IR 05000369/1989032
| ML19325F333 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | McGuire, Mcguire  |
| Issue date: | 11/03/1989 |
| From: | Cooper T, Shymlock M, Vandoorn P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19325F332 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-369-89-32, 50-370-89-32, NUDOCS 8911200151 | |
| Download: ML19325F333 (15) | |
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMIS$10N '
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Report Nos.:- 50-369/89-32 and 50-370/89-32
Ocensee: Duke Power Company 422 South Church Street
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Charlotte, NC 28242 l
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Facility Name:
McGuire Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2 i
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Docket'Nos.:
50-369'and 50-370 License Nos.:. NPF-9 and NPF-17
. Inspection Conducted:
September 13, 1989 - October 13, 1989.
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Inspectors; Md///I/
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P.' K ' VanD orn, Sefior Resident Inspector-
. C60per, Resident Inspector
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' Approved by:
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M..B. Shymlock, Section Chief Date Signed
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Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY
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Scope:
This routine, resident inspection was conducted onsite inspecting in
.the areas of operations, safety verification, surveillance testing, g#
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maintenance activities, follow-up on previous inspection findings,
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10 CFR Part 21 inspection, licensee self assessment capability, facility modifications, folicwup of licensee event report:;, and plant startup from refueling.
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Results:
In the areas' inspected, one non-cited violation and two weaknesses
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ware identified.
The violation involved failure to retest a charging i
s, pump after maintenance during an outage (paragraph 6.b).
One weakness involved workers not performing all activities described on
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a Work Request indicating a possible program deficiency (paragraph 5.b.).
Another weakness involved a failure of licensee programs to consistently identify repetitive problem areas c
(paragraph 11).
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REPORT DETAILS
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Persons Contacted Licensee Employees j
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.G. Addis,' Superintendent of Station Services D..Baxter, Support Operations Manager
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- J. Boyle, Superintendent of Integrated Scheduling'
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D. Bumgardner, Unit 1 Operations Manager J. Foster, Station-Health Physicist c
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- R. Futrell, Nuclear Safety.Assurence Manager.
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G. Gilbert, Superintendent of Technical Services-O. Hendrix, Maintenance Engineering Services Manager
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- T. Mathews, Site Design Engineering Manager
- T. McConnell, Plant Manager
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- *D. Murdock, McGuire Design Engineering Division Manager-W. Reeside, Operations' Engineer i
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R. Rider, Mechanical Maintenance Engineer
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- M. Sample, Superintendent ~of Maintenance
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- R. Sharp, Compliance Manager
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'*J. Snyder, Performance Engineer
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J. Silver, Unit 2, Operations Manager
- A. Sipe, McGuire Safety Review Group Chairman
- B. Travis, Superintendent of Operations
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R. White, Instrument and Electrical. Engineer
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Other licensee employees contacted included construction craftsmen, q
engineers, technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, and
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office personnel.
- Attended exit interview
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2.
Plant Operations (71707, 71710)
The inspection staff reviewed plant operations during the report period to verify conformance with applicable regulatory requirements. Control room (
logs, shif t' supervisors' logs, shift turnover records and equipment removal and restoration records were routinely perused. Interviews were k
conducted with plant operations, maintenance, chemistry, health physics, and performance personnel.
Activities within the control room were monitored during shifts and at shif t changes. Actions and/or activities observed were conducted as prescribed in applicable station administrative directives. The complement s
of licensed personnel on each shif t met or exceeded the minimum required by Technical Specifications (TS).
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Plant tours taken during the report period included, but were not limited h
i to, the turbine buildings, the auxiliary building, Units 1 and 2 electrical equipment rooms, Units 1 and 2 cable spreading rooms, and the station yard zone inside the protected area, i
During the plant tours, ongoing activities, housekeeping, security,
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L-equipment status, and radiation control practices were observed.
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inspectors noted the presence of two folding chairs in an areas not easily r
l accessible in the alcove by the Unit 2 component cooling water pumps.
The chairs which should not be there were removed by' the licensee after j.
t notification.
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Unit 1 Operations
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i The unit ran at 100% power for the entire period except for one e
weekend when power was reduced for load following.
During the period the licensee recognized two past operability problems associated with the Control Area Ventilation System (VC).
