ML20140B717
| ML20140B717 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 05000000, 05000470 |
| Issue date: | 10/06/1981 |
| From: | Charemagne Grimes Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20140B723 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-86-45 NUDOCS 8110230061 | |
| Download: ML20140B717 (15) | |
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Docket No.: STN 50-470 <
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g 4sm 4 APPLICANT: COMBUSTION ENGINEERING, INC.
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! FACILITY: CESSAR STANDARD NUCLEAR STEAM SUPPLY SYSTEM
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St'P. JECT: SIMMRY OF SEPTEMBER 17, 1981 HEETING REGARDING CE APPEAL OF STAFF POSITIONS t
On September 17, 1981, the staff met with representatives of Combustion
. to the accident and tran. stent analyses for the CESSAR Standard Huclear i Steam Supply System. The meeting attendees are identified in Enclosure 1 and CE's proposals ~are presented in Enclosure 2.
i The staff positions at issue evolved from a series of meetings between CE, 4
the Reactor Systems Branch, and the Accident Evaluation Branch during which CF presented material that will be contained in the reformatted Chapter'15 of the CESSAR FSAR and CE responses to staff questions. CE generally comented that a significant effort has gone into formatting the accident and transient analyses consistent with the Standard Review Plan (SRP) and they had previously indicated that the CESSAR envelope would probably j require certain exceptions to the SRP acceptance criteria in order to i
- support the CESSAR site envelope. Each of the staff positions is described ;
helow, followed by a brief sumary of the discussion and the result of the -
1 CE appeal . ,
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, 1 The staff cannot accept higher offsite doses than the SRP acceptance
' criteria (30 rem) for the locked-rotor / sheared-shaft events on a '
probahilistic basis. .
- PC argued that the probability of the event sequence coupled with the
! conserantisss in the analysis support a higher dose criterton. The staff indicated that the event envelopes a spectrum of accidents and, thus, a snecific event and the associated dose criteria cannot be limited probabt-Ifstically. In addition, the staff identified reductions in conservatism that result from the acceptance the " convoluted" fuel failure criteria and the use of a decontamination factor of 100 Further, the staff indicated that a variable steam generator tuhe leakage rate could be used in the snalysts up to the Standard Technical Specification limit, which results I
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I COMUSTION ENGINEERING, INC. OCT A 19af i
.- I in a plant-specific Technical Specification (TS) Ifmit. The staff noted that this event had been categorized as an " accident" for the CESSAR Preliminary Design Approval (PDA) and. consequently, agreed that CE could use either (1) 10 CFR 100 guidelines (300 rem) for the locked-rotor event in conjunction with a loss of offsite power (LOP). TS tube leakage. and the worst single active failure; or (2) the SRP acceptance criterion J (30 rem) for the locked-rotor event with T5 tube leakage and LOP only.
The detailed assumptions for this analysis will be resolved between the sta f f reviewer and the CE analyst. j l
- 2. tie staff cannot accept higher offsite doses than the SRP acceptance criteria (10 rem) for a letdown line break outside contatment on a probabilistic basis. Further. the staff assumes an todine spiking factor of 500 and the Standard Technical Specification value for primary coolant activity (1 UC1/gm) for their confirmatory analysis and will require additional justification to support alternate values.
The discussion of this event was similar to that for the locked-rotor event l described above. The staff suggested that CE assume an operator action time based on the draft ANSI standard N660 in order to demonstrate conformance with the SRP criteria. The staff also suggested that CE consider the use of a flow restricting orifice in the line. CE agreed to consider these alternatives.
The detailed assunptions for this analysis will be resolved between the staff reviewer and the CE analyst. The staff further suggested that CE use the s ta nda rri technical specificatinn limit for the primary coolant activity since the basis for that value goes beyond the offsite doses for accident analyses.
- 3. The staff will require analyses for a spectrum of steam line breakssizes inside and outside contaiment, rather than only the double-ended :
guillotine ~mai n-steam line break. l CE indicated that, because of limited resources and time required to reformat Chapter 15. they should restrict their efforts to meeting the objectives of the SRP acceptance criteria: 1.e., assess the potential for a. return in power.
in addition. CC noted that the assumptions to conservatively assess the worst
- time for LOP could result in a short duration of DNB near the time of trip resulting in unacceptable offsite doses. The staff agreed that such a comHnation of assumptions is overly conservative and, therefore. CE need
- only assess the worst LOP timing relative to return to power for steam line breaks. CE will perform analyses for a spectrum of steam line break sizes which assumes LnP at the inttf ation of the event. CE must demonstrate that
- the off trip occurs when predicted by procedures and that the boron transpnet versus overcooling trade-off is conservatively treated.
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3 CCPSU5 TION ENGINEERING, INC. -?. OCT C9 4 The probabilistic argunent on which CE has requested an exception to the 119t primary system design pressure criterion for the feedwater line break (WLB) is inadequate.
CE described the conservatisms in the WLB analysis and proposed that the probability of the event is consistent with the A5wE Code Limit of 120%
of design pressure. The staff agreed that a 120% limit is appropriate for the worse WLR in conjunction with LGP. However, the staff will require that CE demonstrate that the worse NLB alone will not exceed llot.
The staff considers the SRP event sequence to be conservative and, therefore, has no objection if certain conservative analysis assumptions are more l- realistically modelled. CE will review the conservatisms in this analysis to detemine the appropriate assumptions, and will perform the NLB analysis with more realistic models and assumptions.
- 5. The staff cannot accept CE's argument that valvas CH 141 end 9 501 can be manually operated outside the control room for events avolving LOP.
The staff stated that they will require that these valves be operable from the control room. However, the staff will accept control-grade operators fnr these valves, provided power is supplied from a vital bus. CE will reconsider their appeal of this position.
F. The staff will require redundant boren dilution alarms for all modes of plant operation.
CE considers a single boronometer and sampling procedures sufficient. The staff does not consider sampling to be an adequate alert to the opert. tor.
CE will determine which alternate methods can be used to provide a backup boron dilution alam and reconsider their appeal of this position.
7 The staff will require individual Itw flow alams for the HPCI pumps.
Pased on CE's descrfption of the NPCI pump operation and flow indication the staff agreed that a single low flow alarm from the plant monitoring system is acceptable, provided CE connit to administrative procedures which will require that the operator reset the low flow setpoint when one HPCI pump is taken out of service.
C. I. Grimes. Project Manager Standardization & Special Projects Bre nch Division of Licensing
Enclosures:
As Stated W
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,A T_T,E!iDE ES ,
l C,ESSAR MEETING l SEPTEMBER 17, 1981' i .
NAME ORGANIZATION R. Ma ttson NRC/DSI i T. Spets NRC/DSI L. Rubenstein NRC/DSI j
W. Houston
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NRC/DSI
( B. Shcron NRC/DSI q T. Quay NRC/DSI
, D. Fieno NPC/DSI
- F. Miraglia '
NRC/DL C. Grimes NRC/DL
, A. Scherer CE
. G. Davis CE
.d R. Fedin CE l C. Kling CE J. Young CE j] R. Mango CE R. Bradshaw CE
/. M. Brynowski CE T. Quan ApS F'
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LOCKED R010R, SilijdED SilAFT DOSE CRIIEl:lh
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,COMPARIS0N WITH CRITERIA (2 HOUR EAB THYROID)
.t l 10CFR100 LIMIT = 300 REM 1
i LOCKED ROTOR + LOP 1 = 100 REM l SilEARED SliAFT + LOP 3 SRP LIMIT = 30 REM i
)
LOCKED ROTOR
=
25 REM i SliEARED SilAFT l
l ESTIMATED FREQUENCY LOCKED ROTOR AND SilEARED SilAFT 5 5 x 10-3 fax _yg,g LR + LOP AND SS + LOP 1 5 x 10-6/Rx-YEAR CONSERVATISMS IN PRESENT EVALUATIONS
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(1) ASSUMED FUEL FAllVRE ON Sil0RT DURATION DNB.
