ML041050804
| ML041050804 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
| Issue date: | 04/14/2004 |
| From: | Troy Pruett NRC/RGN-IV/DRP/RPB-D |
| To: | Overbeck G Arizona Public Service Co |
| References | |
| Download: ML041050804 (78) | |
Text
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY C O M M I S S I O N R E G I O N IV 611 RYAN PLAZA DRIVE, SUITE 400 ARLINGTON, TEXAS 76011-4005 A p r i 1 14, 2004 Gregg R. Overbeck, Senior Vice President, Nuclear Arizona Public Service Company P.O. Box 52034 Phoenix, AZ 85072-2034
SUBJECT:
MEETING
SUMMARY
FOR END-OF-CYCLE PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT
Dear Mr. Overbeck:
This refers to the end-of-cycle performance assessment meeting conducted at the Estrella Mountain Community College, Avondale, Arizona, on April 1, 2004. Topics discussed during the meeting included the Reactor Oversight Process and the safety performance at Palo Verde.
The meeting attendance list, a copy of the slides presented during the meeting, and a transcript of the meeting are included as Enclosures 1, 2, and 3.
In accordance with Section 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," Part 2, Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC's Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at htt~://www.nrc.uov/readinu-rm/adams.html(the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Should you have any questions concerning this matter, we will be pleased to discuss them with you.
Troy W. Pruett, Chief Project Branch D Division of Reactor Projects Dockets: 50-528 50-529 50-530 Licenses: NPF-41 NPF-51 NPF-74
Arizona Public Service Company
Enclosures:
- 1. Meeting Attendance List
- 2. NRC Presentation
- 3. Transcript of Proceedings cc wlenclosures:
Steve Olea Arizona Corporation Commission 1200 W. Washington Street Phoenix, AZ 85007 Douglas K. Porter, Senior Counsel Southern California Edisori Company Law Department, Generation Resources P.O. Box 800 Rosemead, CA 91770 Chairman Maricopa County Board of Supervisors 301 W. Jefferson, 10th Floor Phoenix, AZ 85003 Aubrey V. Godwin, Director Arizona Radiation Regulatory Agency 4814 South 40 Street Phoenix, AZ 85040 M. Dwayne Carnes, Director Regulatory AffairslNuclear Assurance Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Mail Station 7636 P.O. Box 52034 Phoenix, AZ 85072-2034 Hector R. Puente Vice President, Power Generation El Paso Electric Company 310 E. Palm Lane, Suite 310 Phoenix, AZ 85004 Jeffrey T. Weikert Assistant General Counsel El Paso Electric Company Mail Location 167 123 W. Mills El Paso, TX 79901
Arizona Public Service Company John W. Schumann Los Angeles Department of Water & Power Southern California Public Power Authority P.O. Box 51 111, Room 1255-C Los Angeles, CA 90051-0100 John Taylor Public Service Company of New Mexico 2401 Aztec NE, MS Z1 10 Albuquerque, NM 87107-4224 Cheryl Adams Southern California Edison Company 5000 Pacific Coast Hwy. Bldg. DIN San Clemente, CA 92672 Robert Henry Salt River Project 6504 East Thomas Road Scottsdale, AZ 85251 Brian Almon Public Utility Commission William B. Travis Building P.O. Box 13326 1701 North Congress Avenue Austin, TX 78701-3326 Lou Trammell, Assistant Director Arizona Division of Emergency Management 5636 East McDowell Road Building 101 Phoenix, AZ 85008-3495 Jeff Griffin, Regional Director Federal Emergency Management Agency Region IX 1111 Broadway, Suite 1200 Oakland, CA 94607-4052 The Honorable Ron Drake Mayor of Avondale 525 North Central Avondale, AZ 85323
Arizona Public Service Company The Honorable Dustin Hull Mayor of Buckeye 100 North Apache Road Buckeye, AZ 85326 The Honorable Robert Robles Mayor of El Mirage P.O. Box 26 El Mirage, AZ 85335 The Honorable Elaine Scruggs Mayor of Glendale 5850 West Glendale Avenue Glendale, AZ 85301 The Honorable Jim Cavanaugh Mayor of Goodyear 119 North Litchfield Road Goodyear, AZ 85338 The Honorable J. Woodfin Thomas Mayor of Litchfield 244 West Wigwam Blvd.
Litchfield Park, AZ 85340 The Honorable John Keegan Mayor of Peoria 8401 West Monroe Street Peoria, AZ 85345 The Honorable Phil Gordon Mayor of Phoenix 200 West Washington Phoenix, AZ 85007 The Honorable Joan Shafer Mayor of Surprise 12425 West Bell Road Surprise, AZ 85374 The Honorable Adolfo Gamez Mayor of Tolleson 9555 West Van Buren Street Tolleson, AZ 85353
Arizona Public Service Company The Honorable Bryan Hackbarth Mayor of Youngtown 12030 Clubhouse Square Youngtown, AZ 85363
Arizona Public Service Company Electronic distribution by RIV:
Regional Administrator (BSMI)
DRP Director (ATH)
DRS Director (DDC)
Senior Resident Inspector (GXW2)
Branch Chief, DRPID (TWP)
Senior Project Engineer, DRPID (JAC)
Staff Chief, DRP/TSS (PHH)
RlTS Coordinator (KEG)
AD Ms: d e s No Initials: ,fl 2 P u b l i c l y Available Non-Publicly Available El Sensitive Non-Sensitive OFFICIAL RECORD COPY T=Telephone E=E-mail F=Fax
ENCLOSURE 1 END-OF-CYCLE MEETING ATTENDANCE LlCENSEElFAClLlTY Arizona Public Service CompanyIPalo Verde DATElTlME April I,2004; 7 p.m. (CST)
LOCATION Estrella Mountain Community College, Avondale, Arizona NAME ORGANIZATION/Member of public Silverio Garcia, Jr. APS I Tim Andert 1 APS 1 David Misbeek APS Frank Garrett APS John Gaffney APS Peter Rail APS Michael Shea APS Fred Riedel APS Terry Radtke APS John Hesser APS Dwayne Carnes APS 1 David Mauldin 1 APS Gregg Overbeck APS Jim Levine APS Note: Other participants did not sign in.
