IR 05000338/2008007
| ML080980139 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | North Anna  |
| Issue date: | 04/01/2008 |
| From: | Vias S Division Reactor Projects II |
| To: | Christian D Virginia Electric & Power Co (VEPCO) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML080980136 | List: |
| References | |
| IR-08-001, IR-08-007 | |
| Download: ML080980139 (13) | |
Text
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ril 1, 2008
SUBJECT:
NORTH ANNA POWER STATION - INSPECTION REPORT NOS.
050-00338/08-007; 050-00339/08-007; AND 072-00056/08-001
Dear Mr. Christian:
This inspection report covers an inspection made by the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) at your North Anna Power Station Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) on February 18-21, 2008. The purpose of the inspection was to evaluate the North Anna Power Station readiness to load spent fuel from wet storage in the spent fuel pool to dry storage at the ISFSI. The enclosed inspection report documents the results of the inspection, which were discussed on February 21, 2008 with Mr. Dan Stoddard and other members of your staff. There were no violations or findings of significance.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its attachments, and your response, if any, will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publically Available Records (PARS) component of NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (The Public Electronic reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Steven J. Vias, Chief Technical Support Branch Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos.: 50-338; 50-339;72-056 License Nos.: NPF-4; NPF-7
Enclosure:
North Anna Power Station - Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI)
Pre-Operational Inspection Report w/Attachments: 1. Supplemental Information 2. Inspector Notes
_________________________
OFFICE RIV:DNMS:RSFS HQ:DNMS:SFST HQ:DNMS:SFST HQ:DNMS:SFST C:TSB/DRP SIGNATURE SPA ECL MMS JJP SJV NAME SPAtwater EC Love MMSampson JJPearson SJVias DATE 03/31/2008 03/27/2008 03/24/2008 03/24/2008 04/01/2008 E-MAIL COPY? YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO
VEPCO 2
REGION IV==
Docket Nos.: 50-338, 50-339,72-056 License: NPF-4, NPF-7 Report No: 050-00338/08-007; 050-00339/08-007; and 072-00056/08-001 Licensee: Virginia Electric and Power Company (VEPCO)
Facility: North Anna Power Station, Units 1 & 2 Location: 1024 Haley Drive Mineral, VA 23117 Dates: February 18 through 21, 2008 Inspectors: Scott Atwater Region IV DNMS Inspector - Team Leader James Pearson SFST Senior Safety Inspector Earl Love SFST Safety Inspector Michelle Sampson SFST Safety Inspector Approved By: Steven Vias, Chief Technical Support Branch 7 Division of Reactor Projects Attachments: 1. Supplemental Information 2. Inspector Notes Enclosure
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY North Anna Power Station NRC Inspection Report 050-00338/08-007; 050-00339/08-007; and 072-00056/08-001 Virginia Electric and Power Company (VEPCO) had selected the NUHOMS-HD Horizontal Modular Storage System for dry storage of spent nuclear fuel at the North Anna Power Station.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) had certified the NUHOMS-HD cask system for storage of irradiated fuel under Certificate of Compliance No. 72-1030 on January 10, 2007.
On February 18-21, 2008, a team of four inspectors performed two evaluations. The first evaluation was to determine if the ISFSI personnel had been trained, the equipment had been tested, and the procedures had been developed to the extent necessary to safely load spent fuel into dry storage at the ISFSI. The second evaluation was to determine if the North Anna Power Station programs were adequate for continued maintenance and operation of the ISFSI once it was loaded. The results of these two evaluations were discussed during an exit meeting on February 21, 2008 with Mr. Dan Stoddard and other members of the staff.
The following provides a summary of the results of the inspection. Details are provided in the Inspector Notes contained in Attachment 2 to this report.
Spent Fuel Cask Crane
$ The crane design features for load control were intact, operable, and properly rated for the application. The design features evaluated included the hoist brakes, trolley brakes, and hoist wire rope rating (Attachment 2, Crane Design, Pages 1-2).
$ The crane bridge and trolley, hoists, hooks, and wire ropes were inspected and maintained in accordance with the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Code and the crane manufacturers instructions (Attachment 2, Crane Inspection/Maintenance, Pages 2-5).
$ The crane was operated, and the crane operators were qualified, in accordance with the requirements of the ASME code (Attachment 2, Crane Operation, Pages 6-7).
Canister Drying and Helium Backfill Operations
$ The canister was vacuum dried and backfilled with helium to the pressures specified by technical specifications. The technical specification time limits for drying and backfilling operations were accurately incorporated into the procedures (Attachment 2, Drying/Helium Backfill, Pages 7-9).
Emergency Planning
$ The Emergency Plan had been expanded to include the ISFSI. Emergency Action Levels (EALs) had been developed for accidents involving the ISFSI (Attachment 2, Emergency Planning, Pages 9-10).
