ML20140G757
| ML20140G757 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde, 05000000 |
| Issue date: | 08/31/1984 |
| From: | Wang A Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| To: | Ebersole J Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20140B723 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-86-45 NUDOCS 8604030558 | |
| Download: ML20140G757 (2) | |
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION o
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ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS o
g WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 Y
August 31, 1984 l
MEMORANDUM FOR:
J. C. Ebersole, Chairman ACRS Palo Verde Nuclear Station Subcommittee FROM:
A. Wang, Staff Engineer [LE2 Jay
SUBJECT:
PALO VERDE FOLLOW-UP REPORT The ACRS in a report to the Comission dated December 15, 1981, stated "Our approval of the operation of this plant is contingent upon satisfactory completion of construction and preoperatinal testing.
For this reason, we request that prior to fuel loading on Unit 1, a report be provided to the Committee describing significant construction deficiencies and their disposition, effectiveness of the quality assurance program and results of the preoperation test program."
The NRC Staff and licensee discussed with the Reactor Operations Subcomittee their initial findings regarding the primary system damage from the preoperational testing. On August 10, 1984 I/E reported to the full Comittee on the status of the items requested in our letter.
I do not believe the Staff in these presentations has satisfactorily completed a response to the Comittee's request.
Final reports for three of the more significant construction deficiencies have not been issued. This includes (1) the primary system damage during preoperational testing (Thermowells, reactor coolant pumps, safety injection thermal sleeves and cracking in the CEA shroud),
l (2) LPSI pumps failure to start, and (3) HPSI valves fail to open.
The licensee has implemented design changes to the RCPs, the RTD l
Thermowells, and the CEA shroud and has removed the thermal sleeves.
The preoperational testing of the primary system with these changes has just been completed. The LPSI pump motors have been replaced by spare containment spray pump motors which have alleviated the start-up problem. However, testing of these pumps have disclosed abnormal, periodic rumbling noises when operating at various flow rates. The i
problem with HPSI valves is still undetermined.
Initially the licensee concluded that the limit torque settings were too low.
Increasing the limit torque settings did not resolve the problem and the license is still investigating why the valves fail to open. Additionally, the auxiliary feedwater system experienced hydraulic resonance during preoperational testing in a normal configuration with miniflow recirculation. This problem was also experienced and corrected during the preoperational testing for the full flow recirculation configu-ration. The licensee has stated they will have final reports for these issues before fuel load which is currently scheduled in November 1984.
8604030558 860311 PDR FOIA SCOTT 86-45 PDR
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Jesse C. Ebersole August 30, 1984 a
I have discussed with the Staff the possibility that the Subcommittee meet at the site with the licensee and Staff to discuss the final resolution of these items and have a plant tour. Also, I will ask the NRC Staff to discuss the fines proposed against Arizona Public Service concerning their quality assurance program.
I have attached the g
i following for your information:
j (1) Memorandum from J. Mark to N. Palladino, "ACRS Report on the Palo i
- l Verde Nuclear Generating Station Units 1, 2, and 3", dated December 15, 1981.
(2) Memorandum from E. Van Brunt (APS) to T. Bishop (I/E), "A 50.55e Potentially Reportable Deficiency Relating to LPSI and Containment Spray Pumps have Experienced Abnormal Rumbling Noises," dated June 29, 1984.
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(3) Region V Report, " Potential Construction Deficiency Report," dated i
August 2, 1984.
- !j (4) NRC Bulletin No. 84-44, "NRC Staff Reduces Proposed Civil Penalty
- i Against Arizona Public Service for Previously Cited Quality
.j Assurance Violation at Palo Verde," dated April 4, 1984.
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If you have any questions or comments, please call me at (301) 634-3267 j
or 3268.
Enclosure:
As stated
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cc: ACRS Members 1
R. Fraley 4
M. Libarkin j
G. Quittschreiber 7
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UNITED STATES "g
!y NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION n
ADVISORY CON...;lTTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS 3 i o,
f WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 gw...../
December 15, 1981 9
Honorable Nunzio J. Palladino Chai rTnan j
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 i
SUBJECT:
ACRS REPORT ON THE PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION 2
UNITS 1, 2, AND 3
Dear Dr. Palladino:
Ouring its 250th meeting, December 10-12, 1981, the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards reviewed the application of the Arizona Public
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Service Connany, the Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement and Power District, the El Paso Electric Company, the Public Service Company of New 'lexico, and the Southern California Edison Company ( Applicants) for a license to operate the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Units 1. 2, and 3.
