ML090200064
| ML090200064 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vogtle  |
| Issue date: | 01/20/2009 |
| From: | Scott Shaeffer NRC/RGN-II/DRP/RPB2 |
| To: | Tynan T Southern Nuclear Operating Co |
| References | |
| IR-08-005 | |
| Download: ML090200064 (43) | |
See also: IR 05000424/2008005
Text
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
SAM NUNN ATLANTA FEDERAL CENTER
61 FORSYTH STREET, SW, SUITE 23T85
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303-8931
January 20, 2009
Mr. Tom E. Tynan
Vice President - Vogtle
Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.
Vogtle Electric Generating Plant
7821 River Road
Waynesboro, GA 30830
SUBJECT: VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION
REPORT 05000424/2008005 AND 05000425/2008005
Dear Mr. Tynan:
On December 31, 2008, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an
inspection at your Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2. The enclosed integrated
inspection report documents the inspection findings, which were discussed on January 15, 2009,
with you and other members of your staff.
The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and
compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed
personnel.
This report documents one self-revealing finding of very low safety significance (Green) which
was determined to be a violation of NRC requirements. The NRC is treating this violation as a
non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy because
of the very low safety significance and because it was entered into your corrective action
program. If you contest this NCV, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of
this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
ATTN.: Document Control Desk, Washington DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional
Administrator, Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC resident inspector at the Vogtle
Electric Generating Plant.
SNC, Inc. 2
In accordance with the Code of Federal Regulations 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of
Practice, a copy of this letter, its enclosures, and your response (if any) will be available
electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly
Available Records (PARS) component of the NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is
accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public
Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Scott M. Shaeffer, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 2
Division of Reactor Projects
Docket Nos.: 50-424, 50-425
License Nos.: NPF-68 and NPF-81
Enclosures: Inspection Report 05000424/2008005 and 05000425/2008005
w/Attachment: Supplemental Information
cc w/encl: (See next page)
_________________________ G SUNSI REVIEW COMPLETE
OFFICE RII:DRP RII:DRP RII:DRP RII:DRP RII:DRP RII:DRP RII:DRS
SIGNATURE /RA/ /RA/ /RA/ /RA/ /RA/ /RA/ /RA/
NAME CRapp SShaeffer E. Crowe E. Morris T. Chandler G. McCoy B. Caballero
DATE 1/ /2009 1/ /2009 1/ /2009 1/ /2009 1/ /2009 1/ /2009 1/ /2009
E-MAIL COPY? YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO
OFFICE RII:DRS RII:DRS RII:DRS RII:DRS RII:DRS RII:DRS RII:DRS
SIGNATURE /RA/ /RA/ /RA/ /RA/ /RA/ /RA/ /RA/
NAME C. Fletcher E. Michel D. Mas-Penaranda J. Hamman C. Peabody R. Lewis R. Berryman
DATE 1/ /2009 1/ /2009 1/ /2009 1/ /2009 1/ /2009 1/ /2009 1/ /2009
E-MAIL COPY? YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO
OFFICE RII:DRS RII:DRS RII:DRS RII:DRS RII:DRS RII:DRS RII:DRS
SIGNATURE /RA/ /RA/ /RA/ /RA/ /RA/
NAME R. Patterson R. Williams G. Kuzo A. Nielsen J. Rivera-Ortiz
DATE 1/ /2009 1/ /2009 1/ /2009 1/ /2009 1/ /2009 1/ /2009 1/ /2009
E-MAIL COPY? YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO
SNC, Inc. 3
cc w/encl: Mr. N. Holcomb, Commissioner
Angela Thornhill Department of Natural Resources
Managing Attorney and Compliance Officer Electronic Mail Distribution
Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.
Electronic Mail Distribution Dr. Carol Couch, Director
Environmental Protection
N. J. Stringfellow, Manager Department of Natural Resources
Licensing Electronic Mail Distribution
Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.
Electronic Mail Distribution Cynthia Sanders, Program Manager
Radioactive Materials Program
Jeffrey T. Gasser Department of Natural Resources
Executive Vice President Electronic Mail Distribution
Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.
Electronic Mail Distribution Jim Sommerville, (Acting) Chief
Environmental Protection Division
L. Mike Stinson, Vice President Department of Natural Resources
Fleet Operations Support Electronic Mail Distribution
Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.
Electronic Mail Distribution Mr. Steven M. Jackson
Senior Engineer - Power Supply
Michael A. MacFarlane Municipal Electric Authority of Georgia
Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. Electronic Mail Distribution
40 Inverness Center Parkway
P.O. Box 1295 Mr. Reece McAlister, Executive Secretary
Birmingham, AL 35201-1295 Georgia Public Service Commission
Electronic Mail Distribution
David H. Jones, Vice President
Engineering Office of the Attorney General
Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. Electronic Mail Distribution
Electronic Mail Distribution
Office of the County Commissioner
Bob Masse, Resident Manager Burke County Commission
Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Electronic Mail Distribution
Oglethorpe Power Corporation
Electronic Mail Distribution Arthur H. Domby, Esq.
Troutman Sanders
Moanica Caston Electronic Mail Distribution
Vice President and General Counsel
Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. Director
Electronic Mail Distribution Consumers' Utility Counsel Division
Govenor's Office of Consumer Affairs
Laurence Bergen 2 M. L. King, Jr. Drive
Oglethorpe Power Corporation Plaza Level East; Suite 356
Electronic Mail Distribution Atlanta, GA 30334-4600
(cc w/encl. cont: See next page)
SNC, Inc. 4
Senior Resident Inspector
Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.
Vogtle Electric Generating Plant
U.S. NRC
7821 River Road
Waynesboro, GA 30830
Susan E. Jenkins
Director, Division of Waste Management
Bureau of Land and Waste Management
S.C. Department of Health and Environmental Control
Electronic Mail Distribution
SNC, Inc. 5
Letter to Tom E. Tynan from Scott M.Shaeffer dated January 20, 2009
SUBJECT: VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION
REPORT 05000424/2008005 AND 05000425/2008005
Distribution w/encl:
C. Evans, RII EICS (Part 72 Only)
L. Slack, RII EICS (Linda Slack)
OE Mail (email address if applicable)
RIDSNRRDIRS
PUBLIC
R. Martin, NRR
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
Docket Nos.: 50-424, 50-425
Report Nos.: 05000424/2008005 and 05000425/2008005
Licensee: Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.
Facility: Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2
Location: Waynesboro, GA 30830
Dates: October 1, 2008 through December 31, 2008
Inspectors: G. McCoy, Senior Resident Inspector (SRI)
E. Crowe, SRI, Farley Nuclear Plant
E. Morris, Acting SRI
T. Chandler, Resident Inspector
C. Fletcher, Reactor Inspector (Section 1R08)
E. Michel, Senior Reactor Inspector (Section 1R08)
B. Caballero, Operations Engineer (Section 1R11)
D. Mas-Penaranda, Reactor Inspector (Section 1R17)
J. Hamman, Reactor Inspector (Section 1R17)
C. Peabody, Reactor Inspector (Section 1R17)
R. Lewis, Senior Reactor Inspector (Section 1R17)
R. Berryman, P.E., Senior Reactor Inspector (Section 1R17)
R. Patterson, Reactor Inspector (Section 1R17)
R. Williams, Reactor Inspector (Section 1R17)
G. Kuzo, Sr. Health Physicist (Sections 2OS2, 4OA1)
A. Nielsen. Health Physicist (Sections 2OS1, 2PS1, 2PS2)
J. Rivera-Ortiz, Sr. Project Inspector (Section 4OA5.2)
Approved by: Scott M. Shaeffer, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 2
Division of Reactor Projects
Enclosure
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
IR 05000424/2008-005, 05000425/2008-005; 10/1/2008 - 12/31/2008; Vogtle Electric
Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2; Access Control to Radiologically Significant Areas
The report covered a three-month period of inspection by four resident inspectors, nine reactor
inspectors, two health physicists, and a project engineer. One Green non-cited violation (NCV)
was identified. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White,
Yellow, or Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process
(SDP). Findings for which the SDP does not apply may be Green or be assigned a severity level
after management review. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial
nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Rev 4 dated
December 2006.
A. NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings
Cornerstone: Occupational Radiation Safety
Green. Two examples of a self-revealing non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.7.1, High Radiation Area, was identified for unauthorized entry into High Radiation
Areas (HRAs). Inadequate communication between workers and Health Physics
department resulted in licensee personnel breaching HRA boundaries without prior
knowledge of the radiological conditions. The licensee had entered these issues into the
corrective action program as Condition Reports 2007105476 and 2007108830.
This finding is greater than minor because it is associated with the Occupational
Radiation Safety Cornerstone attribute of Human Performance and adversely affects the
cornerstone objective of ensuring adequate protection of worker health and safety from
exposure to radiation from radioactive material during routine civilian nuclear reactor
operation. The finding was evaluated using the Occupational Radiation Safety
Significance Determination Process and was determined to be of very low safety
significance because it not related to As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA)
planning, did not involve an overexposure or substantial potential for overexposure, and
the ability to assess dose was not compromised. This finding involved the cross-cutting
aspect of Human Performance, Work Practices H.4.a] because the HRA events were a
direct result of poor communications during pre-job briefings and a willingness on the
part of licensee personnel to proceed in the face of uncertainty. (Section 2OS1).
B. Licensee-Identified Violations
None.
Enclosure
REPORT DETAILS
Summary of Plant Status
Unit 1 operated at full rated thermal power for the entire inspection period.
Unit 2 started the report period shutdown for a planned refueling outage. The unit was
restarted on October 19 and attained full power on October 29. The unit was shutdown
on November 16 to replace a reactor coolant pump seal. The unit was restarted on
November 21 and reached full power on November 25. The unit operated at full rated
thermal power for the remainder of the inspection period.
1. REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity
1R01 Adverse Weather Protection
a. Inspection Scope
Seasonal Readiness Review. The inspectors performed a walkdown of the following two
systems to verify they would remain functional during low temperature conditions. The
inspectors reviewed preventive maintenance activities associated with heat tracing and
freeze protection systems to verify they were appropriately scheduled and completed
prior to the onset of cold weather. The inspectors reviewed compensatory actions to
verify they were implemented for degraded or inoperable heat trace and freeze protection
equipment. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed the condition report (CR) database to
verify that adverse weather related items were being identified and appropriately
resolved. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
C Unit 1 nuclear service cooling water (NSCW) tower instrumentation rooms (both
trains)
C Unit 1 and 2 refueling water storage tank instrumentation rooms
Impending Adverse Weather Condition Review. On November 25, the inspectors
reviewed licensee procedure 11877-1 and 11877-2, Cold Weather Checklist, to verify the
licensee had implemented actions to prepare the plant site for predicted severe weather
conditions of sub-freezing temperatures. The inspectors walked down various safety-
significant areas of the plant to verify the licensees ability to respond to the predicted
adverse weather conditions.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
4
1R04 Equipment Alignment
a. Inspection Scope
Partial System Walkdown. The inspectors performed partial walkdowns of the following
two systems to verify correct system alignment. The inspectors checked for correct valve
and electrical power alignments by comparing positions of valves, switches, and
breakers to the documents listed in the Attachment. Additionally, the inspectors
reviewed the condition report database to verify that equipment alignment problems were
being identified and appropriately resolved.
