IR 05000528/1985044
| ML17299A890 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
| Issue date: | 12/05/1985 |
| From: | Miller L, Sorensen R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17299A889 | List: |
| References | |
| RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-737, TASK-1.A.1.3, TASK-2.B.1, TASK-2.D.3, TASK-2.E.1.2, TASK-2.F.1, TASK-TM 50-528-85-44, 50-529-85-45, IEB-79-14, IEC-80-09, IEC-80-9, NUDOCS 8512240055 | |
| Download: ML17299A890 (14) | |
Text
8512240055 851206 PDR ADOCK 05000528
PDR U. S.
NUCLEAR REGULATOR/ COMMISSION REGXON V Report Nos. 50-528/85-44 and 50-529/85-45 Docket Nos. 50-528 and 50-529 License No. NPF-41 Construction Permit No.
CPPR-142
)"t Licensee:
Arizona Nuclear Power Project P., O. Box 52034 Phoenix, Arizona 85072-2034-
'i Facility Name:
Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Xnspection at:
Palo Verde Site, Wintersburg, Ar'izona Inspection Conducte
.
Nov mber 18-27, 1985 r>
Units',1 and
Xnspector:
R.
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R actor Inspector Dat igned Approved By:
f~y L. F. Mil er, Jr., Chief Reactor Projects Section
Dat S gned
~Summar Xns ection on November 18-27 1985 (Re ort Nos. 50-528/85-44 and 50-529/85-45)
Areas Ins ected:
Unannounced licensing inspection by a regional based inspector of TMI Action Plan items, Bulletins and Circulars,
CFR 50.55(e)
items, licensee action on inspector identified items, and licensee action on Part 21 deficiencies, all in Unit 2, with some inspections carried over into Unit 1.
NRC Inspection Procedures 25401B, 92701, 92703, 30703, 92700, and 92716 were covered during this inspection.
The inspection of Units 1 and
involved 42 inspector hours onsite by one NRC inspector.
Results:
No violations or deviations were identifie t h
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DETAILS 1.
Personnel Contacted a.
Arizona Nuclear Power Pro ect (ANPP)
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Karner, Assistant Vice-President, Nuclear Production Rogers, Nuclear Engineering Manager
,Russo, Manager, Quality Audits and Monitoring Shriver, Manager, Quality Systems and Engineering Zeringue, Technical Support Manager Penick, Supervisor, Quality Monitoring Adney, Plant Superintendent, Unit 2 b.
Bechtel Power Cor oration (Bechtel)
+D. Hawkinson, Project QA Manager
>'<D. Freeland, Resident Engineer
>L. Abrahamson, Resident Engineer The inspector also talked with other licensee, contractor, and craft personnel.
"Denotes those persons attending exit meeting of November 22, 1985.
The inspector reviewed the items below which represent a portion of a comprehensive and integrated plan to improve safety following the events at Three Mile Island, Unit 2 in March 1979.
(The item numbers are from Enclosure 2 of NUREG-0737).
(Closed) I.A.1.3 Limitin Overtime The licensee revised procedure 10AC-OZZ07, Overtime Ximitations.
This revision allowed only the Plant Manager or a manager reporting directly to him to authorize exceeding the established overtime limitations for personnel involved in safety related activities.
.I The inspector was satisfied that this procedure now conformed to the recommendations of this TMI item, and'lso conformed to the final draft Technical Specifications for Unit 2'.
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(0 en) II.B.l Reactor Coolant S stem Vents I'he inspector reviewed a Justificati'on.for Interim Operat'ion letter (JIO)
the licensee had written to NRR requesting relief from making the Reactor Coolant Gas Vent System operable prior to fuel load. It committed to testing valve HV-108 per ASME Section XI re'quirements prior to entering t,l
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Mode 4 and testing HV-108 at normal operating temperature and pressure prior to entering Mode 2.
This item will remain open until testing of HV-108 is complete.
(0 en) II.D.3 Direct Valve Position Indication (VPI) for Pressurizer Safet Valves Calibration of the VPIs for pressurizer safety valves had been completed, as stated by licensee representatives, per procedure 36ST-9ZZ08.
However, the procedure results had not yet been reviewed and approved by the licensee at the time of the inspector's exit meeting with licensee management, and therefore was not yet available for the inspector's review.
At the exit meeting, the inspector requested that the licensee express mail or fax a copy of this procedure to Region V for review.
The licensee agreed.
This item will remain open until the inspector has reviewed procedure 36ST-9ZZ08 for satisfactory completion.