The joint applicants have designated the Arizona Public Service Company as the Project Manager and Operating Agent with
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full authority to construct and operate the power station. The project was considered at a Subcommittee meeting in Phoenix, Arizona on November 23-24, 1981, and members of the Committee toured the facility on November 23, 1981.
In its review the Committee had the benefit of discussions with representatives of the Arizona Public Service Company, Combustion Engineering, Inc., Bechtel Power Corporation, the NRC Staff, and members of the public. The Committee also had the benef.it of the documents listed. The Conmittee ecmmented on the construction permit application I:
for the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Units 1, 2, and 3 in a report dated November 12, 1975 to the NRC Chairman.
The Palo Verde application is submitted in accordance with the Commissio.n's regulations as described in Appendix 0 to Part 50, " Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities," and Section 2.110 of Part 2, " Rules of Prac-tice," of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations. NRC policy stated in the Federal Register (42 FR 34395 and 43 FR 38954) allows for a reference system that involves an entire facility design or major fraction of a design outside the context of a license application. For this application the reference system is the Combustion Engineering standard nuclear steam supply system known as its Standard Reference System 80. This design has been reviewed by the ACRS and discussed in its report dated December 15, i
1981, " Final Design Approval for Combustion Engineering, Inc. Standard Nuclear Steam Supply System (Standard Reference System 80)".
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Honorable Nunzio J. Palladino December 15, 1981 I
a This power station is located in a sparsely populated section of Maricopa County, Arizona, about 36 miles west of the nearest boundary of Phoenix, The nearest densely populated center is Sun City, Arizona, about Arizona.
35 miles east-northeast of the site, which had a 1980 population of about Palo Verde is the first commercial nuclear power station to 57,800 persons.
l be operated by Arizona Public Service Company and the first in the state of
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The Palo Verde Nuclear Generatira Station uses three System 80 pressurized water nuclear steam supply systems designed by Combustion Engineering, Inc.
Each of these has a design core power output of 3800 MWt. The turbine gen-
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erators are oriented so as to minimize plant damage should turbine failure The containment is a steel-lined, orestressed concrete cylindrical occur.
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structure with a hemispherical done and a design pressure of 60 neig.
j c1oling tower makeup is supplied from treated sewage effluent from the city of Phoenix.
The Connittee's review included consideration of the management organization and capability, and the operator training program. The organizational plan The
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for technical support of the operating plant is still being fomulated.
Committee notes that the Arizona Public Service Company management personnel have extensive experience in both commercial and other nuclear plant opera-tion and construction. The utility anticipates using many of its installa-l
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The tion surveillance staff members as part of the technical support team.
ACRS encourages this organizational arrangement, but believes the Applicant should promptly analyze the skill requirements needed to support operations and make certain that the necessary capabilities will be available when In order that the Committee be kept informed, we request an update-needed.
on the organizational arrangement in about one year from this date.
The Committee notes that Arizona Public Service Comoany has a training simulator in nperation at the Palo Verde site. The Committee's review in-dicated that the training program is being developed and that use of the plant simulator is still in the process of being integrated into the pro-The Committee recommends that Arizona Public Service Company examine gran.
industry-sponsored programs concerning effective use of simulators for training and make certain that its approach takes account of current under-standing of simulator training limitations.
Discussion with the Arizona Public Service Company staff indicated that emergency operating procedures for dealing with off-normal plant behavior Development of such procedures should be expedited to are incomplete.
provide maximum time to make use of them in the operational training pro-gram.
In the Palo Verde design the primary systen does not include capability for This rapid, direct depressurization when the plant has been shut down.
places extra importance on the reliability of the auxiliary feedwater I
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I Honorable Nunzio J. Palladino December 15, 1981 i
system and makes it necessary that the NRC Staff and the Applicant assure 1
the availability and dependability of this system for a wide variety of l
It also places extra requirements on the continued integrity of the two steam generators as the only method of heat removal immediately after shutdown. The ACRS recommends that the NRC Staff and the Arizona Public Service Company give additional attention to the matter of shutdown heat removal for Palo Verde and develop a detailed evaluation and justifi-cation for the position judged to be acceptable. The Committee wishes to be kept informed.
Arizona Public Service Company should expand its studies on systems inter-actions and systems reliability.
A number of items have been identified as Outstanding Issues, Confirmatory Issues, and proposed License Conditions in the NRC Staff's Safety Evaluation i
Report dated November 1981. The ACRS is satisfied with the progress on these topics and believes that they should be resolved in a manner satisfactory to the NRC Staff.
Our approval of the operation of this plant is contingent upon the satisfac-I tory completion of. construction and preoperational testing. For this reason, 1
e request that, prior to fuel loading on Unit 1, a report be provided to the w
j Committee describing significant construction deficiencies and their disposi-
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tion, effectiveness of the quality assurance program, and results of the i
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preoperational test program.
