ML070780673
| ML070780673 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Beaver Valley, Davis Besse, Perry |
| Issue date: | 03/09/2007 |
| From: | Kucinich D US HR, Comm on Government Reform & Oversight |
| To: | Caldwell J Region 3 Administrator |
| References | |
| Download: ML070780673 (52) | |
Text
HENRY A WAXMAN CALIFORNIA CHAIRMAN TOM LANTOS CALIFORNIA EDOLPHUS TOWNS NEW YORK PAUL E KANJORSKI PENNSYLVANIA CAROLYN E MALONEY NEW YORK ELlJAH E CUMMINGS MARYLAND DENNIS J KUClNlCH OHIO DANNY K DAVIS ILLINOIS JOHN F TIERNEY MASSACHUSFrTS WM LACY CLAY MISSOURI DIANE E WATSON CALIFORNIA STEPHEN F LYNCH MASSACHUSFrTS E R W HIGGINS NEW YORK JOHN A YARMUTH KENTUCKY BRUCE L ERALEY IOWA ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA BETTY McCOLLUM MINNESOTA JIM COOPER TENNESSEE CHRIS VAN HOLLEN MARYLAND PAUL W HODES NEW HAMPSHIRE CHRISTOPHER S MURPHY CONNECTICUl JOHN P SAREANES MARYWND PER WELCH VERMONT TOM DAVIS VIRGINIA RANKING MINORITY MEMBER DAN BURTON INDIANA CHRISTOPHER SHAYS CONNECTICUT JOHN M McHffiH NEW YORK JOHN L MICA FLORIDA MARK E SOUDER INDIANA TODD RUSSELL PlATlS PENNSYLVANIA CHRIS CANNON UTAH JOHN J DUNCAN JR TENNESSEE MICHAEL R TURNER OHIO OARRELL E ISSA CALIFORNIA KENNY MARCHANT TEXAS LYNN A WESTMORELAND GEORGIA PATRICK T MCHENRY NORTH CAROLINA VIRGINIA FOXX NORTH CAROLINA BRIAN P BILERAY CALIFORNIA BILL SAL1 IDAHO ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS Bouee of Bepreeentatibee COMMITTEE O N OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM 21 57 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING WASHINGTON, DC 205156143 MUOAIN 1202) 225-5051 FACSIMILE 1202) 2254784 MINOR^
1202) 2255074 TlY 1202)225852 hltp:Noverslght.house.gov March 9, 2007 Mr. James L. Caldwell Administrator United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region I11 2443 Warrensville Road, Suite 2 10 Lisle. Illinois 60532-43 52
Dear Mr. Caldwell:
The Subcommittee on Domestic Policy has concerns about FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company's (FENOC) request to be relieved from independent oversight mandated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) after a near catastrophe at the Davis-Besse Nuclear facility.
As you know, NRC requires that FENOC submit to independent assessments of its operations performance. This requirement followed NRC's investigation into FirstEnergy's efforts to deceive the government about safety violations at the Davis-Besse facility. Those violations resulted in a football-sized crater in the reactor vessel. FirstEnergy's mismanagement and efforts to evade its detection nearly resulted in a disaster at the plant. Only a slim steel liner stood in the way of radioactive release into the air, which would have jeopardized the safety of millions of residents of in the state of Ohio.
A strong argument was made to require Davis-Besse to cease operations. However, the NRC instead chose to allow FirstEnergy to continue operations, contingent upon the company's adopting a new safety focus with full and accurate reporting of operating problems. NRC mandated that FirstEnergy submit to an independent assessment for five years.
Only two years into the new operating agreement with NRC, FirstEnergy is now seeking to be relieved from independent assessment of its operations.
As you know, the NRC has the ability to relax the Davis Besse confirmatory order "upon demonstration by the licensee of good cause." The FirstEnergy safety record from the past four years since the near catastrophe at Davis-Besse suggests that FirstEnergy not only failed to
Page 2 demonstrate "good cause," but has clearly demonstrated the need for more rigorous oversight, not less. To underscore this, I have attached for your review a series of NRC reports that highlight a continuing pattern of deception by FirstEnergy.
The NRC Office of Investigations in August of 2006 concluded that FirstEnergy falsified records at their Beaver Valley nuclear plant (Attachment 1). The records in question were for the replacement of the reactor vessel head, the repair that Davis-Besse was forced to do after FirstEnergy allowed the original to deteriorate to the point of failure. This August 2006 incident is not an isolated misstep.
For example:
e September 26, 2002: The NRC Office of Investigations concluded that application for access was falsified at Perry (Attachment 2).
October 6, 2003: The NRC Office of Investigations concluded that overtinie records were deliberately falsified at Perry so as to appear to comply with technical specifications (Attachment 3).
0 April 1, 2004: The NRC informed FirstEnergy that it found "creative timekeeping" at Perry (Attachment 4).
0 November 4, 2004: The NRC issues White finding to FirstEnergy for "creative accounting" of the emergency alert and notification system testing at Davis-Besse (Attachment 5).
I request that NRC brief the subcommittee on this matter and contact Jaron Bourke, Staff Director, at (202) 225-6427 to arrange a suitable time.
Sincerely, Dennis J. Kucinich
- Chairman, Subcommittee on Domestic Policy DJK:ap
August 1,2006 EA-06-152 Mr. James H. Lash Site Vice President FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company Beaver Valley Power Station Post Office Box 4 Shippingport, Pennsylvania 15077
SUBJECT:
BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION - NRC OFFICE OF INVES REPORT NO. 1-2005-036
'IGA IONS
Dear Mr. Lash:
This letter refers to information provided by your staff at the FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company (FENOC) Beaver Valley Power Station (BVPS) on June 16, 2005, which indicated that a contract engineer provided false information to BVPS. Specifically, you informed the NRC that while placing an approved engineering change package (ECP) into your records system, a clerk identified that certain materials, including required Design Interface Evaluations (DIES), were missing. You commenced an immediate review and determined that a contract engineer had not completed the required work for ECP 03-541, the Replacement Reactor Vessel Closure Head Project (RRVCHP), yet indicated by signature on the ECP that all work had been completed as required. As a result, the NRC Office of Investigations (OI), Region I, initiated an investigation on August 31, 2005, into the circumstances surrounding this matter.
Based on the results of the 01 investigation, one apparent violation was identified and is being considered for escalated enforcement action in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy.
The current Enforcement Policy is included on the NRC's Web site at +wgz~r-c-ggv; select What We Do, Enforcement, then Enforcement Policy. Specifically, the 01 investigation results indicated that the contract engineer deliberately provided false information to Beaver Valley which, if not discovered, would have resulted in a violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix 6, Criterion Ill. The false information involved signing ECP 03-541 as complete when it was not.
Even though this falsification was identified and corrected prior to implementation of the design change, this act constitutes an apparent violation of 10 CFR 50.9, "Completeness and Accuracy of Information."
Based on the 01 investigation results, the NRC concludes that the action of the former contract engineer was deliberate because he knew that the Design Interface Evaluations (DIES), as well as other technical information, were required to be completed before he signed ECP 03-541, certifying the package was complete and ready for management approval. While the NRC staff noted that Beaver Valley subsequently identified this issue, BVPS's Quality Assurance Program reviews, a 10 CFR 50.59 review, and management's review and approval of the ECP all failed to identify that the package was incomplete, BVPS also failed to provide the proper level of
Mr. James H. Lash 2
oversight and monitoring of the contract employee resulting in an additional missed opportunity to identify and correct this issue prior to it resulting in the apparent violation. A summary of the 01 report is enclosed.
