ML20235H081
| ML20235H081 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Nine Mile Point  |
| Issue date: | 11/26/1986 |
| From: | NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORP. |
| To: | Linville J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20235G041 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-87-438 NUDOCS 8709300358 | |
| Download: ML20235H081 (3) | |
Text
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,o November 26, 1986 TO:
Jim Linville, Chief, Section 2C, DRP FROM: NMP Resident Office WEEKLY STATUS REPORT /l4 - NINE MILE POINT 2 1.
Plant Status:
NMP-2 completed CRD scram time testing on the morning of 11/24.
The CRD testing progressed smoothly. Only one CRD required adjustment based on scram timing. Subsequently, NMP-2 has been completing open vessel testing, preparing for reactor vessel reassembly, modifying MSIV actuators, and reworking the MSIV ball valves. As of 11/26, vessel level was lowered to approximately 85 inches for installation of vibration monitoring instrumentation. The steam separator has also been installed.
The MSIV valve work remains the critical path for initial criticality.
2.
MSIV Status:
Five valves have been reassembled as of 11/26, one of which has not been officially leak rate tested.' The remaining three balls are onsite and awaiting installation. Leak rate testing of the 6D MSIV was stopped due to problems encountered while performing leak. rate testing of the 7B MSIV. The 7B MSIV failed the official leak rate test and was disassembled. The ball had an area where the tungsten carbide was severely gouged. On 11/25, NMP-2 held a meeting to determine the cause(s) of the latest leak test failure.
Positive identification of the failure mechanism is pending further investigation, but NMP-2 suspects increased valve closure speed and misalignment between the ball and the seat. This weekend is the earliest time at which an MSIV would be ready for a leak test to confirm NMP-2's hypothesis.
3.
Violation of Technical Specifications:
On 11/24, NMP-2 notified the NRC of two fire protection LCO violations found as part of reviewing fire patrol records.
Specifically, on 11/12 one fire patrol exceeded the 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> requirement for initiating the patrol and another fire patrol exceeded the allowable time for the repeated patrol of an area.
Both' patrols were compensatory measures for an inoperable containment penetration.
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Reportable Events:
i on 11/20, NMP-2 had two half scrams of the reactor with all rods inserted due to loss of the Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS) which supplies RPS Channel B.
Both Electrical Protection Assemblies (EPAs) were found tripped, and a voltage transient is suspected as the cause. The loss of RPS Channel B caused primary and secondary containment isolations, RWCU isolation, and SBGTS initiation.
Problems were experienced with different system responses to the event and are being evaluated. Specifically, the RWCU pump did not trip, the SBGTS 1A fan discharge valve did not open, and the RPS B control room alarms did not stay lit after being acknowledged.
On 11/23 with all rods inserted, NMP-2 had a scram of the Group 2 control rods due to a momentary loss of power to Channel A of the
-Group 2 scram' relays concurrent with a half scram inserted into Channel B as part of APRM surveillance testing. NMP-2 suspects the loss of power occurred due to a personnel error during the equipment tagout of adjacent fuses.
On 11/25, NMP-2 had an automatic, start of SBGT Train A due to a detached jumper. A jumper was installed on a damper as part of the monthly surveillance test of the Reactor Building Ventilation Effluent Monitors. The jumper fell off, shorted to ground, and closed the damper. This caused the ventilation to isolate and SBGT Train A to start.
5.
Planned Activities:
The remaining MSIVs reassembly could be completed by 11/30.
Modifications to MSIV actuators are progressing and could be completed by 12/1, allowing final stroke time and seat leak testing during that week. Following reassembly of the reactor vessel, there will be a hydrostatic test of the vessel seals.
Based on a 11/27 completion of MSIV work, NMP-2 had projected a 12/18 initial criticality. We continue to believe this date overly optimistic and believe a late December criticality would be the earliest.
1' l
i so 6.
Cumulative Summary of Significant Events 10/31 - License issued 11/2 - Fuel loading begun 11/5 - IRM reactor trip followed by SDV level reactor trip (ENS) 11/6 - Vital area breached without compensatory measures (ENS) 11/7 - Fuel loading with bypassed SRM (LCO violation) 11/8 - Inoperable RB exhaust rad monitor (LCO violation) l l
11/9 - Two APRM reactor trips due to faulty circuit card (ENS) 11/10 - Inoperable RB exhaust rad monitor (ENS) 11/15 - Fuel loading completed 11/17 - Imbedded conduits without fire seals (LCO violation) 11/20 - Half scram /ESF actuation due to loss of UPS (ENS) 11/23 - Group 2 scram due to loss of power and APRM testing (ENS) 11/24 - Fire patrol errors found from 11/12 (LCO violation) 11/24 - CRD functional, friction, and scram testing completed 11/25 - SBGTS auto start due to detached jumper (ENS)
CCI T. Murley J. Allan W. Kane S. Collins S. Ebeneter T. Martin P. Eselgroth W. Cook G. Meyer R. Bernero, NRR M. Haughey, NRR
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