ML20235H221
| ML20235H221 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Nine Mile Point  |
| Issue date: | 02/27/1987 |
| From: | NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORP. |
| To: | Linville J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20235G041 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-87-438 NUDOCS 8709300417 | |
| Download: ML20235H221 (49) | |
Text
o' February 27, 1987 To:
Jim Linville, Chief, Section 2C, DRP From: NMP Resident Office & Glenn Meyer l
STATUS REPORT #10 - NINE MILE POINT 2 1.
Plant Status:
The plant continued to await resolution of MSIV leakage problems.
Two revised packing designs have been unsuccessful. Once an acceptable packing design is found, criticality is expected to occur a month afterwards. The lack of solenoid valve spacers in inboard MSIVs is being resolved and should not be critical path.
The inspection coverage was provided by the resident inspectors, Larry Wink and Michele Evans (startup testing), and Al Finkel (surveillance testing).
One noteworthy management change occurred two weeks ago when the Unit 2 plant management went on around-the-clock coverage in preparation for covering criticality and startup.
Seven departments (Ops, Maintenance, QA, Radeon, Startup & Test, Tech Services, and Engineering) have managers onsite at all times.
The managers typically have 4 duty sections and split each day into 3 shifts. The resident inspectors have noticed a distinct improvement in plant management's involvement in daily problems and the,ir support in resolving them. The plant has accomplished more activities, e.g.,
surveillance testing, and has done them better.
2.
MSTV Status j
In the last Status Report the MSIV logic modifications had been made and tested, the MSIVs had passed Type C leakage tests, and the SER was expected to be issued on 2/6. Since then the MSIV packing was found to be faulty, and spacers within the solenoid valves of the inside containment MSIVs were found to be missing.
The SER has not been issued pending resolution of the leakage problems.
h*IA V 3f 8709300417 870924 3
4 Prior to issuance of the SER, prototype testing of the revised MSIV design revealed that the packing was not resilient and leaked excessively after heatup and cooldown cycling. NMPC is working to fix this and considers that a revised packing design will be the solution. A test of a revised packing design showed major improvement but still had a factor of 7 increase in leakage rates after thermal cycling. A further change in this revised packing design was made, but on 2/26 it failed worse than the previous design after a heatup and cooldown cycle. If this test had been acceptable, NMPC planned to install the revised packing in the installed MSIVs beginning on 2/28. NMPC plans to run a second prototype test in parallel with the plant packing modifications to obtain more data.
On 2/8 the plant ran a new surveillance test of MSIV closure rates with only one of the two installed solenoid valves operable on each MSIV. On the 7 MSIVs properly tested, 2 failed to close and 5 closed in excess of the 5 sec. closure limit.
The eighth MSIV was not properly tested due to a jumper problem. Later evaluation found a spacer was missing in the 6 solenoid valves on inboard containment MSIVs 6A, 6B, and 6C.
The spacers had been
" installed" during earlier actuator modifications to remove the latches. Post-installation QC inspections of the outboard MSIVs clearly documented their installation, though the spacer installation on the inboard MSIVs had not been specifically checked or documented.
By 2/26 the missing spacers had been installed.
3.
Reportable Events:
On 2/7 a full scram occurred as a result of the bumping of a flexible section in the variable leg sensing line to two reactor vessel level transmitters. An auxiliary operator was performing a valve lineup and accidentally bumped the sensing line. This event is similar to the automatic HPCS actuations on 12/10/86.
On 2/8 all MSIVs automatically closed when the turbine was reset per an EHC surveillance test. The surveillance procedure did not adv ess the existing unit electrical lineup, in which power was r
being fed back through the main generator output breaker. As a result, when the turbine was reset, the EHC system responded to an 1800 rpm generator speed setpoint signal and started to open the turbine stop valves. The open stop valves and MSIVs caused the low condenser vacuum trip to become unbypassed, which shut the MSIVs, as designed. The test procedure was revised to correct the error.
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l L_ _
On 2/9 a momentary loss of'the Division II 600 VAC Emergency Bus occurred as a result of an operator error. An operator inadvertently opened the supply breaker to the emergency bus,'
'immediately recognized the error, and reclosed the breaker. All emergency systems responded as designed.
On 2/22 the on-shift fire chief discovered that two hourly fire watch patrols had been missed. The missed patrols were compensation for an inoperable fire detection zone in the North Autiliary Bay. The fire detection zone was returned to service two hours after the patrols were missed. The apparent cause of the missed patrols was miscommunication between the fire watch and his supervisor.-
On 2/24 an automatic Engineered Safety Feature actuation occurred as a result of personnel error. While performing Main Steam Line Isolation response time testing, an operator misunderstood verbal directions given him and mistakenly opened the supply breaker to the containment isolation logic circuit. This caused a containment isolation, reactor water cleanup system isolation, shutdown cooling isolation, reactor building ventilation isolation, and automatic start of both trains of the Standby Gas Treatment System. All systems responded as designed.
During followup on in Information Notice 87-08, records revealed that two DC Limitorque Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) valves had motor leads similar to other leads that had failed.
NMPC installed fiberglas sleeves on the leads to prevent any shorting problems and performed aging tests to ensure tne environmental qualification of the leads was acceptable.
4.
Planned Activities:
IF the latest packing design had tested acceptably, NMPC had projected the following schedule.
2/28 - Begin replacing MS1V packing 3/21 - Complete MSIV packing work 3/28 - Complete hydro of MSIVs 4/4 - Initial Criticality Schedules continue to be highly tentative. Apparently, if an acceptable packing design can be found, criticality could occur within 5 weeks.
1
E 5.
