IR 05000416/1982042
| ML20055A211 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Grand Gulf  |
| Issue date: | 06/14/1982 |
| From: | Crowley B, Economos N NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20055A201 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-416-82-42, IEB-82-01, IEB-82-1, NUDOCS 8207150578 | |
| Download: ML20055A211 (7) | |
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Ktg UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION o
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RECION 11
o 101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SulTE 3100 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303 o
Report No. 50-416/82-42 Licensee: Mississippi Power and Light Company Jackson, MS 39205 Facility Name: Grand Gulf Docket No. 50-416 License No. CPPR-118 Inspection at Grand Gulf site near Port Gibson, Mississippi Inspector:
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B. R. Cr ley (/
Date Signed
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Approved byv k' (Hf LHgt
__G V 7V N. Ecoh6kn Acting Section Chief
/Date/ Signed Engineefing Inspection Branch Division of Engineering and Technical Programs SUMMARY Inspection on May 25-27, 1982 Areas Inspected This routine, unannounced inspection involved 19 inspector-hours on site in the areas of IE Bulletins, previous inspection findings, and licensee identified (50.55(e) items.
Results Of the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
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REPORT DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- C. K. McCoy, Plant Manager T. E. Reaves, Jr., Corporate QA Manager
- J. W. Yelverton, Nuclear Site QA Manager
- J. C. Roberts, Startup Supervisor
- M. A. Lacey, QA Consultant J. M. Kelley, QA Supervisor Other licensee employees contacted included security force members, and office personnel.
Other Organizations J. K. Conway, Project Field QC Engineer, Bechtel Power Corporation J. G. Serino, Lead Electrical QC Engineer, Bechtel Power Corporation C. F. O'Neil, Resident Light Structures Group Supervisor, Bechtel Power Corporation D. A. Yoder, Manager, QA - I&SE, General Electric R. E. Edwards, Manager, TD&SO, General Electric M. L. Horne, NDE Specialist - I&SE, General Electric
- Attended exit interview 2.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on May 27, 1982, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above.
On May 28, 1982, the inspector visited General Electric Offices in Norcross, Georgia, to review records related to Inspector Followup Item 416/81-11-04.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Violation 416/82-26-02, CRD Piping and pipe support discrepancies.
Mississippi Power and Light Company letter of response AECM-82/235 dated May 27, 1982, has been reviewed and determined acceptable by Region II. The inspector held discussions with the licensee and examined corrective actions as stated in the letter of response.
The inspector concluded that Mi ssi s'sippi Power and Light Company had determined the full extent of the subject violation, performed the necessary followup actions to correct the present conditions and developed the necessary corrective actions to preclude recurrence of similar circumstances.
The corrective actions identified in the letter of response have been implemented. It should be noted that this violation and Construction Deficiency Report 82-13 (see paragraph 6.b.) relate to the same problem. In addition to performing a
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100*. inspection of randomly selected pipe supports, the licensee's constructor performed a walkdown of the control rod drive system in accordance with IE Bulletin 79-14. All items identified by the walkdown are on a " punch" list and are being worked.
4.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.
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5.
Independent Inspection Effort a.
The inspector conducted a general inspection of the reactor building and auxiliary building to observe plant progress and activities such as material control, housekeeping, and storage.
b.
On April 1, 1982, the General Electric Company (GE) telephonically reported information regarding primary coolant leakage from incore instrumentation at Kuo Sheng 1, a BWR 6 reactor located in Taiwan. GE stated that a written report will be issued and that Grand Gulf, the lead BWR 6 in this country, had been notified.
The written report was forwarded to the NRC on May 18, 1982. Based on the report, the RHR/LPCI was operated in an abnormal mode for normal shutdown for an extended period of time.
This resulted in LPCI injection directly into the core for an extended period of time, eventually causing fatigue failure of an incore instrument tube and subsequent leakage from the reactor pressure vessel. The solution to the problem was to install flow deflectors on tt? shroud at the three LPCI inlets to prevent direct horizontal flow impingement upon the core and instrumentation and to instruct operators not to operate the RHR system in the LPCI injection mode unless it is required for accident or emergency situations.
The inspector reviewed MP&L Design Change 82/4014 which added flow deflectors at the LPCI inlets. The deflectors were designed by GE and installed to GE reouirements. At the conclusion of this inspection, the installation had been completed.
c.
