ML030370067

G20030048/LTR-03-0059 - Rep. Dennis J. Kucinich Ltr Re Petition Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206 Requesting the NRC Revoke Firstenergy Nuclear Operating Company'S License to Operate the Davis Besse Nuclear Power Station

ML030370067
Person / Time
Site:	Davis Besse
Issue date:	02/03/2003
From:	Kucinich D US HR (House of Representatives)
To:	Travers W NRC/EDO
References
2.206, G20030048, LTR-03-0059
Download: ML030370067 (32)

Text

EDO Principal Correspondence Control FROM: DUE: 03/10/03 EDO CONTROL: G20030048 DOC DT: 01/03/03 FINAL REPLY:

Representative Dennis J. Kucinich Travers, EDO FOR SIGNATURE OF : ** GRN ** CRC NO: 03-0059 Travers, EDO DESC: ROUTING:

2.206 - Revoke FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Travers Company's License to Operate the Davis-Besse Paperiello Nuclear Power Station Kane Norry Craig Burns DATE: 02/03/03 Dyer, RIII Rathbun, OCA ASSIGNED TO: CONTACT: Cyr, OGC Skay, NRR NRR Collins Goldberg, OGC SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS OR REMARKS:

OGC is sending out an explanatory letter of the 2.206 process.

-W*C lakE scy-0n &4lSz:~E(Y-O)

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY CORRESPONDENCE CONTROL TICKET Date Printed:Feb 03,2003 14:51 PAPER NUMBER: LTR-03-0059 LOGGING DATE: 02/03/2003 ACTION OFFICE: EDO AUTHOR: Dennis Kucinich AFFILIATION: REP ADDRESSEE: William Travers

SUBJECT:

Petition pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206 requesting the NRC revoke FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company's license to operate the Davis Besse nuclear power station ACTION: Appropriate DISTRIBUTION: Chairman, Comrs, OCA, RF LETTER DATE: 02/03/2003 ACKNOWLEDGED No SPECIAL HANDLING:

NOTES:

FILE LOCATION: Adams DATE DUE: DATE SIGNED:

EDO -- G20030048

202 225 5745 T-031 P.002/030 F-371 Feb-03-2003 11:37am From-R=p.Dennis i=cinich comzmmees.

aeerm Governmenlt ICH E-uGfovmtntRor DENNIS J. KUC I MU DISTR OHIO and toe arkforco I fW 1130 LOteNGWtX MOFI MSUJL CO WMSW~dOtH s.C. 2OS1SWrkWC~

Cangress of hWWe ww.house.gov/kucinich (202) 225-5871 14400 DEMOrr AV!)ME flus j~ Pre5sWtdives OHIO 44107 LAKEWOODl.

(216) 225.l50 February 3, 2003 Dr. William D. Travers Executive Director for Operations U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Dr. Travers:

THE NUCLEAR

SUBJECT:

PETITION PURSUANT TO 10 C.F.R. §2.206 REQUESTINGNUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REVOKE FRSTENERGY THE DAVIS-BESSE OPERATING COMPANY'S LICENSE TO OPERATE NUCLEAR POWER STATION.

Re: License NPF-3, Docket #050-00346.

L.Request for Enforcement that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Congressman Dennis Kucinichl hereby requests

[FirstEnergy's] license to operate the

[NRC] revoke FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company's Ohio. The NRC licensed the Davis-Besse Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station in Port Clinton, license will not cxpire until 2017. Because plant to operate as a nuclear facility in 1977. This in violation of NRC rules and regulations and FirstEnergy (1) has admittedly operated the plant to observe safety standards necessary to its own operating license, (2) has admittedly failed and (3) has deliberately withheld protect health and to minimize danger to life or property, the I Congressional District of the State of

'Congressman Dennis J. Kucinich lives in and represents over10600,000 people in northeast Ohio, represents Ohio in the United States House of Representatives. He from west-side and its western and southern suburbs. This district is less than 100 miles encompassing Cleveland's to the plant and prevailing wind conditions, people the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station. Due to its proximity detrimentally affected if a nuclear accident were to occur at be and property within the Congressman'S district would the Davis-Bcsse facility.

a .ar--

From-Rep.Dennis J.Kucinich 202 225 5T45 T-031 P.003/030 F-M7 Feb-03-2003 11:38am Dr. William D. Travers January 27, 2003 Page 2 plant conditions in order to continue information from the NRC and fraudulently misrepresented in order to comply with its regulations and to operate the plant in an unsafe manner, the NRC, to operate the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station.

guidelines, must revoke FirstEnergy's license of the nuclear reactor head which FirstEnergy's misplaced priorities led to corrosion if it had not been discovered. The NRC has placed would have led to a Loss of Cooling Accident of this event and learning how to keep such much emphasis on discovering the root cause of safety encompassed the entire plant, corrosion from recurring. FirstEnergy's disregard reactor head. FirstEnergy ignored numerous however, and was not simply centered on the from the NRC, ignored repeated warnings from its own monitoring systems, and lied to warnings hid information from the NRC. The NRC, therefore, must not be satisfied with repair and and reactor head, bat must demand accountability inquiry into the discovered corrosion of the nuclear and operating conditions. FirstEnergy must for FirstEnergy's disregard of its rules, regulations and willful non-compliance.

be held accountable for its egregious violations oversight of all nuclear power facilities in The NRC is responsible for the licensing and authority Congress granted it to follow its own America. The NRC must be willing to use the a nuclear power facility that has operated in rules and regulations and revoke the license of contempt of the NRC's authority and public safety.

violations of rules and regulations to the The NRC cannot trust FirstEncrgy to bring other information to the NRC raises the question of NRC. FirstEnergy's record of failing to disclose view. The NRC should not have to prove what other violations they may be keeping from public in order to bring those violations to light.

that Davis-Besse has violated other safety regulations

202 225 5745 J.Kuc inich 202 225 5,'45 T-031 P.004/030 F-371 From-Rep.Diflnii J.Kucinich From-Rep.Dennis Feb-03-2003 11:39am Feb-03-2003 11:39am Dr. William D. Travers January 27, 2003 Page 3 they have to operate Davis-Besse as a Nuclear Power Station, If First&ergy wishes to continue license.

NRC for a new operating the choice to apply to the will license and forcing them to apply for a new One Revoking FirstEnergy's operating regulations to show that the facility complies with all on FirstEnergy place the burden of proof force the Davis-Besse facility to undergo te exhaustive and meticulous and guidelines, and will These inspections necessary to obtain a new operating license.

inspections, tests and inquiries based not just those parts the NRC can justify inspecting entire facility, will cover Davis-Besse's to undergo Not only is the authority to force FirstEnergy problems.

on their knowledge of past NRC's powers, it is essential that the NRC exercise this te such a searching inquiry well within do and regulations, and ensure that other licensees with its rules authority to ensure compliance with lie and hide information from the NRC than to comply to not find that it is more efficient the NRC's rules.

the basis for the request

11. Facts that constitute issue licenses to Congess gives the NRC the authority to Under 42 UI.S.C. § 2133(b) who agree to observe such safety standards to protect to observe and persons who "are equipped establish."

may by rule danger to life or property as the Commission health and to minimize licensee violates the authority to take those licenses away if the NRC Congress has also given the

§2137.

those standards. See 42 U.S.C §50.100.?

authority in its own regulations. See 10 C.F.R.

