IR 05000397/1993028
| ML20057C667 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Columbia  |
| Issue date: | 08/26/1993 |
| From: | Mcqueen A, Pate R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20057C663 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-397-93-28, NUDOCS 9309290243 | |
| Download: ML20057C667 (11) | |
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.U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION V
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Report No.:
50-397/93-28 License No.:
NPF-21 Washington Public Power Supply System (WPPSS)
Licensee:
P.O. Box 968 3000 George Washington Way Richland, Washington 99352 Facility Name: Washington Nuclear Project, Unit 2 (WNP-2)
Inspection at: WNP-2 Site, Benton County, Washington Inspection Conducted: August 9 - 13, 1993 b
W Inspector:
4A A. D. McQueen, Emergency Preparedness Analyst Date Signed
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M f.3 Approved by:
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Date S5gned R' ert J. Pate,' Ch'ief, Safeguards, Emergency Preparedness, and Non-Power Reactor Branch i
Summary:
This routine inspection by a region-based inspector examined Areas Inspected:
Open the following portions of the licensee's emergency preparedness program:
Items identified during previous emergency preparedness inspections; Emergency Knowledge and Detection and Classification; Notification and Communications; Performance of Duties; Operational Status of the Emergency Preparedness During Program and Onsite follow-up of Events at Operating Power Reactors.82201, 82203, 82 this inspection, portions of Inspection Procedures 92701 and 93702 were used.
In the areas inspected, the licensee's emergency preparedness
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Results:
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program appeared adequate to accomplish its objectives ard the licensee was found to be in compliance with NRC requirements, i
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9309290243 930827.
PDR ADOCK 05000397 O
PDR.
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t INSPECTION DETAILS
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1.
Key Persons Contacted
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- li. L. Aeschliman, Emergency Planner
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- A. L. Alexander, Radiation Protection
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Barley, Radiation Protection (RP) Consultant C. J. Becker, Shift Manager
- J. A. Benjamin, Manager, Quality Assessment
- D. W. Coleman, Supervisor, Regulatory Services J. W. Dabney, Manager, Work Control Group
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- M. G. Eades, Licensing Engineer
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- C. L. Fies,-Licensing Engineer N. L. Garza. Emergency Training
- J. C. Gearhart, Director, Quality Assurance.(QA),'WNP-2
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- D. J. Graham, Senior Fire Protection Specialist
- L. T. Harrold, Manager, Maintenance Division
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M. G. Kappl, Shift Manager l
- S. S. Kim, ALARA Manager
- A. F. Klauss, Emergency Planning
- R. L. Koenigs, Manager, Design Engineering
- D. E. Larson, Manager, Emergency Preparedness (EP)
- K. B. Lewis, Licensing Engineer
- T. S. Love, Chemistry Manager l
- K. P. Meehan, Emergency Planner
- M. M. Monopoli, Manager, Support Services N. K. Nault, Engineering Associate, Maintenance
- K. T. Newcomb, Fire Marshal
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R. F. Patch, Supervisor, Craft
- S. H. Peck, Manager, Equipment Engineering'
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- K. E. Pisarcik, General Aide, licensing J. D. Prescott, Control Room Supervisor
G. O. Ray, Emergency Planner
- J. D. Rhoads, Manager, Operating Events and Resolution
- J. R. Sampson, Manager, Maintenance Production
- W. H. Sawyer, Shift Manager, Operations
- G. O. Smith, Manager, Operations Division
- G. C. Sorensen, Manager, Regulatory Programs
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- J. H. Swailes, Plant Manager
- D. A. Swank, Licensing Engineer
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- R. L. Utter, Supervisor, EP Operations
- R. L. Webring, Technical Manager
- J. C. Wiles, QA Engineer
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The above individuals denoted with an asterisk were present during the
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exit meeting on August 13, 1993. The inspector also contacted other
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members of the licensee's emergency preparedness, administrative, and technical staff during the course of the inspection.
NRC Personnel at Exit Interview
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R. C. Barr, Senior Resident Inspector N.
Mamish, Radiation Specialist, RV
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A. D. McQueen, Emergency Preparedness Analyst, RV
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J. H. Reese, Chief, Facilities Radiological Protection Branch, RV'
W. J. Wagner, Fire Protection Inspector, RV 2.
Functional or Program Areas Inspected t
The licensee appeared to be maintaining their previous level of performance in the following areas and their program appeared adequate to e
accomplish their objectives.
Emergency Detection and Classification (MC 82201)
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f The licensee has an individual, the Shift Manager, on site at all times who has the authority and responsibility to immediately and unilaterally classify events and initiate any emergency actions, including recommending protective measures to offsite officials.