C Unit 2 train A auxiliary feedwater (AFW) system when the train B auxiliary feedwater
pump was out of service for maintenance
C Unit 1 train B emergency diesel generator (EDG) and fuel oil transfer system
following maintenance activities
Complete System Walkdown. The inspectors performed a complete walkdown of the
Unit 1 train B NSCW system. The inspectors performed a detailed check of valve
positions, electrical breaker positions, and operating switch positions to evaluate the
operability of the redundant trains or components by comparing the required position in
the system operating procedure to the actual position. The inspectors also reviewed
control room logs, condition reports, and system health reports to verify that alignment
and equipment discrepancies were being identified and appropriately resolved.
Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R05 Fire Protection
a. Inspection Scope
Fire Area Tours. The inspectors walked down the following four plant areas to verify the
licensee was controlling combustible materials and ignition sources as required by
procedures 92015-C, Use, Control, and Storage of Flammable/Combustible Materials,
and 92020-C, Control of Ignition Sources. The inspectors assessed the observable
condition of fire detection, suppression, and protection systems and reviewed the
licensees fire protection Limiting Condition for Operation log and CR database to verify
that the corrective actions for degraded equipment were identified and appropriately
prioritized. The inspectors also reviewed the licensees fire protection program to verify
the requirements of Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) Section 9.5.1, Fire
Protection Program, and Appendix 9A, Fire Hazards Analysis, were met. Documents
reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
Enclosure
5
C Unit 2 EDG fuel oil storage pumps and tanks
C Unit 1 and 2 spent fuel pools
C Unit 1 safety injection pump rooms
C Unit 2 auxiliary component cooling water (ACCW) pump rooms
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R06 Flood Protection Measures
a. Inspection Scope
Internal Flood Review. The inspectors walked down the following two areas which
contained risk-significant structures, systems, and components below flood level to verify
flood barriers were in place. Motor controllers and terminal boxes that could become
potentially submerged were inspected to ensure that the sealing gasket material was
intact and undamaged. The inspectors reviewed selected licensee alarm response
procedures to verify alarm setpoints and setpoints for sump pump operation were
consistent with the UFSAR, the setpoint index, and Technical Specifications.
C Unit 1 residual heat removal pump rooms (both trains)
C Unit 1 containment spray pump rooms (both trains)
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R07 Heat Sink Performance
a. Inspection Scope
Annual Review. The inspectors reviewed the licensees records of the performance tests
conducted on the Unit 2 A train component cooling water (CCW) and ACCW heat
exchangers. The inspectors reviewed EPRI NP-7552, Heat Exchanger Performance
Monitoring Guidelines to ensure that the licensees testing procedures were appropriate.
Additionally, the inspectors reviewed the licensees corrective action program for heat
exchanger performance issues to ensure that discrepancies were being identified and
appropriately resolved. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R08 In-service Inspection (ISI) Activities
.1 Non-Destructive Examination (NDE) Activities and Welding Activities
Enclosure
6
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the implementation of the licensees ISI program for monitoring
degradation of the reactor coolant system (RCS) boundary and risk significant piping
boundaries. The inspectors activities consisted of an on-site review of NDE and welding
activities to evaluate compliance with the applicable edition of the American Society of
Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section XI (Code of
record: 2001 Edition with 2003 Addenda), and to verify that indications and defects (if
present) were appropriately evaluated and dispositioned in accordance with the
requirements of the ASME Code,Section XI acceptance standards.
The inspectors review of NDE activities specifically covered examination procedures,
NDE reports, equipment and consumables certification records, personnel qualification
records, and calibration reports (as applicable) for the following examinations:
C UT examination of weld 21204-023-21, ASME Class 2, Safety Injection System, 6-
inch diameter pipe-to-tee (Section XI ISI)-Direct Observation.
C UT examination of weld 21204-243-31-RI, ASME Class 2, Safety Injection System,
1.5-inch diameter pipe-to-elbow (Risk Informed ISI)-Direct Observation
C Radiography (RT) examination film of welds associated with Q.I.S. Work Order No.
08-70-0658 (ASME Section III and V NDE)
The inspectors also reviewed documentation for the following indications, which were
accepted for continuous service:
C CN-RIDA-07-40, Westinghouse Thermal Sleeve Wear Criteria Analysis, Rev 0.
The inspectors review of welding activities specifically covered the welding activity listed
below in order to evaluate compliance with procedures and the ASME Code. The
inspectors reviewed the work order, repair and replacement plan, weld data sheets,
welding procedures, procedure qualification records, welder qualification records, and
NDE reports.
associated with Work Order 2081126401, Pipe to Flange Weld.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2 PWR Vessel Upper Head Penetration Inspection Activities
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensees activities relative to the Bare Metal Visual
examination of the reactor pressure vessel upper head (RPVUH) nozzles and the visual
examination to identify potential boric acid leaks from pressure-retaining components
above the RPVUH. These activities were reviewed to verify licensee compliance with the
Enclosure
7
regulatory requirements of NRC Order EA-03-009 Modifying Licenses dated February 20,
2004. The inspectors specifically reviewed BMV examination procedures, final BMV
examination report and disposition of indications, personnel training and qualification
records, final image electronic report, a sample of examination videos, and reports for
the visual inspection of pressure retaining components above the head performed every
outage. In addition, the inspectors reviewed the licensees RPVUH Effective
Degradation Years calculation to ensure it had been performed and updated in
accordance with the NRC Order.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.3 Boric Acid Corrosion Control (BACC) Inspection Activities
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensees BACC program activities to ensure
implementation with commitments made in response to NRC Generic Letter 88-05, Boric
Acid Corrosion of Carbon Steel Reactor Pressure Boundary, and applicable industry
guidance documents. Specifically, the inspectors performed an on-site record review of
procedures and the results of the licensees containment walk-down inspections
performed during the Unit 2 fall 2008 outage. The inspectors also interviewed the BACC
program owner and conducted an independent walk-down of the reactor building to
evaluate compliance with licensees BACC program requirements and verify that
degraded or non-conforming conditions, such as boric acid leaks identified during the
containment walk-down, were properly identified and corrected in accordance with the
licensees BACC and corrective action programs. The inspectors reviewed the following
four engineering evaluations completed for evidence of boric acid found on systems
containing borated water to verify that the minimum design code required section
thickness had been maintained for the affected components.
- CR 2008102122 - Boric Acid Containment Recovery Project.
- CR 2007106211 - Boric Acid Containment Recovery Project.
- CR 2007110612 - Boric Acid Containment Recovery Project.
- CR 2008108419 - Boric Acid Containment Recovery Project.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.4 Steam Generator (SG) Tube Inspection Activities
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the eddy current testing (ECT) activities of Unit 2 SGs 1 and 4
to ensure compliance with Technical Specifications, applicable industry standards, SG
Program Procedures, and ASME Code Section XI requirements. The inspectors
Enclosure
8
reviewed the latest Degradation Assessment (DA) report to identify the scope of the
inspection and verify it addressed existing and potential degradation mechanisms, plant
specific degradation history, and applicable operating experience. The inspectors
reviewed portions of the tube inspection plan to verify it complied with the inspections
cited in the DA. The inspectors reviewed the licensees SG Program Strategic Plan to
ensure SG tube inspection intervals were in accordance with EPRI Pressurized Water
Reactor Steam Generator Examination Guidelines, Revision 7. The inspectors selected
a sample of site-specific acquisition and analysis Examination Technique Specification
Sheets (ETSS) to ensure that equivalency was maintained with the associated qualified
ETSSs per the EPRI Pressurized Water Reactor Steam Generator Examination
Guidelines, Revision 7. The inspectors discussed in-situ pressure testing requirements
and monitoring with engineering personnel associated with the sites ECT vendor. None
of the SG tubes met the criteria for in-situ pressure testing. The inspectors also reviewed
the last Condition Monitoring and Operational Assessment report in conjunction with the
inspection status reports to assess the licensees prediction capability for expected tube
degradation. The inspectors reviewed licensee criteria for tube repair to verify they were
consistent with EPRI guidelines. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed documentation to
ensure that resolution analysts, ECT probes, and equipment configurations were certified
to detect the expected types of SG tube degradation, including performance of a site
specific performance demonstration. The inspectors also directly observed acquisition
for a sample of tubes, and directly observed a qualified resolution analyst perform
calibration and resolution of tubes from calibration group 66. The inspectors discussed
the status of foreign objects, and associated foreign object search and recovery for
objects discovered as a result of Digital Metal Impact Monitoring System alarms received
during shutdown. The inspectors reviewed the licensees Secondary Side Integrity plan,
and interviewed plant personnel to ensure compliance with EPRI SG Integrity
Assessment Guidelines, Revision 2.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.5 Identification and Resolution of Problems
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed a review of ISI-related problems, including welding, BACC,
and SG inspections that were identified by the licensee and entered into the corrective
action program as CRs. The inspectors reviewed the CRs to confirm that the licensee
had appropriately described the scope of the problem and had initiated corrective
actions. The review also included the licensees consideration and assessment of
operating experience events applicable to the plant. The inspectors performed this
review to ensure compliance with 10CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective
Action, requirements. The corrective action documents reviewed by the inspectors are
listed in the report attachment.
Enclosure
9
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification
a. Inspection Scope
Resident Quarterly Observation. The inspectors observed operator performance on
October 21, during licensed operator simulator training described in Operating Test
Dynamic Simulator Scenario DS#9, Rev. 21. The simulator scenarios covered operator
actions resulting from NSCW pump shaft shear, main turbine trip below P-9, loss of the
running main feed pump and subsequent loss of all feed water, anticipated transient
without trip, rod control failure, and emergency boration. Documents reviewed are listed
in the Attachment. The inspectors specifically assessed the following areas:
C Correct use of the abnormal and emergency operating procedures
C Ability to identify and implement appropriate actions in accordance with the
requirements of the Technical Specifications
C Clarity and formality of communications in accordance with procedure 10000-C,
Conduct of Operations
C Proper control board manipulations including critical operator actions
C Quality of supervisory command and control
C Effectiveness of the post-evaluation critique
Annual Review of Licensee Requalification Examination Results. On January 08, 2009,
the licensee completed administering the 2008 biennial written examinations and annual
requalification operating tests, which are required to be given to all licensed operators in
accordance with 10 CFR 55.59(a) (2). The inspectors performed an in-office review of
the overall pass/fail results of the written examinations, individual operating tests, and the
crew simulator operating tests. These results were compared to the thresholds
established in Manual Chapter 609 Appendix I, Operator Requalification Human
Performance Significance Determination Process.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the following three CRs to evaluate the effectiveness of the
licensees handling of equipment performance problems and to verify the licensees
maintenance efforts met the requirements of 10 CFR 50.65 (the Maintenance Rule) and
licensee procedure 50028-C, Engineering Maintenance Rule Implementation. The
inspector also reviewed the safety-significant system to verify that the licensees
maintenance efforts met the requirements of 10 CFR 50.65 (the Maintenance Rule) and
Enclosure
10
licensee procedure 50028-C, Engineering Maintenance Rule Implementation. The
reviews included adequacy of the licensees failure characterization, establishment of
performance criteria or 50.65(a)(1) performance goals, and adequacy of corrective
actions. Other documents reviewed during this inspection included control room logs,
system health reports, the maintenance rule database, and maintenance work orders
(WO). Also, the inspectors interviewed system engineers and the maintenance rule
coordinator to assess the accuracy of identified performance deficiencies and extent of
condition.
