IR 05000369/1989039
| ML19354E503 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | McGuire, Mcguire  |
| Issue date: | 01/17/1990 |
| From: | Gooden A, Rankin W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19354E501 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-369-89-39, 50-370-89-39, NUDOCS 9001310298 | |
| Download: ML19354E503 (18) | |
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UNITED STATES
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q'o NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISslON p, "
REGION 11 n
g j
101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.
ATLANTA GEORGIA 30323
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JAN 2 31990
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Report Nos.:
50-369/89-39 and 50-370/89-39
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Licensee: Duke Power Company 422 South Church Street Charlotte, NC 28242 Docket Nos.:
50-369 and 50-370 License Nos.: NPF-9 and NPF-17 i
Facility Name: McGuire 1 and 2 Inspection Conducted: December 5-8, 1989
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Inspector:
/2 ld, 17-90 A. Gooden ate Signed
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Accompanying Personnel:
B. Breslau i
R. Schin l
M. Stein
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Approved by: M
/m/ 7-7d_
cm W. P,ankin, Chief Date Signed Emergency Preparedness Section i
Emergency Preparedness and Radiological Protection Branch
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Division of Radiation Safety and' Safeguards
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SUMMARY
Scope:
This routine, announced' inspection was to observe and evaluate the ~ annual emergency exercise.
State and local government partici press releases, protective action recommendations (PARS)pation:was limited to
,,and communication of emergency notification messages.
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Results:
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Within the areas evaluhted, no violations or deviations were identified; however, an exercise weakness was identified involving the Shift' Supervisor's lack of participation while serving as the Interim Emergency Coordinator (IEC) 1
in the analysis of plant conditions or the identification and implementation ofJ plant mitigating actions (Paragraph 8).
The licensee committed to a review of.
. jj the individual's actions during the exercise-and-to assure that~ personnel
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assigned this role are familiar with their responsibilities as the IEC.-
were identified in the licensee's. emergency
The following (strengths
~ 1), sability to establish an alternate method of communication organization:
between the plant and the Crisis Management Center (CMC) during the loss of CMC 9001310298 900123
'm ADOCK 05000369 FDC
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phones; (2) good interfaces, including turnover briefings, between the Recovery Manager in the CMC and the Emergency Coordinator in the Technical Support Center (TSC); (3) good accident assessment and mitigating actions by the TSC staff; (4) good activation and staffing of emergency facilities; and (5) effective exercise critique and'self identification of items.
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REPORT DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- G. Addis, Superintendent, Station Services
- N. Atherton, Production Specialist-Compliance
- R. Banner, Nuclear Production Engineer
- J. Boyle, Superintendent, Integrated Scheduling
- R. Brown, Production Specialist-0conee Station
- J. Hampton, General Manager, Nuclear Relations-General Office
- R. Harris, System Emergency Planner-
- R. Hasty, Production Specialist-Compliance
- R. Leonard, Station Emergency Planner
- T. McConnell, Station Manager
- W. McRee, Emergency Planner, Nuclear Production Department
- G. Pickler, Shift Supervisor
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- M. Sample, Superintendent, Maintenance
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- G. Savage, Nuclear Information Representative R. Sharpe, Compliance Engineer i
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- B. Travis, Superintendent, Operations
- H. Tucker, Vice-President, Nuclear Productions Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included engineers, operators, mechanics, security force members, technicians, and
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administrative personnel.
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NRC Resident Inspector
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- K. Van Doorn
- Attended exit interview i
2.
ExerciseScenario(82302)
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The scenario for the emergency exercise was reviewed to determine that-provisions had been made to test an integrated emergency response
capability as well as the basic elements existing within the licensee, State and local Emergency Plans and organization as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14),10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.F and specific
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criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.N.
The scenario was reviewed in advance of 'the scheduled exercise date and discussed with a member of the licensee's staff.