The NRC recognizes this A license or conStruction of licenses and consmuctionpenmits for cause. statehnent in the uspension, modification in part, for any material false or because of or modified, in whole or 2

(-Revocatimo, pemit may be revoked, suspended, or otder statamrt of fict required of whe applicant; application for license or in the supplcmental

T-031 P.005/030 202 225 5745 Feb-03-2003 i1:39am J.Kucinich From-Rmp.Dmnnhu J.Kucinich From-Rep.Dennis 202 225 5745 T-031 P.005/030 F-371 F.b-03-2003 11:39am Dr. William D. Travers January 27, 2003 Page 4 can revoke a license for (1) "any material false statement ... .of fact rcquired of the The NRC

.., which would warrant the Commission to applicant"; (2) "conditions revealed by the applicant (3)failure to.. . operate a facility in refuse to grant a license on an original application";

permit or license"'; or (4) "failure to observe, any accordance with the terms of the construction 3

of the act, regulations, license, permit, or Order of the Commission."

of the terms and provisions of this regulation, including fraudulently FirstEnergy has violated each and every prong and the operational safety of the plant to misrepresenting its records, the nature of its inspections, the NRC.

upon three of its regulations in addition The NRC has identified ten violations, irfringing findings include:

to violating FirstEnergy's operating license. Those boundary leakage;

1) Operating the reactor with prohibited pressure acontinuingbuild-lp of boric acid

2) failure to take adequate corrective action for deposits on the reactor head; recurrent accumulations of boric acid on

3) failure to take adequate corrective action for containment air cooler fins; or statement of fact or any report, record, inspection, or other tose conditions revealed by the application for license to refuse to grant a license on an original application (other than means, which would wanrant the Coemission this part); or for failure to coDslsrct or operate a facility in relating to Secs. 50.51, 50.42(a), and 50.43(b) of or license, provided that failurc to make timely completion of accordance with the terms of the construction permit the proposed const¢uction or alteration of a facility the provisions of Sec. 50.55(b); or for violation of, or failure to under a construction permit shall be governed by the act, regulations, liccnse. permit, or ordcr observe, any of the tenrs and provisions of of the CommissionsL) 3 Id.

Inspection Report Augmented Inspection Team Follow-Up Spccial

' Sec Davis-Besse Nuclear Powcr Station NRC No. 50-346/02-0(DPRS), October 2, 2002.

From-Rep.Dmnnis J.Kucinich 202 225 5745 T-031 P.006/030 F-371 Feb-03-2003 11:39am Dr. William D. Travers January 27, 2003 Page 5 of radiation element

4) failure to take adequate corrective action for repeated clogging radionuclides, and filters although a sample of the filter deposits revealed iron oxides, primary chemistry, action for

5) failure to follow the corrective action procedure and take timely corrective a modification a condition adverse to quality, in that the licensee failed to implement head and CRDM to permit complete inspection and cleaning of the reactor vessel nozzles; trend in RCS

6) failure to complete an identified corrective action for an adverse unidentified leakage;

7) deficiencies in the licensee's Boric Acid Corrosion Control procedure;

8) failure to follow the boric acid corrosion control procedure; program procedure;

9) two examples of failure to follow the station's corrective action or required by the

10) multiple examples of information provided to the Commission not complete Conmnission's regulations to be maintained by the licensee that were and accurate.5 These actions, or inactions, violate:

A) FirstEnergy's license to operate the Davis-Besse facility, specifically Coolant Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation of Reactor System Operational Leakage, paragraph 3.4.6.2; measures B) 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, which requires that shall be taken to ensure conditions adverse to quality such as failures,

5745 T-031 P.007/030 F-371 202 225 P.007/030 F-371 J.Kucinich Fram-Rup.Dennhu J.Kucinich From-Rep.Dennis 202 225 5745 T-031 Fmb-03-2003 11:40am Feb-03-2003 11:40am Dr. William D. Travers January 27, 2003 Page 6 and malfimctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective material and equipment, non-confoimances are promptly identified and corrected, and that for the significant conditions adverse to quality, the measures shall assure that to cause of the condition is determined and that corrective actions are taken preclude repetition; C) 10 C.F.R. Part 50 Appendix B, Criterion V, which requires that activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures, or drawings, of a type appropriate to the circumstances and shall be accomplished in accordance with these instructions, procedures or drawings; and, D) 10 C.F.R. 50.9 which requires that information provided to the Commission by a licensee or information required by statute or by the Commissions be regulations, order, or license conditions maintained by the licensee shall 6

complete and accurate in all material respects.

the nature of its FirstEnergy's willful hiding of records and willful misrepresentation of are criminal inspections and the state of the Davis-Besse nuclear power facility, moreover,

§ 2272; 18 U.S.C.

violations, which may be punished by fines and imprisonment. See 42 U.S.C.

§ 1001.

FirstEnergy If the NRC does not use its authority to withdraw FirstEnergy's license after safety, and force the has flouted the NRC's regulations with considerable consequence to public s See id. at pp. ii. iii.

' See id. at pp. 2. 4. 57, 9, 12, 14, 15, and 19.

11:40am From-Rep.Dennis J.Kucinich 202 225 5745 T-031 P.008/030 F-371 Feb-03-2003 Dr. William D. Travers January 27, 2003 Page 7 examination, the question arises whether operators of this facility to undergo a fall re-licensing to revoke a license is not a hollow power, this authority will ever be exercised. The authority and the NRC must not treat it as such.

A. The Hole a 5 by 7 inch hole, 6 inches deep, On March 6, 2002, workers at First Energy discovered stainless steel lining, which had begun to in the head of the nuclear reactor, leaving only a thin 7 This hole was discovered by accident crack and bulge, to contain the nuclear reaction inside.

the nozzles exhibited "unexpected while workers were repairing cracked nozzles. One of investigated to see what allowed for movement" while being repaired and workers, fortunately, hole were not discovered, the reactor could this movement. Experts have concluded that if the have also concluded that Davis-Besse's have ruptured within the next year of operation. Experts not have been able to stop a nuclear meltdown from occurring. 9 safety systems may predict, the hole could have been Although the head corroded in a way the NRC did not had FirstEnergy acted responsibly, either discovered much sooner or ameliorated altogether As this petition will show, within its own operating license and within federal regulations.

rusty boric acid deposits, (2) a significant FirstEnergy knew that there were: (1) excessive and filters in its plant caused by an unidentified increase in unidentified coolant leakage, (3) clogged Scientists, 7 Pavis-Besse: The Reactor with a Hole in its Head, Union of Concerned9 2

. October 29, 2002, p.

htr://www.ucstisa.orgiclean energy/nuclear safe/pa&e.cfihate1D=7 Nuclear Power Station, Unit No.1, April 29, 2002.

'See Licensee Event Report 2002-002-000, Davis-Besse 29, 2002.