We believe that we have sufficient information to make our final enforcement decision for this matter. However, before the NRC makes a final decision, we are providing you an opportunity to either: (1) respond to the apparent violation within 30 days of the date of this letter; (2) request a predecisional enforcement conference (PEC) within 10 days of the date of this letter; or (3) request Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) within 10 days of the date of this letter.
Please contact Mr. Ronald Bellamy at 61 0-337-5200 within 10 days of the date of this letter to notify the NRC of your intended response. In addition, to assist NRC in its final enforcement decision, if you choose to reply or if you request a predecisional enforcement conference, we request that FENOC provide the NRC with a copy of any evaluations performed and actions taken by FENOC related to the contract engineer's trustworthiness, site access, and information entries into the PADS database, if any, following FENOC's discovery of this issue.
If you choose to provide a written response, it should be clearly marked as a "Response to An Apparent Violation in 01 Report 1-2005-036; EA-06-152" and should include: (1) the reason for the apparent violation, or, if contested, the basis for disputing the apparent violation, (2) the corrective steps that have been taken and the results achieved, (3) the corrective steps that will be taken to avoid further violations, and (4) the date when full compliance will be achieved.
Your response may reference or include previous docketed correspondence, if the correspondence adequately addresses the required response. If an adequate response is not received within the time specified or an extension of time has not been granted by the NRC, the NRC will proceed with its enforcement decision or schedule a predecisional enforcement conference.
If you request a PEC, it will be held at our office in King of Prussia, PA. Since the PEC will be based on the findings of an 01 investigation, it will not be open for public observation, but will be transcribed. The purpose of the PEC is to discuss the apparent violation and the circumstances surrounding it, and to give FENOC an opportunity to provide its perspective on this issue and any other information that FENOC believes is relevant to the NRC's enforcement determination.
If a conference is held, the NRC will issue a press release to announce the conference and the fact that it is closed to public observation.
Instead of a written response or a predecisional enforcement conference for the apparent violation of 10 CFR 50.9, you may request ADR with the NRC in an attempt to resolve this issue. ADR is a general term encompassing various techniques for resolving conflict outside of court using a neutral third party. The technique that the NRC has decided to employ during a pilot program, which is now in effect, is mediation. Additional information concerning the NRC's pilot program is described in the enclosed brochure (NUREGIBR-0317) and can be obtained at http:llwww.nrc.qovlwhat-we-doirequlatory/enforcement/adr. html. The Institute on Conflict Resolution (ICR) at Cornell University has agreed to facilitate the NRC's program as an intake neutral. Please contact ICR at 877-733-9415 within 10 days of the date of this letter if you are interested in pursuing resolution of this issue through ADR.
In addition, please be advised that the number and characterization of apparent violations described herein may change as a result of further NRC review. You will be advised by separate correspondence of the results of our deliberations on this matter.
Mr. James H. Lash 3
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosures, and your response (if you choose to provide one) will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the NRC's document system (ADAMS), accessible from the NRC Web site at http:l/www.nrc.qov/readinq-rrnladams.htm1. To the extent possible, your response should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be made available to the Public without redaction.
Sincerely, Brian E. Holian, Director Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos. 50-334, 50-412 License Nos. DPR-66, NPF-73
Enclosures:
- 1. Summary of 01 Report 1-2005-036
- 2. NUREGIBR-0317 cc w/encl 1:
G. Leidich, President and Chief Nuclear Officer J. Hagan, Senior Vice President of Operations and Chief Operating Officer D. Pace, Senior Vice President, Fleet Engineering J. Rinckel, Vice President, Fleet Oversight L. Myers, Executive Vice President, Special Projects R. Anderson, Vice President, FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company Manager, Fleet Licensing, FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company R. Mende, Director, Site Operations T. Cosg rove, Director, Maintenance P. Sena, Director, Engineering L. Freeland, Director, Site Performance Improvement and Manager, Regulatory Compliance D. Jenkins, Attorney, FENOC B. Sepelak, Supervisor, Nuclear Compliance M. Clancy, Mayor, Shippingport, PA D. Allard, PADEP C. O'Claire, State Liaison to the NRC, State of Ohio Z. Clayton, EPA-DERR, State of Ohio Director, Utilities Department, Public Utilities Commission, State of Ohio D. Hill, Chief, Radiological Health Program, State of West Virginia J. Lewis, Commissioner, Division of Labor, State of West Virginia W. Hill, Beaver County Emergency Management Agency J. Johnsrud, National Energy Committee, Sierra Club DISTRIBUTION w/encl 1 :
SECY JDyer, NRR MWeber, NRR CA BBoger, NRR
Mr. James H. Lash OFFICE RI/DRP I
RI/ORA I
RI/DRP I RI/OI I
RI/RC I
OFFICE RI/ORA I
HQlOE I
I I
I,
NAME ARosebrook*
RSummers
- RBellamy*
EWilson*
KFarrar' DATE 07/19/06 07/19/06 07/19/06 0 7/2 OJO 6 07/20/06 RI/DRP BHolian*
NAME DHolody/RJS for OSolorio **
DATE 07/2 1/06 07/28 106 07/26 106 4
OEMAIL OEWEB LReyes, ED0 WKane, DEDR SCollins, RA MDapas, DRA MJohnson, OE LLopez,OE OSamuel, OE LChandler, OGC BJones, OGC MElwood, OGC MBaty, OGC JSchlueter, OSTP R1 DRP-Mail Region I OE Files (with concurrences)
- Hard Copy RLaufer, NRR TColburn, NRR BSosa, OED0 Enforcement Coordinators RII, RIH, RIV EHayden, OPA HBell, OIG GCaputo, 01 LTremper, OC DScrenci/NSheehan, RI PCataldo, NRC Resident Inspector RBellamy, RI KFarrar, RI DHolody, RI RSummers, RI SlSP Review Complete:
AAR (Reviewer's Initials)
FACTUAL
SUMMARY
OF 01 INVESTIGATION REPORT NO. 1-2005-036 An investigation was initiated on August 31, 2005, by the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commissions (NRC) Office of Investigations (OI), Region I to determine if a contract (Demark Inc.), mechanical engineer working formerly at the Beaver Valley Power Station (BVPS),
provided false information to BVPS when the engineer signed an engineering change package (ECP) for the replacement reactor vessel closure head project (RRVCHP) on June 1, 2005, indicating that the required work had been completed, when it had not been completed. Based on evidence developed during its investigation, 01 substantiated that the former contract engineer deliberately provided false information to BVPS by signing the RRVCHP ECP indicating that all of the required work had been completed when he knew otherwise.
