IR 05000397/1985010

Insp Rept 50-397/85-10 on 850325-29.No Violations or Deficiencies Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Emergency Response Facilities & Implementation of NUREG-0737,Suppl 1 Requirements.Items for Improvement Noted

ML20132D526
Person / Time
Site:	Columbia
Issue date:	07/05/1985
From:	Fish R, Prendergast K, Temple G, Wenslawski F NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
To:
Shared Package
ML20132D520	List: IR 05000397/1985010 ML20132D517
References
RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-737 50-397-85-10, NUDOCS 8508010111
Download: ML20132D526 (35)

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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION V

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Report No. 50-397/85-10 Docket No. 50-397 License No. NPF-21 i Licensee: Washington Public Power Supply System P. O. Box 968 Richland, Washington 99352

Facility Name

Washington Nuclear Project No. 2 (WNP-2)

i Inspection at: WNP-2 Site, Benton County, Washington Inspection conducted: March 25-29, 1985 Inspectors:

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Ms _ 7!3/75" j i. F. Fish, Chief Date Signed

! wrgency Preparedness Section and Team Leader i

j JW//.)w C M. Temple, Emergency Preparedness Analyst 7/Wfr Date Signed i

10 L kK.M.Prendergast,EmergencyPreparednessAnalystDateSigned

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Team Members: R. T. Hogan, Emergency Preparedness Specialist, NRC

G. W. Lapinsky,' Jr., Engineering Psychologist, NRC t E. H. Markee, 'Jr. , Senior Meteorologist, NRC

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1 'M. E. Wangler, Health Physicist, NRC

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i M. L. Wohl, Nuclear _ Engineer, NRC

{ G. R. Bryan,. Reactor Operations, Comex Cor ;

K. C. McBride, Senior Research Engineer, r

.Battelle Pacific Northwest Laboratories (PNL)

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Approved By: bhkh F. A. exis awski, CtrGf 04 7/S/ W Da'te Signed j Emergen reparedness and Radiological

! Protection Branch.

- Summary:

Inspection on March 25-29, 1985 (Report No. 50-397/85-10)

l Areas Inspected: An announced appraisal of the Emergency Response facilities j (ERFs) was conducted using draft Revision 5 of IE Inspection Procedure 82212 i

to determine if the licensee has successfully implemented the requirements in l Supplement I to NUREG-0737 and the regulations. The appraisal covered the j Technical Support Center (TSC), Control Room Response, Operational Support Center (OSC), Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) and alternate EOF, as well [

t as the instrumentation, supplies and equipment for these facilities. The l

appraisal involved approximately 396 inspector hours onsite by eight (8) NRC

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inspectors and two (2) contractor team members.

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• Results: : No deficiencies o,,g violations of NRC. requirements were identifie ' K~n%Impf items' for -imprdving the licensee's prograr.{have been identified in the re,po.r . < c

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TABLE OF CONTENTS FOR THE DETAILED ERF EVALUATION Page N .0 Technical Support Center .............................. 1 l Physical Facilities .............................. 1 j 1. Design, Location and Structure ......... I 1. Layout ................................. 2 1. Equipment and Supplies ................. 2 1. Communications Systems ................. 3 1. Power Supplies ......................... 4 1. Conclusion ............................. 5 1.2 Information Management ....................... ... 5 1. Variables, Parameters and Display Interfaces ............................. 5 1. Manual In fo rmation Sys tems . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 1. Dose Assessment ........................ 8 1. ~ Conclusion ............................. 10 1.3 Function'al Capability ............................ 11 1. Operations and Control Room Support .... 11 1. . Conclusion ............................. 11 2.0 Control' Room Response ................................. 11 2.1 Staffing ......................................... 11 2.2 Manual Dose Assessment ........................... 12 2.3 Conclusion ....................................... 12 3.0 Operational Support Center ............................ 13 3.1 Physical Facilities .............................. 13 3. Design, Location and liabitability . . . . . . 13 3. Equipment and Supplies ................. 13 3. Communications ......................... 14

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.2-3. Conclusion ............................. 14

3.2 Functional Capability ............................ 14

$ -( 3. Staffing................................ 14 3. Operations ............................. 14 3.2'.3 Conclusion ............................. 14

'4 0 . Emergency Operations Facility .........................

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. f 4.' 1 Physical Facilities .............................. 15-

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4. Design, Location and Habitability of the Primary EOF ........................ 15'

4. ' Design a'nd Location of the A1 ternate EOF 16 4. Equipment.and Supplies _................. 17 4. Communications ......................... 17 4. Power Supply ........................... 18

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'4. Conclusion'.............c............... 19

~ Information Management ......... ................. 19 4. Variables, Paranieters and Display.- -

' Interfaces ............................. 19

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-3-4. Conclusion .. ................. . . . . . . . . 27 5.0 Exit Interview ........................................ 27 Attachment A - Persons Contacted ........................... 29

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DETAILED ERF EVALUATION 1.0 Technical Support Center (TSC) Physical Facilities 1. Design, Location and Structure The Washington Nuclear Project Unit 2 (WNP-2) TSC is located within the restricted area in a structure attached to the Radwaste Building. The location is within a 2 minute walk of the Control Room (CR)-and there are no major security barriers between the TSC and CR. The TSC was built in accordance with the State of Washington Uniform Building Code which is comparable to NRC Seismic Category II requirements. The TSC was designed to accommodate a minimum of 25 people. Useable floor space was estimated by the licensee to be about 3,100 square feet. Based on a visual inspection, the size of the TSC appeared adequate to accommodate the 30-35 people assigned to the facility during periods of activatio The TSC has been designed to have the same habitability as the CR under accident conditions. TSC personnel are protected from gamma radiological hazards by eighteen inch concrete walls and ceilings. In an emergency, the normal TSC air inlet isolates and make-up air is drawn from the CR remote air intake system. This change in mode of operation, which also directs the TSC air through high-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) and charcoal filters, is actuated by the signal (s) that activate the CR emergency ventilation system. In addition the CR can manually change the operational mode of the TSC ventilation syste The air supply,is monitored for iodine, particulates and noble gases; however, this monitor was inoperable due to calibration difficulties. The Region. intends to follow-up on the licensee's actions concerning the monitors not being operable'(open item, 85-10-01). An audio signal alarm has been-installed in the TSC to alert personnel of l advers'e conditions. A portable airborne radiation monitor is also available for use in the TSC. The appraisal disclosed that two permanently installed area radiation monitors, described in Section 4 of Appendix B of the )

-Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) and in a June 17, 1982 {

letter fr nn G. D. Bouchey to A. Schwencer, have not been )

installed. During an April 16, 1985 telephone discussion, the NRC Appraisal Team was informed that, as a result of a 1 mid-1983 design change, these two monitors were deemed -j unnecessary and therefore would not be installed. The '

FSAR had not yet been amended to reflect this chang Radiological protection of TSC personnel during an emergency is to be accomplished by portable monitoring equipment. The health physics (HP) technician who is assigned to the TSC is responsible for making periodic

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-("approximately every 15 minutes) surveys 1 Procedure

13.14.'3 provides' the guidance necessary to make these

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surveys. Dedicated instruments are available in the TSC emergency kit for this purpos . Layout The layout of the TSC was designed without benefit of a task analysis or information flow analysis. However, users were involved early in the design and any deficiencies or recommendations that arose during drills and exercises were formally reported and factored into the

