IR 05000390/2018003
| ML18308A007 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Watts Bar  |
| Issue date: | 11/01/2018 |
| From: | Masters A NRC/RGN-II/DRP/RPB5 |
| To: | James Shea Tennessee Valley Authority |
| References | |
| IR 2018003 | |
| Download: ML18308A007 (35) | |
Text
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ber 1, 2018
SUBJECT:
WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT - NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000390/2018003 AND 05000391/2018003
Dear Mr. Shea:
On September 30, 2018, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2. On October 24, 2018, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. Tom Marshall and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
NRC inspectors documented four findings of very low safety significance (Green) in this report.
These findings involved violations of NRC requirements. The NRC is treating these violations as non-cited violations (NCVs) consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the Enforcement Policy.
Further, inspectors documented three licensee-identified violations which were determined to be of very low safety significance in this report. The NRC is treating these violations as NCVs consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the violations or significance of these NCVs, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC resident inspector at the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant.
If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; and the NRC resident inspector at the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely,
/RA/
Anthony D. Masters, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 5 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos.: 50-390, 50-391 License Nos.: NPF-90, NPF-96
Enclosure:
IR 05000390/2018003, 05000391/2018003
Inspection Report
Docket Number(s): 50-390, 50-391 License Number(s): NPF-90, NPF-96 Report Number(s): 05000390/2018003, 05000391/2018003 Enterprise Identifier: I-2018-003-0036 Licensee: Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA)
Facility: Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 Location: Spring City, TN 37381 Inspection Dates: July 1 to September 30, 2018 Inspectors: J. Nadel, Senior Resident Inspector J. Hamman, Resident Inspector M. Thomas, Resident Inspector M. Donithan, Reactor Inspector M. Kirk, Resident Inspector (Browns Ferry)
S. Roberts, Resident Inspector (Saint Lucie)
A. Butcavage, Reactor Inspector W. Loo, Senior Health Physicist A. Nielsen, Senior Health Physicist Approved By: Anthony D. Masters, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 5 Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring licensees performance by conducting a quarterly integrated inspection at Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information. Self-revealed findings, violations, and additional tracking items are summarized in the table below. Licensee-identified non-cited violations are documented in report sections 71111.05AQ and 71153.
List of Findings and Violations Configuration Control Error Results in Actual Auxiliary Building Internal Flooding Event Cornerstone Significance Cross-cutting Aspect Report Section Initiating Events Green [H.12] - Avoid 71111.06 Non-cited violation (NCV) Complacency 05000390/2018003-01 Closed A self-revealed Green finding and associated NCV of Technical Specification (TS) 5.7.1,
Procedures, was identified when the licensee failed to maintain adequate configuration control in the high pressure fire protection (HPFP) system in accordance with station configuration control procedure, NPG-SPP-10.2, Clearance Procedure to Safely Control Energy. Specifically, the licensee failed to restore HPFP system vent and drain valves to their appropriate configuration prior to returning the system to service which resulted in a significantly large amount of HPFP system water (on the order of 10,000 gallons) being introduced into many areas (including all levels) of the Unit 1 side of the auxiliary building and wetting numerous structures, systems, and components (SSCs) (including cables, ventilation ducts, motor-operated valves, etc.)
Unauthorized Entry Into a High Radiation Area Cornerstone Significance Cross-cutting Report Aspect Section Occupational Green [H.4] - 71124.01 Radiation Safety NCV 05000391/2018003-02 Teamwork Closed A self-revealed Green finding and associated NCV of TS 5.11.1.e was identified when the licensee failed to maintain current survey information and failed to inform a worker of increased dose rates in a high radiation area. As a result, a worker received an electronic dosimeter alarm on the Unit 2 pressurizer platform due to changing radiological conditions associated with a reactor mode change.
Failure to Collect Compensatory Samples for an Out-of-Service Effluent Monitor Cornerstone Significance Cross-cutting Report Aspect Section Public Radiation Green [H.12] - Avoid 71124.06 Safety NCV 05000390/2018003-03 Complacency Closed The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated NCV of TS 5.7.2.3 when the licensee failed to take compensatory samples in accordance with Table 1.1-1 of the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual when the Unit 1 steam generator blowdown effluent monitor was out of service. Specifically, radiation monitor 1-RM-90-120/121 was inoperable from April 27 to May 27, 2018, and compensatory samples were not collected and analyzed within the required frequency of at least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
Inadequate Sensitive Equipment Control Results in Unit 2 Reactor Trip on April 12, 2018 Cornerstone Significance Cross-cutting Aspect Report Section Initiating Green [H.5] - Work Management 71153 Events NCV 05000391/2018003-04 Closed A self-revealed Green finding and associated NCV of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, Drawings, was identified for the licensees use of a procedure that was not appropriate to the circumstances, which led to the conduct of improperly planned maintenance on sensitive equipment, ultimately resulting in a reactor trip. Specifically, an inadequacy was identified in station procedure 0-TI-12.10, Control of Sensitive Equipment, which lists the sensitive equipment defined, in part, as equipment that could cause a unit trip, on which work activities are required to be appropriately planned and conducted in a manner that will preclude a unit trip. The procedure did not list the high side reactor coolant system loop flow transmitter common drain line as sensitive equipment, which allowed the licensee to improperly perform maintenance on it without the appropriate planning and control necessary to preclude the Unit reactor trip that occurred on April 12, 2018.
Additional Tracking Items Type Issue number Title Report Status Section LER 05000390/2018001-00 Failure to replace capacitors 71153 Closed results in inoperable 120 VAC vital inverter LER 05000390/2017006-00 Structural degradation of 161 71153 Closed kV line pole leads to condition prohibited by TS LER 05000390, Main control room boundary 71153 Closed 05000391/2017014-00 door left open leading to a loss of safety function LER 05000391/2018001-00 Reactor trip on low reactor 71153 Closed coolant system flow due to maintenance on flow instrumentation
PLANT STATUS
Unit 1 operated at or near rated thermal power (RTP) from the beginning of the inspection period until September 15, 2018, when the unit shut down for a planned refueling outage. The unit remained shut down in a refueling outage for the remainder of the inspection period.
Unit 2 started the inspection period at approximately 45 percent power during power ascension from a previous trip. The unit achieved at or near RTP on July 3, 2018. The unit continued operating at or near rated thermal power until August 22, 2018, when the unit tripped due to a turbine trip. The unit returned to at or near RTP on August 30, 2018, and remained there throughout the rest of the inspection period.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed plant status activities described in IMC 2515 Appendix D, Plant Status and conducted routine reviews using IP 71152, Problem Identification and Resolution. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
REACTOR SAFETY
71111.01 - Adverse Weather Protection Seasonal Extreme Weather
Inspectors evaluated site readiness for extreme high temperatures by walking down the 500kV switchyard and evaluating procedural checklists for summer readiness.
71111.04 - Equipment Alignment Partial Walkdown
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:
- (1) The 2A containment spray pump while the 2B was out of service for a planned surveillance test, on July 18, 2018
- (2) The B main control room (MCR) chiller while A MCR chiller was out of service for maintenance, on August 20, 2018
- (3) Emergency diesel generators (EDGs) 1A, 2A, 1B, 2B, and the alternate feeder while C common station service transformer (CSST) was out of service for a planned outage, on August 20, 2018
- (4) The 2A EDG while the 2B EDG was undergoing surveillance testing and engine analysis, on August 29, 2018
- (5) The 1A and 1B motor driven auxiliary feedwater (MDAFW) pumps after construction of pre-outage scaffolds in mode 1, on September 27, 2018
71111.05AQ - Fire Protection Annual/Quarterly Quarterly Inspection
The inspectors evaluated fire protection program implementation in the following selected areas:
- (1) Missed entry into OR-14.10.4 when Unit 1 Pressurizer power operated relief block valve was closed, condition report (CR) 1432723 July 19, 2018
- (2) EDG CO2 when CO2 tank developed a leak due to maintenance activities on refrigerant line on August 3, 2018
- (3) Control building, elevation 708', Unit 1 and Unit 2 auxiliary instrument rooms and computer room on August 14, 2018
- (4) Auxiliary building 772' Unit 1 and Unit 2, A and B, 480V board rooms, 480V transformer rooms, 125V vital battery rooms, and 5th vital battery and board room on September 12, 2018
- (5) Unit 1 containment during U1R15 outage, on September 27, 2018
71111.06 - Flood Protection Measures Internal Flooding
The inspectors evaluated internal flooding mitigation protections in the auxiliary building on
===July 21, 2018.