Concern Relative to Thoroughness of Inspections On May 18, 1982, the licensee notified RII of a concern expressed relative to inspections not conducted as thoroughly or completely as they should have been prior to sign of f.
The concerns were expressed relative to inspection of bolt torqueing and grouting behind support plates for electrical hangers.
Investigation by the licensee revealed that the concerns were relative to electrical conduit hangers and supports and involved only the field engineer who signed that the conduit supports were ready for QC inspection. Under the licensee's 0A program the field engineer's sign t
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off does not indicate a detailed inspection as would be performed by a QC inspector.
Ninety-five electrical conduit hangers / supports were involved in the concern. Although the licensee did not feel a problem existed, based on the fact that a detailed QC inspection followed the field engineer sign off, as a precaution, the decision was made to re-inspect the 95 hangers / supports.
Considering accessibility, 48 hangers / supports were inspected 100%, 39 hangers / supports were partially inspected, and eight hangers / supports were not inspected.
The re-inspection involved a total of approximately 1500 inspection points. Sixteen discrepancies out of the 1500 inspection points were identified. Thirteen of the discrepancies were minor dimensional or other miscellaneous problems which the licensee determined to be insignificant.
Three of the discrepancies involved undersize or missing fillet welds.
Although all of the discrepancies were acceptable from an engineering design standpoint, the licensee was concerned about the welding problems and decided to inspect welds on another sample of conduit supports. Two QC inspectors were involved in the inspection of the undersize and missing welds. One inspector only inspected one hanger and the other inspected the majority of the hangers of concern.
The licensee decided to sample 55 additional hangers / supports as follows:
15 - Hangers previously inspected by the inspector who had only inspected one hanger 25 - Hangers previously inspected by the inspector who had inspected a majority of the hangers of concern 15 - Hangers previously inspected picked at random.
The inspector discussed the concerns with the licensee and reviewed the re-inspections performed to date.
There were no further questions relative to the 13 minor dimensional discrepancies and minor miscel-laneous discrepancies. Inspector followup item 416/82-42-01, conduit support welds, was identified for review of licensee's final documen-tation of the problem and review of results of re-inspection of welds on additional electrical hangers / supports.
After completion of the inspection, the licensee telephoned on June 3, 1982, to report the results from inspection of the 55 additional hangers. A total of 461 welds were involved with the 55 hangers (186 located in control building,127 located in drywell, and 148 located in auxiliary building). Six problems were found (three welds undersize by 1/16" - 1/8" for a portion of the weld, two minor cases of undercut, and one weld with lack of fusion at " wrap around" or corner area).
Based on design requirements, the licensee determined that all of the above discrepancies were acceptable. Based on a previous examination of fillet welds, the licensee concluded that fillet welds for conduit hangers / supports are over designed to the point where welding
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discrepancies (undersize fillets, etc.) similar to those found during the re-inspection are not a problem. Therefore, the licensee does not consider conduit hanger / support welds to be a problem.
Final docu-mentation of resolution to this problem will be reviewed under the above noted inspector followup item.
Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
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6.
Licensee Identified Items (LII)
Prior to this inspection, the licensee identified the following items under the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55(e):
a.
(0 pen) CDR 81-44, Unqualified Bettis Air Actuators on Henry Pratt Valves, on October 29, 1981, Mississippi Power and Light Company notified RII of a potential 50.55(e) item concerning unqualified Bettis Air actuators on Henry Pratt valves.
Interim Reports AECM-82/45 dated January 29, 1982, AECM-81/470 dated November 30, 1981, and AECM-82/97 dated March 15, 1982, were submitted. The inspector reviewed Interim Report AECM-82/97 and noted that the cause of the deficiency was not fully explained. The report stated that the cause of the deficiency is that the actuators were not manufactured under a QA program.
The inspector pointed out to the licensee that the final report should give more detail explaining why the actuators were not manufactured under a QA program.
b.
(Closed) CDR 82-13, Supports Installed and Accepted by RCI Not in Accordance With Approved Design Requirements.
On March 17, 1982, Mississippi Power and Light Company notified RII of a potential 50.55(e) item concerning supports installed and accepted by Reactor Controls, Inc. (RCI) that were not in accordance with approved design requirements. An Interim Report AECM-82/182 dated April 28, 1982, was l
submitted.
The final Construction Deficiency Report AECM 82/240 was submitted on May 27, 1982. The report has been reviewed and determined
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to be acceptable by RII. The inspector held discussions with licensee personnel to verify that corrective action identified in the report had been completed. (See paragraph 3. above for additional information on this item.)