9See Davis-Besse: The Reactor with a Holc in Its Head, Union of Concerned Scientists, October

202 225 5745 iKucinich 202 225 5745 T-031 P.009/030 F-371 Feb-03-2003 11:40am From-Rmp.Dmnnis J.Kucinich From-Rep.Dennis Feb-03-2003 Dr. William D. Travers January 27, 2003 Page 8 and, moreover, (4) knew that it was unable to fully inspect or clean the source of corrosion, and FirstEnergy either hid or refused to disclose this information to the NRC, vessel head. Yet, for leaks in its to extend the time the plant was running before conducting tests to look lobbied the reactor.

the very cause of the hole in the head of CRDM nozzles - which turned out to be in its and mandates the most severe enforcement power the NRC has This is unconscionable, license for the Davis-Besse station.

arsenal, revocation of FirstEnergy's operating Head B. Failure to Provide Access to Reactor notices to Davis-Besse regarding the In the late 1980's the NRC issued several 0

system pressure boundary resulting from boric acid.1 In other degradation of the reactor coolant cause the the kdnd of problems that would ultimately words, NRC made FirstEnergy aware of built precluded The way that the Davis-Besse plant was hole over a decade before it happened.

of the head of the nuclear reactor. Other plants with similar designs were easy visual inspections of the larger access ports into the structure to allow for better inspection and cleaning cutting considered a similar alteration in the structure vessel head. In the spring of 1990, Davis-Besse decided cancel head."' In September of 1993, managers after finding boric acid deposits on the fsro Boric of Pteactor Coolant System Pressure Bounduyresuiing

' 0 Sce, e.g. IN 86-108,4/24/1987, Degradaion, Acid Corrosion.

with closure plated inibe

("MOD 90-0012 initiated to install multiple access ports

" See MOD 90-0012, 3/21/1990 from the CRD flanges and to permit cleaning and inspecticn of the reactor head. Bonc acid has leaked susceptible to degradation.')

closure head is reactor head is carbon steel and therefore has accunmlated on the reactor head. The

From-Rep.Dennis J.Kucinich 202 225 5745 T-03 1 P.01t0/030 F-371 Feb-03-2003 11:40am Dr. William D. Travers January 27, 2003 Page 9 had been cleaned the work order to alter the structure because they claimed that the reactor 2

successfully duning the last three outages." This claim was false.

better access to In 1994, engineers again recommended altering the structure to allow for the reactor vessel head the head. Reports from Davis-Besse, in 1994, state 'Video inspections of do not encompass for the C1XDM nozzle issue and as a follow-up to the CDRM flange inspection from the reactor a 100% inspection of the vessel head. Cleaning of excessive boric acid reside again vessel head also does not encompass I00%."'13 This recommended modification was 4 indicate brought up in the fall of 1998, and a budget for it was approved.' In 1998, reports allow for

'there is less thanr 50% accessibility to the reactor vessel head, which does not the modification complete inspection or cleaning of potential boric acid deposits.'S In 2000, plant with this was again put off, this time until 2002.16 Davis-Besse is the only nuclear power and necessary access to design that failed to make the modification necessary to allow complete the head of the reactor. 7 using high powered 12 See MOD 90-0012, 9/27/1993 ("Void Request approvcd. Current inspectsn techniques tdming last 3 outages head cameras precluded the need for inspecton ports, additional, cleaning of the reactor vessel was completed successfully without requiring access por.'")

3MOD 94-0025, 7/18/1994.

4 See DBPRC Mceting History, 9/1/1998; DBATS 9/17/1998; DBPRC Meeting History 9/17/1998.

5 Id.

16 See DBPRC Meyting History, 9/7/2000.

Marcy Kaptur inquiring 17 See NRC Rcsponse to Letter from Congressman Edward I.Starley and Congresswoman into Safety Issues at the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Plant, June 28, 2002, p.11

From-Rep.Dennis J.Kucinich 202 225 5T45 T-031 P.011/030 F-371 Feb-03-2003 11:41am Dr. William D. Travers January 27, 2003 Page 10

- 2002.

C. Failure to Inspect and Clean Reactor Head 1990 claimed that acid deposits In refueling shutdowns in 1990, 1991 and 1993, managers 5 reviewing records, however, it has been were fully cleaned from the reactor vessel head." After reactor head every single time. There is determined that workers left boric acid deposits on the at all in 1990, or that it was cleaned in no documentation that the reactor head was inspected head was cleaned in 1993.)

1992. FirstEnergy cannot verify how well the reactor 1994, even though engineers Davis-Besse decided not to inspect the reactor head in 20 it be done, because it bad not made a commitment to NRC to do so. In 1996, an recoinmended show boric acid accumulation, and inspection was performed, and photographs and videotape no record showing that the head was rust stained boric acid on the reactor head. There is 21 cleaned.

' Sec MOD 90-0012,9/27/1993.

Nuclear Power Station, 4/15/2002, pp. 26-28 "See Root Cause Analysis Report, First Energy, Davis-Besse full inspection of the head, and that records did not show that the (explaining that the camera angle did not allow for head but did reported an excessive anmount of boron on the RPV were head bad been inspected in 199D, in 1991 engineers (a strong indication of corrosion) were found, and not clean it, and in 1993, reddish brownboron deposits could not be verified.)

cleaned, but the effectiveness of the cleaning the cornumicnt Al6892 requires a visual inspection of 2

°See PCAQR 94-0295, 3/17194 & 4/29/94. ("TERMS of B&W safcty the potential for CRDM nozzle craciing in support reactor vessel head every refueling to determine requires a visual inspcction be cracking. This safety evaluation evaluation to the NRC discussing CRDM nozzle Affairs and Design Engincering its presence. Regulatory performed to either no cracking exists or to conirm that visual inspection is not a comitment rnade to the NRC, it is reconmmended believe that although the enhanced the NRC and of the reactor vessel head is not a comitninen to it be done.")C'Since the enhanced visual inspection though the been identified in the U.S. and boric acid leakage due to the fact that no cases of head cracks have of a crack being present. in dhink there is a significant risk CRDM nozzle flanges is low, Plant Engineering doesn't to us are not highly reliable. Thercfore, he does not believe that addition, the inspection methods ctrrently available it is necessary to perfbrl the inspection at this tine.")

of boric acid 21 See PCAQR 96-0551, 4/21/1996 (BVideo tape of CRDM nozzle6 inspection shows several patches at the bottom (core location p- ) shows rust or brown stained boron accumulation on the RV head. CDRM nozzle 67 or brown stained boron accumulation.") See also has rust of the nozzle at the head. Thc head =a in the vicinity also Root Cause Analysis Report, p. 28.

From-Rep.Dennis J1ucinich 202 225 5745 T-031 P.012/030 F-371 Feb-03-2003 11:41am Dr. William D. Travers January 27, 2003 Page I 1 and again found boric acid on the In 1998, Davis-Besse inspected the reactor head as "fist-sized clumps" of red rusty boric reactor head, indeed several deposits were described to clean the reactor head, and documented it acid.22 This time Davis-Besse decided to attempt of the boric acid deposits to remain because with a video.n Workers, however, allowed some 24 structure, as noted above, made it difficult to clean parts of the head.

the found large "solid rock hard" deposits In 2000, workers inspected the head and again to remove as much boric acid "as possible" and of boric acid.25 A recommendation was made 26 leaving the rest of the boric acid build-up on the reactor head. Workers attempt to justify the head with pressurized water, but were unable to remove all of the boric acid deposits.

cleaned fully. An April 25, 2000 order, signed by Reports, however, state that the work was performed 27 system engineer, states "Work performed without deviation." On July 7, the reactor coolant a report stating "Engineering displayed 2000, the plant's quality assurance manager signed accumulaion from the reactor head was noteworthy persistence in ensuring boric acid that the cleaning was not successful and thoroughly cleaned." An engineer later acknowledged 28 n See PCAQR 98-0649,411811998; PCAQR 99-0767,4/25/1998 23 See Video, Reactor Head Cleaning, 5/4/1998.

to the very available to do the work and the limited access 24 Root Cause Anaysis Report, p.29. (Ibe equipment top of the RPV head limited the removal process.")

to the inside of the called 'Boron rerovalday.' Deconpeoplebroke 2s See RCS SPB, 4/12/2000 (Todayshouldbe rock deposits of boron on the head. Recommemdation at this time Rx head with crowbars and reported solid hbrd cvaluatc head condition, contact B&WOG to justify iot removing all continue to remove as much boron as possible, or steam better to justify Icaving boron on head.")

the dcposits, DO NOT recommend use of water 2 Seeji.