. desig In addition, the licensee compared the WNP-2 design with the design of other licensee's ERFs to identify whether any important design aspect had been overlooked. One of the suggestions made by the NRC after the licensee's last emergency preparedness exercise was that the operation of the TSC might benefit from a human factors evaluatio It should be noted that some modifications to the TSC layout have been made since the exercise. Based on visual inspection and the licensee's ongoing deficiency reporting system, the appraisal staff judged the layout of the TSC to be adequate to support its functio . Equipment and Supplies All of the records, drawings and document support equipment provided in the TSC are located in a records room, immediately adjacent to the decision center discussion area. Documents available to TSC personnel include Technical Specifications, FSAR, Emergency Plan (EP), Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIPs), and microfiche /hardcopy piping and instrument drawings (P& ids). This documentation was readily available and complet Various radiological equipment and supplies are maintained in a locked emergency protection cabinet in the TSC. The radiation instrumentation, which is operated by a HP technician,' provides a capability to monitor TSC dose rates, radionuclide concentrations in air and levels of personnel and surface contamination. The appraisal disclosed that the monitoring equipment'was within the calibration period and tests showed the portable monitors'

batteries were in good condition. Supplies of direct reading dosimeters and a dosimeter charger were availabl The licensee has a procedure for checking the inventory of the emergency cabinet on a quarterly basis. The responsible person stated that these insentories actually consist only of checking the instruments for operability and calibration. The task sheets associated with these inventories do not completely list the tasks to be perfo rme An~i'a ventory conducted at the time of the

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• 3 appraisal revealed a shortage of personnel dosimeter Since discrepancies of this type were also discovered in field team kits and decontamination kits, it is suggested that the inventory be performed using the contents list from the aforementioned procedure and/or post an inventory list inside the cabinet. A person assigned to the

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emergency preparedness group said he felt it was a training problem. He noted that the related procedure was being revised. As an additional suggestion, the quantity of paper / protective clothing in the decontamination kit located at the primary decontamination facility (487'

level of the Radwaste Building) should be evaluated to determine if it is adequate to accommodate TSC and OSC personnel during an emergenc The availability of other necessary supplies to support TSC functions were also considered. Maps, steam tables, drawings, forms, hand held calculators and other similar supplies and equipment were available. Although no formal system to maintain supplies of pencils, paper, grease pencils and other consumable supplies was available, the necessary supplies were readily available in ample quantit . Communication Systems The licensee has developed multiple and redundant emergency communication systems for transmitting and receiving information between the ERFs and offsite

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agencies. These communication systems have been described

_ in Section 8 of the licensee's E In addition, the

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licensee'~s communications capabilities were examined

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i during the preoperational emergency preparedness inspection conducted June 20 - July 1, 1983 and documented

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in Inspection Report No. 50-397/83-23. These

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communication systems and their' capabilities were verified

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rm during this' appraisal. It .should be noted that since the

~ , .preoperational inspection, the Response Agency Network

- (CRASH),' wh'ich connects. the licensee's ERFs and the State Jand-local Emeigency Operation Centers (E0Cs), has been

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made operational. The Headquarters Communication Center System (HCCS) iri Richland is no longer manned 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> a day. The' communication center located within the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) portion of the Plant Support' Facility (PSF) is still manned 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> a day and

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functions as a hub for communications during an emergenc Communication capabilities during an accident involving a total, loss of AC power would not be severely impacted because 16 dedicated lines, including all CRASH telephones, would survive via an uninterruptible power supply (UPS). The inspector verified that tests of the communication systems had been completed in accordance with EPIP 13.14.4, Revision 2, " Emergency Equipment".

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.. 4 As part of this appraisal, the inspector verified that

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physical and administrative notification systems for augmenting the onshift emergency organization during emergencies was available and effective. The inspector reviewed the licensee's records of a drill that was performed on March 20, 1984 to verify augmentation time Based on the results of this drill, the inspector concluded that an augmentation goal of 60 minutes could be me . Power Supplies With the exception of some wall outlets, all TSC electrical loads are powered from class IE division 1 critical sources. During normal operations, power to division 1 is' supplied from the main turbine generator auxiliary power output. During periods when power from the-turbine generator is not available, power is obtained from offsite sources through the ASHE substation north or south busses, each of which has multiple grid feed If the main generator and all of the grid power sources were lost, the power sequencing and load shedding network would seek 230 kv power from a separate ASHE feed, if available, or 115 kv backup power, which bypasses ASHE entirel Failing all of these alternatives, power would be supplied from the division 1 diesel generato The plant's main frame (PRIME) computer is located within

.the CR, with colorgraphics terminals (RAMTEK) located in the TSC and EOF. .The PRIME computer has been provided with a backupcUPS. Although the PRIME system would survive a total AC power outage, access to the PRIME would

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be lost in the TSC because power would not be supplied to

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the terminals. The PRIME system would continue to service

'the CR.. It should be noted that UPS life would be degraded if. the main frame were forced to serve a

. multi-user environment (e.g., TSC, E0F and CR),

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During a complete loss of AC power, emergency lighting

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would be supplied by battery powered relay activated

spotlight unit Licensee personnel stated that emergency

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' lighting would'last.approximately 90 minutes. Information

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obtained at the time of the appraisal indicated that p during'a . loss of AC power, power to the water pump servicing'the TSC would be lost, thus eliminating the

~ supply-of potable water, as well as the water supply to

• the restroom facilities. During an April 17, 1985 telephone discussion, a licensee representative reported that potable water to the entire site would be lost (i.e.,

TSC, OSC and CR). Since the licensee has estimated that a

' loss of offsite power would only last about 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />, supplies of bottled water are not normally kept at the site. Non potable water could be provided from the fire protection water supply. Additionally, the licensee has s

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power supplies which could be connected to operate the water pump. As a suggestion, the licensee might wish to review this situation to determine if there is a need to store supplies of bottled wate . Conclusion Based on the findings in Section 1.1, this portion of the licensee's program meets the requirements of Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737. However, the following items are suggested for improving the progra (1) Review the procedure for inventorying the emergency kits and the actual implementation of this procedure to assure that problems described in Secton 1.1.3 do not persis (2) Review the decision not to store supplies of bottled water for use when there is a loss of potable water

- resulting'from the loss of AC power (see previous paragraph). '

(3). Review quantities of paper / protective clothing maintained at primary decontamination facility (487'

level of Radwaste Building) to assure they are adequate for emergencie .2 Information Management 1. Variables, Parameters and Display Interfaces The overall safety status of WNP-2 is well supported by a data acquisition and display computer based system. This system consists of two central processing units (CPUs)

located in the CR: A DEC PDP 11-44 front-end processor

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which> gathers data from some 1452 analog (range) and digital (two state) sensors (optically isolated) and transmits it continuously to a PRIME 750 and, on operator request, stores it on high density magnetic tape; and a PRIME 750 computer which provides user reports, graphics, computation, and disk and tape storage. The CR PRIME 750 system includes user interactive terminals and colorgraphic cathode ray tubes (CRTs) in the CR, TSC, and EOF. The PRIME 750 has four megabytes of read / write memory, three 300 megabyte disk units, magnetic tape capability, two matrix printers, colorgraphics terminals, monochrome CRTs and printer / plotter devices. Sensors are sampled 500 times per second (full 1,452 sensor sample sets /second) by the PDP 11-44 and written directly to shared access memory in the PRIME 750. Full sample sets are stored in two rotary disk files: A 24-hour file (sample sets taken every 8 seconds) and; A two-week file ,

(sample sets taken once every minute). '

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' Software residing in the PRIME 750 allows recall of the

- stored information for trend display or printed sensor reports. .As previously discussed, the PRIME 750 is supplied with a two-hour UPS system. CPU and ERF

. peripheral devices (terminals) are hard wired serial data lines and can support data transmissions froin 300 baud to 9600 baud (most ERF devices were operating at 4800 baud).

Four. primary software options are available through the PRIME 750, however, only the Graphics Display System (GDS)

and Emergency Dose Projection Sp em (EDPS) will be discussed in this report (EDPS is discussed in Sections 1.2.3,and 4.2.3.3).