ENCLOSURE 2 Palo Verde Annual Assessment Meeting Reactor Oversight Program - 2003 Assessment Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Region IV Avondale, Arizona April 1, 2004
Agenda II Introduction NRC Organization and Goals Review of Reactor Oversight Process National Summary of Plant Performance Discussion of Plant Performance Results Licensee Response and Remarks NRC Closing Remarks NRC available to address public questions
NRC Representatives Art Howell, Director, Division of Reactor Projects
- (8 17) 860-8248 Mark Satorius, Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Projects
- (817) 860-8291 Jeffrey Clark, Branch Chief
- (817) 860-8166 Greg Warnick, Senior Resident Inspector
- (623) 386-3638 Jim Melfi, Resident Inspector
- (623) 386-3638 Nancy Salgado, Senior Project Engineer
- (8 17) 276-6550 Me1 Fields, Project Manager, NRR
- (301) 415-3062
Region IV Organization
\
Dr. Bruce Mallett \
Regional Administrator I
\
L Pat Gwynn Deputy Regional Administrator I
d Art Howell Dwight Chamberlain Director Division of Reactor Projects Director Division of Reactor Safety I Mark Satorius Gail Good I Deputy Director Deputy Director Jeffrey Clark Regional Specialists Branch Chief I \ I \
Palo Verde Project Engineers Resident Inspectors Nancy Salgado Greg Warnick David Dumbacher Jim Melfi I i
NRC Performance Goals Maintain safety and protect the environment Enhance public confidence Improve effectiveness, efficiency, and realism of processes and decision making Reduce unnecessary regulatory burden
Reactor Oversight Process Strategic Performance Areas I
Safety Cornerstones e
Baseline Inspection Performance Indicator Results Results Significance Significance Threshold Threshold Regulatory Response
Examples of Baseline Inspections Equipment Alignment -92 hrslyr Triennial Fire Protection -200 hrs every 3 yrs Operator Response -125 hrslyr Emergency Preparedness -80 hrslyr Rad Release Controls - 100 hrs every 2 yrs Worker Radiation Protection - 100 hrslyr Corrective Action Program -200 hrs every 2 yrs Corrective Action Case Reviews -60 hrslyr
Significance Threshold Performance Indicators Green: Only Baseline Inspection White: increase NRC oversight u
Yellow: Requires more NRC oversight Red: Requires more NRC oversight Inspection Findings Green: Very Low safety issue White: Low to moderate safety issue Yellow: Substantial safety issue Red: High safety issue
Action Matrix Concept Licensee Regulatory Degraded Multiple/Rep. Unacceptable Response Response Cornerstone Degraded Performance Cornerstone Increasing Safety Significance Increasing NRC Inspection Efforts Increasing NRCILicensee Management Involvement Increasing Regulatory Actions
Focus of Today's Meeting A public forum for discussion of the licensee's performance NRC will address the licensee performance issues identified in the annual assessment letter Licensee may respond to the information in the letter and inform the NRC of new or existing programs to maintain or improve their performance
National Summary of Plant Performance Status at End of CY 2003 Licensee Response Column Regulatory Response Column Degraded Cornerstone Column Multiplemepetitive Degraded Cornerstones Unacceptable Total
- Davis-Besse is in IMC 0350 process
National Summary Performance Indicator Results (at end of 2003)
Green 1825
.White Yellow Red 15 0
0 Total Inspection Findings (2003)
Green 748
.White Yellow Red 9
2 1
Palo Verde Assessment Results I
I (Jan 1 - Dec 31,2003)
Assessment Based On:
Licensee Response column No greater than green findings1PIs in baseline inspections Discussion of supplemental inspections
Palo Verde Inspection Activities (Jan 1 - Dec 31,2003)
The resident and visiting inspectors from other branches combined to perform 5249 hours0.0608 days <br />1.458 hours <br />0.00868 weeks <br />0.002 months <br /> of inspection on all three units during 2003. This included a special inspection for the July 28, 2003 Unit 3 automatic trip due to grid disturbances. Unit 2 had additional inspection hours due to the Steam Generator replacement refueling outage in the fall.
Jim Melfi filled the vacant resident inspector position in early 2003.
For the year the plant had only very low safety signiticance tindings: emergency core cooling sumps.
Palo Verde Additional Inspection Activities (Jan 1 - Dec 31,2003)
Special inspections this year related to the grid disturbance and the Unit 2 steam generator replacement inspections.
Palo Verde Annual Assessment Summary (Jan 1 - Dec 31,2003)
APS operated Palo Verde Units 1 ,2, & 3 in a manner that preserved public health and safety All cornerstone safety objectives were met.
NRC plans baseline inspections at PVNGS for the 2004 assessment period.
A bienniel Problem Identification & Resolution (PIR) inspection is scheduled for May.
During the year the NRC also focused on the safetv culture at the Palo Verde site.
Licensee Response and Remarks Gregg Overbeck Senior Vice President, Nuclear Arizona Public Service Company
Contacting the NRC Report an emergency:
(301) 816-5100 (call collect)
Report a safety concern:
(800) 695-7403 Allegation @ nrc.gov General information or questions:
www.nrc.rrov Select "What We Do" to access Public Affairs
Reference Sources Reactor Oversight Process:
a Public Electronic Reading Room:
a Public Document Room:
F 1-800-397-4209 (Toll Free)
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION - REGION IV PUBLIC MEETING TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS Avondale, Arizona April 1, 2004 6:30 p.m.
PREPARED BY:
Robin L. B. Osterode, RPR, CSR AZ Certified Court Reporter No. 50695 Page 1
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS, commenced at 6:30 p.m. on April 1, 2004, at Avondale, Arizona, before Robin L. B. Osterode, RPR, CSR, Arizona Certified Court Reporter No. 50695.
APPEARANCES:
For The United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission:
JEFFREY A. CLARK, Branch Chief, Division of Reactor Projects/Project Branch VICTOR DRICKS, Public Affairs Officer JAMES MELFI, Resident Inspector, Palo Verde MARK A. SARTORIUS, Deputy Director, Region IV - Division of Reactor Projects GREG WARNICK, Resident Inspector, Palo Verde For APS:
DWAYNE CARNES, Director, Nuclear Assurance and Regulatory Affairs, Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station DAVID MAULDIN, Vice President, Nuclear Engineering and Support GREGG R. OVERBECK, Senior Vice Page 2
040401nu.txt president, Nuclear Avondale, Arizona April 1, 2004 6 : 3 0 p.m.
MR. WARNICK: Good evening, my name is Greg Warnick, and I'd like to welcome you all to this public meeting. This is a Category 1 public meeting in accordance with the NRC public meeting policy.
Under that policy, Category 1 meetings are open to public observation. The members of the public who are in attendance should be aware that this is a meeting between the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and management of the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station.
Before we adjourn the meeting, we will open the floor to questions from public observers.
In addition, we would ask that comments or questions from the audience be limited to five minutes each to Page 3
040401nu.txt 18 allow for equal participation. We would appreciate 19 it if you would please use our sign-up sheet to help 20 organize the comment and question portion of the 21 meeting.
22 Following the meeting, an official 23 meeting summary will be available through our ADAMS 24 system. We have provided NRC public meeting feedback 25 forms. If you wish, either provide comments to one of our staff members or complete the forms. The forms can be mailed or they can be given to us today.
We appreciate any feedback you wish to provide. This meeting is also being transcribed so that any concerns or questions are accurately captured.
