IR 05000528/1985005
| ML17298C023 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
| Issue date: | 03/15/1985 |
| From: | Miller L, Sorensen R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17298C022 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-528-85-05, 50-528-85-5, 50-529-85-07, 50-529-85-7, 50-530-85-04, 50-530-85-4, NUDOCS 8504110048 | |
| Download: ML17298C023 (13) | |
Text
U.
S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION V
Report Nos.
50-528/85-05, 50-529/85-07 and 50-530-85-04 Docket Nos.
50-528, 50-529 and 50-530 License Nos.
NPF-34 Construction Permit Nos.
CPPR 142 and 143 Licensee:
Facility Name:
Arizona Public Service Company P.
O. Box 21666 Phoenix, Arizona 85036 Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station - Units 1, 2 and
Inspection at:
Palo Verde Site, Wintersburg, Arizona Inspection conducted:
February 11-15, 1985 Inspector:
R.
CD orense
, Reacto Inspector Dat gned Approved By:
L. F ilier,. Jr.
ief Reactor Projects ction 2 J/ia /tA Date Signed Summary:
Ins ection on Februar 11-15 1985 (Re ort Nos.-50-528/85-05 50-529/85-07 I
and 50-530/85-04 Areas Ins ected:
Routine unannounced inspection by regional based inspector of licensee action on 50.55(e) construction deficiencies, and program directed inspection of operational staffing in Unit 2.
The inspection focused on Units 1, 2 and 3 and involved 34 inspector hours onsite, by one NRC inspector.
Results:
No violations or deviations were identified.
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Arizona Public Service Com an (APS)
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Van Brunt, Jr., Vice President, Nuclear Production Ide, Director, Corporate gA/gC Karner, Assistant Vice President, Nuclear Production Allen, Operations Manager Nelson, Maintenance Manager Nelson, Supervisor of Security Zeringue, Technical Support Manager Cedarguist, Chemistry Superintendent Perkins, Radiation Protection Superintendent Bloom, Licensing Engineer Rhodes,,Manager, Document Control Penick, Supervisor, Document Review-Denotes those persons attending exit meeting, February 15, 1985.
The inspector also contacted other licensee and contractor personnel during the course of the inspection.
2.
Licensee Action on 10 CFR 50.55(e)
Construction Deficiencies (DERs)
The following 50.55(e)
items were reviewed by the inspector to determine implementation of the licensee's corrective action and to assess the thoroughness of the corrective action.
The items marked with an asterisk (>') were judged by the licensee to be reportable under
CFR 50.55(e)
criteria; the others were considered to be 'not reportable.
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(Closed):" DER 84-54 Containment Sum Isolation Valve Could Not Be 0 ened Electricall The licensee discovered that a containment sump isolation valve could not be opened electrically after being manually closed.
There were eight valves in each unit with identical characteristics (24-inch, 16-inch or 10-inch Limitorque operated Posi Seal International butterfly valves).
The operators on these valves use rotors to open and close contacts, as required, for position indication, torque switch bypass, open limit and closed limit.
The licensee determined the problem to be that the closed limit contacts and torque switch'ypass contacts could not be adjusted independently of each other since they were on the same rotor.
When the valve was closed manually, the valve disc was driven past the zero degree position to the mechanical stop.
Therefore, more opening torque was required to open the valve, and torque bypass was required.
However, since the closed limit contacts and torque
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bypass contacts were on the same rotor, the torque bypass contacts opened at the zero degree position and the motor tripped on overtorque.
The corrective action involved use of a spare rotor in the Limitorque operator for the torque switch bypass.
This allowed the valve to be opened electrically after being shut manually by properly bypassing the opening torque.
Work has been completed for the eight valves in Unit 1 per Design Change Package 1SE-SI-500.
Retest of these valves has been completed in Unit l.
In addition, the inspector requested the licensee to shut all the valves manually, and open them electrically, to demonstrate the effectiveness of the corrective action.
This was accomplished per Work Order (WO) fj69960.
Work was completed in Unit 2 per Design Change Package (DCP) 2SE-SI-500 in accordance with Startup Work Authorization 10741.
WPP/gCI 262.0, which inspected the modifications for conformance to the DCP, was signed off for each valve in Units 1 and 2.
All applicable quality control (gC) and field engineer (FE) signatures were present and in order.
All electrical termination cards were signed off and appear to be complete.