Cumulative Summary of Significant Fvents 10/31 - License issued 11/4 - All SRM rod block channels jumpered out (LCO violation) 11/5 - IRM reactor trip followed by SDV level reactor trip (ENS) 11/6 - Vital area breached without compensatory measures (ENS) 11/7 - Fuel loading with bypassed SRM (LCO violation) 11/8 - Inoperable RB exhaust rad monitor (ENS) 11/9 - Two APRM reactor trips due to faulty circuit card (ENS) 11/10 - Inoperable RB exhaust rad monitor (ENS) 11/17 - Imbedded conduits without fire seals (LCO violation) 11/20 - Half scram / ESF actuation due to loss of UPS (ENS) 11/23 - Group 2 scram due to loss of power and APRM testing (ENS) 11/24 - Fire patrol errors found from 11/12 (LCO violation) 11/25 - SBGTS actuation due to detached jumper (ENS) 11/27 - SBGTS actuation due to rad monitor spike (ENS) 11/28 - 2 SBGTS actuations due to clogged inlet tilters (ENS) 12/3 - Scram due to loss of UPS power on MSIV logic flaw (ENS) 12/3 - Group 2 scram due to improper electrical isolation (ENS) 12/8 - SBGTS actuation due to rad monitor spike (ENS) 12/10 - SBGTS design deficiency on heater flow switch (ENS) 12/10 - HPCS starts (3) due to bumping; locked out HPCS (ENS) 12/16 - Group e PCIS isolation due to wiring check error (ENS) 12/18 - 4,500 gal. injection of RHR and LPCS (ENS) 12/22 - 3 EDGs disabled due to fuel oil draining (ENS) 12/23 - Unplanned 12/13 reactor scram reported (50.72 violation) 12/23 - Lack of fire patrol discovered (LCO violatien) 12/31 - SBGTS actuation due to RB dp signal (ENS) 1/1
- Inop Div I & II batteries due to corrosion (ENS) 1/9
- 2 SBGTS actuations during flow balance tests (ENS) 1/16 - SBGTS actuation due to detached jumper (ENS) 1/26 - Part 21 Report for cable duct seal (ENS) 1/26 - Part 21 Report for ag stat relays (ENS) 1/26 - MSIV actuation during surveillance testing (ENS) 1/27
- Lack of fire watch - CO2 suppression (LCO violation) 1/27 - Failure to compensate for lost vital area key (ENS) 2/2
- Reactor scram & EDG start during check valve testing (ENS) 2/2
- MSIV actuation during check valve testing (ENS) 2/2
- SBGTS actuation due to bumped damper relay (ENS) 2/7
- Scram due to flexible line bumping (ENS) 2/8
- MSIV closure due to procedure error (ENS) 2/9
- Momentary loss of emergency bus personnel error (ENS) 2/22 - Missed fire watches for 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> period (LCO violation) 2/24 - ESF systems actuated due error on breaker isolated (ENS) cc:
Murley Starostecki, IE Kane Bernero, NRR Collins Partlow, IE l
Ebneter Haughey, NRR Martin Cook Gallo Meyer Bettenhausen l
hf4 Sm Collias 1
i STATE OF.NEW YORK.
SUPREME. COURT COUNTY OF ONONDAGA h-I NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION U
300 Erie Boulevard West Syracuse, New York; LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY 175 East-Old Country Road Hicksville, New York; NEW YORK STATE ELECTRIC & GAS CORPORATION P.O. Box 287 Ithaca-Dryden Road Ithaca, New York; ROCHESTER GAS and ELECTRIC CORPORATION
.89-East Avenue Rochester, New York; and CENTRAL HUDSON GAS & ELECTRIC CORPORATION 284 South Avenue Poughkeepsie, New York, SUMMONS Plaintiffs, W'
-vs-8 I.A.S. No.
- GULF-+ WESTERN, INC.
$1 Gulf +WesternPlaza Justice W New York, New York; WICKES MANUFACTURING COMPANY 26261 Evergreen Road Southfield, Michigan; an'd CROSBY VALVE & GAGE COMPANY 43 Kendrick Street Wrentham, Massachusetts, Defendants.
l TO THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANTS,:
YOU ARE HEREBY SUMMONED and required to serve upon plaintiffs' attorneys an answer to the complaint in this action within twenty days l
after the service of this summons, exclusive of the day of service, or fra: A 4 38 Ebbik
within thirty days after service is complete if this eummons is not personally delivered to you within the State of Nrw York.
In case of your failure to answer, judgment will.be taken against you by default for the relief demanded in the complaint.
The basis of the venue designated is the residence and principal office of the plaintiff, NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION, which is located at 300 Erie Boulevard West, City of Syracuse, County of Onondaga, State of New York.
DATED: April 16, 1987 SWIDLER & BERLIN, CHARTERED Office and P. O. Address 1000 Thomas Jefferson Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20007 Telephone (202) 342-5500 BISCOCK & BARCLAY Office and Post Office Address Financial Plaza P.O. Box 4878 i
Syracuse, New York 13221 Telephone (315) 422-2131 8
Attorneys for Plaintiff, Niagara W
i Mohawk Power Corporation HUNTON & WILLIAMN Attorneys for Plaintiff Long Island Lighting Comp'any Office and P. O. Address 707 East Main Street P. O. Box 1535 Richmond, Virginia 23212 Telephone (804) 788-8552 HUBER LAWRENCE & ABELL Attorneys for Plaintiff New York State Electric & Gas Corporation Office and P. O. Address 99 Park Avenue New York, New York 10016 Telephone (212) 682-6200 f
1 1
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NIXON, RARGRAVE, DEVANS & DOYLE Attorneys for Plaintiff Rochester Gas and Electric l,
Corporation Office and P. O. Address Lincoln First Tower P. O. Box 1051 Rochester, New York 14603 Telephone (716) 546-8000 GOULD & WILKIE Attorneys for Plaintiff Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corporation Office and P. O. Address 1 Wall Street New York, New York 10005 Telephone (212) 344-5680 3
0 8
Ez
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STATE OF NEW YORK SUPREME COURT COUNTY OF ONONDAGA
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NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION;
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COMPLAINT LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY;
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i NEW YORK STATE ELECTRIC & GAS
)
]
CORPORATION;
)
Index Noo__
j ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORPORATION; )
1 and, CENTRAL EUDSON GAS & ELECTRIC
)
CORPORATION,
)
)
I.A.G.:
Plaintiffs,
)'
)
- against -
)
Justice:
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GULF + WESTERN, INC.;
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J WICKES MANUFACTURING COMPANY; and
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1 CROSBY VALVE & GAGE COMPANY,
)
I
)
')
Defendants.
)
)
Plaintiffs, for their complaint against defendants, allege as follows:
THE PARTIES 1.
Plaintiffs Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation ("NMPC"), a New York corporation, having its principal plac4 of business at 300 Erie Boulevard West, City of Syracuse, County of Onondaga,
' State of New York; Long' Island Lighting Company, a New York corporation, having its principal place of business at 175 East Old Country Road, Hicksville, New York; New York State Electric &
Gas Corporation, a New York corporation, having its principal place of business at P.O. Box 287, Ithaca-Dry' den Rd., Ithaca, New York; Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation, a New York i
l corporation, having its principal place of business at 89 East Avenue, Rochester, New York; and Central Budson Gas & Electric Corporation, a New York corporation, having its principal place of business at 284 South Avenue, Poughkeepsie, New York (collectively " Owners") are utilities engaged, inter alia, in the business of generating and distributing electric power to consumers in the State of New York.
2.
Owners are tenants in common of a nuclear powered electric generating plant with a capacity of approximately 1080 megawatts of power, known as Nine Mile Point Station Unit #2
("NMP2") located in the Town of'Scriba, County of Oswego, and State of New York.
Pursuant to an agreement dated September 22, 1975, among the owners, NMPC is empowered to act as their agent for the design, construction, licensing, and operation of NMP2.
I Upon information and belief, defendant Gulf + Western, 3.
Inc., formerly known as Gulf & Western Industries, Inc., ("G+W")
is a Delaware corporation with its main offices and principal place of business at One Gulf + Western Plaza, New York, New York.
G+W was duly authorized to do business in the State of New York on November 22, 1967, and is still authorized to do business in the State of New York.
4.
Upon information and belief, up and until July 31, 1985, G+W held Gulf & Western Manufacturing Company ("G+W Mfg.") as a wholly-owned subsidiary.
Up and until November 4, 1983, G+W Mfg.
operated its " Fluid Systems Division" (also known as the Bonney -
Forge Engineered Valve Division) as a business entity with administrative headquarters at 25 Graystone Street, Warwick, Rhode' Island, the-business of which included, but was not limited to, the manufacture and sale of ball valve systems, the Longineering design'and analysis, and the assembly, testing and L
marketing of various types of valve systems for the nuclear l
industry.
l S.
Upon information and belief, defendant crosby Valve s Gage Company (" Crosby") is a Massachusetts corporation with its main office and principal place of business at 43 Kendrick Street, Wrentham, Massachusetts.
Crosby was duly authorized to do business in the State of New York on June 27, 1985, and is still authorized to do business in the State of New York.
6.
Upon information and belief, in November 1983, Crosby acquired G+W Mfg.'s Fluid Systems Division.
Pursuant to
-agreement between Crosby and G+W Mfg., G+W Mfg. retained all product liability and warranty service obligations, whether express or.. implied, with respect to any product shipped or sold in place or services rendered by the Fluid Systems Division or any predecessor in interest before November 4, 1983.
7.
Upon information and belief, G+W subsequently assumed all obligations of G+W Mfg. Onder the agreement and G+W Mfg.
assigned to G+W all of its rights, title and interest under the agreement. -
8.
Upon information and belief, on July 31, 1965, Wickes Companies, Inc. acquired the Consumer and Industrial Products Group of G+W, including G+W Mfg.
The corporate charter of G+W Mfg. was amended October 3, 1985, changing its corporate name to Wickes Manufacturing Company ("Wickes Mfg."), a Delaware corporation with its main office and principal place of business at 26261 Evergreen Road, Southfield, Michigan.
Wickes Mfg. was duly authorized to do business in the State of New York on January 21, 1986, and is still authorized to do business in the State of New York.
BACKGROUND FACTS 9.
In 1971, NMPC contracted with Stone & Webster Engineering Company ("SWEC") for the design of NMP2.
Regulations issued by the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission ("NRC")
and its predecessor agency, the Atomic Energy Commission, required NMP2 to be equipped with a main steam isolation valve
("MSIV") system on the steam lines connecting the nuclear reactor
'with the steam turbine to ensure that in the event of certain nuclear accidents harmfu1 amounts of radioactive materials would
~
not be discharged into the environment.
NMP2 cannot be licensed for full power operations until the MSIV system meets NRC-mandated performance criteria.
I l
4-
10.
An MSIV system consists of valves, actuators, and logic control panels.
In the case of NMP2, there are two valves, two actuators and two logic control panels for each of the four main steam lines.
The valves, when open, allow the steam to flow from the nuclear reactor to the steam turbine and, when closed, prevent that' flow.
The actuators are the mechanisms that physically open and close the valves.
The logic control panels translate signals into a command to the actuators either to open or to close the valves.
11.
Originally, the design for NMP2 called for an MSIV system based around the traditional wye pattern globe valve.
These valves have a cylindrical plug which is positioned at a 45-degree angle to the steam line.
The wye pattern globe valve MSIV system for NMP2 was to be furnished by General Electric Company in conjunction with its pgreements to supply NMPC with a
^
nuclear reactor and related equipment comprising a complete nuclear steam supply system and certain design information.
12.
Beginning in 1973, a company called E.B.V.-Systems, 9
Inc. ("EBV") urged NMPC to utilize an MSIV system with a type of
' valve different from the traditional wye design, called a ball valve, in which a-sphere with a cylindrical hole through it is place'd in the steam line.
By rotating the sphere 90 degrees, the valve can either allow the steam to pass through its cylindrical hole or prevent steam flow.
The three principal advantages _ _ _
asserted for the ball valve system were reduced maintenance costs, lower levels of leakage of radioactive material when i
closed, and reduced space requirements.
l
- 13.. NMPC was reluctant to include a ball-type MSIV system in the design of NMP2 because EBV did not exhibit the apparent design and manufacturing resources adequate to support the development and maintenance of a critical safety component.
Subsequently, EBV became a part of G+W Mfg., a subsidiary of G+W, one of the largest corporations in the United States.
To NMPC, this meant that it could rely both on EBV staying in the nuclear valve business and on G+W's experience and developmental resources, and its ability to furnish spare parts over the 40-year life of the plant.
In addition, in 1976, G+W Mfg. performed what it reported to NMPC as successful tests on an 8-inch prototype ball valve promising application of the ball valve technology to a 24-inch MSIV system for a nuclear power plant.
In promotional material furnished to NMPC, G+W Mfg. represented, inter alia, that its ball valve system did not leak,. was
" bubble-tight," " stopped steam loss completely," " assured complete reliability" and " exceptional sealing" "under the most adverse operating conditions," " consistently seals," and that its
. engineering staff was highly qualified and experienced in nuclear valve design. l
14.
As a result of all the foregoing factors, and G+W Mfg.'s aggressive marketing, NMPC's reluctance to utilize the o.1 88 valve system was overcome by the asserted benefits and in aboitt..ianuary 1977, NMPC decided to negotiate a contract with G+W
- 1fo, for an MSIV system utilizing a ball valve.
CONTRACT BETWEEN THE PARTIES 15.
On May 13, 1977, NMPC issued its Specification No.
NMP2-F363D for a ball valve MSIV system.
That specification, iq4ed largely on the G+W Mfg. design and drafted with the aenistance of G+W Mfg., required the vendor to ensure th'at the valve system would, inter alia, limit leakage when closed to 0.1 0:.a.idard cubic foot per hour ("SCFH") per inch of nominal seat
.1. vmFor at a pressure of 45 psig (pounds per square inch gauge)
' close within no less than 3 and no more than 5 seconds in the 4
,enb of an emergency The vendor was also to guarantee that the waV system would perform satisfactorily under the rated mditions.
16.
The specification was sent to G+W Mfg. with a document,
~
eucitled " Instruction to Bidders," that included a series of
" conditions" which "will form part of the Purchase Order when issued."
One of, those conditions, " Condition 5,"
required the i
bidder to agree:
j That the eauipment and all carts thereof shall be free from defects in desian, workmanship, and material, shall be entirely suitable for the service described in the specification or reasonably inferred
therefrom, and of first-class workmanship throuchouts also that the ecuipment will achieve the cuaranteed performance stated in the specification when operatino at the desian conditions listed in the specification.
Should any failure to fulfill this warranty appear within 18 months from the' reactor going critical the first time or before October 1, 1983, whichever occurs first (except as may be otherwise provided herein under the heading ' Warranty extension') the Seller shall, upon written notice by the Purchaser of a defect, repair or replace the defective work.
The decision as to whether to repair or replace the defective work shall be made by the Seller.
The cost of removal and reinstallation of any defective work shall be for the Seller's account.
This warranty will be extended for one year from completion of original repair or reinstallation on those components actually repaired or replaced.
In the event that the equipment fails to achieve the guaranteed performance, then, to the extent that the deficiency or failure to achieve the guaranteed performance is attributable to the equipment supplied by the Seller, the Seller shall make such adjustments or modifications to enable the equipment to achieve the guaranteed performance.
The cost of these adjustments or modifications shall be for the I
Seller's account.
After such adjustments or j
modifications, should the eauinment fail to 1
I achieve cuaranteed performance, an eauitable settlement shall be made, which may without limitation include an adiustment of the ourchase order orice.
(Emphasis added.)
17.
On June 17, 1977, G+W Mfg. submitted a bid in accordance with Specification No. NMP2-P303D.
In its bid, G+W Mfg. stated that "[w]e warrant our valves to a leakage value required by your specification."
t I 1
____-__--__________-__-_O
l 18.
G+W Mfg. knew or should have known that a failure of the MSIV system to meet this leakage value would likely result in a costly delay in licensing and hence in the commercial operation of the plant.
19.
On July 27, 1977, representatives of G+W Mfg. and HMPC l
met at NMPC's offices to negotiate the terms of an agreement.
At I
that meetira, it was agreed that NMPC'8 proposed warranty j
i provision, " Condition 5," would apply to the agreement, subject I
to an additional condition, not here relevant.
J 20.- On July 29, 1977, NMPC, through its agent, SWEC, issued 1
a letter of award to G+W Mfg., incorporating condition 5.
j "n October 3, 1977, NMPC, through its agent, SWEC, 21.
O i
issued a purchase order confirming the letter of award.
That order called for G+W Mfg. to design, furnish and deliver an MSIV l
system consisting of eight ball valves, eight actuators, and eight control panels, and to provide engineering services, including but not limited to the preparation of a " Topical Report" to be submitted to the NRC as a necessary part of the NRC licensing required by the purchase order.
The order was agreed 4
to by G+W Mfg. on November 30, 1977.
This agreement also incorporated the " Condition 5" warrenty and provided NMPC with a further warranty that the NRC would license the MSIV system to be designed and manufactured by G+W Mfg.
1 9-
k 22.
Pursuant to the contract, on January 24, 1979, G+W and G+W Mfg. submitted their " Topical Report" on a ball valve-type MSIV system to the NRC.
A " Topical Report" provides a technical l
explanation of a nuclear plant-system or component, and usually provides design criteria, functional performance characteristics and other data used by the NRC to assess the suitability and adequacy of the system for safe operation.
The Topical Report submitted by G+W and G+W Mfg. confirmed the' representations that had been made to NMPC prior to execution of the contract and stated, without reservation or qualification, that the valve system would perform at a level consistent with the requirements and specifications of the contract.
Based on these i
representations, NMPC proceeded with incorporating the ball valve MSIV design in its design, construction, and l'icensing efforts for NMP2.
23.
In the summer of 1979, NMPC became aware of the possibility that G+W Mfg. might sell or shut down its Fluid Systems Division, which was responsible for performing the contract referred to in paragraphs 15 through 21, above.
NMPC expressed its concern to G+W Mfg. that such a sale or shutdown might adversely affect NMPC's interests and stated that NMPC was seriously considering terminating its contract with G+W Mfg.
In response to that concern, on September 11, 1979, Neal J. Feola, Executive Vice-President - Operations of G+W Mfg., wrote to NMPC l
as follows:
l i l
1
.First, we should start by' identifying that Fluid Systems is a division of Gulf + Western Manufacturing Company and that the Gulf +
Western Manufacturing Company is the contracting party and. plans to honor its obligations under this purchase. order.
You raised concern relative to our providing technieni support during the period of this order and subsequent thereafter during the period of the licensing of the site in which the equipment to be supplied under this purchase order is planned for use.
We recognize and ur.derstand the need for.this support and assure you that Gulf + Western Manufacturing Company will continue to make available this support during this time period.
We are prepared to further assure you that in the event business conditions at the Fluid Systems Division result in the sale or shutdown of this division, then Gulf +
Western Manufacturing Company would make available this support by one of the following means:
Retention of selected Fluid Systems personnel.
Use of the technical services of other Gulf + Western Manufacturing Company divisions including the Advanced Development & Engineering Center.
Use of outside consultants and subcontractors.
eae Relative to the subject of the sale of this division, Gulf + Western Manufacturing Company intends to obligate the' purchaser to the fulfillment of all of Fluid Systems Division's outstanding commitments, including those items of technical support and spare parts availability as discussed earlier in this letter.
However, obligating the purchaser to such fulfillment will not relieve the Gulf + Western Manufacturing 2
Company responsibilities to its customers for conformance to outstanding contractual commitments of the Fluid Systems Division.
