IR 05000410/1986020
| ML17055B835 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Nine Mile Point  |
| Issue date: | 06/10/1986 |
| From: | Briggs L, Eselgroth P, Florek D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17055B834 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-410-86-20, NUDOCS 8606190318 | |
| Download: ML17055B835 (20) | |
Text
0 Report No.
Docket No.
License No.
Licensee:
U.S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Region I 50-410/86-20 50-410 CPPR-112 Nia ara Mohawk Power Cor oration 300 Erie Boulevard Nest S racuse New York 13202 Facility Name:
Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station Unit 2 Inspection At:
Scriba New York I
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d.'m
Inspectors:
L. Bri s,
ea or Inspector da e
D.
orek, Lead actor nspector ate Approved By:
P.
elgro
,
ef, Test Programs Section,
, date Operations Br h,
DRS Ins ection Summar
Ins ection on Ma 5-9 1986 Ins ection Re ort No.
50-410/86-20 d i of the preoperational test program including test procedure review, test results evaluation and test witnessing; the power ascension test program including the overall program, test procedure review and the power ascension reduction; QA/QC interfaces and plant tours.
Results:
No violations were identified.
NOTE:
For acronyms not defined, refer to NUREG-0544,
"Handbook of Acronyms and Initial i sms".
t 8606190318 860613 PDR ADOCK 05000410 G
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DETAILS 1.0.
Persons Contacted Nia ara Mohawk Power Cor oration and Contractors
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Abbott, Station Superintendent, NMPC Balduzzi, Records Management, NMPC Beckham, NQA-Operations, NMPC Blackburn, Startup Test Group Manager, NMPC Bufis, Test Group Manager, NMPC Bulger, Project Advisory Engineer, SWEC Cari sle, Lead STD and A Engineer, GE Carter, Record Management, NMPC Conway, Power Ascension Manager, NMPC Drake, Startup Project Supervisor, SWEC Doyle, NQA-Operations, NMPC Eddy, Site Representative, PSC Hanley.
Manager Contracts and Purchasing, NMPC Kallander, Manager, Records Management, NMPC Kassakatic, Startup Test Group Manager, NMPC Koehl, Test Group Supervisor, NMPC Kovack, Supervisor QA Audit, NMPC Matlock, Deputy Project Director, NMPC McCracker, BOP Lead Engineer, SWEC Mural, Associated Senior Technician, NMPC Opelski, NQA-Operations, NMPC Robles, GE Site Operations Manager, GE Sandwich, Manager, Information Management, NMPC Weakley, Special Projects, NMPC Wielde, Supervisor, Surveillance QA, NMPC Young, Test Engineer, Hangers and Support Inspection Group, NMPC U.S. Nuclear Re ulator Commission
" R.
Gramm, Senior Resident Inspector
- J. Hunter, Reactor Engineer
" J. Stair, Reactor Engineer
" Denotes those present at exit meeting on May 9, 1986.
2.0 Preo erational Test Pro ram 2.1 Prep erational Test Procedure Review
~Sco e
The POT identified below was reviewed in preparation for test witness-ing, for technical and administrative adequacy and to independently
verify that testing is planned to adequately satisfy ance and licensee commitments.
It was also reviewed review and approval, proper format, test objectives, initial conditions, test data recording requirements to normal.
regulatory guid-to verify licensee prerequisites, and system return N2-POT-94, Traversing Incore Probe, Revision
~Findin s
No unacceptable conditions were noted during the review.
2.2 Prep erational Test Results Evaluation Review
~Sco e
The completed preoperational test procedure listed below was reviewed during this inspection to verify that adequate testing has been con-ducted to satisfy regulatory guidance, licensee commitments and FSAR requirements and to verify that uniform criteria were being applied for evaluation of completed test results in order to assure technical and administrative adequacy.
