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Category:INSPECTION REPORT
MONTHYEARIR 05000397/19990011999-03-19019 March 1999 Insp Rept 50-397/99-01 on 990201-04 & 0303-05.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Physical Security Program IR 05000397/19970071997-11-18018 November 1997 Partially Withheld Insp Rept 50-397/97-07 on 971020-26. (Ref 10CFR73.21).Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected: Plant Support Re Vehicle Barrier Sys Which Was Consistent W/Summary Description & Accurately in Security Plan IR 05000397/19970061997-06-0909 June 1997 Insp Rept 50-397/97-06 on 970519-23.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Insp Consisted of Review of Licensee Planned & Implemented Activities Associated W/Isi Program IR 05000397/19970021997-03-0606 March 1997 Insp Rept 50-397/97-02 on 970127-31 & 0212-14.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Engineering & Plant Support Security IR 05000397/19960231996-12-16016 December 1996 Insp Rept 50-397/96-23 on 961118-22.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Engineering & Plant Support IR 05000397/19930281993-08-26026 August 1993 Insp Rept 50-397/93-28 on 930809-13.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Emergency Preparedness Program, Emergency Detection & Classification,Notification & Communication IR 05000397/19920341992-12-30030 December 1992 Insp Rept 50-397/92-34 on 921207-11.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Emergency Preparedness Program IR 05000397/19880221988-06-29029 June 1988 Insp Rept 50-397/88-22 on 880606-09.Violation Noted.Major Areas inspected:880512 Radioactive Resins Spill in Radwaste Bldg Which Resulted in Declaration of Unusual Event & Facility Tour IR 05000397/19870271987-12-0303 December 1987 Insp Rept 50-397/87-27 on 871001-1105.Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Control Room Operations,Esf Status, Surveillance & Maint Programs,Lers,Special Insp Topics & Licensee Action on Previous Insp Findings IR 05000397/19870031987-03-18018 March 1987 Insp Rept 50-397/87-03 on 870223-27.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Calibr of Instrumentation,Ie Bulletin Followup,Licensee Action on Previous Insp Findings,Licensee Action on Items of Noncompliance & Part 21 Followup IR 05000397/19870011987-03-0303 March 1987 Insp Rept 50-397/87-01 on 870104-0214.No Violations or Deviations Identified.Major Areas Inspected:Control Room Operations,Esf Status,Surveillance Programs,Maint Topics, Lers,Special Insp Topics & Listed Insp Procedures IR 05000397/19860371987-01-16016 January 1987 Insp Rept 50-397/86-37 on 861116-870103.No Violations or Deviations Identified.Major Areas Inspected:Esf Status.Lers, Surveillance Program,Maint Program,Special Insp Topics & Licensee Action on Previous Insp Findings IR 05000397/19860381987-01-0707 January 1987 Insp Rept 50-397/86-38 on 861124-26 & 1215-19.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Gaseous Waste Sys,Liquids & Liquid Wastes,Facilities & Equipment,Followup on IE Info Notices & Enforcement Items IR 05000397/19860261986-11-19019 November 1986 Insp Rept 50-397/86-26 on 860915-20.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Emergency Preparedness Exercise & Associated Critique & Followup on Open Items Identified During Previous Insps IR 05000397/19860311986-09-17017 September 1986 Enforcement Conference Rept 50-397/86-31.Topics Discussed: Violations Identified in Insp Rept 50-397/86-12 Re Equipment Qualification Program,Violations in Insp Rept 50-397/86-11 & Repeat Violations in Control of Combustible Matls IR 05000397/19860111986-07-25025 July 1986 Insp Rept 50-397/86-11 on 860616-27.Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Mgt Controls & Licensee Activities,Including Operator Recovery Actions,Qa Program,Measuring & Test Equipment & Tech Spec Surveillances & Tests IR 05000397/19860161986-05-16016 May 1986 Enforcement Conference Rept 50-397/86-16 on 860415.Major Areas Discussed:Apparent Violation Re Fire Protection Program Discussed in Insp Rept 50-397/86-05.App R Fire Protection Audit Findings Encl IR 05000397/19860081986-04-22022 April 1986 Insp Rept 50-397/86-08.No Violation or Deviation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Changes to Emergency Preparedness Program, Public Info,Shift Staffing & Augmentation & Notifications & Communications ML20153H0281986-02-14014 February 1986 Insp Rept 50-397/86-02 on 860113-17 & 21 & 0203.No Violation or Deviation Noted.Major Area Inspected:Radiological Controls.Allegation Re Failure to Make Every Effort to Maintain Radiation Exposures ALARA Substantiated IR 05000397/19850261985-10-25025 October 1985 Insp Rept 50-397/85-26 on 850909-13.No Significant Deficiencies or Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected: Emergency Preparedness Exercise & Associated Critique,Follow Up on Previous Findings & IE Info Notices & Previous Drills IR 05000397/19850341985-09-30030 September 1985 Safety Insp Rept 50-397/85-34 on 850909-13.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Followup of Generic Ltr 83-28, Required Actions Based on Generic ... & Ti 2515/64,Rev 1, Near-Term Insp Followup to Generic.. IR 05000397/19850131985-07-23023 July 1985 Insp Rept 50-397/85-13 on 850624-25.No Significant Deficiencies or Violations Identified.Major Areas Inspected: Emergency Preparedness,Including Knowledge & Performance (Training),Licensee Audits & Changes to Program IR 05000397/19850101985-07-0505 July 1985 Insp Rept 50-397/85-10 on 850325-29.No Violations or Deficiencies Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Emergency Response Facilities & Implementation of NUREG-0737,Suppl 1 Requirements.Items for Improvement Noted IR 05000397/19820141982-08-0202 August 1982 IE Insp Rept 50-397/82-14 on 820607-0709.Noncompliance Noted:Pipe Bending Procedures Not Properly Qualified & Approved & Prompt Measures Not Initiated to Document Condition or Identify Nonconforming Matl IR 05000397/19820161982-07-30030 July 1982 IE Insp Rept 50-397/82-16 on 820719-22.No Noncompliance Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Previously Identified Enforcement & Followup Items & Licensee Identified 10CFR50.55e Reported Items IR 05000397/19820121982-07-0101 July 1982 IE Insp Rept 50-397/82-12 on 820501-31.No Noncompliance Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Contractor Activities & Investigation of Allegations Re Processing of Nonconformance Repts & Insp of Fire Protection Sys IR 05000397/19820111982-06-25025 June 1982 IE Insp Rept 50-397/82-11 on 820517-20,0607 & 0609-11.No Noncompliance Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Activities Associated w/as-built Drawing Program & Followup Items IR 05000397/19820091982-05-26026 May 1982 IE Insp Rept 50-397/82-09 During Apr 1982.No Noncompliance Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Licensee & Contractor Activities to re-evaluate & Improve Detailed Work Methods IR 05000397/19780091978-09-14014 September 1978 Insp Rept 50-397/78-09 on 780822-25.No Noncompliance Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Review of Quality Records,Installation Procedures & Implementation of Fire Protection Program 1999-03-19