- The GDS software package provides the capability to report Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.97, Revision 2, variables, as well as other utility selected sensors. The appraisal disclosed that the essential RG 1.97, Revision 2 variables have been provided to the CR, TSC and EOF by accessing the GDS software stored in the PRIME 750. Final determination with respect to meeting the RG 1.97 variables required by Supplement I to NUREG-0737 is being addressed by the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR). Contrary to prescribed readout standards, the appraisal staff discovered that the GDS software permitted test data to be stored with operational data, resulting in anomalous indications. Upon investigation, it was determined that test data could not be distinguished from actual data in the historical data bas In addition to this problem, terminals in the CR, TS EOFwereobservedtooccasionallybecome" locked-up"gand .

The issues involved in this problem are: (1) computer response times are variable and often very slow; (2) no .

feedback is provided to tell the user that a command has been received and/or the computer is working on the command; (3) the system " stacks" commands and works on them sequentially, and (4) the system provides no meaningful error messages and has no " HELP" functio Because the response time of the computer is variable, users have no consistent time constant by which to judge whether the computer is responding normally. Because response times are sometimes very long (greater than 30 seconds), the user cannot quickly discriminate between a slow response and no response. In addition, the users are generally provided with no feedback messages that could alleviate the problems of slow and variable response I) " Lock-up" is a condition in which the computer will not allow the operator to communicate and execute software commands. The operator cannot escape or interrupt the program to start ove [ --

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(i.e., visual or audible indications that a command has f

been received and is being executed).

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[ Given the above situation, the appraisal staff observed l that users had difficulty determining whether a program L was executing properly. A common user response was to hit l a function button repeatedly af ter 5-10 seconds, then to

variously hit the " break" key, the " return" key, and/or a

[ control character string. If none of those actions l

elicited a response, the user would assume that the terminal was " locked-up" and the user would either reset or turn off the terminal and attempt to reload the program using control character commands. If unsuccessful, the

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user would then call a computer professional for help.

I The staff noted that even if a program was executing l correctly (albeit slowly), after 5-10 seconds users tended to assume that the command was not being executed and would start entering new commands. Since the computer

" stacks" commands, the likelihood of sequencing errors is increased and may, in fact, account for some of the

" lock-up" problems being experienced. The situation is further exacerbated by the lack of meaningful error messages and the lack of a " HELP" function. The appraisal staff also noted that " lock-up" would occur if the monochrome CRTs (Perkin Elmer 1200) terminals were used to l execute graphical display commands.-

Another observation by the appraisal staff was that TSC and EOF terminals could affect the " Emergency l Classification" status bar on the GDS in the CR without i the knowledge or consent of the CR operators. This status i bar is on all of the top-level or current conditions

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display pages. It is intended to alert the CR, TSC, and l EOF personnel to possible changes in Emergency l Classification Levels (i.e., Unusual Event, Alert, Site Area Emergency, General Emergency). The. bar is normally green but changes to. yellow, red, and magenta as the event classification escalates. The inputs determining the classification level are provided by a software routine that takes into account plant symptoms and radiological release data. The staff found that the Emergency Classification bar could be put into an alerting state from the EOF by doing dose projections on another sof tware subsystem that feeds a calculated value to the Emergency Classification routine in GDS. Although the staff does not believe that this problem will compromise the function of the TSC or EOF, it is a disrupting influence and should be examined. Confirmatory prompts could be added so that -

the user knows that he is about to change emergency levels (e.g., " Based on plant conditions, your current projection of dose rate will change the Emergency Classification Level to (Unusual Event, etc.). Do you want to do this?

If so, call the control room, x' , and the TSC, x ;

inform them of.the change in status,.they type YES, and

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.* 8 press retur If not, press 'F17' to return to the menu."). Such prompting woubt minimize inadvertent changes to the GDS display The final observation regarding the TSC computer-based displays was that there was extreme glare on the CRT screens that affected the readability of the displays. Of particular concern was the poor readability of the " slave" monitor in the center of the TSC which is intended for use by the Plant Emergency Director and his technical staf There are several economical methods for reducing CRT glare, such as CRT hoods or egg-crate diffusers for overhead lighting. The licensee should investigate some of these alternative . Manual Information Systems The licensee uses some manual methods to display information in the TSC. These non-computer based displays include plant status boards, accountability logs, significant event logs, historical event records (hand-written Vu graphs) and printed output from the facsimile copier. The staff found these displays to be readable, understandable, and adequate to support TSC function . Dose Assessment Dose assessment capabilities in the TSC, EOF, and CR are provided through the EDPS. The EDPS consists of effluent

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monitors, meteorological monitors, a computer and a set of

, computerized models th'at may be used to calculate radiation doses from radioactive materials released in gaseous effluents during an accident. Doses to the whole body from plume exposure, to the thyroid from inhalation of radioiodines, and to internal organs from ingestion of

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contaminated' food are available. In the TSC two of the computerized models are available, a main computer system

' that calculates whole body and thyroid doses, and a backup; battery powered * microcomputer system (Radio Shack TRS-80) that performs 1similar calculations. Calculations of.the whole body andithe thyroid doses at the Exclusion Area Boundary (EAB) are continuously made by the main EDPS without intervention and are indirectly displayed on the CDS as an indicator,that classifies an emergenc J As source term input to the EDPS, monitors provide a real-time indication of radioactive effluents. Monitors

.are located in the reactor, turbine, and radwaste building ventilation exhausts to measure airborne activity escaping directly to the atmosphere. Noble gases, radioiodines, and particulates are monitored in this fashion. The monitors have appropriate acnsitivity and range to function properly during an accident. These monitors also I

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have high range capabilities to ensure onseale

measurements during a severe acciden In addition, high

! range containment monitors indicate exposure rates inside l primary containment. The monitors have detector

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capabilities up to 1E07 r/hr. Backup primary containment radiation monitors are available with a range up to IE04 r/hr. The monitors will be used to determine the extent i of core damage during a severe accident. Finally, the l post accident sampling system (PASS) provides additional j means for determining source terms after an accident has l begun. The PASS has the capability to monitor air samples j - from primary or secondary containment, coolant samples, and samples from sumps located in the reactor buildin All of the above monitors are part of the GDS. During an j emergency the data from these monitors is input directly

, into EDPS.

i Meteorological data are directly available to the EDPS from the primary tower as wind direction, wind speed and sigma theta at the 10 and 75 meter levels, vertical temperature difference between the 10 and 75 meter levels, dry bulb temperature and dew point temperature at the 10 meter level, and precipitation near ground level. Also, data for wind direction, wind speed and sigma theta at the ( 23 meter level and dry bulb temperature and dew point

! temperature at the 10 meter level are directly available to the EDPS from a backup towe Redundant and/or b.ackup power is available to both towers. All of the onsite meteorological data are availabic from the GDS. In the event that site meteorological data are not available, EPIP 13.8.2, Revision 2, " Manual Offsite Dose Calculations", instructs that weather information can be obtained from the Pacific Northwest Laboratories (PNL)

Weather Forecaster.at the llanford Reservation and from the National Weather Service Forecaster at Portland, Orego ~

l The meteorological data presented during the appraisal for I the calendar year 1984, which showed the joint data recovery of wirid direction, wind speed, 'and vertical temperature difference from the primary tower was 88%,

' indicated that a' historically reliable indication of meteorological variables may be marginal. However, due to the fact that the licensee has an acceptable instrument surveillance and calibration program and the capability to utilize an equally reliable backup measurements systems, the reliability of obtaining onsite meteorological data is acceptable. An inspection of the meteorological tower during the appraisal revealed that the temperature aspirator shield openings are pointed toward the wes According to ANSI /ANS 2.5-1984, Standard for Determining Meteorological Information at Nuclear Power Sites, the openings should point toward the north to minimize the chance of reflected sunlight influence on the temperature sensors.