Based in large part on these assurances, NMPC decided not to terminate its contract with G+W Mfg.
DEFENDANTS' FAILURE TO FULFILL THEIR CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS 24.
As a result of defendants' defective and delayed Performance under this contract, despite years of intensive effort on NMPC's part, defendants' MS17 system never met the contractual specifications for MSIV performance and licensing approval for full power operations was not provided by the NRC.
25.
In an effort to minimize the damage caused by
_ defendants' breaches, NMPC expended many millions of dollars trying to bring the MSIV system up to specification and to achieve licensing approval from the NRC.
Despite NMPC's best efforts, those of numerous. consultants and contractors paid by NMPC, and the issuance of numerous memos of changes to the contract, resulting in the purchase of many millions of dollars of additional services from defendants, NMPC was unable to obtain 1
an MSIV system meeting its specification or to obtain a license for NMP2 for full power opere'tions.
26.
Among the defects in the MSIV system furnished by defendants, all of which constituted breaches of contract and caused substantial injury to plaintiffs, are the following:
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a.
the roller bearings in the actuator latch mechanism cracked; b.
the' bracket bolts in the actuator were not properly torqued; c.
the " modification kits" designed to correct the deficiencies in the original roller bearings were themselves defective; d.
when the valve bodies corroded and defendants agreed to' furnish a spare valve body for testing of the repair procedure end welder training, they failed to deliver the valve body in accord with the agreed schedule; e.
the actuators would not reliably close the valves within five or fewer seconds; f.
the valve seats and balls became sco. red or scratched during pre-operational testing, resulting in excessive leaking; g.
the packing between the seal ring assembly and the valve body did not provide an adequate seal, resulting in excessive leaking; and h.
the valve balls. suffered from crack-like indications.
27.
NMPC's efforts in connection with the problems I
described in paragraphs 24-26 included, but were not limited to, the devotion of the time of its own engineers and those of SWEC, diverting those engineers from other important tasks critical to
.the completion of NMP2, and the entry into a number of memos of changes with Crosby, substantially increasing the contract price.
I Notwithstanding their contractual obligations, defendants refused to correct these problems entirely at their own expense.
In
! _______ _ _ _ O
addition, NMPC was compelled to enter into numerous separate purchase orders with Crosby and other contractors and consultants in an effort to cc rect these problems.
28.
With plant operation being delayed by the inability to obtain a license for full power operations as a result of the inadequate MSIV system, on March 11, 1987, the Owners finally decided to abandon the ball valve system and to substitute the j
)
wye pattern globe valve type system.
In making this decision,
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i the owners considered the fact that although the ball valve
]
system continued to offer potential maintenance economies and
.might permit earlier plant operation if its continuing defects could be eliminated expeditiously, it was apparent that eliminating the defects of the ball valve system might take many more months or might never be accomplished.
29.
Meanwhile, NMPC had been proceeding with a parallel effort to procure and prepare the wye pattern globe valve system and that design approach was already approved by the NRC.
The i
Owners reasonably believed that its substitution would end the l
l uncertainty and provide a reasonable certainty that NMP2 could attain operations, a matter of great'importance to the Owners, who had, by March 1987, approximately $5.8 billion invested in NMP2.
The interest alone on this amount was costing the Owners l
approximately $1.75 million per day.
Moreover, the delays in NMP2 opening caused by the failure of the MSIV system were adversely affecting the cost of credit to the Owners.
For example, on
i March 10, 1987, Standard & Poor's Corp., a leading bond rating firm, announced'that it had downgraded the bond ratings of three of the Owners, in part because " recurring valve problems are expected to postpone commercial operation (of NMP2] until first quarter of 1988, delaying recovery of the [ Owners'] substantial investment.
A lowered bond rating, in turn, increases the cost of borrowing money.
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST G+W, WICKES MPG. AND CROSBY (Breach of Contract) 30.
Paragraphs 1 through 29 are incorporated herein by reference as if fully set forth.
31.
The defendants contracted, as described in paragraphs 15-21, to design, furnish and deliver to NMPC an MSIV system consisting of eight ball valves, actuators and logic control panels and cabinets for use in NMP2, and to provide in connnection therewith certain engineering and administrative services.
The MSIV system was required to conform to certain agreed technical performance specifications.
The defendants also agreed that the MSIV system would be licensed by the NRC for the service intended, and as part of their duty to demonstrate licensability to the NRC, the defendants agreed to provide a Topical Report to the NRC on the ball valve MSIV system.
l f _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _.
32.
Subsequently, when NMPC discovered _various defects in-the MSIV system provided by'the defendants, the defendants agreed, among other thines, to furnish timely a spare valve body and to provide additional services with respect to the MSIV system.
33.
The defendants breached their agreements with NMPC.
34.
Defendants were negligent, extremely careless, and recklessly indifferent to the rights of others in performing various services that the contract required them to perform.
Their engineering services in the design and testing of the MSIV system, in the production of the Topical Report, in diagnosing and remedying various problems with the MSIV system as they arose, and in other respects, fell below the standard of professional care usually exercised by engineers in.the community, and their services fell below the higher standards applicable to professionals possessing the special expertise that the defendants claimed to have.
35.
As a direct and proximate result of these breaches, and each of them, by the defendants, the owners have been injured and have incurred and continue to incur substantial damages.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST G+W AND WICKES MFG. ONLY (Breach of Contract) 36.
Paragraphs 1 through 29 are incorporated herein by reference as if fully set forth. ;
4 37.
As more fully described in paragraph 23, defendants G+W and G+W Mfg. agreed that, in the event of a sale of the Fluid Systems Division, they would obligate the purchaser to fulfill all of the Fluid Systems Division's outstanding commitments, including provision of spare parts and technical support during the performance of the NMP2 MSIV contract and would also themselves remain obligated to the fulfillment of all outstanding contractual commitments.
38.
Defendants breached their agreement by failing to obligate Crosby, as agreed, upon its purchase of the Fluid i
Systems Division in 1983, and by failing to honor their own surviving contractual obligations under the MSIV contract.
39.
As a direct and proximate result of this breach by defendants, the owners have been injured and have incurred and continue to incur substantial damages.
j THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST G+W,
{
l WICKES MFG. AND CROSBY (Breach of Express Warranties) 40.
Paragraphs 1 through 29 a.re incorporated herein by reference as if fully set forth.
