refer to
IP 71111.01, Adverse Weather Protection, Section 02.04, Evaluate Readiness to Cope with External Flooding as a
guideline. The inspection should include, but not be limited to, an assessment of any licensee actions to verify through
walkdowns and inspections that all required materials and equipment are adequate and properly staged. These walkdowns
and inspections shall include verification that accessible doors, barriers, and penetration seals are functional.
Licensee Action
Describe the licensees actions to verify the capability to mitigate existing
design basis flooding events.
a. Verify through walkdowns and
inspection that all required
materials are adequate and
properly staged, tested, and
maintained.
Licensee actions included identifying equipment, structures and penetration seals
utilized/required to mitigate internal and external flooding. The licensee then
walked down the equipment to ensure that it was adequate and properly staged.
Doors, barriers, sumps, berms and penetration seals that were utilized to mitigate
flooding were identified and inspected. In addition, the licensee reviewed
maintenance and surveillance testing history for the Structures, Systems, and
Components (SSCs) credited to mitigate internal and external flooding events.
Describe inspector actions to verify equipment is available and useable.
Assess whether procedures were in place and could be used as intended.
The inspectors assessed the licensees capabilities to mitigate flooding by
reviewing the licensees walkdown activities. In several instances, these reviews
involved the inspectors accompanying licensee engineering personnel during in-
field walkdowns. In addition, the inspectors independently walked down selected
flood mitigation equipment to further assess the licensees flood mitigating
capabilities. Licensee flood mitigation procedures and flooding analysis were also
reviewed to verify usability and accuracy.
Discuss general results including corrective actions by licensee.
The licensee identified that the turbine building sump vault hatch did not have a
periodic maintenance activity to inspect/repair the hatch. The inspectors verified
that this condition was entered into the licensees corrective action program.
The inspectors concluded that useable procedures and equipment were in place
and available to mitigate the most limiting flooding events, which was a circulating
water pipe expansion joint rupture or turbine building sump check valve failure
during a postulated 11 foot seiche coupled with an historical high lake level of
583.6 feet above sea level.
9
Enclosure
Licensee Action
Describe the licensees actions to assess the potential impact of seismic events
on the availability of equipment used in fire and flooding mitigation strategies.
b. Verify through walkdowns that
all required materials are
adequate and properly
staged, tested, and
maintained.
Licensee actions included identifying equipment utilized/required to mitigate fire and
flood events. Plant walkdowns were performed to assess functionality of important
equipment needed to mitigate a flood or fire following a design basis earthquake.
Walk downs included external visual inspections of associated pumps, diesels,
motors, breakers, pipes, valves, tanks, intake structures, hoses, and fittings. The
material condition of surrounding equipment and structures, including the structure
that houses the credited equipment, were also inspected. Non-seismic equipment and
structures were visually inspected to determine if any surrounding SSCs could be
adversely impacted due to seismic interaction.
Describe inspector actions to verify equipment is available and useable.
Assess whether procedures were in place and could be used as intended.
The inspectors accompanied licensee personnel on selected walkdowns to verify the
licensees actions and assess their adequacy. Additionally, the inspectors
independently walked down fire piping, fire mitigating components, the B.5.b fire truck,
B.5.b related equipment, flooding barriers, and areas susceptible to flooding. The
walkdown included the residual heat removal and containment spray pump rooms,
emergency diesel generator rooms, fire water storage tank yard and the screen house
intake structure. The inspectors assessment was consistent with the licensees
conclusions that there were a few potential seismic vulnerabilities that need to be
evaluated, as described below.
Discuss general results including corrective actions by licensee. Briefly
summarize any new mitigating strategies identified by the licensee as a result of
their reviews.
The licensee identified four potential deficiencies as summarized below:
1) The licensee noted that the alarms in the condenser pits and the auxiliary
building sump that are credited to alert operators to take action to mitigate
internally flooding are both non safety-related and non-seismic. Therefore,
seismic response procedures will be enhanced to have Auxiliary Equipment
Operators check the turbine and auxiliary buildings for internal flooding as
soon as possible in order to assist control room operators in taking action to
mitigate/terminate the event.
10
Enclosure
2) The licensee identified that during an external flooding event due to a seiche,
the west wall of the turbine building is credited for preventing flooding on the
turbine building 591 foot elevation. However, documentation could not be
found to verify that the turbine building west wall that extends beyond the
screenhouse was Seismic Class I. Therefore, structural design engineering
will evaluate if the wall can be analyzed to be seismically qualified, or if it has
to be modified.