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l During an emergency the EDPS is used by TSC and CR l personnel only for a short period of time. The EOF is staffed during an emergency at about the same time as the TSC snd has the primary responsibility for assessing doses i and recommending protective actions during an emergency.

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Thus the dose assessment functions will quickly transfer

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to personnel in the EOF. For this reason specific EDPS ,

capabilities, including a detailed discussion of source terms and meteorology, are described in Section 4. Although the use of the EDPS in the TSC and the CR is

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limited, the NRC Appraisal Team did find that the dose assessment capability at the TSC and CR is generally adequate to respond to an accident. The NRC Appraisal Team noted two areas for improvement. First, there is no direct display of maximum integrated dose or dose rate at the EAB (1.2 mile site boundary). Since this value may affect emergency action levels, and since it is already automatically calculated and is an input to the GDS Emergency Classification status bar algorithms, it should be displayed or changes made to casily display i Currently, to estimate doses at the site boundary,

'

personnel in the TSC and CR must correctly interpret values.from grid map displays which are difficult to read-(data is printed in yellow). TSC personnel were observed

, to have some difficulty interpreting the EAB doses from

the 1 square mile grid map. Some further training and/or modification of the output is recommende .The second area for improvement involves the main computer system. In several instances abnormal termination of l program execution (lockup) was observed. This condition was apparently' caused in part by the use of incompatible

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input data (e.g. , use of predictive effluent data and l actual meteorological data). The abnormal termination i necessitated the assistance of a second party to reset the-system. This need for second party assistance may adversely affect TSC and/or CR response during an emergency when the EDPS is used. We understand that the

[ problem has been identified and is being corrected. It is l

recommended that high priority be given to correcting the l problem as quickly as possible.

I l 1. Conclusicti Based on the findings in Section 1.2, this portion of the licensee's program meets the requirements in Supplement I to NUREG-0737. However, the following items need licensee action and will be classified as "open" items which will be tracked by the Regio The data collection, storage and display system, (GDS l

! and EDPS) did not appear to provide an acceptable l level of reliability because (1) the data acquisition

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I software did not exclude test data and projections from the operational data, (2) did not provide l confirmatory prompts and user assists to help prevent l " lock up" and (3) permitted projection analyses to l

change the displayed classification status (Section 1.2.1) (85-10-02).

!

l Modify the EDPS software to allow correction of the inadvertent input of incompatible data without termination of the program execution (Section 1.2.3)

(85-10-03).

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The following items are suggested for improving your

program.

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l (1) Eliminate the glare on the TSC CRT ,

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i (2) Reorient the temperature aspirator shield openings on

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the meteorological tower to point north instead of wes (3) Modify the GDS to include a display of the calculated doses at the EAB.

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(4) Provide additional training on the use of the main l EDPS program to TSC personne .3 Functional Capability l 1. Operations and Control Room Support i .

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l The functional capability of the TSC was evaluated by l presenting a NRC developed accident scenario to key members of the licensee's staff normally assigned to the l facility during an emergency. Licensee persor.ac1 l responded to the postulated circumstances by describing their actions and.how the equipment and supplies available it. the TSC would be used. The evaluation showed that the

TSC would be. adequately staffed and capable of performing

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the~ assigned functions. The responsibilities for dose

, projections (assessments), licensee protective action I recommendations and offsite notifications (except to NRC)

transfer to the EOF.

[ 1. Conclusion l Based on the findings in Section 1.3, this portion of the

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licensee's program meets the requirements of Supplement I to NUREG-0737, 2.0 Control Room Response

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2.1 Staffing l

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There are sufficient onshift pers'nnel o to perform the functions identified in Table 2 'of Supplement I to NUREG-0737 (Table B-1 of-NUREG-0654, Revision 1).' The Shift Technical Advisor (STA) performs the required dose projections before the TSC is manned. Onshift personnel complete notification forms and verbally transmit this information to the EOF communication center for disseminatio Firefighting, rescue and first aid capabilities are provided by the onshift Plant Emergency Tea .2 Manual Dose Assessment During the appraisal, personnel in the CR were observed in their use of the backup, battery powered microcooputer as described in EPIP 13.8.2. A problem was presented to one of the licensee's STAS and he was asked'to make a whole body and thyroid dose calculation at the EAB.

i EPIP 13.8.2 provides procedures for obtaining meteorological data for insertion into the backup EDPS computer program on the TRS-80 microcomputer. The procedure states that data can be obtained from the GDS, or by telephone from the PNL Weather Forecaster or the National Weather Service Forecaster in Portland. The use of strip i charts indicating meteorological parameters measured at the primary tower in the CR is not addressed in the procedure. Since it is likely that information from the strip charts will be used for manual calculations, the procedure could be improved by including a j methodology for reading average (e.g. ,15 minute) conditions from

these charts, the units of measurements, and any conversion factors.

Also, consideration should be given to installation of strip chart

recording of meteorological parameters from the backup towe For the observation in the CR no GDS displays were allowed to be used. It was observed that CR personnel retrieved the appropriate information' from other CR indicators for source term and meteorolcgical data for input into the backup computer program and performed the necessary calculation with little trouble. The appraisal staff observed that in general, the licensee has the capability for providing rapid dose calculations with minimal

interference in the response to an accident, and this capability is adequate to scope the magnitude of the potential impact '

2.3 Conclusion '

i Based on the findings in Section 2.0, this portion of the licensee's

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program meets the requirements of Supplement I to NUREG-073 However, the following items are suggested for improving the progra (1) Include in EPIP 13.8.2, "Hanual Offsite Dose Calculations", a methodology for reading average (e.g., 15 minute) conditions from the strip charts indicating meteorological parameter (2) Install strip chart recorders in the CR for meteorological parameters from the backup towe ,

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3.0 Operational Support Center (OSC)

3.1 Physical Facilities 3. Design, Location and liabitability

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The OSC is located in the General Service (GS) Building lunchroom at grade level. This area as well as the nearby lobby, conference room, access control and machine shop are considered to be part of the OSC and are used as an assembly area for plant personnel. Accountability is

'

conducted in the lunchroom prior to dispatching personnel l'

to other areas of the GS Building. The OSC does not have special shielding or ventilation systems, however, a portable air sampler is used to monitor habitability in the OSC. Emergency power will maintain airborne radioactivity monitoring and emergency lighting in case of a loss of offsite powe Periodic surveys are conducted by a IIP technician to monitor direct radiation level If radiological or other conditions necessitate the abandonment of the OSC, the licensee has identified the

! Cold Chemistry Room, located in the basement level of the GS Building, as an alternate OS The size and layout of the OSC and alternate OSC appeared i adequate as assembly points for plant operation support personnel. The nearby areas would provide temporary space during accountability activities. The OSC layout has a designated staging area for operations personnel briefing and dispatch. Prior to performing their tasks, operations i teams dress out and receive dosimetry at access control and then report to the lunchroom for briefing. Based on

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'NRC comments made after the licensee's previous emergency exercise, the operation of the OSC could be improved by providing a separate briefing / debriefing area. .The

'

appraisal disclosed that the licensee intends to remove the. freezers.which are currently located in the lunchroo This should help to' decrease congestion and noise levels,

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as well as provide' additional space for L briefing /debriefingpurpose : t .

3.1l2 Equipment and Supplies The OSC has been supplied with appropriate equipment, some of which has been stored in emergency cabinets located in the OSC. Radiological equipment and personnel dosimetry for teams entering the plant are available at access control. Dedicated respiratory protection equipment, protective clothing, potassium iodide and EPIPs have been stored in the OSC emergency cabinets. Separate cabinets are maintained for fire protection equipment. Plant

, diagrams and' drawings can be obtained from the upper level

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of the GS Building. Status boards, which are permanently

posted in the OSC, are used to post plant status

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information, area radiation levels and environmental dat Overhead projections are also used to display information a during periods of OSC activatio . Communications The communication systems existing in the OSC have been

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described in Paragraph 1.1.4 above. Since the OSC is normally the lunch room, telephones are not usually kept connected. These telephones are normally stored in locked cabinets and connected only during periods of activation and for testing purposes. The OSC is equipped with an

,

emergency page override, portable telephones that can be tied into the plant telephone system and hand-held radio Special respiratory protection masks (Louddfouth) equipped with speakers are available for field team use. These masks allow verbal communications between team members without having to remove the mask.