[Table view] Category:NRC-GENERATED
MONTHYEARIR 05000397/19990011999-03-19019 March 1999 Insp Rept 50-397/99-01 on 990201-04 & 0303-05.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Physical Security Program IR 05000397/19970071997-11-18018 November 1997 Partially Withheld Insp Rept 50-397/97-07 on 971020-26. (Ref 10CFR73.21).Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected: Plant Support Re Vehicle Barrier Sys Which Was Consistent W/Summary Description & Accurately in Security Plan IR 05000397/19970061997-06-0909 June 1997 Insp Rept 50-397/97-06 on 970519-23.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Insp Consisted of Review of Licensee Planned & Implemented Activities Associated W/Isi Program IR 05000397/19970021997-03-0606 March 1997 Insp Rept 50-397/97-02 on 970127-31 & 0212-14.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Engineering & Plant Support Security IR 05000397/19960231996-12-16016 December 1996 Insp Rept 50-397/96-23 on 961118-22.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Engineering & Plant Support IR 05000397/19930281993-08-26026 August 1993 Insp Rept 50-397/93-28 on 930809-13.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Emergency Preparedness Program, Emergency Detection & Classification,Notification & Communication IR 05000397/19920341992-12-30030 December 1992 Insp Rept 50-397/92-34 on 921207-11.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Emergency Preparedness Program IR 05000397/19880221988-06-29029 June 1988 Insp Rept 50-397/88-22 on 880606-09.Violation Noted.Major Areas inspected:880512 Radioactive Resins Spill in Radwaste Bldg Which Resulted in Declaration of Unusual Event & Facility Tour IR 05000397/19870271987-12-0303 December 1987 Insp Rept 50-397/87-27 on 871001-1105.Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Control Room Operations,Esf Status, Surveillance & Maint Programs,Lers,Special Insp Topics & Licensee Action on Previous Insp Findings IR 05000397/19870031987-03-18018 March 1987 Insp Rept 50-397/87-03 on 870223-27.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Calibr of Instrumentation,Ie Bulletin Followup,Licensee Action on Previous Insp Findings,Licensee Action on Items of Noncompliance & Part 21 Followup IR 05000397/19870011987-03-0303 March 1987 Insp Rept 50-397/87-01 on 870104-0214.No Violations or Deviations Identified.Major Areas Inspected:Control Room Operations,Esf Status,Surveillance Programs,Maint Topics, Lers,Special Insp Topics & Listed Insp Procedures IR 05000397/19860371987-01-16016 January 1987 Insp Rept 50-397/86-37 on 861116-870103.No Violations or Deviations Identified.Major Areas Inspected:Esf Status.Lers, Surveillance Program,Maint Program,Special Insp Topics & Licensee Action on Previous Insp Findings IR 05000397/19860381987-01-0707 January 1987 Insp Rept 50-397/86-38 on 861124-26 & 1215-19.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Gaseous Waste Sys,Liquids & Liquid Wastes,Facilities & Equipment,Followup on IE Info Notices & Enforcement Items IR 05000397/19860261986-11-19019 November 1986 Insp Rept 50-397/86-26 on 860915-20.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Emergency Preparedness Exercise & Associated Critique & Followup on Open Items Identified During Previous Insps IR 05000397/19860311986-09-17017 September 1986 Enforcement Conference Rept 50-397/86-31.Topics Discussed: Violations Identified in Insp Rept 50-397/86-12 Re Equipment Qualification Program,Violations in Insp Rept 50-397/86-11 & Repeat Violations in Control of Combustible Matls IR 05000397/19860111986-07-25025 July 1986 Insp Rept 50-397/86-11 on 860616-27.Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Mgt Controls & Licensee Activities,Including Operator Recovery Actions,Qa Program,Measuring & Test Equipment & Tech Spec Surveillances & Tests IR 05000397/19860161986-05-16016 May 1986 Enforcement Conference Rept 50-397/86-16 on 860415.Major Areas Discussed:Apparent Violation Re Fire Protection Program Discussed in Insp Rept 50-397/86-05.App R Fire Protection Audit Findings Encl IR 05000397/19860081986-04-22022 April 1986 Insp Rept 50-397/86-08.No Violation or Deviation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Changes to Emergency Preparedness Program, Public Info,Shift Staffing & Augmentation & Notifications & Communications ML20153H0281986-02-14014 February 1986 Insp Rept 50-397/86-02 on 860113-17 & 21 & 0203.No Violation or Deviation Noted.Major Area Inspected:Radiological Controls.Allegation Re Failure to Make Every Effort to Maintain Radiation Exposures ALARA Substantiated IR 05000397/19850261985-10-25025 October 1985 Insp Rept 50-397/85-26 on 850909-13.No Significant Deficiencies or Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected: Emergency Preparedness Exercise & Associated Critique,Follow Up on Previous Findings & IE Info Notices & Previous Drills IR 05000397/19850341985-09-30030 September 1985 Safety Insp Rept 50-397/85-34 on 850909-13.