The scenario' developed for this exercise was adequate to exercise the onsite and offsite emergency organizations of the licensee and provided sufficient emergency information to the State and local government agencies for their
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participation in the exercise. No prompting or undue interaction between
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controllers and players was observed during the exercise.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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3, AssignmentofResponsibility(82301)
This area was observed to assure that primary responsibilities for emergency response by the licensee had been specifically established and that adequate staff was available to respond to-an emergency as required by10CFR50.47(b)(1),10CFR50,AppendixE,ParagraphIV.A.andspecific criteria in NUREG-0654 Section II.A.
The inspectors observed that specific emergency assignments had been made for the licensee's emergency response organization and there were adequate staff available to respond to the simulated emergency.
The initial response organization was augmented by -designated licensee-representatives; however, due to the scenario conditions, long term or continuous staffing of the emergency response organization-was not demonstrated.
The licensee demonstrated a strong comitment to training as evidenced by the number of alternates participating in key positions during the exercise.
The inspectors observed the activation, staffing, and operation of the emergency (OSC)ganization in the Control Room, TSC, Operations SupportSta or Center,
,and the CMC.
effective in the TSC and CMC. The assignment of responsibility at each of the facilities were consistent with the licensee's. Emergency Plan and implementing procedures.
However, both licensee and NRC observers noted that the reporting chain for the OSC during the postulated accident was l
confusing.
Further, Section B of the Emergency Plan does not clearly l
delineate between the TSC and Control Room as the reporting chain for the OSC. The licensee indicated that this item was considered an action item for taking actions, including a plan revision, to clearly identify the OSC reporting chain during emergency situations.
No violations or deviations were identified.
4.
Emergency Response Support and Resources (82301)
l This area was observed to determine that arrangements for requesting and l
effectively using assinence resources have been made, that arrangements to accommodate State and local staff at the licensee's near-site Emergency
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Operations Facility (E0F) have been made, and that other organizations capable of augmenting the planned response have been identified as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(3), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.A and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.C.
State and local involvement in this exercise was limited to press releases, PARS, and communication of emergency notification messages.
A State liaision was accommodated at the CMC.
Arrangements and current i
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Letters of Agreement had been executed with offsite support agencies; however, the scope of this exercise did not require such demonstration of resource capabilities.
No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
Emergency Classification System (82301)
This area was observed to determine that a standard emergency classification and action level scheme is in use by the licensee as i
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required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.C, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.D.
An emergency action level scheme (EAL) was used to promptly identify and
properly classify the emergency and escalate to more sevnre emergency
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classes as the simulated emergency progressed.
The licensee's current
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classification scheme was revised and implemented during October 1989, via i
Plan Revision 28. As of the date of the exercise, a determination (by NRC
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Headquarters and/or Regional Office) of the adequacy of the licensee's revised classification scheme had not been made; such a determination was j
considered to be outside the scope of the NRC's evaluation of the exercise.
The licensee's emergency procedures provided for initial and continuing mitigating actions during the simulated emergency.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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6.
Notification Methods and Procedures (82301)
This area was observed to determine that procedures had been established j
for notification by the licensee of State and local response organizations and emergency personnel, and that the content of initial and followup messages to response organizations had been established; and means to provida early notification to the populace within the plume exposure
pathway had been established as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(5), 10 CFR 50, i
Appendix E, Paragraph IV.D. and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.E.
s An inspector observed that notification methods and procedures had been established and were used to provide information concerning the simulated emergency conditions to Federal, State, and local response organizations
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and to alert the licensee's augmented emergency response organization.
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With one exception, notification of the State and designated local offsite organizations were completed within 15 minutes following the declaration of the emergency event.
The exception involved a delay following the.
General emergency and is discussed in detail in Paragraph 10 of this report.
The licensee identified the need to conduct additional training
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for TSC Communicators to enhance their familiarization with the Emergency Notification Form and the proper completion of form.
It was noted by both
licensee and NRC observers that message No. 5~(subsequent to the General Emergency declaration) contained an incorrect time entry.
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The Alert Notification System (ANS) for alerting (EPZ) public within the -
the plume exposure pathway emergency planning zone was not actuated
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during this exercise.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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EmergencyCommunications(82301)
This area was observed to verify that provisions existed for prompt personnel as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(6)ganizations and emergenc communications among principal response or
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Paragraph IV.E and specific guidance in NUREG-0654,Section II.F.