April 25,2000 (FOIA 2002-0226).

27 See Davis-Besse Work Order 00-001846-000, View, The Plain Dealer, 12/01/02.

23 See Mangels, John, & Funk, John, Hidden in Plain

11:41am From-Rep.Dennis Ji.Kucinich 202 225 5745 T-031 P.013/030 F-371 Feb-03-2003 Dr. William D. Travers January 27, 2003 Page 12 no additional time should some boric acid deposits were lefi behind. Management decided that 29 Management did not be spent attempting to clean the head because it would not be successful.

3 attempt to justify leaving boric acid on the head.

During the next scheduled shut-down in 2002, which FirstEnergy successfully the reactor head.3" After lobbied the NRC to delay, over 900 pounds of boric acid was found on the pineapple-sized hole finally clearing away this unprecedented accumulation, workers found the nuclear reaction in the reactor head, leaving only the thin stainless-steel lining to contain to fill this purpose or inside. This lining, which was cracldng and bulging, was never meant withstand that kind of pressure.

[CRDM]

D. Failure to inspect, correct or identify Control Rod Drive Mechanism nozzle leakages.

Cracking of On August 3, 2001, the NRC issued Bulletin 2001-01 "Circumferential of cracked and leaking Reactor PressLure Vessel Head Penetration Nozzles" describing instances design were found CREDM nozzles. Some of the nozzles at other nuclear power plants of similar cracked nozzle could to have circumferential cracks, leading to the dangerous possibility that a nozzle leakage would be ejected from the vessel head causing a major nuclear accident CRDM would remain when lead to excessive boric acid deposits, as the boric acid in the coolant water leakage.

water evaporated from the hot reactor head. It would also lead to excess unidentified 9 See Root Cause Analysis Report, p.30.

3 See id.

that the approximately 900 pounds of 31See id. at p. 20 'in surmmary, while the case is not conclusive, it is probable from the PWSCC crack at noles 2 boric acid deposits that accumulatcd on the TV head are the result of leakage and 3."

202 225 5745 T-031 P.014/030 F-371 Fsb-03-2003 11:42am Fram-Rmp.Dannis J.Kucinich Dr. William D. Travers January 27, 2003 Page 13 reactor was aware from 1999 on, that the amount of unidentified leakage from the FirstEnergy 32 doubled from its historic amount and was increasing steadily. Nobody coolant system had found the source of that unidentified leakage.

of 2001, the Vice-President of Davis-During a phone call with the NRC in November there is a high-likelihood that [there were]

Besse agreed that "based on operating experience the plant to identify and correct those leaks.

leaks."33 Yet he would not agree to shut down in nozzles 1, 2,3, 5 and 47. FirstEnergy During the 2002 inspection, cracks were found and that the worst crack began in 1990 and grew to a through wall crack between 1994 postulates 1996 the crack should have been discovered between 1996. FirstEnergy further postulates that cleaned and inspected as it had committed to and 1998 if the reactor head had been thoroughly theNRC to do.35 Reactor InfonnationNoticc 2002-13, "Possible Indicators of Ongoing 32 Regulatory Commission, Safety at Davis-See Nuclear Petition Pursuant to 10 C.FX 2.206 regarding Pircsure Vessel Head Degradation." April 4,2002;Report, pp. 16-17.

Analysis Besse Nuclear Power Plant; Root Causc 11/8/2001, 6:38p.m.

To: Steven Long, From: Jack Strosnider, 33 Memo: Re: After Meeting Discussions, 3' See Root Cause Analysis Report, pp. 22-23.

bare head visual inspection had id. at 23. (If the RPV head had been initially clean, and if a timely 100% as the classical 3 See have expressed itself within a short time bccn complcted, the leakage would most probably have been apparent within one or two fuel cycles from the time would "popcorn" crust of boric acid deposits. This large-scale corrosion of the through the nozzle wall and would not havc been accompanied by the crack progressed observed, and its detection the 'popcorn' manifestation was not yet low-allow steel. However, at Davis-Besse, leakage deposits.")

could have been obscured by previous flange

202 225 5745 J.Kucinich Prom-Rsp.Dmnnis J.Kucinich From-Rep.Dennis 202 225 5T45 T-031 P.015/030 F-371 Feb-03-2003 Fsb-03-2003 11:42am 11:42am Dr. William D. Travers January 27, 2003 Page 14 license, was required to shut down FirstEnergy, pursuant to the conditions of its operating within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> of a through wall crack in a CRDM nozzle. 3 6 Davis-the Davis-Besse station 6 years.

Besse was operating in violation of its license for over E. Ignored Clogged Air Filters on Radiation Detectors.

radiation detectors. The air filters For over two years, boric acid clogged air filters on the they were changed due to the were supposed to be changed on a monthly basis. Normally, 37 Beginning in the spring of 1999, the filters were schedule rather hanm from becoming clogged.

38 sometimes as often as every day.

becoming clogged on an increasingly frequent basis, filters analyzed. Chemical analysis of Engineers at Davis-Besse bad the material clogging the due to "corrosion."39 Reports further the debris determined it was "iron oxide" and it was attributable to a steam leak4 suggested that, because the particles were so fine, it was not find it. Instead, they continued Although engineers suspected a coolant leak, they did Workers, moreover, moved the monitor to clean and change the filters, sometimes every day.

System leakage shall be limited to: (a) No Pressure 3.4.6.2 Conditions on Operating License (Reactor Coolam BOUNDARY LBAKAGE, be in at least HOT STANDBY 36 Boundary Leakage. Action: a. With any PRESSURE following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.')

within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the 37 See Root Cause Analysis Report, p.36 2, pp. 145-151.

is Scc id; Sequence of Relcvant Events, First Energy, Attachment Robert C. Hovland, July 30, 1999, p. 1. (reporting on a 19 Sce also Condition Report, No. 1999-1300. Supervisor detectors located inside the reactor containment building problem identified by workers at Davis-Besse. Radiation failed due to debris collecting on thei inlet filters.

which continually monitorcd radiation levels ofthe air repeatedly from 'corosion.')

oxide" Chemical analysis of the debris determined it was "Iron 40 See Root Cause Analysis Report, p. 36.

From-Rep.Dennis JKucinich 202 225 5745 T-031 P.016/030 F-371 Feb-03-2003 11:42am Dr. William D. Travers January 27, 2003 Page 15 sensors because it intakes to different spots, and even bypassed one of the devices' three continued to trigger alarms '~

F. FirstEnergy Lobbies ARC to defer inspections.

of management at It is with the above admitted knowledge and understanding on the part lobbied the NRC to defer Davis-Besse that the NRC must look at FirstEnergy's actions when it inspections for cracked and leaking nozzles.

of cracked and In August of 2001, the NRC issued bulletin 2001-01, describing instances to provide specific leaking nozzles, including CRDM nozzles. The bulletin asked the plants to do so, plants like information about the structural integrity of the plants nozzles. In order of the nozzles before Davis-Besse were asked to do a "qualified visual examination of 100%"

to give each plant time December 31, 2001.42 NRC set the date of December 31, 2001 in order and equipment in place. 43 to schedule a shut-down and arrange to have the necessary personnel given time-table." All plants All other plants performed the necessary inspections within the of them found with the same design as Davis-Besse found cracked CRDM nozzles. Several to nozzle ejection and a circumferential cracks, the kind of cracks that NRC believed could lead major nuclear accident.