The evidence supporting the conclusion included information identified by the licensee that certain sections of the written design change package, including the Design Interface Evaluations (DIES), were not completed as specified by the design change process requirements at BVPS. 01 interviewed individuals and reviewed the licensees documentation associated with the incomplete ECP. During 01s interview with the contractor engineer, he admitted being knowledgeable of the fact that the ECP work was not complete when he signed the package, that he knew that the BVPS design change process procedure required the DIES be completed prior to his signing the ECP as complete, and he admitted to 01 that he probably should not have signed off on the ECP until the missing information had been received. 01 noted that while he asserted that he had made management aware of the fact that the required information was not complete, other testimonial and documentary evidence gathered during the 01 investigation does not support this claim and revealed that management was unaware of this fact. The contractor engineer also admitted that only two or three of the (-25 total) DIES were completed, and that some additional technical work had not been completed at the time that he had signed the ECP. As a result of the engineers admission and lack of supporting evidence into his claim that BVPS management was aware of the incomplete status of the signed ECP, 01 concluded that the contractor engineer deliberately provided false information to BVPS when he signed the ECP indicating that the required work was complete, while knowing that the DIES were not completed.
September 26,2002 Mr. William R. Kanda Vice President - Nuclear, Perry FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company P. 0. Box 97, A290 Perry, OH 44081
SUBJECT:
OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS REPORT NO. 3-2001 -059
Dear Mr. Kanda:
This refers to an investigation initiated on December 28, 2001, by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commissions (NRC) Office of Investigations (01) to determine whether a contract insulator deliberately provided incomplete and inaccurate information to the First Energy Operating Company (FENOC) to obtain unescorted access to Perry Nuclear Power Plant. Based on the information developed during that investigation, 01 concluded that the individual deliberately failed to fully disclose his entire criminal background history on his personnel security questionnaires. The synopsis of the 01 report is enclosed. No enforcement action is being taken against FENOC in this matter. This concludes the NRCs investigation into this matter.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at htt~://www.nrc.~ov/readina-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
If you have any questions concerning this matter please contact me at (630) 829-9500.
Sincerely,
/RA/
Cynthia D. Pederson, Director Division of Reactor Safety Docket No. 50-440 License No. NPF-58
Enclosure:
As stated
OFFICE Rlll I
Rlll:OI' I
Rlll I
Rlll I
'Paul
'Berson Pederson NAME
- Weil/bh 9/23/02 9/26/02 DATE 9/20/02 9/12/02
'Approval to release 01 synopsis was provided on 9/12/02 in an E-mail from R. Paul, Rlll:OI to C. Weil, RIII:EICS, as part of EA-02-198.
SYNOPSIS On December 26, 2001, the US. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Investigations, Region 111, initiated an investigation to determine if a contract insulator at the Perry Nuclear Generating Station deliberately falsified access authorization records in violation (sic).
Based on the evidence developed, this investigation did substantiate that a contract insulator deliberately falsified access authorization records by failing to disclose his complete criminal history.
Case No. 3-2001-059
9 P
1 I
Tftle: PERRY NUCLEAR POWER STATION DELIBERATE VIOLATION OF TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REQUIREMENTS REGARDING OVERTIME,ANDDELIBERATE FALSIFICATION OF OVERTIME RECORDS Licensee:
FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company 76 South Matn Street Akron,OH 44308 Docket No.: 50-440 Reported by:
"illiam C. Franz, Spec!& a n t OMice of Investigations Field Office, Region Case NO.: 3-2002-031 RePodDa@ October 6, 2003 Control Office.: O I : R ~
status: CLOSED Reviewed and Approved by:
Rlchard C. Paul, Director Office of Investlgatfons Field office, Region III WARNING DO NOT DISSE
SYNOPSIS This investigation was initiated on October 23,2002, by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Investigations, Region IU, to determine whether Atlantic Group (AG) contractors and/or P c
~
Nuclear Power Statim (CITY) sup~rvisors deliberately violated_tcchnical specification requinments regarding oveftime and deliberately falsified overtime records in violation of 10 CFR 50.5,10 CFR 50.9 and Perry Technical Specification 5.2.2.e.
Based upon the evidence developed, this investigation did substantiate that AG contractors and Perry ~upervisors deliMtdy violated overtime technical specification rquirements regarding overtime and &Iibcrately falsified overtime records.
Case NO. 3-2002-03 1
1
THIS PAGE BLANK -ONALLY
TABU3 OF CONTENTS SYNOPSIS............................................................
.... 1 L,ISTOFINTERVEWEES.,...................................................
5 DEl'AlU OFINVESTIGATION................................................
7 Applicable Regulations..................................................
7 Purpose of investigation...................................................
7 7
7 m'd staff.........................
f................ 9 Coordination with the Regional Counsel....................................
9 Review ofDocumentation.................................................
9 11 11 12 13 13 15
- .. 16 -
17 17 18 Agent's Analysis........................................................ 20 Conclusion............................................................
21 SUPPI.E4ENTALINPORMATION...........................................
23 LlsTOFEXHIBJXS.........................................................
25
\\
FIELD OFFTCEDIRE OR, OFFICE OF Case No. 3-2002-031 3
TH[s PAGE ICEFT BLANK INTENIIONUY Case No. 3-2002-03 1
Exhibit No..
..17 13 2
19 I5
,I8 14
i APPROVAL OF TIGATIONS, REGION KII Cue NO.
3-2002-031 6
DEl'A.ILS OF INVESTIGATiON 10 CFR 505: Deliberate Misconduct (2001 Edition) 10 CFR 50.9: Completeness and Accuracy of Momation (2001 Edition)
Peny Technical Specification S.2.2.e This investigatjoa was initiated on October 23,2002, by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), Office of Investigations (OD, Region IU (RIII), to determine whether Atlantic &up (AG) contractors andlor Perry NucIear Power Station (Perry) s u ~ s o r s deliberately violated technical specification requirements regarding overtime and deliberately falsified ovlrtime records in violatim of 10 CFR 50.5,10 CFR 50.9 and Perry Technical Specification 5.2.2.e.
B _ a d C
ax-morning meeting wi c 0vertMe 8p APPROVAL OF TIGATIONS, REGION Ill Case NO.
3-ZOO2-03 1
Bhaiot turned in an overtime deviation for IC Agent'a Note: According to Pcny Technical SpeCitication 5.2.2.c, overtime deviations arc required to allow employees or contractors to exceed 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> in a 7-day period rule and arc mUdy approved and/or distrpproved at the Outage D k t o r level. This rule was designed to ensun that pcrsomel conducting work on nuclear related equipment were not mentally fatigued and wen capable of performing their tasks safely and efftktively.
me next day, 7 - 1 c worked on his enough pcoplc to do the test already set up for that shift, overtime deviadom, but he did not.' J&&hch 19,300:
that he had concerns about whad
'A
? A r
c
! d falsified the time catdd at &e time Of-Bllbmittal to skirt indicating that whicl r
i
(?nl c
m with the submia of the time stated that his conscience had been 7 0 cy actually happened (Exhibit 2, pp. 6-9,1142).
(.
uring a discussion with Perry mpcrvisors, the outage w BS ending Case NO.
3-2002-03 1
an overtime deviation request to plant management for nuthcdzation @hibit 2, pp. 18-26).
%%wash the fa&by justify&
e
~t w a nat aware of any kiDdofta+oritism except for previously working at Perry as a contractor time cards w his 0v;;;junlcss ins 2, pp. 29,31036).
7 c 7d l-ic w i n a t i o n with RC$QWI S taff On October 7, an Allegation Review Board (ARB) was held on this matter, but the NRC staff did not have all of the relevant infoxmation for 01 to make a dccilon on accepting this issue for investigation. This informa ARB, it was determined tha Specification 5.2.2.e and 10 uently provided to 01 on Octobk 23,2002. At this bit 3).
