IR 05000220/1986016
| ML18038A217 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Nine Mile Point  |
| Issue date: | 09/16/1986 |
| From: | Nimitz R, Shanbaky M, Sherbini S NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18038A216 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-220-86-16, 50-410-86-46, NUDOCS 8610150505 | |
| Download: ML18038A217 (28) | |
Text
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
Report Nos.
50-220/86-16 50-410/86-46 Docket Nos.
50-220 50-410 License Nos.
DPR-63 CPPR-112 Licensee:
Nia ara Mohawk Power Cor oration 300 Erie Boulevard West S racuse New York 13202 Facility Name:
Nine Mile Point Units 1&2 Inspection At:
Oswe o
New York Inspection Conducted:
Au ust 4-7 1986 Inspectors:
Approved by:
i. tJ R.
L. Nimitz, Senior R
iation Specialist r
L bJ i.
S. Sherbini, Radiation ec alist M. Shanbaky, Chief, Faci liti s Radiation Protection Section date date date Ins ection Summar
Ins ection conducted on Au ust 4-7 1986 Combined Ins ection Re ort No. 50-220/86-16 50-410/86-46
.
A~Id:
R controls including: licensee's action on previous findings at Unit 1 and Unit 2; organization, staffing, training, and qualification of personnel, preoperational testing at Unit 2; bulletins, circulars and information notices, and worker concerns.
Results:
Several problems were identified in the implementation of radiological controls for LPRM replacement at Unit 1 (Details, paragraph 5.0).
Sb101505Q5 Bb0'730 PDR ADOCK 05000220
Details 1.
Persons Contacted l.l ~iN h k
'T ~ Perkins, General Superintendent T.
Roman, Station Superintendent, Unit
"E. Leach, Superintendent, Chemistry/Radiation Protection Management
- P. Volza, Supervisor, Radiological Support
"J. Duell, Supervisor, Chemistry and Radiation Protection
"R. Gerbig, Radiation Protection Supervisor, Unit
- T. Irving, ALARA Coordinator 1.2 U.S. Nuclear Re ulator Commission W. Cook, Senior Resident Inspector C.
Mar schall, Resident Inspector
"Denotes those individuals who attended the exit meeting on August 7, 1986.
The inspector also contacted other licensee personnel.
. 2.
~Pur ose The purpose of this routine, announced inspection was to review the following matters:
Unit 1 licensee's action on previous findings; worker's allegation relating to receipt of unnecessary exposure sustained via residual radioactivity contained in a laceration; circumstances and licensee evaluation associated with an instance of off-scale dosimetry on April 29, 1986.
Unit'
licensee's action on previous findings; licensee's action on bulletins, circulars and information notices; preoperational testing of the following systems:
Control Room Ventilation System, Standby Gas Treatment System, Process and Area Radiation Monitoring Syste.0 Licensee's Aetio n Previous Findin s
3.1 3.2 (Closed)
Follow-up Item (50-220/83-27-01)
Licensee to establish and implement the long term Radiation Protection Technician Training and Retraining Program.
This and other matters associated with Train-ing/retraining matters is being reviewed in conjunction with fol-low-up items 50-220/86-16-01; 50-410/86-46-01 and is closed for administrative purposes.
(Closed)
Follow-up Item (50-220/84-22-03)
Licensee's on-site radia-tion sources do not possess sufficient activity to calibrate high range radiation monitoring equipment.
The licensee calibrates in-struments on-site to about 320 R/hr.
Administrative controls have been placed on use of these instruments in excess of this dose rate.
The licensee now sends selected instruments (RO-7s) off-site for periodic calibration to 20,000 R/hr.
This matter is closed.
3.3 3.4 (Closed)
Follow-up Item (50-220/85-18-01)
Licensee to establish and implement a program to train personnel in new procedures and proce-dure changes and establish a program as necessary to verify previous experience of contract radiological controls materials personnel.
This matter is being reviewed in conjunction with follow-up item 50-220/86-14-01; 50-410/86-46-01 and is closed for administrative purposes.,
(Closed)
Follow-up Item (50-410/85-32-04)
Licensee to complete pre-operational and surveillance testing of area radiation monitors.
The licensee has completed preoperational and surveillance testing of ARNs.
Appropriate radiation sources were used to calibrate the detectors and test alarm function and trip values.
This matter is closed.
