IR 05000395/1982029
| ML20053E133 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Summer  |
| Issue date: | 05/14/1982 |
| From: | Brownlee V, Peebles T, Skolds J, Stetka T, Swan W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20053E116 | List: |
| References | |
| TASK-2.K.1, TASK-TM 50-395-82-29, IEB-80-10, NUDOCS 8206070637 | |
| Download: ML20053E133 (9) | |
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UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
o REGION 11 U
$
101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100
%,
f ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303
Report No. 50-395/82-29 Licensee: South Carolina Electric and Gas Company Columbia, SC 292m Facility Name:
V. C. Summer Docket No. 50-395
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License No. CPPR-94 Inspection at V. C.. Summer site near Winnsboro, South Carolina f//9IZ Inspectors:
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p. Skolds U/
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Dafe Signed
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W. Swan
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Date Signed
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.' Stetka
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g Date Signed Approved by:
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/Y V. L. Br.pwnlee, Section Chief, Division of Date Signed
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Project and Resident Programs SUMMARY Inspection on April 1-30, 1982 Areas Inspected This routine, unannounced inspection involved 264 inspector-hours on site in the areas of Open item Followup, Comparison of As Built Plant to FSAR, Preoperational Test Results Review, Plant Operating and Emergency Procedure Review, THI Action Plan Followup, and Licensee Identified item Followup.
Resul ts Of the six areas inspected, no apparent items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
e 8206070637 820514 PDR ADOCK 05000395 e
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- 0. S. Bradham, Station Manager
- J. G. Connelly, Deputy Plant flanager
- S. J. Smith, Assistant Manager, Mantenance
- B. G. Crcley, Assistant Manager, Technical Support
- K. Woodward, Supervisor of Operations
- A. R. Koon, Technical Services Coordinator
- H. I. Donnelly, ISEG
- S. S. Howze, Nuclear Licensing
- H. ' C. Fields, Technical Services Engineer L. F. Storz, Assistant Manager, Operations Other licensee employees contacted included technicans, operators and office personnel.
- Attended exit interview 2.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on April 1-30, 1982, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings Not inspected.
4.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.
5.
Open Item Followup (Closed) (81-29-05) This item dealt with commitment to lock shut the manual isolation valves in the air supply to the 36" purge valves.
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l Operating Procedure (50P) 114. " Reactor Building Ventilation System, "
requires these manual valves to be locked shut during 11 odes 1 through 4.
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(Closed) (80-16-06) This item dealt with a problem in restarting the turbine driven emergency feedwater pumps after an emergency start.
System i
Operating Procedure (50P) 211, " Emergency Feedwater," adequately addresses the proper operation of the governor in order to ensure proper starting of i
the emergency feedwater pump.
(Closed) (80-25-06) This item dealt with inconsistencies between G0P's, l
E0P's and Draft Technical Specifications concerning the number of safety injection pumps taken out of service at low temperature and pressure conditions.
The Draft Technical Specifications state that two safety l
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injection pumps are taken out of service when less than 275 F.
G0P-7 requires that two pumps be taken out of service and that the breaker be locked open.
The response to question 211.29 is being changed to require two charging pumps be taken out of service at low temperature and pressure conditions.
E0P-1 and S0P-112 have been changed to indicate that recirculation will commence 14 hours1.62037e-4 days <br />0.00389 hours <br />2.314815e-5 weeks <br />5.327e-6 months <br /> after a LOCA and thereafter on 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> cycles.
The Technical Specifications will indicate which valves are required to be locked during operation.
Therefore, the statement in Question 211.48 concerning locking provisions does not indicate which valves will be locked.
(Closed) (80-25-13) This item dealt with the fact that no criteria existed as to when a filter in the CVCS needed to be changed out.
SOP-102 has been revised to establish this criteria.
(0 pen) (82-29-01) Source Range !!onitor.
In a letter dated April 19, 1982, the licensee committed to install a source range neutron flux monitor either at the control room evacuation panel or at another location independent of the control complex and that this would be done prior to startup after the first refueling.
(Closed) (81-05-16) This item dealt with a statement concerning starting duty of RHR pumps.
Although sane operators, interviewed by the inspector concerning the meaning of this statement did not interpret the statement correctly, all operators interpreted the statement conservatively.
Therefore the starting duty of the RHR pumps would not have been exceeded.
(0 pen) (82-29-02)
Fire Protection Modifications.
In a letter dated April 20, 1982 the licensee comnitted to install smoke detection equipment in locations described in the attachment to the letter by the end of the first refueling outage. Until this equipment is installed this item will remain open.