Yet, Plain Dealer 12/29/02.

" Mangels, John & Funk, John, Davis-Bessc Workers' Repair Job Hardest 42 NRC 2001-01 bulletin, August 3, 2001 of Davis-Besse Regarding Damage to a See id.; Office of the Inspector General Event Inquiry, NRC's Regulation the Reactor Vessel Head, Case No.02-032, December 30, 2002.

of Davis-Besse Regarding Damage to the 44 See Office of the Inspector General Evcnt Inquiry, NRC's Regulation Reactor Vessel Head, Case No.02-032, December 30,2002, p. 10.

T-031 P.017/030 F-371 202 225 5745 P.017/030 F-371 Feb-03-2003 11:43am J.Kucinich From-Rmp.Dmnnhs J.Kucinich From-Rep.Dennis 202 225 5745 T-031 Feb-03-2003 11:43am Dr. William D. Travers January 27, 2003 Page 16 that, although it ranked Davis-FirstEnergy responded on September 4,2001, stating cracks, it felt that its previous inspections Besse as a "high-susceptibility" plant for developing to perform these inspections until the end were sufficient and that it did not intend to shut down more meetings throughout October and of March, 2002.45 FirstEnergy and the NRC held information to the NRC attempting to justify November, where FirstEnergy provided additional FirstEnergy misrepresented the quality the delay of thesc inspections. During these meetings, reactor head.

and actuality of inspections of the nozzles and the where FirstEnergy's objective was In October of 2001, during a meeting with the NRC, was safe to operate until the next to provide a reasonable basis for assurance that Davis-Besse assured the NRC that "All CRDM scheduled refueling outage in March of 2002, FirstEnergy boron deposits using video penetrations were verified to be free from the characteristic These videos were made before and after recordings from the previous 2 refueling outages.

Besse has a better as-built record of their cleaning the head."4 They fauther stated that "Davis 6

such, Davis-Besse has done more and better head and the interference fits than other plants. As 47 gave this information to the NRC, knowing quality inspections than other plants.'" FirstEnergy of the reactor head for over 10 years, knowing that they had been unable to do a full inspection over 10 years, and knowing that there was a that they had left boric acid deposits on the head for and leakage.

virtually 100% possibility of CRDM nozzle cracks Cmcking of Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Penetraion

'd Response to NRC Bulletin 2001-01, -Circurrfereaisal2731, September 4, 2001.

Nozzle," Dockct # 50-346, Licence # NPF-3, Scrial #

p.1.

"W Commission Technical Assistant Briefing, October 11,2001, 47 Id.

From-Rep.Dennis J.Kucinich 202 225 5745 T-031 P.018/030 F-371 Feb-03-2003 11:43am Dr. William D. Travers January 27, 2003 Page 17 apparently did FirstEnergy showed the NRC video-tapes taken of the reactor head. They bead service platform, not share with the NRC, however, that because of the design of the reactor as recommended and because FirstEnergy had refused to alter the design of that service platform head.

by its own engineers, the video-recorder was unable to view the entire reactor of the reactor FirstEnergy hid information from the NRC. FirstEnergy had a photograph in the photograph -

head taken during April of 2000. Damage from corrosion is clearly indicated the reactor head. 4" This there is an evident "red river" of rusty boric acid flowing from on top of was attempting to photo was not included in a packet given to the NRC when FirstEnergy conducting convince the NRC that they should be allowed to continue to operate without inspections for nozzle leaks.49 FirstEnergy, moreover, did not share with the NRC that the amount of unidentified nor did they share that coolant leakage had doubled since 1999 and was continuing to increase, share that they were they were unable to identify the source of this leakage. FirstEnergy did not boric acid dust, and that having daily problems with their air filters becoming clogged with rusty tell the NRC that they had been told that this was a warning sign for corrosion. Nor did they they were unable to identify the source of this corrosion.

NRC that Instead, FirstEnergy offered to perform compensatory measures to assure the offered to 1) shut the plant would operate in a safe manner until a scheduled shut down. They "See Attached Photo. DB-I2rfo jpg misled about trouble at Davis-

'9 Mangels, John & Funk, John, Hidden in Plain View: Regulators said they were evident in this photo 7akc in April 2000 Besse, The Plain Dealer, Deccmber 1, 2002. ("Rust and dried boric acid arcdid not provide the photo to the Nuclear during an inspection of the Davis-Besse nuclear reactor lid. The company on the lid weren't leaking.")

Rcgulatory Commission last fall, as it attempted to convince the agency that nozzles

11:43am From-RepmDennis J.Kucinich 202 225 5745 T-031 P.019/030 F-37 Feb-03-2003 Dr. William D. Travers January 27, 2003 Page 18 as originally planned; 2) down Davis-Besse by February 16, 2002, instead of March 31, 2002, maximize availability of operatc at lower reactor coolant system (RCS) hot leg temperature; 3) and 5) perform inspections redundant safety systems; 4) provide additional training to operators; these compensatory of 100% of the VH~sY' Nuclear experts have persuasively argued that and NRC knew or actions had no real effect on the safety of thc reactor, and both FirstEncrgy through the Freedom Of should have known this." In fact, NRC staff communications obtained Information Act adequacy and document that Nuclear Reactor Regulation staff originally doubted the 52 significance of these same compensatory actions.

to allow it to FirstEnergy, through deception and disingenuousness, persuaded the NRC through February 16, 2002.53 FirstEnergy has since confessed that it acted continue operating 54 this way because it was more concerned with production than safety.

Nuclcar Operating Company so NRC Staff Evaluation related to NRC Bulletin 2001-01 Response FirstEnergy 3, 2002.

Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1, Docket No. 50-346, December St See Gunter, Paul & Lochbaum, Dave, Anatomy of a Flawed Decision: NRC has a Brain but No Spine, NIRS, UCS, 15/2002, p. 4.

Davis-Besse Operating 52 nEzil from Allen Kiser, NM. To Stephen Sands, NRR, 11/26/2001,"Forward changes are "rngCgglble."); Email Temperature Change," FOIA 2002-0229 (stating that opational temperature NR, 12/07/2001, "Fwd: Re: Inspections of from Christine Lipa, Region a, to Douglas Pickett and Stephen Sands, operator' is neither dedicated nor staged); E-Davis-Besse Commtmemnts," FOA 2002-0229 (stating that "dedicated Inspections of Davis-Besse CommitmentS,"

mail from Gareth Perry, N , to Steven Long, NRM, 12/13/2001, Fwd: that this would result in a significant FO1A 2002-0229 (stating in regard to dedicated operator, "I can't imagine increase in safety.").