Work for Unit 3 was being tracked by the licensee on DCP 3SE-SI-500.
In the Final Report for DER 84-54, the licensee committed to completing all work prior to licensing of Units 2 or 3.
This DER is, therefore, closed for all three units.
(0 en)"-
DER 84-48 Limit Switches on Safet -Related Valves Su lied with Deficient Ex ansion Plu s
The licensee determined that faulty expansion plugs were installed on the limit switches of some safety-related valves manufactured by Anchor-Darling Valve Company.
NCR SJ-4341 was issued.
Pnly NAMCO EA180 series limit switches of certain specific date codes were affected.
The expansion plug was used to hold the limit, switch actuating arm in place.
If faulty, it could lead to erroneous valve position indication in the control room.
The faulty expansion plugs were susceptible to galling which could cause loosening of the actuating arm.
The new expansion plugs were stainless steel with silver coated threads which were designed 'to prevent galling.
The licensee identified which valves in Unit 1 contained NAMCO EA180 series limit switches.
A walkdown was initiated per Work Order No.
61546 to inspect these limit switches for the suspect date codes, and for loosening of the actuating arm.
Work Orders Nos.
59216, 68344 and 67609 were issued,'n accordance with DCP lOJ-SG-130, to replace the expansion plugs with suspect date codes, and also those with loose actuating'rms.
These work orders were closed.
The inspector verified that the work orders were completed with all applicable signoffs complete, and in order.
NCR SJ-4341 was closed and thus all work was completed in Unit 1.
However, NCR SJ-556 was still open for Unit 2.
Work in
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Units 2 and 3 was being tracked on Investigation Requests 2S-IR-036 and 3C-IR-036, and DCPs 2SJ-SG-130 and 3CJ-SG-130.
In addition, the vendor made a
CFR 21 notification to the NRC, This DER is closed for Unit 1, but remains open for Units 2 and 3.
(Closed)"-
DER 84-102 'nchor-Darlin Swin Check Valves with Missin Tack Welds The licensee discovered construction deficiencies in Anchor-Darling swing check valves.
The deficiencies were characterized as follows.
1.
Missing tack weld on hinge pin set screw, 2.
Hinge pin set screw not tight against hinge pin, 3.
Disc nut pin not tack welded to disc nut.
There were 24 Anchor-Darling swing check valves in Unit 1.
Construction Inspection Plan (CIP) 592.0 was dispositioned to inspect these 24 valves for the above listed deficiencies.
Eight valves were then found with one or more of these deficiencies.
The valves have been repaired per applicable Startup Work Authorizations (SWAs) and Work Orders (WOs).
The inspector verified that all the required signatures on the SFRs and WOs were complete and in order.
Thus, corrective action was completed in Unit 1.
Likewise, CIPs 606.0 and 607.0 were initiated to perform this inspection in Units 2 and 3 respectively.
In the Final Report of
.this DER, the licensee committed to completing these inspections, and any rework prior to licensing for each unit.
This DER is therefore closed for all three units.
(0 en):" DER 84-59 Safet -Related Motor Control Center Cables Dama ed b Fire Sto s, During startup testing in Unit 2, the licensee discovered damaged cables associated with Class 1E motor control centers (MCCs).
The damage was limited to the cabling insulation jacket',
and resulted from the sharp metal edges of MCC moisture seals around the cables where the cables penetrated the MCCs.
Noncomformance Report (NCR) SE-4857 was initiated to document the damaged cable and it was replaced in accordance with Startup Work Authorization (SWA) 8941..
S In addition, NCR SE-4884 was initiated. It required a walkdown of all moisture seals in Unit 1 per SWA 26511.
This walkdown included inspection for damaged cable, replacement of any damaged cable, and installation of metal edge protectors where:required.
No damaged cable was identified in"Unit 1.
Work was completed in Unit 1, and both NCR SE-4884 and SWA 26511 were closed.
Further, the applicable drawing was revised to reflect the requirement to add sheet metal edge protectors in moisture seal l r
t
NCR SE-4857 remains open, and a walkdown was planned by the licensee of all moisture seals in Unit 2 to inspect, for damaged cabling and install metal edge protectors where required.
Unit 3 has no moisture seals installed at present.
However, the licensee has revised the applicable drawing and committed to installing metal edge protectors where required.
This DER is closed for Units 1 and 3 and remains open for Unit 2.
e.