Cables (1 Sample)===
The inspectors evaluated cable submergence protection in:
- (1) Manhole 3B, work order (WO) 119273871 on August 24, 2018
71111.07 - Heat Sink Performance Heat Sink (Triennial)
The inspectors evaluated heat exchanger and heat sink performance and maintenance on the following components from July 16 to July 20, 2018:
- (1) Heat exchangers, cooled by service water, IP Section 02.02.b
- component cooling system heat exchangers A,B,C
- 1A-S, turbine driven auxiliary feedwater (TDAFW) pump alternate lube oil cooling water source
- (2) Heat exchanger, closed loop or air cooled, IP Section 02.02.c
- Unit-1, residual heat removal heat exchanger 1A
- (3) Ultimate heat sink, Sections 02.02.d.5, 02.02.d.6 and 02.02.d.7
- essential raw cooling water (ERCW) pumps in-service tests, train A, pumps C-A, D-A
- intake pumping station, pump bay train A, inspection /cleaning
- ERCW system buried piping train A, system leakage test
- break of downstream dam, abnormal operating instruction
- intake channel maintenance walk-down inspection
- intake structure and associated ERCW pumps, traveling screens, and strainer equipment walk-down inspections
71111.08 - Inservice Inspection Activities
The inspectors evaluated pressurized water reactor non-destructive testing by reviewing the following examinations from September 24-28, 2018:
- (1) Ultrasonic (UT)a) Ultrasonic Calibration/Examination Report No. R-013, Weld MRP-146-DR-2, RCS Drain Line, ASME Class 1 (Reviewed)b) Ultrasonic Calibration/Examination Report No. R-051, Component ID, RSGFW-4, Steam Generator 4, Feedwater Nozzle to Shell Weld, ASME Class 2, September 25, 2018 (Observed)
- (2) Visual a) Summary Report, VT-2 of Class 1, Reactor Bottom Mounted Instrumentation Penetration Nozzles, 17, 22, 25, 32 and 49, IAW ASME Code Case N-722 (Video Review)b) Summary Report, VT-2 of Class 1, Reactor Upper Head Surface of CRDM Penetration Nozzles10,18, 38 and 73, IAW Code Case N729, Penetration Numbers (Video Review)c) Summary Report No 15097, In-service Inspection (ISI), VT-3 of Seismic Support plates for CRDM Upper End, (Reviewed)
- (3) Eddy Current Testing (ECT)a) Reactor pressure vessel bottom mounted instrumentation, Class 1, In-core Instrumentation (ICI) Thimble Tubes, Examination Results. (Reviewed.)
- (4) Weld Data Package a) Weld Number 1-003C-D0008-2AE, Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Discharge Venturi ASME Class 3, Weld Data Sheet (Reviewed.)
b) Weld Number 1-003C-D0008-2AE, Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Discharge Venturi Weld, ASME Class 3, Record of Liquid Penetrant Examination (Reviewed.)
c) Weld Number 1-003C-D0008-2AF, Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Discharge Venturi Weld, ASME Class 3, Data Sheet (Reviewed.)
d) Weld Number 1-003C-D0008-2AF, Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Discharge Venturi Weld, ASME Class 3, Record of Liquid Penetrant Examination (Reviewed.)
- (5) IWE Inspection Results a) Report Number R-043, ASME Section XI, Exam Category E-A and Appendix J, Containment Annulus, Azimuth 0-360 Degrees, Elevation 834- Top, Visual Examination of IWE Surfaces b) Report Number R-054, ASME Section XI, Exam Category E-A and Appendix J, Containment Annulus All Elevations Azmoth180-270, Visual Examination of IWE Surfaces (Reviewed)c) Integrated Leak Rate Test Results Completed January 31, 2013 (Reviewed)
The inspectors also evaluated the licensees boric acid control program performance, and performed a walk-down inspection of the reactor containment building with the boric acid program owner.
The NRC walk-down inspection also included accessible portions of the lower level of the containment raceway, at the inside surface of the steel containment interface with the concrete floor area.
The inspectors also included a review of the licensee response to a Westinghouse 10 CFR Part 21 associated with control rod drive mechanism (CRDM) thermal sleeve wear and the associated EPRI Materials Reliability Program Needed Interim Guidance for PWR CRDM thermal sleeve wear.
71111.11 - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance Operator Requalification
On July 10, 2018, inspectors observed simulator as-found exam per scenario 3-OT-SRE-1004, Revision 4, ERCW pump trip, anticipated transient without scram (ATWS), and main steam line break.
Operator Performance (1 Sample)
The inspectors observed and evaluated the U1RFO15 shutdown and cooldown of Unit 1 on September 15, 2018.
71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness Routine Maintenance Effectiveness
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of routine maintenance activities associated with the following equipment and/or safety significant functions:
- (1) CR 1402327, Intake pumping station strainer room B sump check valve 0-CKV- 40-598 stuck open
Quality Control (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated maintenance and quality control activities associated with the following equipment performance issues:
- (1) Control of quality parts and quality control verifications for WO 119028006, Central processing unit installation in the main control board for design change notification (DCN) 66465, on September 20,2018
71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
The inspectors evaluated the risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities:
- (1) Risk assessment for July 18, 2018, with the 2B containment spray pump and auxiliary building gas treatment system train B out of service for surveillance testing
- (2) Risk assessment for week of August 13, 2018, with the Unit 1 turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump out of service for a pump component outage
- (3) Risk review of CR 1433989 on August 15, 2018, for the failure of the Unit 2 turbine setter to 000.0 and associated adverse condition monitoring plan
- (4) Risk assessment for week of August 20, 2018, with common station service transformer C (CSST C) out of service for planned outage
- (5) Risk assessment for August 24, 2018, with Unit 2 shutdown in Mode 3 for a forced outage
- (6) Risk assessment for September 15, 2018, with Unit 1 in Mode 3 during refuel outage U1R15
71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
The inspectors evaluated the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:
- (1) Prompt determination of operability (PDO) for CRs 1390880, 1391006, 1391009,
===1391010, and 1391012, Improper determination of span adjustment for Rosemount transmitters used for Unit 2 steam generator wide and narrow range instruments
- (2) Immediate determination of operability (IDO) for CR 1438627, Lower containment ventilation cooler 1B outlet temperature control valve 1-TCV-67-100 failed closed
- (3) IDO and PDO for CR 1421234, Unit 1 and Unit 2 auxiliary feedwater system operability between 0 percent and 22 percent power
- (4) Past operability determination (POE) for CR 1398085, Tornado dampers indicated closed when powered on
- (5) POE for CRs 1383947, 1383948, Failure of penetration relief check valves to open
- (6) IDO for CR 1439643, 1B-B EDG load swings during monthly surveillance causing FLEX diesel lockout
- (7) IDO and Engineering Assessment for CRs 1433039, 1433048, and 1433192, Engineering evaluation of wetted components and cables due to auxiliary building flooding
- (8) POE for CR 1430328, Water intrusion in Unit 1 turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump oil system
71111.19 - Post Maintenance Testing
The inspectors evaluated the following post maintenance tests:
- (1) WO 119676976 and WO 119683422, 1-SOI-3.02, Turbine driven AFW pump run following maintenance to correct the water intrusion into oil issue, on June 27, 2018
- (2) WO 119205758, 2-MVOP-003-0116B-A, MOV, ERCW header A isolation valve, maintenance of Limitorque actuator, on July 10, 2018
- (3) WO 117745376, Water leak at 2-CKV-3-820, 2A MDAFWP discharge check valve, install new gasket and pipe dope to hinge pin plugs, on July 10, 2018
- (4) WO 119716537, Replace small expansion valve, powerhead, and refrigerant lines on the B MCR chiller, on July 13, 2018
- (5) WO 119812205, Replace digital reference unit for 1B-B diesel generator after load swings during monthly surveillance run on August 16, 2018
==71111.20 - Refueling and Other Outage Activities (Partial Sample)
The inspectors evaluated Unit 1 refueling outage cycle 15 (U1R15) activities from September 15, 2018 to September 30, 2018.
71111.22 - Surveillance Testing The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance tests: Routine==
- (1) WO 119668048, 1-SI-99-10-B, One time only 1-SI-99-10-B 62 day functional test of SSPS train B and Rx trip breaker B, on July 5, 2018
- (2) WO 119260715, 0-SI-82-11-A, Monthly diesel generator start and load test DG 1A-A, on July 13, 2018
- (3) WO 119720997, 1-SI-63-10.1-A, Emergency Core Cooling System Venting Inside Containment, on August 28, 2018
- (4) WO 119378650, 2-SI-68-28, Primary Radiochemistry Requirements, on September 7, 2018 In-service ===
- (1) WO 119539031, One time only 1-SI-3-923-S Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1A-S Comprehensive Pump Test Credited for Quarterly Performance Test, on June 25, 2018
Containment Isolation Valve (1 Sample)
- (1) WO 119064730, 1-SI-70-701, Containment Isolation Valve Local Leak Rate Test Component Cooling, on September 27, 2018
Ice Condenser (1 Sample)
- (1) WO 119062458, 1-SI-61-1, Determination of Boron and pH on Ice Condenser Ice, on September 6,
RADIATION SAFETY
71124.01 - Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls Radiological Hazard Assessment
===The inspectors evaluated radiological hazards assessments and controls.
Instructions to Workers===
The inspectors evaluated worker instructions.
Contamination and Radioactive Material Control (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated contamination and radioactive material controls.
Radiological Hazards Control and Work Coverage (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated radiological hazards control and work coverage.
High Radiation Area and Very High Radiation Area Controls (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated risk-significant high radiation area and very high radiation area controls.
Radiation Worker Performance and Radiation Protection Technician Proficiency (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated radiation worker performance and radiation protection technician proficiency.
71124.06 - Radioactive Gaseous and Liquid Effluent Treatment Walk Downs and Observations
The inspectors evaluated the licensees radioactive gaseous and liquid effluent treatment systems during plant walkdowns.
Calibration and Testing Program (Process and Effluent Monitors) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the licensees gaseous and liquid effluent monitor instrument calibration and testing.
Sampling and Analyses (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated radioactive effluent sampling and analysis activities.
Instrumentation and Equipment (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated radioactive effluent instrumentation and equipment.