3) The license identified that although the plant is designed with diverse sources
of fire protection equipment and water sources to supply fire mitigation
equipment, this equipment and its associated water sources are not designed
and installed to Seismic Class I requirements. Therefore, the licensee will
evaluate the need to develop mitigating strategies to provide additional means
of mitigating a fire following a seismic event.
4) The licensee identified that the plant fire truck is currently housed in a structure
on site that is not designed to Seismic Class I requirements. Therefore, the
licensee will evaluate the need to relocate the fire truck to a Seismic Class I
structure or to a location that would not present a seismic hazard to the
equipment.
The inspectors verified that all of these issues were entered into the licensees
corrective action program.
The inspectors did not identify any issues of concern.
11
Enclosure
03.04 Assess the thoroughness of the licensees walkdowns and inspections of important equipment needed to mitigate fire
and flood events to identify the potential that the equipments function could be lost during seismic events possible for the
site. Assess the licensees development of any new mitigating strategies for identified vulnerabilities (e.g., entered it in to the
corrective action program and any immediate actions taken). As a minimum, the licensee should have performed walkdowns
and inspections of important equipment (permanent and temporary) such as storage tanks, plant water intake structures,
and fire and flood response equipment; and developed mitigating strategies to cope with the loss of that important function.
Use IP 71111.21, Component Design Basis Inspection, Appendix 3, Component Walkdown Considerations, as a
guideline to assess the thoroughness of the licensees walkdowns and inspections.
Licensee Action
Describe the licensees actions to assess the potential impact of seismic
events on the availability of equipment used in fire and flooding mitigation
strategies.
a. Verify through walkdowns that
all required materials are
adequate and properly
staged, tested, and
maintained.
Licensee actions included identifying equipment utilized/required to mitigate fire and
flood events. Plant walkdowns were performed to assess functionality of important
equipment needed to mitigate a flood or fire following a design basis earthquake.
Walk downs included external visual inspections of associated pumps, diesels,
motors, breakers, pipes, valves, tanks, intake structures, hoses, and fittings. The
material condition of surrounding equipment and structures, including the structure
that houses the credited equipment, were also inspected. Non-seismic equipment
and structures were visually inspected to determine if any surrounding SSCs could be
adversely impacted due to seismic interaction.
Describe inspector actions to verify equipment is available and useable.
Assess whether procedures were in place and could be used as intended.
The inspectors accompanied licensee personnel on selected walkdowns to verify the
licensees actions and assess their adequacy. Additionally, the inspectors
independently walked down fire piping, fire mitigating components, the B.5.b fire
truck, B.5.b related equipment, flooding barriers, and areas susceptible to flooding.
The walkdown included the residual heat removal and containment spray pump
rooms, emergency diesel generator rooms, fire water storage tank yard and the
screen house intake structure. The inspector's assessment was consistent with the
licensees conclusions that there were a few potential seismic vulnerabilities that
need to be evaluated, as described below.
12
Enclosure
Discuss general results including corrective actions by licensee.
Briefly summarize any new mitigating strategies identified by the licensee as a
result of their reviews.
The licensee identified four potential deficiencies as summarized below:
1) The licensee noted that the alarms in the condenser pits and the auxiliary
building sump that are credited to alert operators to take action to mitigate
internally flooding are both non safety-related and non-seismic. Therefore,
seismic response procedures will be enhanced to have Auxiliary Equipment
Operators check the turbine and auxiliary buildings for internal flooding as
soon as possible in order to assist control room operators in taking action to
mitigate/terminate the event.
2) The licensee identified that during an external flooding event due to a seiche,
the west wall of the turbine building is credited for preventing flooding on the
turbine building 591 foot elevation. However, documentation could not be
found to verify that the turbine building west wall that extends beyond the
screenhouse was Seismic Class I. Therefore, structural design engineering
will evaluate if the wall can be analyzed to be seismically qualified, or if it has
to be modified.
3) The license identified that although the plant is designed with diverse sources
of fire protection equipment and water sources to supply fire mitigation
equipment, this equipment and its associated water sources are not designed
and installed to Seismic Class I requirements. Therefore, the licensee will
evaluate the need to develop mitigating strategies to provide additional means
of mitigating a fire following a seismic event.
4) The licensee identified that the plant fire truck is currently housed in a
structure on site that is not designed to Seismic Class I requirements.