(Closed) (82-03-04) This item involved numerous canmitments in a letter dated January 23, 1981 to the NRC.
This item did not include any items concerning emergency feedwater listed in the same letter. The inspector verified that all other commitments were implemented.
(Closed) (81-14-08) This item dealt with a low lube oil pressure shutdown of the diesel generator. NCN 380 was written to investigate the problem.
The disposition if this NCN determined that the low lube oil pressure was caused by high DP across the lube oil strainer and filter.
This high DP was caused by the accumulation of preservatives in the strainer and filter. At this
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point the diesel had only been operated on site approximately 50 hours5.787037e-4 days <br />0.0139 hours <br />8.267196e-5 weeks <br />1.9025e-5 months <br />.
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is not believed that this situation, e.g. high DP, will occur again because of the absence of the preservatives in the oil.
It was also noted that the diesel generator did operate for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> at full load even with the high DP.
Therefore, even if a high DP developed during operation, testing has proven that the diesel can operate for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> under these conditions.
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(0 pen) (81-31-07) This item dealt with a commitment by the licensee to install power lockout on RHR suction isolation valves prior to startup after the first refueling.
Prior to the installation of the devices, the licensee conmitted to remove power from these valves during Modes 1, 2 and 3.
GOP-1 and the Technical Spedification require the power be removed form these valves in Modes 1, 2 and 3.
Until the power lockout switches are installad, this item will remain open.
(Closed) (81-05-17) This item dealt with a commitment by the licensee to set the Hi Flux at Shutdown Alann at two times background and to increase the shutdown margin from 1% delta K/K to 2% delta K/K for Modes 4 and 5.
The Technical Specifications have been changed to include the 2% delta K/K requirement and GOP-9 has been revised to require the Hi Flux at Shutdown Alann be set at 2 times bv.kground.
(Closed) (79-28-02) This item dealt with discrepancies between the Technical Specifications and the Administrative Procedure for the development of safety-related Procedures. Administrative Procedure (AP)-102, has been revised and now reflects the requirements in the-
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Technical Specifications.
The follcwing open items dealt with comments on procedures.
80-25-05 SOP-117 81-31-01 E0P-8 81-29-13 SOP-112 80-15-03 SOP-304 i
80-25-03 S0P-101 80-25-04 SOP-102 81-05-16 SOP-115 81-23-08 SOP-116 81-28-05 SOP-201 81-28-06 SOP-304, 305, 311 82-06-03 All G0Ps and S0Ps 82-06-04 All E0Ps 81-23-07 ALL E0Ps
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The procedure rewrite effort revised all of the G0P's, E0P's and SOP's. All concerns expressed in the above open items were resol'ved. The above items i
are considered closed.
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Licensee Identified Item Followup (0 pen) (80-29-01) CCP Miniflow flodification.
In a letter dated June 13, 1980 the licensee reported a significant deficiency concerning Charge / Safety i
Injection Pump miniflow isolation.
In a letter dated December 19, 1980 the licensee indicated that they had accepted Westinghouse's Interim Modifi-
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cation II.
The inspector verified the following actions had taken place:
1.
The Charging / Safety Injection Pump miniflow is directed to the VCT and
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l the miniflow return to the Charging / Safety Injection pump suction is locked closed during normal operation.
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The VCT relief valve has a capacity of 350 gpm which exceeds the miniflow of all three Charging / Safety Injection pumps and reactor coolant pumps seal return flow.
3.
Emergency 0;,erating Procedure '(E0P) have been revised to:
a.
Close the CCP miniflow isolation valves when the actual RCS pressure drops to the calculated pressure for manual reactor cooltnt pump trip.
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Reopen the CCP miniflow isolation valves should the wide range RCS pressure subsequently rise to greater than 2000 psig.
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This _50.55(e) report as well as IEB 80-18 will remain open until a f
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permanent solution to this problem is implemented.
(Closed)(82-06-01) Containment Isolation Globe Valves.
In a letter dated January 20, 1982 the licensee indicated a potential problem existed concerning globe valves used for containment isolation of the seal injection lines not seating tight enough.
In a letter dated March 26, 1982, the licensee 1' indicated that a functional test of these valves was conducted to detennine _if the valves would seat tight enough to seal off the flow of wa ter..The temonstrated that the globe valves will seal under differentit
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The inspector found that the torque switch was found to be 'impropei ty set when the problem was originally' identified.
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proper setting of the torque switch resulted in p' roper valve operation. The <
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inspectqr agreed with the licensee's assessment that this item was not
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reportable.
s (0 pen) (82-29-03) Design of Supports Utilizing Snubbers.