At this point I will proceed with introductions. As I.stated, my name is Greg Warnick.
I'm the Senior Resident Inspector at Palo Verde.
With me from the NRC this evening are Mark Sartorius, Deputy Director of the Division of Reactor Projects, for our regional office, Region IV, which is located in Arlington, Texas. Jeff Clark, our Branch Chief, who has responsibility over Palo Verde; Victor Page 4
040401nu.txt Dricks, Public Affairs Officer; and Jim Melfi, Resident Inspector at Palo Verde. I'd also like to note a state official here, Mr. Aubrey Goodwin; he's the regional director of the Arizona Regulatory Commission. I would now ask you, Mr. Overbeck, to take this opportunity and introduce your staff.
MR. OVERBECK: Thank you, Mr. Warnick, Mr. Clark, Mr. Melfi, for this opportunity to meet with you concerning feedback on Palo Verde's annual plant performance assessment; I would like to welcome the members of the public and the media that are here tonight, and I can see in the audience several of our 1 Palo Verde employees. With me today in the audience 2 is my boss Mr. Jim Lebond (phonetic), Executive Vice 3 President, our Chief Nuclear Officer. At the table 4 with me today is David Mauldin, our Vice President of 5 Nuclear Engineering and Support; and Mr. Dwayne 6 Carnes, who is our Director of Nuclear Assurance.
7 The NRC's director oversight process has 8 improved station performance by focusing our 9 attention and resources on those areas important to 10 nuclear safety. The process allows our employees and Page 5
040401nu.txt the public to monitor our performance on a quarterly basis via the NRC Web page. We look forward to your comments on Palo Verde's performance, and thank you for this opportunity.
MR. WARNICK: Thank you. We appreciate your staff - - you and your staff for coming to this meeting. Although we have already provided you with a written manual assessment, we would like to take this opportunity to publicly share this assessment with you in a little more detail. Our presentation is in the form of slides. These slides will also be available as an attachment to the meeting summary.
Our agenda for the presentation is shown here. Having completed introductions, the balance of the meeting will proceed with the discussion of the 1 NRC organization and goals, review of the reactor 2 oversight process, the national summary of plant 3 performance, discussion of plant performance results, 4 licensee response and remarks. We will provide our 5 NRC closing remarks, and at that point we will be 6 available to address public questions.
7 This slide shows various NRC personnel in Page 6
040401nu.txt Region IV and headquarters who are assigned responsibility for Palo Verde. Besides those already introduced, we have Art Howell, he's our director of the division of reactor projects; Nancy Salgado, who is our senior project engineer; and Me1 Fields, who is our project manager who is located in Washington.
This is a summary of the Region IV organization. As you can see here, our regional administrator, Dr. Bruce Mallet (phonetic),has responsibility for overall operations of our region.
There are two organizations, the division of reactor projects and reactor safety, that help implement the baseline inspection program. We inspectors fall under the division of reactor projects and you can see that Jeff Clark is our branch chief. Our regional specialists help out coming to the site to perform specialized inspections.
Next slide, Jim. Thank you.
1 The NRC has four primary performance 2 goals, they are: to maintain safety and protect the 3 environment; to enhance public confidence; to improve 4 efficiency, effectiveness, and realism of processes Page 7
040401nu.txt and decision making; and to reduce unnecessary regulatory burden.
A brief overview of our reactor oversight process is shown here. To illustrate this process 1'11 use the reactor safety strategic performance areas. This includes the initiating events, mitigating systems, and barrier integrity safety cornerstones. These cornerstones are monitored through a combination of baseline inspections and performance indicators. Findings associated with baseline inspections and performance indicators that don't meet established thresholds are reviewed for significance. The significance of the issues will determine, through the action matrix, what level of regulatory response will be implemented.
This concludes our introductory comments.
Now we would like to get into more of the specifics regarding the focus of today's meeting.
Let me get into some examples of baseline inspection. The next few slides will briefly expand on the key elements of this oversight process. These 1 are a few of the inspections performed and the Page 8
040401nu.txt approximate time it takes to complete the inspections. For instance, numerous equipment alignment inspections are performed by the resident inspectors. We do this to verify that the safety-related equipment is properly aligned to perform the safety functions that are required. In addition to these inspections that the resident inspectors perform, regional specialists perform specialized inspections such as the triennial fire protection and radiation release controls inspections.
The NRC has developed a color scheme to establish significance thresholds of performance indicators and inspection findings. As the color or significance changes from green to red, there is a corresponding increase in NRC oversight. The action matrix concept helps clarify this increase in oversight. As the safety significance of an issue increases, NRC inspection effort increases, NRC/Licensee management involvement increases and regulatory actions increase.
Today's meeting provides a public forum to discuss the licensee's performance. The NRC will address performance issues identified in the annual Page 9
assessment letter; and finally, the licensee may have an opportunity to respond to the information in the letter that's described on this slide.
Here's a national summary of the status of plant performance at the end of cycle year 2003.
I'd like to highlight that Palo Verde is in the licensee response column. The annotation there at the bottom that Davis-~esseis in the Inspection Manual Chapter 0350 process, that means that the facility was shut down under order to perform corrective actions for plant restart at the end of 2003.
These are the numbers per national plant performance at the end of 2003. Under the revised oversight process each licensee submits a fixed number of performance indicators. The number of inspection findings vary and is dependent upon what we inspectors find at the different sites. As I pointed out before, Palo Verde is in the licensee response column, they had no greater than green findings in baseline inspections, and all performance indicators remained green. In addition to baseline inspections, we had a couple supplemental or special Page 10
040401nu.txt 24 inspections as conditions warranted. No greater 25 than green findings were identified during these special inspections.
Here I'd like to point out that 2,000 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> is approximately what an individual works in one year; however, due to things like travel and training, not all of those 2,000 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> are spent directly performing inspections. The inspection effort described in this first bullet represents efforts of approximately six inspectors. Another activity that occurred this year is that Jim Melfi, resident inspector, arrived in 2003 to complete our resident staffing; additionally, the plant had only very low safety - - excuse me, for a year the plant had only very low safety significance findings, involving the emergency core cooling sumps during the last outage on unit 2 and identified the grading wasn't completely in accordance with design documentations. And another issue was that material that wasn't fully qualified to be in those sumps was identified. The special inspections performed last year related to the grid disturbance that occurred in Page 11
040401nu.txt 21 July and the unit 2 steam generator replacement 22 inspections.
23 In summary, our annual assessment is that 24 APS operated Palo Verde units 1, 2, and 3 in a manner 25 that preserved public health and safety. All cornerstone objectives were met. The NRC plans baseline inspections at Palo Verde for the 2004 assessment period, which includes a biennial problem identification and resolution inspection, which is scheduled for May of this year. And finally, last year we spent some time focusing on the safety culture of Palo Verde and will continue to do so this year.