Therefore, the licensee will evaluate the need to relocate the fire truck to a
Seismic Class I structure or to a location that would not present a seismic
hazard to the equipment.
The inspectors verified that all of these issues were entered into the licensees
corrective action program.
The inspectors did not identify any issues of concern.
13
Enclosure
Meetings
.1
Exit Meeting
The inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. J. Gebbie and other members of
licensee management on April 29, 2011. The inspectors asked the licensee whether
any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No
proprietary information was identified.
14
Enclosure
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee
J. Gebbie, Site Vice President
Q. Lies, Plant Manager
D. Cobb, Maintenance Manager, WIN Team
G. Curten, Design Engineering, Mechanical
R. Pletz, Fire Protection and Safety Services Supervisor
M. Scarpello, Regulatory Affairs Manager
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
J. Cameron, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 6/DRP/RIII
15
Enclosure
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
The following is a list of documents reviewed during the inspection. Inclusion on this list does
not imply that the NRC inspectors reviewed the documents in their entirety but rather that
selected sections of portions of the documents were evaluated as part of the overall inspection
effort. Inclusion of a document on this list does not imply NRC acceptance of the document or
any part of it, unless this is stated in the body of the inspection report.
03.01 Assess the licensees capability to mitigate conditions that result from beyond design
basis events
Number
Description or Title
Date or
Revision
Fire Pre-Plans Fire Protection Response to a Large Fire or
Explosion Event
Revision 12
Berrien County Emergency Management Memorandum of
Understanding
February 1,
2010
Lake Township Fire and Rescue Memorandum of
Understanding
November 17,
2010
Bridgman City Fire Department Memorandum of
Understanding
December 6,
2010
Lakeland HealthCare Memorandum of Understanding
November 5,
2010
Medic1 Ambulance Memorandum of Understanding
December 21,
2010
Entergy, Palisades Nuclear Plant Reciprocal Laboratory Use
Agreement
October 14,
2010
Mutual Assistance Agreement between Detroit Edison,
Entergy Nuclear Palisades, LLC, and Indiana Michigan Power
November 5,
2010
Nuclear Power Plant Emergency Response Voluntary
Assistance Agreement
January 17.
2007
Voluntary Assistance Agreement by and Among Electric
Utilities Involved in Transportation of Nuclear Materials
January 17,
2007
Berrien County Sherriffs Department Memorandum of
Understanding
November 9,
2010
Michigan State Police Memorandum of Understanding
September 26,
2008
12-OHP-4022-
018-001
Loss of Spent Fuel Pit Cooling
Revision 13
12-OHP-4026-
EDM-001
Extensive Damage Mitigation Initial Response
November 18,
2008
12-OHP-4026-
EDM-002
Extensive Damage Mitigation Enhanced Site Response
Strategies
November 18,
2008
12-OHP-4026-
EDM-003
Extensive Damage Mitigation Resource Management
Guidance
November 18,
2008
12-OHP-5030-
APR-001
Appendix R Toolbox and Ladder Inventory
Revision 3
AR 2011-3416
Enhance 12-OHP-4022-018-001 Loss of Spent Fuel Pit
Cooling
AR 2011-4027
SAMG, EDM, B.5.b Training Not Given as Reqd by TPD-600-
EPT
16
Enclosure
AR 2011-4983
Appendix R Toolbox Electrical Tape Not Correct Type By
Procedure
Donald C.