Ctions potentially violated Pcrry Technical COOd ination With the Re &malCounSc~
ceA.BERSON, 5 view of Documentation CSC NO.
3-2002-031
On, io-id them to be incoatct, and retumed them to the who comcfed and submitted the time sheets for processing 7c (Exhibit 5).
err01~
made during these events, management expectations, and ways cpprevent recurrence were
&iscussed -bit 6).
7c-CBfd showed he h d a d i2 h o z o n Mon 7 e.
(Exhibit 7).
7 r-cards showed th ts to Iocate the original time cuds W a c tb 8 copy of a policy regarding falsification of records dgned by 7f4
, effective October 1998, stated that any employee who falsified records, reparts &forms, OT who knowipgly aiped any document known to contain false material, would be subject to immcdiete discharge (Exhibit 10).
On August 12,2003, FWOC provided OkND with B rtsponse letter pursuant to a request for overtime deviation and time card record information. The lettcr indicated that &r FENOC's on database and microfiche files, no approved overtime deviations ring RF08 were found. Furthermore, a review was also conducted
/I C
APPROVAL OF TIGATIONS, REGlON III
\\
Case No. 3-2002431 10
of the time cards submitted b acknowledged that no othe OLRIU covering the week uzing that period. FENOC pt for those previously provided to 3 c The testimony provided during the interviews was reviewed regarding the allegations involved in this investigation. b addition, documents related to the allegation, which arc listed in the Review ofWcumentation section of this repoa, were also reviewed. Copies of the hterviews and documents obtained by OERJII me attached as &%its to this report.
n
&riew
-cr utated that wha traveling at the end of the week work on his day off. However, at the other end of the shift. Th worked within a 7day period without a waiver, that since he was
-so stated that he wan surprised to talked about the day before that he was going that day, because it was deviation since the job they w thought that they wanted to.get part oitae conversation betivee traveling, not being there for APPROVAL OF TIGATIONS; REGION III Cast NO.
3-2002-031 11
they werc doing. There may have been deviations in other groups for people working 7 days a week of which he was not awm (Bthiiit 12, pp. 15-17).
7 c 7c 7c hours to avoid exec should have countm want comment and did not respond 7c (Exhibjt 13, pp. 13-16).
ecausc that week C
they bad a very high reg C~SC NO.
3-2002-031 12
and overtime, but d d not take part in that diecussion (Exhibit 1 4 3 8 ).
exceeding the nquircd or the time cards and that someone came one, but could not rem cordial business relati t
having to work overtime at it meant to submit a time card that was false.
own to be unintentional. He questioned the fact that if iomeme was going to do something like that, why would they verbalize it (Exhibit 15, pp. 3-8).
TIGATIONS, REGION III Cut NO.
3-2002-031 13
had nointention of signing 811 Wegal &ne sheet. Ib emphasized that he would not haveZgncd was not aware 7 C 3c 7 c so stated that it was discussed among the supervisors that something was wrong and to put in an after-th
? C time sheets because no oue woul
.accurately reflect him working ov
&viatian after-the-fact. However, but believed it could have been an pp. 14-18,23}.
Furthirmore, he reiterate hours worked (Exhibit 15, pp. 24-28, Agents Note: On July 30,2003, Tim firm) sent OkRIII a letter indic his interview on June 19,2003, rgan Lewis (FENOC law s e n t d by counsel after ad not prepared for the urate end incomplete information. After having fcfieshed his quested an opportunity to cleat up any potentially incomct DISCLOSURE Wr APPROVAL OF OFFICE OF REGION III Case NO.
3-2OO2-03 1
14
information. MATTHeu'S was advised th could provide additional 7 C
@formation to 01 regarding this issue. To has been'nceived by OI.
7L
--c the bfiff. RC never I
g more like "creative t realized that bcing silent t that if any one of the ng Iike that, then the as talking about doing the 7c bvertime, someone should have proposed processing an ovcrtimC deviation (Exhiiit 16, pp. 3-9).
e deviation was sub
-also stated thg 85 in th g&g shifr turnover, but did ubdtted his own or@nd time card or if it was done b!
- & & & & a t everybody was working different hours and had diffennt since a lot & i g s were going on, the monitoring of put a lot of time into. As are instead attended a meeting about not meeting manageme maintaia control of things like he should have (Exhibit 16, pp. 18,20-23).
of those things that he a
Cut NO.
3-2002-03 1 15
tted that the time card issuq was not handed Viation in effect. He rcmembcmd hearing a state Outage Director that overtime deviations wouldnot be easy to the level of difficulty in getting overtime deviations depended exist other than having as a hard worker who was only eir job to rein him back in, which 7t
-is made aware of the fact that there was m overtime pectad each Project Manager 7c anh to of the rqdd-worlchg hours and any othercompany functions that bok place. He acknowledged that R falsifkation of overtime Itcords would not have been taken I C and had not aecn B time card until p about the time cards being rctumed believed that R correction
. He knew that it was Perry as t0.m after-the-fact overtimc deviation Aft&-the-fact deviations art 7 c er stated that if it was determined that a deliberate falsification occulTcd due to APPROVAL OF TIGATIONS, REGION HI CEX NO.
3-2002-03 1 16
mistake, then there pbabry would be some form of minor docssnt tolcq-mgf
- ents, OOD inshsdthat L-should be handling the matt#,
disciphry actions
- * -&it 17, pp. 21-22i24-25 taw]: that he h e but never h a d 7b 7c.
b e
sheets, but could not recall any concems expressed bm about WO&&
c b
having exceeded the overtime ntlcvb3t 18, pp. 5-10),
nicd ever stating or indicating to somebody that there 7e
.-. i use of overtime deviations. However, there was a process by which it could bc entered and
.10-12,15-16,18-21).
NOT FOR OF Crtst NO.
3-2002-031 17
knew nothing about overtime tatcd tbat in March of 2001. he 10 -
statement administratively creative or any si
( t*
..---u-milar statement of any $e. He comprehended the statement to mean markiag up time sheets in some incomt m e r to skirt poljcies that were in
&GZi ever making the c statement as creative timekeeping, and first heard it used by his Si McCOY,.who was 011 the night shift during RFOS (Exhibit 20, Case NO.
3-20093031 18
that if the subject was broached to Peny supervisors during the turnover and nothing was said, then either the 72-ho~r rule or their approach must not be a big deal. He dso thought that whether his horn showed up BS straight time or overtime, it did not pay, because straight time rates wen cheaper to the client than overtime that when he came iP on Monday or Tuesday, he wodred 7 days straight e in on hi8 day off waa because he beli nobody else was available. Nonethel Ucy and was not trying to justify it Agent's Note: According t9 Peny personnel, McCOY was not employed by the AO during RF08, but worked 88 an in&pcn&nt contra&.
Attempts to find McCOY have been unsuccessful at this time. P q is in the process of checking database records to determine McCOY's employment status on the MOV Project during RFO8.
the outage was over, he found Perry supervisors insinuated indicated that he knew better that he never used it in a j APPROVe OF
-IONS, REGION IIl Ca~e NO.