It was determined through interviews with Shift Managers that the licensee has adequate procedures to direct the user to classify emergencies. The licensee has procedures to review the Emergency Action Levels (EALs) with State and local authorities as required.
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Notifications and Communications (MC 82203)
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The licensee's notification procedures appeared consistent with the
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emergency classification and action level scheme and provisions for
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verifying messages appeared appropriate. The scheme is tested in
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accordance with pertinent procedures. Actual notifications since the
last routine inspection were reviewed as indicated in subsection e below.
It was verified that the appropriate communications equipment and procedures existed in the emergency facilities and appeared consistent with the needs for communication within the licensee's organization, for offsite support, and with the State and local authorities as required. Since the last routine EP
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inspection, the licensee has added a pager call system in' addition l
to the auto-dialer callout system.
Both systems are in use for
emergency response organization callout and have been tested by the licensee in response callout drills.
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Knowledge and Performance of Duties (MC 82206)
c.
The licensee has an EP training program implemented and maintained as required. Two Shift Managers were interviewed regarding emergency response reference documents, their responsibilities, and position functions in emergency response. They indicated they had been trained on tb. EAL schemes and demonstrated a familiarity with
the EAL procedure and using-it for classifying emergency events.
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d.
Operational Status of the Emergency Preparedness Program (MC-82701)
(1) Emergency Plan and Implementina Procedures (a)
Emergency Plan Revision A rewritten Revision 11 to the site Emergency Plan was submitted by the licensee and is under review at Region V.
The original Revision 11 had elements found unacceptable in its regulatory reviews. The licensee submission indicated the necessary changes had been made to correct the items previously found not acceptable.
(b) Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures Nineteen Plant Procedures Manual (PPM) Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIP), which had been revised since the last routine inspection, were reviewed during this inspection:
PPM 13.2.1, Man-Cause and Natural Emergency Actions,
Revision 8, dated March 15, 1993.
PPM 13.5.1, Controlled Evacuation of the Protected
Area, Revision 7, dated March 15, 1993.
PPM 13.5.2, Immediate Evacuation of the Protected
Area, Revision 7, dated March 15, 1993.
PPM 13.7.5, Decontamination Operations at Remote e
Locations, Revision 8, dated March 15, 1993.
PPM 13.7.7, Emergency Operations facility First Aid
Center Operations, Revision 8, dated May 20, 1993, PPM 13.7.8, Transportation of Injured or Contaminated o
Injured Personnel to an Offsite Medical facility, Revision 8, dated May 20, 1993.
PPM 13.8.1, Computerized Emergency Dose Projection e
System Operations, Revision 7, dated May 20, 1993.
PPM 13.8.2, Backup Emergency Dose Projection System e
Operations, Revision 11, dated May 20, 1993.
PPM 13.10.6, Plant /NRC Liaison Duties, Revision 8, e
dated March 15, 199 _
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tr PPM 13.10.10, Health Physics, Chemistry Operations e
Support Center Duties, Revision 7, dated March 15,
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1993.
PPM 13.11.3, Site Support Manager and Staff Duties, o
Revision 8, dated March 15, 1993.
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' PPM 13.11.9, Administrative Support Manager and Staff
Duties, Revision 10, dated March 15, 1993.
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PPM 13.11.12, Technical Data Center Operations and e
Center Director Duties, Revision 9, dated March 15, 1993.
e PPM 13.11.15, Communications Center Operations, Revision 9, dated May 20, 1993.
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e PPM 13.11.16, Health Physics Center Operations, l
Revision 7, dated May 20, 1993.
PPM 13.11.17, Nearby Nuclear Facility Emergencies e
Request for Assistance, Revision 5, dated May 20, 1993.
PPM 13.11.18,1r formation Coordination Duties,
Revision 5, dated May 20, 1993.
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PPM 13.13.4, After Action Report, Revision 5, dated
March 15, 1993.
PPM 13.14.5, Emergency Organization & Training,
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e Revision 11, dated May 20, 1993.
No apparent degradations in site emergency preparedness were noted in the marked changes.
Emergency Facilities, Eouipment. Instrumentation, and Supplies (2)
The Control Room (CR), Emergency Operations Facility (EOF),
Technical Support Center (TSC) and the Operations Support-l Center (OSC) were toured and inspected, to include response
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equipment, instrumentation and calibration, and supplies on Sample maintenance records selected randomly and all EP hand.
corrective action requests (CAR) were reviewed regarding At the time of emergency preparedness equipment and supplies.
The the inspection, there were a total of nine open CARS.
oldest dated from 1989, two from 1990, and two from 1992.
