IR 05000395/1982033

IE Insp Rept 50-395/82-33 on 820504-06.No Noncompliance Noted.Major Area inspected:small-scale Radiological Emergency Exercise

ML20054G998
Person / Time
Site:	Summer
Issue date:	05/19/1982
From:	Andrews D, Huffman G, Jenkins G, Marston R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20054G987	List: IR 05000395/1982033 ML20054G986
References
50-395-82-33, NUDOCS 8206220480
Download: ML20054G998 (8)

Text

. .

1. '9g, UNITED STATES 8 '

n NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

$ E REGION 11

1. 101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100 p,

ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303

% o

.....

Report No. 50-395/82-33 Licensee: South Carolina Electric and Gas Company Columbia, SC 29218 Facility Name: V. C. Summer Docket No. 50-395 License No. CPPR-94 Inspection at the Summer site near Jenkinsville, South Carolina Inspectors: [ M,c/cew / f//8/<f2 D. L. Andrews Date Signed

. < r/<uvf f/sJ/]L Date Signed h R. R. ftarston N].Yr! ~ kN SL G. N. Huffman

// Date Signed Accompanying Perso e . VanNiel, Basyouni Henaish Approved by: . -

, s b [g/5h

/

b G. R. Jb ins, Section Chief, EPOS Division Date Signed SU!illARY Inspection on flay 4-6, 1982 Areas Inspected This routine, announced inspection involved 76 inspector-hours on site in the area of a small scale radiological emergency exercis Resul ts In the area inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie PDR ADOCK 05000395 C PDR

. .

DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees

• C. Nichols, Jr., Senior Vice President, Power Production and System Operations

• D. W. Dixon, Vice President, Nuclear Operations

• W. A. Williams, Jr. , General Manager, Nuclear Operations

• 0. S. Bradham, Plant flanager

• J. G. Connelly, Deputy Plant Manager

• K. E. Beale, Emergency Planning flanager

• B. G. Croley, Technical Support Supervisor

• L. A. Blue, Director of Health Physics

• F. Bacon, Chemistry Supervisor

• F. J. Leach, Director of Site Engineering

• H. J. Sefick, Security Supervisor

• R. M. McSwain, fledia Coordinator Other licensee employees contacted included several technicians, operators, and security force member NRC Resident Inspector

• J. Skolds, Senior Resident Inspector

• Attended exit interview Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on llay 6,1982, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 abov . Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings Not inspected.

' Unresolved Items

! Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.

Exercise Scenario l

The scenario for the emergency exercise was reviewed to determine that provisions had been made to test the integrated capability and a major

,

portion of the basic elements existing within the licensee's emergency plan

and organization as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14),10 CFR 50, Appendix E, paragraph IV.F and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.N.

l i

l l

1 - - - - - -

I

l

. .  ;

2 The scenario was reviewed in advance of the scheduled exercise date and was discussed with licensee representatives on fiay 4,198 The inspectors concluded that the scenario developed for this exercise was adequate to fully exercise the licensee's emergency organization. The inspectors had no further questions in this are . Assignment of Responsibility This area was observed to determine that primary responsibilities for emergency response by the licensee have been specifically established and that adequate staff is available to respond to an emergency as required b CFR 50.47(b)(1),10 CFR 50, Appendix E, paragraph IV.A, and specific criteria in NUREG 0654,Section I The inspectors observed that specific emergency assignments had been made for the licensee's emergency response organization and there were adequate staff available to respond to the simulated emergency. The initial response organization was augmented by designated licensee representatives and the capability for long term or continuous staffing of the emergency response organization was demonstrated. The inspectors had no further questions in this are . Onsite Emergency Organization The licensee's onsite emergency organization was observed to determine that the responsibilities for emergency response are unambiguously defined, that adequate staffing is provided to insure initial facility accident response in key functional areas at all times, and that the interfaces among various onsite response activities and offsite support activities are specified as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2),10 CFR 50, Appendix E, paragraph IV.A, and specific criteria in NUREG 0654,Section I The inspectors observed that the initial onsite emergency organization was well defined and that adequate staff was available to fill key functional positions within the emergency organization. Augmentation of the initial emergency response organization was accomplished through mobilization of off-shift personnel and corporate assistance. The on duty Shift Supervisor assumed the duties of Emergency Director promptly upon the initiation of the simulated emergency and directed the response until relieved by the Station

!!anager. The inspectors had no further questions in this are . Emergency Response Support and Resources This area was observed to determine that arrangements for requesting and effectively using assistance resources have been made as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(3),10 CFR 50, Appendix E, paragraph IV. A and specific criteria in NUREG 0654,Section I Offsite assistance resources utilized during this exercise included the Blair, Jenkinsville-Monticello, and Greenbrier-Bethel Volunteer Fire

,

. .