(Closed) II.E.1.2 Auxilia Feedwater (AFW) S stem Automatic Initiation and Flow The inspector reviewed the applicable portions of the Integrated Safeguards Test, 93PE-2SAOl, to determine proper initiation and function of the AFW system.
The applicable steps of the procedure appeared to be properly conducted, and the AFW system appeared to function as designed as evidenced by the test procedure.
This TMI Action Plan Item is closed.
II.F.1 Accident Monitorin Instrumentation (0 en) Containment Water Level Monitor The inspector determined that no prerequisite test or preoperational test had been performed on this system.
The inspector also determined that procedure 36ST-9ZZ05 was the procedure that would demonstrate the operability of the system, but was not scheduled for performance by the licensee until sometime prior to initial Mode 3 entry.
NUREG 0737 indicates that this TMI item must, be implemented, for reactors receiving an operating license after January 1,
1982, prior to receiving an operating license.
The licensee was reminded of this at the exit meeting, and that implementation of a TMI modification is not considered complete until it has been satisfactorily tested.
In addition, the licensee committed to preoperationally testing this system in Section 14B.29 of the Palo Verde Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR).
The licensee's failure to preoperationally test this system will be identified to NRR prior to the low power licensing of Unit 2.
This item will remain open until testing of the Containment Water Level Monitor has been satisfactorily completed.
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(Closed)
Containment H dro en Monitor The inspector reviewed procedure 91PE-2HPOl which was the preoperational test procedure for the containment hydrogen monitor.
The procedure was performed satisfactorily and appeared to demonstrate the proper functioning of the hydrogen monitor.
This item is closed.
Licensee Res onses to Bulletins and Circulars (Closed)
IE Bulletin (IEB) 79-14 - Seismic Anal sis of As-Built Safet-Related Pi in S stems The inspector reviewed the licensee's actions in response to Bulletin 79-14.
This Bulletin required licensees to verify that seismic analyses performed on safety-related piping applied to the as-built configuration of the safety-related piping.
Bechtel, as the licensee's architect-engineer, was tasked with addressing the requirements of the Bulletin.
Design elements to be inspected during system walkdowns were identified in Bechtel Internal Procedure XP-4.37.
This procedure defined the program for addressing the pertinent points of IEB 79-14, and was reviewed during a previous inspection for Unit 1.
That inspection found that IP 4.37 complied with the requirements of IEB 79-14 (see Inspection Report 84-43).
The inspector reviewed a sample of five walkdown packages for conformance to IP-4.37.
All packages reviewed implemented the guidelines of IP 4.37.
The inspector independently walked down portions of three piping systems walked down by Bechtel resident engineers using the same stress isometric drawings.
This was to verify the accuracy and validity of the findings identified in the walkdown packages during the walkdowns of those systems.
While the inspector had numerous questions concerning various as-built features of piping and pipe supports, 'all were resolved to the inspector's satisfaction.
Any deviations identified during the various walkdowns by Bechtel engineers were documented in the walkdown packages and reviewed by stress engineers at Bechtel Norwalk.
By incorporating the as-built data into the original design input, they determined whether pipe stresses were still acceptable.
Only one deviation in Unit 2 could not be reconciled with the design input in this way.
This involved enlarging a pipe penetration in the pressurizer blowout enclosure, where a portio'n of Reactor Coolant Gas Vent piping passed, through. he, time'f this inspection, a work request had been initiated to perform,'this work.
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This finding will be identified to NRR prior to the"low'power licensing of Unit 2.
The inspector was satisfied with the licensee's, actions regarding IEB 79-14 and it is closed for Unit 2.'
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(Closed)
IE Circular (IEC) 80-09 - Problems with Plant Internal Communications S stems l~
i'his circular dealt with problems w3.th plant internal communications during loss of offsite power events, and the introduction of false signals into plant protection circuitry by portable radio transmitters.
The internal communications system at Unit 2 was identical to that of Unit 1, i.e. powered from uninterruptable power supplies (see Inspection Report 84-44).
The inspector confirmed through field inspection that the licensee had posted signs in key areas about the plant; where sensitive electronic equipment was located.
These signs prohibited portable radio transmissions in those areas.
The inspector was satisfied with licensee's response to this circular and it is closed for Unit 2.
Licensee Action on 10 GFR 50.55(e)
Re ortable Events The following potential 50.55(e)
item was reviewed by the inspector for reportability and to determine the thoroughness of the licensee's corrective action.
The item marked with an asterisk ("-) was judged by the licensee to be reportable under the 50.55(e) criteria.