5 3 ScC Mangels, John & Funk, John, Hidden in Plain Vicw: Regulators said they were misled about trouble at Davis-disingenuous," Brian Sheron, the agency's Bcsse, The Plain Dealer, December 1, 2002. ("1 think thats a little bit were asking them to provide us with all the associate director for project licensing and technical analysis, said. "We we did not get everything.")

information to support their argument to operate beyond Dec. 31. Apparently, 10 was less than an 54See Management and Human Performance Root Causes, FENOC, August 15, 2002, p. ("There combined with taldng adequate nuclear safety focus - There was a focus on production, established by management, of degraded conditions."); See id.

minimum actions to meet regulatory requirements, that rcsulted in the acceptance

T-031 P.020/030 F-371 202 225 5745 F-371 iKucinich From-RepOennis J.Kucinich From-Rep.Dennis 202 225 5745 T-031 P.020/030 Feb-03-2003 11:44am Feb-03-2003 11:44am Dr. William D. Travers January 27,2003 Page 19 knowing The NRC, moreover, allowed FirstEnergy to continue operating Davis-Besse nozzles, a condition that that there was a very high likelihood of cracked and leaking CRDM that the NRC, as requires immediate shut-down. The Office of Inspector General concluded on FirstEnergy, and less well, was overly concerned with the financial impact of a shut-down nuclear power plant concerned that FirstEnergy complied with regulations ensuring that the operated in a safe mannerAs G. FirstEnergy's Behavior Following Discovery of the Hole.

rehabilitated since the FirstEnergy has not exhibited behavior showing that it has been contemplated how to fix discovery of the hole in the nuclear reactor head. When FirstEnergy first putting a steel band-aid the hole in the reactor head, they wanted to patch the hole - essentially the company finally on top of it - an unprecedented move in the nuclear industry. Although in the long run, the decided not to take this route because it determined it would be too expensive for public safety. 5 6 fact that it was even publicly contemplated shows a continuing contempt concerns - Rigor in assessing issues for at p.29 ('Beginning in the mid 1990s, management focus was on production actions to meet regulatory rcquirements was their potential impact on nuclear safety di-imiihed: Taldng minimumless directly involved, and relied on interpreted to be adequate for nuclear safety - Management style was subordinates to escalate concerns.")

55 See Office of the Inspector Gcneral, NRC's Regulation of Davis-Besse regarding Damage to the Reactor Vessel Head (Case No.02-03S). December 30,2002, pp. 23-24. See also Gunter, Paul & Lochbaum, Davc, Anatomy of a 8/5/2002 (concluding that the NRC allowed Davis-Flawed Decision: NRC has a Brain but No Spinc, NIRS, UCS, and arguably all 5 - which are to govern all NRC Besse to continue operating knowing that 4 of 5 safety principles mistakes, has disputed the findings of the decision maling - wcre not met). The NRC, instead of learning from its about where the NRC's priorities lie. See Inspector Gcneral's report in a letter that has done much to increase doubt Report on NRC's regulation of Davis-Memorandum to: Hubert T. Bell, Inspector General, From: Richard Meserve, January 8, 2003.

Besse Regarding Damage to the Reactor Vessel Head (Case No.02-03S),

Plain Dealer, 5/24/2002.

m See Krouse, Peter, Repair Job at Davis-Besse deemed too expensive, The

Feb-03-2003 11:44am Frm-RepDennis J Kcinich 202225 5T45 T-031 P.021/030 F-371 Dr. William D. Travers January 27, 2003 Page 20 at Shortly afier the shat-down, four employees were unnecessarily exposed to radiation quickly in Davis-Besse. FirstEnergy tried an untested method to shut down the reactor more expelled order to save time and money. This resulted in additional bursts of radiation being working in within the plant. FirstEnergy allowed workers to forego some safety apparatus while then allowed the the radiated area because they could work more quickly without it. FirstEnergy and shoes workers to leave the plant with particles of radiation clinging to their bodies, clothes until these and to spread that radiation into the environment. This radiation was not discovered 57 58 workers visited other nuclear plants and set off alarms on their way in to the plants.

of the FirstEnergy did not properly train inspectors who were to oversee the integrity double-reactor before start-up. FirstEnergy's failings were not discovered until NRC inspectors, and checldng FirstEnergy's work, found that FirstEnergy inspectors had missed some corrosion rules and acid build-up. The NRC found that the failings of these inspectors violated two NRC could have jeopardized the plant's safety if allowed to persist 59 The NRC was forced to order 60 the company to retrain its inspectors and re-inspect the entire containment building.

Davis-Besse broke rulcs, but fine notlikely, The Plain Dealer, 118/03; NRC 57See Funk, John & Mangels, Jo bn, Special Inspections - Substantial Potential for an Overexposure of Occupational Workcrs (Report No. 50-346/02-16 No. 50-346/02-06(DRS))

(DRS)) and Uncontrolled Release of Radioactive Material to the Environment (Report the licensee did not take (explaining that though this turned out to be of low to moderate safety concern, because much more serious and suitable measurements of radioactive material, the exposure to radiation could have beenduring the work activity that the failure of the licensee to obtain and properly analyze representative air samples intake is an apparent and/or adequately conduct bioassay measurements so as to characterizethe radiological violation of 10 C.F.R. 20.1204; 20.1502(b))

(Report No. 50-NRC

' Special Inspcctions - Substantial Potntial for an Overxposure of Occupational WorkersNo. 50-346/02-(Report 346/02-16 (DRS)) and Unconuollcd Relcase of Radioactive Material to theEnviromnent staff became aware that four of 06(DRS)) Two Preliminary White Findings, l17103. at p.4 ("In April 2002, the NRC upon their anival at other nuclear power plants fhese individuals wcrc determined to bc radioactively contaminated and that the source of the contamination was potentially from their work at Davis-Besse.")

5See Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station NRC Special Inspection - Boric Acid Corrosion Extent of Condition -

10C.FR Part 50, Report No. 50-236/02-09 (DRS)), September 13, 2002 (finding that Davis-Besse violated

202 225 5745 T-031 P.022/030 F-371 Feb-03-2003 11:44am From-Rep.Dennis J.Kucinich Dr. William D. Travers January 27, 2003 Page 21 being forced to work excessive There bave been reports, moreover, that workers are concerns whether employees working long overtime. Employees and safety groups have raised have several times in recent months hours can do their jobs effectively. Davis-Besse employees have objected to uncompensated alerted management to working hour concerns. Employees feel pressured to work for free or risk future overtime and protested that Davis-Besse employees that work out there," Oak Harbor resident merit raises.6 ' "I'm friends with quite a few people during a September meeting. "I know Tom Lentz told NRC officials overseeing Davis-Besse and six and seven days a week. That cannot some of them have been on 12-hour shifts or more 62 be a safe working environment."

head and other heavy objects in During the repair of a crane used to move the reactor's supervising the work allowed the crane to be the containment building, a First Energy manager according to FirstEnergy, overly concerned used despite the unfinished work because be was, quality. He was placed on administrative with staying on schedule, and less concerned with adequately, but skated on minor repairs - they leave. Workers, reportedly, did the major repairs change burned out light bulbs or clean did not label new wiring, replace electrical panel screw, of maintenance saw the faulty work, he up debris. FirstEnergy claims that when the director acceptance and Drawings," in that, the licensee failed to provide Appendix B, Criterion V "Instuctions, Procedures for the cxtent of condition inspcctions of systems in used criteria or requirements to follow the inspection plans V, Instructions, Proccduires and Drawings," in iha, the and 10 C.F.IL Parn 50, Appendix B, Criterion of condition containment, ccrtification to perform contaiwnent area extent licensee failed to adequately trainpersonnel for VT-2 errors hinder Davis-Besse restart, The Plain Dealer, walkdowns.); See also Mangels, John, NRC: Inspection 9124/2002.