At this point I'd like to turn some time over to Jeff Clark, our Branch Chief, to further elaborate this point.
MR. CLARK: Good evening. During our assessment of the Palo Verde issues in 2003 one thing we focused on was safety consciousness of individuals in their ability to raise safety concerns through their management. In 2003 we received an abnormally high number of allegations from individuals at the .
Page 12
040401nu.txt Palo Verde Nuclear Station. While we openly take safety concerns from any individual, if it's an employee, we usually inquire about their communication of the issue with normal processes on site.
During these discussions, as well as identified a potential negative trend in employee perception of their freedom to raise such safety issues at Palo Verde. Mr. Overbeck, we also note that your staff also saw a very similar trend in the issues within your systems and processes. We spoke to you last year and we explained our observations and described that this potentially indicated a problem with your program.
Through last fall you conducted an internal evaluation of the safety conscious work environment at Palo Verde, you also commissioned an independent assessment, you shared the results of these reviews with us, and we also conducted our own on-site review with specialists from the region in December of last year. To discuss the overall issue, Page 13
040401nu.txt you attended a public meeting with us held in Arlington, Texas on January the 14th of this year.
From this we concluded that you do have an environment where employees feel free to raise safety concerns; however, you expressed, and we agreed, that some areas of your program need improvement.
These areas include employee awareness and familiarity with the employee concerns and differing professional opinions process, as well as the effectiveness of management issue tracking and resolution processes in resolving non-nuclear concerns. You outlined at the January 14th meeting corrective actions you were undertaking to sustain and promote a safety conscious work environment at Palo Verde. We have stated that we have no immediate safety concerns in this area, but we will continue to monitor your implementation of the corrective actions you've already discussed. We will also continue to independently conduct interviews and evaluations of this area during upcoming inspection activities. One area of focus will be we will plan to conduct additional interviews and additional inspections in Page 14
040401nu.txt this area in the upcoming problem identification and resolution inspection, which is scheduled for May of this year.
Let me further explain, as we have in individual discussions over the year and in our January 14th meeting with you in the region, that while we do not regulate employee management relations, we do see strong ties with how employees perceive the safety culture through your relations with them, and even the non-safety or noncritical concerns.
If I could offer an analogy, I'm from Texas and I live in Dallas County, and for the past several years that I've lived in Dallas County, 1 myself and the citizens of Dallas have complained 2 about the water. The water tastes horrible. I 3 advise people in my house, when they come visit, 4 "Don't drink the water," but we're consistently 5 reminded by the County of Dallas that the water meets 6 all regulatory parameters, and as a matter of fact, 7 it's very well within limits. That is not the issue 8 that we as the citizens - - that I was trying to Page 15
040401nu.txt convey to the County of Dallas; the issue is that the water did not taste good. That is not a safety concern, it wasn't a public health concern, but it was a concern raised by the individuals. What we're saying is that there are some issues that are being raised by your employees, we understand, and we think you understand, that they're not nuclear safety concerns, but they're issues that are important to your people and we see that there could be a tie in the way that they raise safety issues and the way that you communicate on other issues not within the nuclear safety realm.
In conclusion, we feel that you are implementing a safety conscious work environment at Palo Verde. We encourage you to foster and improve communications and employee concerns in all areas, including non-nuclear safety. We believe that open 1 communication of issues between you and your 2 employees will help sustain and promote the best 3 safety environment at the Palo Verde Nuclear Station.
4 With that, I'll turn it back over to 5 Greg.
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040401nu.txt MR. WARNICK: Thanks, Jeff, I'm going to look to the NRC staff now. Does any of the NRC staff have any questions for Palo Verde management?
(No audible response.)
MR. WARNICK: Okay, Mr. Overbeck, at this point I'd like to give you the opportunity to make any comments to our assessment.
MR. OVERBECK: Palo Verde appreciates the many thousands of hours that the NRC spent monitoring our activities. Your agency's observations are not only important to the public, but are important to us. At Palo Verde we strive to be the safest and best nuclear station in the country. We accept critical feedback from wherever we can get it, and appreciate the effort and candor of your inspectors.
We share a common goal, above all else we are committed to protect the health and safety of the public. We strive every day to operate Palo Verde in a manner that exceeds regulatory requirements. We are proud of your assessment and the performance of 1 our employees. Your inspectors and our assessment 2 agree that we can do more to improve our employees' Page 17
040401nu.txt understanding and use of our issues resolution processes. As you know, we recently completed additional training for our supervisors, and this year we are extending that training to our employees.
Because of the NRC1s oversight, and the hard work of our 2,000 employees, Palo Verde operates safely generating power for our seven owners and their 4 million customers. That power is good for Arizona and it's good for the nation, and I thank you for your comments.
MR. WARNICK: Thank you, Mr. Overbeck.
The next thing in our meeting is to ask members of the public to present if you have any comments or questions that you have for any of the participants here. I'd like to reiterate, again, to limit your comments and questions so that everybody can equally participate who would like to. I think we had a sign-up list that was out front there. We have three individuals; since there's only three, I don't think we need to force anybody to go in order; any of those three, if they'd like to come up, we have a speaker up here in front, you can address comments or questions to either of the participants.
Page 18
If you would like to, please state your name so we all know who is speaking to us.
SPEAKER #1: Good evening, my name is David Misbeek. I'd like to read from this statement that I wrote.
The safety conscious work environment is contingent on management trust. To have any trust there must be a sense of fairness and respect. These are not mutually exclusive terms. We have been told time and time again how our company values its employees. Pinnacle West just had its fourth best year ever financially and Palo Verde is the envy of the nuclear industry, yet the front line's annual salary increase doesn't even match inflation; meanwhile, management effectively doubled their salaries. To say this is unfair is an understatement. How can employees trust management with these egregious acts of selfishness? To counter that this compensation philosophy, both for management and the front line, simply mirrors what the industry is doing doesn't make it right. If this kind of selfish behavior on the part of upper management has occurred with salaries, is there any doubt that this behavior hasn't also bled over into Page 19
040401nu.txt 25 areas directly affecting nuclear safety?
For many years now Palo Verde has enjoyed the recognition of being a leader in nuclear safety, the number of allegations has been low. We have had five straight IMPO-1s. Our nuclear safety indicators have been and continue to be excellent, so therefore, nuclear oversight has relaxed. The NRC trusts what Palo Verde is doing, whatever Palo Verde has told the regulator, the regulator has had little reason to doubt or question because our track record has been so good. The regulatory margin was so large that there was even a time when Palo Verde requested that we only have one NRC resident inspector on site. But I believe Palo Verde management has taken advantage of this trust by not being totally open and honest with the NRC, and in turn, the NRC doesn't appear to be up to the task of providing the necessary checks and balances.