C CR 2008107271, Containment cooling fan number 7 did not start in fast speed
C CR 2008107662, NSCW pump number 3 Agastat timing relay out of tolerance
C CR 2008112205, Unit 2 first bank steam dumps; 2PV-0507A, B, and C; control signal
not properly connected
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Evaluation
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the following two work activities to verify plant risk was properly
assessed by the licensee prior to conducting the activities. The inspectors reviewed risk
assessments and risk management controls implemented for these activities to verify
they were completed in accordance with procedure 00354-C, Maintenance Scheduling,
and 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4). The inspectors also reviewed the CR database to verify that
maintenance risk assessment problems were being identified at the appropriate level,
entered into the corrective action program, and appropriately resolved.
C November 10, planned maintenance for Unit 1 train B NSCW pump #4
C December 18, planned maintenance for Unit 1 train B CCW pump
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R15 Operability Evaluations
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the following four evaluations to verify they met the
requirements of procedure NMP-GM-002, Corrective Action Program, and NMP-GM-002-
001, Corrective Action Program Instructions. The scope of this inspection included a
review of the technical adequacy of the evaluations, the adequacy of compensatory
measures, and the impact on continued plant operation.
Enclosure
11
C CR 2008111760, Unit 2 train B AFW check valve, 2-1302-U4-116, failed surveillance
testing
C CR 2008111970, Unit 2 turbine driven AFW steam inlet valve, 2-HV-5106, stroke
time out of specification
C CR 2008110669, Unit 2 train B containment spray pump low differential pressure
C CR 2008112035, Unit 1 train B missed surveillances on NSCW pumps 2 and 6
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R17 Evaluations of Changes, Tests, or Experiments and Permanent Plant Modifications
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed selected 10 CFR 50.59 evaluations to confirm that the licensee
had appropriately considered the conditions under which changes to the facility, UFSAR,
or procedures may be made and tests can be conducted without prior NRC approval.
The inspectors reviewed the nine evaluations for changes listed in the Attachment and
reviewed additional information, such as drawings, calculations, supporting analyses, the
UFSAR, and Technical Specifications (TS) to confirm that the licensee had appropriately
concluded the changes could be accomplished without prior NRC approval. The
inspectors also reviewed the nineteen changes listed in the Attachment which the
licensee had determined that 10 CFR 50.59 evaluations were not required to confirm that
the licensees conclusions to screen out these changes were correct and consistent
with 10 CFR 50.59.
The inspectors evaluated the engineering design change packages for the following
eleven modifications to verify there were no adverse effects on system availability,
reliability, and functional capability. The inspectors review also verified that all details
were incorporated in licensing and design basis documents and associated plant
procedures. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed test documentation to ensure
adequacy in scope and conclusion. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
The inspectors also reviewed selected CRs and the licensees recent self-assessment
associated with modifications and screening/evaluation issues to confirm that problems
were identified at an appropriate threshold, were entered into the corrective action
process, and appropriate corrective actions had been initiated and tracked to completion.
C 1049501701, Containment Spray Pump Overcurrent Relay Setpoint Change
Attributes: Control Signals, Equipment Protection, Process Medium, Failure Modes,
Licensing Basis, Post Modification Testing
C 1060607901, Mitigating Actions on Alloy 600 Materials in Pressurizer Nozzle Welds
Attributes: Materials/Replacement Components, Pressure Boundary, Licensing
Basis, Failure Modes
Enclosure
12
C 1070824101 Replace Electrical and Mechanical Lockout Valve Solenoids,
Attributes: Energy Needs, Material/Replacement Components, Post Modification
Test, Vendor Information, Walkdown
C 1071579101, Valve 1HV-11817 Internals Removal (Mitigating Systems)
Attributes: Operations, Flowpaths, Pressure Boundary, Process Medium, Failure
Modes, Licensing Basis, Post Modification Testing
C 2049000601, Snubber Reduction (Mitigating Systems)
Attributes: Materials/Replacement Components, Structural
C 2060336901, 480V Switchgear Transformer and Breaker Replacements (Mitigating
Systems)
Attributes: Materials/Replacement Components, Control Signals, Operations, Failure
Modes
C 2060609501, Mitigating Actions on Alloy 600 Materials in Pressurizer Nozzle Welds
Attributes: Materials/Replacement Components, Pressure Boundary, Licensing Basis,
Failure Modes
C 2061287901, TDAFW Governor Valve Bonnet Gasket (Mitigating Systems)
Attributes: Materials/Replacement Components, Flowpath, Pressure Boundary
C 2071073601, Installation of Manual Valves on the SIS Test Header (Unit 2), (Barrier
Integrity)
Attributes: Flowpaths, Process Medium
C 2081590101/2, Addition of Vent Valve to CCP Suction Line (Unit 2), (Barrier Integrity)
Attributes: Equipment Protection, Flowpaths, Process Medium
C 2081605401, Replace Motor 2HV8103C with New Motor in Stock, (Mitigating Systems)
Attributes: Materials Replacement Components, Operations, Post Modification
Testing, Energy Needs, Control Signals, Licensing Basis
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R18 Plant Modifications
a. Inspection Scope
Temporary Modifications. The inspectors reviewed temporary modification TM
2081803801 and associated 10CFR50.59 screening criteria against the system design
bases documentation and procedure 00307-C, Temporary Modifications. This temporary
modification installed a camera inside containment to allow operators to observe the leak
Enclosure
13
rate of the number 2 seal on reactor coolant pump 3 on local flow indicator, 2FIS0192.
The inspectors reviewed implementation, configuration control, post-installation test
activities, drawing and procedure updates, and operator awareness for this temporary
modification.
Permanent Modifications. The inspectors reviewed minor design change MDC
2081590101 and associated 10CFR50.59 screening criteria against the system design
bases documentation and procedure 58007-C, Design Change Packages. This design
change installed a high-point vent valve, 2-1208-X4-054, on the common coolant
charging pump suction line, 2-1208-L4-139-6. The inspectors conducted a visual
walkdown to verify the installed vent valve was consistent with specifications and
drawings provided in the design change package. The inspectors verified that the
modification did not degrade the system design bases, licensing bases, or equipment
performance capability. Additionally, the inspectors verified that plant risk was not
increased unnecessarily during implementation of the modification.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors either observed post-maintenance testing or reviewed the test results for
the following seven maintenance activities to verify that the testing met the requirements
of procedure 29401-C, Work Order Functional Tests, for ensuring equipment operability
and functional capability was restored. The inspectors also reviewed the test procedures
to verify the acceptance criteria were sufficient to meet the Technical Specifications
operability requirements.
C WO 2071889201 and 2061382201, Unit 2 train B motor-driven AFW pump outage
C WO 1081701001, Unit 1 train A control building control room filter
C WO 1081751501, Unit 1 train A EDG vibration switch
C WO 2080253001, Unit 2 train B NSCW transfer pump motor (located in A tower)
C WO A081808201, Technical Support Center air handling unit
C WO 1080381901, Unit 1 train B NSCW pump #4
C WO 1081073801 and 1081073601, Unit 1 train B CCW pump #6 outage
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
Enclosure
14
1R20 Refueling and Other Outage Activities
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed the following inspection activities described below for the Unit
2 refueling outage that began on September 17 and for the Unit 2 maintenance outage to
replace a reactor coolant pump seal that began on November 16. The inspectors
confirmed that the licensee maintained defense-in-depth commensurate with the outage
risk control plan for key safety functions and applicable technical specifications and that
configuration changes due to emergent work and unexpected conditions were controlled
in accordance with the outage risk control plan. Documents reviewed are listed in the
Attachment.
C Reviewed RCS pressure, level, and temperature instruments to verify that the
instruments provided accurate indication and that allowances were made for
instrumentation errors.
C Verified that outage work did not impact the operation of the spent fuel cooling
system during and after core load..
C Reviewed the status and configuration of electrical systems to verify that those
systems met technical specification requirements and the licensees outage risk
control plan.
C Observed decay heat removal parameters to verify that the system was properly
functioning and providing cooling to the core.
C Reviewed system alignments to verify that the flow paths, configurations and
alternative means for inventory addition were consistent with the outage risk plan
C Reviewed selected control room operations to verify that the licensee was controlling
reactivity in accordance with the TSs.
C Observed the licensees control of containment penetrations to verify that the
requirements of the TSs were met.
C Reviewed the licensees plans for changing plant configuration to verify that technical
specifications, license conditions, and other requirements, commitments, and
administrative procedure prerequisites were met prior to changing plant configuration.
C Observed refueling activities for compliance with TSs, to verify proper tracking of fuel
assemblies from the spent fuel pool to the core, and to verify foreign material
exclusion was maintained.
C Performed containment closure activities, including a detailed containment walkdown
prior to startup, to verify no evidence of leakage and that debris had not been left
which could affect the performance of the containment sump.
C Observed heatup and startup activities to verify that TSs, license conditions, and
other requirements, commitments, and administrative procedure prerequisites for
mode changes were met prior to changing modes.
C RCS integrity was verified by reviewing RCS leakage calculations and containment
integrity was verified by reviewing the status of containment penetrations and
containment isolation valves.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
Enclosure
15
1R22 Surveillance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the following four surveillance test procedures and either
observed the testing or reviewed test results to verify that testing was conducted in
accordance with the procedures and that the acceptance criteria adequately
demonstrated that the equipment was operable. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed
the CR database to verify that the licensee had adequately identified and implemented
appropriate corrective actions for surveillance test problems.
Surveillance Tests
C 14905-2, Unit 2 RCS Leakage Calculation (Inventory Balance)
C 14666-2, Unit 2 Train A Diesel Generator and ESFAS Test
In-Service Tests
C 14545-2, Unit 2 Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Operability Test
Containment Isolation Valve
C 14313-A-2, Unit 2 Containment Penetration 13A Local Leakrate Test
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1EP6 Drill Evaluation
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the facility activation exercise guide and observed the following
emergency response activity to verify the licensee was properly classifying emergency
events, making the required notifications, and making appropriate protective action
recommendations in accordance with procedures 91001-C, Emergency Classifications,
and 91305-C, Protective Action Guidelines.
C On November 5, the licensee conducted an emergency preparedness drill involving a
steam generator tube rupture and loss of AC power to emergency buses, 1AA02 and
1BA03. The technical support center was activated and the site participated in the
exercise.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
Enclosure
16
2. RADIATION SAFETY
Cornerstone: Occupational Radiation Safety
2OS1 Access Control To Radiologically Significant Areas
a. Inspection Scope
Access Controls The inspectors evaluated control of worker access to radiologically
significant areas and monitoring jobs in-progress associated with the Unit 2 refueling
outage. The inspectors directly observed implementation of administrative and physical
radiological controls; evaluated radiation worker (radworker) and health physics
technician (HPT) knowledge of and proficiency in implementing radiation protection
requirements; and assessed worker exposures to radiation and radioactive material.
During facility tours, the inspectors directly observed postings and physical controls for
radiation areas, HRAs, and potential airborne radioactivity areas established within the
radiation control area (RCA) of the Unit 2 containment, Unit 1 and Unit 2 auxiliary
buildings, and radioactive waste (radwaste) processing and storage locations. The
inspectors independently measured radiation dose rates or directly observed licensee
radiation surveys for selected RCA areas. Results were compared to current licensee
surveys and assessed against established postings and Radiation Work Permit (RWP)
controls. Licensee key control and access barrier effectiveness were evaluated for
selected Unit 1 and Unit 2 Locked High Radiation Area (LHRA) and Very High Radiation
Area (VHRA) locations. Changes to procedural guidance for LHRA and VHRA controls
were discussed with health physics (HP) supervisors. Controls for storage of irradiated
material within the spent fuel pool were observed and evaluated. Established
radiological controls were observed for selected HRA tasks including SG eddy current
work and movement of a spent resin container. In addition, licensee controls for areas
where dose rates could change significantly as a result of plant shutdown, refueling
operations, and resin sluicing activities were reviewed and discussed.