Cook Nuclear
Plant
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Station Fuel Damage Caused by
Earthquake and Tsunami Action Plan Response
April 15, 2011
Lesson Plan
AE-C-00104
Abnormal/ Emergency Tasks
August 12,
2008
Lesson Plan
AE-C-EDMG
Auxiliary Equipment Operators Continuing Training
Revision 0
Lesson Plan
AE-J-3322
B.5.b EDMG3
February 28,
2009
Lesson Plan
RQ-C-3245
Validated SEC Threat/Extensive Damage Mitigation
November 8,
2007
Lesson Plan
RQ-C-3614
License Operator Requalification SAMG/SACRG Review
Revision 0
Lesson Plan
RQ-S-3601-D1
Licensee Operator Requalification Dual Unit Training Scenario Revision 0
OP-12-5132-
29
Flow Diagram CVCS-Boron Hold up Boric Acid Reserve Tank
Units 1 & 2
Revision 29
SAMG SAG-1
Feeding Steam Generators
April 8, 2009
SAMG SAG-2
Depressurize RCS
April 8, 2009
SAMG SAG-4
Inject Into Containment
April 8, 2009
SAMG-1
Severe Accident Management Guidance Manual
April 10, 2007
01
Appendix R Toolbox and Ladder Inventory
January 29,
2001
03.02 Assess the licensees capability to mitigate station blackout (SBO) conditions
Number
Description or Title
Date or
Revision
12-OHP-4021-
033-001
Supplemental Diesel Generator Operations
Revision 6
12-OHP-4023-
SUP-009
Restoration of 4KV Power from EP
Revision 7
1-OHP-4021-
028-014,
Attachment 6
Initiating or Restoring From ESW Cooling To Air Handling
Units Following A Failure of Both Chiller Packages
Revision 26
1-OHP-4022-
055-003
Loss of Condensate to Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps
Revision 9
1-OHP-4023-
ECA-0.0
Loss of All AC Power
Revision 25
1-OHP-4025-
R-13
Restore Diesel Generators
Revision 4
2-OHP-4022-
016-004
Loss of Component Cooling Water
Revision 19
2-OHP-4023-
ECA-0.0
Loss of All AC Power
Revision 24
2-OHP-4025-
LS-3
Steam Generator 2/3 Level Control
Revision 4
2-OHP-4025-
R-12
Component Restoration
Revision 6
17
Enclosure
2-OHP-4025-
R-8
Restore Electrical System
Revision 2
03.03 Assess the licensees capability to mitigate internal and external flooding events required
by station design
Number
Description or Title
Date or
Revision
12-OHP-4022-
001-009
Seiche
August 12,
2010
1-OHP-4024-
124
Annunciator #124 Response: Containment
March 9 2007
MD-12-CW-
005-N
Flooding Due to Circulating Water Expansion Joint Failure
April 6, 2006
MD-12-SCRN-
001-N
Screen House Internal Flood Levels
January 15,
2009
SD-061206-
001
Flooding Evaluation Report for D.C. Cook Power Plant
Revision 2
02
12-DR-129, Inspect for Functionality/ Corrosion / Degradation
July 13, 2010
01, MTM
Inspect and Lube Watertight Doors per ME.DOOR.001
August 26,
2009
03.04 Assess the thoroughness of the licensees walkdowns and inspections of important
equipment needed to mitigate fire and flood events to identify the potential that the
equipments function could be lost during seismic events
Number
Description or Title
Date or
Revision
DCC-PV-12-
MC17-N
Flood Protection Features
October 14,
2001
DCC-PV-12-
MC33-N
Flood Protection
November 23,
1994
DIT-B-02531-
00
Seismic Class I Boundaries
October 23,
2002
N920101
Fire Protection Storage Tanks at Cook Plant
February 11,
1992
OP-125152-14
Flow Diagram Fire Protection-Water Yard Piping Unit 1 & 2
Revision 14
18
Enclosure
LIST OF ACRONYMS USED
Alternating Current
Agencywide Documents Access and Management System
Action Request
CFR
Code of Federal Regulations
EDMG
Extensive Damage Mitigation Guidelines
IP
Inspection Procedure
KV
Kilovolt
NRC
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Severe Accident Management Guidelines
Station Blackout
Structures, Systems, and Components
TI
Temporary Instruction
L. Weber
-2-
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter
and its enclosure will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC
Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of
NRCs document system (ADAMS), accessible from the NRC Web site at
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Jamnes L. Cameron, Chief
Branch 6
Division of Reactor Projects
Docket Nos. 50-315; 50-316
Enclosure:
Inspection Report 05000315/2011011; 05000316/2011011
cc w/encl:
Distribution via ListServ
DOCUMENT NAME: G:\\DRPIII\\1-Secy\\1-Work In Progress\\TI Reports\\Cook 2011 001Rev.docx
Publicly Available
Non-Publicly Available
Sensitive
Non-Sensitive
To receive a copy of this document, indicate in the concurrence box "C" = Copy without attach/encl "E" = Copy with attach/encl "N" = No copy
OFFICE
RIII
RIII
NAME
J. Rutkowski:dtp
J. Cameron
DATE
05/10/11
05/11/11
OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
Letter to L. Weber from J. Cameron dated May 13, 2011.
SUBJECT:
D. C. COOK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 - NRC TEMPORARY
INSTRUCTION 2515/183 INSPECTION REPORT 05000315/2011011;
DISTRIBUTION:
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