IR 05000528/1985011
| ML17298C165 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
| Issue date: | 04/30/1985 |
| From: | Andrew Hon, Miller L, Sorensen R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17298C164 | List: |
| References | |
| RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-737, TASK-1.C.8, TASK-1.G.1, TASK-2.K.3.05, TASK-TM 50-528-85-11, 50-529-85-16, 50-530-85-10, IEB-84-03, IEB-84-3, NUDOCS 8505280418 | |
| Download: ML17298C165 (19) | |
Text
U.
S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COHHISSION
REGION V
Report Nos. 50-528/85-11, 50-529/85-16 and 50-530/85-10 Docket Nos 50-528, 50-529 and 50-530 License Nos.
NPF-34 Construction Permit Nos.
CPPR 142 and 143 Licensee:
Arizona Public Service Company P.
O. Box 21666 Phoenix, Arizona 85036 Facility Name:
Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station - Units 1, 2 and
Inspection at:
Palo Verde Site, Wintersburg, Arizona Inspection Conducted:
A i 8-19, 1985 Inspectors:
Approved By:
~Summar:
Rea p ctor
. Hiller, r
, Chief Reactor'roje'c s Section
R.
C.
orensen, Re ctor Inspector, 3a Da igned 4-
~
Date igned
S>
Date Signed Ins ection on A ril 8-19 1985 (Re ort Nos. 50-528/85-11 50-529/85-16 and 50-530/85-10 of licensee action on 50.55(e) construction deficiencies, followup of previously identified items, THI action plan items, quality assurance for power ascension testing, and IE Bulletins.
The inspection of Units 1,,
2 and
involved 78 inspector hours onsite by two NRC inspectors.
Results:
No violations or deviations were identified.
8505280418 850503 PDR ADOCK 05000528
y ~
DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted a.
Arizona Public Service Com an (APS)
"cW.
'C
"N.
S
~
M.
MT T.
M.
R.
D.
Karner, Assistant Vice President, Nuclear Production Ide, Director, Corporate QA/QC
,Russo, Manager, Quality Audits 8 Monitoring Lossing, Supervisor, Quality Investigations Penick, Supervisor, Quality Monitoring Karbassian, Operations Engineer Bloom, Licensing Engineer White, Supervisor, QA Audits Bimson, QA Monitoring Engineer Baron, Supervisor, QA Testing Monitoring Blasdel, QA Testing Monitoring Engineer b.
Bechtel Power Cor oration (Bechtel)
'"D. Hawkinson, Project QA Manager
>T. Horst, Project Field Engineer-H. Foster, Project QC Engineer D. Freeland, Resident Engineer H. Miyahara, Resident Engineer H. Guire, QA Engineer R. Doskasil, QA Engineer Denotes those persons attending exit meeting, April 12, 1985.
The inspectors also contacted other licensee and contractor personnel during the course of the inspection.
2.
Licensee Action on
CFR 50.55(e) Construction Deficiencies (DERs)
The following 50.55(e)
items were reviewed by the inspector to determine implementation of the licensee's corrective action and to assess the thoroughness of the corrective action.
All the DERs listed below were judged to be reportable by the licensee under
CFR 50.55(e)
requirements.
a
~
(Closed for Unit 1)
DER 84-52 - Diffusor Base Flan es for Atmos heric Dum Valves The licensee had previously 'determined that the atmospheric dump valve diffusor base flanges could become overstressed during a Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE).
The diffusor base flanges are 1" thick and the diffuso'r serves as an anchor for inlet piping.
As a result, this piping could fall and damage MSSS safety-related piping or components during an SSE.
This was discovered by the licensee during a review 'of the associated seismic analysis.
A subsequent seismic analysis by Control Components, Inc.
(CCI) showed that a
base flange thickness of 2" would be sufficient to withstand the effects of an SSE.
The root cause of this deficiency was the failure by the applicable engineering group to transmit piping load information to the supplier.
Corrective action has been completed by the licensee for Unit l.
The diffusor base flange has been increased in size from 1" to 2" in accordance with Design Change Package (DCP) 10J-SG-117.