To illustrate, I submitted an allegation to the NRC stating that the safety law channel set points as described in the associated calculation were not conservative to support safe operations Page 20
040401nu.txt 22 under all conditions. As proof, I submitted a 23 procedure that contained different set points that 24 were much more conservative than those contained in 25 the calculation along with the allegation. Palo Verde addressed the allegation by saying that the set points in that calculation were acceptable, and that set point differences between procedures and calculations were also acceptable as long as they were conservative. Palo Verde knew that its answer to the NRC wasn't totally honest, as a pending revision to the calculation already acknowledged the fact that two of the critical set points were technical specification allowable values, and therefore, they had to be set to values consistent with those already in the procedure, and not to the values listed in the approved revision of the calculation, which is just what the allegation stated.
When I received the NRC1s resolution of concerns to this allegation, I could see that the NRC just copied Palo Verdels conclusion, the NRC concluded, just as Palo Verde had, that everything Page 21
040401nu.txt 19 was acceptable. I assumed, when I included the 20 procedure with the allegation, that the NRC would 21 naturally adopt a questioning attitude: Why are the 22 set points significantly lower in the procedure? It 23 says here in the procedure that these more 24 conservative set points are used if there is a 25 significantly lower-than-predicted flux due to core reload. What does the FSAR say? Shouldn't this more conservative set point be listed in the FSAR, as it appears more bounding than this higher, less conservative set point?
To date I do not know if Palo Verde ever revised its response to the NRC. As I haven't heard anything back from the NRC on this topic, I don't even know if the NRC cares to follow up. So now I've asked the NRC's office of the inspector general to investigate this and other examples of what I consider substandard performance.
And these deceitful practices are not just recent occurrences for Palo Verde, to be sure, a five-fold increase in allegations in 2003 is not just a statistical aberration, but something that is Page 22
040401nu.txt indicative of frustration over a long-term festering culture of management contradiction and disrespect for its employees, all of its employees, not just one or two work groups. To restore trust, leaders, starting at the top down, are going to have to restore a sense of fairness. This can only happen through action and not words. The leadership has the power to foster respect, fairness, and trust. The question is, do they have the will? Thank you.
MR. CLARK: Thank you, Mr. Misbeek, I would like to address a couple comments back with you. We appreciate your comments. We appreciate your concerns. One specific item is the allegation that you raised, we can't specifically discuss that this evening with you, because it is currently in our process to work -- it's not our process to discuss those with you in this forum. We could possibly speak with you offline to discuss some of that, if you like.
Another aspect I'd like to touch on, we, as described in our presentation, do have three resident inspectors at the facility; as you can see, Page 23
040401nu.txt we spent several thousand inspector hours last year.
As to your comment regarding, I would say, plagiarizing the licensee's response to an allegation, not specific to this one, you occasionally see that the NRC does use responses provided from the licensees or wording used from the licensees as a confirmatory action to respond back to the licensee or to respond to the concerned individual, that we saw, we understood, and this is what we addressed from the licensee. It's not that we're agreeing necessarily with that specific statement, but we're saying that we understand what your statement is, we make an independent action, as we do on all investigations, or actions of this nature. We'll make an independent assessment on our own of the safety significance or the actual compliance of the issue, and that's what we will respond to you. And as I said, in specific cases or whatever, we can talk offline and discuss those with you. Thank you again for your comments.
MR. WARNICK: We have two more individuals here. The next one on our list here.
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040401nu.txt SPEAKER #2: Thanks for having me here.
My name is Tim Andert, I am INC tech on the FEN (phonetic) team at Palo Verde. In February I wrote CRDR number 2684654, which addressed a red rubber hose eye wash station or safety shower station that was in the yard to replace what I thought was one safety shower that was out. I wrote that and got a response back that was totally inappropriate. The response back said that we did not have to follow the ANSI standard in there, because OSHA did not adopt the ANSI standard.
Unfortunately, any letters that I have found that came from OSHA said they would hold companies accountable to the latest standard and they considered the latest industry standard to be the current ANSI standard. It appears out there that in 1 1981, or whenever we actually wrote our safety 2 manual, we referenced ANSI 1981 standard, we wrote 3 our safety manual on there and apparently we have not 4 read that because it has become obsolete. ANSI 1990 5 came out, and 1998, and the current rev is now 2004.
6 Our safety department out there has never gotten a Page 25
040401nu.txt copy of 1990, 1998, or 2004; they barely have a copy of 1981. It seems like it's hard to find.
And the problem out there that I have, Mr. Overbeck got a letter, I'm not sure who else got a letter that I sent, it has eleven points about the shower systems, they are so horrendous that, you know, I can't see - - really what's horrible about this whole bit, the main thing that I've been arguing about and talking to a lot of people, we need to notify employees we have this problem. Again, I was out at the serve water towers, guys had no idea we don't have safety showers. These ones do not have any water whatsoever. These are bulk sulfuric acid tanks; that I know of between the serve water and inside the fence, there's at least 12 of them. Out of these six stations, there's only two of them that have working showers. And of those two working showers, since we have never done an annual inspection, which is according to ANSI 1998, we do 1 not do a weekly flush since 1986, OSHA stated that we 2 follow the Department of Energy guidelines they 3 recommended, but basically, the OSHA recommendation Page 26
040401nu.txt you're going to follow, it required a three-minute flush per station every week and an annual be performed.
Nobody knows the last time we've ever done an annual on an eye wash station. Those eye wash stations are in areas like class battery rooms.
We send electricians to perform maintenance, and the electricians I talk to do not know that problem existed; chemists I've talked to do not realize his safety shower had not been tested per ANSI, the 1998 standard. And we meet counts 3 , 4 shut-down of the plant.
I have been basically arguing with people for two weeks over this, they keep coming back asking me -- telling me they'll keep me informed, there's people doing something out there, because there's a lot of people informing me, but have still not informed the employees. We definitely haven't informed Bectel. We haven't informed our own people, and I already sent a copy to Mr. Freeman, he should have a copy of the letter that I sent to Mr. Overbeck, and I filed an allegation against it, Page 27
040401nu.txt because I think we are not protecting people in areas that need to have maintenance done, and right now.
The other big problem is in looking at OSHA is that we meet all the requirements to declare this an imminent danger and here it is right here, I can't see any reason why we don't meet this requirement and, by law, according to OSHA, I'm required to do it.
MR. CLARK: Let me answer the questions you've raised so far. Again, I appreciate you bringing the concerns to us. Typically, again, for reasons for protection of identity, or whatever, we do not normally discuss allegations.
SPEAKER #2: Let me tell you one thing before I go, I have no problem with it. The problem is after this article came out I had enough people asking if I was one of the five unnamed people, the suspicion follows. If I don't file the allegation, somebody feels you did anyway. People tell me what they think, it's the others I don't - - it pains me to come up here and say this, because I've had other problems out here before that have never been truly addressed from the supervisors -- I shouldn't say supervisor, one level above supervisors. Department heads, in front of HR, MF1d me, and HR out there Page 28
never ever pursued it. It was up to me to pursue it, and at that point if HR won't pursue it, I'm not going to. It's just that bad. It's pretty bad. But I'm really surprised I did this. I almost regret I brought up these showers, it's been consuming, it's even been a problem with me and my wife at home.