In a letter dated February 19, 1982 the licensee reported that four supports were discovered during snubber surveillance in which mechanical snubbers were designed in a bottomed out conditon) This report served as anfinterim report. Until a
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final report is submitted and reviewed, this item will remain open.
(0 pen) (82-29-04) Water,in Valve 8886.
In a letter dated April 5,1982 t'fie'
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licensee reported that water was found in the valve operator for ' valve 8886.
This repo~rt served as an interim report.
Until a final report is subditted
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and evaluated this item will remain open.
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(Closed) (80-16-06) Woodward GoveYndr Problem ~on Turbine Driven Emergency Feedwater Pump.
In a letter to the SRC dated June 4,1980 the licensee N
described a problem with Jrestartin'g the turbine driven emerger.cy feedwater pump within 30 minutes after the'ptmp,is shutdown.y The licensee indicating that the operating procedure was ch.nged and that it 1abel had been applied
f to the governor indicating the proper procedure for oparating the governor.
s The inspector verified the procedure has been changhd and a label has been l
placed on the governor.
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(0 pen) (81-28-01)
Diesel Gen'erator Fuel Oil Lines. This item dealt with a
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problem, with the diesel generator fuel oil returp lines.
In a letter to the A'
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NRC dated September 10,19817the, licensee reported the problem and indicated Q
that the pipe supports fo'r these' lines would be liinalled exactly per the
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manufacturer's drawings.' In a letter dated' barch 29, 1982 the licensee reported that the manufacturer's drawings ~did not specifically address pipe support locations.
The pipe supports were fnstalled using the spacing t
criteria specified by the manufacturer. The inspector reviewed the installation of the supports and found them to be acceptable. However, the licensee must submit to the manufacthrer an as-bu,ilt drawing of the hangar locations. Until this is done. this item will remain open. >
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7.
Comparison of As-Built Plant to FSAR Description A walkdown of various systems was conducted to determine on a sampling basis that the as-built plant conforms to commitments contained in the FSAR.
Systems Examined included:
Safety Injection Accumulators Emergency Feedwater RHR System Reactor Building Spray, "A" Train High Head Safety Injection (from pumps to hot legs)
Findings were acceptable.
8.
Preoperational Test Procedures Results Review The inspector reviewed the results of the following preoperational tests:
SG-2 Safeguards Logic Test
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SI-1 BIT Recirculation Flow Test SI-2 Accumulator Discharge Valve Test SG-4 Safeguards Test Without Blackout SG-7 Safeguards Test with Blackout SI-8 ECCS Check Valve Backleakage Test SP-1 Reactor Building Spray Ring Flow Verification The results were reviewed to ensure the test was performed ~in accordance
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with procedures and the commitments in the FSAR and the results were within the acceptance criteria.
Findings were acceptable with the-following exceptaions;
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SG-7 Acceptance Criteria 8.4 states that each diesel generator safeguard loading does not exceed the 2000 hour0.0231 days <br />0.556 hours <br />0.00331 weeks <br />7.61e-4 months <br /> rating of 4548KW.
There was no objective evidence in the test to prove that this acceptance criteria was met.
Until this item is resolved, this item will remain open (82-29-05).
9.
Plant Operting and Emergency Procedure Review During the period of January 18-22, 1982 a special inspection of the General Operating Procedures (GOP's), System Operating Procedures (S0P's), and Emergency Operating Procedures (EOP's) was conducted to determine the adequacy of these procedures for plant operation.
Details of this
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inspection are contained in NRC in'spect.jon Report 50-395/82-06 and at that time, these procedures were judged to be not suitable fnr plant operation.
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Followirg a major procedure re-write p[ogram by the licensee, this followup inspection of plant operating and emergency procedures was conducted.
During this inspection, selected GOP's, SOP's, and E0P's were reviewed.
This review compared these procedures with each other and checked the procedures against system diagrams, draft Technical Specifications, plant as-built conditions, and panel layout and nomenclature.
In addition, operators were interviewed to determine their knowledge and understanding of
various procedures.
a.