3. Conclusion Based on the findings in Section 3.1, this portion of the licensee's program meets the requirements of Supplement I to NUREG-073 ,

3.2 Functional Capability

.

3. Staffing

I The OSC is activated at the Alert level by onshift

, emergency personnel (Plant Emergency Team). The onshift  !

emergency personnel consist of two electricians, two i equipment operators, a radwaste operator and a !!P

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technician. Set-up:of the OSC takes approximately 10 minutes. Coincident with the notification of the onshift emergency personnel, the OSC Director and Lead OSC llP Support individual are notified via pagers. These two

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individuals implement telephone trees to recall the

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balance of the OSC staf ., .

L 3. Operation c .

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The functional capability of the OSC was evaluated by

'

presenting'a NRC. developed accident scenario to key

,~- " members of the licensee's staff normally assigned to the

' facility during an emergency. Licensee personnel

' responded'to the postulated circumstances by describing

'

the actions that would be taken and by demonstrating how the equipment and supplies available in the OSC would be used. The evaluation showed that the OSC would be adequately staffed and capable of performing the assigned

. function . Conclusion

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. 15 Based on the findings in Section 3.2, this portion of the licensee's program meets the requirements of Supplement I to NUREG-073 .0 Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)

4.1 Physical Facilities t

4. Design, Location and Habitability The EOF is located in the shielded lower Icvel of the PS The PSF is located 0.75 miles southwest of WNP- The facility has been built in accordance with the State of Washington Uniform Building code and will withstand adverse conditions of high wind and floods. The EOF was designed using the guidance of NUREG-0696, " Functional Criteria for Emergency Response Facilities", and

NUREG-0654 as criteria for size. The useable area is

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estimated to be 20,000 square feet and the design

!

assumption for number of personnel is 50. Generally, all work space is considered to be multipurpose. Most of the work-areas are used as offices and classrooms during normal operations and would be converted during emergencies. The appraisal staff concluded that the EOF was amply sized and would accommodate more than 50 peopl During the initial design development, design guidelines were established for necessary room adjacencies and separations.- The' appraisal staff identified no obvious problem in the present arrangement, however, the staff-suggests that the licensee consider moving the " Decision Center" to a more central location.

'

The BOF has 2' feet thick concrete walls and ceiling separating it from the remainder of the PSF. The EOF is

, also partially underground. The protection factor calculated using the class 9 reactor accidents from WASH-1400 is 4000. The PSF ventilation system is comprised of three subsystems: one for the upper floor,

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, one for the lower floor and one for the EOF. The first two have outside air intakes and exhausts and operate in this manner during the normal mode of operation. The lower floor subsystem, which' includes a HEPA filter as well as heating and cooling, is the source of air for the EOF. Therefore, all air supplied to the EOF is HEPA filtered. There are three (3) emergency modes of

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operation for'the ventilation system. Emergency Mode 1 consists of closing the intake and exhaust dampers for the upper and lower floor subsystems which places these

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subsystems in a recirculation mode and isolates the PSF / EOF from the outside air. Mode 1 operation is actuated by a reading of 100 mr/hr on a radiation detector in the intake air to the lower floor subsystem. Emergency Mode 2, actuated by a 50 mr/hr reading on the radiation

monitor in the return duct of the lower floor subsystem,

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isolates the EOF from the remainder of the PSF by

actuating the EOF recirculation subsystem. The EOF subsystem includes a !! EPA filter. Mode 2 also stops the operation of the upper and lower floor subsystems. The

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licensee has not evaluated the effect of inleakage (e.g.

under the doors to the EOF) into the EOF on its

habitability for all emergency situations. Emergency Mode 3, actuated by a 50 mr/hr reading on the radiation

detector in the EOF subsystem, consists of stopping the  ;

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operation of all three subsystem According to the licensee and observations of the appraisal team members all filters (pre and ifEPA) are

- monitored by differential pressure measuring device These devices are connected to a computer system, whose terminal is located in the EOF, that provides an ability to determine actual readings as well as receive an alarm signal when the maximum allowable reading is reached. A person is assigned to this computer area when the EOF is 1 activate The EOF includes a laboratory to be used as a backup for analysis of Postaccident Sample System (PASS) sample Use of the fume hoods in the. laboratory will be required

,

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to analyze the PASS samples. At the present time the above described emergency modes of operation of the PSF /E0F ventilation system does not allow operation of the fume hcods because of an inadequate source of ai Recognizing the potential need for the fume hoods, the licensee initiated a Design Change Package (DCP) which

'

will alter the operation of the PSF / EOF ventilation system. The changes consist of (1) providing 1200 cubic feet per minute (cfm) of outside (intake) air into the upper floor subsystem and actuation of the fume hood-exhaust fan (s) and (2) continuing the operation of the upper and lower floor subsystems during Emergency Mode 2 ,

operation. This will provide a HEPA filtered source of air for. operation of the fume hoods because air flow from the upper floor subsystem passes through the lower floor subsystem before it goes to the EOF. The Region intends to follow-up on the changes to the PSF / EOF ventilation system made in connection with the DCP (85-10-04).

4.1.2 Design and Location of the Alternate EOF The licensee has identified their WPPSS licadquarters in 2 Richland, Washington as their alternate location. This facility was approved because of the high protection factor provided by the E0F; and its location, 9.5 miles from the WNP-2 site, was approved by the Commission (SECY-83-361). Adequate space is provided at this facility to accommodate individuals unable to reach the EOF because of high radiation dose rates caused by severe accidents and has adequate communications with the TSC and

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EOF. frhe licensee stated that although the communications console is'not normally manned, communications tests are performed monthly'.

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4. Equipment and> Supplies Records and drawings available to EOF personnel are identical to those supplied to the TSC (see Section 1. i above). These documents are maintained in the records

! room of the. EOF. Vendor manuals are noe on file within the EOF, however, they can be identified via computer and obtained from Building 81, located immediately outside the restricted area fence, or from the maiatenance offices in the GS Building. The TSC obtains vendor manuals in the same manne <

The EOF is equipped with sufficient radiological monitoring equipment to measure radiation levels under accident conditions. The nearby laundry facility and a calibration laboratory located within the PSF can provide i additional equipment. Three portable air monitors with audio and visual alarms are positioned throughout the EO An area radiation monitor is located in the Meteorological

and Unified Dose Assessment Center. At the time of the appraisal the alarm set point for this monitor had not

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been established. Portable survey instrumentation for use J

in the EOF is available. Sufficient portable equipment is

,

available to support in plant and offsite monitoring team

activities. Laboratory and counting facilities are available in the EOF to analyze air and swipe sample The plant dosimetry laboratory is located in the EO *

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Personnel dosimeters and thermoluminescent dosimeters (TLDs) are available in suf ficient number and appropriate operating ranges for all EOF personnel and plant support personnel. The appraisal disclosed that there was some

'

confusion regarding the handling of TLDs during accident (Site Area Emergency or General Emergency) situations.