Communications among the licencee's emergency response facilities, within the licensee's emergency orgonization, and between the licensee's emergency response organization and offsite authorities were good. As an exercise objective to test the backup comunications system, the Exercise Director coordinated with the licensee's Communications System group to disable all CMC phones thereby rendering phones inoperable.
The inspectors observed prompt and effective decision-making on the part of the Recovery Manager and CMC Staff to maintain comunications with the TSC, and also to ensure that command and control over the accident and
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mitigating conditions would not be compromised. To that end, actions were initially taken to re-establish communications with the Emergency Coordinator in the TSC and transfer command and control of the accident from the CMC back to the TSC due to loss of communications equipment.
Although the use of the Field Monitoring Team radio as a backup created some confusion initially regarding network control, communication was promptly established.
As further evidence of the CMC Staff's efforts to l
maintain an open line of communication with the TSC, cellular phones were procured and provided to key personnel in the CMC for communicating with their counterparts in the emergency organization.
No violations or deviations were identified.
8.
Emergency Facilities and Equipment (82301)
This area was observed to determine that adequate emergency facilities and equipment to support an emerg)ency response are provided and maintained as
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required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(8, 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.E. and i
specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.H.
The inspectors observed activation, staffing, and operation of the l
emergency response facilities.
No major equipment deficiencies were observed.
Facilities observed by the NRC evaluation team included:
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Control Room - The exercise Control Room was established outside the main Control Room to remove exercise activity from real day-to-day events.
An inspector observed the Shift Supervisor during the initial stages of the emergency for purposes of evaluating the Shift Supervisor's actions as the IEC in managing
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the emergency.
In accordance with Section A of the Emergency
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Plan, the Shift Supervisor is the person in charge and assumes the position of the Emergency Coordinator until the arrival of the Station Manager.
The person in charge is the key decision maker regarding event classification, PARS, notification and activation, and-accident assessment.
The inspector noted that the Shift Supervisor did not actively participate in the analysis of plant conditions or the identification and implementation of mitigating conditions.
Following the Alert declaration, the Shift Supervisor did not announce that the
Emergency Plan had been implemented or that. he. had assumed the -
duties of the Emergency Coordinator.
Further, other personnel in the Control Room (e.g. Unit Manager' and Shift Manager)
appeared to exercise supervisory authority over the Shift; Supervisor.
The Shift Supervisor's efforts were focused t
primarily on completing the Emergency Notification forms.
The Shift Supervisor's actions as Emergency Coordinator resulted in a poor demonstration of command and control over the emergency.
This item was discussed with licensee representatives prior to
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and during the exercise critique as an exercise weakness.
The-licensee acknowledged the Shift Supervisor's involvement with the Emergency Notification forms, but did not agree with the assessment.
A commitment was made to review the Shift Supervisor's actions and to assure.that personnel are familiar with the role and responsibilities of the Emergency Coordinator.
Exercise Weakness (50 369, 370/89-39-01):
The Shift Supervisor failed to demonstrate the responsibilities of Emergency Coordinator.
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TSC - The TSC was activated and fully manned within 13 minutes from the time the Alert classification was announced. With one exception, discussions between the Emergency Coordinator and members of the TSC staff (regarding event classification decisions, accident assessment, and plant mitigating conditions)
were effective and technically sound. The one exception' involved a delay in the development and ultimate provision of PARS to offsite authorities following the General Emergency declaration (see Paragraph.10).
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OSC - The OSC was promptly staffed when directed by the.
Emergency Coordinator.
The NRC and licensee observer noted the following: (1)~the OSC staff did not maintain a tracking system of in-plant teams (showing team comp)osition, respective tasks, deployment time, and time of return ; (2) no formal turnover-from the Control Room to the OSC following OSC activation
regarding in-plant teams or prioritization of jobs; (3) reporting chain for OSC unclear; (4) absence of a formalized log documenting the emergency activities; and (5) lack of
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familiarity by teams regarding administrative procedures for use during emergencies involving tagouts, work requests, approvals
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for work ' requests, etc.
