ML20235H200
| ML20235H200 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Nine Mile Point  |
| Issue date: | 01/12/1987 |
| From: | NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORP. |
| To: | Linville J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20235G041 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-87-438 NUDOCS 8709300409 | |
| Download: ML20235H200 (4) | |
Text
. _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _
g January 12, 1987 To:
Jim Linville, Chief, Section 2C, DRP From: hMP Resident Office / Project Engineer STATUS REPORT #8 - NINE MILE POINT 2 1.
Plant Status:
The plant remains in limbo, awaiting the resolution of the MSIV leakage and MSIV trip logic circuit design problems. Niagara Mohawk has the ball.
The inspection coverage was provided by the resident inspectors, including inspection of MSIV leak testing. The residents perceived a deteriorating trend in the atmosphere of the control room, possibly due to the lack of plant operations underway and the tendency of plant personnel to congregate in the control room. This perception was discussed with plant management, who committed to reinforce to the operators the importance of the proper work atmosphere in the control room and their responsibility to enforce it.
2.
MSIV Status:
In a 1/8 meeting with Region I Chuck Mangan summarized the Niagara Mohawk position on the MSIVs as follows. hMP-2 has no faith that the ball valves as designed can consistently meet the leakage requirements. Although prototype testing may be pursued in parallel to eventually modify the ball valve design, the two main options to permit criticality of hMP-2 are use of the ball valves on the basis of initially meeting the leak test and having acceptable dose consequences from the leakage expected later or replacement of the ball valves with Y pattern globe valves.
However, under either option there is significant licensing uncertainty. With the ball valves NRR acceptance of the NMP-2 j
analysis under Generic Letter 86-17 and NUREG-1169 is uncertain.
]
With the Y pattern globe valves the possibility exists of an adverse Significant Hazards Consideration and subsequent hearings. Mangan indicated that the ball valves were the most likely path, and if that course is taken, hMP-2 hopes to have the i
analysis to NRR by 1/19 and to get NRR approval within 2 weeks.
l I
i Rr8 - 7 7
'il 8 8709300409 870112 g
-438 PDR
Since the last report, on 12/21 MSIV 6B failed the Type C leak test and was found to be scratched and gouged. Later, evaluatien of two of the MSIVs with acceptable leak tests found them to be scratched and gouged also. Subsequently, a coated ball without the Haynes 25 layer was installed and stroked, but it also failed the leak test.
The ball from MSIV 6B was tested in MSIV 7D to determine the trend of the leakage rate during a postulated operating cycle's usage. The test showed that when tested wet for one cycle, the leakage increased to 9.8 SCFH across the seats and 38.1 SCFH between the seats (acceptance criteria = 6 SCFH).
The test was continued dry for another half cycle, and the leakage continued to increase to 16.9 SCFH across the seats and 66 SCFH between the seats. This data will be used in the analysis of the dose consequences of the leakage. Most of this information was discussed during 1/5 meeting in Bethesda.
Concerning the MSIV trip logic circuit Mangan stated that there is agreement between NMP-2 and the NRC on the course of action for resolving the design issues and that although the details need to be worked out, he does not expect the changes to be difficult or to become the limiting path. The background on this l
issue is that in a 1/6 meeting NRR convinced NMP-2 that the current MSIV trip logic circuit is not acceptable to GDC 21 and IEEE-279. To reduce the chance of an inadvertent MSIV closure and to provide for testing, the design incorporates an automatic auctioneering circuit, which allows the hydraulic solenoid valves to remain energized from redundant power sources. However, this is unacceptable due to the potential for paralleling the redundant power supply systems of the RPS.
3.
Violation of Technical Specifications:
None.
4.
Reportable Events:
On 12/31 the B train of the Standby Gas Treatment System (SBGTS) actuated due a detected low reactor building differential pressure while the A train was in operation. The systems responded as designed. This is the first SBGTS actuation which involved the building differential pressure signal of SBGTS.
Earlier actuations involved the building differential pressure signal of the ventilation system.
On 1/1 the Division I and II batteries failed surveillance tests due to the presence of corrosion on the battery terminals and one terminal with a high resistance. The batteries were declared inoperable.
Initial evaluation of the Gould batteries found inconsistent application of the anti-corrosion grease on the terminals; some terminals completely coated, some terminals lightly coated, and some grease apparently misapplied.
n___ _ _. _ _ - _. - _.__.-
J
Dn 1/9 two SBGTS actuations occurred during flow balance testing j
of the Reactor Building recirculation system. Dn the first l
actuation 2 tagged out solenoid valves caused ventilation dampers l
to fail open, and the resulting low ventilation flow signal started SBGTS. During the restart of the normal ventilation system flow problems were experienced, which caused another low flow signal and a second SBGTS actuation.