Dose Calculations (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated dose calculations.
71124.07 - Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program Site Inspection
The inspectors evaluated the licensees radiological environmental monitoring program.
Groundwater Protection Initiative Implementation (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the licensees groundwater monitoring program.
71124.08 - Radioactive Solid Waste Processing and Radioactive Material Handling, Storage, and Transportation Radioactive Material Storage
The inspectors evaluated the licensees radioactive material storage.
Radioactive Waste System Walk-down (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the licensees radioactive waste processing facility during plant walkdowns.
Waste Characterization and Classification (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the licensees radioactive waste characterization and classification.
Shipment Preparations (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the licensees radioactive material shipment preparation processes.
Shipment Records (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the licensees non-excepted package shipment records.
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
71151 - Performance Indicator Verification The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below for the period from July 1, 2017, through June 30, 2018.
- (1) Unit 1 and Unit 2 High Pressure Safety Injection
- (2) Unit 1 and Unit 2 Cooling Water
- (3) Unit 1 and Unit 2 Safety System Functional Failures
- (4) Unit 1 and Unit 2 Reactor Coolant System Leak Rate The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below for the period from April 1, 2017, through June 30, 2018. (2 Samples)
- (1) Occupational Exposure Control Effectiveness
- (2) Radiological Effluent Technical Specifications/Offsite Dose Calculation Manual Radiological Effluent Occurrences (RETS/ODCM) Radiological Effluent Occurrences
71153 - Follow-up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion Events and Personnel Performance
The inspectors evaluated both the plant and licensees response to an automatic trip of the Unit 2 reactor on August 22, 2018, caused by a failed manual U/D counter card in the main turbine.
Licensee Event Reports (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following licensee event reports which can be accessed at https://lersearch.inl.gov/LERSearchCriteria.aspx:
- (1)05000390/2018001-00, Failure to Replace Capacitors Results in Inoperable 120 VAC Vital Inverter
- (2) 05000390,05000391/2017014-00, Main Control Room Boundary Door Left Open Leading to a Loss of Safety Function
- (3)05000391/2018001-00, Reactor Trip on Low Reactor Coolant System Flow Due to Maintenance on Flow Instrumentation
- (4)05000390/2017006-00, Structural Degradation of 161 kV Line Pole Leads to Condition Prohibited by TS
INSPECTION RESULTS
Licensee Identified Non-Cited Violation
71111.05AQ - Fire Protection Annual/Quarterly
This violation of very low safety significance was identified by the licensee and has been entered into the licensees corrective action program and is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Violation: Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) Unit 1 Operating License Number NPF-90, Condition 2.F, requires, in part, that TVA shall implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved Fire Protection Program as described in the Fire Protection Report for the facility, as approved in Appendix FF Section 3.5 of Supplement 18 and Supplement 29 of the SER (NUREG-0847). The WBN Fire Protection Report was developed for WBN to ensure compliance with the requirements of this license condition. Fire Protection Report, Part II, is the Fire Protection Plan. The Fire Protection Plan, Section 14, Fire Protection Systems and Features Operating Requirements (ORs), Subsection 14.10, Fire Safe Shutdown Equipment, paragraph 14.10.4, requires a fire watch to be established in auxiliary building room 757-A10 within one hour of closing pressurizer block valve 1-FCV-68-332-B. Contrary to the above, on July 19, 2018, the licensee failed to establish a fire watch in auxiliary building room 757-A10 within one hour of closing pressurizer block valve 1-FCV-68-332-B.
Significance/Severity Level: This violation is of very low safety significance (Green) based on the results of the IMC 0609, Appendix F, Fire Protection Significance Determination rocess, Phase I Screening Approach. Specifically, the licensees failure to establish a fire watch within one hour of closing the pressurizer block valve did not increase the likelihood of a fire, did not delay detection of a fire, nor did it result in a more significant fire than previously analyzed in auxiliary building room 757-A10 (IMC 0609, Appendix F, Step 1.4.1, Question 1.4.1-A).
Corrective Action Reference(s): This issue is being tracked in the licensees corrective action program by CR 1432723.
Configuration Control Error Results in Actual Auxiliary Building Internal Flooding Event Cornerstone Significance Cross-cutting Aspect Report Section Initiating Events Green [H.12] - Avoid
71111.06 - Flood NCV 05000390/2018003-01 Complacency Protection Measures
Closed A self-revealed Green finding and associated NCV of TS 5.7.1, Procedures, was identified when the licensee failed to maintain adequate configuration control in the HPFP system in accordance with station configuration control procedure, NPG-SPP-10.2, Clearance Procedure to Safely Control Energy. Specifically, the licensee failed to restore HPFP system vent and drain valves to their appropriate configuration prior to returning the system to service which resulted in a significantly large amount of HPFP system water (on the order of 10,000 gallons) being introduced into many areas (including all levels) of the Unit 1 side of the auxiliary building and wetting numerous structures, systems, and components (SSCs)
(including cables, ventilation ducts, motor-operated valves, etc.)
Description:
On July 21, 2018, the licensee repaired a leak in a 3 inch HPFP pipe located in the Unit 1 713 pipe chase upstream of standpipe isolation valve 1-ISV-026-0639 and downstream of the 6 HPFP supply header. Prior to beginning the work to repair the leak, the licensee generated a clearance order to isolate and tag out the affected portion of the system. In the Remarks section of the clearance order two vent valves, 1-SPV-26-671 and 1-SPV-26-672, were identified to be used to drain the appropriate section of piping. These vent valves were not written into the clearance order via a tag (i.e., no-tag/info tag/danger tag).
The licensee was not able to adequately drain the system using only 1-SPV-26-671 and 1-SPV-26-672. The fire marshal, via email, identified additional drain locations that were to be used to adequately drain the system; however, the clearance order was never changed to include these additional drains.
NPG-SPP-10.2, Clearance Procedure to Safely Control Energy, Section 3.2.3.I.1, requires that an adequate number of devices, such as, vents, drains, and dump valves, used to depressurize or drain components are identified to be tagged in the open position or appropriate controls are in place in accordance with Attachment 5, Paragraph G. NPG-SPP-10.2, Attachment 5, Paragraph G, stipulates what is to be done to protect employees when suitable means are not available to depressurize or control hazardous energy. Contrary to this procedural requirement, the licensee did not appropriately identify which vents and drains were to be tagged in the open position.
After draining the appropriate section of piping and completing repair of the leak, the licensee commenced restoration of the system. During restoration, licensee personnel did not realize that the vents identified in the clearance orders Remarks section nor the drains identified in the Fire Marshals email were still open and needed to be closed. Consequently, the licensee released the clearance order with vent and drain locations still open. Upon returning the system to operation, HPFP water was discharged through the open vent and drain paths which flooded portions of the Unit 1 auxiliary building and the Unit 1 auxiliary equipment building.
NPG-SPP-10.2, Section 3.4.4.B, requires that the [responsible employee] ensures components inside the clearance boundary are restored to their proper configuration based upon the work performed and the controls imposed by the work documents. Contrary to this procedural requirement, the licensee did not ensure components inside the clearance boundary were restored to their proper configuration.
Operators first became aware of the condition when alarm 159-B, additional equipment building floor and equipment sump level LO, illuminated on panel 1-M-15. Subsequently, a report from an auxiliary operator indicated water coming into the auxiliary building. Shortly thereafter, source range (SR) and intermediate range (IR) nuclear instruments (NI) alarmed in the control room and showed erratic indications, which was caused from HPFP water intrusion into electrical equipment associated with the NIs. Both the SR and IR NIs were declared inoperable as a result. Unit 1 also experienced alarms in the control room due to grounds on the Unit 1 vital battery boards 1 and 2.
Corrective Actions: The immediate corrective actions were to isolate portions of the fire protection header to arrest the flooding. The licensee generated numerous condition reports documenting equipment that was affected by the flooding event. It initiated a prompt investigation of the event to document what happened, current conditions, extent of condition, and planned actions, which included an operations stand down to discuss recent human performance errors, and to reinforce proper configuration control/tagging methods and log keeping practices. The licensee also verified that no other hold orders in their system exhibited similar inappropriate configuration control characteristics. Lastly, the licensee completed walkdowns to identify all SSCs that were wetted or submerged and completed assessments of their functionality/operability through engineering evaluations and/or performance tests (valve strokes, etc.).
Corrective Action Reference: This issue is being tracked in TVAs corrective action program by CR 1433039.
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The failure to maintain adequate configuration control of the HPFP system when returning it to service, as required by station procedure NPG-SPP-10.2, Clearance Procedure to Safely Control Energy, was a performance deficiency.
Screening: The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it is associated with the configuration control attribute of the initiating events cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations.
Specifically, both the SR and IR NIs were declared inoperable due to water intrusion from the flooding event.
Significance: In accordance with IMC 0609, Attachment 4, the inspectors determined the initiating events cornerstone was affected due to the occurrence of an internal flooding event and used IMC 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power to determine the significance of the finding. The inspectors determined that a detailed risk evaluation was required in accordance with IMC 0609, Appendix A, Exhibit 1, Initiating Events Screening Questions, Section E, External Event Initiators, because the finding impacted the frequency of an internal flooding initiating event. A regional SRA performed the detailed risk evaluation using SAPHIRE Version 8.1.8 and Version 8.50 of the Watts Bar Unit 1 & 2 combined SPAR model. The SRA developed a scenario to model the flooding from the HPFP header described in the finding. The result was an increase in core damage frequency of less than 1E-6/year for Unit 1, which would be a finding of very low significance (Green). The dominant sequences involved the flood leading to a reactor trip with a consequential LOOP (not caused by the flood) and failure of auxiliary feed water along with failure to feed and bleed. This was mitigated by the low likelihood of a reactor transient given the flood location.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: The finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the avoid complacency (H.12)attribute of the human performance area as defined in IMC 0310, Aspects Within the Cross-Cutting Areas, because the licensee failed to recognize and plan for the possibility of mistakes, latent issues, and inherent risk when controlling the configuration of a HPFP header.