In addition, a review of the startup experience on Unit 1 should be made prior to fuel loading on Unit 2 and the Committee kept informed.
'We believe that if due consideration is given to the recommendations above, and subject to satisfactory completion of construction, staffing, and pre-operational testing, there is reasonable assurance that Palo Verde Nuclear r
i Generating Station Units 1, 2, and 3 can each be operated at power levels uo to the design core power output of 3800 MWt without undue risk to the health and safety of the public.
Additional comments by ACRS member !1. Bender and ACRS members H. W. Lewis and ti. S. Plesset are presented below.
j Sincerely yours, J. Carson Mark Chairman Additional Comments by ACRS Member M. Bender The NRC requirements for instrumentation to follow the course of an acci-I dent have been generally outlined in Regulatory Guide 1.97.
The ACRS has concentrated most of its attention on instrumentation to detect inadequate
i Honorable Hunzio J. Palladino
-4 December 15, 1981 I
o core coolina, sometimes called pressure vessel coolant level measuring instrumentation. The Regulatory Guide 1.97 requirements and the emphasis on measurement of vessel coolant levels both seem to have confused the real accident diagnosis requirements.
The proposed coolant level indicators could only have value under quiescent conditions. The proposed devices, differential pressure indicators and heated junction thermocouples, require considerable information about hy-draulic conditions, pressure distribution, and density variations in the pri-mary coolant circuit to be useful for unambiguous interpretation of changing coolant inventory in the reactor core. A full understanding of mass and energy distribution and related physical behavior of the nuclear system would he needed to make such information diagnostically useful under most accident conditions. The main value would appear to be for conditions where the system has been depressurized and the coolant state is known, for example, prior to refueling. Such knowledge does not appear relevant to the circum-stances of prima'ry concern such as accident conditions comparable to the TMI-2 event.
Regulatory Guide 1.97 has a mixture of requirements, some directed to pre-accident symptom identification, some to actual surveillance of rapidly J
changing transients, and some to surveillance of accident recuperation con-(
ditions. Although all of these requirements could be justified under some circumstances, it is likely that, if everything listed in the guide were provided, the operators could be overwhelmed by the informational detail and their diagnostic capability actually impaired.
At a time when una%iguous accident diagnostic information is urgently needed, a maze of indicating and analytical devices that might confuse the operators hardly makes sense.
I propose the following criteria as a basis for determining accident diagnostics adequacy, 1.
Does the operator have a well-defined set of signals to guide his emergency response to important accidents?
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Do the emergency procedures enable the operator to avoid misinter-pretation of those signals under circumstances where accident diagnosis is needed in conjunction with emergency actions?
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In accident recovery is the sensor capability adequate to enable the operators to establish whether a stable and safe operating condition is being maintained until the system can be brought to cold shutdown and reliable decay heat removal functions assured?
4.
If fuel failures occur, is there capability to determine whether the failures are of minor or major significance (clad reaction
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I Honorable Nunzio J. Palladino December 15, 1981 J
l with water and fuel melting); whether bulk quantities of radioac-tive_ nuclides have been released to the primary coolant circuitry, the containment interior, or are leaking from containment; and whether the containment boundary is jeopardized by overpressure or overtemperature?
l Only a few additions to the pre-TMI-accident instrumentation appear necessary i
to address these considerations. However, to be certain that necessary in-formation is available, the actions required of operators during accidents must be thoroughly examined. Emergency procedure guidance is ncw being developed by the nuclear steam supply equipment vendors. This guidance must be converted into usable procedures that may be testable on nucl.$ar plant simulators. Palo Verde and a few other installations have simulators that might be used for this purpose. Those ooerating organizations having appro-priate simulation equipment should give priority attention to proving the effectiveness of the diagnostic equipment in conjunction with proposed emergency procedures in order to verify diagnostic adequacy. No serious effort in this direction appears to have been initiated up to this time.
Additional Comnents by ACRS Members H. W. Lewis and M. S. Plesset We do not wish to belabor the points we made in our addendum to the ACRS
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letter dated November 17, 1981 on the St. Lucie Plant Unit 2, but they are as
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relevant here as there. The Staff continues to accept instruments that do not provide an unambiguous measure of liquid level in the pressure vessel, and continues to lack an adequate rationale therefor. We do not find fault with the Applicants for their efforts to be responsive to the Staff, but are concerned about the proliferation of inadequately considered requirements, of which this is only one example. To sanctify an ambiguous indication of core water level is to play with fire.