(2) ASSUMED LOSS OF 0FFSITE POWER AT MOSl. ADVERSE ,
TIME Willi RESPECT TO DNB. -
(3) ASSullED TECH SPEC TUBE LEAKAGE (1 cen).
Let hit a.ies -- iq*4 m ,, a 4 q .,, _
be tech scec - no . cent.1-r poen ny m>*
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l JC.11D R010R, S!E.!d:f.D 9.!JT 1
l BASED ON THE FSTIMATED RECURREriCE FREQUEllCY (<5x10-6 fax _yg) ,
1 FOR l.0CKED Rb'10R AND SHEARkD SHAFT EVENTS COMBif1ED WITH A l.0SS UF OFFSliE. POWER (LOP),10CFR100 DOSE LIMITS ARE l API'R01'R I AT E . -
! DETEnrif f1ATION O'F THE APPROPRI ATE DOSE LIMITS S110VLD ALSO CONS 1 DER Tile SIGN!F1 CANT CONSEltVATISMS Iil THE EVEtiT EVAL.UATION I4E 11100. FOR EXAMPLE, FUEL CLADDil1G WAS ASSUMED TO Fall UP0f1 Uld,110 WEVER, FOR Tile LOCKED ROTOR AllD SiiEARED SilAl T EVEllTS 110 CLAls Fall.UtlE IS EXPECTED. IllE DN8 CONDITION IS OF Sit 0RT Dul:AllOI! OflLY STARTillG AS Tile REACTOR TRIPS. FUEL TEliPERATtIRE
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C Al f t!!.All0lis Of. THE H01' Pill DURillG DNB lilDICATED THAT THE Cl./.lDil!G REllAlflS BELOW 3 320 f.
Tile EVALUATION METil0D ASSUf4ED Tilt MOST ADVERSE TIME FOR LOP W1111 ITESPECT T0 MINIMUM Dll3R.
LOP CAN ONLY, REDUCE THE MittlMUM Ul@R IF 1T OCCURS WITHIN 3 SEC0f!DS OF REACTOR TRIP. IHE FRAC 110ft OF FUEL lil DllB AtID THE CORitESPO!! DING RAD 10LGG'ICAL DOSE -
Wr'iti !i Itf RI Diirf D llY AT I E AST A F AC TOR OF 2 FOR A ItL ASOt:Alu.L DI: LAY OF l.0P iOLLOWitlG REACT 0lt IRIP.
- I N A!iDI I!ON , ILCH SPEC Til!!E LLAKAGE OF }GPM WAS ASSUf4ED, ALTHuuGH Ol'l.RAllflG lilS10ltY HAS SliOWN TilAT LEAKAGE IS tl0RMALLY LLSS lilAN Al'lROXIMAlft.Y 100 GAL / DAY. CALCllLATED DOSES WOULD BE PROPOR-1 I Uf;All LY ' LOWER.
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! LETD0'<.'l' LINE BREAK CRITERI A
'I COMPARISON WITH CRITERIA (2 HOUR EAB THYROID DOSE) 1 1
.i j " WORST" LTDN LINE BREAK = 100 REM i 4 l SRP LIMIT = 30 REM l
OTHER RCS BREAKS < 30 REM FREnt,. my
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C-E ESTIMATED FREQUENCY = 9 x 10-5/RX-YEAR CONSERVATISMS IN THE EVALUATION METHOD (1) 30 HlNUTES OPERATOR ACTION (2) TECH. SPEC. ACTIVITY (2) NO CREDIT FOR AUX. BUILDING DECONTAMINATION (4) NO CREDIT FOR AUTO ISOLATION . .