For selected tasks, the inspectors attended pre-job briefings and reviewed RWP details
to assess communication of radiological control requirements to workers. Occupational
workers adherence to selected RWPs and HPT proficiency in providing job coverage
were evaluated through direct observations and interviews with licensee staff. Electronic
dosimeter (ED) alarm set points were evaluated against area radiation survey results for
selected 2R13 outage tasks.
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of radiation exposure controls, including air
sampling, barrier integrity, engineering controls, and postings through a review of both
internal and external exposure results. Worker exposure as measured by ED and by
licensee evaluations of skin doses resulting from discrete radioactive particle or
dispersed skin contamination events were reviewed and assessed. Licensee activities
for monitoring and controlling alpha-emitting radio-nuclides were evaluated. For HRA
tasks involving significant dose rate gradients, e.g. SG work, the inspectors evaluated the
use and placement of whole body and extremity dosimetry to monitor worker exposure.
Radiation protection activities were evaluated against the requirements of UFSAR
Enclosure
17
Section 12; TS Sections 5.4 and 5.7; 10 CFR Parts 19 and 20; and approved licensee
procedures. Documents reviewed are listed in the report Attachment. The inspectors
completed 21 of the required line-item samples described in Inspection Procedure (IP)
Problem Identification and Resolution The inspectors reviewed corrective action
program (CAP) documents associated with access control to radiologically significant
areas. This included review of selected CRs related to radworker and HPT performance.
The inspectors evaluated the licensees ability to identify, characterize, prioritize, and
resolve the identified issues in accordance with procedure NMP-GM-002. The
inspectors also evaluated the scope of the licensees internal audit program and
reviewed recent assessment results. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
Introduction. Two examples of a Green, self-revealing, non-cited violation (NCV) of TS 5.7.1, High Radiation Area, was identified for unauthorized entries into HRAs.
Inadequate communication between workers and HP resulted in licensee personnel
breaching HRA boundaries without prior knowledge of the radiological condition.
Description On May 9, 2007, a Shift Operator (SO) performed a visual inspection in the
Unit 2 Residual Heat Removal Pump Room A. This room contained both a Radiation
Area (RA) and a posted and barricaded HRA. The SO contacted HP prior to entering the
room, but failed to communicate that entry into the HRA might be required. As a result,
HP briefed the SO on current RA radiological conditions. The assigned RWP did not
allow entry into HRAs without first obtaining a briefing on the HRA radiological conditions.
Typically, this inspection does not require the SO to pass the HRA boundary; however,
insulation obstructed the SOs view from outside the HRA. Without knowledge of dose
rates in the HRA, the SO proceeded past the HRA boundary and subsequently received
an ED dose rate alarm.
On August 16, 2007, two Facilities personnel entered the Unit 2 Fuel Handling Building
room 2-FHB-A-01 to perform cleaning duties and replace light bulbs. This area
contained a Contaminated Area (CA), RA, and a posted and barricaded HRA. Prior to
starting work, the personnel were briefed by HP on radiological conditions in the CA and
RA. There was no clear understanding between the two groups that a HRA entry would
be required. The assigned RWP did not allow entry into HRAs without first obtaining a
briefing on the HRA conditions. Without knowledge of dose rates in the HRA, one
worker proceeded past the HRA boundary in room 2-FHB-A-01 to continue the
housekeeping activities and received an ED dose rate alarm.
Analysis The inspectors determined that the unauthorized entries into HRAs were
performance deficiencies. This finding is greater than minor because it is associated
with the Occupational Radiation Safety Cornerstone attribute of Human Performance and
adversely affects the cornerstone objective in that workers who enter HRAs without prior
knowledge of current radiological conditions could receive unintended occupational
exposures. The finding was evaluated using the Occupational Radiation Safety SDP and
determined to be of very low safety significance (Green). The finding was not related to
Enclosure
18
ALARA planning, nor did it involve an overexposure or substantial potential for
overexposure, and the ability to assess dose was not compromised. This finding
involved the cross-cutting aspect of Human Performance, Work Practices H.4.a]
because the HRA events were a direct result of poor communications during pre-job
briefings and a willingness on the part of licensee personnel to proceed in the face of
uncertainty.
Enforcement TS 5.7.1, High Radiation Area, requires individuals entering HRAs to meet
one or more of the following criteria: 1) carry a survey meter; 2) wear an ED and be made
aware of radiological conditions in the area; or 3) be escorted by a HP technician.
Contrary to the above, on May 9, 2007, and on August 16, 2007, plant personnel entered
HRAs without a survey meter, without being aware of radiological conditions in the area,
or without HP technician escort. Because the violation is of very low safety significance
and has been entered into the licensees CAP (CR 2007105476 and CR 2007108830),
this violation is being treated as an NCV, consistent with Section VI.A of the NRC
Enforcement Policy: NCV 05000424/425, 2008005-01, Unauthorized Entries Into High
Radiation Areas.
2OS2 ALARA Planning and Controls
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed ALARA program guidance and its implementation for ongoing
2R13 job tasks. The inspectors evaluated the accuracy of ALARA work planning and
dose budgeting, observed implementation of ALARA initiatives and radiation controls for
selected jobs in-progress, assessed the effectiveness of source-term reduction efforts,
and reviewed historical dose information.
ALARA planning documents and procedural guidance were reviewed and projected dose
estimates were compared to actual dose expenditures for the following high dose jobs:
scaffolding installation/removal, reactor vessel head work, steam generator maintenance
activities, motor operated valve (MOV) testing and maintenance, and installation of the
external neutron monitoring system inside containment. Differences between budgeted
dose and actual exposure received were discussed with cognizant ALARA staff.
Changes to dose budgets relative to changes in radiation source term and/or job scope
were also discussed. The inspectors attended pre-job briefings and evaluated the
communication of ALARA goals, RWP requirements, and industry lessons-learned to job
crew personnel.
The inspectors made direct field or closed-circuit-video observations of outage job tasks
involving work inside Unit 2 containment. For the selected tasks, the inspectors
evaluated radworker and HPT job performance, individual and collective dose
expenditure versus percentage of job completion, surveys of the work areas,
appropriateness of RWP requirements, and adequacy of implemented administrative and
physical controls.
Implementation and effectiveness of selected program initiatives with respect to source-
term reduction were evaluated. Chemistry program ALARA initiatives and their effect on
Enclosure
19
containment and auxiliary building dose rate trends were reviewed.
Plant exposure history for 2005 through 2008 year-too-date, and data reported to the
NRC pursuant to 10 CFR 20.2206 were reviewed, as were established goals for reducing
collective exposure during the current 2R13 outage. The inspectors reviewed procedural
guidance for dosimetry issuance and exposure tracking. The inspectors also examined
dose records of declared pregnant workers to evaluate assignment of gestation dose.
ALARA program activities and their implementation were reviewed against 10 CFR Part
20, and approved licensee procedures. In addition, licensee performance was evaluated
against guidance contained in Regulatory Guide (RG) 8.8, Information Relevant to
Ensuring that Occupational Radiation Exposures at Nuclear Power Stations will be As
Low As Reasonably Achievable, and RG 8.13, Instruction Concerning Prenatal Radiation
Exposure. Documents reviewed are listed in of the Attachment. The inspectors
completed 20 samples of specified line-items in IP 71121.02 to close the procedure.
Problem Identification and Resolution. The inspectors reviewed selected CR and Action
Item (AI) data in the area of exposure control. The inspectors evaluated the licensees
ability to identify, characterize, prioritize, and resolve the identified issues in accordance
with NMP-GM-002. The inspectors also evaluated the scope of the licensees internal
audit program and reviewed recent assessment results. Documents reviewed are listed
in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
Cornerstone: Public Radiation Safety
2PS1 Radioactive Gaseous and Liquid Effluent Treatment and Monitoring Systems
a. Inspection Scope
Groundwater Monitoring. The inspectors discussed current and future programs for
onsite groundwater monitoring with chemistry specialists and corporate staff, including
number and placement of monitoring wells and identification of plant systems with the
greatest potential for contaminated leakage. The inspectors also reviewed procedural
guidance for identifying and assessing onsite spills and leaks of contaminated fluids. In
addition, the inspectors reviewed records of historical and recent contaminated spills
retained for decommissioning purposes as required by 10 CFR Part 50.75(g).
The licensee has installed a number of onsite groundwater monitoring wells; optimally
located to detect contamination based on recent hydrological studies. The sample
results from these wells were included in the Annual Radiological Environmental
Monitoring Program Report. For the period reviewed, all monitoring well results were
below reporting limits (20,000 pCi/L for drinking water and 30,000 pCi/L for non-drinking
water).
Enclosure
20
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
2PS2 Radioactive Material Processing and Transportation
a. Inspection Scope
Waste Processing and Characterization During inspector walk-downs, accessible
sections of the liquid and solid radwaste processing systems were assessed for material
condition and conformance with system design diagrams. Inspected equipment included
floor drain tanks; resin transfer piping; resin and filter packaging components; and
abandoned evaporator equipment. The inspectors discussed component function,
processing system changes, and radwaste program implementation with licensee staff.
The 2007 Effluent Report and radionuclide characterizations from 2007 - 2008 for each
major waste stream were reviewed and discussed with radwaste staff. For primary filters
and Dry Active Waste (DAW) the inspectors evaluated analyses for hard-to-detect
nuclides, reviewed the use of scaling factors, and examined comparison results between
licensee waste stream characterizations and outside laboratory data. Waste stream
mixing and concentration averaging methodology for spent resin and primary filters were
evaluated and discussed with radwaste operators. The inspectors also reviewed the
licensees procedural guidance for monitoring changes in waste stream isotopic
mixtures.
Radwaste processing activities and equipment configuration were reviewed for
compliance with the licensees Process Control Program and UFSAR, Chapter 11.
Waste stream characterization analyses were reviewed against regulations detailed in 10
CFR Part 20, 10 CFR Part 61, and guidance provided in the Branch Technical Position
on Waste Classification and Waste Form. Reviewed documents are listed in Section
2PS2 of the report Attachment.
Transportation The inspectors directly observed preparation activities for a shipment of
contaminated laundry. The inspectors noted package markings and placarding,
observed dose rate measurements, and interviewed shipping technicians regarding
Department of Transportation (DOT) regulations.
Five shipping records were reviewed for consistency with licensee procedures and
compliance with NRC and DOT regulations. The inspectors reviewed emergency
response information, DOT shipping package classification, radiation survey results, and
evaluated whether licensees in receiving were authorized to accept the packages.
Procedures for opening and closing Type B shipping casks were compared to Certificate
of Compliance requirements. In addition, training records for selected individuals
currently qualified to facilitate the shipment of radioactive material were reviewed.
Transportation program implementation was reviewed against regulations detailed in 10
CFR Part 20, 10 CFR Part 71, 49 CFR Parts 172-178; as well as the guidance provided
in NUREG-1608, Categorizing and Transporting Low Specific Activity Materials and
Enclosure
21
Surface Contaminated Objects. Training activities were assessed against 49 CFR Part
172 Subpart H. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. The inspectors
completed 6 of 6 samples as required by IP 71122.02.