41.
In connection with the purchase of the MSIV system, the defendants made certain affirmations of fact or promises relating to the MSIV system.
Additionally, the defendants provided or 1
adopted certain descriptions of the MSIV system.
These affirmations of fact and promises relating to the MSIV system as 1 L___---_-__------------
l
l f
well as the descriptions thereof, which were found, among other places, in defendants' promotional literature, the specifications, defendants' bid documents and Topical Report and the purchase order, were relied upon by NMPC in agreeing to purchase the MSIV system from the defendants and as such became or were made part of the basis of the bargain between NMPC and the defendants.
These affirmations, promises and descriptions concerning the quality, design, workmanship and performance of the MSIV system constituted express warranties by the defendants that the MSIV system and the subsequent repair attempts would conform thereto.
42.
As a result of each of the many defects described in paragraphs 24-26, and others, the MSIV system failed to conform to the promises, affirmations and descriptions made or adopted by the defendants, as part of the basis of the bargain with NMPC, and the attempted repairs failed to rectify the problems with the MSIV system.
Consequently, the defendants breached their express warranties.
43.
Within a reasonable time of learning of each defect or
' failure, NMPC notified the defendants thereof.
44.
As a direct and proximate result of the defendants' breaches of their express warranties, and each of them, the Owners have been injured and have incurred and continue to incur substantial damages. -
e-FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST G+W, 1
WICKES MFG. AND CROSBY l
(Breach of' Warranty of Merchantability) j 45.
Paragraphs 1 through 29 are incorporated herein by reference as if fully set forth.
46.
At the time they contracted for the sale of the MSIV system to NMPC, and for the subsequent attempted repairs thereto, the defendants were merchants with respect to goods of that kind, l
in that they dealt in goods of that kind and otherwise held themselves.out as having knowledge and skill peculiar to the q
i services and goods involved in the transaction.
j j
47.
As a consequence of the defendants' status as merchants
]
with respect to the MSIV system, they warranted that the system and the attempted repairs thereto would be merchantable.
48.
As a result of each of the many defects described in
]
paragraphs 24-26, and others, and of the unsuccessful attempts to l
correct them, the MSIV system was not merchantable.
Thus the i
l defendants' warranty of merchantability was breached.
l 49.
Within a reasonable time of learning of each of the aforesaid defects and failures, NMPC notified the defendants 1
thereof.
50.
As a direct and proximate result of the defendants' breaches of their. warranty of merchantability, the Owners have been injured and have incurred and continue to incur substantial i
damages.
j -__- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST G+W, WICKES MFG. AND CROSBY.
(Breach of Warranty of' Fitness for a Particular Purpose) 51.
Paragraphs 1 through 29'are incorporated herein by reference as if' fully set forth.
52.
At the time they contracted with NMPC for the sale of the MSIV system, the defendants knew or had reason to know, through prior negotiations, conversations and correspondence and through receipt of the specification, that NMPC intended to use the.MSIV system for a particular purpose.
Specifically, the defendants knew that NMPC intended to use the MSIV system for the purpose of isolation valves on the main steam lines of a boiling water nuclear reactor and that as such it was intended to perform the critical safety function of preventing the release of radioactive materials to the environment in the event of a rupture in a main steam line or certain other accidents.
The defendants also knew or.had reason to know that in order to perform its intended critical safety function, the MSIV system had to operate reliably under the design requirements of the specification for the 40-year projected life of NMP2 without any loss of ability to
~
perform.
Finally, the defendants knew or had reason to know that, because of the critical safety function intended to be performed by the MSIV system, its reliable operation according to the design requirements had to be demonstrated before NMP2 could receive a full power operating license from the NRC. _ _ _ __ _ - ____
53.
At the time they contracted with NMPC for.the sale of 4
the MSIV. system, the defendants knew or had reason to know that I
they.had represented themselves to HMPC as experienced manufacturers of high quality ball valve systems entirely suitable and fit for use as main steam isolation valve systems in nuclear i
power plants.
The defendants also knew or had reason to know that NMPC had never constructed a nuclear power plant using a ball valve MSIV system, and that NMPC was relying on the defendants' expertise, skill and judgment to design, manufacture and furnish an MSIV system which would be suitable and fit for NMPC's intended purpose.
54.
NMPC did in fact rely upon the defendants' expertise, skill and judgment to design, manufacture and furnish an MSIV system which would be suitable and fit for NMPC's intended purpose.
55.
The defendants warranted that the MSIV system which they designed, manufactured and furnished was entirely suitable and fit i
for NMPC's particular purpose.
56.
As a result of each of the many defects described in paragraphs 24-26, and others, and of the unsuccessful attempts to
. correct t em, t e MSIV system was entirely unsuitable and unfit h
h l
for NMPC's intended purpose, and thus the defendants breached j
1 their warranty of fitness for a particular purpose.
57.
Within a reasonable time of learning of each of the aforesaid defects, NMPC notified the defendants thereof.
i.
58.
As a direct and proximate result of the defendantn#
breaches of their warranty of fitness for a particular purpose the owners have been injured and have incurred and continue to incur substantial datages.
SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST G+W, WICKES MPG., AND CROSBY (Negligence:
Engineering Malpractice) 59.
Paragraphs 1 through 29 and 31 through 34 are I
incorporated herein by reference as if fully set forth.
60.
Throughout their dealings with NMFC, defendants have held themselves out as uniquely qualified and experienced to provide the professional engineering services necessary for the successful design, manufacture, repair, licensing, and operation of a ball valve-based MSIV system for a nuclear power plant.
NMPC contracted with the defendants for the supply of the NMP2 MSIV system and for the performance of related engineering services in reliance on their claim of special expertise.'
These professional engineering services included the assessment of the suitability of the defendants' ball valve MSIV system for installation in the NMP2 plant.
NMPC also contracted with defendants for services related to the repair, remedy, and modification of the NMP2 MSIV system as problems arose. -
\\
61.
Defendants owed NMPC and the other NMP2 Owners a duty of reasonable care, and of the degree of care usually exercised by professional engineers in the community.
Further, defendants l
owed NMPC and the other Owners that higher degree of care that their claims of special expertise implied.
62.
The information and professional assessments that the defendants provided to NMPC concerning the fitness of the ball valve MSIV system were deficient, inaccurate, and misleading in, among other things, the following critical respects.
The defendants falsely represented that the MSIV system that they had designed for the NMP2 plant was adequately tested.