The aforementioned items were documented by the licensee during the. Controller - Evaluator critique and assigned to the McGuire Exercise Action Item Tracking System for corrective action, d.
CMC - The facility was promptly activated and fully staffed in accordance with the Crisis Management Implementing Procedure ~
(CMIP-1).
Status boards were strategically located and readily accessible for viewing by the CMC staff.
Interaction between j-the Recovery Manager and the various CMC Group Managers in the execution of the CMC activities was effective.
The effectiveness of the CMC staff to ensure continuos management a
control over the accident was further apparent during the loss of CMC telephones.
In response to the loss of phones, the
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following actions were taken: (1) communications were promptly re-established via the Duke Power Crisis Management radio system; (2) lead responsibility for the company's emergency
response activity was transferred back to the Emergency Coordinator in the TSC; and (3) cellular telephones were procured for key members of the CMC staff and the State Liaison representative to provide a continuous line of communication with their counterparts.in the emergency organization.
During a t
l review of various reference documents located inside the CMC Managers area, a copy of the McGuire Emergency Plan was noted as having been superseded.
The current revision is Revision 28,.
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dated October 1989; the copy found in the CMC was Revision 25,
dated July 1988 copy No.,60, assigned to~ R. W -Rasmussen.
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According to a licensee representative, the' referenced
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copyholder was no longer with the company.
Consequently, a cognizant member of the licensee's corporate emergency' planning staff took actions to replace the outdated plan with a current copy. The inspector had no further questions in this area.
l No violations or deviations were identified.
9.
AccidentAssessment(82301)
This area was observed to assure that. adequate methods, systems, and equipment for assessing and monitoring actual or potential offsite consequences of a radiological emetgency condition were in use as required
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by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(9), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph.IV.B. and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.I.
The accident assessment program included both an engineering assessment of
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plant status and an assessment of radiological hazards to both onsite and
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offsite personnel resulting from the accident.
Both p'rograms appeared
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effective during this. exercise in analyzing the plant status so as to make recommendations to the Emergency Coordinator concerning mitigating actions to reduce damage to plant equipment, to prevent release of radioactive materials, and to terminate the emergency condition.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
10.
Protective Responses (82301)
This area was observed to verify that guidelines for protective actions during the emergency, consistent with Federal guidance, were developed and in place, and protective actions for emergency workers, including required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(personnel, were implemented promptly a evacuation of nonessential 10), and specific criteria in NUREG-0654 Section II.J.
An inspector verified that the licensee had developed and implemented emergency procedures for formulating PARS for offsite populations within the 10 mile EPZ. The licensee's PARS were consistent with the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and other criteria.
However, i
notification to the appropriate State and local authorities following the declaration of a General Emergency was not within the 15 minute criteria.
An NRC inspector noted that the General Emergency was declared at 10:46 a.m. and the resulting notifications containing the appropriate PARS were not made until 11:05 a.m. (19 minutes after the event declaration).
Although a difference in time was noted (17 minutes), licensee evaluators also recognized that the notification did not occur within 15 minutes in
accordance with procedural requirements.
The following factors may have-contributed to the delay:
CMC Transfer of lead responsibility back to the TSC approximately 5 minutes prior to upgrading the event declaration from a Site-Area Emergency to a General Emergency.
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The Emergency Coordinator did not appear to associate the escalation
to General Emergency with a required PAR. The Emergency Coordinator appeared surprised when questioned by the Recovery Manager in the CMC regarding what PARS would be recommended; Approximately 10 minutes after the event escalation, the Emergency Coordinator had not directed any evaluation of PARS nor referred to the PAR flowchart included in Procedure RP/0/A/5700/04 (General Emergency).
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Excessive time was allotted to the development of' PARS based on
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projected conditions as opposed to using.the default PARS included in l
the General Emergency implementing procedure RP/A/5700/04.
l-Procedural verification may have delayed the availability of the i
General Emergency implementing procedure to the Emergency l
Coordinator; In addition to the factors discussed above, a licensee observer indicated the TSC layout may have contributed to delays in the information flow between members of the TSC organization involved in communications and radiation protection. The licensee acknowledged the delay in notification l
and discussed training for personnel in the area of. PARS and use of the i
PARS flowchart.
