ML031250082

G20030221/LTR-03-0262 - Rep. Dennis J. Kucinich Ltr. Safety Culture at Davis Besse

ML031250082
Person / Time
Site:	Davis Besse
Issue date:	04/29/2003
From:	Kucinich D US HR (House of Representatives)
To:	Diaz N NRC/Chairman
Shared Package
ML031350659	List: ML031250082
References
CORR-03-0109, G20030221, LTR-03-0262
Download: ML031250082 (5)

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EDO Principal Correspondence Control FROM: DUE: 05/12/03 EDO CONTROL: G20030221 DOC DT: 04/29/03 FINAL REPLY:

Representative Dennis J. Kucinich TO:

Chairman Diaz FOR SIGNATURE OF : ** PRI ** CRC NO: 03-0262 Chairman Diaz DESC: ROUTING:

Safety Culture at Davis Besse Travers Paperiello Kane Norry Dean Burns DATE: 05/01/03 Dyer, RIII Miller, RI ASSIGNED TO: CONTACT: Merschoff, RIV Reyes, RII NRR Collins Cyr, OGC SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS OR REMARKS:

Coordinate with Region III.

-Ieplak'Se-L.I- ' & aCTc s t

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY CORRESPONDENCE CONTROL TICKET Date Printed:Apr 30, 2003 17:15 PAPER NUMBER: LTR-03-0262 LOGGING DATE: 04/30/2003 ACTION OFFICE: EDO AUTHOR: Dennis Kucinich AFFILIATION: REP ADDRESSEE: Nils Diaz

SUBJECT:

Concerns safety culture at Davis Besse nuclear plant ACTION: Signature of Chairman DISTRIBUTION: RF, OCA to Ack LETTER DATE: 04/29/2003 ACKNOWLEDGED No SPECIAL HANDLING:

NOTES: Chairman's Correspondence FILE LOCATION: Adams DATE DUE: 05/14/2003 DATE SIGNED:

EDO -- G200302 2 1

Apr-30-2003 02:43pm From-Rep Dennis J.Kucinich 202 225 5745 T-460 P 002/004 F-046 DENNIS J. KUCINICH Icomtmrnees:

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Dear Chairman Diaz:

On April 7, 2003, the NRC announced it was sending a seven-member team to the Davis-Besse nuclear plant to assess safety culture. The five NRC members on the team were described as having expertise in human performance and organizational effcctivcness. The two consultants on the team were described as having-"a track record at improving safety culture at problem nuclear power plants." Among other experience, the consultants were described as having key roles in the efforts to restore a proper safety culture at the Millstone nuclear plant in the late 1990s.

I comrnmend the NRC for conducting a formal assessment of the safety culture at Davis-Besse.

FirstEnergy conceded that its placing production ahead of safety contributed to the breadth and depth of the problems at the troubled plant. As your actions suggest, it is insufficient to merely correct the safety problems at the plant. The culture that allowed so many problems to collect must also be remedied in order for there To be public confidence that a proper safcty culture now exists at the plant.

I am concerned that issues regarding the potential harassment and intimidation of employees who have raised concerns are not being addressed in an appropriatc manner. It is my understanding from the Commission briefing conducted in February that the current program at the site for addressing employee concerns is just being started and that the previous program did not provide any internal mechanisms for responding to complaints of retaliation.

As important as safety culture is to the overall safety of a nuclear power plant, I have serious concerns about how the NRC's expert team will evaluate current conditions at Davis-Besse. As you know, the NRC announced on March 26, 2003, that it had rejected a recommendation made by its staff to promulgate regulations for safety conscious work environments at nuclear power plants. ' Thus, the NRC presently lacks, and will not pursue, defined standards for the safety culture at nuclear power plants. I fail to see how the NRC's expert team will be able to determine that the safety culture at Davis-Besse is at or above some established, and acceptable, standard, when the NRC has no standard.