This DCP was accomplished per Work Order (WO) 68780.
All signoffs appear to be complete and in order, including Quality Control inspections.
The inspector personally verified the installation of the 2" base flanges in Unit 1 by field inspection.
The inspector reviewed the new seismic analysis performed by CCI that showed the new design was acceptable under seismic loading conditions (i.e. stresses were lower than the allowable).
Drawings 13-P-SGF-158 and 13-P-SGF-159 have been revised to reflect the existence of 2" base flanges.
Finally, IOM-E-11451 documents training held for applicable engineers to ensure design changes were correlated with calculation load changes" in the future, and information transmitted to suppliers.
The replacement of the diffusor base flanges was made a licensing condition for initial entry into-Mode 4 in Unit 1.
The ins'pector was satisfied with the licensee's corrective action, and this DER is closed for Unit l.
(Closed)
DER 84-37 - Environmental uglification of'Duct Sealants The aspect'of this DER that remained open from Report 50-528/85-01 was to qualify '22 duct sealants, identified in use at PVNGS for a 40 year service lif'e.
This has been completed.
The inspector reviewed the environmental qualification report,
$/A674-85, prepared by the Corporate Consulting and Development Company.
The report documents tests and analyses which include thermal aging and seismic deflection.
The report was thorough and the documented tests and analyses were consistent with postulated environmental conditions.
The sealants were qualified (including a 10/ margin).
The inspector was satisfied with the licensee's actions, and this DER is closed for all three Units.
(Closed for Unit 1)
DER 84-101 Containment Pur e Valve Failed to 0 en A containment purge valve (CPB-UV-005B) failed to open but the valve position indication showed the valve to be open.
Investigation by the licensee determined that the driven gear on the valve shaft had become disengaged from the shaft.
This occurred for two reasons:
1)
Failure to use Ioctite at this connection as required by the vendor's desig B l
A
) II
2)
Orientation of the valve such that the Limitorque motor was below the body of the valve and the driven gear became disengaged from shaft due to gravity.
There are five valves in Unit 1, of the 17 supplied by the Henry Pratt Company, that-were oriented in this fashion.
All five of these valves have been disassembled, inspected for the existence of, Loctite, and reassembled.
CPB-UV-005B was worked in accordance with Startup Work Authorization (SWA) 27460 and SWA 26883.
Ioctite was applied properly and (}C signoffs were complete.
Nonconformance Report (NCR) 5316, which originally documented the problem, is closed.
Investigation Report IR-050, that authorized disassembly, inspection, and reassembly of the remaining four valves, was completed.
This was accomplished per Construction Work Order 70215 for CPA-UV-002A, CPB-UV-003B, EWA-UV-0065 and EWA-UV-145. All reterminations of leads appeared to be accounted for with termination cards signed off by gC inspectors.
Retest for CPB-UV-005B was performed per 93EG-OZZ17 and the retest for the other four valves was conducted per 73ST-9ZZ07.
These retests cycled the valves with both. local and remote valve position indication verified.
This DER is closed for. Unit 1.
d.
(Closed for Unit 1)
DER 84-64 - Locked-u Snubbers This DER identifies six snubbers that were found damaged after Hot Functional Testing, and again after the hot pump test, such that they would not cycle during therm'al expansion.
As a result, an inspection was performed of all safety related size gg and size jjg snubbers in Unit 1.
This was accomplished in accordance with SWA 25055.
Five others were found locked up but these were considered isolated cases.
All ll snubbers have been replaced, as evidenced by Startup Field Reports 1SG-309, 1CH-743, and SWA 25396 and SWA 21470.
The licensee upgraded snubbers in systems SG-039 and SG-048 (steam generator blowdown lines)
due to snubbers in portions of these systems failing more than once.
This resulted from heatup and cooldown cycles imposing unpredictable stresses and displacements on this piping and the snubbers being undersized for this application.
Bechtel resident piping engineers decided an upgrade of these snubbers from size jjq to size /jl was warranted.
In addition, monitoring instrumentation was installed to monitor these snubbers during the next heat-up/cooldown cycle.