They also stated that the valve system provided for fail-safe closure and that the actuator solenoids provided sufficient force to release the latching mechanisms and close the valves.
The defendants represented that the MSIV system would perform to applicable specifications and standards, including specification's and standards for leakage.
In fact, a number of the components of' the system that the defendants designed and manufactured had severe deficiencies.
The actuators and latches, in particular, were defective, and the system failed to perform to specifications and standards.
The valves did not close reliably, and the actuator solenoids lacked sufficient power to trip the latch to close the valve.
The valves also leaked badly during subsequent, pre-operational testing that simulated operating conditions.
f l
f.
63.
The deficiencies and inaccuracies in the defendants'
~
assessments were the product of defendants' negligent engineering.
Among other engineering errors, the defendants based their conclusions concerning the suitability of the design of their MSIV system on testing that failed to account for the thermal conditions actually obtaining during plant operation.
The defendants conducted their testing with a scaled-down prototype of the valves that they designed for installation in NMP2.
The prototype was an 8-inch valve, whereas the MSIV system that the defendants designed for the NMP2 plant employed 24-inch valves.
The defendants' testing prototype was inadequately scaled and, as a result, failed to replicate the thermal conditions that a full-size, 24-inch valve would experience.
These thermal conditions produced differential metal expansion in components of the 24-inch valves, which, in turn, caused severe leaking, rendering them unfit, as designed and delivered, for use in a nuclear power plant MSIV system.
64.
The defendants' engineering services in connection with futile efforts to remedy various defects in the MSIV system were deficient and failed to account for'the fundamental defects in the system design.
65.
Defendants' engineering was negligent.
It fell below the standard of professional care usually exercised by engineers in the community, and it fell below the higher standards applicable to professionals possessing the special expertise that l
l _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - -
l
' defendants held themselves out as possessing.
- Further, l
defendants knew or had reason to know that poor performance of these engineering services would risk especially great harm.
A i
leaking MSIV system, or a system whose valves failed to close properly, could, in the event of a nuclear accident, cause extensive death, injury, and property loss.
Further, the correction of a faulty MSIV system in NMP2, once the system was installed, would. foreseeable result in extensive delay in the completion of the plant and massive increases in the cost of its construction.
66.
The owners were substantially injured as the proximate and foreseeable result of defendants' negligence.
In reliance on defendants' professional opinion that the MSIV system was adequately tested and fit for incorporation in the NMP2 plant, NMPC proceeded to install that system.
When problems were discovered, the defendants' negligent engineering failed to correct them and in fact impeded the finding of a solution.
These various problems have caused, and continue to cause, substantial delay in the completion of the plant, at enormous cost to the Owners.
The probitms have resulted in damage to and destruction of components of the system.
The owners have also had to expend large sums to analyze and attempt to fix the problems and, ultimately, to remove the defendants' faulty MSIV system and to install instead a wye pattern globe valve MSIV system.
1 !
l
1
?
SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST G+W, WICKES MTG.. AND CROSBY (Negligent Misrepresentation) 67.
Paragraphs 1 through 29, 31 through 34 and 60 through 66 are incorporated herein by reference as if fully set forth.
68.
The information that defendants provided to NMPC, prior to, at the time of and subsequent to execution of the contract, concerning the performance of the MSIV system that the defendants had designed, concerning the results, significance, and adequacy of the testing that they had performed, and concerning the diagnosis and remedy of various problems discovered during testing after the MSIV system was installed, was erroneous, and defendants were negligent in so providing erroneous information.
69.
Because of their relationship to the Owners and because of a public duty, defendants owed NMPC and the other Owners the duty to provide information on such matters only with care.
Defendants knew or should have known that the Owners would be relying on this information for the serious purpose of proceeding with the purchase, installation, maintenance and repair of the i
ball valve MSIV system, and that the Owners stood to suffer substantial harm, in the form of delay and increased costs in NMP2 construction, if the information proved to be false, erroneous, or misleading. 1 i
9-i l
l 1
70.
When NMPC and the other Owners then reasonably relied on defendants' various assertions, based as they assertedly were i
on defendants' claimed special expertise, the owners suffered substantial harm, which was th'e proximate result of defendants' negligent misrepresentations.
DAMAGES 71.
As a result of the foregoing, the Owners have incurred,
.and continue to incur, damages including, but not limited to, the following a.
the cost of purchasing, installing and testing the ball valve MSIV system and associated services; b.
the cost of attempting to redesign, repair, correct and test the ball valve MSIV' system, including monies paid to the defendants and others; c.
the added costs to complete NMP2 caused by the defendants' failure to timely provide a properly functioning MSIV system; d.
the costs attributable to delay in bringing NMP2 into full operation because of the problems with the MSIV system, including, without limitation, interest, carrying charges (including an allowance for funds used during construction) and overhead costs of a non-functional plant; e.
lost profits; f.
the increased cost to the Owners of borrowing money caused by lowered bond ratings resulting from the failure to 1 '
2
~
L bring NMP2 into full operation because of the failure of the defendants' MSIV system; and g.
the cost of purchasing, installing and.
testing a substitute MSIV system.
I WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation, Long Island Lighting Company, New York State Electric & Gas Corporation, Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation, and Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corporation dtmand judgment against G+W, i
Wickes Mfg. and Crosby, jointly and severally, in an amount equal to the special and general damages determined pursuant to the allegations of the First through Seventh Causes of Action, which j
plaintiffs believe and therefore allege to be, as of this date, approximately Five Hundred Million Dollars ($500,000,000), plus interest, costs, disbursements and attorney's fees where l
I appropriate, and that the Court award such other reli.ef as it deems just and proper.'
Dated:
April 17, 1987 Swidler & Berlin, Chartered Attorneys for Plaintiff Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation 1000 Thomas Jefferson Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.