3-2002-031 19
consideicd a coaching session.
also received no formal reprimands from the AO, but "c had apologized profiely to ed fa the wrongness of his actions (Exhiiit 20, pp. 32-33,35-38,42-43,49-51).
tion, it can bc concluded that
&pcctations and ways to prevent reFmnce, but no disciplinary acson was impIcm&tca
,wed. "Dav-irff worked. *Tn s m o r t of the bointcd out concerns aEut the htcgrity of peay supervision anti covering Upvle f&T&%n of oJertime records. Pcny policy notification letter, signed by FENOC Vice President WOOD, clearly established the company's position in relation to the falsification of records. It hdicattd, "Any employee who falsifi-a records ar knowingly signs R document known to contain false mattrial, shall be subject to immediate discharge."
The Peny response letter, pursuant to a quest for overtime deviation and time card record information, showed that no ovextime devit~tio~s WCR in effect at that time. It also 7c I
mment,thercwasno k
td in the falsificatiofi of overtirde records. Furthermore, since he did not supervise dthu of the contractors, hc would NOT FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSURE WITHOUT APPROVAL OF FIELD OFFICE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF 1[NVESTIGATIONS, REGION III Case No. 3-2002413 1
20
t the overtime deviations. Although according o involved in the changes to the necessary to have both elthcr not performed tted laowing that w- - -
- - d h r k c d on their days off without an overtiddeviation. They also 3 that the 9v e issue was not right and then should have becn E deviation in place.
-hanging the 06ginal time cards and admitted
-_.-. that 3
%we\\G;Zded &at any of the tune sheets were ted the -OUR?
worked, and there WBS m aftw-the-fact deviation put into credibility since other testimonial. evidence proves the existence of e PENOC database search also verified that no ahw-the-fact deviapon
%inid havinn BPY knowledae or involvement in ~Ms matter.
~
3a Conclusion OF FIELD OFFICE D TIGATIONS, REGION IlI C a t NO.
3--1oO2-O3 1 21
~
Case No. 3-2002-03 1
22
r On September 23,2003, William P. S E T S, Special Counsel for Regulatory Enforcement, Fraud Section, Criminal Division, U.S. Dep-cnt of Justice, Washington, D.C., advised z that in his view, the case did not warrant prosecution and rendered an oral declination.
During the course of this investigatiOn, intehews conducted disclosed potential dlegatiom of fitness-fof-dutY violations. Besed on the infodon obtained, it w8s discovered that an
&mation o c
c
~
.between Wo contracton'duxing W08 atPW. This information was forwarded to the RlII etaff for review of any potential safety or technicd concerns and is not included in this Report of Investigation.
m
I
\\
NOT FOR PUB h C DISCLOSURE OUT APPROVAL OF FIELD OF"ICEDIRE&FFICE O
F T
REGIONm CSC NO. 3-2002-03 I 24
lZescriDtion (1 page).
Investigation Status Record, 01 Case No. 3-2002-031, dated October 23,%02 Transcript of Interhew o 7 pages).
ARB Allegation. Action Plan, Wegation No. RIU-02-ArO171, dated October 2, 2002 (5 pages).
loyte Time Card S rked or the weeks Perry Policy Notification Letter regarding falsification of records, endorsed by WOOD, effective October 1998 (1 page).
FENOC response letter pursuant to a request for overtime deviation and time card rcCord information, dated August 12,2003 (Ipage).
Transcript of Interview Transcript of Interview o Transcript of Interview o Transcript of Interview o 5 pages).
FIELD OFFICE DIRE CUC NO.
3-2002-03 1
25
16 Transcript of Interview o 17 Transcript of Tntcrview o 18 19 20 Transcdpt of Interview o CSC NO.
3-2002-031 26
April 1, 2004 EA-03-208 Mr. William R. Kanda Vice President - Nuclear, Perry FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company P. 0. Box 97, A210 Perry, OH 44081
SUBJECT:
[NRC OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS REPORT NO. 3-2002-0311
Dear Mr. Kanda:
This refers to the investigation conducted by the US. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
Office of Investigations (01) into an apparent violation of the Technical Specification limit on working hours on March 12 and March 13, 2001, at the FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Companys (FENOC) Perry Nuclear Power Plant. A summary of the 01 investigation was provided to you on December 19, 2003, and a predecisional enforcement conference was held with you on March 2, 2004.
Based on information developed during the 01 investigation, information contained in letters from FENOC on February 25, 2004, and March 22, 2004, and the information you provided during the predecisional enforcement conference, the NRC has concluded that a violation of NRC requirements occurred. In summary, on March 9, 2001, during Refueling Outage RF-08, at least one contract technician, responsible for testing motor operated valves (MOVs) at the Perry Nuclear Power Plant deliberately devised a plan of creative timekeeping, so that three technicians worked on a regularly scheduled day off and charged that time to a day during the following week when they had fewer hours scheduled. One technician mentioned this plan during a regular shift turnover meeting that was attended by at least three FENOC supervisors associated with the MOV testing program. A comment about creative timekeeping, was attributed to at least one technician. Another employee reminded those attending the turnover meeting that regardless of the number of hours the technicians planned to work, plant procedures limited them to a maximum number of hours in a given period of time. Following this reminder, none of the supervisors asked the technician about his comment regarding creative timekeeping, sought preapproval of the overtime as required by Technical Specification, or otherwise followed-up on the issue. As a result, two technicians worked in excess of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> in a 7-day period without a preapproved overtime deviation. One technician worked 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> per day for 9 consecutive days and a second technician worked 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> per day for 10 consecutive days. The time card for each technician was prepared in a manner that indicated the technicians did not work in excess of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> in a 7-day period. One FENOC supervisor refused to sign the time cards, apparently believing the cards contained inaccurate or incorrect information; however, that supervisor failed to take action to identify, correct, or inform management of this information.
The FENOC supervisors were all aware that a deviation from the overtime guidelines needed to be submitted and approved by plant management before the overtime could be worked. By failing to stop the technicians plan to work in excess of the overtime guidelines and by failing to submit a request for prior approval of the overtime, the FENOC supervisors allowed a violation of the Technical Specification limiting overtime to occur. The actions of two of the supervisors are considered willful violations, representing careless disregard of the Technical Specification limiting overtime because they knew that the technicians planned to work in excess of the overtime guidelines. The other supervisor was on a different shift than the technicians and was not in direct control of their work hours. In addition, he said he believed the technician was joking when he made the comment about creative timekeeping. The NRC concluded that his actions did not rise to the level of careless disregard; however, he had an opportunity to prevent the violation of Technical Specifications. The actions of at least one technician in devising the plan to exceed the overtime guidelines is considered to be a deliberate violation of the Technical Specification requirement. Because the violation involved willfulness, it has been categorized in accordance with the General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions, (Enforcement Policy), NUREG-1600, at Severity Level Ill.
In accordance with the Enforcement Policy, a base civil penalty in the amount of $60,000 is considered for a Severity Level Ill violation. Because this was a willful violation, the NRC considered whether credit was warranted for Identification and Corrective Action in accordance with the civil penalty assessment process in Section VI.C.2 of the Enforcement Policy. The violation was identified to FENOC by another FENOC employee; therefore, credit is warranted for the ldentification civil penalty adjustment factor. While corrective actions at the time the violation was identified to FENOC were minimal (e.g., corrective action report did not address the employee integrity aspect of the violation and only one of the three supervisors responsible for the violation was counseled) broader corrective actions were taken following a subsequent FENOC investigation of the violation. Corrective actions consisted of, but were not limited to:
(1) sending a letter to all plant personnel on overtime management, including responsibility for compliance with work hour limits; (2) providing training to supervisors and staff on compliance, completeness and accuracy, including overtime deviations and time cards; (3) incorporating training on compliance, completeness and accuracy into your plant access training; (4) providing more detailed guidance on individual and supervisory responsibility for control of work hours; and (5) counseling the involved supervisors. On balance, credit was warranted for the Corrective Action civil penalty adjustment factor.