1 The issue centered around the TLDs not in use and their l transport from security access to the !!calth Physics Center Coordinator at the EOF. The licensee is currently revising the applicable procedures to clarify this situatio I Various other additional supplies necessary for the functions performed by the EOF are also available. The-ambulance bay area contains a permanent decontamination

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facility capable of handling contaminated of fsite teams and sample In addition, a mobile decontamination trailer is availabl ;

4. Communications ,

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.* 18 The cormnunications systems existing in the EOF have been addressed in Section 1.1.4 above. Notification and manning of the EOF is conducted by alerting key individuals by pager from the connunications center in the E0F. Some of these key individuals make subsequent notifications by initiating a call tree. The connunications center is manned 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> per day by security personnel. Upon declaration of an emergency, a

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second security officer reports to the communications center to assist in the notification process. The console has been designed such that notifications can be conducted simultaneously from two separate console location . Power Supply

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Emergency power is supplied to the EOF by a diesel generator. During a loss of offsite power, critical functions in the EOF would continue, however, lighting

would be lost in certain areas (e.g., restrooms, showers, whole body counting areas and adjacent computer areas).

Although the diesel generator provides emergency power to

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the dosimetry laboratory, the appraisal disclosed that the

'

TLD readers cannot be connected to the emergency power supply. The licensee should consider whether installation of emergency lighting in some of these areas is appropriate. A 20,000 gallon emergency potable water source is located in a storage tank at the laundry facility. This facility is located adjacent to the PS Water is supplied to the EOF by booster pumps which are powered by the emergency diesel generato "4. EOF Security ,

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. 'The licensee has provided the EOF with an industrial level

of security. Visitors are to go to the front of the PS The receptionist will sign the visitors in and issue them

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an' appropriate badge that is to be worn in a visible

., location. The EOF. is also used on a day to day basis for

,

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office space and training rooms. Persons working in the EOF latitisies other then during an emergency are expected

. to wear their.identificatic badges. During the hours of about 5:30 h.m. to 7:00,p.m. the PSF is open with visitor control provided-by the receptionist. During the other j

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periods the PSF is locked and entrance is controlled by

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security personnel. Access to the EOF during its emergency activation is controlled by security. During the appraisal period persons were observed in the EOF without visible identification badges. The second floor and first floor side doors, the latter providing direct access to the EOF, were unlocked and unguarded during the

' normal work hours. The GDS and EDPS terminals are located

! .in the Technical Data Center and the Meteorological and i Unified Dose Assessment Center (MUDAC) respectively. An operating manual for the EDPS was located near the

!

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... 19 terminal in the MUDAC. To the appraisal team members it appeared that there was uncontrolled access to these terminals, 4. Conclusion Based on the findings in Section 4.1, this portion of the licensee's program meets the requirements of Supplement 1

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to NUREG-0737. Ilowever, the following items are suggested for improving the program.

l (1) Consider moving the " Decision Center" to a more central location.

! (2) Review possible sources of (IIEPA) unfiltered air s

(e.g. leakage under the doors to the EOF) into the

EOF and evaluate their impact on the habitability of

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the EOF during an emergency.

i (3) Establish the alarm set point for the area monitor i located in HUDAC so it can be declared oper tiona (4) Evaluate the need for additional emergency lighting

'

when there is a loss of offsite powe (5) Review Procedure 13.11.7, other applicable procedures

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and training to assure that dosimeters not being used are returned to the EOF as required by Item 5 in

!

Attachment E to Procedure 13.11.7.

(6) Evaluate the need for altering the electrical leads to the TLD readers so they can be connected to the emergency power when the need arises.

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(7) Review the security of the GDS and EDPS terminals in

the EOF to. assure that only authorized persons have

! uncontrolled access to them.

l 4.2 Information Management

- 4. Variables,_ Parameters and Display Interfaces

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The variables, paraNeters and display interfaces in the

' EOF are the same as for the TSC, see Section 1.2.1 abov !

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_ 4. Hanual Information Systems Manual methods for displaying information in the EOF are consistent with those in the TSC and OSC. The appraisal staff found these display methods to be easy to read and understand, and appropriately locate . Dose Assessment

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The EOF dose assessment procedures are described in EPIP 13.11.14, Revision 1, "MUDAC Operations". This center is used by the Supply System and offsite authorities to coordinate field team operations, project doses and dose rates, and determine protective actions. As with the TSC, the EOF uses the EDPS for dose assessment during an emergency, (described in EPIP 13.8.1, Revision 1,

" Computerized Emergency Dose Projection System Operations", and EPIP 13.8.2). The EDPS is a system of computer programs and effluent monitor and meteorological instrumentation inputs used to determine radiation exposure from gaseous effluents during an emergency. For the purposes of this section, only the dose assessment ,

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capabilities as embodied in the computer programs of the system were examine , The EDPS has 3 computer codes available. The first main computer program is used to calculate external whole body and thyroid inhalation doses. This program may use either real time data from effluent and meteorological monitors in the automatic / manual mode or projected data in the predictive mode. The second main computer program is a ,

code consisting of two combined computer codes; MES0I, a t variable trajectory dispersion model, and CASPAR, a dose i calculation program using meteorology input f rom HES01 and 1 manually input source terms. The MES01/GASPAR program i

calculates doses from ingestion of contaminated food. The third program is the backup, battery powered microcomputer used in the event that the main computer programs are unavailable. Like the first main computer program, the backup program calculates external whole body and thyroid inhalation doses. The following paragraphs summarize some of the features of these programs and appraisal staff comments in the three major technical areas.

.,

4.2. Source Terms Leakage of radionuclides to the environment can take place mainly from the Reactor Building, the Turbine Building, and the Radwaste Buildin The Reactor Building has high, intermediate and low ra*.ge gas monitors, and normal and high activity particulate and iodine samplers. The builditg ventilation flow rates are 97,000 CFM for normal operations for the Reactor Building (4,000 CFM when the Standby Gas Treatment System (SGTS) u in use), 260,000 CFM for the Turbine Building, and 84,000 CFM for the Radwaste Building. The source terms in curies per second (Ci/sec) are computed by coupling the appropriate instrument reading (r/hr) to the instrument response factor (Ci/m3 per r/hr) and the flow rate to the environment (CFM) with filtration factors where appropriat __- . . .. - - - -. .

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Source terms may also be determined, in the event of failure of building effluent monitors, from grab samples of the gaseous effluent stream Constituent radionuclide determinations of these samples may be performed either in-plant or at the EOF, using an i

Intrinsic Germanium Detector and a Nuclear Data (ND) 66 computer terminal coupled to a ND 6680 mainframe computer. This system identifies gasuna peaks in the 70 Kev to 2 Hev energy range with high resolution. Results of the laboratory analyses are stated as individual isotopic concentrations or as I-131 and Xe-133-equivalent concentrations. Coupling these radionuclide concentrations with the building ventilation i flow rates, the source term release rates are l computed. Additionally, dose calculations may be made based on samples taken by licensee and Department of Energy (DOE) monitoring teams in the field. For purposes of data reduction for monitoring team data, a mobile van equipped with

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a Davidson 1024 Hultichannel Analyzer with l' Sodium Iodide (Nal) detectors is availabl Alternatively, samples may be analyzed in the EOF as discussed above. Also available in the field are 12 permanent airborne particulate and iodine environmental monitors, 56 TLDs and 3 Pressurized Ionization Chambers (PICS) to

,

measure environmental radiation.

A method of estimating fission product release fractions from core damage evaluation estimates

'

is embodied in the Plant Procedures Manual, Section 9.3.22, entitled " Core Damage Evaluation". Core damage evaluation by these

! procedures depends on'several plant parameters, including reactor water level, containment

, atmosphere radiation levels, containment j -

hydrogen concentrations, and fission product l . radionuclide concentrations in the reactor i

coolant and containment atmospher In this

procedure core water level history is first

!

noted. If the core has been uncovered, fuel or fuel cladding damage may exist. Containment atmosphere radiation levels are the quickest

sources of data to estimate core damage in the event of a loss of coolant accident (LOCA).