3.5 (Open)
Fol low-up Item (50-220/86-16-01; 50-410/86-46-01)
Licensee to establish and implement a training and retraining program for Radia-tion Protection personnel.
The following was identified:
A defined initial training program for Radiation Protection personnel has been established and implemented.
Tasks for which an individual is to be qualified on based upon his/her scope of responsibilities, have been identified.
A program to train personnel in new procedures and procedure changes is in place.
A sufficient number of personnel have been trained and qualified to support Unit 2 fuel load activities.
The scope and frequency of retraining/requalification for Radiation Protection personnel has been identifie Within the stope of the review, the following matters needing lic-ensee attention were identified:
Upgrade retraining/requalification program for Radiation Pro-tection personnel and associated procedures as described in the recently developed retraining/requalification action plan.
Establish administrative controls for the training/qualification of "temporary Radiation Protection workers."
Current procedures do not address
"temporary licensee radiation protection per-sonnel" (Note:
These individuals are licensee employees and not contractors).
3.6 (Closed)
Follow-up Item (50-410/85-47-01)
Licensee to review and revise General Employee Training (GET).
The licensee reviewed the GET Program for applicability to Unit 2.
The program was revised to identify new emergency assembly areas.
Appropriate personnel have been made aware of the new locations and will be retrained in these during their yearly GET requalification.
3.7 3.8 3.9 (Closed)
Follow-up Item (50-410/85-20-07)
Licensee to establish and implement a Radiation Protection and Radwaste Operator Training Pro-gram at Unit 2.
The Radwaste Operator Training Program was reviewed during inspection 50-410/86-17 and found acceptable'he Radiation Protection personnel training program is discussed in item 3.5 above.
(Open) Follow-up Item (50-410/85-20-09)
NRC to review Radiological Controls Organization for Unit 2.
The Radiation Protection elements of the organization were reviewed and found acceptable to support fuel load.
The chemistry organization and staffing was reviewed in inspection 50-410/86-17.
The licensee was found to have trained an adequate number of radwaste operations personnel to support fuel load activities.
The adequacy of the Radwaste Organization including descriptions in appropriate administration procedures remains open.
(Closed)
Follow-up Item (50-410/85-32-01)
NRC to review selected aspects of training and qualification program for Unit 2 Radiation Protection personnel.
The matters associated with this item are discussed in section 3.5 above.
4.
Worker Alle ation Unit
RI-86-A-0074 4.1 General On June 16, 1986, a contractor worker, formerly employed at the Niagara Mohawk Power Station, Unit 1, contacted NRC Region I.
The worker alleged that radioactive material, introduced into the tissue of his finger via a cut, still remained in the tissue and should have been removed.
The worker was concerned that the remaining radio-activity was providing needless exposure to hi The worker Ws contacted by an NRC Region I Senior Radiation
. Specialist on June 16, 1986.
The licensee was contacted via telephone on June 16, 1986 by a NRC Region I Senior Radiation Specialist to ascertain the general cir-cumstances, and licensee evaluation surrounding the event.
A letter dated June 27, 1986 detailing the worker's concerns and requesting review of the concerns was transmitted to the licensee from NRC Region I.
4.2 An on-site inspection, by a
NRC Region I Senior Radiation Specialist, of the worker's concerns was initiated on August 4, 1986.
Descri tion On April 1, 1986, while preparing a pipe for welding in the drywell at Nine Mile Point Unit 1, a contractor worker sustained a small cut (6 mm) to the fifth (small) finger of his left hand.
A radiation survey of the cut showed that it was contaminated, measuring 2000 cpm at '," using a pancake probe.
An unusual event was declared at the site (contaminated injured person),
and the worker was transported to Oswego Hospital for treatment, arriving there at approximately 1730.
A radiation protection supervisor was present at the hospital to supervise radiation surveys and to advise the physician on radiolo-gical matters.
After several trials, the physician succeeded in reducing the wound contamination down to 1000 cpm.
Based on an initial low dose estimate by the radiation protection supervisor, (50 mrem to the finger), the physician and the radiation protection supervisor agreed that it is not necessary to perform any additional tissue removal or decontamination.
Subsequent dose calculations by the licensee, using acceptable in-dustry methods ( ICRP 2 and NCRP 39), indicated 8.4 rem per calendar quarter as compared to the regulatory limit (10 CFR 20.101) of 18.75
,rem per calendar quarter.
On July 18, 1986, the worker met with the licensee and a licensee's consultant (physician).