The remainder of the damaged snubbers appeared to have been damaged by mishandling due to work in progress in the general area, and were therefore not upgrade I LI
In addition, DCP 10S-SG-131 replaced nine g~q snubbers with nine gl snubbers in the above systems per CWO 72898.
All documentation appeared to be in order with all required signatures present, including equality Control.
Low friction slide plates were installed, one in each of the above systems, to designated supports to allow the piping to expand and contract more easily.
The inspector verified that a 50$ sample of the gl size snubbers had been upgraded.
The inspector also verified the installation of the low friction slide plates.
SFR 1SG-346 addresses the installation of temporary monitoring devices on the piping near these upgraded and replaced snubbers to monitor pipe movement during Post-Core Hot Functional Testing.
Monitoring devices 'included lanyards to measure pipe displacement, and accelerometers to measure deflections.
The inspector verified installation of these monitoring devices at the snubbers examined in Unit 1.
The replacement of all damaged
$/g and f/~g snubbers, and installation of friction slide plates were imposed as license'onditions for initial entry into Mode 4.
I This action is complete and this DER is closed for Unit l.
3.
Followu of Previousl Identified Items a.
(Closed) Followu Items 50-528/529/530/84-54-01
- Incor oration of Miti atin Core Dama e Trainin in Re uglification Trainin for Licensed 0 erators As documented in Inspection Report 84-54, licensee management committed to developing a lesson plan, by April, 1985, for including mitigating core damage in requalification training for licensed operators'he inspector verified that this commitment has been met.
A review was conducted of the lesson plan and student handout for this training.
All six aspects of training for mitigating core damage as outlined in Enclosure 3 of the Denton letter of March 28, 1980 were covered.
The training appears to be detailed and thorough.
This satisfactorily completes the licensee's committed actions.
This item applies to all three units and is closed.
b.
(Closed) Deviation 50-528/84-25-03 A for Fire Protection Some followup aspects to this item remained to be examined from Report 50-528/85-08:
l.
A sample of portions of the completed version of IP 5.26-04, 2.
Viking equality'ontrol Manual, and
I lh lI
3.
Seven individual Corrective Action Requests (CARs) from Bechte1.
equality Assurance concerning Viking.
The inspector reviewed the above items and determined that the seven CARs reflected a tendency by Viking to disregard their own (}C manual.
However, Bechtel and APS QA are actively pursuing the remaining corrective actions to these CARs.
In addition, the inspector has reviewed numerous preoperational tests, vendor tests and licensee and A/E inspections to provide a
high degree of confidence in the operability of Viking supplied systems and conformance to design specifications.
It appeared that the guidelines established by BTP 9.5-1 for Fire Protection QA were being followed by the licensee and that commitments made in the FSAR to this effect were being met.
This deviation is closed.
(Closed) Followu Item 50-529/84-04-02 - Use of Standard Factor Elbows Previous Ins ection The inspector had requested the licensee to verify from the cable vendor that the use of standard 16-inch factory elbows in cable raceways is acceptable for 1/C 500 KCMIL 5Kv cable, and that other larger cable with larger radius requirements is not run in factory elbows.
Measurements taken by the inspector at the inside edge of the elbow indicated the minimum cable bend radius was violated.
The licensee subsequently identified three 1/C 4/0 5Kv cables that were run in standard factory elbows for which the minimum cable bend radius of 12.48 inches was violated.
The inspector reviewed 2 separate pieces of correspondence, dated 12/5/84 and 10/29/84, from Bechtel, Norwalk to Anaconda Mire and Cable Company, the cable vendor.
One requests the acceptability of using standard 3-inch factory elbows for 1/C 4/0 5Kv cables, noting that the maximum sidewall pressure of 500 Xt./lb. and maximum pulling tension of 1693 lbs.
had not been exceeded.
The actual inside bend radius using these elbows is 11.72-inches versus a
required minimum radius of 12.48 inches.
The other requests the acceptability of using standard 4-inch factory elbows with an actual inside bend radius of 15.'25-inches on 1/C 500 KCMIL 5Kv cables, which have a required minimum bend radius of 16.08 inches.