Both trains had been apparently inoperable during implementation of an Nuclear Station Modification (NSM) (see paragraph 10) and both trains may have been inoperable due to filter bypass leakage.
On September 15 the licensee discovered that the filter preheaters for the Annulus Ventilation System (VE) would not activate if both trains of VE were cross connected which is the normal operational configuration. 'On September 18 the licensee inadvertently made both VE trains inoperable for a short period while implementing a modification to correct the preheater problem.
Licensee evaluation of these issues was not complete at the end of the report' period.
An enforcement conference is being held on October 20, 1989 to discuss problems associated with these systems.
Off-site electrical bus IA was lost twice during Hurricane Hugo on Septemoer 22.
The bus was quickly recovered with no adverse effects on the plant.
Maximum winds measured, casite, were 55 MPH sustained and gusts to 90 MPH.
b.
Unit 2 Operations The unit began the period in Mode 4 starting up from a refueling outage and after recovery from a Containment Spray System overpressure event which had occurred on September 5 (see NRC Report 369,370/89-31).
Unit 2 was placed on-line on September 19 cnd reached 100% power on September 25 remaining at 100% for the rest of the report period.
A small fire occurred at the
'3' Residual Heat Removal pump on September 13.
Oil soaked insulation was found smoldering near an cil fill port.
No equipment damage occurred.
Some hurricane damage was experienced on the Unit 2 Turbine building.
Some portions of metal siding were blown off and the roof was damaged as was the bay door.
Debris caused a loss of of f-site electrical buss 28.
The bus was quickly regained and no adverse ef fects on the plant occurre o
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Excess Personnel at Control Boards
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During a previous problem with the turbine control system the
inspector had noted a large number of staff SR0's in the Control Room (CR) near the operators front panels.
A total ol' 22 people were observed in this area.
The inspector had asked the 0perations Superintendent whether his policies allowed this and to evaluate
4 whether this many individuals in the CR was appropriate.
The
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inspector was informed that pressnt policy limiting the number of
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persons in CR does include staff SR0's and the licensee agrees that there were too many on this occasion.
The licensee restressed the policy during recent Shift Supervisors meeting, d.
Containment Walkdown Previous walkdown inspections had identified nylon ty-raps on electrical cables and the licensee had been asked to evaluate the acceptability of this practice.
The inspector held discussions with licensee design personnel and reviewed a memo to File No. MC-1354.00 dated October 9,1989 concerning this subject.
The licensee appears to have recognized in 1981 that the nylon would becorne brittle due to L
heat and radiation and changed to stainless steel banding.
"Tefzel" ty-raps were approved for use outside containment in 1986.
While Tefzel looks like nylon it is much more durable.
The licensee evaluated the consequences of broken nylon ty raps in containment considering possible migration to the sump.
It does not appear likely that many ty-raps would come out of the trays and migration
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would be minimal.
A floit test showed that they would sink when I
surface tension was broken and the typical size piece would be caught in the sump screens.
The licensee indicated that the few ty-raps that might be in lower containment would be well enveloped by the j
amount of debris assumed by the flow analysis.
Also the licensee does not take credit for ty-raps in cable seismic analysis and experience has shown very little cable movement after construction is complete in a cable tray.
The licensee indicated that site personnel would be sensitized to this issue so that any unexpected problems would be identified and re-evaluated.
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Fire Doors The inspectors noted that a door between the Turbine Building and the Service Building hallway outside the CR was inoperable on several occasions, e.g.
stuck open or not latching.
The door was marked
" Fire Door Do Not Block".
The licensee confirmed that the fire analysis for the plant does not take credit for this door.
While this did not appear to be a significant technical problem the inspector did inform the licensee that this lack of attention to this door was a poor practice and could dilute personnel's attitudes
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toward maintaining important fire doors operable.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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.3.
Surveillance Testing (61726)
a.
Selected surveillance tests were analyzed and/or witnessed by the.
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inspectors to ascertain procedural and performance adequacy and conformance with applicable Technical Specifications.
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Selected tests were witnessed er reviewed to ascertain that current written approved procedures were available and in. use, that test equipment in use was calibrated, that test prerequisites 'were met, that system restoration was completed and test results were adequate.