Enforcement:
Violation: Technical Specification 5.7.1, Procedures, requires that written procedures covering activities that are recommended in Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A, February 1978, which include equipment control activities (e.g., locking and tagging), be established, implemented, and maintained. Contrary to the above, on July 21, 2018, the licensee failed to adequately implement its station equipment control procedure, NPG-SPP-10.2, Clearance Procedure to Safely Control Energy, when it performed work on the HPFP system which led to a loss of configuration control and an internal flooding event.
Enforcement Actions: This violation is being treated as an NCV consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Unauthorized Entry Into a High Radiation Area Cornerstone Significance Cross-cutting Report Aspect Section Occupational Green [H.4] - 71124.01 Radiation Safety NCV 05000390/391/2018003-02 Teamwork Closed A self-revealed Green finding and associated Non-cited Violation (NCV) of TS 5.11.1.e was identified when the licensee failed to maintain current survey information and failed to inform a worker of increased dose rates in a high radiation area (HRA). As a result, a worker received an electronic dosimeter (ED) alarm on the Unit 2 (U2) pressurizer platform due to changing radiological conditions associated with a reactor mode change.
Description:
On November 25, 2017, a worker was briefed on radiological conditions on the Unit 2 pressurizer platform. At this time Unit 2 was in Mode 5 and general area dose rates were less than 25 mrem/hr in the work area. However, the worker actually entered the pressurizer platform area on December 2, 2017, and did not receive an updated briefing from radiation protection (RP) prior to entry. By that time the reactor was in Mode 3 and dose rates had increased substantially. While working on the platform the worker received a dose rate alarm of 189 mrem/hr, which exceeded the ED setpoint of 150 mrem/hr, and exited the area. A follow up survey found that general area dose rates had increased to 360 mrem/hr. In addition to the workers failure to stop by the RP desk and receive an updated briefing prior to entry, the inspectors noted that the licensees ability to provide an accurate briefing at that time would have been impaired, since RP had not updated their survey data to account for the change in modes.
Corrective Action(s): The licensees corrective actions included updating the survey documents for that area, evaluation of training needs related to changing plant conditions, a review of outage routine survey frequencies, and revising checklists used for HRA briefings.
Corrective Action Reference(s): CR 1364197, 1364213 and 1394740
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The failure to maintain current survey data and to inform a worker of changing radiological conditions prior to entry into a HRA, as required by TS, was a performance deficiency.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the occupational radiation safety cornerstone attribute of program and process for exposure/contamination control and monitoring and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the adequate protection of worker health and safety from exposure to radiation from radioactive material during routine civilian nuclear reactor operation. Failing to inform workers of current radiological conditions prior to entry into HRAs removes a barrier within the exposure control program and could lead to unintended doses.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using the Occupational Radiation Safety Significance Determination Process (SDP), Appendix B. The inspectors determined the finding to be of very low safety significance because the performance deficiency was not an as low as reasonably achievable planning issue, there was not an overexposure nor substantial potential for an overexposure, and the licensee's ability to assess dose was not compromised.
Cross-cutting Aspect: The finding involved the cross-cutting aspect of human performance, teamwork, because the event was a result of poor individual and work group communications and coordination of activities within and across organizational boundaries.
Enforcement:
Violation: Technical Specification 5.11.1.e states that entry into HRAs shall be made only after dose rates in the area have been determined and entry personnel are knowledgeable of them. Contrary to the above, on December 2, 2017, a worker entered a HRA prior to dose rates being determined and prior to being made knowledgeable of them.
Disposition: This violation is being treated as a NCV, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Failure to Collect Compensatory Samples for an Out-of-Service Effluent Monitor.
Cornerstone Significance Cross-cutting Report Aspect Section Public Radiation Green [H.12] - Avoid 71124.06 Safety NCV 05000390/391/2018003-03 Complacency Closed The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated NCV of TS 5.7.2.3 when the licensee failed to take compensatory samples in accordance with Table 1.1-1 of the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM) when the Unit 1 steam generator blowdown effluent monitor was out of service. Specifically, radiation monitor 1-RM-90-120/121 was inoperable from April 27 to May 27, 2018, and compensatory samples were not collected and analyzed within the required frequency of at least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
Description:
On April 27, 2018, in order to support leak repair work, a jumper was installed that disabled the automatic closure of isolation valve 1-FCV-15-44 on a high radiation signal from 1-RM-90-120/121, Unit 1 steam generator blowdown effluent monitor. Upon completion of the work the effluent monitor was returned to service, however the jumper was mistakenly left in place and not removed as required by procedure 0-PI-OPS-1.1. As a result, the effluent monitor would not have been able to perform its function of isolating blowdown on a high radiation signal and was therefore out of service until the error was discovered during a jumper audit on May 27, 2018. During the time 1-RM-90-120/121 was out of service, the ODCM requirements for compensatory sampling were not being performed. However, the CR written during the jumper audit was closed without addressing the missed compensatory samples and without identifying the need to include this issue in the 2018 Annual Radiological Environmental Release Report. The inspectors pointed out the ODCM compliance aspects of this issue to the licensee and another CR was written. The inspectors noted that, although effluent monitor 1-RM-90-120/121 was out of service and no compensatory samples were taken, the licensee maintained the capability to account for effluents released via this pathway due to weekly sampling of secondary side condensate. No abnormal effluent concentration levels were identified in the condensate during the time 1-RM-90-120/121 was out of service.
Corrective Action(s): The licensees immediate corrective actions included removal of the jumper to return the effluent monitor to service. Subsequent to this, additional actions were taken including plans to document the missed compensatory samples in the 2018 Annual Radiological Effluent Release Report and validating the time and date of the jumper removal for the inoperable period.
Corrective Action Reference(s): CRs 1418308 and 1430810
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The failure to remove a jumper as required by procedure 0-PI-OPS-1.1, was a performance deficiency.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the public radiation safety cornerstone attribute of plant facilities/equipment and instrumentation for process radiation monitors and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring adequate protection of public health and safety from exposure to radioactive materials released into the public domain as a result of routine civilian nuclear reactor operation. Failure to collect and analyze compensatory samples within the required frequency of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> could degrade the ability to identify high effluent concentrations that might indicate the need to isolate the steam generator blowdown pathway.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using the Public Radiation Safety SDP, Appendix D. The inspectors determined the finding to be of very low safety significance because it was associated with the effluent program; however, it was not a substantial failure to implement the effluents program and it did not result in a public dose greater than an Appendix I to 10 CFR Part 50 or 10 CFR 20.1301(e) dose value.
Cross-cutting Aspect: The finding involved the cross-cutting aspect of human performance, avoid complacency, because the event was the direct result of a workers failure to remove the jumper.
Enforcement:
Violation: Technical Specification 5.7.2.3 requires implementation of the ODCM. Table 1.1-1 in the ODCM, Radioactive Liquid Effluent Monitoring Instrumentation, requires that grab samples be collected and analyzed for principal gamma emitters at least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> when 1-RM-90-120/121 is out of service and when the specific activity of the secondary coolant is less than 0.01 microcuries per gram dose equivalent Iodine-131.
Contrary to the above, from April 27 to May 27, 2018, grab samples were not collected and analyzed once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> when 1-RM-90-120/121 was out of service and the specific activity of the secondary coolant was less than 0.01 microcuries per gram dose equivalent Iodine-131.
Disposition: This violation is being treated as a NCV, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Inadequate Sensitive Equipment Control Results in Unit 2 Reactor Trip on April 12, 2018 Cornerstone Significance Cross-cutting Aspect Report Section Initiating Green [H.5] - Work 71153 - Follow-up of Events NCV 05000391/2018003-04 Management Events and Notices of Closed Enforcement Discretion A self-revealed Green finding and associated NCV of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, Drawings, was identified for the licensees use of a procedure that was not appropriate to the circumstances, which led to the conduct of improperly planned maintenance on sensitive equipment, ultimately resulting in a reactor trip. Specifically, an inadequacy was identified in station procedure 0-TI-12.10, Control of Sensitive Equipment, which lists the sensitive equipment defined, in part, as equipment that could cause a unit trip, on which work activities are required to be appropriately planned and conducted in a manner that will preclude a unit trip. The procedure did not list the high side reactor coolant system (RCS) loop flow transmitter common drain line as sensitive equipment, which allowed the licensee to improperly perform maintenance on it without the appropriate planning and control necessary to preclude the Unit 2 reactor trip that occurred on April 12, 2018.
Description:
On April 12, 2018, the licensee implemented minor maintenance WO 119245800 inside Unit 2 containment to repair a wet boron leak on a common drain header associated with the RCS Loop 1 low flow reactor trip instrumentation.