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Followup of Generic Ltr 83-28, Required Actions Based on Generic ... & Ti 2515/64,Rev 1, Near-Term Insp Followup to Generic.. IR 05000397/19850131985-07-23023 July 1985 Insp Rept 50-397/85-13 on 850624-25.No Significant Deficiencies or Violations Identified.Major Areas Inspected: Emergency Preparedness,Including Knowledge & Performance (Training),Licensee Audits & Changes to Program IR 05000397/19850101985-07-0505 July 1985 Insp Rept 50-397/85-10 on 850325-29.No Violations or Deficiencies Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Emergency Response Facilities & Implementation of NUREG-0737,Suppl 1 Requirements.Items for Improvement Noted IR 05000397/19820141982-08-0202 August 1982 IE Insp Rept 50-397/82-14 on 820607-0709.Noncompliance Noted:Pipe Bending Procedures Not Properly Qualified & Approved & Prompt Measures Not Initiated to Document Condition or Identify Nonconforming Matl IR 05000397/19820161982-07-30030 July 1982 IE Insp Rept 50-397/82-16 on 820719-22.No Noncompliance Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Previously Identified Enforcement & Followup Items & Licensee Identified 10CFR50.55e Reported Items IR 05000397/19820121982-07-0101 July 1982 IE Insp Rept 50-397/82-12 on 820501-31.No Noncompliance Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Contractor Activities & Investigation of Allegations Re Processing of Nonconformance Repts & Insp of Fire Protection Sys IR 05000397/19820111982-06-25025 June 1982 IE Insp Rept 50-397/82-11 on 820517-20,0607 & 0609-11.No Noncompliance Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Activities Associated w/as-built Drawing Program & Followup Items IR 05000397/19820091982-05-26026 May 1982 IE Insp Rept 50-397/82-09 During Apr 1982.No Noncompliance Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Licensee & Contractor Activities to re-evaluate & Improve Detailed Work Methods IR 05000397/19780091978-09-14014 September 1978 Insp Rept 50-397/78-09 on 780822-25.No Noncompliance Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Review of Quality Records,Installation Procedures & Implementation of Fire Protection Program 1999-03-19
[Table view] Category:TEXT-INSPECTION & AUDIT & I&E CIRCULARS
MONTHYEARIR 05000397/19990011999-03-19019 March 1999 Insp Rept 50-397/99-01 on 990201-04 & 0303-05.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Physical Security Program ML20154H7501998-10-13013 October 1998 Revised Notice of Violation from Insp on 971118.Violation Noted:In April 1996,licensee Made Changes to Procedures as Described in Safety Analysis Rept Without Seeking Prior Commission Approval & Changes Had Effect of Changing TS PNO-IV-98-025, on 980615,WNP-2 Initiated Plant Shutdown as Result of Traversing Incore Probe That Could Not Be Moved. Licensee Observed Some Drive Cable Damage & Cable Wrapped Around Some Components Under Reactor Vessel1998-06-16016 June 1998 PNO-IV-98-025:on 980615,WNP-2 Initiated Plant Shutdown as Result of Traversing Incore Probe That Could Not Be Moved. Licensee Observed Some Drive Cable Damage & Cable Wrapped Around Some Components Under Reactor Vessel ML20199E3161997-11-18018 November 1997 Notice of Violation from Insp on 971020-26.Violation Noted: on 971021,inspector Identified Gap in Vehicle Barrier Sys That Provided Path for Design Basis Vehicle to Gain Access to Unauthorized Proximity to Vital Area IR 05000397/19970071997-11-18018 November 1997 Partially Withheld Insp Rept 50-397/97-07 on 971020-26. (Ref 10CFR73.21).Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected: Plant Support Re Vehicle Barrier Sys Which Was Consistent W/Summary Description & Accurately in Security Plan IR 05000397/19970061997-06-0909 June 1997 Insp Rept 50-397/97-06 on 970519-23.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Insp Consisted of Review of Licensee Planned & Implemented Activities Associated W/Isi Program IR 05000397/19970021997-03-0606 March 1997 Insp Rept 50-397/97-02 on 970127-31 & 0212-14.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Engineering & Plant Support Security IR 05000397/19960231996-12-16016 December 1996 Insp Rept 50-397/96-23 on 961118-22.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Engineering & Plant Support ML20134Q0381996-11-21021 November 1996 EN-96-084:on 961126,notice of Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in Amount of $100,000 Issued to Licensee.Action Based on Several Instances Where Surveillances Not Performed & Mode Changes Made W/O Assurances That Equipment Operable PNO-IV-95-007, on 950218,plant Reactor Scrammed from 80% Power Due to Turbine Trip.News Media Was Notified of Event1995-02-21021 February 1995 PNO-IV-95-007:on 950218,plant Reactor Scrammed from 80% Power Due to Turbine Trip.News Media Was Notified of Event PNO-V-93-021, on 931201,chemical Spill in Radwaste Building. Caused by Addition of Oxidizing Agent,Hydrogen Peroxide. Employees Working on Floor Were Moved to Different Part of Plant1993-12-0202 December 1993 PNO-V-93-021:on 931201,chemical Spill in Radwaste Building. Caused by Addition of Oxidizing Agent,Hydrogen Peroxide. Employees Working on Floor Were Moved to Different Part of Plant ML20059D2141993-10-15015 October 1993 Notice of Violation from Insp on 930402-0517.Violation Noted:Licensee Determined That Records Required to Be Maintained by NRC Not Complete & Accurate in All Matl Respects IR 05000397/19930281993-08-26026 August 1993 Insp Rept 50-397/93-28 on 930809-13.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Emergency Preparedness Program, Emergency Detection & Classification,Notification & Communication PNO-V-93-004, on 930121,automatic Reactor Scram Received Due to Low Level in Reactor Pressure Vessel.Licensee Estimates That Plant Will Be Shut Down for Repairs & Maint for 3 to 5 Days.Inspector Onsite During Event.Press Release Issued1993-01-21021 January 1993 PNO-V-93-004:on 930121,automatic Reactor Scram Received Due to Low Level in Reactor Pressure Vessel.Licensee Estimates That Plant Will Be Shut Down for Repairs & Maint for 3 to 5 Days.Inspector Onsite During Event.Press Release Issued IR 05000397/19920341992-12-30030 December 1992 Insp Rept 50-397/92-34 on 921207-11.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Emergency Preparedness Program PNO-V-92-024, on 920711,while Retesting Main Steam SRV at Approx 14% Reactor Power,Srv 3B Opened When Operated from Control Room But Would Not Close.Reactor Operators Reduced Reactor Pressure in Effort to Reseat Valve1992-07-13013 July 1992 PNO-V-92-024:on 920711,while Retesting Main Steam SRV at Approx 14% Reactor Power,Srv 3B Opened When Operated from Control Room But Would Not Close.Reactor Operators Reduced Reactor Pressure in Effort to Reseat Valve PNO-V-91-031, on 911119,licensee Declared Unusual Event Following Low Reactor Pressure Vessel Level Condition W/Eccs Injecting.Reactor Tripped on Turbine Trip.All ECCS Sys Responded as Designed1991-11-19019 November 1991 PNO-V-91-031:on 911119,licensee Declared Unusual Event Following Low Reactor Pressure Vessel Level Condition W/Eccs Injecting.Reactor Tripped on Turbine Trip.All ECCS Sys Responded as Designed ML20203C2231991-06-14014 June 1991 PNO-V-91-04B on 910614,Region V