Enclosure
Fire Protection
$ The Fire Protection Plan had been expanded to include the ISFSI. Emergency response training had been provided for off-site responders (Attachment 2, Fire Protection, Pages 10-11).
Fuel Selection and Verification
$ The spent fuel assemblies selected for loading met the technical specification requirements for assembly type, decay heat load, and physical design characteristics (Attachment 2, Fuel Selection/Verification, Pages 11-14).
$ A canister loading plan had been developed based on the combination of spent fuel assembly enrichment, burnup, cooling time and decay heat. The loading plan met technical specification requirements (Attachment 2, Fuel Selection/Verification, Pages 11-14).
$ The non-fuel assembly hardware (NFAH) selected for loading met the technical specification requirements for burnup and cooling times (Attachment 2, Fuel Selection/Verification, Pages 11-14).
$ The technical specification actions required for spent fuel mis-loading had been incorporated into the loading procedure (Attachment 2, Fuel Selection/Verification, Pages 11-14).
General License Conditions
$ The NUHOMS-HD cask design was compatible with the North Anna Power Station 10 CFR Part 50 requirements. There were no items identified that required NRC review or approval prior to use of the cask system (Attachment 2, General License, Pages 14-20).
$ The licensee had calculated the dose to the public at the site boundary from a worst case accident during ISFSI operations. The dose was within the limits allowed by 10 CFR 72.106 (Attachment 2, General License, Pages 14-20).
$ The licensee had calculated the dose to the public at the site boundary from normal ISFSI operations. The dose was within the limits allowed by 10 CFR 72.104 (Attachment 2, General License, Pages 14-20).
$ The soil structure under the ISFSI pad was evaluated and was not subject to liquefaction during a Safe Shutdown Earthquake (Attachment 2, General License, Pages 14-20).
$ The Horizontal Storage Modules (HSMs) were placed on the ISFSI pad in an array that was consistent with the technical specifications (Attachment 2, General License, Pages 14-20).
$ The NUHOMS-HD cask system design parameters were bounded by the North Anna Power Station reactor site parameters (Attachment 2, General License, Pages 14-20).
Enclosure
Heavy Loads and Rigging
$ A safe load path had been established for transfer cask movements, meeting the requirements of NUREG 0612 (Attachment 2, Heavy Loads and Rigging, Pages 20-21).
$ The loading procedure required an engineering analysis of the transfer cask and canister following any cask drop greater than 15 inches. The analysis was required by technical specifications to ensure the canister and transfer cask were still capable of performing their design functions of confinement and shielding (Attachment 2, Heavy Loads and Rigging, Pages 20-21).
$ Transfer cask lifting height restrictions had been established to ensure that a drop would not result in dose rates at the site boundary in excess of the 10 CFR Part 100 limits. These lifting heights were consistently monitored and adhered to during the inspection (Attachment 2, Heavy Loads and Rigging, Pages 20-21).
Procedures and Technical Specifications
$ Procedures were established to ensure that the NUHOMS-HD cask storage system technical specification requirements for inspection, operation and surveillance were implemented (Attachment 2, Procedures and Tech Specs, Pages 22-24).
Quality Assurance
$ The licensee had applied their 10 CFR Part 50 Quality Assurance Program to the ISFSI.
Measures had been established to ensure that purchased material, equipment and services conformed to procurement documents (Attachment 2, Quality Assurance, Pages 24-25).
Radiation Protection
$ The canister unloading procedure contained provisions to minimize radiation exposure to workers, and radiological releases to the environment, during canister gas sampling (Attachment 2, Radiation Protection, Pages 25-28).
$ The canister unloading procedure minimized the potential for overpressurizing the canister during reflooding. During the inspection, the Vacuum Drying System (VDS) was operated to confirm its capability to control the reflooding flow rate to less than 4.0 gpm, as described in the NUHOMS FSAR (Attachment 2, Radiation Protection, Pages 25-28).
$ The canister loading procedure required a contamination survey of the area below the transfer cask annulus seal, in order to evaluate the seals effectiveness. Radiation Protection personnel performed this survey during the inspection (Attachment 2, Radiation Protection, Pages 25-28).
$ Criticality prevention and monitoring during cask loading was implemented. The minimum spent fuel pool boron concentration required by Technical Specifications was established.
Criticality monitoring and alarm systems were installed in all areas where spent fuel was handled (Attachment 2, Radiation Protection, Pages 25-28).
Enclosure
Records
$ The licensee was maintaining a current copy of the 10 CFR 72.212 Evaluation Report, Certificate of Compliance, and related documents as required by 10 CFR 72.212 (Attachment 2, Records, Page 28).
$ The licensee had made the required 90 day notification to the NRC prior to loading their first cask, as required by 10 CFR 72.212 (Attachment 2, Records, Page 28).