MR. CLARK: We did receive those, we have already taken action on those, we have turned those concerns over to OSHA, and we have contacted the licensee and informed them that we have turned the issue over to OSHA. That is not typically something that's under NRC purview, but we do have an agreement with OSHA to notify them of certain conditions, as you have alluded to in your document.
SPEAKER #2: I understand that.
MR. CLARK: So we've already taken steps.
We'd like to further discuss this with you if you would like to, but I assure you that we have taken some steps.
SPEAKER #2: The problem that comes in is the other one about not being able to bring up concerns and having to address - - this is all part Page 29
040401nu.txt 23 of - - I've never seen a group that's argued and 24 fought and tried to -- you've got people who are 25 going out in these areas in imminent danger, any of this stuff can kill them, blind them for life, and they still have not informed the employees. An employee does not distinguish a difference between personal safety and nuclear safety. If they can't get their company to sit down and at least put out something saying maybe we don't know if whatever ANSI standard we need to follow is out there, but we have a problem where safety showers do not even flow water, serve water inside the places where you've got high concentrations of sulfuric acid. The ones myself and a carpenter have been going out on, 75 percent of the eye pieces for these things are unacceptable, they're dangerous, they could blind you, and most of the employees out there don't know this. They will go over, if they get something in their eyes when they're not doing a regular job, they'll go to that safety shower and could get blinded, that's a minimum.
And that basically comes down to right Page 30
040401nu.txt 20 here, that right now, we're in imminent danger and 21 there's four or five things here, we meet each of 22 those criteria for imminent danger. When I've got a 23 safety guy saying they've never looked at 1990, 1998, 24 2004, what makes you think - - why would any employee 25 think they're doing anything different for nuclear safety? It's trust they have to build with the public and the employees, it's not working. I'm up here figuring I'm committing suicide, I have once before when the FEN team got shut down, I was told by Mr. Mules (phonetic), it was through Gregg Overbeck, it was a done deal, nothing else was going to happen, nothing you could do. So I went above Mr. Overbeck's head.
Mr. Overbeck had me in there, nice meeting, no problem, but sure as hell a year later I had it showed up in my PEP that I didn't use the train. My department head told me it was already past him, PEP changed it for pay raises, they said okay, we'll take it out. I said I want my pay reevaluated, they said it had no effect on it whatsoever, this is ridiculous. And we're up here, Page 31
040401nu.txt 17 if you want our trust, you know, this bit right now, 18 and the thing is you've got safety stations, these 19 chemists can't -- any strong acid base they're 20 required to have a shower and have an eye wash there 21 that's plumbed and working. You've still got 22 electricians going out and doing work on class 23 batteries, those are required for safe shutdown.
24 MR. CLARK: I understand, and we're 25 looking for OSHA - -
SPEAKER #2: I'd like to get a commitment to tell your employees tomorrow there's a problem with the showers. They cannot expect to walk up there and have 120 pounds of water blasting out of these things, it's unreal. I can't believe you guys are that callous, and it's bad, you guys are some real good people, you want to go home too, but your workers are going out in these conditions. You don't have one station that's been certified, period. You do not have any - -
MR. OVERBECK: Mr. Andert, let me assure you that we do appreciate your concerns. We do have people that are looking into your concerns. We have Page 32
040401nu.txt people working on eye wash stations, and I know there have been communications at every one of the meetings I have been at about the issue and what we're trying to do about it. Thank you for your concerns.
SPEAKER #2: Let me hand you this and read exactly what it is. According to OSHA when I read it, as an employee, I am legally obliged, after reading that, to file an imminent danger complaint, because I haven't seen it happen. When workers are standing next to me and do not know there's a problem with the eye wash stations, after two and a half weeks after the CRDR came back, there's a problem out there. I'm not saying you guys are bad people, necessarily, but it sure shows - - I mean, you are in charge of the plant. I'm asking you right now to go back in there and say there is a problem with our showers, there is no doubt about it. When you have so many nonfunctional things around sulfuric acid, large amounts of it, that's callous. There's no call for it. Your employees are relying on you to give them the info. The people in the middle and bottom are running around like crazy to correct problems we Page 33
040401nu.txt don't know how to correct. We're doing more harm than good. People are thinking you just went out and fixed that station. I don't have the standard in front of me on site anywhere to tell me what the flow pattern is supposed to be. I have not flushed the system. And that came out in 1986 for a three-minute flush to get rid of one of the amoebas that can blind you and give you Legionnaire's disease.
The little cans out there, they are substituting those for a plumb safety system, and that's totally unacceptable. If you get covered with acid in the middle of a yard, you want that 30- to 40-gallon per minute shower, you don't want something that puts out 5 or 6 gallons for three minutes and then that's it, you're toast. We don't even follow 1 our own procedure when we send people out to work on 2 sulfuric acid, most of us didn't even know there was 3 a sulfuric acid part in our safety manual, it isn't 4 readily available. If you get into it, people don't 5 even know you have to go into SWIMS to get into DM1 6 Main. If you don't check the block that says 7 "current rev," you can't get a copy, unless somebody Page 34
040401nu.txt has an old copy.
A 20-year-old copy is probably the most current, it's atrocious. You can't fix it tomorrow, I guarantee you there's no way, but the employees need to know this, period. That's the least you owe them. There's no way around it, that's the least you owe them. If it comes from the top, it's much better than having a bunch of people running around knowing what the properties are, holding meetings, and trying to do their best, but they still need to tell the site it's unsafe in those areas, period. And just 19 because is a safety shower and flows water doesn't 20 mean it's going to be good. When I've washed them 21 out, there's 120 pounds of pressure coming out, a guy 22 who is scrambling because he's got crap in his eyes 23 like that, if the acid don't blind him, the water 24 will. That's all I got.
25 MR. OVERBECK: Thank you for your 1 comments.
2 SPEAKER #2: It's been a nightmare, this 3 whole thing.
4 MR. CLARK: Understand we appreciate your Page 35
040401nu.txt comments.
SPEAKER #2: I appreciate being here.
MR. CLARK: We'll look into it.
Next person, please.
SPEAKER #3: Good evening. My name is Silverio Garcia, I've been an employee for 18 years at Palo Verde. Just one quick note, I read that CRDR that this gentleman talked about, if you go read the CRDR there's no problem. I got a phone message from Mr. Beling (phonetic) saying the action plan is in motion; how can the action plan be in motion when the CRDR says there's no problem. I've got a problem with the CRDR process and management and CRDR, that's my problem with that CRDR there. I wasn't going to talk about it, but that's just one of about a billion things I've got with the power plant. What I would like to do is read some comments to you, I wrote them down as quick as I can. I don't really have any questions for you, I just got something for you to contemplate about based on life at Palo Verde.