Issued Rev 3 to CAL Concerning Actions to Be Taken by WPPSS Subsequent to Unsuccessful Simulator Requalification Retake Exam Performed 910605-06 PNO-V-90-049, on 901207,w/plant Operating at Full Power, Explosion Occurred in Area of B Phase Insulator of Plant Main Transformer,Which Caused Turbine & Reactor Trip.Unusual Event Was Declared Due to Explosion1990-12-0707 December 1990 PNO-V-90-049:on 901207,w/plant Operating at Full Power, Explosion Occurred in Area of B Phase Insulator of Plant Main Transformer,Which Caused Turbine & Reactor Trip.Unusual Event Was Declared Due to Explosion PNO-V-90-041, on 901024,licensee Declared Unusual Event After Determining That Vital & non-vital Instrument Power Supplies Interconnected Through Certain Sys Instrumentation1990-10-25025 October 1990 PNO-V-90-041:on 901024,licensee Declared Unusual Event After Determining That Vital & non-vital Instrument Power Supplies Interconnected Through Certain Sys Instrumentation PNO-IV-90-028, on 900603,while Attempting to Energize Station Normal Auxiliary Power Transformers,Short Circuit Failure in Bus Works for 25 Kv Sys.Fire Brigade Responded But No Fire Was Reported.Event Under Investigation1990-06-0404 June 1990 PNO-IV-90-028:on 900603,while Attempting to Energize Station Normal Auxiliary Power Transformers,Short Circuit Failure in Bus Works for 25 Kv Sys.Fire Brigade Responded But No Fire Was Reported.Event Under Investigation PNO-V-88-054, on 880824,licensee Declared Unusual Event as Result of Increase in Unidentified Leakage to Level Above TS Limit of 5 Gpm.Reactor Was Later Shutdown & Unidentified Leakage Rate Had Correspondingly Decreased to Approx 8 Gpm1988-08-24024 August 1988 PNO-V-88-054:on 880824,licensee Declared Unusual Event as Result of Increase in Unidentified Leakage to Level Above TS Limit of 5 Gpm.Reactor Was Later Shutdown & Unidentified Leakage Rate Had Correspondingly Decreased to Approx 8 Gpm IR 05000397/19880221988-06-29029 June 1988 Insp Rept 50-397/88-22 on 880606-09.Violation Noted.Major Areas inspected:880512 Radioactive Resins Spill in Radwaste Bldg Which Resulted in Declaration of Unusual Event & Facility Tour ML20150F9771988-06-29029 June 1988 Notice of Violation from Insp on 880606-09.Violation Noted: on 880512,individual Entered Radwaste Bldg W/O Being Accompanied or Provided W/Radiation Monitoring Device & on 880608,door to Radwaste Bldg Not Locked PNO-V-88-013, on 880213,plant Experienced Condenser Tube Failure & Shut Down Manually Scramming Plant from 35% Power. on 880214,reactor Bldg Air Supply Fan Started W/O Trip Circuit Being Energized.Cause Under Investigation1988-02-16016 February 1988 PNO-V-88-013:on 880213,plant Experienced Condenser Tube Failure & Shut Down Manually Scramming Plant from 35% Power. on 880214,reactor Bldg Air Supply Fan Started W/O Trip Circuit Being Energized.Cause Under Investigation IR 07100001/20110051987-12-0404 December 1987 Notice of Violation from Insp on 871001-1105.Violation Noted:Maint Electrician Worked More than 24 H in 48 H Period & Plant Operations Committee Meeting Held W/Chairman & Three Rather than Four Members as Required IR 05000397/19870271987-12-0303 December 1987 Insp Rept 50-397/87-27 on 871001-1105.Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Control Room Operations,Esf Status, Surveillance & Maint Programs,Lers,Special Insp Topics & Licensee Action on Previous Insp Findings PNO-V-87-079, on 871126,digital Voltmeter Connected to Wrong Terminal Resulting in Inadvertent Opening of Safety Relief Valve 2D.Caused by Technician Error.Position of Safety Relief Valve Identified & Shut1987-11-27027 November 1987 PNO-V-87-079:on 871126,digital Voltmeter Connected to Wrong Terminal Resulting in Inadvertent Opening of Safety Relief Valve 2D.Caused by Technician Error.Position of Safety Relief Valve Identified & Shut ML20236T8241987-10-30030 October 1987 Exam Rept 50-397/OL-87-03 on 870922-30.Exam Results:Four Out of Six Reactor Operator Candidates & Eight Out of Eleven Senior Reactor Operator Candidates Passed Exams.Sample Test & Other Supporting Info Encl ML20236G3791987-10-26026 October 1987 PNS-V-87-008:on 871024,licensed Plant Operator Reportedly Arrested by Kennewick City Police Dept & Charged W/Discharge of Firearm within City Limits & Reckless Endangerment. Licensee Suspended Employee Unescorted Access to Plant PNO-V-87-024A, on 870322,reactor Manually Tripped Due to Loss of Feedwater.Caused by Mechanical Failure of 1/4-amp Fuse in Feedwater Control Sys.Rcic Sys Operated Properly.Plant Restarted on 8703241987-03-25025 March 1987 PNO-V-87-024A:on 870322,reactor Manually Tripped Due to Loss of Feedwater.Caused by Mechanical Failure of 1/4-amp Fuse in Feedwater Control Sys.Rcic Sys Operated Properly.Plant Restarted on 870324 PNO-V-87-024, on 870322,both Main Feedwater Pumps Lost Suction Pressure & Tripped.Plant Operator Manually Tripped Reactor Upon Losing All Feedwater Flow.Reactor Vessel Level Restored & Heat Manually Removed.Investigation Pending1987-03-23023 March 1987 PNO-V-87-024:on 870322,both Main Feedwater Pumps Lost Suction Pressure & Tripped.Plant Operator Manually Tripped Reactor Upon Losing All Feedwater Flow.Reactor Vessel Level Restored & Heat Manually Removed.Investigation Pending ML20205G6601987-03-20020 March 1987 Exam Rept 50-397/OL-87-02.Requalification Program Evaluated as Satisfactory,Per Rev 0 to NUREG-1021 & WT Russell 860522 Memo Re Listed Requirements PNO-V-87-022, on 870319,licensee Found Pressure Switch on Discharge Side of RHR Sys Pump B Isolated.Licensee Unisolated Switch & Restored Sys to Full Operability.Region V Followup Continuing1987-03-20020 March 1987 PNO-V-87-022:on 870319,licensee Found Pressure Switch on Discharge Side of RHR Sys Pump B Isolated.Licensee Unisolated Switch & Restored Sys to Full Operability.Region V Followup Continuing IR 05000397/19870031987-03-18018 March 1987 Insp Rept 50-397/87-03 on 870223-27.