Procedure 0-TI-12.10, Control of Sensitive Equipment, Section 2.1, General Requirements, subsection D states, that Appendix A lists systems and equipment requiring sensitive equipment control. Procedure 0-TI-12.10, Appendix A, did not list the high side RCS loop flow transmitter common drain line as a sensitive component requiring special control. As a result of this procedural inadequacy, the licensee did not properly plan nor appropriately conduct the maintenance activity affecting the high side RCS loop flow transmitter common drain line. Upon performing work on the RCS loop flow transmitter common drain line, the workers created a disturbance in the system which, when sensed by the RCS Loop 1 low flow reactor trip instrumentation, caused a reactor trip on low RCS flow.
The licensee first became aware of the inadequate procedure as a result of the U2 reactor trip on April 12, 2018, which prompted the licensee to perform an apparent cause analysis to determine the cause and contributing causes of the trip. As a result of this investigation, the licensee determined that the RCS Loop 1 flow transmitters and associated equipment should have been identified in 0-TI-12.10. The residents noted that procedure NPG-SPP-07.3, Work Activity Risk Management Process, Revision 22, Attachment 2, contains requirements for planning and risk characterization of work activities. Step 1.4 of Attachment 2 requires physical activity performed on or near trip sensitive equipment to be considered a high risk classification, which would not be allowed for a minor maintenance WO when the unit is online. Since the RCS Loop 1 flow transmitters and associated equipment were not designated as trip sensitive equipment, the risk was characterized as low in accordance with NPG-SPP-07.3, and the work was allowed to be implemented through a minor maintenance work order inside Unit 2 containment while online.
The licensee determined that not including the RCS Loop 1 flow transmitters and associated equipment in 0-TI-12.10 removed the only physical barrier that would have prevented the reactor trip and contributed to the risk assessment being classified as low risk in accordance with NPG-SPP-07.3.
Corrective Actions: The licensee generated corrective actions which included briefing site personnel on the event and its causes, revising 0-TI-12.10 to add newly identified sensitive equipment, revising NPG-SPP-07.3 to reference 0-TI-12.10 in the work order risk characterization process, and requiring the work controls center to challenge all work orders/requests coming through their shop per NPG-SPP-07.3 requirements in order to provide additional opportunities for ensuring work is appropriately planned and implemented.
Corrective Action Reference: This issue is being tracked in TVAs corrective action program by CR1404737.
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The failure to ensure that procedure 0-TI-12.10 provided an adequate list of sensitive equipment to be appropriately controlled was a performance deficiency. Specifically, Appendix A of the procedure lists systems and equipment requiring sensitive equipment control; however, the RCS Loop 1 low flow reactor trip instrumentation and associated equipment, which meets the definition of sensitive equipment as defined in 0-TI-12.10, was not listed in Appendix A.
Screening: The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it is associated with the procedure quality attribute of the initiating events cornerstone and adversely affects the cornerstone objective of limiting the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations.
Specifically, the failure to ensure that procedure 0-TI-12.10 provided an adequate list of sensitive equipment resulted in the approval of work in the vicinity of trip sensitive equipment while the unit was online, which resulted in a unit trip.
Significance: In accordance with IMC 0609, Attachment 4, the inspectors determined the initiating events cornerstone was affected due to the occurrence of a reactor trip and used IMC 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power to determine the significance of the finding. The inspectors determined that the finding screened to Green in accordance with IMC 0609, Appendix A, Exhibit 1, Initiating Events Screening Questions, Section B, Transient Initiators, because the finding caused a reactor trip but did not result in the loss of mitigation equipment relied upon to transition the plant from the onset of the trip to a stable shutdown condition.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: The finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the work management attribute of the human performance area as defined in IMC 0310, Aspects Within the Cross-Cutting Areas, because the licensee did not identify and manage risk commensurate with the work on the RCS Loop 1 low flow reactor trip instrumentation and associated equipment.
Enforcement:
Violation: 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Quality Assurance Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants and Fuel Reprocessing Plants, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, requires, in part, activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures, or drawings, of a type appropriate to the circumstances and shall be accomplished in accordance with these instructions, procedures, or drawings. Contrary to the above, on April 12, 2018, the licensee failed to ensure its station sensitive equipment control procedure, 0-TI-12.10, Control of Sensitive Equipment, was adequate for identifying and controlling RCS Loop 1 low flow reactor trip instrumentation and associated equipment, which led to improperly planned work being conducted on sensitive equipment resulting in a reactor trip.
Enforcement Actions: This violation is being treated as an NCV consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Licensee Identified Non-Cited Violation 71153 - Follow-up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion This violation of very low safety significance was identified by the licensee and has been entered into the licensee corrective action program and is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Violation: Watts Bar Unit 1 TS 3.8.1, AC Sources - Operating, Condition A, requires, in part, that an inoperable required offsite circuit be restored to operable status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
Contrary to the requirements of Technical Specification 3.8.1, a required offsite circuit was determined to be inoperable from May 27, 2017, to June 2, 2017.
Severity/Significance: This violation was characterized using traditional enforcement because the NRC determined that this violation was not reasonably foreseeable and preventable by the licensee and, therefore, was not a performance deficiency. This was because the degraded 161 kV power pole was owned and controlled by a separate entity, TVA Transmission. The violation was assessed using Sections 2.2.4 and 6.1.d.1 of the NRCs Enforcement Policy and determined to be a SL IV violation.
Corrective Action Reference(s): CRs 1302767 and 1301565 This violation closes LER 05000390/2017-006-00.
Licensee Identified Non-Cited Violation 71153 - Follow-up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion This violation of very low safety significance was identified by the licensee and has been entered into the licensee corrective action program and is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Violation: Watts Bar Unit 1 TS LCO 3.8.7, Inverters-Operating, requires that two inverters in each of the four channels shall be operable. Contrary to the above, the licensee failed to ensure that two inverters in each of the four channels were operable. Specifically, from April 9, 2017 to January 10, 2018 inverter 1-II was inoperable due to an unqualified class 1E capacitor associated with the inverter.
Severity/Significance: Using Chapter 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process for Findings At-Power, Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, the issue screened as having very low safety significance (Green) because it did not represent an actual loss of function of at least a single train for greater than its technical specification allowed outage time. Two vital AC busses as a minimum remained operable at all times, therefore a loss of safety function did not occur.
Corrective Action References: CR 1376221 This violation closes LER 05000390/2018-001-00.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
- On July 20, the heat sink inspector presented the inspection results to Mr. Tom Marshall, Plant Manager, and other members of the licensee staff.
- On September 28, 2018, the inservice inspector presented the inspection results to Mr. Paul Simmons, site vice-president and other members of the licensee staff. The inspectors confirmed that all proprietary information reviewed during the inspection was returned or will be destroyed following report completion and that none of the potential report input discussed was considered proprietary.
- On August 10, 2018, and September 14, 2018, the radiation protection inspectors presented the radiation protection inspection results to P. Simmons, Site Vice-President, and other members of the licensee staff.
- On October 24, 2018, the resident inspectors presented the quarterly resident inspection results to Mr. Tom Marshall and other members of the licensee staff.