"=(Closed for Unit 2)
DER 85-16 - Cracked S okes in Hubs of Air Handlin Units (AHUs)
The licensee discovered cracked spokes on the hubs of AHUs 1M-HJB-Z04 and 3M-HJB-Z04 in Units 1 and 3 respectively.
These units provided conditioned air for cooling safety-related equipment in the Engineered Safety Feature Switchgear Room and the D.C. Equipment Room.
There were two of these AHUs in each unit, making a total of six for the site.
The two cracked hubs were sent to the vendor for examination.
It was concluded that the cracked spokes were the result of poor quality castings.
The vendor has instituted as part of its inspection program a
requirement to radiograph all hubs prior to installation in individual AHUs.
New hubs were fabricated and installed by the licensee on AHUs 1M-HJB-Z04 and 3M-HJB-Z04.
These new hubs were made of higher strength 1018 carbon steel.
However, the vendor recommended that the hubs in all six of these AHUs be replaced with new radiographed castings supplied by them.
The hubs for the two AHUs in Unit 2 were replaced per Work Orders (WO) 106277 and 106432, using new radiographed hubs supplied by the vendor.
Use of the fabricated hubs for AHUs 1M-HJB-Z04 and 3M-HJB-Z04 was not recommended by the vendor as the units may not. function properly.
Tests were conducted by the licensee on these two AHUs to determine the acceptability of the hubs they fabricated.
The tests measured fan speed, air flow, and current drawn and the results were submitted to the vendor for concurrenc L I
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This DER is closed for Unit 2, however, the inspector will followup on the vendor's assessment of the test results and the licensee's replacement of hubs in the other AHUs in Units 1 and 3.
Licensee Action on Ins ector Identified Items
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(Closed) Followu Item 85-11-01 - Anal sis of Differences Between Units
and 2.
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'I This item originated from the, Appendix R team inspection of March, 1985.
The licensee was requested to analyze the"differences between Units 1 and 2 to ensure that the same safe shutdown capabil'ities,ex'ist in Unit 2 in the event of a fire.
f EI The licensee submitted this analysis'o NRR by. letter ANPP-33307-EEVB/DKN dated August 30, 1985.
Per the NRR Project'.Manager, NRR has reviewed this analysis and was satisfied with. the 'conclusions.
f This item is closed.
<<C-Licensee Action on 10 CFR 21 Deficiencies (0 en) 85-15-P TEC Model 914-1 Valve Flow Monitor Modules This Part 21 report involved potentially defective flow monitors supplied to Palo Verde by Technology for Energy Corporation.
At the time of the inspector's exit meeting with licensee management, the licensee had tentatively identified the locations of these valve flow monitors, which were principally associated with the pressurizer safety valves and steam generator safety valves.
A licensee representative stated that the surveillance tests performed on these modules to ensure operability closely paralleled the test recommended by the vendor.
However, the inspector still must review supporting documentation that confirms the above information and at the exit meeting requested this documentation be mailed to him in the Region.
The licensee agreed.
The licensee's incomplete response to this Part 21 report will be identified to NRR prior to the low power licensing of Unit 2.
This item remains open.
H dro en Recombiner Previous Ins ection The Palo Verde FSAR committed to being able to transport the hydrogen recombiner from one unit to another within a 72-hour period and making it operable within a 100-hour period.
However, no test was committed to in the FSAR to demonstrate this.
The inspector had inquired as to how the licensee would demonstrate that this could be achieved.
Both recombiners were located in Unit k.
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This Ins ection I
The inspector reviewed two analyses, one by Bechtel and one by the licensee, that showed that a hydrogen recombiner could be transported
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from one unit to another and made operable in approximately 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
However, one of these analyses took credit for the recombiner and control panel already being located in the unit in question.
All that would need to be transported was the exhaust unit.
This was pointed out to licensee management at the exit meeting.
While the inspector was satisfied that the licensee had assured themselves that they could meet their commitment stated in the FSAR, the inspector asked the licensee to consider moving one recombiner to Unit 2 in light of the study performed above.
Licensee management stated that they, were considering moving one of the hydrogen recombiners to Unit 2 after receiving a low power operating license.
In addition, licensee management committed to keeping a record of the time it took to move one recombiner unit to Unit 2 if they decided to move it, No violations or deviations were identified.
The inspector met. with the licensee representatives denoted in paragraph 1 on November 22, 1985.
The scope of the inspection and the inspector's findings as noted in this report were discusse (
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