(See also section 3.c below for a discussion of the EP maintenance Equipment selected at random was verified as tracking system.)
being in calibration by review of maintenance records pertaining thereto.
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(3) Organization and Management Control No substantive changes-d been made in the EP staff or the Emergency Response Organization since the last EP inspection at
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(4) Training Emergency Preparedness training records are maintained by the Emergency Preparedness training staff in a stand-alone database, as well as in the centralized WNP-2 training records
The " official" WNP-2 training records database is the l
system.
The-EP PASSPORT Personnel Qualification Data (PQD) system.
training database is configured so that required EP training
reports can be printed as needed.
It has been felt necessary t7 maintain this stand-alone EP database because the central-i site training database was not kept updated _as rapidly as the EP database was; and therefore, was not accepted as current for The EP training purposes of required EP training reports.
staff is currently working with the PQD staff to adapt the system to accommodate rapid entry of EP training data and to
It is planned for the print the required EP training reports.
EP training records and reports integration into the PQD system to be accomplished by about October 1, 1993.
(5)
Independent and Internal Reviews and Audits (a) The 1993 Annual Audit of the Emergency Preparedness Program for WNP-2 (Audit 93-611), dated May 17, 1993, was reviewed during this inspection. The audit report Executive Summary indicated:
The Emergency Preparedness Program was found to l
be in conformance with regulatory and licensing requirements, and is being implemented in
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accordance with program procedures.
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Two Quality Finding Reports (QFR) were issued by the audit (b)
team; one for the Manager of Support Services and one for the Manager of Emergency Preparedness. One pertained to
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updating of as-built drawings of emergency facilitics, a carry-over from a previous audit (QFR-1). The sher found that "...several Emergency Program Manuals from outside l
agencies that are renuired to be kept current in certain Supply System Emergency Response Centers were not current, and there was no program in place to ensure that they are kept current" (QFR-2). Corrective actions on these audit.
findings were pending.
(c)Section III. 3.0 discussed the EP Support Services i
Tracking System (SSTS).
It was noted that a previous i
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J Quality Assurance Audit (92-596) had identified weaknesses
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in the SSTS database. These weaknesses had also been I
disclosed and discussed in two prior NRC inspections at the site (NRC Inspection Reports 92-05, dated
March 20, 1992, Section 2.c.(2); and 92-17, dated June 8,
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1992, Section 2.a.(2)). At that time the licensee had agreed to review this tracking system for r ys to ' correct During this' inspection, th. licensee
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i its shortcomings.
i indicated that the EP maintenance tracking.s being converted to and integrated into the WNP-2 Scheduled The licensee felt this would
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Maintenance System (SMS).
solve past problems with the SSTS, since the SMS will
automatically initiate a Problem Evaluation Request (PER)
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when a maintenance item is not properly entered as l
accomplished by the suspense date.
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Two members of the four person 1993 audit team were
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members of the Washington State Department of Health,
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Radiation Protection Division; and they provided a separate report which was included as an attachment to the
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The licensee indicated that salient points audit report.
from the state audit report had been included in the body
Their participation appeared to of the main audit report.
significantly enhance the scope of the audit, particularly _
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regarding outside agencies in emergency response.
state identified " area of concern" was discussed at length l
by the NRC inspector with the licensee:
Several positions in the Emergency Response
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e Organization have only the minimum number of l
personnel qualified for each position to staff
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that position for 2 shifts, without addressing the possibility of absence of a responder due to
illness or vacation. Two positions list the same person as backup or second responder.
The licensee indicated the EP staff is reviewing means to
In some cases, the list has already
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address this concern.
It was indicated been expanded for critical positions.
that those positions remaining with few designated names
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were clerical or administrative support in nature, and do not require significant emergency response training;
therefore, the positions can be filled when needed with
other clerical personnel.
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Onsite Follow-up of Events at Operatina Power Reactor Facilities
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(MC-93702)
l Two unusual events (UE) had been reported to the NRC Headquarters Operations Officer (H00) since the last emergency preparedness
l The licensee notification to the NRC H00
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inspection at WNP-2.
indicated that:
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(1) 60 March 31, 1993, an unusual event was declared at WNP-2
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an1 after commencing a Tech Spec required' shutdown per TS 3.6.3 when high pressure core spray (HPCS) was declared
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inoperable at 0615 PST due to the degradation of emergency service water (ESW) flow from the required 48 GPM to 46 GPM.as determined in surveillance test 7.4.7.1.1.3.
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Reactor Core Isolation Cooling system (RCIC) has been inoperable since 3/19/93 awaiting completion of a design modification (See Event #25283).