LIST OF
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Section 71111.01: Adverse Weather Protection
0-PI-OPS-1-SO, Summer Operation, Rev. 0014
CR 1418580
CR 1418584
CR 1418586
Section 71111.04: Equipment Alignment
Procedures
2-SOI-72.01, Containment Spray System, Valve Checklist 2-72.01-1V, ATT 1V, Rev. 0001
2-SOI-72.01, Containment Spray System, Power Checklist 2-72.01-1P, ATT 1P, Rev. 0000
0-SOI-82.03, Diesel Generator (DG) 2A-A, Rev. 0014
0-SOI-82.03 ATT 1), Diesel Generator (DG) 2A-A Power Checklist 82.03-1P, Rev. 0000
0-SOI-82.03 ATT 1V, Diesel Generator (DG) 2A-A Valve Checklist 82.03-1V, Rev. 0010
0-SOI-67.01 ATT 3V. Essential Raw Cooling Water System Supply Header 1A Valve Alignment
Checklist 0-67.01-3VG, Rev. 0017
0-PI OPS-17.0, 18 Month Locked Valve Verification Rev. 0084
1-PI-OPS-1-PE, Protected Equipment, Rev. 0021
MMTP-102, Erection of Scaffolds/Temporary Work Platforms and Ladders, Rev. 0015
WO 119103377
CRs 1450590, 1450594, 1450601, 1450608, 1450612, 1450618, 1446913, 1449656, 14506252
Drawings
2-47W812-1, Containment Spray System
Section 71111.05AQ: Fire Protection
CR 1438825
CR 1439553
WBN PFP CON-0-708-01, Pre fire plan for control building, elevation 708, Rev. 3
WBN Fire Protection Report, Part VI, Fire Hazard Analysis, Rev. 54
NPG-SPP-18.4.7, Control of Transient Combustibles, Rev. 0011
NPG-SPP-18.4.6-6, WBN Fire Watch Route Sheet, Rev. 008
NPG-SPP-18.4.6-3, NPG Fire Watch Briefing and Turnover Form, 12-10-2010
Fire Protection Plan, Part II, Rev. 54
0-AOI-30.1, Plant Fires, Rev. 005
CR 1436656
CRs 1447078, 1447087, 1447089. 1447261
WBN PFP AUX-0-772-01, Pre fire plan for auxiliary building 772 (general), Rev. 1
WBN-PFP-AUX-0-772-02, Pre fire plan for auxiliary building 772 (Unit 2), Rev. 4
WBN PFP AUX-0-772-03, Pre fire plan for auxiliary building 772 (Unit 1), Rev. 4
WBN Fire Protection Report, Part II, Fire Protection Plan, Rev. 54
WBN Fire Protection Report, Part X, NFPA Code Evaluation, Rev. 54
NPG-SPP-18.4.7, Control of Transient Combustibles, Rev. 0011
Drawing 0-45W883-5
MMTP-102, Erection of Scaffolds/Temporary Work Platforms and Ladders, Rev. 0016
NPG-SPP-18.4.6-6, WBN Fire Watch Route Sheet, Rev. 008
NPG-SPP-18.4.6-3, NPG Fire Watch Briefing and Turnover Form, December 10, 2010
Fire Protection Plan, Part II, Rev. 54
0-AOI-30.1, Plant Fires, Rev. 0005
CR 1432723
WBN PFP RXN-1-757-01, Pre fire plan: Unit 1 reactor building el 757, 763, 782, 801, Rev. 1
WBN PFP RXN-1-713-01, Pre fire plan: Unit 1 reactor building el 713, 724, 744, Rev. 2
WBN PFP RXN-1-702-01, Pre fire plan: Unit 1 reactor building el 702, Rev. 1
WBN Fire Protection Report, Part II, Fire Protection Plan, Rev. 54
WBN Fire Protection Report, Part VI, Fire Hazard Analysis, Rev. 54
WBN Fire Protection Report, Part X, NFPA Code Evaluation, Rev. 54
NPG-SPP-18.4.7, Control of Transient Combustibles, Rev. 0011
MMTP-102, Erection of Scaffolds/Temporary Work Platforms and Ladders, Rev. 0016
Section 71111.06: Flood Protection Measures
CR 1433039
Clearance Order 0-TO-2018-0072, 0-26-0898
NPG-SPP-18.4.6-6, WBN Fire Watch Route Sheet, Rev. 008
Operator Logs
WBNOSG4099, Moderate Energy Line Break Flooding Study, Rev. 16
WB-DC-40-31.51, Evaluating the Effects of Flooding Due to Moderate Energy Pipe Failures
Inside and Outside Containment, Rev. 5
Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 1 Probabilistic Risk Assessment Individual Plant Examination,
Volume 4, Rev. 0, Appendix E.1, Watts Bar Internal Flood Analysis
WB-DC-40-61, Equipment and Floor Drainage System, Rev. 5
NPG-SPP-10.1, System Status Control, Rev. 9
NPG-SPP-10.2, Clearance Procedure to Safely Control Energy, Rev. 20
WBN Level 2 Evaluation Report for CR 1433039
WBN Prompt Investigation Report Out for CR 1433039
Section 71111.07: Heat Sink Performance
Work Orders
114559486, Preventative Maintenance (PM) Work Order, Intake Pumping Station Pump Bay
Train A, Inspection /Cleaning, PM-600110059, Rev 9, 9/18/14
116154000, PM, P1429, Component Cooling System Heat Exchanger C Performance Test,
6/1/16
117400453, PM 600112124 Work Order, Monitoring of Silt Accumulation in Intake Channel,
9/13/16
117761176, PM, P1430, Component Cooling System Heat Exchanger A Performance Test,
3/20/17
117761938, PM, P1533, Surveillance Task, 0-TRI-67-902-A, System Leakage Test, Essential
Raw Cooling Water (ERCW) System Buried Piping, Train A, 8/11/17
118086210, PM, P4430, Component Cooling System Heat Exchanger B Performance Test,
10/28/17
118121517, PM, P1231, TI-79.824, Diesel Generator 2A-A Jacket Water Cooler Performance
Test, 7/29/17
118630001, Task 200, Obtain Bids for EDG Jacket Water Heat Exchanger Replacement,
3/28/17
119002300, PM, P1458, TI-79.824, Diesel Generator 2B-B Jacket Water Cooler Performance
Test, 6/20/18
119150948, PM P0023, 0-SI-67-901-A, ERCW Train A Pumps Performance Test, 5/13/18
119651562, Unit-1, Implement DEC 66688-Replace the 1A1 EDG Jacket Water Heat
Exchangers, HTX-082-0720A1-A, 6/15/18
Action Requests
CR 1277211, Generate Parent Work Order for Watts Bar Nuclear (WBN) Project FP612858,
Ultimate Heat Sink/ Essential Raw Cooling Water (ERCW) Margin Recovery, 3/28/17
CR 1381083, Diesel Generator Heat Exchanger Performance Testing, 1/26/18
CR 1393145, Oil leak on the ERCW Pump H-B, 3/9/18ondition Information
CR 1417305, Error in CCS Heat Exchanger C, Cleaning Alignment, 5/25/18
CR 1423468, Implement Design Engineering Change (DEC) 66688, Replace the Emergency
Diesel Generator (EDG) Jacket Water Heat Exchangers, 6/15/18
CR 1432254, NRC Identified, Clarification needed for 0-AOI-22, 7/19/18
CR 1432578, NRC Identified, UFSAR and N3-67-4002 ERCW Pump Submergence
Inaccuracies, 7/19/18
CR 1432581, NRC Identified, Abnormal Operating Instruction 0-AOI-22, Contains Errors in the
Discussion Section, 7/19/18
Calculations
CDQ000020080081, Loss of Chickamauga Reservoir-Drain Down Analysis, 3/17/14
EPMJFL120285, ERCW System Flow Requirements, 3/28/18
EPMSME040790, Component Cooling System Load List, 2/23/17
Drawings
10N215, WBN Plant, Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) Grading Plan, Intake Channel, Rev. E
0-47W803-2, WBN, TVA, Flow Diagram Auxiliary Feedwater, Rev.4
0-47W845-1, Essential Raw Cooling Water (ERCW) System Flow Diagram, Rev. 9
0-47W845-2, ERCW System Flow Diagram, Rev. 10
Procedures
0-CM-4.05, WBN 1 & 2, Non-Oxidizing Biocide Injection for Control of Asiatic Clams, Zebra
Mussels, and MIC, Rev. 3
0-CM-4.10, WBN 1 & 2 Sodium Hypochlorite Injection for Control of Clams, Slime, and MIC,
Rev. 9
0-TI-79.703, WBN Unit 0, Component Cooling System Heat Exchanger C Performance Test,
Rev. 1
-TI-79.701, WBN Unit 1, Component Cooling System Heat Exchanger A Performance Test,
Rev. 2
2-TI-79.701, WBN Unit 2, Component Cooling System, Heat Exchanger B Performance Test,
Rev. 2
2-TI-79.823, WBN Unit 2, Diesel Generator 2A-A Jacket Water Cooler Performance Test, Rev.
2-TI-79.824, WBN Unit 2, Diesel Generator 2B-B Jacket Water Cooler Performance Test, Rev.
O-AOI-22, WBN 1 & 2, Abnormal Operating Procedure, Break of Downstream Dam, Rev. 2
TVA-IGA-09.002, TVA Intergroup Agreement (IGA) Nuclear and River Management, Rev. 3
Other Documents
0-TI-79-000, WBN Unit 1& 2, Technical Instruction, Program for Implementing NRC Generic Letter 89-13, 6/22/18
EDMS: L18 990318 800, WBN Unit-1, Eddy Current Examination Report, Residual Heat
Removal Heat exchanger 1A, March 1999
Licensee Event Report (LER)-390/2017-009-00, Unanalyzed Condition Related to Dual Unit
Operation of the ERCW System during a Design basis Accident, 9/11/17
Past Operability Evaluation (POE) for CR-1316395, 8/28/17
WBN Plant, NRC, Integrated Inspection Report 05000390/2017003, 05000391/2017003,
11/22/17
WBN-ENG-SSA-18-003, Ultimate Heat Sink Inspection Readiness Self-Assessment, 5/10/18
WBN Unit -1, Change Request Form No. 64578, 5/29/15
WBN Unit-1 Eddy Current Examination Report of Residual Heat Removal Heat Exchanger A
and B, RIMS No. L18 930317 802, November 1992 through April 1993
WBN-VTD-W120-2760, Westinghouse Instruction Manual for Auxiliary Heat Exchangers, Rev.