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LE1DOWN LINE BREAK
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1 BASED ON THE ESTIMATED FREQUENCY (9x10-5/RX-YR) FOR LETDOWN LINEBREAK,1CFkIDO'DOSELIMITSAREAPPROPRIATE. l
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2 DETERMINATION OF.'THE APP'ROPh! ATE DOSE CRI'TERI0N SHOULO ALSO CONSIDER THE SIGNIFICANT CONSERVATISMS IN THE EVENT EVALUATION
', METliOD.
^ IHE CONSERVATISMS INCLUDED: NO CREDIT FOR OPERATOR l
. ; ' ;v .:. j ACTION UNTIL 30,[ MINUTES; NO CREDIT FOR AUXILIARY BUILDING l
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DECONTAMINATION,.AND.NO CREDIT FOR AUTOMATIC LETDOWN LINE l
- 1.: f l ISOLATION ON HIGHfREGENERATIVE HEAT EXCHANGER OUTLET TEMPERA- l
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1 IN ADDITION, TECH: SPEC RCS COOLANT ACTIVITY. (4.6 UC1/GM) HAS r BEEN ASSUMED, ALTHddGH,0PERATING HISTOR'Y FOR C-E PLANTS DEMONSTRATES THAT.' ACTIVITIES ARE EXPECTED TO BE LESS THAN ;
O.4 vCI/GM MORE'.T kN.90. PERCENT 0 OPER INN .- -
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THE PRESENT EVALUATION METHOD ASSUMES AN IODINE SPIKING FACTOR 0F 100. APPROXIMATELY 70 PERCENT OF IODINE SPIKING FACTORS ,
CALCULATED BASED ON OBSERVED DATA (CENPD-180) ARE LESS THAN .
l Tills VALUE. l
, 10CFR100 DOSE LIMITS ARE APPROPRIATE BASED BOTil ON THE LOW l RECURRENCE FREQUENCY AND CONSERVATISMS IN THE EVALUATION. i
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.4SMLL STEAM Lil!E BREAK (SLB)
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SMLL S.B CONSI.DERED .,.. . ;
AllD PRESENTED AS PART OF ORIGINAL RE-CATE0GRiZED CESSAR CliAPTER 15. l w.... ... . 1 REFORMTTING. .EFF.OR.T.. TERMINATED SMALL SLB REARALYSIS DUE TO SRP i
) ACCEPTANCE CRIT.ERIA AND LIMITED MANPOWER..
OVERLY CONSERV .:; .=
fife dSSUMPTIONS WillCil ADVERSELY IMPACT S SLBCONSEQUENCE$0.' l
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LOSS OF 0FFSITE POWER
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FUEL CLADDING FAILURE DUE TO A SHORT DURATION IN DNB
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TECllNICAL SPECIFICATION LEAKAGE IN AFFECTED STEAM GENERATOR JM', Y. . .
BREAK IN SPECIALLY.00ALIFIED STEAM PIPE (I.E., CONTAIN- .
MEllT TO MSIV).OR MSIV FAILURE TO CLOSE iM$.d.- *
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10% 10D.111E5IfWENT0RY...IN . FUEL. R0D . GAPS __. '. -
IllSTANTANE0US ..;.
M.IXING 0F 10DIf1E WITHIN RCS . -
If1STANTANE00S TRANSPORT OF ACTIVITY RELEASE TO SITE B0VilDARY NO DECONTAMINATION, RAIN-00T, OR PLATE-00T.
TO SITE BOUNDARY -
LIMITING METER 0 LOGY ORIGINAL CATEGORIZATION INDICATED A SMLL SLB COMBillED WITH ALL TliESE ASSUMPTIONS IS OUTSIDE DESIGN BASES ENVELOPE. :p.. .
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SMLL STEAM LillE BREAK (SLB)
C-E DID ORIGINALLY CONSIDER AND INCLUDE A SMALL SLB IN CESS.'tR .