According to station management, triining would include l
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E TSC communicators, radiation protection personnel, and 'others involved in the decision-making.regarding PARS.
The inspector informed licensee i
representatives that this item would be tracked as an Inspector Followup
Item (IFI).
IFI 50-369, 370/89-39-02:
Provide training to key members of the TSC staff in the area of PARS.
The inspector observed that PARS were included in the details of Procedure RP/0/A/5700/04 (General Emergency) and Enclosure 4.5 to the j
referenced procedure.
However, during the procedural review, the
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inspector noted an inconsistency in PARS between the procedure details and j
the enclosure flow chart.
Section 2.2.1.2 of RP/0/A/5700/04, recommends j
sheltering within 5 miles radius and 10 miles downwind as the immediate'
j actions following the declaration of a General Emergency.
Enclosure 4.5 recommends in-place sheltering for 5 mile radius.
This finding was -
acknowledged by the licensee as requiring a revision to the procedure.
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i The licensee was informed that this item would be tracked as an IFI.
IFI 50-369, 370/89-39-03: Revise Section 2.2.1.2 of Procedure RP/0/A/5700/04 for consistency with Enclosure'4.5 to referenced procedure.
No violations or deviations were identified.
i 11. Exercise Critique (82301)
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The licensee's critique of the emergency exercise was observed to determine that deficiencies identified as a result of the exercise and weaknesses noted in the licensee's emergency response organization were -
formally presented to licensee management for corrective actions as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14),10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph-IV.F,
and specific criteria 'in NUREG-0654,Section II.N.
The licensee conducted a player critique immediately after the exercise was terminated. A Controller / Evaluator Critique which was observed by the
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NRC Evaluation Team was also conducted on December 7, 1989, following the
'l exercise. The licensee's Controller / Evaluator Critique identified most of
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the NRC findings.
ihe findings including recommended actions were
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discussed and documented by the licensee via the licensee's Action Item
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Tracking System.
A formal licensee /NRC critique of the exercise was held on December 8,
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1989, with exercise Controllers, key exercise participants, and licensee management.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
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12. Federal Evaluation Team Report j
The report by the Federal Evaluation Team (Regional Assistance Committee and Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region IV staff) concerning the activities of offsite agencies during the exercise will be forwarded by separate correspondence.
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13. Public Meeting l
A public critique of the exercise was scheduled for December 8,.1989, in
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Iredell County, North Carolina.
Participants included the licensee, Federal, State, and local agencies.
Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92701)
a.
(Closed) IFI 50-369, 370/89-10-01:
Clarify and quantify Site Area Emergency EAL addressing reactor coolant system. leakage makeup..
The EALs in the McGuire Classification Procedure (RP/0/A/5700/0) were revised to unambiguously define the conditions requiring an Alert or
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Site Area Emergency due to the reactor coolant system leakage, I
b.
(Closed) IFI 50-369, 370/89-10-02:
Define the level of offsite-radiological releases reportable on initial-and -followup notifications during plant emergencies.
The licensee's commitment (stated in NRC Inspection Report Nos. 50-369, 370/89-10) was to determine if low level radiological releases which required no PARS should be entered on offsite
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notification forms.
By review of letters' dated November 30, 1989, to the NRC, State, and County Emergency Preparedness Divisions, the
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licensee determined that low level radiological releases will be
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entered on offsite notification forms.
15. Exit Interview The inspection scope and results were summarized on' December 8,-1989, with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1.
The inspector described the areas
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inspected and discussed in detail the inspection results listed below.
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of.the material provided
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to or reviewed by the inspectors during the inspection.
Dissenting comments were expressed by a member of the licensee's staff regarding the exercise weakness detailed in Paragraph 8.