Therefore, to encourage prompt identification and comprehensive correction of violations, I have been authorized, after consultation with the Director, Office of Enforcement, not to propose a civil penalty in this case. However, significant violations in the future could result in a civil penalty.
You are required to respond to this letter and should follow the instructions specified in the enclosed Notice of Violation when preparing your response. The NRC will use your response, in part, to determine whether further enforcement action is necessary to ensure compliance with regulatory requirements.
OFFICE Rlll I E D:OE' I E Rlll I
E Rlll I
Rlll I N NAME Weil Congel Caniano for Grobe for Clayton DATE 3/31/04 03/30104 3/31/04 4/1/04 4/1/04 Pederson Reynolds In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and the enclosure will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the NRC's document system (ADAMS), accessible from the NRC Web site at httD://www.nrc.aov/readinq-rm/adams.html.
I N
Rlll Caldwell 4/1/04 Sincerely,
/RA/
James L. Caldwell Regional Administrator Docket No. 50-440 License No. NPF-58
Enclosure:
Notice of Violation cc w/encl:
G. Leidich, President - FENOC K. Cimorelli, Acting Director, Maintenance Department V. Higaki, Manager, Regulatory Affairs J. Messina, Director, Nuclear Services Department T. Lentz, Director, Nuclear Engineering Department T. Rausch, Plant Manager, Nuclear Power Plant Department M. O'Reilly, Attorney, First Energy Public Utilities Commission of Ohio Ohio State Liaison Officer R. Owen, Ohio Department of Health
' HQ concurrence received 3/30/04 from Frances Ramirez, OE
ADAMS Distribution:
RidsNrrDipmlipb WTravers, ED0 SCollins, DEDR FCongel, OE JDyer, NRR DDambly, OGC HBell, OIG GCaputo, 01 GGrant, Rlll CPederson, Rlll SReynolds, RII I RCaniano, Rlll PHiland, Rlll JCreed, Rlll DHills, Rlll ADunlop, Rlll CWeil, Rlll MRing, Rlll JDixon-Herrity, OE SLewis, OGC RPaul, 0I:Rlll WFranz, 0I:Rlll RFranovich, NRR Enforcement Coordinators RI, RII and RIV 0E:ES 0E:EA (2)
OE : MA1 L 0E:Web RA0:RII I OAC : RI I I SRI, Perry DRPlll DRSlll PLBl JRKI
NOTICE OF VIOLATION FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1 Docket No. 50-440 License No. NPF-3 EA-03-208 During an NRC investigation concluded on October 6, 2003, a violation of NRC requirements was identified. In accordance with the "General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions," NUREG-1600, the violation is listed below:
Technical Specification 5.2.2.e for the Perry Nuclear Power Plant requires, in part, that administrative procedures shall be developed and implemented to limit the working hours of unit staff who perform safety related functions (e.g., key maintenance personnel). The procedures shall include guidelines on working hours that ensure adequate staff coverage is maintained without heavy use of overtime. Any deviation from the working hour guidelines shall be authorized in advance by the Plant Manager in accordance with approved administrative procedures and with documentation of the basis for granting the deviation.
Plant Administrative Procedure (PAP) 0224, "Fitness for Duty," Revision 2, February 5, 1999, implements Technical Specification 5.2.2.e.
Section 5.13 of PAP-0224 defines key maintenance personnel as those individuals physically performing or immediately supervising the performance of maintenance, repair, testing, modification, or calibration of safety-related structures, systems or components.
Section 6.14 of PAP-0224 provides, in part, that the Technical Specification overtime guidelines will be followed in the event that substantial amounts of overtime are required during extended periods of shutdown for refueling, major maintenance or major plant modifications. The guidelines state that an individual should not work more than 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> in any 7-day period (excluding shift turnovers). Deviations from the overtime guidelines are requested by the immediate supervisor from the Plant Manager, or designee, using the Technical Specification Overtime Deviation Request form (PNPP No. 7699). Section 6.1 5.2 of PAP-0225 designates the Technical Specification Overtime Deviation Request form (PNPP No. 7699) as a quality assurance record.
Contrary to the above, from March 6 to March 15, 2001, two key maintenance personnel responsible for testing motor operated valves, a safety-related function, failed to follow Technical Specification overtime guidelines. Specifically, during Refueling Outage RF-08, the two individuals each worked in excess of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> in a 7-day period and the immediate supervisors failed to request deviations from the overtime guidelines in advance from the Plant Manager or authorized designee. One individual worked 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> per day for 10 consecutive days from March 6 to March 15,2001, and the other individual worked 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> per day for 9 consecutive days from March 7 to March 15, 2001.
This is a Severity Level Ill violation (Supplement I)
Notice of Violation Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company is hereby required to submit a written statement or explanation to the US. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555 with a copy to the Regional Administrator, Region Ill, and a copy to the NRC Resident Inspector at the Perry Nuclear Power Plant, within 30 days of the date of the letter transmitting this Notice of Violation (Notice). This reply should be clearly marked as a Reply to a Notice of Violation; EA-03-208 and should include for each violation: (1) the reason for the violation, or, if contested, the basis for disputing the violation or severity level, (2) the corrective steps that have been taken and the results achieved, (3) the corrective steps that will be taken to avoid further violations, and (4) the date when full compliance will be achieved. Your response may reference or include previous docketed correspondence, if the correspondence adequately addresses the required response. If an adequate reply is not received within the time specified in this Notice, an order or a Demand for Information may be issued as to why the license should not be modified, suspended, or revoked, or why such other action as may be proper should not be taken.
Where good cause is shown, consideration will be given to extending the response time.
If you contest this enforcement action, you should also provide a copy of your response, with the basis for your denial, to the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001.
Because your response will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the NRCs document system (ADAMS), accessible from the NRC Web site at htttx//www.nrc.aov/readina-rm/adams.html, to the extent possible, it should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be made available to the public without redaction. If personal privacy or proprietary information is necessary to provide an acceptable response, then please provide a bracketed copy of your response that identifies the information that should be protected and a redacted copy of your response that deletes such information. If you request withholding of such material, you must specifically identify the portions of your response that you seek to have withheld and provide in detail the bases for your claim of withholding (e.g., explain why the disclosure of information will create an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy or provide the information required by 10 CFR 2.390(b) to support a request for withholding confidential commercial or financial information). If safeguards information is necessary to provide an acceptable response, please provide the level of protection described in 10 CFR 73.21.
In accordance with 10 CFR 19.1 1, you may be required to post this Notice within two working days.
Dated this 1 day of April 2004.