NMP-2 is evaluating an event at Palo Verde concerning embrittled connecting rods on a Cooper-Bessemer diesel generator for potential deportability.
Initial vendor information indicated that similar parts existed at NMP-2.
However, thus far NMP-2 has been unable to confirm this.
5.
Followup on Previous Events on 1/8 an enforcement conference was held to discus the SRM events during fuel loading and the operating staff errors in general.
NMP-2 showed that the 11/8 event concerning an inoperable Reactor Building exhaust radiation monitor was not a violation, as the Tech Spec action statement had been complied with inadvertently. The corrective actions and root cause analyses of many of the events were discussed. NMP-2 management was generally repentent and acknowledged that most of their planning had concentrated on the start-up and power ascension phases and that the fuel loading planning was overlooked. Region I concluded that Severity Level IV violations are appropriate for the two events (all SRM trip functions were jumpered out and fuel loading with one SRM bypassed) and will obtain IE concurrence with this position.
The licensee initially attributed the 11/28 events concerning the two actuations of SBGTS to wind effects on the Reactor Building differential pressure detector's outside sensing line. However, later evaluation found clogged inlet filters to the Reactor Building Ventilation System. This would have caused the supply fans to trip, the exhaust fans to increase the differential pressure and then trip, and the SBGT System to start on loss of ventilation flow.
NMP-2 attributed the earlier incorrect analyses to the limited number of monitored parameters within the ventilation system and the similar dp/SBGT actuation problems at Limerick and Susquehanna.
6.
Planned Activities:
NMP-2 must resolve the dual problems of MSIV trip circuit acceptability and leakage of MSIV ball valves. Until the detailed problem resolutions are established, no meaningful l
schedule for initial criticality can be projected.
l l
l 1
1
a W -
- 6.
Cumulative Summary of'Significant Events f.
10/31 - License issued 11/2 Fuel loading begun
- 11/4 - All SRM rod block channels jumpered out (LCO violation) 11/5 - IRM reactor trip followed by SDV level reactor trip (ENS) 11/6 - Vital area breached without compensatory measures (ENS) 11/7 - Fuel loading with bypassed SRM (LCO violation) 11/8 - Inoperable RB exhaust rad monitor (ENS) 11/9 - Two APRM reactor trips due to faulty circuit card (ENS) 11/10 - Inoperable RB exhaust rad monitor (ENS) 11/15 - Fuel loading completed 11/17 - Imbedded conduits without fire seals (LCO violation) l 11/20 - Half scram / ESF actuation due to loss of UPS (ENS) 11/23 - Group 2 scram due to loss of power and APRM testing (ENS) 11/24 - Fire patrol errors found from 11/12 (LCO violation) 11/24 - CRD functional, friction, and scram testing completed 11/25 - SBGTS actuation due to detached jumper (ENS) 11/27 - SBGTS' actuation due to rad monitor spike (ENS) 11/28 - 2 SBGTS actuations due to clogged inlet filters (ENS) 11/30 - Completed installation of MSIV balls and leak tests 12/3 - Scram due to loss of UPS power on MSIV logic flaw (ENS) 12/3 - Group 2 scram due to improper electrical isolation (ENS) 12/8 - SBGTS actuation due to rad monitor spike (ENS) 12/10 - SBGTS design deficiency on heater flow switch (ENS) 12/10 - HPCS starts (3) due to bumping; locked out HPCS (ENS) 12/16 - Group 8 PCIS isolation due to wiring check error (ENS) 12/18 - 4,500 gal. injection of RHR and LPCS-(ENS) 12/21 - MSIV 6B failed Type C leak test 12/22 - 3 EDGs disabled due to fuel oil draining (ENS) 12/23 - Unplanned 12/15 reactor scram reported (50.72 violation) 12/23 - Lack of fire patrol discovered (LCO violation) 12/31 - SBGTS actuation due to RB dp signal (ENS) 1/1
- Inop Div I & II batteries due to corrosion (ENS) 1/9
- 2 SBGTS actuations during flow balance tests (ENS) cc: Murley Starostecki, IE Kane Bernero, NRR Collins Partlow, IE Ebneter Haughey, NRR Martin Eselgroth Bettenhausen 1
Cook Meyer l
l i
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _