ML031320292

G20030231/LTR-03-0282 - Rep. James C. Greenwood Ltr Davis-Besse Lessons Learned

ML031320292
Person / Time
Site:	Davis Besse
Issue date:	05/07/2003
From:	Greenwood J US HR, Subcomm on Oversight & Investigations
To:	Diaz N NRC/Chairman
Shared Package
ML031340477	List: ML031320292
References
G20030231, LTR-03-0282
Download: ML031320292 (6)

Text

t EDO Principal Correspondence Control FROM: DUE: 05/14/03 EDO CONTROL: G20030231 DOC DT: 05/07/03 FINAL REPLY:

Representative James C. Greenwood TO:

Chairman Diaz FOR SIGNATURE OF : ** PRI ** CRC NO: 03-0282 Chairman Diaz DESC: ROUTING:

Davis-Besse Lessons Learned Travers Paperiello Kane Norry Dean Burns/Cyr DATE: 05/08/03 Dyer, RIII ASSIGNED TO: CONTACT:

NRR Collins SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS OR REMARKS:

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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY CORRESPONDENCE CONTROL TICKET Date Printed:May 07, 2003 11.33 PAPER NUMBER: LTR-03 -0282 LOGGING DATE: 05/07/2003 ACTION OFFICE: EDO AUTHOR: James Greenwood AFFILIATION: REP ADDRESSEE: Nils Diaz

SUBJECT:

Davis Besse nuclear power plant ACTION: Signature of Chairman DISTRIBUTION: Comrs, RF, OCA to Ack LETTER DATE: 05/07/2003 ACKNOWLEDGED No SPECIAL HANDLING: Response requested by May 21, 2003 NOTES: Commission Correspondence FILE LOCATION: -Adams DATE DUE: 05/16/2003 DATE SIGNED:

EDO -- G20030231

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Dear Chairman Diaz:

As you know, the circumferential cracking of the control rod drive mechanism nozzles, the buildup of extensive boric acid deposits over a period of years, and the recent discovery of significant corrosion on the reactor vessel head at the Davis-Besse nuclear power plant represent the most significant safety matters the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has encountered in the past two decades. In the months since the problems at Davis-Besse were discovered, NRC has reflected on its many fai]ures to identify these extensive safety deficiencies at an earlier stage, and has attempted to apply lessons leaned.

I am concerned, however, that the Commission itself and NRC staff may not have completely identified all intenal weaknesses tbat prevented NRC from identifying the severe safety deficiencies at Davis-Besse, and thcrefore have not completely developed and applied lessons learned from the Davis-Besse experience. It would be unfortunate if the Commission and NRC staff were to overlook any management and procedural weaknesses it uses for identifying and resolving complicated and in some cases subjective regulaTory safety decisions.

Specifically, I have reviewed a February 20, 2003 memo from Steven Long of the NRC to each Commissioner. In his memo, Mr. Long described a questionable "voting" process utilized by an NRC manager to dete=mine whether to issue an order requiring shutdown of the Davis-Besse reactor by December 31, 2001, and a second "vote" to determine the likelihood that Davis-Besse would eject a nozzle if allowed to operate until February 16, 2002. am concerned that NRC staff would employ a "voting" process for determining significant safety maters, and I expect you can provide me with a clear understanding of the rules and documented procedure for administering "Votes" on significant regulatory safety matters. am particularly interested in Mr.

Long's account of the first "vote" on whether to issue the order. According to the memorandum, the breakdown on the Erst vote split with all managers voting against issuing the shutdown order, and an outnumbered technical staff voting in favor of issuing the order.

May-DE-03 10:24pm From- T-T02 P.003/005 F-944 The Honorable Nils J. Diaz Page 2 I also am concemed with the NRC's decision on December 4, 2001 - without any documented safety rationale -- to accept FirstEnergy's proposal To operate Davis-Besse beyond December 31, 2001. The safety rationale, intended to describe the process used by NRC in the Fall of 2001 to support its December 4, 2001 decision, was finally issued on December 3, 2002.

It does not seem reasonable that NRC would fail to provide the required documentation to describc its rationale on such a significant safety matter before the fact.

With respect to the technical content of the December 3, 2002 rationale, I believe the Long memo has identified serious weaknesses in the methods NRC has used to apply risk infonnation and risk assessment modeling in the decision-makling process on this matter. I also find it alarming that NRC would rely on reactor vessel inspection data from 1996 for calculating the likelihood of nozzle ejection in the Fall of 2001, without any clear explanation of the risk significance of why FirstEnergy was unable to obtain required inspection data during scheduled outages in 1998 and 2000. As you know, useful inspection data from 1998 and 2000 was unobtainable due to enormous deposits of boric acid that created a physical barrier that prevented any access to the top of the reactor, including the corroded areas. In its documented rationale, NRC simply notes that "the inspection conducted in 2000 was considered to be less effective." I believe a more complete and careful evaluation of the conditions that prevented inspections in 1998 and 2000 could have led to a different risk analysis and possibly a different outcome on the "vote" on whether to require a December 31, 2001 shutdown.

In order to obtain a better understanding of whether NRC has completed its lessons learned process, and to determine whether NRC can assure public health and safety in any future decision to restart of the Davis-Besse nuclear power plant, I request that, pursuant to Rules X and XI of the U.S. House of Representatives, you provide responses to the attacled list of questions and requests for rccords by Wednesday, May 21, 2003. Please note that, for the purpose of responding to this request, the terms "records" and "relating" should be interpreted in accordance with the second attachment to this letter.

If you have any questions regarding this request, please contact me or have a member of your staff contact Mr. Dwight Cates of the Energy and Commerce Committee staff at (202) 226-2424.

Sincerely, am C. Greenwood

'>Subfotee on Oversight and Investigations Attachments

may-06-03 10:24pm From- T-702 P.004/005 F-844 Attachment 1

1. Please provide all records relating to the consideration and final decision by NRC not to issue a shutdown order at Davis-B esse.

2. Please review the February 20, 2003 memorandum from Steven M. Long to the Commission and provide me with a full explanation on each point raised in that memo.

3. Please describe the administrative procedures or other guidelines for NRC staff adopted by the Commission and used for developing final recommendations or determinations on significant safety matters including shutdown orders and other significant risk determinations used in regulatory actions.

4. Please describe the voting process utilized by NRC staff and how this voting process was consistent with administrative procedures or guidelines with respect to the decisions on the proposed shutdown order for Davis-Besse and the December 4, 2001 acceptance of Firstnergy's bulletin response.

5. Please provide a full explanation on why the absence of adequate inspection data on the reactor vessel head from the 1998 and 2000 outages was acceptable to NRC staff in the risk assessment and regulatory decision-making process, and to what degree The absence of this data was a factor in the risk assessment and regulatory-decision making process.

6. Why did NRC staff fail to complete, before December 4, 2001, the documented safety rationale to support its December 4, 2001 decision to allow Davis-Besse o operate until Februar 16,2002?

May-06-03 10:25pm From- 1-[lJZ r.uuuUo r-041i Attachment 2

1. The terr "records" is to be construed in the broadest sense and shall mean any written or graphic mraterial, however produced or reproduced, of any kind or description, consisting of the original and any non-identical copy (wletler different from the original because of notes made on or attached to such copy or otherwise) and drafts and botl sides thereof, whether printed or recorded electronically or magnetically or stored in any type of data bank, including, but not limited to, the following: correspondence, menoranda, records, summaries of pcrsonal conversations or interviews, minutes or records of meetings or conferences, opinions or reports of consultants, projections, statistical statements, drafts, contracts, agreements, purchase orders, invoices, confirmations, telegraphs, telexes, agendas, books, notes, pamphlets, periodicals, reports, studies, evaluations, opinions, logs, diaries, desk calendars, appointment books, tape recordings, video recordings, e-mails, voice mails, computer tapes, or other computer stored matter, magnetic tapes, microfilm, microfiche, punch cards, all other records kept by electronic, photographic, or mechanical means, charts, photographs, notebooks, drawings, plans, inter-office communications, intra-office and intra-departmental communications, transcripts, checks and canceled checks, bank statements, ledgers, books, records or statements of accounts, and papers and things similar to any of the foregoing, however denominated.

2. The terms "relating," relate," or regarding" as to any given subject means anything that constitutes, contains, embodies, identifies, deals with, or is in any manner whatsoever pertinent to that subject, including but not limited to records concerning the preparation of other records.