The inspector reviewed the test results and verified the licensee's evaluation of test results by review of test changes, test deficien-cies,
"As-Run" copy of the test procedure, acceptance criteria, per-formance verification, recording conduct of test, gC inspection records, restoration of system to normal after test, independent verification of critical steps or parameters, identification of personnel conducting and evaluating test data, and verification that the test results have been approved.
N2-POT-32, Low Pressure Core Spray, Revision 1, results approved by the licensee on May 1, 1986.
Discussion This was the first preoperational test procedure of a safety related system to undergo the complete licensee results review and approval cycle including Station Operating Review Committee (SORC) approval.
The procedure results satisfied established acceptance criteria with relatively few test deficiencies, three of which remain open.
The inspector noted that test deficiencies are noted in the text of the test summary with no centralized index of deficiency reports (DR) in the POT results package.
This required any reviewing party to per-form a detailed review of the test summary to ensure all DRs were accounted for and tracked for licensee resolutio The licensee stated that this had been identified by their own staff and that they were currently working on a means to computerize POT deficiencies by individual test so they would be readily retrievable.
The inspector noted that the current method is cumbersome at best and that the new system would be followed during subsequent routine inspections.
Findin<is No violations were observed.
The three open test deficiencies con-cerning N2-POT-32 will be carried as an unresolved item (410/86-20-01)
pending licensee resolution and subsequent NRC review.
The open DR numbers are 13885, 13615 and 11203.
2.3 Witnessin Hi h Pressure Core S ra HPCS Diesel Testin Discussion The inspectors observed a portion of HPCS diesel testing being con-ducted on May 5, 1986.
The test was being performed to test a
HPCS breaker modification (NKDCR No. 258352) which incorporated a time delay into the HPCS diesel generator output breaker to allow the starting current of the HPCS pump to decay before enabling the over-current trip.
Testing was being conducted using normal operating procedures N2-IOP-100B (diesel)
and N2-IOP-33 (pump)
as part of the preliminaries for the Loss of Power Test.
The HPCS diesel breaker tripped about 1.5 seconds after the HPCS pump was started.
Testing was terminated at that time.
The licensee was in the process of evaluating the modification and what further changes would be necessary to prevent tripping of the HPCS diesel generator output breaker.
Failure to resolve this item and successfully run the HPCS pump on the HPCS diesel caused the Loss of Power test, scheduled for May 8, 1986, to be rescheduled for May 12, 1986.
~Findin s
No unacceptable conditions were identified.
System operation was being conducted in accordance with approved procedures.
3.0 Power Ascension Pro ram 3.1 References
'egulatory Guide 1.68, Revision 2, August 1978, "Initial Test Programs for Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants" ANSI N18.7-1976,
"Administrative Controls and Quality Assurance for the Operational Phase of Nuclear Power Plants"
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Nine Nile Point Unit 2 (NNP-2) Technical Specification Proof and Review Copy
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NMP-2 Final Safety and Analysis Report (FSAR), Chapter 14,
"Initial Test Program"
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NMP-2 Safety Evaluation Report 3.2 Overall Power Ascension Test Pro ram
~Sco e
The inspector reviewed the following procedures:
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AP-1.4, "Startup Test Phase",
Draft copy dated March 1986
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"Power Ascension Test Procedures",
Draft copy dated April 1986
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"Composition and Responsibility of Site Organization",
Revision 1, dated December 5,
1985
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"Composition and Responsibility of Unit Organization",
Revision 2, dated April 12, 1986
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AP-2, "Production and Control of Procedures",
Revision 5, dated April 1, 1986 The inspector discussed with the Power Ascension Manager (PAN) the approaches taken to assure adequate implementation 'of the power ascen-sion program.
Training and staffing were also discussed.
The inspec-tor reviewed the administrative procedures to determine adequate con-trols exist to assure that test procedures are current prior to use, test personnel are knowledgeable, controls exist for test procedure changes, interruptions in tests are controlled, proper test coordi-nation, documentation of unusual events and test deficiencies, test results are reviewed, test acceptance criteria are defined, retest after test deficiencies and appropriate review.