Problem Identification and Resolution Selected CRs in the area of radwaste processing
and transportation were reviewed in detail and discussed with licensee personnel. The
inspectors assessed the licensees ability to characterize, prioritize, and resolve the
identified issues in accordance with licensee procedure NMP-GM-002. The inspectors
also evaluated the scope of the licensees internal audit program and reviewed recent
assessment results. Licensee CAP documents reviewed are listed in Section 2PS2 of
the report Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
4. OTHER ACTIVITIES
4OA1 Performance Indicator (PI) Verification
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the listed PIs during the period from
July 1, 2007 through June 30, 2008, for Unit 1 and Unit 2. The inspectors verified the
licensees basis in reporting each data element using the PI definitions and guidance
contained in procedure 00163-C, NRC Performance Indicator and Monthly Operating
Report Preparation and Submittal, and Nuclear Energy Institute document NEI 99-02,
Regulatory Assessment Indicator Guideline.
Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems
C Mitigating Systems Performance Index (MSPI), Cooling Water Systems
C MSPI, Emergency AC Power Systems
C Safety System Functional Failures
The inspectors reviewed Unit 1 and Unit 2 operator log entries, the Vogtle Electric
Generating Plant Unit 1 and Unit 2 NRC Mitigating System Performance Index Basis
Document, the monthly operating reports and monthly PI summary reports to verify that
the licensee had accurately submitted the PI data.
Cornerstone: Occupational Radiation Safety
- Occupational Exposure Control Effectiveness
The inspectors reviewed PI data collected from January 1, 2007, through September 30,
2008. For the reviewed period, the inspectors assessed CAP records to determine
whether HRA, VHRA, or unplanned exposures, resulting in TS or 10 CFR 20 non-
conformances, had occurred during the review period. In addition, the inspectors
reviewed selected personnel contamination event data, internal dose assessment
Enclosure
22
results, and ED alarms for cumulative doses and/or dose rates exceeding established
set-points. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
Cornerstone: Public Radiation Safety
- Radiological Control Effluent Release Occurrences
The inspectors reviewed the PI results for the period of January 1, 2007, through
September 30, 2008. For the assessment period, the inspectors reviewed cumulative
and projected doses to the public, out-of-service effluent radiation monitors and
compensatory sampling data. The inspectors also reviewed licensee procedural
guidance for collecting and documenting PI data. Documents reviewed are listed in the
Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems
.1 Daily Condition Report Review. As required by Inspection Procedure 71152,
Identification and Resolution of Problems, and in order to help identify repetitive
equipment failures or specific human performance issues for follow-up, the inspectors
performed a daily screening of items entered into the licensees corrective action
program. This review was accomplished by either attending daily screening meetings
that briefly discussed major CRs, or accessing the licensees computerized corrective
action database and reviewing each CR that was initiated.
.2 Focused Review
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed a detailed review of the work-around lists for Unit 1 and 2 that
were in effect on October 28. The inspectors reviewed the licensees list to determine
whether any items would adversely affect the operators ability to implement abnormal or
emergency operating procedures. The inspectors reviewed proposed corrective actions
and schedule for each item on the work-around list. The inspectors reviewed the
compensatory actions and cumulative effects on plant operation. The inspectors verified
each item was being dispositioned in accordance with plant procedure 10025-C, Work
Around Program. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings and Observations
No findings of significance were identified.
Enclosure
23
.3 Semi-Annual Trend Review
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed a review of the licensees corrective action program and
associated documents to identify trends which could indicate the existence of a more
significant safety issue. The review was focused on repetitive equipment issues, but also
considered the results of inspector daily CR screening and the licensees trending efforts.
The review nominally considered the six month period of July 2008 through December
2008 although some examples extended beyond those dates when the scope of the
trend warranted. The inspectors also reviewed several CRs associated with operability
determinations which occurred during the period. The inspectors compared and
contrasted their results with the results contained in the licensees two latest Integrated
Performance Assessments. Corrective actions associated with a sample of the issues
identified in the licensees trend reports were reviewed for adequacy. The inspectors
also evaluated the trend reports against the requirements of the licensees corrective
action program as specified in licensee procedure NMP-GM-002 and 10 CFR 50,
Appendix B. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings and Observations
No findings of significance were identified. The inspectors compared the licensee
Integrated Performance Assessments with the results of the inspectors daily screening
and did not identify any discrepancies or potential trends in the data that the licensee had
failed to identify.
4OA5 Other Activities
.1 Quarterly Resident Inspector Observations of Security Personnel and Activities
a. Inspection Scope
During the inspection period, the inspectors conducted observations of security force
personnel and activities to ensure that the activities were consistent with licensee
security procedures and regulatory requirements relating to nuclear plant security. These
observations took place during both normal and off-normal plant working hours.
b. Findings and Observations
No findings of significance were identified.
.2 (Closed) Unresolved Item 05000424/2008003-02: Steam Generator (SG) Tube Damage
as a Result of Tube Pulling Activities
The inspectors evaluated additional information regarding SG tube damage caused by
tube pulling activities. Specifically, several tubes adjacent to tube R11C62 in SG
Number 4 suffered damage when the licensee vendor attempted to remove a section of
tube R11C62 assuming that the tube was completely cut. The vendors Root Cause
Enclosure
24
Analysis determined, in part, that the cause of the issue was incorrect setting of cutting
tool rotation in conjunction with insufficient detail of the acceptance criteria of for tube
cutting in the vendors procedure.
The vendor initiated corrective actions to revise the tube pulling procedure in order to
ensure that correct rotation is verified prior to begin tube cutting activities and to enhance
the requirements for confirmation that a tube is severed after a cutting operation. In
addition, the licensee initiated corrective actions to track the implementation of the
vendors corrective actions for future onsite SG work and to improve vendor oversight by
requiring SG vendors to identify and notify the licensee about all critical hold-points for
SG activities.
The damaged tubes were re-inspected with Eddy Current Testing, stabilized, and
repaired by plugging before the Unit returned to normal operation. The licensee
performed an Operational Assessment and determined that the repaired tubes, as well
as the rest of the tubes left in service, would maintain their structural integrity until the
next inspection opportunity. The inspectors concluded that this issue resulted in no
findings of significance based on the results of the Root Cause Analysis and Operational
Assessment, planned corrective actions, discussions with the licensee, and the fact that
the SG tube damage and repairs occurred while the plant was in a safe condition.
4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit
.1 Exit Meeting
On January 15, 2009, the resident inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. T.
Tynan and other members of his staff, who acknowledged the findings. The inspectors
confirmed that proprietary information was not provided or examined during the
inspection.
ATTACHMENT: SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
Enclosure
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee personnel:
R. Brown, Training and Emergency Preparedness Manager
C. Buck, Chemistry Manager
W. Copeland, Performance Analysis Supervisor
R. Dedrickson, Plant Manager
K. Dyar, Security Manager
I. Kochery, Health Physics Manager
J. Robinson, Work Control Superintendent
T. Tynan, Site Vice-President
D. Vineyard, Operations Manager
J. Williams, Site Support Manager
T. Youngblood, Site Engineering Manager
NRC personnel:
S. Shaeffer, Chief, Region II Reactor Projects Branch 2
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED AND CLOSED
Opened and Closed
05000424, 425/2008005-01 NCV Unauthorized Entries Into High Radiation Areas
(Section 2OS1)
Closed
05000424/2008003-02 URI Steam Generator Tube Damage as a Result of Tube
Pulling Activities (Section 4OA5)
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Section 1R01: Adverse Weather Protection
Procedures
11901-1, Heat Tracing System Alignment
11901-2, Heat Tracing System Alignment
1877-1, Cold Weather Checklist
1877-2, Cold Weather Checklist
System Health Reports
Heat Tracing System (1817)
Section 1R04: Equipment Alignment
Procedures
11610-2, Auxiliary Feedwater System Alignment
11146-1, Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Transfer System Alignment
11145-1, Diesel Generator Alignment
11150-1, Nuclear Service Cooling Water System Alignment
Attachment
2
Drawings
2X4DB161-1, 2, 3, Auxiliary Feedwater System
1X4DB170-2, P&I Diagram Diesel Generator System Train B
1X4DB133-2, P&I Diagram Nuclear Service Cooling Water System
1X4DB134, P&I Diagram Nuclear Service Cooling Water System
1X4DB135-1, P&I Diagram Nuclear Service Cooling Water System
1X4DB135-2, P&I Diagram Nuclear Service Cooling Water System
System Health Reports
Auxiliary Feedwater System 1302A, Third Quarter 2008
Section 1R05: Fire Protection
Procedures
Procedure 92865-2, Zone 165 - Diesel Generator Tanks and Pumphouse Fire Fighting Preplan
Procedure 92866-2, Zone 166 - Diesel Generator Tanks and Pumphouse Fire Fighting Preplan
Procedure 92839-1, Zone 139 - Fuel Handling Building - Level 1 Fire Fighting Preplan
Procedure 92731-1, Zone 31 - Auxiliary Building - Level B Fire Fighting Preplan
Procedure 92732-1, Zone 32 - Auxiliary Building - Level B Fire Fighting Preplan
Procedure 92730-2, Zone 30 - Auxiliary Building - Level B Fire Fighting Preplan
Procedure 92733-2, Zone 33 - Auxiliary Building - Level B Fire Fighting Preplan
Section 1R08: In-service Inspection Activities
Procedures
Procedure NMP-ES-024-208, Version 1.0, Visual Exam of Reactor Vessel Head Penetrations &
Base Material (Remote & Direct)
Procedure NMP-ES-024-506, Version 1, Manual UT Exam of Non-PDI, Full Penetration Welds.
Procedure Number 00435-C, Revision 5.3, Boric Acid Corrosion Control Program.
Procedure Number 83201-C rev 7.1, Boric Acid Corrosion Assessment.
Westinghouse Procedure Number MRS 2.4.2 GPC-37, Steam Generator Eddy Current Data
Analysis Techniques for Vogtle Units 1&2, Rev 14
Westinghouse Procedure MRS-TRC-1910, Use of Appendix H Qualified Techniques at Vogtle
Unit 2 13th Refueling, Rev 0
Calculations
Vogtle Unit 2 Determination of RPV head Effective Degradation years, June 24, 2008.
CAV-NF-1561, EFPY Operation of Vogtle with Projection to the EOC Burnup for the Current
Operating Cycle on Unit 2, June 4, 2008.
Calculation Note DDM-96-009, Documentation of Appendix H Compliance and Equivalency, Rev
0
Corrective Action Documents
2008104461, 2008102122, 2007106211, 2007110612, 2008108419, 2008110436, 2008110460
Other
Boric Acid Corrosion Assessments: 1204-2007-004, 1204-2008-04, 1204-2008-011,
1204-2008-013.
VGEP Unit 2, Boric Acid Leak Summary report, September 21, 2008.
Work Orders 2070719501, 2070668801, 2070628701, 2070668701, 2053288601, 2053288501,
Attachment
3
UT Calibration/Examination Record for Report Number S08V2U055 and S08V2U056.
Certified Test Report for Ultragel II Couplant Batch: 06225.
RT Film for welds associated with Work Order Number 2070570001.
Radiography (RT) examination film of welds associated with Q.I.S. Work Order No. 08-70-0658
(ASME Section III and V NDE).
Training and qualification records for 4 LMT Test operators and data analysts.