The Station Mana'ger committed
to the following actions:
(1) review the Shift Supervisor's actions.
during the postulated accident and evaluate the individual's familiarity with the role and responsibilities as IEC; and (2) consider additional operators for completing Emergency Notification. forms and conducting procedural reviews.
There were no further dissenting comments regarding-the inspection findings. The licensee acknowledged the two items discussed-in Paragraph 10 and the corrective action to resolve those items:
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Revise Procedure RP/0/A/5700/04 to remove inconsistency with
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Enclosure 4.5.
Conduct training in PARS and the use of PAR Flowchart.
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Item Number Description / Reference
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50-369,370/89-39-01 Exercise Weakness - Shift Supervisor
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of the Emergency Coordinator (Paragraph.8).
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50-369, 370/89-39-02 IFI - Provide training to key members of the TSC staff in the area of PARS and PARS
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flowchart.(Paragraph 10).
l 50-369,370/89-39-03 IFI - Revise Section 2.2.1.2 of Procedure RP/0/A/5700/04 for consistency
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with Enclosure 4.5 to procedure (Paragraph 10).
Licensee management representatives were informed that two open items were reviewedandclosed(Paragraph.14).
l Attachment:
Scope, Objectives and Scenario
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Timeline
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I.
SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES
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A.
Scope
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i The McGuire exercise, to be conducted on December 7, 1989,
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is designed to meet.the exercise requirements of 10CFR50, Appendix E,
Section IV.F.
The State, Counties, and the'
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l Crisis Management Center will participate.
A formal critique involving Duke Power and NRC will be held on December 8, 1989 at 10:00 a.m. at McGuire Nuclear l.
Station.
This critique will be closed to the public.
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B.
Exercise Objectives (Duke Power Company Emergency Organization)
Emergency Management 1.
Demonstrate the ability to declare _ emergency l
classification in accordance with procedures.
2.
Demonstrate the ability.to notify the State and'the Counties within
minutes.
after. declaring an emergency or after changing-the emergency classification.
3.
Demonstrate the ability to alert, notify, and staff the TSC and OSC facilities after declaring an Alert l
or higher emergency class.
4.
Demonstrate'the ability _to notify NRC not-later than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> after declaring one of the emergency classes.
5.
Demonstrate assembly of station personnel within 30 minutes in a
simulated emergency and provide
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accountability for any not present at the assembly l
locations.
6.
Demonstrate access control measures to the plant site, CMC, News Center, and' Media Center.
7.
Test communications equipment among on-site emergency. f acilities including plant extensions and-intercoms.
8.
Test off-site communications equipment to the County and State warning points, County and State emergency operations centers and to NRC. including the Selective Signaling System and the NRC Emergency Notification System.
9.
Demonstrate adequate radio communications between the State / Counties and the CMC.
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Test the adequacy and operability of emergency.
equipment / supplies.
11.
Demonstrate precise and clear transfer of responsibility from-the Shift. Supervisor in the Control Room to the Emergency, Coordinator in the TSC,. and from the Emergency Coordinator in the TSC to the Recovery Manager in the CMC..
12.
Demonstrate proper use of the message format and authentication methodology for messages transmitted-
.to State and Counties.
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13.
Demonstrate the ' ability-to alert, notify, and staff'
the CMC after declaring. a' Site Area Emergency or higher emergency class (or af ter a decision by f the Recovery Manager during an Alert).
14.
Demonstrate the ability
.to provide accurate
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information to the news media in a timely manner and
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to provide effective rumor control according to the Crisis Management Implementing Procedures.
Accident Assessment 15.
Demonstrate the ability to transmit data _using the Crisis Management Data Transmittal' System in accordance with procedures and to distribute this data throughout the CMC according-to the Crisis
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Management Implementing Procedures..
16.
Evaluate the adequacy of - the following assessment I.
tools:
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Drawings 2.
Data Display Boards 3.
Maps I
17.
Demonstrate adequate radio communications between the off-site monitoring teams and the TSC/ CMC.
18.
Demonstrate the ability to collect air, soil, water and vegetation samples in accordance with procedures.
19.
Demonstrate the ability to develop off-site dose projections in accordance with procedures.