20007 (202) 342-5500 Hiscock & Barclay Attorneys for Plaintiff Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation P. O. Box 4876 Syracuse, NY 13221 (315) 422-2131 i l
1
E i-
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Hunton & Williams Attorneys for Plaintiff l
l Long Island Lighting Company l
707 East Main Street j
P.O. Box 1535 Richmond, VA 23212 (804) 788-8552 Huber Lawrence & Abell Attorneys for Plaintiff New York State Electric &
j Gas Corporation j
99 Park Avenue i
New York, NY 10016 l
(212) 682-6200 i
Nixon, Hargrave, Devans & Doyle Attorneys for Plaintiff Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation Lincoln First Tower P.O. Box 1051 Rochester, NY 14603 (716) 546-8000 Gould & Wilkie Attorneys for Plaintiff Central Budson Gas'& Electric Corporation 1 Wall Street New York, NY 10005 (212) 344-5680 J
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F0lA. er-yrp Eg
g REGION I MORNING REPORT PAGE 4 JANUARY 12, 1987 Licensee / Facility Notification / Subject f
Nine Mile Point 2
')
1/9 ENS - 1/12 Resident PC DN 50-410
..../
MSIV Status /SBGT Actuations MSIV_ UPDATE Testing on MSIV 7D with the ball from MSIV 6B (which had failed the leak test) was completed on 1/8. Testing consisted of 27 sets of closures.
Each set consist of two fast closures and two partial closures. The first 18 sets were conducted with the ball being wetted prior to cycling, and the last 9 were done with with a dry ball. Leak testing was done from the upstream side of the valve after each set and at approximately four set intervals via the between the seats method. With a vetted ball, upstream leak checks ranged from 5.5 to 9.8 SCFH, while between the seat leakage ranged from 16 to 38.1 SCFH. Dry ball leak checks ranged from 9.3 to 16.9 SCFH using the upstream method and 31 to 66 SCFH using the between the seats method.
These results were graphed by the licensee, showing an increased slope (leakage increasing more with each set) during the dry cycles. On 1/9, the licensee was to make public the decision whether or not to replace the ball valves with Y pattern globe valves. The decision was postponed until after a proposed meeting with NRR on 1/13. As of 1/12, all valves have been reassembled and actuators were being electrically connected.
EVENT On 1/9, at 12:59 p.m., both trains of the Standby Gas Treatment (SBGT) System automatically started. The automatic start was caused by a Reactor Building Normal Ventilation System low flow signal.
The low flow condition resulted from personnel error when Drywell Recirculation System solenoid operated valves 50V-6A and SOV-6B were deenergized in accordance with a station tagout. When SOV-6A and 6B were deenergized, their respective isolation dampers failed open as designed. The isolation dampers communicate with the Reactor Building Normal Ventilation System and, because the B Recirculation Unit was running for system testing, this resulted in the reduction in air flow through the normal ventilation system. Both SBGT System trains started and operated as designed.
During the restoration of the normal ventilation system line-up, a second automatic start of the B train of SBGT occurred at 1:21 p.m.
In accordance with procedure, the B train was secured and the Reactor Building Normal Ventilation supply and exhaust fans were started. When the second pair of supply and exhaust fans were being started, the supply fan failed to start. This resulted in an air flow imbalance with two exhaust fans and only one supply fan running.
The air flow imbalance resulted in another low air flow signal and automatic start of the B train.
Licensee investigation determined that the second supply fan discharge damper position switches failed to pick up and satisfy the fan start logic. These actuations were reported via ENS. Routine resident followup.
Fora 4'3 ?
E//T
s PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION I AUGUST 18, 1986 To:
. James Blaha, Director,' Program Support and Analysis Staff From:. Thomas E. Murley, Regional Administrator, Region I Limerfs'e'e'7FaciliD~.,
Notification /Subiect Nine Mile Point Unit 2 8/15 Call 50-410 Failure of MSIVs to Close Quickly Enough
./
Event The main steam isolation valves (MSIV) will not close within the required 3-5 coconda required because the actuator latching mechanism will not release
.quickly enough. The MSIVs are a unique ball valve manufactured by Crosby. The licensee is investigating a design change to correct the deficiency.
Licensee / Facility Notification /Subiect Peach Bottom Units 2 and 3 RI Fax 8/18/86 DN 50-277 & 50-278 EQ Inspections.
Event Peach Bottom Units 2.and 3 are in cold shutdown while EQ inspections of Limitorque operator wiring is being conducted. As of 8:00 a.m. on 8/18/86, 81 of 83 Limitorques have been inspected and 32 valves returned to service on Unit 2.
Inspections of Limitorques on Unit 3 began on 8/17/86. As of 8:00 a.m.,
on 8/18/86, 71 out of 83 valves have'been blocked and 12 inspections have been completed. The licensee has identified two wires in Limitorques on Unit 2 that cppear to not meet EQ requirements. Wire identification: and characterization continues by the licensee. The resident inspector is following licensee's cctivities.
Licenses / Facility Notification /Subiect Beaver Valley Unit 2 50.55(e) Report DN 50-412' Event For steam generator PORV control of secondary pressure, the licensee reported that when pressure decreases below the setpoint, the PORV remains open and cperator action is required to close valves (all three valves). This could result in uncontrolled plant blowdown and cooldown from all three steam genera-tors without prompt operator action.
It is expected that this potential problem can probably be handled by reorganizing the control circuitry.
Fe2m 43 g ElA.
j PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION I SEPTEMBER 10, 1986 To:
James Blaha, Director, Program Support and Analysis Staff FROM: Thomas E. Murley, Regional Administrator, Region I 1
icens e/FaMhy Notification /Sub_iect Indian Point 3 9/9 ENS / Reactor Trip 286 On 9/9 at l'0:00 a.m., the reactor tripped from 95% power when a feedwater perturbation caused by the loss of No. 31 main boiler feed pump resulted in low steam generator levels. All systems operated as per design, and the plant was stabilized in hot shutdown. The licensee determined that an emulsion and foreign materials in the feed pump control oil system caused the steam supply to the pump to be isolated. The licensee replaced the oil, cleaned the oil reservoir, and successfully tested both feed pumps. Post trip reviews have been completed. The unit was taken critical on 9/10 at 7:00 a.m.
The resident inspectors are observing licensee restart activities.
Licensee /Fa'cIlity Notification /Subiect Nine Mile Point 1 9/8 SRI Call DN 50-220 Inadvertent Scram of a Control Rod Even
/
On 9/8 a single control rod scram occurred when the rubber diaphragm in the air operator of its Scram Outlet Valve failed due to aging. The licensee valved out the Hydraulic Control Unit, replaced the failed diaphragm, and restored the rod to its original position per Reactor Physics procedures. The Resident inspector identified a potential problem in that a similar failure of the Scram Inlet Valve could cause damage to the control rod drive internals and failure of the control rod drive. The licensee is investigating the generic implications of the failure and the need for a diaphragm replacement program. The resident inspector is following licensee actions.
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