CN-RIDA-07-40, Westinghouse Thermal Sleeve Wear Criteria Analysis, Rev O.
NL-05-0990, Vogtle Unit 2 Response to NRC Request for Additional Information Regarding
relaxation from First Revision of NRC Order EA-03-009, July 1, 2005.
NL-05-1672, Vogtle Unit 1 & 2 Relaxation of Requirements Associated with the First revised
Order EA-03-009, Feb 20, 2004.
NL-07-1260, Vogtle Unit 2 Results of RPV Inspections Required by First Revised Order EA-03-
009, June 21, 2007.
Reactor Vessel Exam Summary Record, Year 2007 for Vogtle Unit 2.
Vogtle Unit 2 Performance Demonstration Initiative Program Procedure: PDI-UT-2, Revision C,
Addenda 3, Generic Procedure for the Ultrasonic Examination of Austenitic Pipe Welds.
Southern Nuclear Study Guide for General Employee Training Topics, January 2008.
NMP-ES-004-GL01, Steam Generator Program Strategic Plan, April 2008.
Vogtle Steam Generator Program Secondary Side Plan, April 2008
SG-CDME-08-31, Steam Generator Degradation Assessment for Vogtle Unit 2 September 2008
Outage (2R13)
Operating License Amendment No. 133 to Facility Operating License NPF-81, Accession No
ML082530044, September 16, 2008
Personnel Qualification Records for various ECT personnel
Certificates of Conformance for various ECT probes
Certificate of Calibration for OMNI-200 ECT testers 221038 and 221041
EPRI ETSS # 20510.1, Rev 6
EPRI ETSS # 20511.1, Rev 8
EPRI ETSS # 21409.1, Rev 5
EPRI ETSS # 21410.1, Rev6
Westinghouse ANTS GBE-A-108, Rev 1
Westinghouse ANTS GBE-B-108, Rev 0
Westinghouse ANTS GBE-C-108, Rev 0
Westinghouse ANTS GBE-D-108, Rev 0
Westinghouse ANTS GBE-E-108, Rev 0
Westinghouse ACTS, GBE-06-108, Rev 0
ASME ECT Calibration Standard Drawing No 1B81101, Rev 0
ASME ECT Calibration Standard Drawing No 1B81102, Rev 1
Various Vogtle 2R13 Refueling Outage Interim Engineering Assessments for SG1 and SG4
Base on Eddy Current Inspection Data
Westinghouse MRS-TRC-1919, Site Specific Performance Demonstration (SSPD) Program,
September 2008
Westinghouse SG-SGDA-05-50, Vogtle Unit 2R11 Refueling Outage Condition Monitoring and
Operational Assessments, November 2005
Attachment
4
Section 1R11: Licensed Operator Requalification Program
Procedures
Operating Test Dynamic Simulator Scenario DS#9, Rev. 21
Section 1R17: Evaluations of Changes, Tests, or Experiments and Permanent Plant
Modifications
Full Evaluations
2054225601, Installation of Freeze Seal to perform work on the bypass line of 2HV8701B, dated
April 7, 2008
DCP 1050351501, 1BB16, 1NB02, 1NB03, 1NB08, 1NB11 and 1NB19 480V Circuit Breaker
and Load Center Transformers 1NB02X, 1NB08X, 1NB09X, and 1NB19X Replacement, Ver. 5.0
DCP 1060336201, 1BB06, 1BB07, 1NB10, 1NB12, and 1NB28 480V Circuit Breaker and Load
Center Transformer 1NB28X Replacement, Ver. 2.0
DCP 1979006101, Safety Features Sequencer Control Logic Upgrade, dated May 17, 2007
DCP 2053320201, 2AB15, 2NB02, 2NB08, 2NB09, 2NB12, and 2NB19 480V Circuit Breaker
and Load Center Transformers 2NB02X, 2NB08X, 2NB09X, 2NB12X and 2NB19X
Replacement, Ver. 7.0
DCP 2061266101, MFRV Air-Gag Instrument Air Supply Line and other MFRV appurtenances
for Reliability Improvement, dated April 5, 2007
DCP 2060336901, 2AB04, 2AB05, 2NB01, and 2NB28 480V Circuit Breaker and Load Center
Transformer 2NB28X Replacement, Ver. 3.0
DCP 2060609501, Mitigation Actions on Alloy 600 Materials in the Pressurizer Nozzle Welds,
dated October 22, 2007
RER A071430001, Interim Onsite Storage for Low Level Radioactive Waste (LLW), dated April
25, 2008
Screened Out Items
2070053701, 207052601, 2070500901, 2070215601, 2070780601, 2071419601, 2080864701,
2081030001, 2081619401,
A080016601
ABN-V00714
DCP 2049000601 Ver. 2.0, DCP C999007101 (DCPT 99-VAN0071-005) Ver. 1.0
MDC 2061287901 Ver. 1.0, MDC 1061785901 Rev. 1, MDC 1061854401 Ver. 2.0
TM 2070053201 Rev. 1, TM 2070053401, TM 2070053601 Rev. 1
Modifications
1049501701, 1060607901, 1070824101, 1071579101, 2049000601, 2060336901 Ver. 3.0,
2060609501, 2061287901 Ver. 1.0, 2071073601, 2081590101/2, 2081605401
Condition Reports
2006102035, 2006102117, 2006105418, 2006113977, 2008110234
Action Items
2006203400, Ensure Pre-Existing Flow Enveloped, dated August 3, 2006
Procedures
11150-1 Rev. 18, 13435-C Rev. 28, 13540-1 Rev. 9.2. 13610-2, 13715A-1 Rev. 4, 14286-1 Rev.
22, 14286-2 Rev. 18, 14546-2 Rev. 27, 14748-2 Rev. 18.1, 14810-2 Rev. 37.1, 17002-1 Rev.
Attachment
5
19.1, 18020-C Rev. 9, 18030-C Rev. 18, 20236-C Rev. 3, 22287-C Revision 3, 22413-C Rev. 1,
23701-1 Rev. 13, 25508-C Rev. 24.1, 25721-C Rev. 15.2, 27572-C Rev. 12.1, Terry Turbine
Type GS2 Governor Valve Maintenance, 27736-C Rev. 9.1, 85052-C Rev. 10, 28480-C Rev. 13,
28909-C Rev. 15, 55020-C Rev. 18.1, 55024-C Rev. 12.3, 58007-C Rev 16, 85052-C Rev. 10
Work Orders
1061785902, Elimination of Pressure Control Circuit 1PT-11741, Rev. 1.0
1061785903, Elimination of Pressure Control Circuit 1PT-11742, Rev. 0
1051650501, Freedom Series Overload Relay Failure Due to Early Trip, Rev. 0
1062213401, Inspection of Aux Contact Assembly Mounting on Freedom Series Starters, Rev. 0
1070247701, Aux Contact Assembly Inspection Found Improperly Seated Block in Cubicle
1BBA22 Supplying 1HV12119, Rev. 0
2060167001, Thermography Indication of Bad Crimp in Starter, Rev. 0
2061284902, Replacement of TDAFW Body-to-bonnet Metallic O-ring with Flexitallic Gasket,
Rev. 0
2070175901, Terry Turbine Governor Valve Inspection, Rev. 1.0
A061353801, Freedom Series Thermal Overload Relays Tripping Early, Rev. 1
MWO1071618401, Contingency MWO to place 1FV0520 MFRV on the Air Gag, dated June 21,
2008
MWO 2081605402, 2HV8103C Motor Replacement, dated October 26, 2006
WO 00567352 01, Rebuild Valve 2-E41-F002, dated February 23, 2005
Calculations
DOEJ-SJ-97-V1N0061-001, Engineering judgment associated with EMI/RFI issues with
Westinghouse supplied sequencer, Rev. 1
EF02712, Nuclear Service Cooling Water System Pipe Stress Analysis, Ver. 5.0
EF02714, Nuclear Service Cooling Water System Pipe Stress Analysis, Ver. 3.0
GL 89-10 Scope of Motor Operated Valves, Ver. 21
MC-V-04-0023, Unit 1 and 2 Containment Spray Pump Relaying, Ver. 1
MC-V-07-0191, Impact Documentation to Base Calculation X3CF12, 1E DC Panel Loading, Due
to Replacement of GE AKR Circuit Breakers with ABB EMAX Breakers per DCP 2060336901,
Ver. 1.0
V2-1202-006-H050, Pipe Support Assembly Evaluation for 2-1202-006-H050, Ver. 5.0
V2-1202-006-H060, Pipe Support Assembly Evaluation for 2-1202-006-H060, Ver. 4.0
X3C18, Voltage Profile for Normal Non-1E Conditions, Rev. 6
X3C22PG, Voltage Profile for Refuel Outage Conditions, dated December 3, 2006
X3CA20, Unit 2 Class 1E 89-10 MOV Starting Voltages, Ver. 6
X4C1000U02, Valve Required Thrust/Torque and Operator Capabilities and Limitations for the
X4C1202S00F1, Failure Modes and Effects (FMEA) - Nuclear Service Cooling Water, Rev. 8
X4C1202S10, NSCW Water Hammer Study, Rev. 2
X4C1202V056, Vogtle NSCW System Water Hammer Analysis, Rev. 2
X4CPS.0075.228, Identification of Components Requiring ECSAs, Rev. 10
X5CP11741, Nuclear Service Cooling Water Train A Pump Discharge Pressure, Rev. 5
X5CP11742, Nuclear Service Cooling Water Train B Pump Discharge Pressure, Rev. 5
X6CDD.46, Dose Rate Versus Distance from Filter Storage HICs, Rev. 0
X6CJH.19, Post LOCA Penetration Streaming - Control Building, Rev. 3
Attachment
6
Drawings
1X3AE13-00056-1, Diesel Generator SFS Card and Chassis Configuration, Sheet 1 of 5, Rev.
21X3AE13-00056-2, Diesel Generator SFS Card and Chassis Configuration, Sheet 2 of 5, Rev.
22X3D-BG-D03B, Piping Penetration Vent System 2-1556-B7-003-M01 Elementary Diagram,
Rev. 4
1X3D-AA-A01A, Main One Line Unit 1, Ver. 26.0
1X3D-AA-E12A, One Line Diagram 480V Switchgear 1NB12 1-1805-S3-B12, Rev. 9
1X3D-AA-E20A, One Line Diagram 480V Switchgear 1NB19 1-1805-S3-B19, Rev. 8
1X3D-AA-E26A, 480V Switchgear 1NB25, Rev. 5
1X3D-AA-E28A, One Line Diagram 480V Switchgear 1NB28 1-1805-S3-B26, Ver. 10
1X3D-AA-E30A, One Line Diagram 480V Switchgear 1NB28 1-1805-S3-B28, Rev. 6
1X3D-AA-M04A, Load Center Transformer Data and Tap Settings, Sheet 20, Ver. 8.0
1X3D-BD-KO4F, Elementary Diagram Nuclear Service Cooling Water System 1-1202-P4-006-
M01, Ver. 21.0
1X3D-BD-KO5W, Elementary Diagram Nuclear Service Cooling Water System 1HV-1669A, Ver.
12.0
1X3D-BD-K05X, Elementary Diagram Nuclear Service Cooling Water System 1HV-1669B, Ver.
9.0
1X3DF512-1, Conduit/Tray Plan Area 1 El 171;-9: to El 185-0 Containment Building Unit 1, Ver.