Special Lifting Devices
$ The licensee had incorporated all dry fuel storage special lifting devices into their 10-year In-Service Inspection (ISI) program in order to ensure continuing compliance with the ANSI standard and license commitments (Attachment 2, Special Lifting Devices, Pages 29-30).
$ The transfer cask trunnions had been load tested by the fabricator to the minimum weight required by the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) standard. The load testing had been followed by non-destructive testing and no anomalies were identified (Attachment 2, Special Lifting Devices, Pages 29-30).
$ The licensee had established procedures to ensure that all dry fuel storage special lifting devices were inspected prior to use (Attachment 2, Special Lifting Devices, Pages 29-30).
Training
$ The training program for ISFSI certification was developed using the Systematic Approach To Training (SAT) process. The knowledge requirements for each task were identified and incorporated into the classroom training. The skill requirements for each task were identified and incorporated into Job Performance Measures (JPMs). The training program was approved by the North Anna Supervisor, Operations Support (Attachment 2, Training, Pages 30-33).
$ The NUHOMS-HD vendor (AREVA) and the Vacuum Drying System vendor (EMS Solutions)
provided training to the North Anna Power Station ISFSI personnel. North Anna had reviewed and accepted the vendor training under their NRC approved 10 CFR Part 50 Training Program. Only those personnel who had completed all phases of the training were certified to operate the ISFSI equipment and systems (Attachment 2, Training, Pages 30-33).
$ The ISFSI field training was provided during the system checks and the dry run training exercises. The operations that were trained met the requirements of the Certificate of Compliance (Attachment 2, Training, Pages 30-33).
Enclosure
Attachment 1 Supplemental Information LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED North Anna Power Station Personnel M. Bradley Supervisor, Health Physics K. Breeden Health Physics Technician B. Campbell Fuel Handler Operations Support (NLO)
B. Carlin Fuel Handler Operations Support (NLO)
B. Carr Fuel Handler Operations Support (NLO)
B. Carroll Engineering Project Manager for ISFSI S. Clements Fuel Handler Operations Support (Licensed)
B. Copeland System Engineer D. Donovan Health Physics Technician R. Evans, Jr. Manager, Radiation Protection and Chemistry T. Huber Director, Nuclear Engineering P. Kemp Supervisor, Licensing N. Lane Plant Manager G. Lear Manager, Organizational Effectiveness J. Leberstien Licensing Engineer B. Miller Health Physicist II, Radiation Protection F. Mladen Director Safety and Licensing F. Motley Senior Quality Specialist III H. Myers Training Specialist R. Scanlan Manager, Nuclear Oversight Department J. Slattery Supervisor, Operations Support B. Speckine Supervisor, Fuel Handling D. Stoddard Site Vice President Corporate Personnel T. Brookmire Supervisor, Nuclear Spent Fuel B. Wakeman Engineer III, Nuclear Spent Fuel Engineer K. Wietharn Engineer III, Nuclear Spent Fuel Engineer C. Zalesiak Engineer III, Corporate Civil Engineering Surry Power Station Personnel A. Ewell Supervisor, Fuel Handling T. Xenakis Fuel Handler Operations Support (Licensed)
J. Lyons Fuel Handler Operations Support (NLO)
T. Keating Fuel Handler Operations Support (Licensed)
Attachment 1
Contractors J. Sheffield Transnuclear R. Simonich EMS Solutions P. Gillespie Health Physics Technician, Bartlett Attachment 1
INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED 60854.1 Pre-operational Testing of Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations at Operating Plants 60855.1 Operation of an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation at Operating Plants 60856.1 Review of 10 CFR 72.212(b) Evaluations at Operating Plants LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED Opened None.
Closed None.
Discussed None.
Attachment 1
LIST OF ACRONYMS USED ANSI American National Standards Institute ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers BPRA Burnable Poison Rod Assembly CFR Code of Federal Regulations CoC Certificate of Compliance dpm Disintegrations Per Minute EAL Emergency Action Level EPIP Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure gpm Gallons per minute GWD/MTU Gigawatt Days per Metric Ton Uranium HSM Horizontal Storage Module ISFSI Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation ISI In-Service Inspection JPM Job Performance Measure kW Kilowatt msl Mean Sea Level NFAH Non Fuel Assembly Hardware NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission ppm Parts Per Million psf Pounds Per Square Foot psi Pounds Per Square Inch QA Quality Assurance SAR Safety Analysis Report SAT Systematic Approach to Training SER Safety Evaluation Report SNCR Supplier Non-Conformance Report SSE Safe Shutdown Earthquake SSI Soil Structure Interaction TEDE Total Effective Dose Equivalent TRB Training Review Board TPA Thimble Plug Assembly UFSAR Updated Final Safety Analysis Report VDS Vacuum Drying System VPI Vibration Suppression Insert wt. % U-235 Weight Percent Uranium 235 Attachment 1