WBN-0-18-097 R0, WBN Unit-1 & 2, PRA Evaluation Response, 7/5/18
71111.08 - Inservice Inspection Activities
0-TI-100.012, ASME Section XI Containment Inservice Inspection (CISI) Program, Steel
Containment Vessel (SCV), ASME Code Class MC components, in accordance with ASME
Code,Section XI, Subsection IWE, 2013 Edition, 9/7/18
N-UT-19, Ultrasonic Examination of Welds in Vessels Greater Than 2-Inches in Wall Thickness
Rev. 20
N-UT-85, Manual Ultrasonic Examination for the Detection of Thermal Fatigue in Piping
Components within the Materials Reliability Program, Rev. 3
Drawings:
1068D-E-01, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 1, Reactor Vessel, Upper Control Rod Drive
Mechanism (CRDM) Support, 9/16/15
30738-1715, PWR Vessel Assembly, Westinghouse, 11/2/98
CHM-2660-C-04, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 1, Steam Generator Replacement, Rev .1
ISI-1068-MRP-03, WB-1, Reactor Coolant System MRP-146 Branch Connections, Rev. 1
WBN-E-2879IC-R, WB-1 Auxiliary Feedwater Isometric Sketch. Rev. 15
Work Orders/Work Requests:
WO-112673820, 1-SI-0-703, Page 1, Containment Integrated Leak Rate Test, January 31, 2013
Action Requests:
Condition Report (CR)-904696, CRDM Seismic Support needs to be added to the ISI Program,
January 12, 2016
CR-1384698, Engineering Evaluation Needed on ASME Pipe, July 7, 2018
CR-1436346, Part 21 - NSAL-18-1 Revision 0, Thermal Sleeve Flange Wear Leads to Stuck
Control Rod, August 2, 2018
CR-1417696, Part 21 EN 53422 - Wear of Thermal Sleeves in CRDM, (with attached Best Effort
Visual Inspection of September 27, 2018), CR Initiation Date May 24, 2018
CR-1450372, NRC Identified White Residue Found on Various Components in U-1 Accumulator
Room 4, September 26, 2018
CR-1450933, NRC Identified White Residue on Bottom of Pressurizer, September 26, 2018
CR-1451366, NRC Inspector Noted Calculation, MDQ0010682007114, uses Code Case N729-
for Determining Effective Degradation Years on WB-1 and WB-2 reactor Heads, Current
version is N729-4, September 27, 2018
Miscellaneous Documents:
51-9221733-000, Watts Bar 1, RO-12, Reactor Vessel Closure Head Penetration Examinations,
April 7, 2014
EDMS # L18 180926 800, Eddy Current Examination Report, In-core Thimble Tubes, Watts Bar
Nuclear Plant Unit-1, Cycle 15, September, 2018
IHI Southwest Technologies, Ultrasonic Certificate of Qualification, D. Maclean
Repair Replacement Activity Planning Form, Work Order No. 114522403, Replace AFW Valve
1-PCV-3-132 with Cavitating Venturi and Associated Piping Modifications, March 7, 2018
Report No. R-013, Weld MRP-146-DR-2, Ultrasonic Calibration/Examination September 18,
2018
Report No. R-043, ASME Section XI, Exam Category E-A and Appendix J, Containment
Annulus, Azimuth 0-360 Degrees, Elevation 834- Top, Visual Examination of IWE Surfaces,
September 26, 2018
Report No. R-051, UT Calibration/Examination, ASME Class 2 Component ID RSGFW-4,
September 30, 2018
Report No. R-054, ASME Section XI, Exam Category E-A and Appendix J, Containment
Annulus All Elevations Azimuth 180-270 Degrees, Visual Examination of IWE Surfaces,
September 26, 2018
TVA, Report of Calibration, Ultrasonic Flaw Detector, Krautkramer Model USN60, Serial
Number 0132MR, Calibration Date, August 9, 2018
TVA Report, Watts Bar U1-R15 RPV Lower Head Bottom Mounted Instrument Penetration and
Instrument Connection Dissimilar Metal Weld Visual Examination, September 30, 2018
Visual Acuity Examination Record for NDE Personnel,
- F. Leonard, C. Rievley
VT-15-005, In-service Inspection (ISI) Report Number, Summary No. 15097-ISI-WBN1, Visual
Examination of Pipe Hanger, Support or Restraint, (VT-3), Upper CRDM Support, September
23, 2015
Section 71111.11: Licensed Operator Requalification Program
IP 71111.11, Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance,
dated January 1, 2015
Simulator Exercise Guide # 3-OT-SRE-1004
OPDP-1, Conduct of Operations, Rev. 0040
OPDP-14, Operator Leadership and Fundamentals, Rev. 0003
0-SI-82-11-A, Monthly Diesel Generator Start and Load Test DG 1A-A, Rev. 0052
Section 71111.12: Maintenance Effectiveness
WO 119646984
0-TI-119, Maintenance Rule Performance Indicator Monitoring, Trending, and Reporting -
10CFR50.65, Rev. 0008
NPG-SPP-03.4, Maintenance Rule Performance Indicator Monitoring, Trending and Reporting -
10CFR50.65, Rev. 0003
DCN 66465
MMTP-104, Rev. 10
MAI-5.2, Structural Bolting, Rev. 0011
Section 71111.13: Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
Unit 1Operators Risk Report, July 18, 2018
Unit 2 Operators Risk Report, July 18, 2018
U1/U2 EOOS Risk Assessment
NPG-SPP-09.11, Probabilistic Risk Assessment Program, Rev. 0003
NPG-SPP-09.11.1, Equipment Out of Service Management, Rev. 0012
NPG-SPP-07.3.4, Protected Equipment, Rev. 0004
1-PI-OPS-1-PE, Protected Equipment, Rev. 0021
OPDP-11, Operational Decision-Making Issue Process
CR 1433989
SDD-N3-47-4002, Turbo generator System Description
Operators Risk Report August 20, 2018
NPG-SPP-09.11.1, Equipment Out of Service Management, Rev. 0012
NPG-SPP-07.3, Work Activity Risk Management Process, Rev. 0024
WBN Defense in Depth Assessment dated September 15, 2018
NPG-SPP-07.2.11, Shutdown Risk Management, Rev. 0012
Section 71111.15: Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
OPDP-8, Operability Determination Process and LCO Tracking, Rev. 0024
CRs 1390880, 1391006, 1391010, 1391012, 1391668
CR 1438627
Fire Protection Evaluation Report
1-ARI-102-108, Unit 1 Annunciator Response Instruction, Rev. 0010
Drawing 1-45W600-30-13
CR 1421234
PDO for CR 1421234
CR 1442336
OPDP-8, Operability Determination Process and LCO Tracking,
CR 1398085
0-AOI-8, Tornado Watch or Warning, Rev. 21
0-GOI-7, Generic Equipment Operating Guidelines, Rev. 7
OPDP-8, Operability Determination Process and LCO Tracking
CRs 1383947, 1383948
WBN Unit 1 Technical Specifications
WBN Unit 1 Technical Specifications Bases
CR 1445729
CR 1433039
CRs 1433192, 1433194, 1433198, 1433207, 1433209, 1448760, 1448811
WB-DC-40-61, Equipment and Floor Drainage System, Rev. 5
CR 1426051
CR 1430328
EWR-18-MEC-003-209, Unit 1 TDAFW pump casing insulation removal
2048-0045-RPT-001, turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Turbine Oil Water, Rev. 0
White paper prepared by EQ engineer on relative humidity in TDAFW pump room
CR 1433039
CR 1433048
CR 1433192
CR 1433194
CR 1433017
CR 1433027
CR 1433063
CR 1433064
CR 1433106
CR 1433113
CR 1433152
CR 1433195
CR 1433196
CR 1433198
CR 1433207
CR 1433209
CR 1343213
CR 1433215
Prompt Determination of Operability Documentation for CR 1421234
CR 1442336
Stone & Webster calculation sheet for calculation #14
Framatome review of 6 line analysis in TVA Calculation WBNAPS2042, Fluid transient analysis
of MFW piping due to check valve closure following postulated pipe rupture, Rev. 06
Red Wolf Associates review of Watts Bar Calculation WBNAPS 2042, Third Party Methodology
Review, Rev. 6
Procedure control form for 1-SI-3-923-S, Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1A S Comprehensive Pump
Test, Rev. 18
Unit 1 Operations Log dated June 25, 2018-June 26, 2018
Section 71111.19: Post Maintenance Testing
WO 119205764
2-SI-3-907-A, Valve Position Indication Verification (train A) Auxiliary Feedwater System, Rev. 6
CR 1431660
0-MI-0.007, Check Valve, Rev. 16
CR 1159253
CR 1426051
PER 154789
1-SOI-3.02, Auxiliary Feedwater System
CR 1426568
CR 1436407
EWR-18-MEC-003-209, Unit 1 TDAFW pump casing insulation removal
WO 119716537
CR 1429639
CR 1430390
CR 1432958
CR 1434476
CRs 1440091, 1440707, 1440459, 1440335, 1439643
Section 71111.22: Surveillance Testing
CR 1430988
CR 1431048
0-SI-82-11-A, Monthly Diesel Generator Start and Load Test DG 1A-A, Rev. 0052
IP 71111 Attachment 22, Surveillance Testing, July 1, 2015
CR 1422717
CR 1428784
1-SI-99-10-B, 62 Day Functional Test of SSPS Train B and Reactor Trip Breaker B, Rev. 0066
1-SI-63-10.2-A, ECCS Pumps and Discharge Pipes Venting - Train A Outside Containment
1-47W809-1, Flow Diagram Chemical and Volume Control System
1-47W810-1, Flow Diagram Residual Heat Removal System
1-47W811-1, Flow Diagram Safety Injection System
EWR18MEC063248, ECCS Venting Engineering Guidance, Rev. 1
1-SI-3-923-S, Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1A-S Comprehensive Pump Test, Rev. 0018
1-SI-3-902, Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1A-S Quarterly Performance Test, Rev.