Detailed below are selected tests which were either reviewed or witnessed:
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PROCEDURE EQUIPMENT / TEST
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PT/0/A/4350/28A 125 Volt Vital Battery Weekly Inspection PT/0/A/4150/11 Control Rod Worth Measurements (Unit 2)
PT/0/A/4150/21 Post Refueling Controlling i
Procedure for Criticality, l'
Zero Power Physics and Power l
Escalation Testing (Unit 2)
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PT/0/A/4150/31 Determination of Rod Withdrawal
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Limits to Ensure Moderator Temperature Coefficient kithin Limits of TS (Unit 2)
PT/0/A/4971/12R Routine Test:
RC Pump Undervoltage u
Sensors (Unit.1)
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PT/0/A/4971/13R Routine Test: RC Pump Undervoltage Sensors (Unit 1)
b.
On September 14,-1989, the inspectors noted that Standby Shutdown
Facility instruments for Unit 1 Pressurizer Level and Steam Generator l
D level were not reading correctly.
The Unit Supervisor indicated l
that the monthly surveillance which had just been performed that day l
had identified these problems and Work Requests were being issued.
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On September 15, the inspectors asked whether all single failure L
scenarios had been evaluated and tested regarding the Control Area Ventilation System (VC).
Specifically the inspectors asked whether a L
single inlet damper failure with two trains running was evaluated l
since the licensee was taking credit for all four inlet dampers for l
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currently existing compensatory action.
The 'licer.see conducted a
test' of this configuration on September 19.
Control room pressuri-
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zation requirements were met, however, per train flow requirements of 2000 CFM plus or minus 10% were not met.
Licensee initial evaluation of this problem judged the system to be functionally operable under.
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these conditions.
Problem Investigation Report M89-0249 was issued
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to* document this evaluation.
Problems associated with this system are the subject of ' an enforcement conference scheduled for
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October 20, 1989.
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d.
On October 5,1989. Westinghouse Corporation notified NRC of a possible problem with Pressurizer Safety Valve set points.
Testing, at another facility of valves that utilize a loop seal using steam to check the set pressure had shown a 4% to 8% drop indicating tet
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point variance as a function of temperature.
Set pressure is required ' by TS to be 2485 plus or minus 1%.
The licensee does
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utilize a cold (approximately 140 degrees F) loop seal design but tests the valves with nitrogen at ambient temperature in the Auxiliary Building.
A single valve had been previously tested with
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water and with nitrogen and the results compared favorably.
Accident
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analysis assumes a 10% error.
Since the licensee's correlation test results were favorably and minimal temperature difference between actual and test conditions exist the licensee initially judged that i
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this was not a significant problem at McGuire.
However, the licensee
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was continuing to evaluate this issue at the close of tne inspection
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period.
t No violations or deviations were identified.
4.
Maintenance Observations (62703)
a, Routine maintenance activities were reviewed and/or witnessed by the inspectors to ascertain procedural and performance adequacy and conformance with applicable Technical Specifications.
The selected activities witnessed were examined to ascertain that, where applicable, current written approved procedures were available and in use, that prerequisites were met, that equipment restoration was completed and maintenance results were adequate.
Detailed below are selected maintenance activities reviewed or witnessed:
Trouble Shoot Control Room Door Lock Failure Work Request (WR)
139802 OPS Diesel Generator 28 Failure Evaluation (WR 140021 OPS)
Trouble Shoot False Alarm in Central Alarm Station Investigate and Repair Cause of Power Range Channel Deviation Alarm on Unit 1 (WR 139735 OPS)
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The inspector witnessed the performance of WR 05717A PT, Perform
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Preventive Maintenance (PM)/ Periodic Test (PT) on Reactor Coolant Pump 1A,18, IC, and ID undervoltage and underfrequency relays.
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. calibrate, and response time test above instrument (s) per above procedure (s)."
The referenced procedures were PT/0/A/4971/12R and j
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PT/0/A/4971/13R.
These procedures had the technicians verify the
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setpoints for the undervoltage'and underfrequency relays.
At no time
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did the technicians inspect, clean, or - repair the relays.
When questioned about inspecting the relays, the technicians informed the
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' inspector that their job was just to check the setpoints, but that t
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they were completing job sequence number one.
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Job sequence number two, which was to operationally test' and E
' functionally verify the loop / instruments per PT/0/A/4350/11 was to be
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completed by Instrument and Electrical personnel (IAE).