In that meeting it was recommended that surgical removal of the remaining minute activity was not advisable because of potential complications.
The health implications from the radiation dose to the finger were discussed and characterized as of minor and remote effects.
The worker was satisfied with this discus-sion and the matter was considered closed.
The licensee is in the process of revising his procedures to provide for a clear guidance on dose calculations, wound surveys and survey documentatio.0 Off-Sca.le Oosime~ Alle ation RI-86-A-0080 5.1 General On July 11, 1986 a licensee worker contacted NRC Region I to discuss concerns associated with under vessel work performed at Unit 1 in late April 1986.
The work was associated with incore instrumentation connectors (LPRMs) located under the vessel.
In subsequent discus-sions, the worker mentioned an off-scale dosimeter incident that had occurred under the vessel.
An on-site inspection of the off-scale dosimeter incident was ini-tiated by a
NRC Region I Senior Radiation Specialist on August 4, 1986.
The incident was determined to have occurred on or about April 29, 1986.
5.2 Descri tion Off-Scale Dosimeter Unit
As a result of a need to perform work associated with LPRM connectors under the reactor vessel, licensee I&C personnel met with ALARA per-sonnel in late February and early March of 1986 to discuss the work and any associated radiological concerns.
The first radiation work permit (RWP) was initiated at that time but not used.
A pre-job ALARA review was issued for this work on March 7, 1986.
A new RWP was issued on April 5, 1986 (RWP No. 2043).
The RWP required work-party personnel to: report to the radiation protection techni-cian at the drywell entrance and review survey maps prior to entry into the drywell; wear dosimetry on. the head; and effectively organ-ize tasks to reduce exposure.
A radiation survey performed at 9:20 a.m.
on April 5, 1986 indicated dose rates of 120-150 mR/hr at the waist level, 300-450 mR/hr at the head level and 600-800 mR/hr at the flange area.
On April 20, 1986 at about 2:00 p.m.
a second survey was performed under the vessel in the work area.
The documented survey indicated 100 mR/hr to the ankle, 125 mR/hr to the waist and 150-200 mR/hr at the head level.
At about 3:30 p.m.
on April 20, 1986 the affected I&C technician made an initial entry on RWP No. 2043.
The individual was signed in on the RWP for 2.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> and received an exposure of 45 millirem.
The technician received a low exposure because most of the time he was testing cables outside the drywell.
During the initial entry on April 20, 1986, the I&C technician read his dosimetry only once.
He verified that his rate of accumulation of exposure was comparable with the dose rate information provided to him by the health physics control point'echnician.
During subse-quent work entries the I&C technician stated that he did not check
rf
his dosimet~-reading while he worked under the reactor vessel.
He only checked it when he was signing out at the end of his shift.
At about 3:30 p.m.
on April 26, 1986, the technician signed in on RWP No. 2043.
The individual worked for a total of 5.75 hours8.680556e-4 days <br />0.0208 hours <br />1.240079e-4 weeks <br />2.85375e-5 months <br /> and received 190 mR.
The individual made multiple entries and signed out at 11:15 p.m.
on April 26, 1986.
At about 3:00 p.m.
on April 27, 1986 the IKC technician again signed in on RWP No. 2043, remained signed in on the RWP for 2.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> and received 160 mR.
A radiation survey of the LPRM area under the vessel was performed and documented shortly before 3: 10 p.m.
on April 28, 1986.
The survey showed 60-110 mR/hr at about 2 feet above the work platform and 140-300 mR/hr at the head level.
On April 28, 1986, at 3:30 p.m., the IKC technician again signed in on RWP No.
2043 and was signed in for 2 '
hours.
The technician entered the drywell without re-zeroing his dosimeter.
The dosimeter indicated about 300 mR.
However, upon exiting the drywell, he found that his dosimeter was off-scale.
The individual apparently did not inform the health physics personnel that his dosimeter was off-scale.
He signed out "off-scale".
Due to an apparent breakdown in communications or a direct failure to inform dosimetry personnel that this pocket dosimeter had gone off-scale, the individual's TLD was not read at that time.
The indivi-dual was issued a second TLD.
The individual was not asked why he wanted a replacement TLD.
No evaluation of the exposure causing the pocket dosimeter to go off-scale or subsequent personnel exposure sustained was made at the time.
(Note:
Radiological Control Super-visory personnel were unaware of the off-scale dosimeter.)
The individual signed in again that evening on RWP No.