The inspector also held discussions with the Supervisor gA Audit and Supervisor gA Surveillance to determine their plans for the power ascension test program.
Discussion Based on discussion with the Power Ascension Manager (PAM) and review of the draft power ascension administrative procedures, the licensee is in the process of formally establishing the NNP-2 power ascension program.
The licensee has not issued any of the approximately 125
power ascension test procedures necessary to implement the test pro-gram as defined in Chapter 14 of the FSAR.
Initial drafts of proce-dures are prepared however.
The PAM indicated that staffing of the test group is ongoing which includes staffing the key personnel of, Shift Test Supervisors.
Training for test personnel is planned to be performed in the future.
The inspector noted the preliminary nature of the power ascension pro-gram but nevertheless reviewed the draft documents to determine the extent to which the program satisfied the above attributes.
Based on the preliminary review, the following concerns were identified by the inspector and discussed with the PAM:
review of reference docu-ments in procedures prior to use of the procedure; control and pro-cessing of Level 1 and Level 2 test exceptions; procedures for con-trol of plant HOLDS and test restart permission after plant HOLD; controls on control system tuning; quality and type of log entries; test briefings on potential plant problems; controls on test restart after delays and test program review between test condition 2 and 3.
The inspector had discussions with the Supervisor QA Audit and Super-visorr QA Survei llances who indicated the plans for QA involvement in the power ascension program were in the process of being developed.
An audit of the power ascension program is planned, but the scope, depth and schedule for the audit is yet to be finalized.
The plans for surveillance activities are also being finalized.
QA review of power ascension test procedures is planned.
QA has recently received draft power ascension procedures to review and will prepare checklists to define the review.
QA plans to witness selected tests and perform test results evaluation of these selected tests.
This latter point was questioned by the inspector since the FSAR and draft administra-tive procedures for startup indicated QA review will be performed on all completed test results.
Based on the inspector questions, the QA plans will be upgraded to be consistent with the FSAR.
3.3
~Findin s
Due to the preliminary nature of licensee power ascension test pro-gram, no violations were identified.
A future inspection will assess the licensee power ascension program, when finalized to assure com-pliance with regulatory requirements and license commitments to sup-port initiation of the power ascension test program.
Power Ascension Procedure Review
~Sco e
The inspector noted based on discussions with the Power Ascension Manager (PAM) that none of the approximately 125 test procedures have been issued although drafts have been prepared.
These procedures are still in the preparation process which includes QA review yet to be
performed.
The inspector noted the preliminary status and reviewed the procedures listed below:
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N2-SUT-I-HV, Chemical and Radiochemical, Revision 0 Draft
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N2-SUT-2-HV, Radiation Measurements, Revision 0 Draft
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N2-SUT-3, Fuel Load, Revision 0 Draft The procedures were reviewed to determine the degree of compliance with the following attributes:
Appropriate management review and approval has been accomplished.
Appropriate committee review has been accomplished.
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Procedure is in the proper format.
Test objectives are clearly stated and consistent with the FSAR.
Appropriate references are listed.
Appropriate prerequisites and precautions have been included.
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Initial test conditions are specified.
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Acceptance criteria are clearly stated.
Provisions have been made to identify test equipment utilized.
Provisions have been made to identify personnel performing the test.
The procedure is technically adequate and workable.
Temporary jumpers, installations and lifted leads are properly restored.
Provisions have been made for recording, evaluating and approving test data.
Provisions have been made to identify test deficiencies and exceptions and to document their resolutions.
Discussion Due to the preliminary nature of the test procedure, the attributes were only used as a guide.
Not all attributes had been implemented especially management and gA review and approval.
The following items were also discussed with the PA Procedure SUT 1 and 2 both lacked taking sufficient data to determine that the defined acceptance criteria were satisfied.
SUT-1 also lacked a clear reference as to what specific limits were associated with the specified generalized acceptance criteria.