Since both high pressure
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injection emergency core cooling systems (ECCS) are
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inoperable, the unit entered TS 3.0.3 which allows I hour to restore one of the systems or commence a plant i
shutdown. At 0717 PST the unit commenced a plant shutdown j
by driving control rods in and reducing load....._ At 0737 PST the POC (Plant Operating Committee) recommended to the
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Control Room that HPCS be considered operable with the reduced ESW flow. At 0836 PST the licensee terminated the unusual event at 87% power after performing a second flow r
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determination satisfactorily at which time HPCS was declared operable.
(H00 Event Number 25335)
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(2) At 0539 PDT on August 3, 1993, a Reactor SCRAM occurred from full power unexpectedly when all 8 main steam isolation valves
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closed during a calibration surveillance on Main Steam Line Rad i
Monitor "D."
All rods fully inserted. The reactor was indicated as stable at 913 PSI with a water level of 44.5 inches. Decay heat was being removed via safety / relief Valves (SRVs) to the suppression pool and makeup was being supplied At 0600 from the CST (Condensate Storage Tank) using RCIC.
PDT, the Shift Manager declared an Unusual Event at his discretion to " heighten personnel awareness" of the reactor j
SCRAM and normal heat sink isolation. There were no complications to.this event that would ordinarily place the plant in an Unusual Event based on Emergency Action levels. At i
0750 PDT, the licensee terminated the unusual event. (H00 Event I
Number 25871)
A review of the circumstances and documentation pertaining to these i
events indicated that the event classifications appeared appropriate and that timely notifications and follow-up notifications were made to the NRC and county and state agencies.
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3.
Follow up on Previous Inspection findings l
0, (Closed) Follow-up Item (92-17-01). TSC Relocation Issues A review of Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure (EPIP) 13.10.3, Technical Support Center Operations and Technical Support Center Director Duties, Revision 9, dated May 4, 1992, contained an added
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" Action 10" on page 3 of 8, which indicated that "When advised the
TSC is uninhabitable, the Plant Emergency Director will select staff members to go to the Control Room or the Emergency Operations l
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Facility based on functional need."
i there was no alternate TSC "per se," and that the support expertise j
required in such cases would be redistributed to the most l
"Open C.A.R. Report" appropriate location to continue support. indicated a finding that the j
(Corrective Action Request) 90-0062 Last
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" Control Room (CR) may not be adequate for handling TSC staff.
3 drills had scenarios that rendered the TSC uninhabitable and made l
Observations it necessary to relocate TSC staff members to the CR.
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of this work arrangement note that the Simulator (inus the CR) may j
lack adequate space and equipment to support this influx of The C.A.R. remarks section indicated that " Installation l
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personnel."
of phones in the control room is waiting for action on MWR AR 5693
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(est. completion August 92)." This item was reviewed during that inspection and it was determined that to mount the additional
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telephones in the control room requires a seismic evaluation, which
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the licensee indicated had been initiated.
The licensee has
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installed additional telephones in the WNP-2 Control Room and
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procedures have been updated to indicate that "When the TSC is uninhabitable, the Plant Emergency Director will transfer plant
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management responsibility to the Control Room."
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(Closed)
Follow-up Item (92-29-01). Review Annual Audit 95-596 i
j Corrective Actions l
The 1992 Annual Audit of the Emergency Preparedness Program for WNP-28, 1992, was reviewed during the
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2 (Audit 92-596), dated AugustThe audit report Executive Summary l
last routine inspection.
indicated twelve deficiencies; three Safety Level II Quality Finding l
Reports (QFRs), five Level III QFRs, one Commercial QFR, and three
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Two areas of significant concern were Observations were identified.
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identified during the audit that required management attention.
memorandum dated June 28, 1993, the Audit Team Leader notified the
l Manager of Support Services that all corrective actions to Audit 92-j 596 had been completed and that corrective actions had been reviewed
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and verified by the audit staff.
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(Closed)
Follow-up Item (92-29-02).
EOF Habitability Questions
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l (IN-92-32)
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One observation indicated in the 1992 annual audit report was i
identified by the inspector as an item to be reviewed by the NRC in
future routine inspections until the issues were resolved.
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NRC Information Notice 92-32, PROBLEMS IDENTIFIED WITH EMERGENCY VENTILATION SYSTEMS FOR NEAR-SITE (WITHIN 10 MILES) EME OPERATIONS FACILITIES AND TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTERS, dated April 29-]
1992, was addressed to all holders of operating licenses orThe notice applied
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construction permits for nuclear power reactors.