2043 at 9:00 p.m.
on April 28, 1986 and worked until about 11:30 p.m.
He signed out with 250 milli rem.
No dose evaluation was made prior to his entry.
\\
The individual turned in his extremity dosimetry and his second TLD badge at the end of his work shift that night.
He did not turn in his film badge.
(Note:
At Nine Mile Point, personnel are routinely issued a film badge along with an accompanying TLD badge.
The TLD badge is read out under special circumstances (e.g.
dose extensions)
and is used to verify pocket dosimeter readings.
The film badge is used as the dosimeter record and is normally processed the first and fifteenth of each month).
A,resurvey ef the LPRM work area was performed at 3:25 p.m.
on April 29, 1986.
The survey results were essentially the same as the previous survey conducted on April 28, 1986 (i.e.
300 mR/hr maximum exposure to the head).
At about 1:30 p.m.
on Apri 1 29, 1986, the IKC technician attempted to sign in on RWP No 2043 to enter the drywell and work on LPRMs.
However, radiation protection personnel would not let the technician enter because:
1) the computer generated exposure report had not been updated to reflect the technician's increase in quarterly ex-posure limit (1000 mR to 1500 mR) and 2) the control point was out of respirator face pieces.
The control point received the exposure upgrade and additional face pieces.
The technician entered the dry-well at about 2:30 p.m. (April 29, 1986).
(Note:
Based on subsequent licensee review, it appears that the individual, contrary to RWP requirements, did not obtain extremity dosimetry and entered and worked without the extremity dosimetry.)
The technician performed work on LPRMs in a kneeling/crouched position from 2:30 p.m. until about 4:30 p.m. (April 29, 1986).
At that time the technician left the area under the vessel and went outside the drywell, and near the access control point.
The tech-nician left to clean the inner portion of his mask which was fogged.
The technician re-entered the drywell at about 4:40 p.m. (April 29, 1986).
Due to fatigue, the technician stood up to work on one particular LPRM and remained in this position until about 5:30 p.m.
In this position, the worker rested his head against a
Unknowingly, the technician had rested his head in an area with dose rates later measured to be between 500-1200 mR/hr.
The area had not been be posted as such (e.g. with hot spot stickers).
(Note:
The I&C technician had not been prohibited from working in this manner.
The technician did not request a radiation survey prior to standing up and placing his head on the CRD flange.
The techn-ician was not challenged by the health physics personnel.)
The technician was informed at this time (5:30 p.m.) via the headset that it was dinner time and work was halted.
The technician exited the drywell, removed protective clothing and read his head pocket dosimeter.
At this time he discovered his 500 mR pocket dosimeter to be off-scale.
He informed the technicians at the access control point of this instance.
This individual signed out on the RWP as
"off-scale dosimeter" and was directed to the dosimetry area to have his TLD read.
The technician's TLD was read at 5:51 p.m.
on April 29, 1986 and indicated 1266 mrem.
This resulted in a total cumulative exposure of about 2050 mrem as compared to the regulatory limit of 3000 mrem per calendar quarte Upon learni~ of the incident at 6:30 p.m.,
the senior radiation protection technician overseeing drywell work, halted work on RWP No.2043.
Additional radiation surveys were performed of this work arear'he survey results indicated 300-800 mR/hr at 1 foot from: the CRD flanges and 500-1200 mR/hr on contact with the flanges.
A meeting was held on May 1, 1986 between the involved technician, his supervisor and the radiation protection supervisor.
A noncon-formance event transmittal (NET) was initiated.
On May 2 and 5, 1986, the involved technician briefed his co-workers regarding the incident and lessons learned.
5.3 Conclusions Off-scale dosimeter Evaluation of the information acquired during the inspection resulted in the following preliminary conclusions:
On April 28, 1986 at about 3:30 p.m.,
an I&C technician sus-tained an off-scale pocket dosimeter while working under the
,reactor vessel at Unit 1.
Contrary to
CFR 20.201, no eval-uation was made of the potential exposure sustained by the individual.
The individual re-entered the drywell and worked under the reactor vessel later that evening.
The individual sustained an additional exposure that evening of 250 millirem.
Contrary to the established procedures (S-RRI-12)
on April 28, 1986 at about 3:30 p.m.:
1)
an individual's dosimeter went off-scale; and 2) the individual may have sustained a poten-tially high exposure; but the individuals film badge was not sent off for special readings (S-RRI-12, Section 4.0)
Contrary to established radiation protection procedures, on April 28, 1986 at about 11:30 p.m.
an IKC technician did not turn-in his whole body film badge when he returned his extremity dosimetry.