On January 14 you had a meeting with Palo 1 Verde management and what was written in the minutes Page 36
040401nu.txt is that there's a trust problem between management and the employees at Palo Verde. My question to you, and I don't want a response, how can you have a safety conscious work environment and have a trust issue between labor and management? If you look at the definition in your process oversight - - reactor oversight process, you can't have one. You can't have an issue of trust and then say we have safety conscious work environment, because I don't trust management. That contradicts itself. That's one.
The next one is Millstone 1996, where I learned about the safety conscious work environment.
I got on the Internet after living out there and said I've got to be living in an environment that's sick.
I got on the Internet before January of 2003, and I said there's got to be something out here. I typed in "safety conscious work environment," and sure enough, Millstone 1996. Actually, you guys held public meetings in 1996, and yet I, as a federal oversighted nuclear worker, was never given the training or fallout of Millstone '96. As a matter of fact, my local management hadn't even heard of "safety conscious work environment" until two or three weeks ago, until I forwarded him those Internet Page 37
sites. So I've got a big problem with people in management, all they worry about is the almighty dollar.
The next one is there's a practice at Palo Verde that if you become a manager, you become a department leader, you become in charge of a department, not necessarily the hands-on guy, but a little bit above that, then they say you need to go get training somewhere else, even though you don't know the procedures or policies in that area, you go over there and get some experience. Well, I read Davis-Besse; in my opinion, if you close your eyes and read about Davis-Besse and put Palo Verde, we're there, or just about opening the door, except we haven't been documented Davis-Besse. One of the problems there is we had management oscillating and nobody really knew what was below them. We've had that at Palo Verde, that's what happens.
Getting back to the safety conscious work environment, you had people in charge of departments, they know they're going to be there for one or two years, why fix the personnel problems when they're out the door? That's the problem at Palo Verde, all we do is swap people. That's all we do. Management, Page 38
040401nu.txt 25 we don't fix the problem, we just shift it. So nothing ever gets fixed. And in the INC world, I can tell you that's the way it's been.
Another comment I'd like to make is Mr. Overbeck said there's quite a few Palo Verde employees in the audience. You know, I get a lot of meaningless e-mails about golf tournaments, things going on that Arizona APS wants us there. I would like to know why this meeting wasn't disseminated to employees at Palo Verde. I look in the crowd and I look at the hands-on people at Palo Verde, there's hardly nobody here. I would like to know why this meeting, and I'll sent you an e-mail, Mr. Clark, I would like to know why this meeting wasn't publicized at Palo Verde for the employees to come and listen.
That's another example that I'm going to give you.
Yeah, we're right there with the regulators and the feds and we're doing fine, but if you really look inside, like the example you gave about the dirty water, bad water, great analogy, that's where we are.
The next one is the allegations, I think Page 39
040401nu.txt 21 we hit 28 allegations in 2003. We led the nation for 22 most of the year. We tied at the end of the year, 23 not something you want to applaud yourself for. My 24 question is, when was Palo Verde going to tell the 25 public, and I don't want you to answer, just at what point does a licensee have a responsibility to the public to tell them we have a trust issue at this nuclear facility between labor and management?
Because when you don't have trust, pick an area, it's worthless, because trust is not something that you are going to pick and choose. It's not your neighbor, if you don't trust your neighbor, you're not going to trust him in anything A to Z, or out at Palo Verde, from Alpha to Zulu. Do you think I trust management in anything? No, because it's well-documented that there's no trust out there.
So with these allegations, I'm curious, I had somebody locally, when they saw the News Times article, call me and say "Silverio, I didn't know this was going on. Thank you for at least doing something. I live 8 miles from the power plant and I don't know beans, because I never get told anything."
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040401nu.txt So to you, the NRC, what does it take or what is the law or what are you going to do to put responsibility on the licensee to tell the public something may be wrong here? And once again, back to the dirty water, we're not violating federal code or law, but there's something wrong here. Where does it cross the line of public trust?
The next one is I want to just thank you.
I want to thank you, Mr. Melfi; I want to thank Nancy Salgado; I want to thank you, Mr. Warnick. Locally, I don't have a problem with the NRC, they have more than captured the employees' comments, especially mine. This is a great avenue. And I'm going to cover something about HR, since we don't have an HR department out there, you're my HR department. I want to thank you, Mr. Melfi, Ms. Salgado, and Mr. Warnick.
Getting back with what Dave Misbeek said and other things, I do question the quality and sincerity of what came out at Arlington's regional office, out of the review board. I don't know what Page 41
040401nu.txt the hell is going on, maybe we'll get to the bottom of that someday. Also, I want to tell you everything -- I've been in the nuclear world since I was 18 years old, I joined the Navy, and that's all I've known since I graduated high school. And everywhere I've always gone they say you have the option to go to the NRC if you want. I've always heard it, you can go to some federal agency, here's a problem we have. I've been in this thing for 18 years out at Palo Verde; I've never received any training that tells me when you open that door to the feds, this is what life's like. I had to spend hours and hours, many nights, learning your work chart and learning what do you do when I open that door voluntarily as an oversighted federal nuclear worker.
And I went to you, I've never received any training as to what my options are. What if I disagreed with the review board? What if I don't like the answer?
I never heard of the office of enforcement before. I never knew what the Christmas tree is with the five-member commission. I never received any training. I went to you guys, and I felt like I was Page 42
040401nu.txt free falling. I didn't - - I've dealt with feds before, I'm a civil rights activist in education, and I never get your federal world.
The employees at Palo Verde have never received any training as to what happens when you voluntarily open that door. I go into that power plant every day, I see three photos, I see yours, Mr. Warnick and Mr. Melfi, and Nancy Salgado's, and there's small writing there about who you are. We need some training, either from you or from the licensee, as to this is what the NRC is and this is your road path if you like or don't like what you get. And that's what we really need. I had to do a lot of studying, I'm still learning, that is a great thing, because I didn't know this.
1 And the other thing, I want to talk about 2 HR, I said it earlier, I spoke to a federal NRC 3 member recently, and he said "Silverio, this is what 4 nuclear safety is, you have to have three things, you 5 have to have good equipment, you gotta have good 6 procedures and training, and you've got to have good 7 people, to some degree, in order to have nuclear Page 43
040401nu.txt safety and act properly in the nuclear world." I thought about that for about a second, and I said wow, the "people" slice out there is missing, it's been missing. We don't have an HR department.