. CHAPTER 15. FOLLOWING AN AGREEMENT WITH THE NRC TO RErora:iAT l CESSAR CHAPTER 15, WE USEDOUR LIMITEDMAf1 POWER RESOURCES TO 3 RE-EVALUATE THE LARGE SLB AS REQUESTED BY THE SRP ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA. ALTHOUGH REANALYSIS OF' A SMALL SLB ACCORDING TO SRP CRiiERIA HAS NOT BEEN COMPLETED, IMPl.EMENTING THE FOL-
[
LOWING OVERLY CONSERVATIVE SRP ASSUMPTIONS WOULD PROBABLY
. RESULT IN AN ANALYSIS WHICH EXCEEDS DOSE CRITERI AI l
- 1. LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER, PARTICULARLY WITHIN A FEW SECONDS OF REACTOR TRIP.
- 2. FUEL CLADDING FAILURE DUE TO A SHORT DURATION IN DNB, EVEN THOUGH EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE INDICATES NO FAILURE WOULD OCCUR. *
- 3. TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION LEAKAGE IN AFFECTED STEAM
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GENERATOR. .-
ll . BREAK IN SPECIALLY QUALIFIED STEAM PIPE (1.E., -
CONTAINMENT TO MSIV) OR NSIV FAILURE TO CLOSE ' -
(I.E., AN ADDITIONAL SINGLE FAILURE). .
- 5. 10% IODINE INVENTORY IN FUEL ROD GAPS.
- 7. INSTANTANEOUS TRANSPORT OF ACTIVITY RELEASE TO SITE BOUNDARY.
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!' 8. Il0 DEC0tlTN.i!NATIOil, RA!!i-0UTJ OR PLATE-00T.
- 9. LlHITING METER 0 LOGY.
l THE ORIGINAL CATEGORIZATION ItJDICATED THAT A SMALL SLB COMBINED WITH ALL THESE ASSUMPTIONS WOULD BE OUTSIDE THE DESIGN BASIS ENVELOPE (I .E., < 10-6/ year),
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. FEEDWATER LliE BREAK PRESSURE CRITERIOl L 3000 COMPARISON WITH CRITERIA ASME LEVEL "C" STRESS = 120% DESIGN f i 2750
" WORST" FHLB + LOP
" WORST" FWLB =
=
= 113%
112%
110%
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,,gSRPPRESSURELIMIT - _ 2500 BEST ESTIMATE FMLB + to? = <106%
NORiML OPERATION =
90%
COMPARlSON OF FREQUENCIES y 2250 .
FREQUENCY FOR WHICH NRC MAY APPLY LEVEL "C" LIMIT = 10-4 To 10-5/ RX-YEAR C-E ESMITATED FREQUENCY FOR FNLB ( 2 0.2 FT2 ') = < 5 x 10-5/RX-YEAR .
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C-E ESTIMAiED FREQUEi!CY FOR FWLB '
+ LOP = < 5 x 10-8/RX-YEAR -
CONSERVATISMS IN EVALUATION OF " WORST" FWLB
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(1) TREATMENT OF SG HEAT TRANSFER (2) NO CREDIT FOR AFFECTED SG LOW LEVEL TRIP UNITL EMPTY (3) FRICTIONLESS CRITICAL FLOW TO BREAK (4) SATURATED LIQUID DIScilARGE FROM BREAK (5) SELECTION OF HOST ADVERSE COMBINATION OF INIT!AL CONDITIONS AiiD UNCERTAINTIES (SG LEVEL, POWER, C00LAhi TEMPERATURES, REACTIVITY FEEDBACKS, RCS PRESSURE;...)
FEEDWATER LINE BREAK FRL$SURE CRITERIC.!;
1 2
Tile ESTIMATED FREQUE!1CY FOR.LARGE (> 0.2.FT ) FNLBS wiTH OR WITitobT A LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER IS SUFFICIENTLY LOW TO ;
JUST!FY APPLICABILITY OF THE ASME LEVEL "C" STRESS LIMIT (120% OF DESIGN PRESSURE). MAXIMUM RCS PRESSURE FOR THE " HORST" FWLB WITH LOP IS 113% OF DESIGN, WELL WITHIN THE LEVEL "C" LIMIT.