(S-RRI-3, Section 4.2)
Contrary to established radiation protection procedure, on April 29, 1986 at about 2:30 p.m.
an IKC technician signed in on RWP No.
2043 and entered and worked under the RWP but did not obtain and use RWP required extremity dosimetry.
(S-RP-2, Section 7.7)
On April 29, 1986 adequate radiation surveys, sufficient to ensure compliance with 10 CFR 20 dose limits were not made by an IKC technician or requested to be made for him prior to his resting his head against a
As a result, the techn-ician unknowingly rested his head against a
CRD flange with measured dose rates of between 500 and 1200 mrem/hou During&he period April 26 - April 29, 1986 inadequate high radiation area control was provided for LPRM work under the reactor vessel in that:
1)
RWP No. 2043, which controlled LPRM work, did not contain a
specific frequency for performing periodic radiation sur-veillancee of the LPRM work.
The RWP indicated "intermit-tent" and intermittent was not defined.
2)
A radiation monitoring device which continuously indicates the radiation dose rate in the area was not provided to the technician.
The dose rate instrument present (a portable Area Radiation Monitor)could not be used in areas entered by the technician (i.e.
3)
An integrating, alarming dosimeter was not provided to the technician.
During the period April 26 - April 29; 1986, an I&C technician made repeated'ntries under the reactor vessel to perform work associate with LPRMs and was not adequately informed of the radiation levels emanating from CRO flanges in his work area.
The individual unknowingly rested his head against a
CRD flange, the radiation emanating from the flange caused the dosimeter to go off-scale.
Subsequent surveys of the CRD flanges indicated contact dose rates of between 500-1200 mR/hr.
Contrary to established radiation protection procedures, on Apri 1 28, 1986 an I&C technician failed to re-zero his dosimeter prior to entering the Radiological Controlled Area to perform RWP work.
Anticipated exposure was such that an off-scale reading could result.
(Procedure S-RP-1, Section 5.6.4)
Contrary 'to established radiation protection procedures, per-sonnel did not initiate a Radiological Occurrence Report (ROR)
on April 28, 1986 when an I&C technician's dosimeter went off-scale, due to the individual's failure to re-zero it prior to entering a high radiation area.
Also, the technician did not periodically check the dosimeter reading while working under the vessel.
(Procedure S-RP-S, Section 19.2. 1)
Contrary to established Radiation Pr'otection Procedures, per-sonnel did not issue a Radiological Incident Report on or about April 29, 1986 when it was determined that the I&C technician may have sustained excessive radiation exposure resulting from deficiencies in his performance and/or the performance of the radiation protection group.
The individual's dosimeter went off-scale during work on LPRMs under the reactor vessel.
(Procedure S-RP-5, Section 19.2. 1)
The IEC technician was provided specific instruction regarding re-zeroing of his dosimeter (anytime the hair-line approaches 75% of full scale).
The technician was tested on this matter and other matters in a May 28, 1985 Radiation Protection Exam.
The individual scored 87.5%.
The individual answered the dosimeter re-zero question correct.
The general employee radiation protection training was not specific relative to the frequency of reading a self-reading pocket dosimeter.
The applicable training module said that the
"frequency is determined by the dose rate in the area."
No reading frequency was specified on the RWP used for LPRM work before or at the time of the off-scale dosimetry event (April 29, 1986).
It was added subsequent to the event.
The licensee's high radiation area access control procedure (S-RP-1) only provided for the use of a continuously indicating dose rate meter to meet technical specification high radiation area process controls (Technical Specification 6. 12-la).
The use of an alarming dosimeter or periodic surveys was not des-cribed in the procedure.
Technical Specification options 6. 12. 1 b and c respectively were not described.
The licensee revised his procedure in March 1985 to allow use of these latter options when "directed by supervision."
Procedural description of implementation methodology was not described.
5.4 Corrective Actions Preliminar Based on a September 4,
1986 telephone conversation between Messers.
M. Shanbaky, R. Nimitz, and S. Sherbini of NRC Region I, and Messers.
E.
Leach, J. Duell, and P.
Volza of Niagara Mohawk, the following actions were taken:
An evaluation of the off-scale dosimetry event was conducted by the Supervisor, Technical Support.