Containment atmosphere hydrogen concentration, resulting from the Zircaloy-water reaction, is

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an indicator of the extent of clad damage that has occurred, Water and gas samples of the reactor coolant and/or the containment atmosphere are analyzed for fission product and

. hydrogen concentration. The presence of

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l I radioiodines.and cesiums in the coolant and

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, noble gases in the containment atmosphere is l

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indicative of core damage. The presence of less

. volatile fission products such as barium, lanthanum, or strontium, indicates fuel melting.

l Additionally, the ratio of concentrations of

'

short-lived noble gas isotopes to Xe-133 and iodine isotopes to I-131 helps in distinguishing between fuel assembly gap and plenum releases

'

due to clad failure and releases from the core by fuel melt / degradation. The PASS is used to obtain the aforementioned reactor coolant and/or containment atmosphere samples. The appraisal staff identified an incorrect slope for the I-131 F-factor curve (Figure D-1) in procedure 9.3.22, and recommends that this be correcte Although the Reactor Bulding, Turbine Building, and Radwaste Building leakage pathways are very important, and may cover the majority of pathways from design basis accidents, there are other release pathways that could be postulated in both design basis and beyond-design-basis accidents. An example would be post-LOCA leakage through a partially failed-open main

, steam isolation valve. Other unexpected I unmonitored release pathways may become manifest l during the course of other accidents, such as

!

primary and secondary containment penetration j seal / integrity breach pathways. Methods for

'

defining a number of representative plausible unmonitored release pathway source terms should l be established, including possible means of estimating isotopic distribution and flow rate

to the environment, along with recommendations

! for assuming ground level, elevated, or

mixed-mode release. It is also recommended that a severe accident source term / dose assessment implementation capability be established. This l capability should include assessment l capabilities for the generation of offsite radiological consequence estimates for immersion, inhalation, ingestion, skyshine, and groundshine sources for Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) severe accident' sequences. These types of l analyses are important in generating real-time

'

emergency response actions as described in NUREG-0396, " Planning Basis for the Development of State and Local Government Radiological Emergency Response Plans in Support of Lightwater Nuclear Power Plants", (e.g., Figure I-II) and in NUREG-065 .

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• • 23 Finally, the CR Steam Jet Air Ejector Condenser Outlet Radiation Monitor visual display has no

physical units designated on i Thus, the observer must know the units in order to make use of the reading .2. Meteorology Three atmospheric transport and diffusion models are used in the EDPS. The backup microcomputer EDPS uses a straightline Gaussian diffusion model for a ground level release. On the

<

primary EDPS a straightline Gaussian diffusion model with provisions to consider elevated and mixed mode releases, and wet and dry deposition "

is available. Both of these models can be considered as Class A models, using the

,

definition of models in Appendix 2 of i NUREG-0654, Revision These models are

. acceptable for use in the TSC, since only initial assessments primarily at the site boundary (1.2 miles) will be made from this location, before the enhanced assessment capability is activated at the EOF, lloweve r,

_ both of these models could be improved by adding i building wake mixing factors. The errors associated with the mixed mode effective plume

, height formulation for use during accidents can lead to large underestimates of doses and

, therefore should be deleted from the mode Atmospheric dispersion rates based on the experimental data from the Hanford Reservation

' ~

(i.e., " desert sigmas") should be included in the model. .-

Capab'il'ity, exists to run a third atmospheric

, * transport 'and diffusion model called MESOI, a

. . variable, trajectory Gaussian puff dispersion model, t'o estimate doses primarily through the

.

>

ingestion' pathway'over longer time frames and

' larger' distances than the straightline

'

<,; trajectory,models. Currently, the licensee is

,

' evaluating whether the MES0I model is an

-

adequate and cost effective approach to

>

satisfying dispersion ~ evaluation requiren.cnt , During'the course of an accident, the MUDAC will be staffed with a corporate meteorologist and will use the primary EDPS straightline model and

,

the subjectine climatological and terrain input

'

of the corporate meteorologist. To satisfy the

' requirement of Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737 to represent conditions up to 10 miles from the plant site, the primary EDPS atmospheric f

. . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ __ _ . . . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _______m _._____...__.-______.m_ _ _ . _ . _ _ _ . _ _ . . - _ _ _

_-_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

.*

.. 24

!

dispersion model should include the capability to calculate variable trajectories in time and space, to make diffusion estimates during calm wind conditions, to limit plume travel distance during given time intervals, and to accumulate doses. While-it is recognized that the

corporate meteorologist will subjectively accommodate this lack of computational capability on the computer, these capabilities should be implemented on the computer since the meteorologist may not be available at the time q of an acciden .2. Computerized Dose Assessment j As previously indicated, the EDPS incorporates three dose assessment programs for use during an

'

emergency. The main EDPS and backup EDPS programs calculate external whole body dose and

thyroid inhalation doses from submersion in a

radioactive gas cloud. A third program identified as tfESOI/CASPAR calculates organ dose i for 4 age groups f rom ingestion of contaminated

foodstuf fs within 50 miles of the plan !

The main EDPS program is used to project doses j within 10 miles of the plant. This program

accommodates 13 noble gases and 5 radioiodine Source terms are provided by effluent monitors, tieteorology data is also provided by monitor Doses and dose rates to the whole body are calculated using submersion dose factors from Table B-1 of RG 1.109. Thyroid inhalation doses j assume the child to be the critical receptor.

! Inhalation dose factors from Table E-9 of RG j 1.109 and the breathing rate from the j -International Council on Radiation Protection

! -(ICRP) Publication 23, Reference Pfan, for the

! child are incorporated into the program. The i results of these EDPS program calculations are j

"

• presented on a computerized map of the area

-

'

around WNP-2. This map is divided into a series

'

'

,

.

of 1 mile square grids that are colored i i according to the radiation levels calculated at

• *

,

the center of each gri In addition, barely readable values for the actual calculations are

presented within each grid. Only individuals

,

experienced in using this grid system program

-

can extract doses at specific distances.-

The backup computer program calculates doses in a manner similar to the main EDPS program. 1.ike

, 3 the more complex program, the backup program l , will accommodate 15 noble gases and 5

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, , ,1adioiodines. Source terms and meteorology data are entered manually. Unlike the main program, this prggram will calculate doses at a

'

t . user-specified distance. Thus users should have

'y

little difficulty in using the information

obtajned from this progra ~

'

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MES01/GASPAR/is

' used to calculate doses from '

-

food ingetLbn at specified locations in the environment. This prograa accommodates

'; '

approximately 35 radionucibies including noble gases, radioiodine.5, particulates, tritium, and c aroon- 14 '. As with the other EDPS progranis, .

MEETlGASPAR calculates external whole body ,

doses from nob'ic goes and organ inhalation dues from submersion in a radioactive clou i

' 1 fe; ddition, itESOI/GASPAR deposits radioactive materials to calculate external whole body ddse

,, ft h a contaminated ground plane and to calculate organ doses from various ingestion pathvays, including cow-niilk, goat-milk, beef,

~

and vegetation censumption. Eight organs ard i incorporated inta the code. This program'as'

I implemented at kNP-2 can be used to direct 4 'y environmental teams to areas of substgntial contamination. Ilowever, the use of this program s , to calculate' doses is limited sined Io' \

"

'

'

consideration of such factors as ra'oionuclide decay and depletion of particulat y fi ri transport has been accommodated. For these tuasons the actual environmental measurements more

, accurately assess the potential imya'ets of the radioactive plume. Thus it is reconsuended that

! MES01/GASPAR be reviewed and modified as

< ,

appropriate to support the Supply System's

'

need .'

In ' reviewing the models it was noted that- the t

?

vekificatf ort of the programs was not well

-

dommentd.,- Mditionally, the backup. EDPS A

prngram had ntt been subject to theipme verification program as the main EDM, programs.