Departments. All three Fire Departments responded promptly to the assistance request from the Shift Supervisor. The Volunteer Fire Depart-ments were escorted onsite to the simulated fire scene by Security personnel and each department deployed their resources _ in support of the plant fire tea The Volunteer firemen as well as the plant fire brigade appeared to have a good knowledge of fire techniques and displayed a cooperative effort in extinguishing the simulated fir Other offsite assistance resources, such as medical and local law enforcement support, were not called upon during this small scale exercis The inspectors had no further questions in this are . Emergency Classification System This area was observed to determine that a standard emergency classification and action level scheme is in use by the nuclear facility licensee as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, paragraph IV.C, and specific criteria in NUREG 0654,Section I The inspectors observed that the emergency classification system was in effect as stated in the Radiological Emergency Plan and in the implementing procedu res. The system appeared to be adequate for the classification of the simulated accident and the emergency procedures provided initial and continuing mitigating actions taken during the simulated emergency. The inspectors had no fu ther questions in this are . Notification Methods and Procedures This area was observed to determine that procedures had been established for notification by the licensee of State and local response organizations and emergency personnel, and that the content of initial and followup messages to response organizations has been established; and means to provide early notification to the populace within the plume exposure pathway have been established as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(5),10 CFR 50, Appendix E, paragraph IV.D, and specific criteria in NUREG 0654,Section I The inspectors observed that notification methods and procedures have been established and were used to provide information concerning the simulated emergency conditions to Federal, State and local response organizations and to alert the licensee's augmented emergency response organizatio The prompt notification system (PNS) for alerting the public within the plume exposure pathway was in place and operational and was activiated during this exercise to warn the public of the significant simulated events occurring at the Summer site. One siren was reported to have failed to i operate during activation of the system. The licensee has initiated action

,

to correct the problem with the inoperable siren.

I

.

The inspectors had no further questions in this are . Emergency Communications This area was observed to determine that provisions exist for prompt i immunications among principal response organizations and emergency trsonnel as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(6),10 CFR 50, Appendix E, ragraph IV.E. and specific criteria by NUREG 0654,Section I e.e inspectors observed emergency communications among the onsite emergency esponse centers, licensee's offsite support groups and between the onsite

.mergency centers and the Emergency Operations Facilit Emergency communications were considered adequate; however, the inspectors noted that emergency announcements made over the plant public address system were not always clear. This problem was discussed with licensee repre-sentatives during the exercise critique on May 6,198 In addition, the NRC Emergency Notification System (ENS) telephone in the Technical Support

'

Center was found to be inoperable. Health Physics Network (HPN) telephones have not yet been installed in the licensee's emergency response facilitie These two items were referred to the Regional Emergency Officer for actio The inspectors had no further questions in this are . Public Education and Information This area was observed to determine that information concerning the simulated emergency was made available for dissemination to the public as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(7),10 CFR 50, Appendix E, paragraph IV.D, and specific criteria in NUREG 0654,Section I The news media center was activatea following notification of the simulated emergency at the plant and provided news releases and plant information to the news media for disemination to the publi The inspectors had no further questions in this area.

1 Emergency Facilities and Equipment This area was observed to determine that adequate emergency facilities and equipment to support an emergency response are provided and maintained as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(8),10 CFR 50, Appendix E, paragraph IV.E, and specific criteria in NUREG 0654,Section I The inspector observed the activation, staffing and operation of the emergency response facilities and evaluated equipment provided for emergency use during the exercis Control Room - The inspector observed that control room personnel acted promptly to initiate emergency response to the simulated emergenc Emergency procedures were readily available to the Emergency Director

___ -

.

and the response to the simulated emergency condition was prompt and ef fective. The inspectors had no further questions in this are Technical Support Center (TSC - The TSC was activated and staffed promptly upon notification by the Emergency Director of the simulated emergency conditions leading to an Alert emergency classification. The TSC staff appeared to be knowledgeable concerning their emergency responsibilities and TSC operations proceedea smoothly; however, status boards and displays were not kept up-to-date and were locatsd in such a manner that they could not be readily seen by TSC personne'.. In addition, the status displays need to be improved in the treas of trend display and historical accident information. This problem was identified by the licensee during the exercise critique, Operations Support Center (OSC) - The OSC was staffed promptly upon activation by the Emergency Director. The inspector observed that teams were formed promptly, briefed and dispatched efficientl Overall, OSC Operations were considered adequat ' Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) - The E0F was activated and staffed following the simulated alert. The E0F appeared to operate efficiently following staffing and provided support to the TSC during the exercis The licensee identified some infomation flow problems within the E0F and between the EOF and TSC during the exercise at the critique held on May 6, 1982. The inspectors noted that the information flow problems did not appear to be significant enough to affect effective the functioning of the EOF. The inspectors had no further questions in this are "