In this particular case (heated thermo-couples in a se;:arator tube), not only dynamic effects, but a pressure vessel full of high-void-fraction water will spoof the instrument, and tend to lull the operator into a false sense of security about the coolant inventory.
In that specific case, the instrument will indicate that the vessel is nearly full.
None of the above is meant to suggest that we oppose the provision of instrumentation to follow the course of an accident or to detect the onset of inadequate core cooling - unambiguous diagnosis of accident conditions through improved instrumentation and training is a high priority. Our concern is a piecemeal and incoherent approach to the problen, as exemplified here.
References:
1.
Arizona Public Service Company, "Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Final Safety Analysis Report," with Amendments 1 through 6.
2.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, " Safety Evaluation Report Related to the Operation of Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2, I
and 3," NUREG-0850, dated November 1981.
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Honorable Nunzio J. Palladino December 15, 1981 d
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Combustion Engineering, Inc., " System 80 CESSAR FSAR," with Amendments 1 through 5.
4.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Conrnission, " Safety Evaluation Report Re-lated to the Final Design of the Standard Nuclear Steam Supply Reference System CESSAR System 80," NUREG-0852, dated November 1981.
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NO I 27 J
June 29, 1984 :
o ANPP-29866-TDS/TRB U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission i
Region V Creekside Oaks Office Park 1450 Maria Lane - Suite 210 Walnut Creek, CA 94596-5368 Attention: Mr. T. W. Bishop, Director Division of Resident Reactor Projects and Engineering Programs
Subject:
Interim Report - DER 84-39 A 50.55(e) Potentially Reportable Deficiency Relating To LPSI And Containment Spray Pumps Have Experienced Abnormal Rumbling Noises.
i File: 84-019-026; D.4.33.2 i
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Reference:
Telephone Conversation between J. Ball and T. Bradish on f
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June 5, 1984
Dear Sir:
The NRC was notified of a potentially reportable deficiency in the referenced telephone conversation. At that time, it was estimated that a determination of reportability would be made within thirty (30) days.
Due to the extensive investigation and evaluation required, an Interim Report is attached. It is now expected that this informacion will be finalized by August 23, 1984, at which time a complete report will be submitted.
Very truly yours m
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'r' E. E. Van Brunt, Jr.
APS Vice President Nuclear Production ANPP Project Director EEVB/TRB:db At tachment cc: See Page Two S
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1 Mr. T. W. Bishop DER 84-39 Page Two cc:
Richard DeYoung, Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement U. S. Nuclear Re;ulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 j
T. G. Woods, Jr.
D. B. Karner W. E. Ide D. B. Fasnacht A. C. Rogers L. A. Souza D. E. Fowler T. D. Shriver C. N. Russo J. Vorees J. R. Bynum J. M. Allen J. A. Brand A. C. Gehr W. J. Stubblefield W. G. Bingham R. L. Patterson R. W. Welcher H. D. Foster D. R. Hawkinson L. E. Vorderbrueggen R. P. Zimmerman S. R. Frost J. Self i
D. Canady T. J. Bloom Records Center Institute of Nuclear Power Operations 1100 Circle 75 Parkway, Suite 1500 Atlanta, GA 30339
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INTERIM REPORT - DER 84-39 POTENTIAL REPORTABLE DEFICIENCY ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY (APS)
PVNGS UNIT 1 I.
Potential Problem A. NCR SM-4201 LPSI pumps 1MSIAP01 and 1MSIBP01 have experienced an abnormal, periodic rumbling noise when operating at approximately 2800 gpa to 3200 :Pe. Neither the cause of this phenomenon nor its potential impact on pump operation are yet known. Additional i
evaluation time is required.
B. NCR SM-4229 Containment spray pumps 1MSIAP03 and IMSIBP03 experienced an abnormal, periodic rumbling noise when operating at approximately J
1800-2300 spa and 2200-2800 spe respectively.
1 II. Approach to and Status of Proposed Resolution 1
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Bechtel engineering is currently studying this problem to determine reportability and technical justification for corrective action.
III. Projected Completion of Corrective Action and Submittal of the Final Report Evaluation of this condition and submittal of the Final Report is Forecast to be completed by August 23, 1984.
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l MORNING REPORT - REGION V DATE: AUGUST 2, 1984 ACILITY NOTIFICATION ITEM OR EVENT REGIONAL ACTION RIZOMA PUBLIC TELEPHONE CALL FROM INFORMATION ITEM:
SE_VICE COMPANY RESIDENT ON 8/2/84 THE LICENSEE WILL BE CONDUCTING A PRACTICE EMERGENCY VNGS DRILL TODAY.