The fuel loading procedure SUT-3 did not contain the information identified in Regulatory Guide 1.68 relating to performing a control rod drive functional test immediately after fuel is loaded in a cell, status of systems and components to support fuel load, standby liquid control operability requirements, boron concentration limits, and verification of control rod operability requirements prior to use in shutdown margin tests.
The procedure also was in conflict with the proposed technical specifications relating to source range monitor minimum count rate operability and numbers of source range monitoring instrumentation requi red during shutdown margin tests.
Also the control of significant refueling problems was being done by shift personnel rather than station management.
These items will be addressed as well as other licensee comments in their own review process in the approved test procedures'indincin Due to the preliminary nature of the startup test program, no viola-tions were identified.
A future inspection will assess the licensee test procedures, when finalized, to determine compliance with regula-tory requirements and licensee commitments to support initiation of the power ascension test program.
3.4 Power Ascension Test Pro ram Reduction The inspector inquired about any licensee plans to reduce the power ascension test program similar to that proposed by the Hope Creek Generating Station.
The inspector was informed that based on the Hope Creek reduction, NMP-2 is requesting a minor reduction in the program with a proposal expected to be formally sent the week of May 12, 1986.
ILI/C Interfaces The QA/QC plans to support the power ascension test program is discussed in Section 3.2.
5.0 Tours of the Facilit The inspector-made several tours of various areas of the facility to ob-serve work in progress, housekeeping, cleanliness controls and status of.
constructio ~Findin s
During the above plant tours, the inspectors noted loose locking nuts on the attachment for snubber 2RCS-PSSP019Al.
The snubber was attached to the 'A'ecirculation loop just downstream of the recirculation loop flow control valve and had a preservice inspection acceptance tag.
Preservice inspection is currently conducted under procedure MS.GENE.003, ASME XI PSI YT-3, Component Support Examination, Revision 5.
The procedure requires locking devices and bolted connections, among numerous other items, to be checked.
The inspector informed the licensee on May 6, 1986 of the above.
The licensee verified the identified condition and found some additional loose locking nuts on the attachment for snubber 2RCS-PSSP051A1 which at-taches to the opposite side recirculation piping at the same point (i.e.,
the snubbers form an inverted V where attached to the recirculation piping).
On May 7, 1986,,the licensee issued a
memo to increase QA/QC surveillance of VT-3 completed components to verify that actual status is consistent with approved VT-3 results.
On May 9, 1986, just prior to the exit meeting, the inspectors met with several licensee representatives to discuss this item.
During the meeting, the licensee presented two work control reports (WCR) numbered 010927 and 010928 which had been initiated in January 1986 (after the VT-3 inspection)
and had subsequently been deferred in March 1986 (WCR still open)
when both snubbers failed the rework QC inspection.
Neither WCR had been forwarded to the responsible test engineer which is the final verification of the actual snubber installation and close out of the WCR.
The inspector also reviewed Stone and Webster Drawing BZ-70N, Revision 5 to verify that the correct supports had been identified on the WCR's.
No unacceptable conditions were identified.
6.0 Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to determine whether they are acceptable, an item of noncompliance or a deviation.
The unresolved item identified during this inspection is discussed in Paragraph 2.2 of this report.
7.0 Exit Interview At the conclusion of the site inspection on May 9, 1986, an exit interview was conducted with the licensee's senior site representatives (denoted in Section 1).
The findings were identified and previous inspection items were discussed.
The inspector noted that the power ascension testing pro-gram was in the process of being developed and as a result, a determination that the licensee was ready to safely initiate the power ascension test program could not be made.
The inspector indicated that when the power ascension test program is sufficiently formalized consistent with the FSAR commitments to Regulatory Guide 1.68 to make the above detemrination, a
future inspection will be performe At no time during this inspection was written inspection findings provided to the licensee by the inspector.
Based on the NRC Region I review of this report and discussions held with licensee representatives during this inspection, it was determined that this report does not contain information subject to
CFR 2.790 restriction h C