22.0
1X4DB133-1, P&ID Nuclear Service Cooling Water System (1202), Ver. 51.0
1X4DB133-2, P&ID Nuclear Service Cooling Water System (1202), Ver. 58.0
1X4DB134, P&ID Nuclear Service Cooling Water System (1202), Ver. 31.0
1X4DB135-1, P&ID Nuclear Service Cooling Water System (1202), Ver. 29.0
1X4DB135-2, P&ID Nuclear Service Cooling Water System (1202), Ver. 34.0
1X4DB137, Component Cooling Water System, Ver. 19.0
2K3-1202-036-01, Nuclear Service Cooling Water System Fabrication Isometric Aux Bldg Area
3H Level A1, Rev. 5
2K3-1202-099-01, Nuclear Service Cooling Water System Fabrication Isometric Aux Bldg Area
3H Level B, Ver. 8.0
2K3-1202-406-01, Nuclear Service Cooling Water System Fabrication Isometric Aux Bldg Area
3H and 3F Level 2, Ver. 4.0
2K3-1203-026-01, Component Cooling Water System Fabrication Isometric Aux Bldg Area 3H
Level A1, Rev. 8
2K3-1203-026-02, Component Cooling Water System Fabrication Isometric Aux Bldg Area 3H
Level 2, Rev. 5
2K5-1202-006-01, Nuclear Service Cooling Water System Fabrication Isometric Outside Area
8F Tunnel 2T2B, Rev. 8
2K5-1202-006-02, Nuclear Service Cooling Water System Fabrication Isometric NSCT
Pumphouse Area 8F, Rev. 8
2X3AC03-01732, Connection Diagram for UNITROL Unit 2X3AC03-1732-3, Rev. 4
2X3AC03-02291, Front View Motor Control Center 2ABA, Rev. 6
2X3D-AA-A01A, Vogtle Main One Line for Unit 2, Rev. 19
2X3D-AA-E03A, 480V Switchgear 2NB03 2-1805-S3-B03, Ver. 9.0
2X3D-AA-E04A, One Line Diagram 480V Switchgear 2AB04 2-1805-S3-B04, Ver. 4.0
2X3D-AA-E05A, One Line Diagram 480V Switchgear 2AB05 2-1805-S3-B05, Ver. 6.0
2X3D-AA-E22A, One Line Diagram 480V Switchgear 2NB21 2-1805-S3-B21, Rev. 6
2X3D-AA-F05A, 480V Motor Control Center 2NBE, Rev. 19
Attachment
7
2X3D-AA-F18A, One Line Diagram 480V Motor Control Center 2ABA 2-1805-S3-ABA, Rev. 13
2X3D-AA-F24A, One Line Diagram 480V Motor Control Center 2ABE 2-1805-S3-ABE, Rev. 20
2X3D-AA-F25A, One Line Diagram 480V Motor Control Center 2BBE 2-1805-S3-BBE, Ver. 17
2X3D-AA-F29A, 480V Motor Control Center 2NBT, Ver. 15.0
2X3D-AA-F36A, One Line Diagram 480V Motor Control Center 2ABF 2-1805-S3-ABF, Ver. 12.0
2X3D-AA-F42, 480V Distribution Panels, Rev. 9
2X3D-BC-B05B, Circulating Water System 2HV-7244, Ver. 8.0
2X3D-BC-B06B, Circulating Water System 2HV-7245, Ver. 7.0
2X3D-BC-B08B, Turbine Plant Cooling Water System 2HV-6799, Rev. 4
2X3D-BC-B55B, Cooling Tower Makeup Valve 2-LY-27268B, Rev. 4
2X3D-BC-B55C, Cooling Tower Makeup Valve 2-LY-27268C, Rev. 1
2X3D-BC-B55D, Cooling Tower Makeup Valve 2-LY-27268D, Rev. 1
2X3D-BG-D03C, Piping Penetration Vent System 2-1556-B7-004-M01 Elementary Diagram,
Rev. 4
2X3D-BG-D03D, Piping Penetration Vent System 2-1556-B7-005-M01 Elementary Diagram,
Rev. 5
2X3D-BG-D03E, Piping Penetration Vent System 2-1556-B7-005-M01 Elementary Diagram,
Rev. 4
2X3D-BG-D03K, Piping Penetration Vent System 2-1556-B7-012-M01 Elementary Diagram,
Rev. 5
2X3D-BH-K01B, AC System 480 Volts 2NB0309, Ver. 2.0
2X4DB111, P & I Diagram RCS System No. 1201, Rev. 27
2X4DB122, P & I Diagram RHR System No. 1025, Rev. 52
2X4DB133-2, P&ID Nuclear Service Cooling Water System (1202), Ver. 49.0
2X4DB134, P&ID Nuclear Service Cooling Water System (1202), Ver. 31.0
2X4DB136, P&ID Component Cooling Water System (1203), Ver. 23.0
2X4DB137, P&ID Component Cooling Water System (1203), Ver. 19.0
2X6AN02-00103-3, Unit 2 Refueling Machine Trolley and Mast Assembly, Rev. 8
2X6AN02-023-5, Unit 2 Refueling Machine General Assembly, Rev. 7
AX1D08SA028, Delay Features Fencing Floppy P.A. and Red Zone Sections and Details, Rev.1
AX2D47A469, Concrete Storage Pad for Low Level Radwaste, Ver. 1.0
AX3D-AA-A00V-01, General Notes, Installation Instructions and References for Cable Splices,
Ver. 19.0
AX3D-AA-A00V-02, Notes and Details for In-line Cable Splices, Rev. 15
AX3D-AA-A00V-03, Notes and Details for In-line Bolted Cable Splices, Ver. 7.0
AX3D-AA-F18A, 480V Motor Control Center ANBT, Ver. 12.0
V2-1201-054-H614, Pipe Support Assembly Drawing for 2-1201-054-H614, Ver. 3.0
V2-1201-054-H625, Pipe Support Assembly Drawing for 2-1201-054-H625, Ver. 1.0
V2-1202-004-H071, Pipe Support Assembly Drawing for 2-1202-004-H071, Rev. 2
V2-1202-006-H060, Pipe Support Assembly Drawing for 2-1202-006-H060, Ver. 2.0
V2-1202-006-H050, Pipe Support Assembly Drawing for 2-1202-006-H050, Ver. 3.0
V2-1202-088-H033, Pipe Support Assembly Drawing for 2-1202-088-H033, Ver. 3.0
V2-1202-151-H025, Pipe Support Assembly Drawing for 2-1202-151-H025, Ver. 4.0
V2-1202-405-H031, Pipe Support Assembly Drawing for 2-1202-405-H031, Ver. 4.0
V2-1203-026-H007, Pipe Support Assembly Drawing for 2-1203-026-H007, Ver. 5.0
Attachment
8
Other Documents
2054225601, Installation of Freeze Seal to perform work on the bypass line of 2HV8701B, dated
April 7, 2008
2070500901, Install Vibration Monitoring on RHR Loop 4 Suction Valve 2HV8702B Bypass and
Packing Leakoff Lines, dated April 14,2006
2081619401, Preaccess Purge Exhaust Damper Air Supply, dated October 29,2008
2NB0309-55024, 480 Volt Solid State Trip Breaker Data Sheet, Rev. 1
2NBT08-55025, AC Molder Case Circuit Breaker Data Sheet 2HV-7244, Rev. 4
2NBT11-55025, AC Molder Case Circuit Breaker Data Sheet 2HV-6799, Rev. 1
2NBT12-55025, AC Molder Case Circuit Breaker Data Sheet 2HV-7245, Rev. 4
2X4AF03-00229, Instruction Manual for Terry Steam Turbine, Ver. 13.0
2X4AQ59-00006, Installation, Operation and Maintenance Manual for Lisega Replacement
Struts, Ver. 3
ASME Form NIS-2 for WO1060607902, dated June 19, 2008
ASME Form NIS-2 for WO1060607903, dated June 19, 2008
ASME Form NIS-2 for WO1060607904, dated June 19, 2008
ASME Form NIS-2 for WO1060607905, dated June 19, 2008
ASME Form NIS-2 for WO1060607906, dated June 19, 2008
ASME Form NIS-2 for WO1060607907, dated June 19, 2008
ASME Test Verification Form 08018, dated March 18, 2008
ASME Test Verification Form 08019, dated March 18, 2008
ASME Test Verification Form 08020, dated March 18, 2008
AX3AE13-00030, Diesel Generator SFS -Common Q Qualification Summary Report, Revision 3
AX3AE13-00031, Diesel Generator Safety Features Sequencer Equipment Qualification Report,
Revision 4
AX3AC03-10021, Freedom Series Starters, Contactors and Thermal Overload Relays
Instruction Manual, Ver. 2.0
AX3AC03-10022, Freedom Series Starters, Contactors, and Thermal Overload Relays Seismic
Qualification Report, Ver. 4.0
AX3AC02B-20016, ABB 480V Breakers Installation and Maintenance Manual, Ver. 2.0
AX3AC02B-20017, ABB EMAX ANSI Qualification Reports, Ver. 1.0
Clearance 2-DT-R13; Tagout 2-DT-08-1204-15105(001), Current
DC-1017, Pipe Stress and Pipe Supports Analysis Criteria, Ver. 15
DC-1018, Pipe break Criteria - Interdiscipline, Ver. 7
DC-1202, Nuclear Service Cooling Water (NSCW) System, Rev. 12
DOEJ-SC-1050351501-001, Seismic Evaluation of 480V Replacement ABB Breakers for Plant
Vogtle 1 DCP 1050351501, Ver. 1.0
DOEJ-SC-1060336201-001, Seismic Evaluation of 480V Replacement ABB Breakers for Plant
Vogtle 1 DCP 1060336201, Ver. 1.0
DOEJ-SC-1061854401-001, Addition of Environmental Seals for Barton Transmitters Models
763 and 764 per DCP 1061854401 for Plant Vogtle, Ver. 2.0
DOEJ-SC-2060336901-001, Seismic Evaluation of 480V Replacement ABB Breakers for Plant
Vogtle 1 DCP 2060336901, Ver. 1.0
DOEJ-SC-2053320201-001, Seismic Evaluation of 480V Replacement ABB Breakers for Plant
Vogtle 1 DCP 2053320201, Ver. 1.0
EQDP X5AD07, ITE Barton Level and Pressure Transmitter Equipment Qualification Data
Package, Rev. 21
Attachment
9
EQDP X6AA15, Westinghouse NSSS Safety Related Mechanical and Electric Equipment, Rev.
88
LDCR 2007054, Deletion of NSCW Pressure Loops 1PT11741 and 1PT11742, dated October
15,2007
NL-04-1150, SNC Response to NRC Bulletin 2004-01, dated July 26, 2006
NL-04-1948, SNC Response to NRC Bulletin 2004-01, dated October 21, 2004
NL-05-0923, First Revised NRC Order EA-03-009, dated June 6, 2005
NL-07-0803, Pressurizer Nozzle Full Structural Weld Overlay Evaluation and Nondestructive
Examination results, Spring 2007 Outage (2R12), dated April 13, 2008
NL-07-0837, Pressurizer Nozzle Full Structural Weld Overlay Evaluation, dated April 13, 2007
NL-07-0859, Pressurizer Nozzle Full Structural Weld Overlay Evaluation and Nondestructive
Examination results, Spring 2007 Outage (2R12), dated April 18, 2008
NL-08-0667, Pressurizer Nozzle Full Structural Weld Overlay Evaluation and Nondestructive
Examination results, Spring 2008 Outage (1R14), dated May 2, 2008
NOTS-02722, Potential Substantial Safety Hazard - Defect in Freedom Series Motor Starter
Heater Packs 10 CFR Part 21 Notification, dated January 6, 2005.