'NRC Memo dated March 26, 2003, from Annette L.Vietti-Cook, Secretary, to William D. Travers, Executive Director for Operations, "Staff Requirements - SECY-02-0166 - Policy Options and Recormncndations for Revising the NRC's Process for Handling Discrimina on Issues."

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202 225 5745 T-460 P 003/004 F-U45 Apr-30-2003 02:45pm From-Rep Dennis J Kucinich Page 2 the NRC's expert team can do is Absent a prc-defined standard, it secms to me that the most nuclear power plants. In other evaluate conditions at Davis-Besse relative to conditions at other is my understanding that the five words, they must base their conclusions on empirical data. It direct involvement in assessing NRC members of the team sent to Davis-Besse had little or no Project, or any of the "problem the safety culture at Millstone, or Diablo Canyon, or South Texas experience with which To assess nuclear power plants." They will have neither a standard nor two consultants on the team have conditions at Davis-Besse. It is also my understanding that the power plants." Their experience extensive experience at Millstone and at other "problem nuclear is better than Millstone was at allows them to make relative judgments like Davis-Besse today those insights.

time x but not as good as Millstone at time y. I am interested in each of the seven team members Please provide me with answers to the following questions from of the Davis Besse Safety Culture Inspection Team. -

and the NRC, in evaluating

1. What are the performance measures used, both by the utility Davis-Besse? It is my the safety culture at Millstone, South Texas, Diablo Canyon and used at Millstone to understanding that the most detailed metrics were developed and for a proper safety monitor performance in areas established as being important attributes culture.

the internal metrics and their

2. Using the Millstone performance measures and metrics, are more rigorous, or thresholds being used at Davis-Besse essentially equivalent, generally generally less rigorous than those at Millstone?

Millstone, are the NRC's

3. Using the NRC's performance measures and metrics from Davis-Besse essentially performance measures and their thresholds being used at those at Millstone?

equivalent, generally more rigorous, or generally less rigorous than and events that created

4. During Millstone's recovery, there were occasional incidents working in the MOV potential "chilling effects" such as the termination of individuals at Davis-Besse. Have any program in 1997. There have been numerous staffing changes filed any forms of employees raised allegations of retaliation, either internally or2 If so, did either the complaints with the NRC or the company in the past 24 months?

the findings. Please company or the NRC investigate the complaints? If so, what were of the names of provide a summary of any events or incidents, without disclosure complaints.

concerned employees, and the actions taken in response to their internal investigations of

5. What is the standard being used by the company in its Is it different than retaliation, and has the NRC determined if that standard is acceptable?

of employees or the NRC's own standards? Is thecre any evidence that terminations has resulted in a contractors, or any other adverse actions complained of, at Davis-Besse more allegations of harassment from 2 According to statistics posted on The NRC's website, the agency received The NRC's statistics also report that 7 Davis-Besse last year (14) than any other nuclear plant in thi Unitcd States. it's not clear how many of These allegations were substantiated by the agency's investigations last year, although substantiations related to harassment cases.

Apr-du-iuud uZ:4UPM From-Rep.Dennis J.Kucinlch ZU? ZZ5 5745 T-4E0 P DU4/004 F-046 Page 3 if there is a reluctance to raise concerns. What is the standard being used to determine "chilling effect" at Davis-Besse.

restored to the

6. At Millstone, the safety culture was judged in May 1998 to have been the safety point where the Unit 3 reactor could be safely restarted. How do you assess the same, culture at Davis-Besse today to the safety culture at Millstone in May 1998:

Davis-Besse be better, or worse? If it is judged to be worse, would you recommend that restarted?

other words, I do not I am interested in the views of all members of the NRC's expert team. In forward me the want the NRC's summary or characterization of the individual answers. Please to the restart prior answers to these questions at the completion of the review, but sufficiently decision on Davis-Besse that I may consider holding a meeting on this topic.

Sincerely, Dennis J. Kucinich Member of Congress DJK:ap