(0 en)
DER 83-82 Im ro er Cable Bend Radius in Diesel Generator Control Cabinets This DER.involved insufficient cable bending radii in Class lE circuits.
Some radii had less than the minimum bending radius as defined in installation specification 13-EM-301 Rev.
8, Anaconda Wire and Cable Company conducted tests to evaluate the safety significance of these cables violating the minimum criteria.
Based on these tests, Anaconda established new criteria for cable bending radius.
NRR evaluated these new criteria for adequacy and determined the following:
1.
The majority of cable system installation practices were based on industry experience.
2.
Deviations to these industry practices occur for practical reasons.
3.
>There have been no catastrophic failures due to these deviations.
4.
There are no regulatory criteria to evaluate the adequacy of these industry practices.
Therefore, this issue is considered closed on the basis of: (1) the new cable bending radius criteria have been established based on tests performed (2)
NRR found no regulatory basis for disputing the new set of,criteria.
A cable bend radius inspection program was initiated based on the new bend radius criteria.
This inspection has been completed in Units 1 and 2.
Therefore, this DER is closed for Units 1 and 2, but will remain open for Unit 3 until completion of this special inspection for minimum cable bending radius.
No violations or deviations were identified.
3.
0 erational Staffin of Unit 2 This was a followup of a previous inspection in this area.
The inspector reviewed the qualifications of selected non-licensed plant personnel
assigned to Unit 2, with respect to ANSI 3.1-1978, which governs these qualifications.
First, the qualifications of a sampling of individuals in mechanical maintenance, electrical maintenance, Instrument and Control (ISC)
technicians, chemists, and radiation protection personnel were reviewed and compared to the ANSI standard.
These were records the inspector could not readily locate during a previous inspection (followup item 50-529/85-02-01).
No deviations from the ANSI standard were identified, and generally, the personnel exceeded the minimum requirements.
Thus, follow-up item 50-529/85-02-01 is closed.
In addition, the inspector reviewed the qualifications of the Operations Plant Superintendent in Unit 2, the highest licensed individual in the unit.
No deviations were identified and the inspector noted that this individual's qualifications significantly exceeded the ANSI requirements.
It was noted during this inspection that, in most instances, no background check was made of an individual's ANSI 3.1-1978 qualifications.
A person's resume was all that was used.
Supervisors generally,did not contact previous employers to verify the validity and accuracy of the resume.
Security background checks only included the individual's employers for the previous three years, and generally did not verify a person'
previous position.
However, provisions have been made to ensure an individual was capable of performing their designated task.
For example, in the maintenance department a prospective employee was given both a hands-on and a written test to ensure he was knowledgeable in his craft. If the person failed the test, they were not hired.
Additionally, they work, initially, under direct supervision of supervisors and peers before they are allowed to work on their own.
They were also required to read applicable station manual procedures.
Similar steps Departments.
that included qualification must receive.
were taken in the Radiation Protection and Chemistry A screening process was used during the initial interview a test.
Also, these personnel have an extensive checklist they must complete, and'ackground training they The inspector concluded that individuals assigned plant safety-related responsibilities at PVNGS possessed the qualifications to assume those responsibilities.
Licensee management representatives were asked at the Exit Meeting if they would consider conducting an audit of a sample of resumes to ensure that the resumes were valid.
They replied, due to the above stated checks and balances, they felt they were in compliance with ANSI 3.1-1978, but would consider an audi I
Finally, the inspector conducted a general review of the licensee's Technical Support Group.
The APS organizational chart for this department was compared with that contained in the Final Safety Analysis Report. lt was noted that for the radwaste, chemistry, and radiation protection disciplines, there was a
lead technician assigned to each unit.
Per the FSAR, this individual reports directly to the discipline superintendent, independent of the unit supervisor for that discipline.
However, in actual practice, this lead technician reports to the unit supervisor.
The arrangement as depicted in the FSAR leaves some doubt as to who is actually in charge of the unit for that discipline.
The technical support manager agreed to initiate an FSAR change to reflect the actual practice at the site.
This will be carried as a
follow-up item (50-529/85-07-01).
The inspector notes that this had already been identified by the licensee's equality Assurance organization in Audit Report 84-022.
Action has been taken to initiate a Safety Analysis Report Change.
An exit meeting was conducted with the licensee personnel indicated in Paragraph 1 on 'February 15, 1985.
The scope and findings of the inspection as described in this report were discusse ~
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