IR 05000369/1989040
| ML19332E347 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | McGuire, Mcguire  |
| Issue date: | 11/21/1989 |
| From: | Bernhard R, Breslau B, Kellogg P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19332E345 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-369-89-40, 50-370-89-40, NUDOCS 8912070109 | |
| Download: ML19332E347 (6) | |
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISslON
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REGION 11
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Report Nos.: 50-369/89-40 and 50-370/89-40
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Licensee: Duke Power Company 422 South Church Street Charlotte, NC 28242
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Docket No.: 50-369 and 50-370 License Nos.: NPF-9 and NPF-17 Facility Name: McGuire 1 and 2 I
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Inspection Conducted: November 6 - 10, 1989
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Inspectors: [ I m I g
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'B. Ereslau, Reactor Engineer Date Signed b hb'
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'R. Bernhard, Reactor Engineer Date '51gned
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Mer 2/ /9Pr Approved by:
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Da';e 5Tgned Oper&tione grams Section Division o actor Safety
SUMMARY Scope:
This announced inspection was conducted es a follow-up to the Operational Safety Team Inspection (OSTI) conducted February 13 - March 22,1989, Inspection Report Nos. 50-369,370/89-02.
The scope of this inspection included review of one Violation and three inspector follow-up items (IFI) as well as those items identified in the OSTI as program weaknesses or concerns.
Results:
The inspectors observed increased management attention towards a problem which has been a longstanding enforcement issue; procedural compliance. This continuing
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emphasis from management is changing a previously existing weak cultural work practice.
i In the areas inspected, the licensee's corrective actions were determined to
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-be adequate.
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REPORT DETAILS
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Persons Contacted Licensee employees
fG. Addis, Superintendent, Station Services
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- fN. Atherton, Nuclear Production Specialist l
- D. Baxter, Manager, Operations Support
- J. Boyle, Superintendent, Integrated Scheduling
- R. Broome, Section Manager, Project Services i
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'*fJ. Day, Nuclear Production Engineer
- D. Franks, Manager. QA Verification
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- fG. Gilbert, Superintendent. Technical Services
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- C. Hendrix, Jr., Manager, Engineering Services
- S. LeRoy, Nuclear Production Specialist
- T. Mathews, Manager, Design Engineering
- fT. McConnell, Station Manager
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- R. Pierce, Section Manager, Instrumentation and Electrical
- M. Sample, Maintenance Superintendent
- A. Sipe, Chairman, McGuire Safety Review Group
- L. Smith, Planning and Scheduling Coordinator
- J. Snyder, Performance Mar.ager Other Licensee employees contacted included instructors, engineers,
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technicians, operators, and office personnel.
NRC Representatives
- fK. VanDoorn, Senior Resident Inspector
- T. Cooper, Resident Inspector
- Attended entrance interview
- Attended exit interview Acronyms used throughout this report are listed in the last paragraph.
2.
Actions on Previous Inspection Findings (92701)
a.
(Closed)IFI 369,370/88-31-08, Follow-up of weaknesses found during Diagnostic Team Inspection concerning operator training facilities, the quality of training materials, the number of hours of simulator requalification training, and the operators' lack of understanding concerning the changes taking place within the requalification examination process.
The licensee has moved from the temporary training facilities to the new facilities which provide a suitable training environment.
A review of training materials indicates a continu'ng upgrade program is maintaining legible viewgraphs and color slides.
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The licensee, is providing all licensed operators with training which incorporates the new guidelines for NRC administered requalification examinations.
This training is scheduled to be completed in time to support the January 1990 NRC administered requalification exam.
Additionally, the installation of the new state-of-the-art simulator in October - November 1988, time frame has been operational since
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January 1989.
The licensee has modeled the facility to support
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plant specific emergency procedures with approximately 12 i
modifications remaining to be installed. The simulator is reported
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by the licensee to be capable of simulating the necessary scenarios to support plant operations.
The licensee has expanded the number of available hours for requalifications training from the 20 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br /> noted in January 1988 time frame to the current schedule of 50 hours5.787037e-4 days <br />0.0139 hours <br />8.267196e-5 weeks <br />1.9025e-5 months <br />.
The training facilities, materials, and simulator are considered adequate to support the licensee's training requirements.
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This item is considered closed, b.
(Closed) Violation 369,370/89-02-01, Failure to follow procedures and using inadequate procedures while conducting safety related McGuire s initial response to violation 89-02-01 maintenance.
consisted of procedure revisions and management direction to plant personnel for verbatim compliance with procedures.
This initial action failed to correct the root cause of the cases of noncompliance with procedures.
Enforcement of verbatim compliance had not been consistent in the past within certain departments in the plant, and
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as a result, some existing procedures had deficiencies which had l
required workers to ' work around' the procedures to get the job done.
With the work around attitude the procedures had not been corrected.
l Feedback provided to plant management by supervisors and workers L
indicated the initial response would not, by itself, fix the
problem.
A more comprehensive concept was developed that would integrate the concepts of procedure intent, the procedure change t
process, and work process.
A system was implemented that allowed for changes not impacting the intent of the procedure to be made quickly, and to be reviewed later for possible permanent incorporation into the procedure.
Classes were conducted with l
supervisors and workers to explain the changes. Better job planning
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practices, including a review of procedures prior to starting work, was implemented.
Encouragement was given to the end users of procedures to correct the procedural 1.1 adequacies.
The inspector interviewed the plant manager, mechanical maintenance supervisors, and mechanics to determine the effectiveness of i
I training and the attitudes toward the new policy.