The following GOP's and associated Appendices were reviewed:
-G0P-1 Plant Startup and Heatup from Cold Shutdown to Hot Shutdown (!! ode 5 to Mode 4), Revision 3;
-GOP-2 Plant Heatup from Hot Shutdown to Hot Standby Mode 4 to 11 ode 3, Revisions 3;
-GOP-3 Reactor Startup from Hot Standby to Startup (liode 3 to j
llode 2), Revision 1;
-G0P-4 Power Operation (liode 1), Revision 1;
-G0P-5 Reactor Shutdown from Startup to Hot Standby (Mode 2 to flode 3), Revision 2;
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-GOP-6 Plant Shutdown from Hot Standby to Hot Shutdown (!! ode 3
to Mode 4), Revision 2;
-GOP-7 Plant Shutdown and Cooldown from Hot Standby to Cold
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Shutdown (Mode 4 to Mode 5), Revision 1;
-Appendix A Generic Operating Precautions, Revision 2;
-Appendix B Reference Critical Data, Revision 1;
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-Appendix C Calculation of Estimated Critical Conditions, Revision 1;
-Appendix 9;
. Inverse Count Rate Ratio Plot, Revision 2;
-EOP-1 Safety Injection Actuation Line Break without Safety
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Injection-E0P-2 s Main Steam Line or Feed Water Line Break Without Safety Injection-EOP-4 Station Blackout Operation i-E0P-5
' Recovery from Reactor Trip-EOP-6 Emergency Boration s
-EOP-7 Refueling Emergency-E0P-8 Control Room Evacauation-E0P-9 High Activity-Radiation Monitoring System-E0P-10 11alfunction of Control Rod System-EOP-11 Loss of Containment Intergrity-E0P-12 Loss of Reactor Coolant Without Safety Injection-E0P-13 Natural Circulation-E0P-14 Inadequate Core Cooling-EOP-15 Reactor Vessel Venting-E0P-16 Total Loss of Residual Heat Removal System-SOP-116 Reactor Building Spray System-SOP-102 Chemical and Volume Control System l
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-SOP-112 Safety Injection Systems-50P-115 Residual Heat Removal System-50P-211 Emergency Feedwater System-S0P-101 Reactor Coolant System-SOP-104 Boric Acid Batching and Transfer In addition, the following Surveillance Test Procedures (STP's) were reviewed because these procedures were referenced by the G0P's:
STP 103.003, Integrated system Surveillance for Plant Startup, Revision 0; STP 103.001, RCS Startup/ Shutdown Surveillance, Revision 0; and, STP 103, 002, Pressurizer Startup/ Shutdown Surveillance, Revision 0.
The GOP's reference a number of STP's (including the STP's listed) that have not yet been written and/or issued.
The issuance of the referenced STP's is necessary before plant operation can proceed in accordance with the G0P's.
The STP's listed have been written and issued however they are in need of revision. The licensee will revise and issue STP's as required for plant opera tion. Tracking of this activity will be in accordance with outstanding open item (395/82-29-06).
During the inspection, problems were identified with the G0P's, E0P's, and 50P's. The problems were either corrected at the time of the inspection or the licensee committed to correct the problems.
At the time of the writing of this report all problems identified with the procedures were corrected.
10. Tlil Action Items (0 pen) II.K.1 IE Bulletin Item 5.
The V. C. Summer Safety Evaluation Report (SER) discusses the licensee's commitments concerning this item.
The inspector verified the following:
le The plant system operating procedures for safety-related systems include valve chicklists that specify initial valve alignment requirements for system startup. Valve manipulations required during the conduct of the procedure are specified in the procedures so that the system is corrected aligned at all times for the current plant mode of operation.
2.
The licensee does not require a sign-off verification at the completion of surveillance tests by an independent operator to assure that the valves have been restored to the system procedure designated status.
This requirement is stated in the V. C. Summer SER and in Attachment I to a letter from the licensee to NRC dated December 11, 1980.
3.
The licensee does not presently require an independent operator verify that the valve alignment is returned to the designated status at the completion of maintenance activities.
This requirement is stated in the V. C. Sumer SER and in Attachment I to a letter from the Licensee to the NRC dated December 11, 198 e-
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Items 2 and 3 must be ret 91ved prior to fuel load.
Item 17 This item dealt with a modification to the Reactor Protection System to Provide a reactor trip on pressurized low pressure without coincidence from pressurizer low level.
The inspector reviewed the Safeguards logic preoperational tests and verified that a reactor trip and safety injection will occur on low pressurizer pressure independent of pressurizer level.
(Closed) 1.C.8 Pilot monitoring of Selected Emergency Procedures for Near-Term Operating License Applicants.
this item deals with reviewing emergency operating procedures to provide a sense of adequacy of the emergency procedures and reviewing the training related to symptons of the postulated transients.
Based on the review of emergency operating procedures described in paragraph 9 of this report, this item is considered closed.
11.
IEB Followup (Closed) IEB 80-10, Contamination of Non-radioactive Systems and Resulting Potential for Unnonitored Uncontrolled Release of Radioactivity to the Envirorment. The licensee's internal response addressed numerous non-radioactive systems in the plant.
The internal response did not address sanitary systems. However conversations with the licensee indicated that this system was evaluated.