The
. inspector questioned IAE and was informed that they would just perform the operational tests and the functional verification, they would not perform the inspection or cleaning.
The inspector was also
informed that these were the generic wording for PM/PT work requests and that they did not mean to do anything other than what the
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procedures stated.
These work requests require preventative maintenance inspections, cleaning, and repairs, which are not being accomplished under these requests.
Periodic tests are being completed, but the physical condition of the affected relays is not being verified.
It appears inappropriate to be taking credit for preventative maintenance which is not being accomplished. The licensee indicated that standard words were placed on the Work Requests and personnel would be expected to
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do only work described in the procedure.
This is considered a weakness in the PM program and will be tracked under Inspector Followup Item 369, 370/89-32-01:
Apparent Weakness in PM Program:
Personnel Not Accomplishing Work Described on Work Requests.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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5.
Licensee Event Report (LER) Followup (90712, 92700)
i The below listed Licensee Event Reports (LER) were reviewed to determine
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l-if the information provided met NRC requirements.
The determination included:
adequacy of description, verification of compliance with Technical Specifications and regulatory requirements, corrective action taken, existence of potential generic problems, reporting requirements
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satisfied, and the relative safety significance of each event.
Additional inplant reviews and discussion with plant personnel, as appropriate, were
conducted for those reports indicated by an (*).
The following LERs are
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- 369/88-20:
Both Trains of the Safety. Injection System Were Inoperable Due to Poor Planning / Scheduling and a Possible Installation Deficiency.
The licensee was in TS 3.0.3 (two trains inoperable) for 20 minutes.. Safety injection (NI) valve 1NI-144B had failed during a stroke time test
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conducted while the other NI train was inoperable.
Licensee corrective actions included repair of the valve, rewrite of stroke time test
L procedures on a train specific basis, scheduling stroke time test on a train' related basis, reiteration of policy to operations personnel to not F
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test equipment if the redundant train is inoperable and changing the procedure for valve setup (limit switch adjustment) since poor setup may have contributed to the failure.
- 369/89-09:
Engineered Safety Features Actuation Occurred Because of Improper Tagout Removal of the Auxiliary Feedwater System.
g 369/89-11:
Technical Specification Surveillances Missed Because the Wrong Component Was Declared Operable.
369/89-12:
Six Ice Condenser Intermediate Deck Doors Were Inoperable Because of an Accumulation of Ice Due to Unknown Reasons, 370/89-08:
Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Storage Tank Technical Specification Disagreed With Final Safety Analysis Report.
- 370/89-07:
Unit 2 Operated in Violation of Technical Specification 3.1.2.1.a and 3.1.2.3 Because Both Centrifugal Charging Pumps Were Inoperable During Refueling.
Following maintenance on the 28 Centrifugal Charging Pump, no immediate retest to determine operability was performed due to a lack of test equipment.
The work request was later misfiled by the planning group and did not get forwarded to the performance group for retest.
Since there was no tracking method in place to track items not required to be operable in modes of operation other than what the plant is currently in, operations was unaware that this equipment had not been retested and declared it operable.
Testing was subsequently accom.olished once the problem was identified which demonstrated that the pump had been functionally operable.
The licensee identified this item and hcs defined corrective action which has the potential for preventing recurrence.
This action includes plans to develop a tracking system for items required to
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be operable in modes other than the one in which the units are operating in at any given moment.
This event is considered a non-cited violation, j
370/89-32-03:
Failure to Accomplish Retest of Charging Pump.
No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Followup on Previous Inspection Findings (92701, 92702)
The following previously identified items were reviewed to ascertain that the licensee's responses, where applicable, and licensee actions were in compliance with regulatory requirements and corrective actions have been completed.
Selective verification included record review, observations, and discussions with licensee personnel.
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(Closed) Violation 369,370/88-20-02.
Failure of Safety Review Group
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to Perform In Plant Surveillance.
The licensee responded to this violation on September 16, 1988.
The licensee has implemented an
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improved surveillance program and has submitted a Technical
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Specification (TS) change request to clarify duties of the Safety Review Group.
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Requir6ments.
The licensee response for this item was submitted on (Closed)
Violation 369/88 30-01:
Failure to Meet TS 3.0.3 Time December 5, 1988.