I would ask you, in your free time, or whoever the inspectors are, why don't you go to the security headquarters and do a query on the HR representatives in the last ten years, and I'd like to see how many of them went into the fence. They sit out there in the buildings in Alpha and Bravo in the air conditioning, and we're living in hell inside the fence. We've got issues from A to Z. We don't take care of the people and don't care about the people. I personally have gone to corporate. I have personally sat down with Bill Post and looked at him in the eyes and told him "We've got problems." It hasn't worked and anybody in the middle it ain't worked. We've got people problems, so you can't have 1 good nuclear safety, because they don't care about 2 the people. They care about the money. It's been 3 about money. And it's sad, it's really sad.
Oh, but we're number 1. But then your Page 44
040401nu.txt analogy about the water comes right on in there.
Something needs to be done. A third party needs to come in, a viable, credible one with integrity. We get these things all the time. I just got one in a safety meeting that says the APS business plan. If you look at the back of it, it says we value the employees and it's got all these great words we are focused on, and all these excellent words. But this isn't worth crap, because in the fence people are so pissed off. I even had an employee come to me one day, he was so upset he couldn't even shut the door behind him. He kept hitting his heel, his hand. He couldn't shut the door, so we could talk in private.
APS don't give you this, they're going to tell you the water is good. I say the water stinks.
Okay, 18 years, I've been in management, I've lived that side, learned a lot. I stepped down because I wanted to go do something useful. I like what I do.
There's a lot of people who come to me and I got sick and tired of it. I had a longer line at my cube than HR has had all year, because I'm in the fence. I'm 1 where the tools are. I'm where the money maker is.
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040401nu.txt And I'm asking you, the NRC, you've got to step in and don't just take the administrative answers. I welcome you in May, because I think you're going to hear where we are.
Russell Weiss and Mr. Freeman stepped in and they came in for that investigation, do you think it was put out properly? So I've got another problem with management out there, they can't announce the meetings properly, especially the investigation in the INC department. We have trust issues, people issues. And I'm going to finish with one last thing.
Last week I got a phone call, I want to say 1998 I and all the other INC people were corraled on the third floor, Mr. Overbeck ran the meeting, "There's been an allegation filed against INC," and I don't recall correctly, but the topic of the meeting was sexual harassment, a female had filed sexual harassment against my department, the department I resigned earlier from. I used to tell my guys "I'm not going to court. If we don't know how to treat women, we're not worth a damn." Guess what happened, the EEOC sided with this female, she went to court, she won. They settled the money with APS, settled her attorney fees.
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1 Our environment out there is so bad, 2 don't even know how to treat women. You've got 3 arrogance, you've got hate, and discontent and low 4 morale. I'm talking about the INC tools. I have a 5 transcript -- I have a tape, as soon as the EEOC 6 thing broke, Mr. Overbeck, in all his arrogance, 7 corrals us into the INC and starts giving us the "you 8 guys" type of speech, it's on tape, and what he said 9 on there really irated the INC guys. There's one 10 statement that keeps ringing in the back of my mind; 11 he said "I know we've got problems sitewide, but 12 we're going to use you guys as guinea pigs." My 13 question is what do we do to save the site, because 14 it's cost the site. INC is standing up, and I'll 15 tell you why, because we're ex-reactor operators, and 16 we're used to crossing the t's and dotting the i t s ,
17 because we're running these systems. We've been the 18 closest to the license and the FSAR, because that's 19 our world, because that's what we base it on. If 20 that's no good, we better stop doing what we're 21 doing.
If the public don't trust us, we better 23 shut it down. That's the kind of guys we are. If Page 47
040401nu.txt 24 you tell me to read something or obey it, that's the 25 world you mess with when you are talking about INC.
You're not talking about other reputable jobs, we're talking about ex-reactor operators that crossed the t's and dotted the i's for many years. People who will take a lot of crap and we're still hanging in there with the FSAR and tech specs. I will close this and I will say there's many changes that need to occur, but if all we're going to do is paper changes, it's not going to work, because you're my HR.
Because what needs to happen out there, like I told you about the neighbor and trust, the neighbor has got to go. That's how you fix trust. You just don't say we're going to train the employees in management.
We got the necessary training in '94, '95, we got all the training we needed. What you got is a mentality that's in the concrete and the concrete needs to be chipped up. That's the problem. We've all had the training, we don't need any more training. We don't even know how to treat women, we just settled a lawsuit, so it doesn't go public. Here's IMPO-1, Page 48
040401nu.txt 20 what IMPO-1 says is the performance of the labor is 21 good. The question here is not whether we can 22 perform. We can perform, and I think five IMPO-1s 23 show it. And I think the fact that what you're 24 looking at is a climate where never has IMP0 come in 25 here and used as a judgment indicator management climate for the employee, nobody has done that.
That's on the Web site. I see where you, the NRC, is.
Finally, on your Web site, you're dealing with the safety conscious work environment, but nobody has ever gone to Palo Verde and said let's measure the climate with the employees, and I applaud the fact we're going to do this. I'm going to end this and say the allegations will never stop, I think we had three more this week. The allegations will never stop at Palo Verde. People are fed up. Some of us have been there a little under 20 years; we don't need to be treated this way.
I thank you for having this meeting and maybe next year we can publicize this meeting so more employees can come. Thank you very much. Have a Page 49
040401nu.txt 17 good night.
18 MR. CLARK: Thank you, Mr. Garcia. Thank 19 you for your comments, we're going to look through - -
20 again, the reason we are here tonight, we'll look 21 through and pick out the individual issues that you 22 gave us. Specifically, we're going to take a look 23 and see what we can find throughout your concerns 24 that we have not possibly already addressed in our 25 processes. I understand you stated you did not want a response necessarily from us tonight, but one thing I'm going to do is invite you to speak with me tonight or offline or sometime this week. I am available, my number was up there; if you would like to stop by after the meeting and discuss some things, I welcome that.
Are there any other people from the public that would like to make comments or ask a question this evening?
Okay, Greg, I'll turn it back over to you.
MR. WARNICK: I appreciate the participation tonight. I thank everybody for their Page 50
040401nu.txt 14 attendance. We hope this meeting has been 15 informative and helpful. This concludes our meeting 16 tonight. Thank you very much.
17 MR. CLARK: We're off record.
(Hearing concluded at 8:16 p.m.)
CERTIFICATE I, ROBIN L. B. OSTERODE, Certified Court Reporter for the State of Arizona, certify:
That the foregoing proceeding was taken by me; that the questions and the answers were taken down by me in shorthand and thereafter reduced to print by computer-aided transcription under my direction; that the foregoing pages are a full, true, Page 51
040401nu.txt 11 and accurate transcript of all proceedings to the 12 best of my skill and ability.
13 I FURTHER CERTIFY that I am in no way 14 related to nor employed by any of the parties hereto, 15 nor am I in any way interested in the outcome hereof.
16 DATED this 12th day of April, 2004.
ROBIN L. B. OSTERODE Certified Court Reporter No. 50695 For the State of Arizona Page 52