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c.
(Closed) CDR 81-17, Lower Flow Rate in the Standby Service Water System
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Than Required by Drawings. On March 3,1981, Mississippi Power and Light Company notified RII of a potential 50.55(e) item concerning a i
lower measured flow rate in the standby service water (SSW) system
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loops A and B than was required by the drawings.
Interim Reports AECM 81/362 dated September 23, 1981, AECM-81/494 dated December 15, 1981, AECM 82/62 dated February 15, 1982, and AECM 82/156 dated April 15, 1982, were submitted.
The final Construction Deficiency Report AECM 82/232 was submitted on May 24, 1982. The report has been reviewed and determined to be acceptable by RII.
The inspector held discussions with licensee personnel to verify that corrective action identified in the report had been complete. _ _ _.
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(0 pen) CDR 82-29, Dikkers Safety Relief Valve... Corrosion.
On
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l concerning corrosion on the actuators for Dikkers safety-relief j
valves.
The inspector observed the corrosic on disassembled
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actuators for valves Q1B21F041-47 (serial 160805) and Q1B21F041-51 i
(serial 160839). The licensee is investigating this problem.
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7.
IE Bulletins (IEBs)
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(Closed) 82-B0-01, Alteration of Radiographs of Welds in Piping Subassem-
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blies.
This Bulletin pertains to alterat %ns found in certain pipe subassembly shop weld radiographs furnished by Associated Piping and
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Engineering Corporation (AP&E).
The Bulletin requires licensees to determine, based on 100*. review of AP&E radiographs for Classes 1 and 2 shop
welded pipe subassemblies less than 1/2" in thickness, whether the
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applicable ASME code penetrameter sensitivity has been altered and whether I
acceptable weld quality is demonstrated. If radiographs are found altered
or unacceptable sensitivity cannot be demonstrated, the Bulletin requires r
appropriate steps to ensure acceptability of affected welds. A written l
l report describing findings and corrective actions is to be forwarded to the
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NRC regional office.
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MP&L written Report AECM 82/169 dated April 23, 1982, has been reviewed by
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RII and found acceptable. Although most of the welds furnished to MP&L by AP&E are greater than 1/2" in thickness, MP&L reviewed all film for all
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i welds furnished by AP&E. No evidence of altered radiographs or inadequate
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sensitivity was detected by this review. It should be-noted that these film had previously been re-reviewed as part of a previous problem with radiographs of materials and components furnished by General Electric (see MP&L PRD-80/28).
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The inspector reviewed the following film to verify th2t corrective actions required by the Bulletin had been completed:
Pipes and Components Weld Type Weld Size Shop Sheet
01B33G001-G010A-1 J
Sweepolet 16"x7/8"
Q1B33G001-G0078-1 A
Circumferential 24"x1-1/8"
Q1821G001-G008-A-1 H
Circumferential 10"x1-1/4"
i Q1821G001-G011-D-1
Sweepolet 28"x1-5/8"
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Q1821G006 S/N 156 Snubber Assy 3-1/2"x.300"
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Q1B33G001-G005A-1 Circumferential 24"x1"
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01B13D003-Pc.
B Safe End 11"x1/2"
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l 112D2587G-1 i
018130003-Pc.
B Safe End 11"x1/2"
11202587G-1 Q1B13D003-Pc.
B Safe End 11"x1/2"
11202587G-1
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Q1813D003-Pc.
B Safe End 11"x1/2"
112D2587G-1
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6 01833G006 S/N 176 Sr.ubber Assy 3-1/2"x.300"
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01B33G006 S/N 009 Snubber Assy 2.873"x.300"
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The inspector observed adequate film sensitivity and did not observe any evidence of alteration of film penetrameter holes.
Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were icentified.
8.
Inspector Follow Items (Closed) Item 416/81-11-04, Records of Qualification Test Specimens do not Identify Built-in Defects.
This item rertained to the unavailability of records describing test specimens with loc.ition and type of defects that the ultrasonic NDE examiner was expected to detect during qualification. The inspector reviewed GE Procedure UT1.27.0, Revision 0,
" Procedure for Practical. Examination of Ultrasonic Examination Personnel" and calibration sheets TS-1 through TS-6.
The calibration sheets document the baseline inspection for qualification blocks UT-1 and UT-2 which have known defects.
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The inspector had no further questions on this matter.
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