The inspector attended the procedure compliance portion of the mechanics training.
Questions asked in the class indicated the mechanics had a good understanding of the new policy.
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i Work activities were observed to determine the degree of compliance i
with procedures. The mechanic observed had a thorough understanding of the procedures format, the purpose of each section, and the j
limitations on designating steps or sections as not applicable to
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the work being performed.
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The programs and training are in place to address the issue of
procedure compliance.
Workers are providing feedback and j
reconmended changes to procedures that had previously required ' work l
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rounds'.. Based upon a continuing emphasis from management, along with the programs in place, this item is closed.
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(Closed) UNR 369,370/89-02-02, Review licensee's calculations for l
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determining proper fuel oil storage tank capacity.
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l A review of the licensee's proposed TS change request and the l
supporting design calculations adequately substantiates the proposed
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change to increase the required minimum volume of fuel oil for the diesel generators from 28,000 gallons to 39,290 gallons.
This change is to ensure sufficient fuel oil is available to run each
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diesel generator for seven days at expected accident loads without
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refueling.
Further review indicates the licensee has been below the
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39,290 gallon level only during scheduled maintenance periods in the refueling outages while the other associated diesel generator was maintained in an operable status during the maintenance period.
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This item is considered closed.
d.
(Closed) IFI 369,370/89-02-03 The licensee cormnitted to conduct a review of each FSAR system description with resultant revisions being reviewed for safety significance.
A review of FSAR revision December 1988 indicates that the system description concerning pressurization of the control room reflects
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current operations of control room ventilation, i.e., the control room is not maintained in a pressurized condition. Pressurization will only occur under specified conditions.
Additionally, the
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licensee is conducting systematic reviews by onsite system technical experts to validate the FSAR, this coupled with the development of administrative procedures which provides the process by which annual updates for each Duke FSAR will be accomplished satisfies the concern regarding the accuracy of the FSAR.
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(0 pen) IFI 369,370/89-02-04, Licensee needs to justify safety significant step deviations from owners guidelines.
This item was not reviewed during this inspection.
The team did note that the licensee has prepared a response to this issue; this item will be reviewed in conjunction with a future E0P inspection.
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In addition to the above items, a number of weaknesses and concerns L
were identified in Inspection Report No. 369,370/89-02 and are addressed below:
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(1)
Paragraph 2.d describes areas within the plant where housekeeping was of poor quality.
The inspectors noted continuing inadequacies in this area.
F Infrequently traveled areas continued to show signs of
inattention to adequate cleanup after work activities are n
complete. Consumables, ladders, and scaffold are present long
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after job completion.
The resident inspectors have been errphasizing this area in their reports and will continue to track this issue.
This issue is closed with respect to this report.
(2)
Paragraph 2.d also indicated that control of catch-containers appeared to be inadequate.
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The inspectors reviewed the weaknesses identified with respect to catch-container control.
The containers are placed under leaking components to direct the possible contamination to an appropriate drain.
A weakness observed was containers not being removed in a timely manner after the leaking component was repaired.
The inspectors reviewed the program for control of catch
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containers. Over the last two years the number of containers L
has been reduced from over 250 to less than 100.
Of this l
number 23 are currently evaluated as permanent containers, to l
remain in place after the component is repaired.
This determination is made based upon past performance of the component and the amount of manpower and exposure required for cleanup if the component leaks.
Recent changes have been made to improve the coordination between maintenance, planning, and health physics to ensure containers are removed in a timely manner after repairs are made and the component has been returned to operating pressure l
and is shown not to lenk. This item is closed.
(3)
Paragraph 2.h indicates valve labeling was in need of improvement, the team noted during walkdowns of the containment spray pump rooms in both units, that the suction pressure gages for each of the four pumps were not labeled.
The inspector, during this inspection, noted an adequate label program was being conducted, this activity was observed by the inspectors during tours in the containment pump rooms and other areas.
The licensee is utilizing a dedicated team approach to complete a three phase labeling program, this process is controlled by station directive SD 3.1.35, Plant Labeling, Revision 0.
This item is considered close n-
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(4)
Paragraph 2.m. describes problems concerning weakness in
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managing the backlog of control room deficiencies.
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The resident inspectors have been tracking this issue, and
documenting licensee progress in this area.
This item is
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closed with respect to this report.
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Paragraph 4.a. notes a lack of dissemination of PRA results to
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p operations training.
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A weakness identified concerning the incorporation of PRA i
results into operations training was reviewed.
The initial
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observation was based upon interviews with the operations
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staff.
Discussions with training personnel showed that some
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PRA information had been used as input to lesson plans as early
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as October 1988. The operations personnel had not been aware i
of the PRA input because it was not presented as such.
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Interviews with the training staff indicated more PRA input would probably.be provided by corporate after the PRA efforts at Oconee and Catawba were complete. The inspector considers this item closed.
'I No violations or deviations were noted within the areas inspected 3..
Exit Interview l
An exit-interview was conducted on November 10, 1989, with those persons indicated in paragraph I above.
The inspectors described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection results.
Proprietary information is not contained in this report.
Dissenting comments were
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not received from the licensee.
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4.
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i AE0D Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data
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E0P Emergency Operating Procedure FSAR Final Safety Analysis Report
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IFI Inspector Follow-up Item NRC Nuclear Regulatory Comission OSTI Operational Safety Team Inspection PRA Probabilistic Risk Assessment QA Quality Assurance R0 Reactor Operator
SR0 Senior Reactor Operator L
SD Station Directive L
TS Technical Specification
UNR Unresolved Items l
WR Work Request t
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