STATE, COUNTY AND LOCAL ORGANIZATIONS WILL M 50-528 PARTICIPATE.
THE PRACTICE IS BEING CONDUCTED IN PREPARATION -FOR THE EP EXERCISE. WITH NRC PARTICIPATION, SCHEDULED FOR SEPTEMBER 26, 1984.
CIZONA PUBLIC TELEPHONE CALL FRDM POTENTIAL CONSTRUCTION DEFICIENCY REPORT:
FOLLOWUP PER MC 2512 i
SERVICE COMPANY LICENSEE ON 8/1/84 THE AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SY3 TEM EXPERIENCED HYDRAULIC VNGS RESONANCE DURING PREOPERATIONAL TESTING IN NORMAL M 55-528 CONFIGURATION (WITH MINIFLOW RECIRCULATION). THIS 50-529 PROBLEM HAD BEEN EXPERIENCED EARLIER IN THE TEST PROGRAM 58-530 IN THE FULL FLOW RECIRCULATION CONFIGURATION.
THE SYSTEM HAD BEEN MODIFIED AND TESTED SATISFACTORILY (FOR THE FULL RECIRCULATION FLOW CONFIGURATION-REFERENCE DER-84-23).
THE LICENSEE WILL EVALUATE THIS CURRENT CONDITION AND e
SUBMIT A WRITTEN REPORT WITHIN 30 DAYS IF THE DEFICIENCY IS DETERMINED TO BE REPORTABLE.
ORTLAND GENERAL TELEPHONE TO M9 DUTY TWO RELAYS ASSOCIATED WITH STARTING THE EMERGENCY FOLLOWUP PER MC 2515 ELECTRIC COMPANY OFFICER ON 8/1/84 DIESEL GENERATORS DURING A LOSS OF 0FF-SITE POWER DO BY RESIDENT ROJAJ NOT MEET THE PHYSICAL SEPERATION CRITERIA. ONE DIESEL INSPECTORS.
N 50-344 HAS BEEN DECLARED IMDPERABLE PENDING RELOCATIDH OF THE RELAYS.
THE PLANT IS IN MODE 6 RELOADING FUEL.
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION sp
't Office of Public Affairs
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C/R Distribution:
Chm, Cmes * '
- SECY. Records.
No. 84-44 FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE Tel. 301/492-7715 (Wednesday, April 4,1984 )
NRC STAFF REDUCES PROPOSED CIVIL PENALTY AGAINST ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE FOR PREVIOUSLY CITED QUALITY ASSURANCE VIOLATION AT PALO VERDE The Nuclear Regulatory Comission staff hastieduced by 50 percent a proposed civil penalty against the Arizona Public Service Company (APS) for violations at the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station that were identified during a special NRC construction assessment inspection at the plant last fall.
In an April 3 letter to APS, the NRC staff said it is imposing a $20,000 fine for the violation, instead of the $40,000 proposed in December, 5ccause of the company's " prompt and extensive corrective action."
Based on the results of a special team inspection conducted at Palo Verde Unit 1 between September '6 and November 1,1983, the NRC Region V office proposed a $40,000 civil penalty against the company on December 12 for a breakdown in its quality assurance program.
Under NRC procedures, APS was i
given 30 days to either pay the fine or fonr. ally submit a protest.
The utility filed its response on January 31, after receiving an extension of time.,
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.. Richard C. DeYoung, Director of the NRC's Office of Inspection and Enforcement in Bethesda, MD today notified the company of his finding that the violations did occur as, cited by the staff, but that the proposed fine had 7-T_
been reduced by 50 percent because of the prompt and extensive corrective actions-identified in the company's January 31 response.
As examples of the corrective actions, DeYoung cited the company's independent assessment following the NRC findings, suspension of startup work at the company's initiative, a management reorganization and the " unusually prompt and extensive" direct involvement by senior corporate management.
The company now,
has 30 days to either pay the 520,000 fine or request a hearing before an NRC administrative law judge.
The violation resulted from four examples of a. breakdown in the quality assurance program:
(1) caps had been installed on pressure sensing lines in the containment building with no procedure to assure that the,y would have been removed prior to operation of the reactor; (2) no record of a disconnected manual operator on a valve in the High Pressure Safety Injection System; (3) no record of a mispositioned valve indicator on a similar HPSI valve; and (4) bolts missing from the frames of six motor control centers.
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' '. In its December 12 letter', the NRC staff also proposed another $40,000 fine against APS for improperly signed electrical installation records at the plant. The company requested and was granted an extension of time. for response to that civil penalty until the NRC Office of Investigations Yeport on the matter is released.
It is not known when that report will be released. Therefore,,today's action does not address that proposed fine, i
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