60 FUnk, John & Mangels, John, Davis-Besse stag-up is pushed back, The Plain Dealer 10/0812002.

spur complaint The Plain Dealer, 12/1412002.

'"Funk, John & Mangels, John, Davis-Besse work hours

'2 See id.

T-031 P.023/Oaa F-371 From-Rep.Dennis J.Kucinich 202 225 5145 T-031 P.023/030 F-371 Feb-03-2003 11:45am Dr. William D. Travers January 27, 2003 Page 22 ordered the crane shut down until all of the work was complete.

63 The manager who was placed claims that he on administrative leave, Timothy Tackett, a veteran supervisor at Davis-Besse, claims he was punished was being forced to skimp on quality for the sake of expedience. He was pushing with administrative leave because he complained to the NRC that FirstEnergy 4 suit against FirstEnergy employees to stay on schedule at the expense of safety." He has filed this event "evidence that because of their treatment of him. An employee of the NRC has called safety has not been the plant's culture of sloppiness and emphasis on power production over snuffed out."65

- a potentially FirstEnergy let debris accumulate on the floor of the containment building with trash, knowing that, serious safety hazard. FirstEnergy allowed the floor to become littered up the emergency sump, in the event of a breach of the nuclear core, this debris could easily clog reaction and potentially thwarting workers from effectively cooling down the nuclear to clean up this debris contributing to a nuclear meltdown. FirstEnergy did not even attempt had pointed out the harm until the summer of 2002 - after nuclear watchdog groups and the NRC in its messiness. 6 6 stains on the During this shut-down, FirstEnergy discovered further boric acid and rust decided to base of the reactor, a potentially extremely hazardous condition. FirstEnergy and running tests.

investigate these signs of potential damage by performing further inspections, The Plain Dcalar, 911/82002.

63 See Funk, John & Mangels, John, Davis-Besse operator sees winter restart, Plain Dealer, 10/23/2002.

"See Funk, John, Davis-Bessc Supervisor sues First Energy over leave, The 65 Funk, John & Mangels, John, Davis Bcssc operator sees winter restart, The Plain Dealer, 9/18/2002.

Dealer, 10/20/2002.

See Funk, John & Mangels, John, Davis-Besse Hole is Full of Questions, The Plain

T-031 P.024/030 F-371 202 225 5745 225 5745 P.024/030 F-371 Feb-03-2003 11:45am Fram-Rsp.Dmnni; J.Kcinich From-Rep.Dennis J.Kucinich 202 T-031 Feb-03-2003 11:45am Dr. William D. Travers January 27, 2003 Page 23 it is agreeable that FirstEnergy has decided to investigate this problem, instead of simply While from the reactor's head, this action does not attributing it to rust stains running down the sides holders to comply with their licenses and operate deserve praise. The NRC should expect license in full compliance with NRC rules and regulations.!

culture at the Davis-Besse plant.

There continues to be an admitted lack of a safety production needs over safety requirements."

FirstEnergy, itself, has admitted that it placed culture in the past and portray itself as FirstEnergy, however, is attempting to place this taken 6 months after the plant had shut-down reformed. A recent employee survey, however, head, shows employees are still not confident because of the discovery of the hole in the reactor Of the 1/3 of Davis-Besse employees who that management has their priorities straight.

valued staying on schedule and budget responded to the survey 61% believed that management finding and fixing problems at the plant. Fifty-eight percent believed that the plant's

-more than not effective. Forty percent felt that programs for identifying and fixing problems were a position that FirstEnergy implemented and paid management did not support the ombudsman, of the normal channel. Twenty-five employees for who is supposed to handle complaints outside they nceded to take it directly to the NRC, and believed that, in order to get a complaint resolved, from retaliation, either harassment or twenty-six employees believed they had suffered of employees knew of instances within their intimidation for raising problems. Twelve percent new issue, The Plain Dealer 10/17/2002.

6"See Funk Johns NRC praises Davis-Besse for bandft a See Management and Human Performance Root Causes, FENOC, August 15, 2002, p.10, p.29

11:45am From-Rap.Dennis J.Kucinich 202 225 5745 T-031 P.025/030 F-371 Feb-03-2003 Dr. William D. Travers January 27, 2003 Page 24 concerns. Even First~nergY workgroup where other workers were harassed for raising safety industry. 69 officials agreed that this is a high number compared to the rest of the new employee Employees at Davis-Besse, moreover, have been bypassing FirstEnergy's strengthening the safety complaint program, designed to assure the NRS that FirstEnergy is NRC and again bypassing culture. 7 0 Several employees have even complained, directly to the 7 ' These employees say that FirstEnergy, that they are being harassed for raising safety concerns.

them, their colleagues because they raised safety concerns, their supervisors reprimanded 72 verbally threatened them and their tires were slashed.

since the FirstEnergy's continuing violations of the NRC's rules and regulations on the NRC's decision to discovery of the hole in the reactor head should have little or no impact of the hole, by themselves, revoke FirstEnergy's license. The events leading up to the discovery the Davis-Besse station.

provide sufficient evidence to revoke FirstEnergy's license to operate it to the NRC. It has, FirstEnergy's behavior since this discovery, however, does little to endear manner in order to restart the according to the NRC, continued to operate in a sloppy and unsafe FirstEnergy has cut facility as quickly as possible, with as little economic impact as possible."

question must arise, then, comers and the NRC has caught them doing so numerous times. The It is only by revoling how many corners has FirstEnergy cut that the NRC has not discovered?

(OSee Davis-Besse Management and Human Pcrfwlmanee Improvement Plan, 9118/2002, pp. S6-60; Funk, Jonb &

9/19/2002.

Mangcls, Jobn, Probc, low morale, hound Davis-Bcsse, The Plain Dealer, The Plain Dealer, 1/30/2003.

'° See Funk, John & Mangels, John, Nuclear safety hearings to begin, 71 See Funk, John & Mangels, John, Davis-Besse workers claim harassmcnt, The Plain Dealer, 1/31/2003.

72 See id.

The Plain Dealer, 9/18/2002.

7 Sce Funk, John & Mangels, John, Davis Besse operator sees winter restart,

Feb-03-2003 11:46am From-Rep.Dennis J.Kucinich 202 225 5745 T-031 P.026/030 F-371 Dr. William D. Travers January 27, 2003 Page 25 to prove that the entire FirstEnergy's license and placing the burden of proof on FirstEnergy the NRC can be assured that Davis-Besse facility is operating within federal regulations, that operating the Davis-Besse FirstEnergy has been held accountable for its violations and is Nuclear Power Station safely.

III. Why the NRC's oversight panels are not sufficient.

to oversee the The NRC and FirstEnergy have created several panels intended of these panels, notably the restart of the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station. Although some cannot adequately ensure 0350 panel, have done some good, these panels by their very nature fact that the NRC has the public safety. These panels are fundamentally encumbered by the of FirstEnergy's failings, the burden of proving that FirstEnergy is not operating safely. Because they are operating safely.

burden of proof needs to be placed with FirstEnergy to prove that problems may exist in Because of FirstEnergy's past behavior, it is unknown what other public cannot tru other areas of the plant that should be examined and repaired. The revoke FirstEnergy's license to FirstEnergy to bring these problens to the NRC. The NRC must it can satisfy all of the NRC's operate. If FirstEnergy wants its license back, it must prove that regulations to receive one.74 reexamine its denial of the Apnil 24,2002,2.206

" In light of recent disclosures, the NRC should, at the very least, petition was also concerned with reassuring the petition asidng for a verification by an independent party. This not related to the hole in the reactor hecad.

public that the troubled plant is not restarting with othcr safety problems to 10 C.F.R 2.206 Regarding Safety at Davis-See Comments to Proposed Director's Decision on Petition Pursuant verification by an independent party is not this Besse Nuclear Power Plant August 29, 2002. Although allowing violations of federal law, and to ensure public safety, nearly enough to hold FirstEnergy properly accountable for its assurance that the NRC and the Nuclear Industry it is at least a step in the right direction. It will provide for public Aftr recent disclosures, it is an are not ignoring other safety concerns that they do not yet deem important.

assurance the public needs.