Again the maximum sidewall pressure and pulling tension were not exceeded.
In both cases, the vendor responded that these practices were acceptable, provided the sidewall pressure and pulling tension were
observed.
This was documented in two separate pieces of correspondence from Anaconda dated 11/1/84 and 12/16/84, which the inspector examined.
The inspector found the vendor's responses acceptable.
Also, 1/C 500 KCMIL 5Kv is the largest Class 1E cable size used at PVNGS.
Other larger cable, in non-Class 1E applications, with larger minimum bend radius requirements, is used but is run in conduit, whose minimum bend radius is greater than the cable's requirements.
This item is closed.
(0 en) Followu Item 50-528/84-56-04 The inspector requested to review licensee action concerning this followup item.
The licensee indicated further action is ongoing in this area.
This item will therefore be examined during a future inspection.
(Closed) Followu Item 50-528/529/530/84-59-02 Vse of WD-40 on Structural Steel Bolts As documented in Inspection Report 84-59, the APS Nuclear Engineering Department initiated an evaluation to determine if WD-40 was proper for structural steel bolt lubrication applications.
The inspector verified that APS Nuclear Engineering contracted Bechtel to perform such an'valuation.
The specification for bolt installation specified that the'olts should have a light coating of oil before torquing to minimize friction between the nuts and the bolts to assure desired tension was achieved for the specified torque applied.
Bechtel conducted tests of different lubricants including WD-40 to determine the friction coefficients.
The result indicated that WD-40 was similar to lubrication oil.
Thus, Bechtel concluded WD-40 was no more detrimental to the structural material than the light residual coating of oil which was normally on the as-received bolts, nuts and washers.
Therefore, limited use of WD-40 in general structural steel bolt torquing application was acceptable.
APS also initiated a Procedure Change Notice (PCN) to procedure WPP/
gCI No. 58.0 "Erection of Structural and Miscellaneous Steel" to specifically include WD-40 as a lubricant for structural bolt torquing.
The inspector considers these responses to be satisfactory.
Thus, this item is closed.
(Closed) Followu Item 50-528/529/530/84-59-03 Overti htened Cable
~Tie Wra a
As documented in Inspection Report 84-59, the licensee's Nuclear Engineering Department initiated an evaluation of the potential adverse effects due to overtightened cable tie wra The inspector verified that the licensee completed'the above
'valuation.
The licensee found that there have not been any conductor insulation failures reported at Palo Verde due to cable tie installation.
The licensee further stated that the primary purpose of the outer jacket was to protect the insulation of the inner conductors from damage throughout the life of the cable.
Tie wraps may indent or extrude the outer jacket, but due to the inherent design pliability/
durability of the cable jacket, insulation damage of the inner conductors would not occur.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's evaluation and found it satisfactory.
Thus, this item is closed.
4.
Licensee Action on IE Bulletins (0 en) IE Bulletin 84-03 "Refuelin Cavit Water Seal" (Also IE Information Notice 84-93 and TI2515/
I This Bulletin requires the licensee
",to evaluate the potential for and consequences of a refueling cavity water seal failure.
Such evaluation should include consideration of:
gross seal failure; maximum leak rate due to failure of active components such as inflated seals; makeup capacity; time to cladding damage without operator action; potential effect on stored fuel in transfer; and 'emergency operating procedures."
APS responded to this Bulletin by contracting Combusion Engineering to perform these evaluations.
Furthermore, the pneumatic seal was modified with embedded reenforcing pins.
The inspector conducted a visual inspection of the refueling cavity and the seal assembly in Unit 1 and 2.
The inspector also inspected the modified rubber seal in the warehouse.
APS informed the inspector that the evaluation report was being prepared and would be submitted to NRC by 4/30/85.
However, procedures for mitigating refueling cavity seal accidents could not be ready until 90 to 120 days before refueling.
The inspector will review the evaluation report, modification documents and procedures implementation during future inspections.
5.
171I Action Items (NUREG 0737)
(Closed) I.C.8
- Pilot lionitorin of Selected Emer enc Procedures SSER No.