PS-03-1393, Vogtle Mid-Year design Change Process Self-Assessment, dated June 20, 2003
PS-03-2319 (RER 2003-V0376), Investigation of Recent Failures of Cutler-Hammer Thermal
Overloads, dated November 7, 2003
PS-04-2134 (RER C049630701), Design Basis Review of Deletion of Pressure Loops
1PT11741 and 1PT11742, dated November 4, 2004
PS-06-0278, (RER C052437601), Review of Failures of Freedom Series Thermal Overloads and
10 CFR Part 21 Reporting Thermal Overloads, dated February 9, 2006
PS-06-2127 (RER C052437601), Suitable Replacement Alternative for Freedom Series Thermal
Overload Relays, dated September 25, 2006
PS-07-1443 (RER C070118501), Verification of RER C049630701 Response Conclusions,
dated July 31, 2007
Safety Evaluation Report related to the Westinghouse Common Q Platform, dated February 24,
2003
SG-15919 (REA 97-VAA621), Evaluation of Snubber 2-1208-123-H007 As-Found Condition,
dated October 2,1997
SG-16580 (REA 97-VAA621), Snubber Deletion - Feasibility/Cost Benefit Study, dated
November 13,1998
SG-17117 (REA 99-VAA629), Replacement Recommendation for Obsolete Cutler-Hammer
Starters and Overload Relays, dated September 1, 1999
SG-18646 (REA 01-VAA615), Review of Application of Lisega E-Bar in Place of Existing
Snubbers, dated August 30, 2001
Technical Specification Section 3.8.6, Battery Parameters
Technical Specification Bases Section 3.8.4, DC Sources - Operating, Revision 1
Technical Specification Bases Section 3.8.5, DC Sources - Shutdown, Revision 1
Technical Specification Bases Section 3.8.6, Battery Parameters, Revision 2
TR 13.8.2, Safety-Related Motor -Operated Valves Thermal Overload Protection and Bypass
devices, Rev. 1
Valve Inservice Testing Program, Revision 12, dated December 6, 2004
V-EL-JP-15001-02.1, Job Performance Measure for EMAX Breaker, dated August 26, 2008
V-EL-JP-15002-1.1, Job Performance Measure for Racking EMAX Breaker, dated August 26,
2008
Attachment
10
V-EL-LP-15001, EMAX Breaker Maintenance Lesson Plan, Rev. 02
Weld Overlay Process Traveler 900757-N6, Rev. 3 with actual data taken on April 4, 2008
X3AR01, Section E9, Cable Installation and Cable Termination, Rev. 28
X4AF03, Specification for Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps and Drivers, Rev. 13
Section 2OS1: Access Control To Radiologically Significant Areas
Procedures, Guidance Documents, and Manuals
43630-C, Calibration, Operation and Use of the Eberline HANDECOUNT Alpha/Beta Counter,
Rev. 10 & Rev.11
43005-C, Establishing and Posting Radiation Controlled Areas and High Radiation Area Access
Control, Rev. 35.2
43000-C, Radiation and Contamination Surveys, Rev. 30
43002-C, Airborne Radioactivity Sampling and Evaluation, Rev. 31
47025-C, Use and Maintenance of the Trends Airshield, Re. 3.3
43018-C, Radiological Controls for Diving Operations, Rev. 2.1
RWPs 07-0105, 07-0104, 08-2304, 08-0112 Rev. 1
HandECount Manual, May 2003
Records and Data
ALARA Briefing Record, RWP 08-2301, Install and Remove Nozzle Dams for U2 S/G 1&4
Surveys 96433, 98589, 94405, 110332
Containment Air Sample log, 9/21/08 - 9/25/08
Personnel Contamination Event Log, 9/22/08 - 10/9/08
Beta/Gamma-to-Alpha comparisons for S/G bowls, 2R10, 2R11, and 2R12
TEDE-ALARA Evaluation Worksheets, RWP Nos. 2311 & 2301, Nozzle Dam Installation, U2
DOP Testing Data Sheet, U2 S/G Negative Pressure HEPAs, 9/24/08
CAP Documents
VQA-2007-023, QA Audit of Health Physics, 7/18/07
CRs 2008102174, 2007105476, 2008110423, 2008110155, 2008104352, 2008103837,
2008109283,
Section 2OS2: As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA)
Procedures, Manuals, and Guidance Documents
Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Strategic Plan for Radiation Exposure Reduction,
2008-2012, Approved 12/14/07
NMP-HP-001, Radiation Protection Standard Practices, Ver. 3.0
00950-C, Personnel Dosimetry Program, Rev. 17.4
16035-2, Chemistry Operations Interface for Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Chemistry Control
During Scheduled Plant Shutdowns, Rev. 1
41001-C, ALARA Job Review, Rev. 28
41006-C, Temporary Shielding, Rev. 24
45012-C, Individual Radiation Exposure Records and Reports, Rev. 22
Southern Nuclear Study Guide for General Employee Training Topics: Plant Access,
Radiation Worker, Respiratory Protection, Confined Space, January 2008
RWPs 08-2004, 08-2005, 08-2300, 08-2301, 08-2302, 08-2304, 08-2311, 08-2601, 08-2602, 08-
2603, 08-2617
Attachment
11
Records and Data Reviewed
ALARA Briefing Records for RWPs 08-2004, 08-2100, 08-2104, 08-2302, 08-2617
Surveys 109508, 109185, 110056, 109079,
Plant Vogtle Unit 2 Refueling Outage Cycle 13 (2R13) - Reactor Coolant System (RCS)
Shutdown Chemistry Parameters September 08-22, 2008, including: Soluble and total
iron; filtrate iodines; soluble and total nickel; xenon (Xe) -133 and Xe-135; Hard
Gamma- emitting radionuclides including cobalt (Co)-58 and Co-60, manganese (Mn)-
54, and total gamma; RCS filtrate isotopes including Mn-54, C0-58, Co-60, zinc -65,
and cesium (Cs) 134 and Cs-137
RCS Chemistry Shutdown Dosimeter Data, Shutdown 09/15-20/08
Mixed Bed Demineralizer No. 3 Dose Rate Data during Unit 2 Outage
Unit 2 Refueling Outage Cycle 12 (2R12) Steam Generator (S/G) Channel-head Dose
Rates, S/G #1, S/G #2, S/G # 3, S/G #4
2R12, Unit 2 Standard Radiation Survey Data,
2R13, Unit 2 Standard Radiation Survey Data
Secondary S/G Dose Rate Comparison Data, 2R10/11/12/13 S/G #4
Shutdown chemistry electronic dosimetry dose rate date after peroxide addition for chemical
degassing, 09/17/08
Unit 2 Refueling Outage Cycle 13 (2R13) Outage Dose Summary Reports,
September 22 -25, 2008, and October 6-9, 2008
2R13 Radiation Exposure, Cumulative Exposure Data. September 22-25, 2008, and
October 6-9, 2008
Daily Health Physics Summary Reports, September 22-25, 2008, and October 6-9,
2008
Minor Design Change (MDC) Request No. 1081391301/1.0, Unit 1, Tri Nuke permanent
storage in refueling cavity, 08/20/08
Engineering work order No. C071255501, Review of full cycle zinc addition - maximum flow for
reactor coolant letdown, Final response, 07/30/07
Request for Engineering Review (RER) C071255501, Units 1 & 2, Review of full cycle zinc
addition - maximum flow for RCS letdown, 08/30/07
File C.04.01, Vogtle Unit 2 Refueling Outage 12 Reactor Coolant System Shutdown
Chemistry Control Report, 07/14/07
CAP Documents
VQA-2007-023, QA Audit of Health Physics, 7/18/07
CRs 2008110012, 2008105257, 2008102036, 2008100658, 2007110751, 2007109138,
2007108087, 2007102593,
AIs 2008201426, 2008201221, 2008201207, 2008201060, 2008200084, 2007206116,
2007204871, 2007204537, 2007204529, 2007204528, 2007204527, 2007204390, 2007204293,
2007203671, 2007203645, 2007203644, 2007109138
Section 2PS1: Radioactive Gaseous and Liquid Effluent Treatment and Monitoring
Systems
NMP-EN-002, Actions for Potential Groundwater Contamination Events, Ver. 2.0
Current 10 CFR Part 50.75(g) File
Groundwater monitoring well sample results, 12/4/07 - 10/3/08
Section 2PS2: Radioactive Material Processing and Transportation
Attachment
12
Procedures, Instructions, and Guidance Documents
46200-C, Shipment of Radioactive Waste and Radioactive Material, Rev. 1.1
46100-C, 10 CFR 61 Waste Classification Sampling Program, Rev. 5.1
46106-C, Waste Classification Resin Shipments, Rev. 6.1
Vogtle Process Control Program, Rev. 8
Records and Data Reviewed
2007 Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report
DAW Waste Stream Analyses, 2007 and 2008
RCS Filter Waste Stream Analysis, 2008
Shipments06-007, 07-017,07-019, 07-022,08-008
CAP Documents
VQA-2006-042, QA Audit of Chemistry and Radioactive Waste, 12/6/06
CR 2008110945, 2008107446, 2007105876, 2007105502
Section 1R20: Refueling and Other Outage Activities
Procedures
12005-C, Reactor Shutdown to Hot Standby (Mode 2 to Mode 3)
12006-C, Unit Cooldown to Cold Shutdown
12007-C, Refueling Operations
12001-C, Unit Heatup to Hot Shutdown
12002-C, Unit Heatup to Normal Operating Temperature
12003-C, Reactor Startup (Mode 3 to Mode 2)
14900-C, Containment Exit Inspection
Section 4OA1: Performance Indicator Verification
Procedures
Procedure No. 00163-C, NRC Performance Indicator and Monthly Operating Report
Preparation and Submittal, Rev. 13.2
Procedure No. 34331-C, Management of DRMS Status and Parameters, Rev. 24.1
Procedure No. 34333-C, Gaseous Effluent Monitor Setup For Releases, Rev. 7
Records and Data Reviewed
Access Control Alarms Report, August 2007 - September 2008
Personnel Contamination Event/Records January 1, 2008, through September 31, 2008
Gaseous waste permit 70250.020.048.G, Unit 1, Continuous Gaseous Effluent Permit
Gaseous waste permit 70256.025.098.G, Unit 1, Batch Gaseous Effluent Permit
Gaseous Permit No. G-20081006-298-C, Unit 1, Plant Vent Continuous Release
Gaseous Permit No. G-20081006-297-B, Unit 2 Containment Batch Release
Vogtle Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report for 2007
CAP Documents
CR 2006111265, CR 2007112260, CR 2008109286
Section 4OA2: Identification and Resolution of Problems
Procedures/Calculations/Engineering Documents
10025-C, Work Around Program, Revision 3
Attachment
13
Unit 1 Operator Burdens and Workarounds List
Unit 2 Operator Burdens and Workarounds List
Condition Reports: 2008100397, 2008101130, 2008101535, 2008101550, 2008101570,
2008101792, 2008101829, 2008101855, 2008101914, 2008101946, 2008102012, 2008102019,
2008102031, 2008102047, 2008102059, 2008102078, 2008102128, 2008102161, 2008102189,
2008103582, 2008105478, 2008105657
Action Items: 2008201942 and 2008203528
Attachment