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Calibr of Instrumentation,Ie Bulletin Followup,Licensee Action on Previous Insp Findings,Licensee Action on Items of Noncompliance & Part 21 Followup IR 05000397/19870011987-03-0303 March 1987 Insp Rept 50-397/87-01 on 870104-0214.No Violations or Deviations Identified.Major Areas Inspected:Control Room Operations,Esf Status,Surveillance Programs,Maint Topics, Lers,Special Insp Topics & Listed Insp Procedures PNO-V-87-015, on 870220,shutdown Commenced Due to Decreasing Lubrication Oil Pressure to Turbine Bearings.Caused by Flange or Pipe Leak Inside Lube Oil Reservoir.Shutdown Will Continue for Approx 4 to 6 Days1987-02-20020 February 1987 PNO-V-87-015:on 870220,shutdown Commenced Due to Decreasing Lubrication Oil Pressure to Turbine Bearings.Caused by Flange or Pipe Leak Inside Lube Oil Reservoir.Shutdown Will Continue for Approx 4 to 6 Days IR 05000397/19860371987-01-16016 January 1987 Insp Rept 50-397/86-37 on 861116-870103.No Violations or Deviations Identified.Major Areas Inspected:Esf Status.Lers, Surveillance Program,Maint Program,Special Insp Topics & Licensee Action on Previous Insp Findings IR 05000397/19860381987-01-0707 January 1987 Insp Rept 50-397/86-38 on 861124-26 & 1215-19.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Gaseous Waste Sys,Liquids & Liquid Wastes,Facilities & Equipment,Followup on IE Info Notices & Enforcement Items PNO-V-86-084, on 861120,plant Shut Down Due to Inoperability of Acoustic Monitor for Safety Relief Valve 5c.Caused by Lack of Environ Qualification Documentation for Connector. Investigation Underway.Plant Will Be Restarted on 8611251986-11-20020 November 1986 PNO-V-86-084:on 861120,plant Shut Down Due to Inoperability of Acoustic Monitor for Safety Relief Valve 5c.Caused by Lack of Environ Qualification Documentation for Connector. Investigation Underway.Plant Will Be Restarted on 861125 IR 05000397/19860261986-11-19019 November 1986 Insp Rept 50-397/86-26 on 860915-20.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Emergency Preparedness Exercise & Associated Critique & Followup on Open Items Identified During Previous Insps PNO-V-86-078, on 861107 & 09 Increased Vibration from Reactor Recirculating Water Pump a Occurred.Licensee Reduced Reactor Power & Shifted Pumps Into Low Frequency Operation, Decreasing Vibration Level1986-11-12012 November 1986 PNO-V-86-078:on 861107 & 09 Increased Vibration from Reactor Recirculating Water Pump a Occurred.Licensee Reduced Reactor Power & Shifted Pumps Into Low Frequency Operation, Decreasing Vibration Level PNO-V-86-064A, on 860918,licensee Declared Alert Due to Tornado Warnings & High Winds.Train a Svc Water Sys out-of- Svc Due to Fire in Svc Water Pump House.Licensee Also Experiencing Low Fire Main Header Pressure1986-09-18018 September 1986 PNO-V-86-064A:on 860918,licensee Declared Alert Due to Tornado Warnings & High Winds.Train a Svc Water Sys out-of- Svc Due to Fire in Svc Water Pump House.Licensee Also Experiencing Low Fire Main Header Pressure PNO-V-86-064, on 860918,licensee Declared Unusual Event Due to High Winds of 85 Mph.Svc Water Pump B out-of-svc Resulting in Emergency Diesel Generator B Being out-of-svc. Rupture in Low Pressure Fire Main Also Reported1986-09-18018 September 1986 PNO-V-86-064:on 860918,licensee Declared Unusual Event Due to High Winds of 85 Mph.Svc Water Pump B out-of-svc Resulting in Emergency Diesel Generator B Being out-of-svc. Rupture in Low Pressure Fire Main Also Reported ML20206U1861986-09-18018 September 1986 Notice of Violation from Insp on 860616-27 IR 05000397/19860311986-09-17017 September 1986 Enforcement Conference Rept 50-397/86-31.Topics Discussed: Violations Identified in Insp Rept 50-397/86-12 Re Equipment Qualification Program,Violations in Insp Rept 50-397/86-11 & Repeat Violations in Control of Combustible Matls ML20206U7381986-09-17017 September 1986 Exam Rept 50-397/OL-86-02 on 860811-14.Exam Results:One Senior Reactor Operator Candidate Failed Simulator Portion & One Senior Reactor Operator Candidate Failed Oral & Simulator Portions of Exam.Eight Candidates Passed PNO-V-86-060, on 860903,reactor Feedwater Pump B Tripped Due to Failure of Overspeed Controls.Caused by Partial Control Valve Closure Re Tripping of Hydraulic Power Units. Investigation Underway1986-09-0404 September 1986 PNO-V-86-060:on 860903,reactor Feedwater Pump B Tripped Due to Failure of Overspeed Controls.Caused by Partial Control Valve Closure Re Tripping of Hydraulic Power Units. Investigation Underway IR 05000397/19860111986-07-25025 July 1986 Insp Rept 50-397/86-11 on 860616-27.Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Mgt Controls & Licensee Activities,Including Operator Recovery Actions,Qa Program,Measuring & Test Equipment & Tech Spec Surveillances & Tests PNO-V-86-034, on 860620,licensee Measured 1.3 Gpm Leakage Into RHR Sys B.Caused by Leak Through LPCI Injection Valve 53B.Util Repairing Valve.Startup Will Be Delayed Until 860629 Due to BPA Load Requirements1986-06-23023 June 1986 PNO-V-86-034:on 860620,licensee Measured 1.3 Gpm Leakage Into RHR Sys B.Caused by Leak Through LPCI Injection Valve 53B.Util Repairing Valve.Startup Will Be Delayed Until 860629 Due to BPA Load Requirements 1999-03-19
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Y U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REG 10]LY Report N /92-34 License N NPF-21 Licensee: Washington Public Power Supply System P.O. Box 968 3000 George Washington Way Richland, Washington 99352 Facility Name: Washington Nuclear Project, Unit 2 (WNP-2)
Inspection at: WNP-2 Site, Benton County, Washington Inspection Conducted: December 7 - 11, 1992 Inspectors: .k h
. McQueeri, Emerg ~cy Preparedness Analyst
/2/EM42 Date Signed y D% A& Iv{ t l lt .Q ils Reactor Inspector Date Signed i A/tf E ussell, Rea,ctor I.icensing Examiner 1111111 L Date Signed
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+t l2 S 2 R. CTT s, 'adiation Specialist Inspector Date'51gndd S. A. Boynton, Emergency Preparedness Specialist, NRR/PEPB Approved by: MN obert J.~ Pate, ' Chief, Safegn&afds, Emergency
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Date Signed Preparedness, and Non-Power Reactor Branch Summary:
Areas Inspected: Announced inspection to examine the following portions of the licensee's emergency preparedness program: follow-up on Open Items identified during previous emergency preparedness inspections and observe the 1992 annual emergency preparedness exercise and associated critiques; and Inspector Identified Items. During this inspection, Inspection Procedures 82301, 92700 and 92701 were use .PDR ADOCK 03000397 G PDR
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Results: In the areas inspected, the licensee's emergency preparedness program was found to be in compliance with NRC requirements within the areas examined. One item was identified as an exercise weakness and several areas were indicated to the licensee for improvement. The exercise weakness is-described in section .