6 stated
"The staff has determined that a pilot monitoring review of selected EOPs (emergency operating procedure)
is not required for licensing.
Therefore, this matter is considered resolved."
Thus, this item is closed.
(0 en) II.K.3.5 Auto Tri of Reactor Coolant Pum (RCP) Durin IOCA
t1 1t I,
The licensee is waiting for final NRR approval of the "trip two/leave two RCPs" scheme proposed by APS and Combustion Engineering in, CEN-152 Rev.
2.
Procedures will be implemented after NRR approves the proposed scheme.
This will be verified in a future inspection.
(0 en) I.G.l Trainin Durin Low-Power Testin The licensee committed in a letter dated 11/10/82 to conduct natural circulation training and requalification on the plant specific simulator prior to exceeding 5/ power.
Furthermore, APS will conduct loss of flow with natural circulation verification and loss of offsite power tests to verify and update the simulator's natural circulation fidelity.
During this inspection the inspector reviewed the following documents related to the simulator training.
Training Department Information Notice Log f84003 Requalification Training Lesson No.
NLROOC-C-2 "Natural Circulation Verification and Theory" Video Tape demonstrating the natural circulation phenomena Emergency Procedure 41EP-1ZZ01, Appendix E "Natural Circulation Verification" PVNGS licensed operator requalification form 81AC-OZZ01-08
- This form included Loss of RCS Flow/Natural Circulation (Code A10) in the checklist.
Sample of licensed operators qualification file.
The training record showing that all licensed operators had passed the training committed to above was incomplete.
Furthermore, the actual reactor test will be conducted during power ascension.
This will be verified during future inspections prior to closing this item.
6.
ualit Assurance ( A) for the Startu Testin Pro ram The objective of this inspection was to verify that the licensee's gA program which covered operational activities had been implemented for the Startup and Power Ascension test program.
gA for the startup and power ascension test program was covered by the licensee's gA Testing Monitor program and by the gA Audit Program.
Both programs were under the corporate QA/gC Department to assure organizational independence from the activities monitored.
gA Testing Monitoring The licensee's testing monitoring program was governed by Procedure 6N417.12.00.
This function involved both in-process verification and after the fact review of testing activities.
Monitoring activity was scheduled by the gA Testing Monitoring supervisor in response to the plant testing activities.
The inspector verified checklists were used by the gA monitor as guidelines during the performance of a preplanned monitoring activity of the following areas:
'
I jl
Conduct of testing Test documentation Control of measuring and test equipment Monitor reports were written by the QA Monitor and unsatisfactory conditions were documented and tracked for followup actions.
A Monthly Quality Monitoring and Effectiveness Summary Report was issued to summarize the overall results of the current month and comparison with previous months.
The inspector also witnessed the monitoring performed on testing activities (one by the control room operators and one by the IRC technicians).
The monitoring effort observed appeared to be adequate.
A Audits on Testin The inpector reviewed the following three audits performed on testings:
Audit No.84-015 "Test Control" August-September 1985 Audit No.84-026 "Measuring and Test Equipment" September 1985 Audit No.84-031 "Surveillance Tests" November 1985 Deficiencies identified from these audits were tracked by the licensee for close out.
The qualification of one of the lead auditors for these audits was also reviewed by the inspector.
Based on the above observations, the inspector concluded that the licensee had implemented an adequate QA program for the startup and power ascension test activities.
7.
Control of ESFAS Cabinet Ke s During the inspection, the inspector observed that while the IRC personnel were performing surveillance tests on the Engineer Safety Feature Actuation System cabinet, keys to the cabinet were left unattended while the testing personnel were preparing for the test.
These keys were checked out from the Shift Supervisor who stated there were no regulatory requirements for the control of these keys.
At the exit interview, the licensee agreed to investigate key controls and improve where necessary.
The inspector considered the licensee response reasonable and will evaluate key control during future inspections.
An exit meeting was conducted with the licensee personnel indicated in paragraph 1 on April 12, 1985.
The scope and findings of the inspection as described in this report were discussed.