The incident was reviewed with appropriate personnel, the erroneous TS interpretation was deleted and another TS interpretation was issued and reviewed.
c.
(Closed)
Violation 369,370/88-31-01:
Failure to follow Operations'
q Procedure and Inadequate Procedure for Diesel Testing.
The licensee responded to this item on December 28, 1988.
Corrective actions included training, refining use of procedure guidance and procedure changes.
Additional management actions regarding procedure compliance are being implemented (see response to Report 369,370/89-05).
d.
(Closed)
Inspector Followup Item 369,370/88-31-06:
Review Removal and Restoration Program Adequacy to Maintain System Alignment.
This issue will be reviewed during followup of Inspector Followup Item
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o 369,370/89-01-06: Weakness in Written Guidance on Use of Procedures.
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(Closed)
Inspector Followup Item 369,370/88-33-04:
Weaknesses in Control of Followup and Documentation of Commitments, Part 21 Reports and PIR's Required for Specific Operational Modes.
The licensee has improved the control processes for each of the weak areas previously identified.
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(Closed)
Violation 369/88-33-09:
Failure to Follow TS 3.0.4 and
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Entering Mode 3 with Auxiliary Feedwater Partially Inoperable.
The licensee response for this item was submitted on March 16, 1989.
Corrective actions included improvements in the program to control travel stops by providing additional guidance in the Station Directive for testing (3.2.2), additional guidance in the Control
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Room (CR) data book, revisions to maintenance procedures and guidance for identifying control and throttle valves on Work Requests.
The NRC inspection report identified a weakness in the operations surveillance which required the valves to be 'open' and was signed off.
Operators on Unit 2 were aware of these valves indicating
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throttle position in tne CR.
The Unit 2 valves were setup to read full open at the throttled position.
While the licensee did not respond to the comment in the report, the Unit 1 valves were reset to indicate full open at the throttled position making the surveillance signoff more legitimate and providing consistency with Unit 2.
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.(Closed)
Violation 369,370/89-01-01:
Failure to Follow Maintenance.
Procedure with Three Examples.
The licensee response for this item was, submitted'on May 1, 1989.
Corrective Actions included training.
and work request program improvements.
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(0 pen) ' Violation 369, 370/89-01-07: Fail'ure to Follow Procedure With Respect to Problem Investigation Report.
During start-up of Unit 2
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A following the refueling outage, start-up was delayed as a. result of
an alarm, T-ave Low, failing to reset.
It was discovered that the i
alarm reset' had been changed, by a modification, during the outage,
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operations.. This is similar to violation 370/88-30-02, except that.
no safety. significant events occurred as a result of this.
The incident was witnessed by the inspector, who identified to licensee personnel that the training and procedure revisions were not
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No Problem Investigation Report was generated on the failure to provide training and required procedure revisions.
No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
10 CFR Part 21 Inspection (36100)
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Previous inspections were conducted of the licensee's 10 CFR Part 21 program.
HowcVer, inspection of implementation of posting requirements and verification of Part 21 implementation on purchase orders had not been
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completed.
The inspectors verified that the licensee had properly posted references to. Part 21 requirements at several prominent locations and the following purchase orders were reviewed to verify part 21 implementation:
Requisition NO.
Material 89-2510 Contacts for
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Electrical Penetrations
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89-2508 Pipe Flanges
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89-2459 115 Volt Relays 89-2306 Pump Parts No violations or deviations were identified.
8.
Plant Startup From Refueling (71711)
I The inspectors observed plant startup and core physics tests to ascertain that startup activities were conducted in a well controlled manor in accordance with approved procedures.
Three startup tests were witnessed
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and are listed in paragraph 3.
The inspectors conducted walkdowns of systems which were worked on during the outage to assure the systems were returned to an operable status.
Walkdowne included the major portions of Nuclear Service Water and Component Cooling Water Systems.
The inspectors
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also=Ltoured containment and auxiliary building areas to observe housekeeping and material condition problems.
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9. Facility Modifications (37701)
The ' inspectors reviewed Nuclear Station Modification MG-52009, VC/YC, to determine whether work was completed in conformance with requirements in the ' facility license, Technical Specifications,10 CFR, and applicable.
codes and standards, to which the facility was built.