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INSPECTION DETAILS Key Persons Contacted
- P. Bagan, Emergency Preparedness (EP) Technical Advisor J. Baker, Plant Manager J. Bekhazi, HVAC System Engineer 0. Brooks, Principal Training Specialist
- M. Monopoli, Manager, Support Services
- J. Parrish, Assistant Managing Director of Operations
- D. Pisarcik, Manager, Radiation Protection
- G. Ray, Principal Emergency Planner M. Reis, Compliance Lead
- G. Sorensen, Manager, Regulatory Programs
- R. Utter, Supervisor, Emergency Preparedness Training The above individuals denoted with an asterisk were present during the exit meeting. The inspectors also contacted other members of the licensee's emergency preparedness, administrative, and technical staff and management during the course of the inspectio NRC Personnel at Exit interview S. A. Boynton, Emergency Preparedness Specialist, NRR/PEPB Cillis, Radiation Specialist Inspector, RV A. D. McQueen, Emergency Preparedness Analyst, RV J. J. Russell, Reactor Licensing Examiner Follow up on Previous Inspection Findinos (927011 Two inspection followup items from the 1991 annual emergency exercise were reviewed during this inspection, (Closed) Followup Item - Exercise Weakness (91-33-01)
During the 1991 annual emergency exercise, it was noted at the TSC that the online Emergency Notification System (ENS) communicator
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with the NRC was unable to view status boards from his locatio In discussions with the NRC base team after the exercise, it was indicated that the line was left unmanned at times up to fifteen:
minutes while gathering requested data. This appeared contrary to 10'CFR 50.72(c)(3), which indicates that "Each licensee shall, during the course of the event: Maintain an open,~ continuous communication channel with the NRC. Operations Center upon request-by the NRC." This request had been made by the NRC, Had this been an actual event,-this situation could have resulted in violation of regulatory requirements. Action was necessary to insure manning and assignment of duties to provide for fulltime coverage of the EN Since the last exercise, the licensee had-
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installed a portable telephone with which the NRC Communicator could walk around and still maintain fulltime telephone coverag This item is close (Exercise Observation) Dose Projections for Future Offsite Releases It was observed during the 1991 Annual Emergency Exercise that approximately 45 minutes prior to the termination of the exercise, following discussions with the NRC Site Team and Operations Center Staff, the Meteorology and Unified Dose Assessment Center (MUDAC)
staff performed a dose consequence assessment of a complete core damage scenario. To perform this assessment, the MUDAC staff utilized the core inventory of radionuclides tabulated in Chapter 15 of the FSAR and attempted to estimate the response of the
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elevated release point monitor. Rather than use the iterative process that was actually used, the MVDAC staff should have had a '
more efficient method for estimating the offsite consequence of a release of 100% of the core inventory. Such a method would have facilitated smoother interaction with the NRC site team and operations center staff. In a review of this item during a previous inspection, the licensee indicated that they were looking at several options to accomplish this type task. One method reviewed was the NRC RASCAL program, along with other programs suggested by FEMA Region X as possible solutions. These and other options will be evaluated by the licensee and the most promising one will continue to be considered for implementation as deemed
! appropriate. For the present time the licensee has installed l " RASCAL" for dose assessment and personnel have been trained in l
the use of the program. This item was reviewed during this i exercise and it was concluded that improvements had been made
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The remaining open items will be reviewed during.the next routine emergency preparedness inspection at the sit . Exercise Planning (responsibility, scenario / objectives development, control of scenario) -
The Manager, Emergency Planning (EP) has the overall responsibility-for developing, conducting and evaluatine, the annual emergency preparedness exercise. The EP staff developed thu scenario with the assistance of licensee staff from other organizat M s aossessing appropriate expertise (e.g. reactor operations,' health physics, maintenance, etc.). In an effort to maintain strict security over the scenario, individuals who
! had been involved in the exercise scenario development were not to l participate in the exercise. NRC Region V and Federal Emergency l
Management Agency (FEMA) Region X were provided an opportunity to comment on the proposed scenario and objectives. The complete exercise l document included objectives and guidelines, exercise scenario and necessary messages and data (plant parameters and radiological
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in formation) . The exercise document was tightly controlled before the
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exercise. Advance copies of the exercise document were provided to the NRC and FEMA evaluators and other persons having a specific need. This exercise was conducted to meet the requirements of IV.F 3 of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 5 . Exercise Scenario The exercise objectives and scenario were evaluated by the NRC and considered appropriate as a method to demonstrate the Washington Public Power Supply System (WPPSS) capabilities to respond to an emergency in accordance with their Emergency Plan and implementing procedures. The exercise scenario started at about 8:00 a.m. with a. trip of the Main Generator, closure of the 230 kilovolt (KV) offsite Startup Power breakers, which then tripped open due to a fault on the S'ertup Power Transformer (TR-S). Conditions for declaring an Unusual tvent (UE) were then met due to a loss Of Offsite Power (LOOP). Emergency Diesel Generators (DG-1, DG-2 and DG-3) received an autostart signal from the LOOP but DG-1 failed to start. This left DG-2 and DG-3 as the only Alternating Current (AC) power sources. Additionally, failure of DG-1 precluded operation of the Low Pressure Core Spray (LPCS) pump and RHR pump "A". Twenty minutes later, a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA)
occurred due to a break of a Reactor Recirc Pump discharge line. The resulting loss of hot coolant uncovered the core and pressurized the Containmen The High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) pump auto started and then tripped on overcurrent. The only remaining operable Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) pump was RHR pump "B", but the "B" pump injection valve failed to open. The loss of all ECCS pumps caused the core to remain uncovered and fuel damage soon occurred. At about 8:25 a.m.,
conditions for a Site Area Emergency were met due to Reactor water level less than -161 inches. About five minutes later, conditions were met for declaring a General Emergency (GE) due to fuel damage caused by inadequate core cooling and a radioactive release to the atmosphere. At about 8:50 a.m., a Burlington Northern freight-train with 33 empty box ~
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cars derailed at the intersection of Highway 395_ and Eltopia Road West.
l This necessitated emergency response from State and County agencies.
l The remainder of the exercise was devoted to stabilizing plant l conditions to preclude any further radiological release, i Federal Observers
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I Five NRC inspectors evaluated the licensee's response to the scenario.
l Inspectors were stationed in the Control Room / Simulator (CR), Technical l Support Center (TSC), Operational Support Center (OSC), and in the -
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l-Emergency Operations Facility (EOF). An inspector in the OSC also accompanied a repair / monitoring tea FEMA evaluators were located at selected offsite emergency facilities and locations. FEMA Region X is preparing a separate report pertaining to offsite emergency-exercise activities.