0054
CR 1426051
WO 119002252
Data Report 180413-132259, Central Labs analysis of 1A terry turbine inboard bearing lube oil,
sample ID AW17820, LRF ID 18040105
2-SI-72-901-B, Containment Spray Pump 2B-B Quarterly Performance Test, Rev. 0007
OPDP-1, Operations Pre-briefing Guideline, Attachment 9, Rev. 0040
WO 119812674
CR 1439643
0-SI-82-11-B, Monthly Diesel Generator Start and Load Test DG 1B-B, Rev. 0054
0-SI-82-18-B, 184 Day Fast Start and Load Test DG 1B-B, Rev. 0026
1-SI-63-10.1-A, ECCS Discharge Pipes Venting - Train A Inside Containment, Rev. 28
EWR18MEC063248, ECCS Venting Engineering Guidance, Rev. 1
CRs 1407257, 1408573, 1408589, 1422476, 1421340
1-47W811-1, Flow Diagram Safety Injection System, Rev. 64
1-SI-61-1, Determination of Boron and pH on Ice Condenser Ice, Rev. 0013
2-SI-68-32, Reactor Coolant System Water Inventory Balance, Rev. 0005
2-SI-68-28, Primary Radiochemistry Requirements, Rev. 0003
2-SI-68-29, Reactor Coolant E-Bar Determination, Rev. 0000
2-CM-6.24, Sampling CVCS Mixed Bed Demineralizers, Rev. 0007
CM-5.11, E-Bar Determination, Rev. 0012
Gamma Isotopic Results computer printouts from September 4, 2018 and September 7, 2018
Chemistry Nuclear IQ database
1-SI-70-701, Containment Isolation Valve Local Leak Rate Test Component Cooling, Rev. 0014
CR 1451068
Section 71124.01 - Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls
Procedures
NPG-SPP-05.1, Radiological Controls, Rev. 10
NPG-SPP-22.300, Corrective Action Program, Rev. 10
RCDP-17, Radiological Postings, Rev. 1
RCDP-20, Radiation and Contamination Surveys, Rev. 0
RCDP-21, Radiological Air Sampling, Rev. 0
RCDP-22, Control of High Radiation Areas and Very High Radiation Areas, Rev. 0
RCDP-23, Control of Radioactive Material, Rev. 0
RCI-100, Radiological Controls, Rev. 53
Data
0-TI-7.005, Storage of Material in the Spent Fuel Pool, Cask Pit, Transfer Canal & New Fuel
Vault, Rev. 14, Effective Date: 02/26/18
Access Control Alarm Report, 21/01 - 12/04/17, RWP No. 17282002
NSTS Confirmation of Annual Inventory Reconciliation, 01/08/18
Radiation Work Permit (RWP) No. 17260317, U2R1 Outage - LHRAs & ARA Entry, SG Eddy
Current Testing
RWP No. 17260333, U2R1 Outage - SG primary manway and insert removal/reinstallation
including insert cleaning/inspection and stud hole/bolt cleaning
RWP No. 17260416, U2R1 Outage - LHRA & ARA, All Laborer activities to support SG
activities in U2 lower containment
RWP No. 18001303, NSSS Filter Changeout and all associated work for LHRA filters
RWP No. 18104603, U1 Lower Containment - Performance of inside containment portion of
1-SI-63-10.1-A (LHRA Entry)
RWP No. 18196126, U1R15 Outage - Upper containment (LHRA, CA, DRPA, ARA), Cavity
decon support
Radtrac Inventory Report, 05/04/18
Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Airborne Radiation Survey, Survey Nos.: 081117206, Routine Air
Sample (RAS) U2R1 SGR 4, 11/08/17; 081117208, RAS U2R1 SGR 3, 11/08/17;
081117209, RAS U2R1 SGR 2, 11/08/17; and 081117227, RAS U2R1 SGR 1, 11/08/17
WBN Radiological Survey Maps, Survey Nos.: wbn-M-20171125-18, R236 U-2 PRT Platform,
11/25/17; wbn-M-20171202-8, R236 U-2 PRT Platform, 12/02/17; wbn-M-20180907-17, A428
U-1 Pipe Chase 713, 09/07/18; wbn-M-20180911-11, R131 U-1 Lower Ctmt Fan Room #1,
September 11, 2018; and wbn-M-20180912-6, A737 Spent Fuel Pool Filter Pit, September 12,
2018
CAP Documents
1364197
1364213
1394740
Section 71124.06 - Radioactive Gaseous and Liquid Effluent Treatment
Procedures
0-CM-9.7.101, Auxiliary Building Exhaust Effluent Monitor Grab Sampling and Filter
Replacement, Rev. 9
0-ODI-90-22, Weekly Auxiliary Building Exhaust Release, Revs. 36 and 37
0-ODI-90-42, 276 Day Channel Operational Test of the Waste Disposal Liquid Effluent
Radiation Monitor Loop 0-LPR-90-122, Rev. 13
0-SI-30-9-A, Auxiliary Building Gas Treatment System Filter Train - A Test, Revs. 9 and 10
1-ODI-90-26, Weekly Sampling of Unit Shield Building Exhaust, Rev. 29
2-ODI-90-56, 92 Day Channel Operational Test of Shield Bldg Vent Rad Monitor Loop
2-LPR-90-400, Revs. 28 and 30
2-SI-90-6, 18 Month Channel Calibration Cntmt Purge Air Exhaust Rad Monitor Loop
2-LPR-90-130-A, Rev. 4
Offsite Dose Calculation Manual, Rev. 2
Data
0-ODI-90-22, Weekly Auxiliary Building Exhaust Release, Rev. 36, July 31, 2018
0-ODI-90-42, 276 Day Channel Operational Test of the Waste Disposal Liquid Effluent
Radiation Monitor Loop 0-LPR-90-122, Rev. 13, October 10, 2017
0-SI-30-9-A, Auxiliary Building Gas Treatment System Filter Train - A Test, Revs. 9 and 10,
November 30, 2015 and August 9, 2017, respectively
1-ODI-90-26, Weekly Sampling of Unit Shield Building Exhaust, Rev. 29, August 9, 2018
2-ODI-90-56, 92 Day Channel Operational Test of Shield Bldg Vent Rad Monitor Loop
2-LPR-90-400, Revs. 28 and 30, April 14, 2017 and April 19, 2018, respectively
2-SI-90-6, 18 Month Channel Calibration Cntmt Purge Air Exhaust Rad Monitor Loop
2-LPR-90-130-A, Rev. 4, January 11, 2018
2017 Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report
Certificate of Calibration, Gamma Standard Source, Radionuclide: Cs-137, Contained
Radioactivity: 100.9 uCi, Reference Date: 1-Dec-05, Source No.: 1133-59
Gaseous Radioactive Waste Release Permit No. G-20180801-389-C
Liquid Radioactive Waste Release Permit No. L-20180717-338-B
Radiation Monitor 101 DatAWare History 16-JUL-2018 to 19-JUL-2018
TVA WBN, Gamma Isotopic Results, Spectrums: 11_2018-07-17_012; 11_2018-07-18_005;
and 14_2018-07-18_007
Watts Bar Operations Department, Shift Order: 18-10, Subject: Jumpers left installed after
declaring rad monitor operable, May 19, 2018
CAP Documents
276339
1418308
1430810
1434141
1432584
1437317
Section 71124.07 - Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program
Procedures
Offsite Dose Calculation Manual, Rev. 2
0-ODI-999-05, Collection of Radiological Environmental Monitoring Samples, Rev. 7
Data
2016 and 2017 Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Reports
GEL Laboratories 2017 Annual Quality Assurance Report for the Radiological Environmental
Monitoring Program (REMP), March 9, 2018
REMIC Trouble Report 18WBN003, ISCO Water Sampler, March 2, 2018
Certificate of Calibration Radiological Environmental Monitoring Air Sampler Serial No. 26029,
6/28/18
Meteorological Monitoring Instrumentation Report of Calibration for Ultrasonic Wind Sensor S/N:
B3720001, 6/12/18
Groundwater Monitoring Well Results, September 2017 - June 2018
Section 71124.08 - Radioactive Solid Waste Processing and Radioactive Material
Handling, Storage, and Transportation
Procedures
NPG-SPP-05.9.1, Radioactive Material/Waste Shipments, Rev. 5
RCDP-23, Control of Radioactive Material, Rev. 0
RWTP-101, 10 CFR 61 Waste Characterization, Rev. 2
Data
Radioactive Shipment Record WBN-16-01
Radioactive Shipment Record WBN-17-03
Radioactive Shipment Record WBN-17-05
Radioactive Shipment Record WBN-18-02
Radioactive Shipment Record WBN-18-115
Nuclide Distribution Report, Dry Active Waste, August 7, 2017
Nuclide Distribution Report, Primary Resin, August 18, 2017
Radioactive Waste Packaging Transportation and Disposal Training, Training Objectives
Section 71151 - - Performance Indicator Verification
Data
2017 Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report
Gaseous Radioactive Waste Release Permit No. G-20180622-372-C
Liquid Radioactive Waste Release Permit No. L-20180627-325-B
List of Dose Rate Alarms, April 2017 - June 2018
Nuclear Performance Reports from April 2017 to June 2018
Section 71153: Follow-up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion
CR 1376221
WO 111928196
1-45W703-2 Drawing
1-45W706-2 Drawing
NPG-SPP-06.2, Preventative Maintenance, Revs. 3, 10, and 12
MMDP-1, Maintenance Management System, Revs. 8 and 20
WBN-VTD-A994-0020, Ametek Solidstate Controls Instructions and Operating Manual with
Drawing for Tennessee Valley Authority Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, 20KVA Inverter, Rev. 7
PM 600100027, Capacitor Replacement for 120V VIT Inv 1-II MPM M7715V
TS Section 3.8, Electrical Power Systems
Log entries reports dated May 27, 2017-June 2, 2017
2-GO-3, Unit Startup From Less Than 4% Reactor Power to 30% Reactor Power, Rev. 0009
2-GO-2, Reactor Startup, Rev. 0011
30