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to the WNP-2 Emergency Operations facility (EOF) and the Technical l
The licensee 1992 audit indicated that "an Support Center (TSC). investigation, required by PPM 1.10.4, is current l
by the Nuclear Safety Engineering Group to determine Supply System l
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The investigation was under posture with respect to the Notice."
Review of this OER Number 85040H (Operating Experience Review').
item during this inspection found that the actions had been completed except for the testing of one HEPA filter and this was scheduled for about August 18, 1993. The licensee appears to have adequately addressed issues of IN-92-32.
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(Closed)
Follow-up Item (92-29-03). Change Emergency Plan to Reauire 12 Month Audits During the last routine inspection, an anomaly was noted in the emergency plan requirement for scheduling yearly emergencyThe preparedness audits.
" annually" in accordance with the Plant Technical Specifications.
The plan defined " annually" as " yearly, normally between two consecutive annual emergency exercises." 10 CFR 50.54(t) states that "the licensee shall provide for a review of its emergency The licensee preparedness program at least every 12 months..." indicated revision (Revision 12) to specifically reflect the regulatory In the interim, the licensee issued SAR Change Notice requirement.
(SCN)93-021 on March 4,1993, to implement the definition change.
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(0 pen) Follow-up Item (93-02-01). Failure to Staff ERFs in One Hour (Exercise Weakness)
During the 1993 annual EP exercise, the inspector observed that the TSC staff manning achieved minimum ccmplement 82 minutes after the declaration of an alert, which exceeded the 60 minute requirement of the Emergency Plan. The failure to meet ninimum TSC staffing requirements in 60 minutes was identified as an exercise weakness.
Since the exercise, the licensee has made nrocedural changes and conducted two call-in drills to improve staffing time for emergency Upon appropriate demonstration of this response facilities.
capability during an exercise or drill, this item will be closed, f.
(0 pen) Follow-up Item (93-02-02).
Failures to Administer KI (Exercise Weakness)
Emergency workers were sent into a plant area that was simulated to have significant radiciodine inventory, but were not administered The failure to Potassium Iodide (KI) as a precautionary measure.
administer KI under adverse radiological conditions was identified-Since the exercise, the pertinent EPIPs as an exercise weakness.
for KI decision making have been revised and personnel have been Upon appropriate demonstration'of this trained in these procedures.
capability during an ' exercise or drill, this item will be closed. __
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(Closed). Follow-up Item (93-05-01).
Determine Adeauacy of Mode-
Dependent EAls During the review of Revision 16 to EPIP 13.1.1, it was noted that
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several Emergency Action Levels (EAls) were indicated as dependent on plant mode of operation for implementation. The reviewer indicated; f
.... Item I.D involved the addition of mode-dependent EALs....
Regarding Item 1.0, as indicated in the NRR
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review, the adequacy of the mode-dependent EALs has not been determined. The review stated that the adequacy of the mode-dependent scheme would be determined after the NRC completes its shutdown risk study and issues guidance
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on shutdown EAls.
Since the shutdown risk study has not been completed, the adequacy of the mode-dependent EAls was not addressed during the review of Revision 16 (or Revision 17). The mode-dependent EAL scheme will be reviewed after the shutdown risk study is completed.
This item was discussed with a member of the Emergency Preparedness Branch at NRC Headquarters and it was indicated that the study of shutdown risks will lead to rulemaking. The rulemaking will then lead to development of acceptable shutdown (mode-dependent) EALs.
It is expected that NRC will then issue further guidance for licensees to generate shutdown EALs. As indicated in the. letter from Ross A. Scarano of Region V to G. C. Sorensen of the Supply System, dated June 30, 1992, "PEPB (NRC) did not attempt to make a determination as to the adequacy of the proposed mode dependency EALs submitted by the Supply System." Closure of this item does not, therefore, indicate acceptance of the mode-dependent EALS
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submitted with Revision 16 to EPIP 13.1.1.
Appropriate review will be accomplished after rulemaking and issuance of shutdown EAL
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guidance by the NRC.
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(0 pen) Follow-up Item (93-05-02) Verify Commitments in Rev. 18 to EPIP 13.1.1 This inspection follow-up item was not reviewed during this inspection.
It will be addressed in review of Revision 18 to EPIP 13.1.1.
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4.
Exit Interview.
On August 13, 1993, at the conclusion of the site visit, the inspector
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met with the licensee representatives identified in paragraph I above to
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This summarize the scope and the preliminary results of this inspection.
was a joint exit interview with Region V Facilities Radiological Protection and Fire Protection. The inspectors indicated which previously open items would be closed. The licensee was provided with details of the items. discussed in section 2 above.
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