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5 Exercise Observations (82301)
The following observations, as appropriate, are intended to be suggestions for improving the emergency preparedness program. An exercise weakness is a finding identified as needing corrective action in accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.F.5. All exercise times and other times indicated in this report are Pacific Standard Time (PST). Control Room / Simulator (CR)
The following aspects of CR operations were observed during the exercise: detection and classification of emergency events, notification, frequent use of emergency procedures, and innovative attempts to mitigate the accident. The inspector assessed the performance of the staff as they operated the plant referenced simulator. The staff was one operating crew. The inspector also observed the critiques conducted after the exercise by drill participants and licensee staf The event began with "C" Residual Heat Removal (RHR) pump out of service. The unit was at 100% power when the Main Generator spuriously trippe The Startup Transformers failed resulting in a loss of offsite powe The crew declared an Unusual Event. Diesel Generator "1" started and tripped. At 8:20 a.m. a loss-of coolant accident (LOCA)
occurred and the High Pressure Core Spray pump tripped on overcurren The crew used seven Automatic Depressurization System valves to depressurize the Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV)._ A Site Area Emergency was declared. The Reactor Coolant Isolation Cooling turbine isolated on low steam inlet pressure. The "B" RHR pump injection valve stuck shut resulting in a loss of low pressure injection and causing RPV water level to peg low on. Fuel Zone indication (less than -285 inches) for ,
approximately 10 minutes. Due to valve failures, Standby Gas Treatment System (SGTS) train _"A" provided an unfiltered release path for _
radioactive material. The "B" RHR pump injection valve was opened and
"C" RHR pump was returned to service. The crew raised and maintained RPV level using "C" RHR pump while "B" RHR pump was used to cool the Suppression Pool. The exercise was terminated at 12:05 The inspector observed two areas of concern. -These observations are listed belo One area of concern was that the crew demonstrated a gap in knowledge concerning the RHR system.- The "C" RHR pump was used to maintain RPV level after the LOCA. The pump was --
turned on, and then off, in order to raise level to the hig end of the 13 inch to 54 inch band set in the Emergency
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Operating Procedures (EOPs). This resulted in starting the pump approximately every three minutes from 9:10 a.m. to 10:30 a.m. This was approximately 28 starts-in an hour and 20 minute time period.- At 10:30 a.m.,-the crew began to control RPV level by cycling the pump discharge isolation
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valve and maintaining the pump running. These excessive pump' starts were contrary to procedure PPM 2.4.2, " Residual Heat Removal System," which stated in step 4.12 that RHR pumps should be limited to two starts from ambient temperature and one start from rated temperature._Any more
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starts required a 30 minute running time or a 60 minute idle time. This caution was based on high motor winding temperatures caused by excessive starting currents. The inspector observed the "C" RHR amperage meter peg high each time the pump was started. In this instance the crew demonstrated a lack of knowledge of this system caution that could have resulted in a failure of one of the two low pressure Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) pumps available to maintain RPV level ("B" RHR pump was dedicated to Suppression Pool cooling but still available for RPV level control). The inspector concluded that in this instance the procedural caution was not contradictory to the intent of the E0Ps and, although not explicitly reprinted in the E0Ps, should have been observed.
, Another area of concern was that the crew failed to properly classify the event. At approximately 8:25 a.m., RPV level dropped to below -285 inches, which was below the Bottom of the Active Fuel. This level remained below the fuel Zone indicating range (-285 inches) for approximately 10 minute During the same time period the Reactor Coolant Pressure boundary was lost due to the LOCA and Primary Containment was lost due to valve failures in the SGTS. A release of radioactive material was in progress and indicated by radiation levels in the plant vent stack and SGTS flow rates. PPM 13.1.1, " Emergency Classification," attachment 4.3 stated " Classification shall be made using conservative principles." PPM 13.1.1 also stated a General Emergency should have been declared if there was a loss of-two fission product barriers and "a high potential for loss of the third." The operator was directed to attachment 4.4 of the same procedure, which referred the operator to PPM 9.3.22,
" Core-Damage Evaluation," for clarification of potential damage to the-fuel. .The fuel was the fission-product-barrier with a-high potential _ for loss. PPM 9.3.22,-section 5.1, directed the operator to evaluate the possibility-of core damage based on reactor water level history. The inspector concluded, using these: procedures, that core-damage was possible during this scenario. Core uncovery for a 10 minute period 30 minutes after shutdown would have probably caused the fuel clad to exceed 1500 degrees (F)
resulting in some degree of' clad failure. 1500 degrees (F)
was the threshold for fuel rod perforation. The inspector concluded that the use of PPM 9.3.22 should have caused the crew to decide there was a high potential for loss of the fission clad barrier and, per PPM 13.1.1, declare a General
- Emergency. Emergency classification was the responsibility
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of the Emergency Director, which was the Shift Manager, until he was relieved of this duty at about 9:10 This provided the crew with 45 minutes to declare the General Emergency from the time of the core uncover The inspector concluded the control room personnel's failure to adequately classify the event was of major concern (92-34-01, EXERCISE WEAXNESS). The facility controllers did not comment on this during the critique immediately following the exercise conducted in the simulato The facility did subsequently acknowledge this concern. The crew that operated the simulator was off shift, undergoing facility requalification examinations, during the week of the exercise. The facility provided remediation and examination of this crew, in the areas listed above, prior to allowing them to return to shif . Technical Support Center (TSC)
The following aspects of TSC operations were observed: activation, accident assessment / classification, notification, and interactions between the various emergency response facilities. The following represent the NRC inspector's observations in the TS At 8:58 a.m., players had been told by controllers that they would not be able to stop the release prior to 9:15 a.m. This was communicated between emergency centers, thus promptin5 players as to when this item would re-enter exercise pla TSC habitability was not properly monitored or maintained, for example:
e The door to the TSC, required to be shut for TSC atmosphere isolation, remained open throughout the exercise, e The TSC Iodine and Noble Gas monitors remained inoperable throughout the exercise. This was determined to be a procedural problem and the procedure was revised soon after the exercise, e No portable atmosphere samples were taken in the TSC during the exercis e No Step Off pad was established to monitor persons entering the TSC to prevent the spread of contaminatio This item is identified for followup in future routine and/or emergency exercise inspections (92-34-02). The TSC staff appeared pro-active in anticipating the need to call in additional personnel to obtain a PASS sample.