)

'

As'a result, during the appraisal, a /ilaw in the s,, determination of the atmospheric stability in

'

tue backup system was identified. It is ,'

s

therMore recommended that the model in the ,

'

back h program be verified and documenty Although some of the problems identifieh above:.

. may have a potential impact on protective actlong

, decision making, ifUDAC personnel include q ' , -

y Health Physicist whose knowledge and experience

{ will be used to review calculations'ptfor to

)

reconunendations for protective action s

• '

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o

s 9

Additionally, these calculations will be reviewed with offsite authorities, also stationed in the EOF, prior to issuance of any protective action recommendation Consequently, the dose assessment methods are generally adequate to meet the needs of the cente . Conclusion Based on the the findings in Section 4.2, this portion of the licensee's program meets the requirements of Supplement I to NUREG-0737. Ilowever, the following items appear to need licensee action and will be classified as

"open" items which will be tracked by the Region.

l

!

(a) Establish a method (s) for defining plausible unmonitored release pathway source terms including possible means of estimating isotopic distribution and flow rate to the environment, along with recommendations for assuming ground level, elevated or mixed-mode releases for these pathways. (Section 4.2.3.1) (85-10-05)

(b) Improve the primary EDPS dispersion model to include calculation of variable trajectories in time and space, to make diffusion estimates during calm wind conditions, to limit plume travel during a given time intarval, and to accumulate doses. (Section 4.2.3.2)

l (85-10-06)

l -

l

.(c) Review and modify MES01/GASPAR to incorporate decay and depletion of radionuclide in transport from the

, release point to the receptor location. (Section 4.2.3.3) (85-10-07)

(d) Improve documentation of the verification of the main EDPS program '

,

(Section 4.2.3.3) (85-10-08)

(e). Provide systematic verification and documentation for

,

the backup microcomputer program. (Section 4.2.3.3)

'

(85-10-09)

In addition, the following items are suggested for improving your progra (1) Correct the error in the F-factor curve for I-131

, decay in Nuclear Performance Evaluation Procedure 9.3.22 (Figure D-1).

(2) Establish a severe accident source term / dose assessment implementation capabilit . .. . .

. .

_ _ _ - _ - - -

, _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

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)(3) , Improve the 'prihary and backup EDPS models by

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, including the effect of building wake mixing, by l ,, _. ,ideleting the mixed mode effective plume height formulation and by including atmospheric dispersion

~

-

• *

rates based'on experimental data from the Hanford Reservation, (4) Consider displaying the physical units (e.g. cpm or

-

.uCi/cc) on the CR-Steam Jet Air Ejector Condenser y , ,

Outlet Radiatio,n Monitor visual displa .3 Functional Capability 4. Operations and TSC Support The functional-capability of the EOF was evaluated by presenting a NRC developed accident scenario to key

'

members of the licensee's staff normally assigned to th facility during an emergency. The individuals responded to the postulated circumstances by describing the actions that would be taken and-by demonstrating how the equipment and supplies available in the EOF would be used. The evaluation showed that,the EOF would'be adequately staffed and capable of performing the assigned function ,

4. Conclusion Based on the findings in Section 4.3, this portion of the licensee's program meets ,the requirements of Supplement I to NUREG-073 .0 Exit Interview On March 29, 1985 an exit interview was held with the licensee for the purpose ofs discussingJthe preliminary findings of the appraisal. Those

~

licensee personne1 who attended the meeting have been-identified in-Attachment A to this report; In addition to the NRC Team Leader and team members, Mr. A. Toth, Senior Resident Inspector, was present. The licensee was informed that no deficiencies or violations.of NRC

, requirements were identified during.the' appraisa The NRC Team Leader informed the' licensee that recommendations for improving specific areas addressed during the appraisal were identified and would be documented in the appraisal report. The NRC Team Leader

.

' stated that no written response would be required, but that-improvement - I

items should be' evaluated and corrected at the licensee's discret3o <-

With the exception of the: recommende'd ' improvement associated with the -

'

,

validation and verification of the backup EDPS program used on the

'

W 1 -microcomputer, all of the improvement items discussed in this report were specifically mentioned during the meetin .

.

..On July 2, 1985 F. Wenslawski, R. Fish and G. Temple of NRC Region V held l a telephone discussion with D. Bouchey,-R. Chitwood, P. Powelliand others

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of the licensee's organization. The items in Section 1.2.4 and 4.2.4 of

~

this report were. identified as being "open" items, which represented a change'from the exit interview held on March 29, 1985. As documented.in the letter transmitting this appraisal report, the licensee committed to examining our concerns described 'in Section 1.2.4 and taking appropriate corrective action .

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' 29-

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Attachment A Persons Contacted

T. Albert, Nuclear Plant Maintenance Engineer

*D. Anderson, Supervisor, Mechanical Maintenance R. Barbee, Supervisor, Plant Engineering L. Barndt, Records Management Clerk

'

L. . Berry, Supervisor, Health Physics

• D. Bouchey, Director, Support Services

• A. Brown, Systems Project Manager

• R. Chitwood, Manager, Emergency Planning and Environmental Programs R. Corcoran, Operations Manager

• K. Cowan, Plant Technical Manager G. Dockter, Principal Test Engineer W. Downs,. Lead Engineer, Telecommunications

C. Fies, Manager, Engineering Services V. Flory, Foreman, Health Physics / Chemistry

D.

Gano, Shift Technical Advisor

• G. Godfrey, Manager, Performance Evaluation

• R. Graybeal, Manager, Health Physics / Chemistry

. S. Heath, Communications Engineer J. Hendrick, Security Training Specialist

I..Jenkins, Principal Nu'elear Engineer D. Kidder, Plant Engineering Supervisor

, *A. Klauss, Senior Emergency Planner R. Kyle, Senior Nuclear Plant Engineer

J. Landon, Maintenance Manager

• D.- Larson, Manager, Radiological Programs and Instrument Calibration-

• D. Mannion, Senior Emergency Planner '

• J. Martin, Plant Manager, WNP-2 R. Matthews, Prin~cipal Engineer H. McCluer, Principal Engineer

.

T. Meade, Electrical Engineer ,

'

C. Mix, Instrument and Control Foreman

• R. Mogle, Senior Emergency Planner

• C.,Noyes,Mnnager,fechanicalSystems

• G. Oldfield',i Senior: Health' Physicist

• D. Ottley, Supervisor, Radiological Services K. Parker, Technical ~ Analyst ,

• J. Parry, Principal Health Physicist

• J. Peters,' Manager,: Plant Administration

• C. Poweks,~ Ass'lstant< Plant Manager,'WNP-2

'

- D. Quee'n',4 Bsilding Maintenance Manager

.*F.jQdina, Pri'ncipaliScientist ,

F. Rippee, Nu^clearnPlant Performance Engineer V Shockley,' Health Physics / Chemistry Support Supervisor

• Security, Programs M. Telander, Manager,' Training and Evaluation Specialist Terrass, Principal .

D. Vorheis, Captain,' Security

'

-

S., Washington, Shift Technical-Advisor

'.M. Westergren,-Senior Training Specialist ~

C. Whitcomb, WNP-2 Design Document Control Manager

.

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, -w,- ,-w,,v--,qm-~-n m -g, q-r -w,-

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'

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• D. Whitcomb, Technical Specialist W. Wolkenhauer, Principal Core Analysis Engineer M. Wuestefeld, Supervisor, Reactor Engineering

• Denotes those present at exit interview on March 29, 193 Persons Present at March 29, 1985 Exit Interview Only J. Baker, Operations Manager, WNP-1 D. Feldman, Manager, Plant Quality Assurance V. Lee, Systems Analyst D. McBeath, Computer Programmer Analyst S. Regev, Health Physicist G. Sorensen, Manager, Regulatory Programs C. Van Hoff, Senior State Liaison Specialist R. Wardlow, Health Physicist I

l l

,

4 5