The evaluation, dated August 12, 1986 provided:
a description of the event; some conclusions; and recommended corrective action.
A second evaluation of the off-scale dosimetry event was con-ducted by the Dosimetry Supervisor.
The evaluation, dated August 29, 1986, provided a description of irregularities associated with dosimetry turn-in, handling, and processing.
A corporate health physics group investigation of the off-scale dosimetry incident and a list of recommendations, was sent to the Manager, Chemistry and Radiation Protection on August 27, 198 A meeting was held between corporate and site health physics personnel on August 28, 1986.
A list of recommendations, action items, and responsible individuals was generated from the meet-ing.
Pending revision of applicable procedures, the licensee informed the dosimetry personnel in memoranda dated August 14 and 25, 1986 that no replacement dosimetry was to be issued to personnel without proper dose evaluations being performed (excluding normal badge change-outs).
The memorandum also provided ins-truction as to what actions to take following notification of an off-scale dosimeter.
Pending procedure revisions to incorporate additional Technical Specification delineated high radiation area control options, a
memorandum was issued to station personnel on August 27, 1986 to provide guidance relative to interface of workers with health physics personnel.
The memorandum was issued to ensure workers and health physics personnel understand the work scope and location such that the current Technical Specification high radiation area control requirements contained in procedures are properly implemented.
t 6.0 Preo erational Testin Unit 2 6.1 General The inspector reviewed the status of the preoperational testing of the following systems:
Process and area radiation monitoring system (ORMS)
Safety related ventilation systems The review was with respect to criteria contained in the following:
0 Regulatory Guide 1.68, November 1978, "Preoperational and Initial Start-up Test Program for Mater Cooled Power Reactors";
Final Safety Analysis Report, Section 6.5, "Habitability Systems";
Final Safety Analysis Report, Section 6.5, "Fission Product Removal and Control Systems";
Final Safety Analysis Report, (FSAR) Section 11', "Radiation Monitoring System";
FSAR, Section 12.3, "Radiation Protection Design Features";
Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), Chapter 14, "Initial Tests Program";
"Specification and Performance of On-Site Instrumentation for Continuously Monitoring Radioactivity and Effluents"; and ANSI N13. 1-1969,
"Guide to Sampling Airborne Radioactive Materials in Nuclear Facilities".
The following matters were reviewed:
system status establishment of appropriate test procedures administrative control of testing and review of test results adequacy of testing The evaluation of the licensee's performance in the area was based on:
independent inspector observation of selected systems including walkdown of safety-related ventilation systems review of test results discussions with testing personnel.
6.2
~Find<n n
6.2.1 Di ital Radiation Monitorin S stem ORMS This system consists of process and area radiation moni-tors.
/
Within the scope of the review the following was identi-fied:
Preoperational testing of all Technical Specification and fuel load required process monitors is not com-plete.
These include:
Above and Below Reactor Building Vent Monitors, Control Room Vent Monitor and Cooling Tower Blowdown.
No testing deficiencies were identified.
All preoperational and surveillance testing of Tech-nical Specification required area radiation monitors is complete.
Surveillance testing has been completed on all area radiation monitoring systems.
No testing deficiencies were identifie The licensee revised his FSAR to describe the actual location of some ARMS.
The FSAR previously contained an incorrect location description for some monitors.
6.2.2 Safet Related Ventilation S stem Testin This system consists of the Control Room Emergency Venti-lation System and the Standby Gas Treatment (SBGT) System.
Within the scope of the review the following was identi-fied:
Preoperational Testing of the SBGT system, with the exception of in-place leak testing, is complete.
Two test exceptions remain open.
Preoperational Testing of the Control Room Emergency System with the exceptions of in-place leak testing is complete.
Within the scope of the review, the following matters were brought to the licensee's attention:
System flow balancing is not complete Bolts were missing from covers of train A of the SBGT.
'lso, material was found stored on top of train A.
Laboratory testing of a representative sample of charcoal from the systems was not performed.
Con-sequently the systems do not meet operability require-ments of the Technical Specification.
The licensee completed laboratory testing.
The test results were acceptable for the Control Room and SBGT systems.
In-place testing results of by-pass leakage of train B
of the SBGT System did not meet Technical Specifi-cation requirements.
The licensee performed sub-sequent testing.
Test results were acceptable.
The inspector met with licensee representatives, denoted in section 1 of the report, on August 7, 1986.
The inspector discussed the purpose, scope, and findings of the inspectio %%