14. Accident Assessment This area was observed to determine that adequate methods, system and equipnent for assessing and monitoring actual or potential offsite consequences of a radiological emergency condition are in use as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(9),10 CFR 50, Appendix E, paragraph IV.B. and specific i

criteria in NUREG 0654, Section 11.1.

i l The accident assessment program includes both an engineering assessment of plant status and an assessment of the radiological hazards to both onsite

! and offiste personnel resulting from the accident. At the Summer plant the

!

engineering accident assessment team functioned to analyze the plant

! equipment status during the accident and to make recommendations to the site j

Emergency Director concerning mitigating actions to reduce damage to plant i equipment, to prevent release of radioactive materials and to terminate the i emergency condition. The radiological assessment group provided continuous updates on inplant radiation hazards and potential releases of radioactive i ma terials. This group was supplemental by field teams to measure actual

! radiation levels and activity concentrations in the environment during releases of radioactive materials.

r l

i -- ._ _ _ _ _ -- -- _ _ . _ _ . . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . , _ _ _ _ . _

)

.

The engineering assessment group utilizied a computer system to graphically display plant parameters for the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) and to continually monitor other parameters within the plant. The system appeared to be effective in aiding the rapid diagnosis of operational and engineering problems in the plant and precluded the need for relaying information concerning plant parameters from the Control Room. It was noted that the SPDS display in the Emergency Operations Area of the TSC was slaved to one of the other display systems in the engineering area, thus the Emergency Director could not independently address an area of interest on the system. The licensee identified this as a potential problem during the exercise critique and has initiated action to revise the system so that the display in the E0A area cc be independently addresse The radiological assessment group utilized a computerized dose assessment

'

system to provide initial offsite dose projections during the period of simulated release of radioactivity from the plant and provided continual i updates of offsite doses, both accumulative and projected, based on l simulated release data and field monitoring team information relayed to toe assessment area. This system utilizes direct inputs from release path

monitors and meteorlogical information so that transposition errors and 4 delays in obtaining proper infonnation have been minimized.

i The inspectors has no further questions in the above are !

15. Protective Responses 1 This area was observed to determine that guidelines for protective actions 1 during the emergency, consistent with Federal guidance, are developed and in place, and protective actions for emergency workers, including evacuation of

'

nonessent tal personnel, are implemented promptly as required by 10 CFR

, 50.47(b)(10) and specific criteria in flVREG 0654,Section II.J.

,

The inspectors observed that protective actions were instituted during the simulated emergency and included a site assembly and accountability of all

onsite personnel. The accountability was conducted efficiently and was l completed well within the 30 minute guideline of fiUREG 065 The inspectors j had no further questions in this are . Radiological Exposure Control

This area was observed to determine that means for controlling radiological I exposures, in an emergency, are established and implemented for emergency I workes and that they include exposure guidelines consistent with EPA l reconvaendations as required by 10CFR50.47(b)(11) and specific criteria in l fiUREG 0654, Section ll.K.

i l The inspectors observed that exposure control measures were utilized

{ throughout the exercise. Radiation surveys were conducted in the emergency j facilities on a routine basis. Offsite surveys were conducted downwind from l the plant during the simulated release of radioactive material Exposure guidelines were considered in all emergency team operations; however, there

] ,

>

- . - - - . - - - - _ . - - . - - - - - _ - - - -

, .e

were two instances in which the inspectors noted that excessive or unnecessary radiation exposure would have occurred during an emergency similar to the exercise scenario: During the collection of a containment atmosphere sample, the individuals taking the sample followed good exposure control measures and expeoited the removal of the sampling apparatus from the system; however, upon returning to the laboratory it was found that the sampling apparatus did not have a particulate filter or iodine cart-ridge in place. Thus the sampling team would have received unnecessary exposure, anc the sampling would have to be repeated. The inspectors stated that the sampling procedure should be revised to include a note to the sampling team to insure that filters and cartridges are in place prior to the sampling evolution (50-395/82-33-01). Two emergency team members were sent into a very high radiation area to manually close a valve. Although the particular valve could have been difficult to close, when it was found that the valve turned easily, one of the two members of the team should have left the are It was estimated that both team members received a simulated 16 Rem dose during the valve closing process. The inspectors stated that the emergency team briefing should include contingency actions by team members to minimize total man-rem dose equivalents received during emergency operation . Exercise Critique The licensee's critique of the emergency exercise was observed to detenaine that deficiencies identified as a result of the exercise and weaknesses noted in the licensee's emergency response organization were formally presented to licensee management for corrective action as required by 10CFR50.47(b)(14),10CFR50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.F, and specific criteria in llVREG 0654,Section I A formal S,CE&G critique of the emergency exercise was held on !!ay 6,1982 with eiercise controllers, key exercise participants, licensee management and flRC personnel attendin Deficiencies and weaknesses in the emergency preparedness program, identified as a result of this exercise were presented. Followup of corrective actions taken for identified deficiencies and weaknesses will be accomplished through subsequent NRC inspections.