From-Rep.Dennis J.Kucinich 202 225 5745 T-031 P.027/030 F-371 Fsb-03-2003 11:46am Dr. William D. Travers January 27, 2003 Page 26 IV. The NRC must use its authority to revoke FirstEnergy's license its regulations.

As discussed, the NRC has the authority to revoke a license for violating that it issues for The NRC has exercised this authority liberally with regard to the licenses or revoke dozens of possessing nuclear materials. It has used its authority to modify, suspend violated its regulations, licenses since 1996.75 It has used this authority when licensees have have failed to use when licensees have failed to conduct necessary tests, when licensees failed to provide the NRC employees with proper training, and when licensees have deliberately with complete and accurate information.

to the licenses that it The NRC has not used its authority to revoke a license with regard regarding enforcement issues to operate nuclear power facilities. The NRC's own guidelines station at Severity Level sanctions would categorize the events that occurred at the Davis-Besse particularly poor I, the highest level, because those events involve (1) "situations involving the violation results in a licensee performance, or involving willfulness"; (2) "situations when the violation has contributed substantial increase in risk, including cases in which the duration of licensee made a conscious decision to to the substantial increase"; and (3) "situations when the

` See hnu:/twww/rrc.eov adin -mndoc-collections enforcemn~t/actionsmaterials/. 1/20/2003.

Departrnent of the Army, IL, EA 76 See id. (Listing orders modifying, revoling or suspending license including:

requirements; Eastern Testing & Inspection, 059, issuing ORDER on 3/26/1997 for numerous violations of NRC radiographer without proper training, false of Inc, NJ, EA-96-085 issuing ORDER on 3/29/1996 for deliberate use issuing ORDER on 6/25/1997 for violation certification of qualification; Envirocare of Utah, Inc. VT, EA-97-303, issuing ORDER on 5/20/1997 - This of 10 C.F.. 150.10; Departrnent of Health & Human Serviccs, EA-97-080,breakdown in licensed activities; HNU action was based onnurmerous violations whichindicated a programmatic of NRC requirements; JC Blair Systems, Inc. MA, EA-96-234, issued ORDER on 8/22/1996 for 7 violations deliberate material false statement; Power Memorial Hospital, PA, EA-96-1 10 issued ORDER on 4/10/1998 for on 4/12/1996 for failure to leak test Inspection, Inc., The Durio Company, Inc., OH EA-95-227, issued ORDER Evaluation Services, NJ, EA-02-103, issued sealed resources at intervals specified by 10 C.F.R. 34.25(b); United requirements involving radiography, as ORDER on 5/14/2002 for licensee's deliberate violations of NRC safcty well as its deliberate provision of inaccurate information to the NRC )

202 225 5745 T-031 P.029/030 F-371 202 225 5745 T-031 P.028/030 F-371 Feb-03-2003 11:46am From-Rep.Dennis JKucinich Dr. William ). Travers January 27, 2003 Page 27 benefit."' 7 The NRC considers these be in noncompliance in order to obtain an economic its fill enforcement action to remedy these violations to be of significant concern, and may apply 7

violations, including issuing appropriate orders.

the enforcement sanctions where The NRC specifically limits its discretion to mitigate had prior opportunity to identify the "the root cause of the event is obvious or the licensee the event." 7 This limitation that the problem but failed to take action that would have prevented the circumstances at the Davis-Besse NRC placed on its own discretion applies directly to acid was accumulating on the reactor head, Nuclear Power Station. FirstEnergy knew that boric knew that corrosion was occurring in the knew that it could not properly inspect the reactor bead, significantly, yet failed to take any action to plant, and knew that coolant leakage was increasing eating a hole in the reactor head. FirstEnergy, identify the leakage or prevent the corrosion from to the NRC about plant conditions in moreover, hid this information from the NRC and lied

- because it was more concerned with order to continue to operate the plant - admittedly production than safety.

and policies to a much greater FirstEnergy has clearly violated the NRC's regulations than others who have had their licenses degree with potentially much greater consequences raises the question of a double-standard - one revoked by the NRC. If NRC does not act here, it challenge the NRC's decision, and a consequence for those who have greater resources to

" 63 F.R. 26630-01, 26642. May 13, 1998.

'3 See id.

( Discrction is not warranted when a licensee idcndfies a violation as a 7' 63 F.R 26630-01, 26642 at Footnote 9. the event is obvious or the liccnsee had prior opportunity to identify the rcsult of an event whete the root cause of prevented the event")

problem but failed to take action that would have

Feb-03-2003 11:49am From-Rep.Dennis J.Kucinich 202 225 5T45 T-031 P.029/030 F-371 Dr. William D. Travers January 27, 2003 Page 28 to challenge the different and much more serious consequence for those with fewer resources not operate fairly NRC. The NRC is abusing the authority granted to it by Congress if it does and consistently with all of its licensees.

V. Conclusion several FirstEnergy has operated outside the parameters of their operating license for information years, has violated numerous federal laws, rules and regulations, and has hidden Davis-Besse from the NRC and lied to the NRC to justify the continuing operation of the with any and all Nuclear Power Station. The NRC cannot trust FirstEnergy to be forthcoming ensure that it has other safety violations it has committed over the last decade. The NRC cannot only way the NRC identified any and all other safety violation FirstEnergy has committed. The is to can ensure that the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station is operating under federal law a new license. This revoke FirstEnergy's operating license and compel FirstEnergy to apply for aspect of the action will place the burden of proof firmly OD FirstEnergy to show that every regulations.

Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station conforms to all federal laws, rules, and States FirstEnergy must be held accountable for its contempt for the laws of the United mandate and the lives of the American people. The NRC, to properly perform its congressional property must to regulate the nuclear industry and protect health and minimize danger to life or NRC is revoke FirstEnergy's license to operate the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station. The so on authorized to do so pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2137 and 10 C.F.R. § 50.100 and has done I ask that the many occasions for less egregious violations than those described here. Therefore,

Feb-03-2003 11:49am From-Rep Dennis J.Kucinich 202 225 5745 T-031 P 030/030 F-31 Dr. William D. Travers January 27, 2003 Page 29 operating license NRC grant tbis section 2.206 petition and immediately revoke FirstEnergy's for the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station.

Sincerely, Dennis J. Kucinich Member of Congress DJK:jbl

Feb-03-2003 11:36am From-Rep.Dennis J.Kucinich 202 225 5745 T-031 P.001/030 F-371 Congressman huJ/wwwhousc.gov/kuCinich Q Dens J. Kucinich Ohio s 10th CongressionalDistict 1730 LmngWOtlh House OM ce Suildlug 14400 Deolb Ave. 5983W. 54's St.

WssOhqngDC20515 Lakwood, Ohlo 44107 Pams, Ohlo 44129 (202)225W581 (phone) (21 22&8-8 (Phona) (440)U84577(Phone)

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