May 5,2005 EA-04-231 EA-04-232 Mr. Mark B. Bezilla Vice President-Nuclear, Davis-Besse FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station 5501 North State Route 2 Oak Harbor, OH 43449-9760
SUBJECT:
DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION FINAL SIGNIFICANCE DETERMINATION FOR A WHITE FINDING AND NOTICE OF VIOLATION (NRC INSPECTION REPORT NO. 05000346/200501 O(DRS)
Dear Mr. Bezilla:
The purpose of this letter is to provide you with the final results of our significance determination of the preliminary White finding identified in Inspection Report No. 05000346/2004018(DRS).
The inspection finding was assessed using the Significance Determination Process (SDP) and was preliminarily characterized as White (Le., a finding with low to moderate increased importance to safety, which may require additional NRC inspections) because it was associated with a failure to implement a risk significant planning standard (RSPS). This preliminary White finding concerned the failure of the emergency planning zone (EPZ) sirens identified on May 7, 2004.
The preliminary White finding was associated with the Ottawa County Sheriffs Office loss of its capability to activate 49 EPZ sirens, located in Ottawa County, between April 27 and May 7, 2004, and potential vulnerability to unknowingly lose its capability to activate the 49 EPZ sirens located in Ottawa County for approximately 30 days prior to a routine Alert and Notification System (ANS) test conducted on May 7, 2004. The preliminary White finding was also associated with an apparent violation of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(5), Emergency Plans.
In our letter to you dated January 13, 2005, transmitting the inspection report and preliminary significance determination, we provided FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company (FENOC) an opportunity to request a Regulatory Conference or provide a written response. You declined the opportunity to discuss this issue in a Regulatory Conference and instead, on February 14, 2005, provided a written response. A copy of the your written response to the NRC has been entered in the NRCs document system (ADAMS) and is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.govlreading-rm/adams.html, ADAMS Accession Number ML050470307.
In your letter, you disagreed with the NRCs application of the SDP and preliminary significance assessment of the finding, and provided information that you requested the NRC use in a re-evaluation of the finding. Specifically, you indicated that the significance of the finding
should be assessed assuming the sirens were unavailable for only 10 days and with consideration that an alternate method was available to notify the public of an emergency.
You also disagreed with our statement that you had several opportunities to correct the ANS performance indicator (PI) data prior to submitting the data to the NRC, including information provided to you by the NRC. Finally, you noted that the apparent violation associated with the submittal of the incorrect ANS PI data appeared to be consistent with the Severity Level IV violation examples included in the NRCs Enforcement Policy.
With regard to the length of time the sirens were unavailable, we re-examined the inspection results and concluded that the county officials lost the capability to activate all 49 Ottawa County EPZ sirens for approximately 10 days. In addition, we determined that the potential existed for the county officials to lose the capability to activate the 49 Ottawa County EPZ sirens for approximately 30 days. Since the ANS is designed to permit the county officials to activate the system, we determined that a loss of this capability would constitute a failure versus a degradation of the system. In addition, we concluded that the system should be considered degraded for that period of time when the potential existed for the system to be made inoperable due to a design flaw and a deficiency in the maintenance program. Therefore, we determined that the county officials inability to activate the 49 Ottawa County EPZ sirens for 10 days and potential loss of its capability to activate the 49 Ottawa County EPZ sirens for 30 days, was appropriately considered to be a degradation of the Risk-Significant Planning Standard and was properly characterized as a White finding.
During our initial significance assessment of the finding, we did not specifically consider the availability of route alerting as an alternate method for public notification during an emergency.
However, we note that the SDP already includes consideration of the presence of an alternate notification system. As a result, we concluded that a re-assessment of the significance of the finding, considering the availability of an alternate public notification method, was not necessary. We also determined that, had route alerting not been available, the finding may have been characterized as being greater than a White finding.
With regard to the statements in our January 2005 letter associated with your submittal of incorrect ANS PI data, we reviewed the information you provided in your response and determined that sufficient information was available to your staff, prior to your submittal of the discrepant ANS PI data, to indicate that the additional silent tests of the EPZ sirens should not have been included in the ANS PI data. Specifically, we determined that Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) publication NE1 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, an NRC-endorsed document issued in November 2001, provided clear guidance which would preclude inclusion of the silent tests of the EPZ sirens in the ANS PI data. The NRC also raised questions regarding the validity of your changing the testing methodology, in the middle of a testing period, and the need for Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) approval for the methodology change. Although the NRC did not raise a specific concern regarding which equipment was used to conduct the silent tests of the EPZ sirens until after the ANS PI data were submitted in July 2004, we determined that sufficient guidance was available and questions were raised regarding the revised methodology, which should have resulted in your staff determining that the silent tests of the EPZ siren tests should not be included in the ANS PI data.
After considering the information developed during the inspection and the additional information you provided in your February 14, 2005, letter, the NRC has concluded that the inspection finding associated with the degradation of the EPZ sirens is appropriately characterized as White (i.e., an issue with low to moderate increased importance to safety, which may require additional NRC inspections).
You have 30 calendar days from the date of this letter to appeal the staffs determination of significance for the identified White finding. Such appeals will be considered to have merit only if they meet the criteria given in NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 2.
The NRC has also determined that the failure to ensure the means to provide early notification and clear instruction to the populace within the plume exposure pathway EPZ is a violation of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(5), as cited in the enclosed Notice of Violation (Notice). The circumstances surrounding the violation are described in detail in the subject inspection report. In accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy, the Notice of Violation is considered an escalated enforcement action because it is associated with a White finding.
You are required to respond to this letter and should follow the instructions specified in the enclosed Notice when preparing your response.
Finally, in your February 14, 2005, letter, you agreed that the 10 CFR 50.9(a) violation of the Commissions regulations, documented in our January 2005 letter to you and associated with the submittal of discrepant ANS PI data for the second and third calendar quarters of 2004, was appropriately characterized as a Severity Level IV violation in accordance with the NRCs Enforcement Policy. On November 4, 2004, you submitted a letter to the NRC correcting the performance indicator data.
Based on the results of this inspection, we have determined that your submittal of discrepant ANS PI data for the second and third quarters of 2004 is a Severity Level IV violation of 10 CFR 50.9, Completeness and Accuracy of Information. You documented the NRCs concerns regarding your submittal of the ANS PI data in your corrective action program as Condition Report 04-06632, the violation was not willful, and compliance was restored within a reasonable period of time. Therefore, this violation is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation (NCV), consistent with Section V1.A of the Enforcement Policy. The NCV was described as Apparent Violation 05000346/2004018-01 in NRC Inspection Report No. 05000346/2004018(DRS). If you contest the violation or significance of the NCV, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this letter, with the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001, with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region 111, the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, and the NRC Resident Inspector at the Davis-Besse facility (EA-04-232).
For the entire inspection period, the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station was under the Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0350 Process. The Davis-Besse Oversight Panel assessed the inspection findings and other performance data to determine the required level and focus of
followup inspection activities and any other appropriate regulatory actions. Even though the Reactor Oversight Process had been suspended at the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, it was used as guidance for inspection activities and to assess findings. Accordingly, we will use the NRC Action Matrix, in accordance with IMC 0305, to determine the most appropriate NRC response for this event. We will notify you, by separate correspondence, of that determination.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the NRCs document system (ADAMS), accessible from the NRC Web site at http.l/www.nrc.qov/readinq-rm/adams.html. To the extent possible, your response should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be made available to the Public without redaction. The NRC also includes significant enforcement actions on its Web site at www.nrc.qov; select What We Do, Enforcement, then Significant Enforcement Actions.