This modification did not involve any changes to the facility license or Technical Specification, other than an extension on the LC0 time to allow
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installation of the modification.
The. inspectors witnessed work in progress and reviewed the final documentation of the installation to verify the modification was installed in accordance with-the approved design.
The inspectors noted that there
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were seventeen Variation Notices issued on this modification, even though the completion notice only lists thirteen of them.
The Project Engineer for this modification stated that he had only included the variation notices that had an impact on plant drawings.
Review and approval
. signatures were present on all VNs, prior to their implementation.
Seven of the variation notices are indicative of a cursory predesign walkdown.
They required rework of the modification due to interferences from installed equipment, inability to remove dampers from abandon-in place duct lines since it would requi e rework to seismic supports, and changes in locations due to measuremer,t inaccuracies in the original design.
These variation notices may have been avoided with more
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field work prior to the final issuance of the modification.
The licensee noted this weakness in the post modification Top Form critique.
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Appndix E on the Nuclear Station Modification Manual controls the production of 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluations.
A screening process is
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used to determine if a 10 CFR 50.59 unreviewed safety question evaluation is needed.
If the screening process determines that an USQ evaluation is j;
required, page two of the evaluation form must be completed and a narrative attached explaining the answers to the questions on page two.
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The modification package on site did not include page two of the 10 CFR
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50.59 evaluation, even though it was required per the page one screening.
The narrative was attached to the package, addressing the answers to the seven questions contained in the USQ evaluation.
Following discussions with the inspector, the Projects group was able to obtain a copy of the i
completed page two from their corporate offices files.
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The inspectors reviewed the operation procedures and the surveillance procedures related to the VC/YC systems and noted that all procedures were revised and issued prior to returning the modified system to operation.
Training has been updated to reflect the currt.nt configuration on the VC/YC system.
All licensed operators received training on the
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modification prior to returning the system to operation.
The inspectors reviewed the post modification test procedures and verified that 'it implemented the testing requirements developed by Design Engineering.
During initial performance of the post modification test, it was determined that adequate flow could not be maintained after the removal of a check dampers, per the modif# cation.
Variation notices were issued and the check dampers reinstalled.
Subsequent testing was within the acceptance criteria established by Technical Specifications and Design Engineering.
The inability of the system to function adequately with the removal of the check dampers was reported in Licensee Event Report 369/89-026.
The problems found in the review of NSM MG-52009 were mainly administrative in nature and did not constitute a significant safety issue.
No violations or deviations were identified.
10. Evaluation of Licensee Self-Assessment Capability (40500)
The inspector reviewed selected Licensee Event Reports (LERs) and Problem Investigation Reports (PIRs) for the period from January, 1988 to present.
Licensee procedure SRG/2, Attachment 6.1, Guidelines for Determination of Recurring Events and Recurring Problems, was reviewed against these reports to determine its effectiveness.
The inspectors noted, several apparent weaknesses in the review-for
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recurring events and problems, in the preparation of the LERs.
According to the process, a review of LERs for the twelve month period preceding the event under review is made to determine if it is recurring.
The twelve month period does not allow for detection of recurring problems for procedures or processes performed on a f requency greater than twelve raonths, such as surveillances performed during refueling outages or on an eighteen month frequency.
A problem could occu every time a procedure is performed and the process has the potential for not identifying a recurr'ng problem.
In addition, !f the event was not attributed to the same cause code, or the event was not exactly the same as a previous one, the process has the potential for not classifying it as a recurring problem.
In addition the licensee progrems do not appear to evaluate PIR problems together with LER problems for repetitiveness.
The inspector noted several recent events that appear to be recurring, t
that the process did not identify as suc * ~ +
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LER 370/89 007, Unit 2 Operated in Violation of Technical Specifi-
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l-cation 3.1.2.1.a and 3.1.2.3 Because Both Centrifugal Charging Pumps
Were Inoperable During Refueling.
According to the review for
!
recurring events, four events occurred with the same cause code
,
resulting in Technical Specification violations, but since none of j'
the events involved use of inoperable components thought to be
,
operable because of a lack of tracking during outages, this event was not considered recurring.
However, LER 369/88-027 occurred when l
maintenance was performed on two valves and the retests were not
,
,
performed prior to entering Mode 4.