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ALTHOUGH MAXIMUM RCS PRESSURE FOR THE LIMITING CASE (0.2 FT BREAK) EVALUATED W1TH VERY C0flSERVATIVE METHODS, i SLIGHTLY EXCEEDS Tile SRP CRITERION OF 110% OF DESIGri, HO FWLB IS EXPECTED TO FXCEED 1.10% OF DESIGN.
1 IHE MAXIMUM RCS PRESSURE DEM0!1STRATED BY THE " WORST" fWLB EVALUA110N IS ACCEPTABLE IN LIGitT OF BOTH THE LOW FREQUEllCY ,
OF THE FWLBS AND CONSERVATISMS IN THE EVALUATION.
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., . . l BORON DILUTION PROTECTION
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MODES 1 AND 2 l
ALARMS: filGH POWER PRE-TRIP - MODE I LOW DNBR PRE-TRIP - MODE 1 '
I BORONMETER - fiODES 1 AND 2 HIGH LOGARITilMIC POWER PRE-TRIP - MODE 2 TRIPS: lilGil LINEAR POWER - MODE 1 lilGH LOGARITilMIC POWER - MODE 2 MODES 3-6 AlliRMS: 1. BOR0f! METER (NOT REDUNDANT)
MAKE'UP llATER (C0ULD BE BYPASSED).
INDICAT10f1S: 1. BOB 0tiMETER --
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2 .' EXCORE STARTUP FLUX DETECTORS
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- 3. SAMPLil1G -
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INDIRECT INDICATIONS: 1. LETDOWN DIVERTER VALVE POSil10N
- 2. CliARGING PUMPS ON -
- 3. MAKE UP FLOW / FLOW FROM RITT.
l WilEN IN MODES 3-6, OPERATING PROCEDURES WILL REQUIRE Tl!E OPERATOR 10 MONITOR Tile DIVERSE INDICATIONS DISCUSSED AB0VE AT INTERVALS lilAT lilLL ALERT Tile OPERATOR OF A DILUTION AT LEAST 15 filNUTES PRIOR TO CRITICALITY IH [10 DES 3-5 Af1D AT LEAST 30 MINUTES IN MODE 6.
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- - . _ . _ _ _ . . _.2 BORON DILUll0N PROTECTION i
J lti t40 DES 1' Arid 2, RPS PRE-TRIP ALARMS AllD" ASSOCIATED REACTOR -
TRIPS PR6 VIDE IND1 CATION'AND PRO' LECT 10N FOR A BORON DILUT10N.
IHE TRIPS ARE TliE Il!GH LitlEAR POWER TRIP FOR MODE 1 AND lifGli 1 LOGARITl!MIC POWER TRIP IN MODE 2. THE BORONOMETER IS ALSO AVAILABLE IN MODES 1 AND 2 FOR INDICATI0li AND ALARM.
. Iti MODES 3 AllD 11, Tile BOR0tl0 METER WILL PROV,lDE AN ALARM ON A BOR0!! CoriCEllTRATION DEVIATION OF 50 PPM. IN MODES 5 AND 6, A MANUAL
- LiliE UP, DIFFERENId FROM 140RMAL OPERATION, IS REQUIRED TO GET FLOW IO TliE BOR0!10 METER. lit MODES 3-6, Tile OPERATING PROCEDURES WILL REQUIRE Tile OPERATOR TO MONITOR Tile BOR0fiOMETER AND TliE STARTUP Fl.UY. DETECTORS AT INTERVALS THAT WOUL'D ALERT THE OPERATOR IN SUFFICIEtiT TIME TO PRECLUDE AN UNAftTICIPATED CRITICALITY. IF THE liOHONot1ETER OR Tile STARTUP DETECTORS AGE..NOT..AVAl.LABLE, THE .
PROCEDURES WILL REQUIRE TliAT RCS sat 1PLING BE CONDUCTED AT THE
!!iTERVALS FBEQUENT ENOUGli TO PRECLUDE UNANTICIPATED CRITICALLITY. .
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