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Protective Action Recommendations 20.
Demonstrate the ability to provide timely ~
to and appropriate protective action recommendations off-site officials in accordance with station procedures or the Crisis Management Plan.
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Plant Operations 21.
Demonstrate the ability to assess the-incident and'
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(c:\\mns\\ scop &obj.893)
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Rev. 1 / 06-15-89 k
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CONFIDENTIAL l
MCGUIRE EXERCISE EVENT SEQUENCE
DECEMBER 7, 1989 Time Initial o Unit 1 is at 100% power and 171 effective full power Conditions days (EFPD) with a continuous run of 335 days, o Chillwater train B in maintenance heat exchanger.
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(Hx) sludge cleaning.
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o RN train B in maintenance for Hx sludge cleaning.
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o KC train B in maintenance'for Hx sludge cleaning, o RN pump 1B in maintenance for a coupling alignment ~
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o A leak was discovered in the weld area between the pipe and the valve-during the inspection of valve
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o Unit ~2 is at 100% power and 320 EFPD with a continuous run of 130 days, o Diesel generator 2B in maintenance for PM's on auxillary pumps.
0800 60 gpm seal leak on reactor coolant pump (RCP)
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Predicted Response
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Players o Implement AP/1/A/5500/08 (Malfunction ~of NC Pump,
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Case 1).
l o Implement AP/1/A/5500/10 (NCESystem Leakage Within-Capability of Both Charging Pumps,. Case.2).
l 0805 Fan fails in lETA switchgear room due to a. motor bearing failure, knocking out switchgear room cooling.
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Predicted Response
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Players
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o Players may attempt counter measures to cool the switchgear room such as opening doors, setting'up portable fans, etc.
i 0815 Switchgear high temperature alarm.
Predicted Response
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o Implement RP/0/A/5700/00 (Classification of Event)
by this time.
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o Implement RP/0/A/5700/02 (Alert) by this time due to
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NC leakage >50 gpm.
0900 o Waste Gas Decay Tank release begins.
l 0915 Predicted Response l
Players o Implement RP/0/A/5700/10 (NRC Immediate Notification) by this time.
0931 Several pieces of 18-gauge Aluminum' flashing that were being used by a roofing crew blow off of, the roof, causing.
a phase-to-ground, and knock out
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off-site power to Unit 1.
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Predicted Response
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Players o Implement EP/1/A/5000/01 (Reactor Trip / Safety Injection),
o Implement AP/1/A/5500/07 (Loss of Electrical Power, Case 2).
0944 1 ETA fails due to'no cooling.
Predicted Response Plant o Emergency incoming breaker fails due to high temperature..
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o Implement EP/1/A/5000/09. (Loss of All AC Power)
i o Implement OP/1/A/6100/17 (Standby Shutdown Facility-l Operation Procedure).
0950 Predicted Response Players o Align Unit 2 power to Unit 1 per-Enclosure 4 of procedure EP/1/A/5000/09.
A breaker is damaged while transferring power.
The breaker is stuck half-way.in the cubicle between the connect and
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disconnect.
1014 Predicted Response Players o Implement RP/0/A/5700/03 (Site Area Emergency) by this time,
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1020 CMC phones inoperable due to an external problem in the Southern Bell system.
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o-Utilize radios for off-site communications.
~1050 CMC phones are restored to operability.
1058 Turbine driven CA pump trips.
1129 Predicted Response Players o Implement RP/0/A/5700/04 (General. Emergency) by this
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1131 off-site power restored by aligning to unaffected i
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l Predicted Response Plant Players o Implement EP/1/A/5000/09.2 (Loss of All AC With Safety Injection Required).
o Implementation of the following procedures should occur before~1200:
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- EP/1/A/5000/01 (Reactor Trip / Safety Injection).
- EP/1/A/5000/02 (High Energy Line-Break in
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- EP/1/A/5000/02.1 (Post LOCA Cooldown and
Depressurization).
1200 Exercise ends.
Predicted Response Players o Conduct player critique.
(c:\\mns893\\eventseq.893)
Rev. 6 / 10-30-89
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