Both events involved the
,
.
misfiling of the work requests during an outage and the failure to
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pef' rm the required retests prior to the need for. the system to
!
operable per Technical Specifications.
Another event occurred that
!
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was not considered in the review for recurring problems, since the event was not reportable.
PIR 2-M89 0193 was written because maintenance was performed on the Unit 2 Containment Purge Filter
_,
Exhaust Fan and no retest or functional verification was performed
!
during the six month period between the maintenance and Core
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Alterations, when Technical Specifications required it to be i
"
A normally scheduled surveillance had been performed on the system in tne six month period, which the licensee retroactively
,
took credit for, preventing it from being reportable.
.
Since this event was not reported, it would not have been included by
't the process in the review for recurring events and problems.
The i
licensee has recognized the need for a review of non-reportable
events in the recurring event and problem review and are tentatively
planning to use a data base being developed by the Quality Assurance
+
organization.
However, no system was being developed for several t
years and no expected completion date is available for the current system.
t b.
LER 369/89-025 concerns the automatic actuation of the Unit 1 Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater pump due to a dropped lead shorting a
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non-safety related fuse and initiating the logic.
This occurred
'
while valve stroke time testing of the ICA-27A valve was being
.
performed.
The LER does not identify this as a recurring problem, i
based on the guidelines.
Following discussions between the licensee and the inspectors, a paragraph was included in the LER stating that l
while this exact event was not recurring, fuse problems with the
,
Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater pump start circuitry was.
LER i
369/88-008 was written in May, 1988, outside the twelve month I
reference period, concerning the automatic actuation of the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater pump due to a blown fuse when a jumper made contact with an adjacent terminal.
This occurred during valve stroke time testing of the ICA-27A valve.
Other incidents have
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occurred where the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater pumps have
automatically initiated due to blown fuses in non-:,afety related L
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f logic circuitry.
The plant performance section has identified this
as a recurring problem and has initiatet corrective actions to
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prevent recurrence; however, based on the guidelines for determining recurring eve'its for the LERs, this is not identified as a recurring
,
problem.
'
c.
LER 369/89-021 involved a design deficiency with Annulus Ventilation system resulting in a TS violation.
Following the guidelines for
recurring event and problem determination, the LER concluded that the
problem wcs not recurring because in the previous twelve months there I
were no other Technical Specification violations due to Design
Deficiencies and unanticipated environmental interactions.
Following
discussions with the inspectors con:erning recurring problems, a
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paragraph was added to the LER stating that the problem of TS violations caused by Design Deficiencies in general is considered
,
recurring.
l The weaknesses in the process for determining recurring events and l
problems will be identified as Inspector followup Item (IFI) 369,
370/89-32-02:
Failure of Licensee Programs to Consistently Identify Repetitive Problem Areas, i
11.
Licensed Operator Physical Examination Management Meeting (30703)
A mancgement meeting was held in the Region II office on August 29, 1989,
!
to discuss an apparent failure of Duke Power Company to meet the licensed
,
i operator medical exam two year requiremente.
It appeared that the Duke program had allowed some operator physicals to exceed the two year requirement.
The Duke presentation included a brief history of the requirements for operator physicals, a review of medical exam data
collected at all three Duke sites, root cause, and actions to prevent
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recurrence.
Duke identified that root cause of the problem as an apparent
!
misunderstanding of meaning "every two years." It was acknowledged by the
NRC that generic guidance would be forthcoming to the industry on this i
topic.
Pending further review of this item it will be tracked as an j
Unresolved Item for Oconee.
12.
Exit Interview (30703)
The inspection scope and findings identified below were summarized on
[
October 13, 1989, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above.
The
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following items were discussed in detail:
[
Inspector Followup Item 369/370/89-32-01:
Apparent Weakness in i
Preventative Maintenance Program:
Personnel Not Accomplishing Work
Described on Work Requests (paragraph 5.b.).
Non-Cited Violation 370/89-32-03:
Failure to Accomplish Retest of Charging Pump (paragraph 6.b).
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Inspector; Follosup. Item. 369,370/89-32-02:
Failure of Licensee l
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The licensee representatives present offered no dissenting comments,_ nor
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did they identify as' proprietary any of the information ':eviewed by.the
inspectors during the course of their inspection, i
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