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8 After lunch arrived at about 11:15 a.m., it appeared to the inspector that player attention to the exercise activities decreased significantl This was also observed by inspectors in the EO . Operational Support Center (OSC)
The following aspects of the OSC operations were observed: activation of the OSC, functional capabilities, communications, and various in-plant repair / monitoring team The OSC was activated and staffed in an orderly and timely manne Accountability and habitability activities were immediately initiate Habitability was verified at least every 15-20 minutes and the accountability status verifications were completed in a timely manne Field teams were properly briefed, tracked, and debriefed. Health physics coverage was good and communications with the field teams were maintained. The OSC Director and his staff provided status reports to the members in the Work Control Center (i.e., OSC) and to the field teams located in the cafeteria at approximate 15 minute interval Participation by all of the OSC and field team members was enthusiastic and realistic. Evacuation of non-essential personnel went efficiently and appeared effective. Observations for improvement and an area of strength included: , The accident scenario contained conflicting health physics data; for instance, airborne concentrations were extremely low for the levels of contamination reported. Field teams did not encounter any airborne problems during the entire scenario even though a release was reported during the initial stages and remained in effect until CEP valves lA and 2A were secure The need for administering KI tablets appeared to be prematur The scenario never did develop to the point-in which KI tablets would have been neede A significant improvement was noted in this exercise by using both the cafeteria and Work Control Center office spaces for the OSC and for managing OSC activities. The OSC Director was able to maintain good command of the situation throughout the entire exercise. This was accomplished by establishing a priority lis The priority list was used very effectively in managing the field teams. There was less confusion than was observed during previous exercises. The OSC Director and the OSC support groups displayed an excellent knowledge of applicable EPIPs and OSC functions.
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The following EOF operations were observed:
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activation; functional capabilities; interface with offsite officials; dose assessment; and the formulation of protective action. recommendations. The following are NRC observations of EOF activitie Emergency Classification and Protective Action Recommendations A General Emergency, based upon loss of containment and RCS barriers and potential loss of fuel clad barrier, should have been declared at approximately 8:25 a.m. (see section 7 above).
Notwithstanding this, a PAR was approved by the Plant Emergency Director (PED) at 9:15 a.m. for evacuation of.affected zones out to 2 miles and sheltering of those zones out to 10 miles. The PAR was transmitted to State and local authorities at 9:34 a.m., about 74 minutes after the release had started and about 19 minutes after the PAR was approved. Had the appropriate classification been made around 8:25 a.m., a PAR would have likely been issue much soone The SAE declaration led to several contradictions by the Emergency Response Organization:
(1) A SAE was declared when a release was known to be in progress with plant conditions deterioratin This sends mixed signals to offsite authorities as to what actions they should be taking. The issuance of the PAR during a SAE contradicted the definition of an SAE which assumes that PAGs will not be exceeded offsite. Also, when questions on the PAR were raised to the EOF, neither the Recovery Manager (RM) nor the Radiological Emergency Manager (REM) understood what the basis was for the PAR. It was subsequently determined the PAR recommendation was made by the MUDAC based on conservatis (2) When issuing the airspace closure request per PPM 13.11.11, the General Emergency attachment was used and the SAE attachment had references to releases delete (3) When the licensee believed that radiological conditions-warranted protective action recommendations for the general public this should have.been a cue that declaration of a general emergency was also warranted. This was questioned in both the TSC and the EOF, but the classification was not upgraded in either center. The SAE declaration was not-questioned in the EOF decision center until after 10:00 In accordance with PPM 13.14.2, protective action recommendations 4 are developed using plant conditions and using dose projection The more conservative PAR is to be used. At 9:15 a.m., the PED was responsible for the issuance of PARS. Plant conditions at the
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time did not warrant a PAR. This means that any PAR would be based upon radiological conditions and would involve dose assessmen No dose assessment was performed in the TSC and dose calculations in the contrcl room did not indicate that a protective action was warranted. Contrary to this, TSC issued a PAR for evacuation at 9:10 a.m. No basis was given for the PAR except " radiological conditions" as indicated on the classification notification form. The PAR was inappropriate for known plant and radiological conditions and was not commensurate with the SAE classificatio This appeared to be a failure to follow procedure 13.1 > Other Observations (1) The Communicator in EOFCC was not familiar with technical terminology and acronyms. This could potentially hinder notifications to State and local EOC (2) A MUDAC Coordinator log entry at 11:58 a.m. indicated that the J W requested information on I-131, however, the coordinator said he could not provide specifics. Contrary to this, two air sample results were available to the MUDAC Coordinator at the time and would have provided useful information to the JI (3) A status board in the E0F Decision Center indicated that an Emergency Planning Advisor should be available; however, no name was posted and it was not apparent that an EP Advisor was available. The presence of an individual who is intimately familiar with emergency planning may have alleviated the emergency classification problem and would directly benefit the Recovery Manage . Licensee Critiques and FEMA Public Meetina A series of exercise critiques was conducted by the licensee upon completion of the exercis Facility critiques were conducted at each emergercy response facility with players and controllers immediately following the exercise. The licensee had noted several of the items also identified by the NRC observers, as well as other exercise strengths and problems for improvement. Two of the critiques immediately following the exercise were considered particularly l
effective for future exercise improvement, the OSC and the TSC ( (sections 8 and 9 above).
- The licensee provided a corporate level critique for the NRC inspection team on December 10, 1992.
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A meeting open to the public was conducted by the FEMA Region X, at the Federal Building ir. Richland, Washington, on December 11, 1992. A brief
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NRC statement of exercise findings was made and FEMA conducted a discussion of exercise offsite activities. The meeting was then opened to questions from attendee ,
1 Exit Intervie On December 10, 1992, at the conclusion of the site visit, the inspectors met with the licensee representatives identified in the attachment hereto to summarize the scope and the preliminary results of this inspection. The inspectors noted which previously open items would be closed and what new items were identified. The inspectors reviewed the weakness discussed in sectio,. 7 above. The licensee indicated actions under consideration to correct the weakness and confirmed that the exercise crew involved had been remediated and examined prior to returning to shif ATTACHMENT Exit Meeting Attendee .
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ATTACHMENT NRC EXIT INTERVIEW ATTENDEES R. M. Abdella, WPPSS D. W. Martin, WPPSS H. L. Aeschliman, WPPSS A. D. McQueen, NRC P. T. Bagan, WPPSS K. P. Meehan, WPPSS S. A. Boynton, NRC M. M. Monopoli, WPPSS P. H. Brenberger, WPPSS L. S. Morris, WPPSS T. E. Chapman, WPPSS A. L. Oxsen, WPPSS T. E. Chrisler, WPPSS J. V. Parrish, WPPSS Cillis, NRC J. F. Perry, WPPSS A. J. Connor, WPPSS G. D. Phillips, WPPSS J. R. Fisher, WPPSS D. J. Pisarcik, WPPSS N. L. Garza, WPPSS F. D. Quinn, WPPSS G. L. Gelhaus, WPPSS G. O. Ray, WPPSS R. J. Given, WPPSS J. J. Russell, NRC J. A. Gloyn, WPPSS V. E. Schockley, WPPSS G. H. Godfrey, WPPSS G. C. Sorensen, WPPSS J. D. Harmon, WPPSS R. L. Utter, WPPSS R. E. Jorgenson, WPPSS M. S. Valdez, WPPSS D. E. Larson, WPPSS R. L. Wardlow, WPPSS M. J. Mann, WPPSS F. A. Wenslawski, NRC
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