Since re1 y,
/RA by Mark Satorius Acting for/
James L. Caldwell Regional Administrator Docket No. 50-346 License No. NPF-3
Enclosure:
Notice of Violation cc w/encl:
The Honorable Dennis Kucinich G. Leidich, President - FENOC J. Hagan, Senior Vice President L. Myers, Chief Operating Officer, FENOC Plant Manager Manager - Regulatory Compliance M. OReilly, Attorney, FirstEnergy Ohio State Liaison Officer R. Owen, Administrator, Ohio Department of Health Public Utilities Commission of Ohio President, Board of County Commissioners J. Papcun, President, Ottawa County Board of Commissioners W. King, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region V Engineering and Services, FENOC of Lucas County
OFFICE Rlll I.
Rlll
- I Rlll I
Rlll I
NAME Riemer:sd Lipa Berson Pederson DATE 4/20/05 4/20/05 4/22/05 4/22/05 OFFICE NSlR
- I OE' I.
Rlll I
Rlll I
NAME Kahler Congel O'Brien MSatorius for DATE 04/26/05 5/4/05 5/5/05 5/5/05 Caldwell followup inspection activities and any other appropriate regulatory actions. Even though the Reactor Oversight Process had been suspended at the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, it was used as guidance for inspection activities and to assess findings. Accordingly, we will use the NRC Action Matrix, in accordance with IMC 0305, to determine the most appropriate NRC response for this event. We will notify you, by separate correspondence, of that determination.
Rlll
- I Pederson for Reynolds 4/22/05 I
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the NRC's document system (ADAMS), accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.qov/readinq-rm/adams.html. To the extent possible, your response should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be made available to the Public without redaction. The NRC also includes significant enforcement actions on its Web site at www.nrc.qov; select What We Do, Enforcement, then Significant Enforcement Actions.
Since re1 y,
James L. Caldwell Regional Administrator
/RA by Mark Satorius Acting for/
Docket No. 50-346 License No. NPF-3
Enclosure:
'Concurrence received from Doug Starkey,OE, in E-mail 5/4/05.
DISTRIBUTION:
SECY OCA L. Reyes, ED0 E. Merschoff, DEDR W. Kane, DEDH F. Congel, OE C Nolan, OE J. Caldwell, RIII:RA L. Chandler, OGC J. Moore, OGC J. Dyer, NRR R. Zimmerman, Director, NSlR G. Tracy, Director, Division of Security, NSlR S. Richards, Chief, IIPB, NRR M. Tschiltz, Chief, SPSB, NRR D. Merzke, NRR D. Holody, Enforcement Coordinator, RI C. Evans, Enforcement Coordinator, RII K. O'Brien, Enforcement Coordinator, Rlll G. Sanborn, Enforcement Coordinator, RIV R. Franovich, Enforcement Coordinator, NRR B. Westreich, Enforcement Contact, NSlR M. Cheok, RES Resident Inspector S. Gagner, OPA H. Bell, OIG G. Caputo, 01 J Piccone, OSTP J. Strasma, RIII:PA R. Lickus, Rlll J. Lynch, Rlll OEWEB OEMAIL GYS SPSI RidsNrrDipmlipb GEG CSTl CAA 1 C. Pederson, DRS (hard copy - IR's only)
DRPlll DRSlll PLBl JRKl DB0350 WDL (IR's only)
R 0 Prep o r',s,E n rc CI o v
NOTICE OF VIOLATION FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Docket No. 50-346 License No. NPF-3 EA-04-23 1 During an NRC inspection conducted between October 25 and October 29, 2004, at the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, a violation of NRC requirements was identified. In accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy, the violation is listed below:
Title 10 CFR 50.54(q) requires, in part, that a licensee authorized to operate a nuclear power reactor shall follow and maintain in effect emergency plans which meet the standards in Section 50.47(b). Title 10 CFR 50.47(b)(5) requires, in part, the means to provide early notification and clear instruction to the populace within the plume exposure pathway Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) have been established.
Section 7.7 of Revision 23 of the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Stations emergency plan indicated that the EPZ Prompt Notification System implements the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(5). Section 7.7 states that the Alert and Notification System (ANS),
consists of 54 sirens that were installed to provide an acoustic alerting signal for the residents and transients within the 10 mile radius of the Davis-Besse Station, and that the sounding of these sirens would alert the public to tune to local radio stations for Emergency Alert Station messages. The emergency plan also indicated that local officials would activate the sirens from the Ottawa County Sheriffs Office.
Contrary to the above, between April 27 and May 7, 2004, the FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company, a licensee authorized to operate the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, failed to provide a means for early notification and clear instruction to the populace within the plume exposure pathway EPZ. Specifically, on April 6th, the time signature of the siren activation equipment, located in the Ottawa County Sheriffs Office, was not revised the following the change to daylight savings time. On April 26th, the licensee conducted a maintenance activity which incorrectly set the time signature of one siren to one hour ahead of the actual day light savings time. On April 27th, the licensee conducted a routine polling of all of the EPZ sirens which caused the time signatures of the remaining EPZ sirens to be set one hour ahead of the actual daylight savings time. The combination of these changes caused the time signatures of the activation equipment and the EPZ sirens to differ by more than the allowed 1.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> which blocked activation of the sirens. As a result, the Ottawa County Sheriffs Office could not activate the 49 EPZ sirens located in Ottawa County until May 7, 2004, when the combined results of these events were identified.
This violation is associated with a White Significance Determination Process finding Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company is hereby required to submit a written statement or explanation to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555 with a copy to the Regional Administrator, Region Ill, and a copy to the NRC Resident Inspector at the facility that is the subject of this Notice, within 30 days of the date of the letter transmitting this Notice of Violation (Notice). This reply should be clearly marked as a Reply to a Notice of Violation;
Notice of Violation EA-04-231, and should include: (1) the reason for the violation, or, if contested, the basis for disputing the violation or severity level; (2) the corrective steps that have been taken and the results achieved; (3) the corrective steps that will be taken to avoid further violations; and (4) the date when full compliance will be achieved. Your response may reference or include previous docketed correspondence, if the correspondence adequately addresses the required response. If an adequate reply is not received within the time specified in this Notice, an Order 9 or a Demand for Information may be issued as to why the license should not be modified, suspended, or revoked, or why such other action as may be proper should not be taken. Where good cause is shown, consideration will be given to extending the response time If you contest this enforcement action, you should also provide a copy of your response, with the basis for your denial, to the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001.
Because your response will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the NRCs document system (ADAMS), accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.qov/readinq-rm/adams.html, to the extent possible, it should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be made available to the public without redaction. If personal privacy or proprietary information is necessary to provide an acceptable response, then please provide a bracketed copy of your response that identifies the information that should be protected and a redacted copy of your response that deletes such information. If you request withholding of such material, you must specifically identify the portions of your response that you seek to have withheld and provide in detail the bases for your claim of withholding (e.g., explain why the disclosure of information will create an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy or provide the information required by 10 CFR 2.390(b) to support a request for withholding confidential commercial or financial information). If safeguards information is necessary to provide an acceptable response, please provide the level of protection described in 10 CFR 73.21.
In accordance with 10 CFR 19.1 1, you may be required to post this Notice within two working days.
Dated this 5h day of May 2005